[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE LONDON ATTACKS:
TRAINING TO RESPOND IN A
MASS TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-35
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
_____
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Peter T. King, New York Jane Harman, California
John Linder, Georgia Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Nita M. Lowey, New York
Tom Davis, Virginia Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Daniel E. Lungren, California Columbia
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Zoe Lofgren, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Katherine Harris, Florida Islands
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Dave G. Reichert, Washington James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Michael McCaul, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
______
SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Columbia
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Islands
Christopher Cox, California (Ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology.......................... 1
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology.............. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 67
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 28
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 23
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 30
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 62
The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Mexico........................................ 25
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 29
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut........................................... 22
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Timothy Beres, Director, Preparedness Programs Division,
Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Robert Jamison, Deputy Administrator, Federal Transit
Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Panel II
Ms. Polly Hanson, Chief of Metro Police, Washington Metro Area
Transit Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Mr. Christopher Kozub, Associate Director, National Transit
Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Mr. Paul Lennon, Director of Intelligence and Emergency,
Preparedness Management, Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transit Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Chief William A. Morange, Deputy Executive Director/Director of
Security, State of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
THE LONDON ATTACKS:
TRAINING TO RESPOND IN A
MASS TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT
----------
Tuesday, July 26, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Simmons, Rogers, Pearce,
Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Pascrell, Thompson, Dicks, Harman,
Norton, and Etheridge.
Mr. King. [Presiding.] Good morning. The Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology will come to order.
We thank our witnesses who came to be with us here today.
The attacks in London the last several weeks have been a
vivid wakeup call to all Americans and to all freedom-loving
people around the world about the threat we face from
international terrorism, specifically the threat we face to our
mass transit systems.
Throughout the world, mass transit systems have long been a
target of terrorists attacks, but, again, in many ways, it took
the recent attacks on London to remind us of such brutal
reality.
Algerian extremists set off bombs in subways in Paris in
1995 and 1996. Palestinian terrorists have carried out suicide
bombings on Israel's buses. Al-Qa'ida terrorists killed 191
people and wounded hundreds more by detonating 10 bombs on
Madrid's commuter trains in 2004, Chechnyan terrorists killed
40 people by bombing the Moscow subway in 2004. And the first
terrorist use of a chemical weapon by a Japanese terror group
occurred in 1995 when they released sarin gas in the Tokyo
subway. And, again, the events of the last several weeks make
it clear that the threat continues.
Mass transit is public and used by millions of people
daily. I know in my city of New York we have 3 to 4 million
people a day on the New York City subway system, and there are
almost 500 subway stations, and that does not even include the
many suburban trains and routes coming into New York City.
Because of the size and openness and the highly networked
character of mass transit, there are no obvious checkpoints
like those at airports to inspect passengers and parcels.
Passengers are strangers, promising attackers anonymity and
easy escape. And attacks on mass transit, the circulatory
systems of urban areas, can cause widespread fear to really
disrupt economic activity and kill or injure large numbers of
people.
Addressing transit security is complicated by the nature
and scope of mass transit. More than 6,000 agencies provide
mass transit services, such as bus, subway, ferry and light
rail--more than 26 million Americans on a daily basis. And to
remain competitive, transit agencies must offer convenient,
inexpensive and quality service.
The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines,
explosive detection devices, enhanced searches of passengers
and baggage, which of course are accepted now at airports,
cannot be transferred easily to subway and/or bus stops. Delays
would be enormous and the costs would be extremely large and
mass transit could in fact grind to a halt.
But that does not mean that we should not be doing more to
increase security. It is difficult and it is vulnerable, but it
does not mean we should stand back and do nothing more.
To the contrary, mass transit systems can develop many
effective countermeasures to make attacks more difficult,
increase the likelihood of detection, minimize casualties and
disruption and reduce panic.
Many measures involve only modest expense. Improving
liaison with state and local first responders, conducting
vulnerability and security assessments, establishing emergency
management plans, instituting preventive controls, holding
tabletop exercises and full-scale drills, and putting in place
procedures to handling bomb threats and left or suspicious
objects are not particularly costly undertakings.
Just this weekend, in fact, I met a retired New York City
police officer who mentioned the possibility--I am going to ask
this of the MTA witnesses today--of allowing retired police
officers to ride free on mass transit. Certainly, in New York
City, there are thousands and thousands of retired police
officers in their 40s and 50s, all of whom are still armed and
well trained. To have them on mass transit every day would, in
effect, be at a cost of maybe $150 a month. You would be
getting the service of a fully trained police officer.
These are things that I think should be looked into. A lot
of this, certainly the others I mentioned, have been done
already before the London attacks.
But also, it is important to realize that there are calls
for new and costly programs, and some of them may well be
necessary. But what I do not want to do is to repeat over the
next several months, the next year in response to the London
attacks, are many of the mistakes we made after 9/11 where a
lot of good money was thrown at programs which turned out not
to work.
And also it is important to realize that federal assistance
for mass transit has been considerable since September 11,
2001, and this does not include the substantial sums that state
and local governments and transit agencies have not made
available for transit-related security purposes over the past
several years.
We need to ensure that the hundreds of millions and
potentially billions of dollars that remain in the pipeline for
transit and other homeland security needs are used most
effectively. We need to quicken our pace implementing transit
security enhancements, but we must be careful not to rush the
process to the extent that we will repeat the kind of wasteful
spending that we saw in the first responder programs after 9/
11.
And in that context, we have to ensure that these funds are
used to achieve clear, measurable and risk-based standards of
preparedness benchmarks, not just feel-good items that may
sound good but not necessarily increase safety. So we have to
have more technology, we have to have more training, and we
have to ensure that whatever we spend our money on has a
reasonably good chance of being effective and getting the job
done.
Over the past several years, beyond funding, both the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation have provided invaluable technical assistance to
transit agencies in conducting vulnerability assessments and
drafting emergency response plans and have offered specialized
training and exercises for mass transit personnel.
The purpose of our hearing today will be precisely on those
activities as they relate to training to respond to terrorist
attacks in a mass transit environment, which present unique
challenges that we must be ready to meet.
We have to ensure that no stone is left unturned. At the
same time, we do not want to be, again, throwing good money
after bad. We have to find out what works and what does not,
where more research should be done, where there should be more
technological advances made, and that really is what we look
forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
So we are fortunate to have some of our top national
experts here. I thank you for being here. I look forward to
your testimony. I look forward to the questioning from both
sides of the aisle.
And with that, I recognize the ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving the
committee a chance to explore emergency response training for
transit employees and emergency responders nationwide.
Many on this committee, on both sides of the aisle, have
spoken loudly and repeatedly over the last few years for
greater prioritization to be assigned to transit security. And
the recent heartbreaking events in London have certainly
brought this issue to the forefront in our own minds.
Our hearts go out to the victims and their families.
England has been a stalwart ally in the global war on
terrorism. They will find no better friend than the United
States as it continues to recover from these tragic attacks.
At home these attacks provide a grim reminder of the terror
that can easily be carried out on American rail systems. For
anybody who has ever taken the train, this comes as no
surprise.
The United States rail sector must cooperate closely with
the Department of Homeland Security to identify vulnerabilities
in our U.S. rail system and to apply countermeasures.
Importantly, our nation's transit employees and emergency
responders must have the training they need, they personnel
they require and the funding they depend upon to maintain at
least a baseline level of readiness.
My fear is at this time that the federal government is
failing to provide appropriate assistance in those three
regards. According to a transit security survey by the American
Public Transportation Association, necessary rail and transit
security measures nationwide are at approximately $6 billion.
This includes investment needed for such vital items as
cameras. Need I say the significance in London of those
cameras. Communications systems, need I remind us where we were
on 9/11 on interoperability. And also the operational costs of
training and additional personnel.
Yet over the last 3 years, the federal government has spent
$256 million to improve rail and transit security. Amazingly,
the Senate has just voted to cut rail and transit grants by
one-third. Figure that out. This is an amazing breach of
responsibility and intelligence, in my mind.
During this same timeframe, however, we spent $12 billion
for aviation security. So that is $10 per passenger on
airlines; one penny per passenger on the number of folks that
use the ferry, the bus, the train, the light rail, as the
chairman pointed out just a few moments ago. I think that this
is a misguided approach.
New Jersey transit, for example, in my state, is enormously
serious about maintaining its security throughout its systems
and has taken the necessary steps to address vulnerabilities.
Since 9/11, New Jersey transit has expanded its uniform police
force by more than 70 percent, provided awareness and safety
training to frontline employees, issued passenger and employee
safety advisories, began serving as first responders at transit
facilities in light of the new demands on local police units
and is now collaborating with the New Jersey State Police to
improve patrolling onboard those trains, in stations and around
those facilities.
However, with only 209 police officers, 6 explosive-
detecting canine teams to protect and secure more than 3,000
buses, 600 trains, serving $750,000 weekday passengers, New
Jersey transit neither has the resources nor the budget to
address these additional security concerns.
And I might say, Mr. Chairman, it is the same in all the
transit systems that I have reviewed in this country. New
Jersey transit is not alone. I am sure our witnesses today from
New York, LA and the Washington metro authorities can elaborate
further on that point.
I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today
to learn the level of training that should be taking place and
to see what degree transit workers are involved and the
training with first responders. Training and personnel remain
two of the biggest transit security needs, and I suspect that
as we move forward on this topic, it will become more and more
clear that there is simply not enough dedicated funding for
mass transit security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing us together today.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The witnesses in our first panel today are Mr. Robert
Jamison, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit
Administration, and Mr. Tim Beres, the Director of Preparedness
Programs Division, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness in the
Department of Homeland Security.
And we will lead off with Mr. Beres.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY BERES
Mr. Beres. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Pascrell and members of the committee. My name is Tim Beres,
and I serve as director of Preparedness Programs Division
within the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness, the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
Mr. King. Can I interrupt for 1 second? If you can try to
keep your statements to 5 minutes, we will certainly make your
full statement part of the record. Thank you.
Mr. Beres. Absolutely.
ODP's mission is to provide assistance and support to our
state and local emergency prevention and response partners. We
achieve this objective through financial assistance, training,
exercise and technical assistance programs. A number of these
programs directly support prevention and preparedness
activities related to our nation's transit systems.
To be sure, our role is part of a larger federal effort to
secure our nation's various transportation systems, including
aviation security, maritime security and surface transportation
security.
I am pleased to be joined by Robert Jamison from the
Federal Transit Administration. We will discuss his agency's
important role in securing our nation's transit systems.
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
Department has awarded approximately $8.6 billion in assistance
through the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban
Areas Security Initiative, of which funding can be applied to
the purchase of equipment for the prevention, detection and
response to attacks on transit systems. These funds can also be
used to support exercises that test state and local emergency
prevention response to terrorist events, as well as training
designed to develop proficiency in preventing and respond to
terrorist acts.
ODP has administrative authority over a number of DHS
transit security programs. We have designed these programs
working in conjunction with our DHS and other federal partners,
like FDA, to focus programmatic decisions and funding
allocation decisions based on a more robust risk-based
methodology.
To this end, we recently announced the award of more than
$134 million under the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant
Program. This year's program also places a strong emphasis on
prevention and detection relative to improvised explosive
devices.
Transit systems selected for funding under the fiscal year
2005 Transit Security Grant Program must conduct a risk
assessment and use this data to create a security and emergency
preparedness plan that specifically identifies how the transit
agency intends to address any shortfall in improvised explosive
device or other prevention detection or response capabilities
identified in the assessment.
In addition, the transit agency is eligible for the 2005
grants and must also participate in a Regional Transit Security
Working Group. The purpose of the group is to develop a
regional transit security strategy, which is intended to
integrate individual agency needs into a regional perspective
in order to holistically address identified transportation
security vulnerabilities.
In addition to providing financial assistance, ODP also
provides extensive technical assistance to ensure that state
and locals can more effectively develop their security programs
and expend federal homeland security resources in an effective
manner.
As part of this overall effort in this area, ODP has
developed the Mass Transit Technical Assistance Program to
provide mass transit agencies with a risk management instrument
to make resource allocation decisions. Our technical assistance
can also assist states, urban areas and eligible transit
systems to organize and form their Regional Transit Security
Working Groups and develop and manage their regional transit
security strategy.
From March 2004 through November 2005, ODP will support 11
exercises specifically involving mass transit and
transportation systems. Of these, ODP provided direct support
in either the planning or the execution for eight of the
exercises. The remaining three exercises were conducted with
the Department of Homeland Security funds.
These exercises were conducted in a number of locations
across the country, including the National Capital Region and
New York City. And since 2002, ODP has directly supported 413
preparedness exercises across the country. And our latest data
indicated that states are using their fiscal year 2004 State
Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security
Initiative funds to support 1,198 exercise-related projects
from planning of an exercise to overtime costs associated with
the actual conduct of an exercise.
In New York City, ODP provided direct support to Operation
Transit SAFE, a full-scale exercise in May of 2004 that
simulated terrorist scenarios involving the detonation of two
explosive devices, each placed in a small backpack on the
northbound and southbound Metropolitan Transportation Authority
subway trains at the Bowling Green station in Lower Manhattan.
Among the preeminent needs of the emergency prevention and
response community is training. Through a number of different
course levels as well as delivery methods, ODP offers a wide
array of courses for a broad spectrum of public safety
disciplines. To meet these needs, ODP's Training Division
offers 50 planning, response and incidence management courses
specific to the disciplines that would respond to a transit/
rail incident as part of a larger WMD terrorism curriculum.
These courses build the foundation for all types of
responses. An example of this is the prevention of and response
to suicide bombing incidents.
In addition, ODP, in partnership with the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, is developing a suite of
intelligence training courses for state and local responders.
The State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness Citizen Corps Program is also engaging citizens in
the transit safety and security of their community. In
Washington D.C., the Metro Citizens Corps is one example of how
this community effort can work.
The transit police assigned to Washington D.C.'s subway
system launched the Metro Citizen Corps on December 1, 2004.
Metro transit police officers, metro employees and a group of
area residents have already participated in specialized
training with their local jurisdictions, participate in day-
long interactive coordination train-the-trainer sessions.
In closing, ODP has and will continue to provide
significant resources and support to secure the nation's
transit systems.
Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions you
have.
[The statement of Mr. Beres follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tim Beres
Chairman King, Ranking Member Pascrell, and Members of the
Committee, my name is Tim Beres, and I serve as Director of the
Preparedness Programs Division within the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness' Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP). The Preparedness Programs Division includes a
Transportation Infrastructure Security Division, which administers a
number of programs specifically designed to enhance transit and
passenger rail security. I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss our efforts to secure our Nation's transit and passenger rail
systems.
ODP has provided significant support to our Nation's emergency
prevention and response community since its establishment in 1998. As a
component of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness, ODP's mission is to provide assistance and support to our
State and local emergency prevention and response partners. We achieve
this objective through financial assistance programs, including the
State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI), as well as the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Program. Our role is much broader, though, than providing financial
assistance. We also administer training, exercise and technical
assistance programs. A number of these programs directly support
prevention and preparedness activities related to rail and mass transit
systems. To be sure, our role is part of a larger Federal effort to
secure our Nation's various transportation systems, including aviation
security, maritime security and surface transportation security.
Financial Assistance Programs
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department of
Homeland Security has awarded more than $250 million in grants
specifically for transit security. In FY 2003, under the UASI Transit
System Security Grant Program, ODP awarded $67.8 million to nineteen
transit systems for security enhancements. Funding allocation decisions
were based solely on ridership, which at the time was the only reliable
risk factor. In FY 2004, ODP provided an additional $49.7 million to
twenty-five major transit systems for security enhancements under the
UASI. For these funds, the Department added the additional criteria of
track mileage to ridership to make final funding allocations.
In recognition of the need to secure our Nation's critical
infrastructure sector, including mass transit and the transportation
systems, the Administration proposed consolidating multiple stove-piped
programs (Port Security, Rail/Transit Security, Intercity Bus, Trucking
Industry Security and Buffer Zone Protection) into a Targeted
Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP). The request included $600
million for TIPP, which would allow the Department the flexibility to
allocate preparedness grants to the highest risk infrastructure sites,
including to our high risk transit operations, based upon the most
recent threat information, rather than attempting to create numerous
specific programs with a level of funding that may prove to be too
little or too much given the risk environment.
ODP recently announced an additional amount of more than $134
million under the FY 2005 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). The
overarching goal of this program is to create a sustainable, risk-based
effort for the protection of regional transit systems and the commuting
public from terrorism, especially explosives and non-conventional
threats that would cause major loss of life and severe disruption. This
year's program also places a strong emphasis on prevention and
detection relative to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. Of the $134
million, $107,900,000 was awarded for security enhancement for rail
transit systems; $22,357,076 for security enhancements for intra-city
bus systems; and $3,887,161 for ferry systems security.
Under the FY 2005 TSGP program, the Department distributed rail
security funds using a more robust risk-based formula. The formula for
rail transit funding was based on several factors, including ridership,
track mileage, the number of stations, and threat, as well as service
to a defined UASI jurisdiction. Likewise, the formula for intra-city
bus funding was based on ridership and location within a UASI
jurisdiction. The funds dedicated to ferry system security were
distributed through a competitive process, but eligible applicants were
determined based on ridership and a location within a UASI
jurisdiction.
Throughout the program development and application process, ODP has
worked closely with a number of governmental and non-governmental
agencies to ensure an appropriate level of subject matter expertise and
to solicit feedback from our Federal, State and industry partners. We
have worked collaboratively with several DHS agencies, including
officials from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP),
the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T), as well as the Department of Transportation's
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA). We have also worked closely with State
transportation officials from New Jersey, New York, and Washington, DC,
and with industry groups, including the Association of American
Railroads and the American Public Transportation Association.
Further, a major focus of the FY 2005 TSGP is to establish and
sustain a risk-based, regional planning process to ensure that
transportation security priorities are addressed in a systematic, risk-
based manner. To this end, a key enhancement to the FY 2005 TSGP is the
requirement that transit agencies receiving funds through the program
work with the states, urban areas and other transit systems in their
defined region to develop a Regional Transit Security Strategy (RTSS).
As the owners and/or operators of infrastructure that is vital to the
well being of the states and urban areas they serve, it is imperative
that transit system security efforts be incorporated into, and
reflective of, regional preparedness planning efforts.
Transit systems selected for funding under the FY 2005 TSGP must
conduct a risk assessment and use this data to create a Security and
Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP) that specifically identifies how the
transit agency intends to address any shortfall in IED or other
prevention, detection, and response capabilities identified in the
needs assessment. In addition, the transit agencies eligible for the FY
2005 TSGP must also participate in a Regional Transit Security Working
Group (RTSWG) for the purpose of developing the RTSS. The RTSS--or
Regional Transit Security Strategy--is intended to integrate individual
agency needs into a regional perspective in order to holistically
address identified transportation security vulnerabilities. The
Department requires that all working groups include representation from
the applicable state(s) and urban area(s) served by the transit systems
receiving funds, and it is strongly recommended that other transit
agencies not eligible to receive funds through the FY 2005 TSGP, but
whose systems intersect with those of the grant recipients, also
participate in the RTSWG process. In addition, for transit systems
whose operations intersect with those of Amtrak in the Northeast
Corridor and in Chicago, a representative of Amtrak must be included in
the RTSWG, and close coordination with Amtrak on the expenditure of
funds for security enhancements at shared facilities must occur.
It is the Department's intent that that RTSS serve as the
integration point between the individual, risk-based SEPPs, and the
overall security goals and objectives of the region. Therefore, the
RTSS must demonstrate a clear linkage to the applicable state and urban
area homeland security strategies developed or currently being revised.
The SEPPs and the RTSS will serve as the basis on which funding is
allocated to address regional transit security priorities, and the
vehicle through which transit agencies may justify and access other
funding and resources available on a region-wide basis through the UASI
program. The RTSS should identify the overall vision of regional
transit preparedness with specific goals and objectives essential to
achieving the vision. The RTSS will serve as an overarching strategy
for the region with mode-specific goals and objectives as they relate
to Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercises (POETE).
Given the focus of this year's program, each RTSS must also
specifically address current and required detection and response
capabilities relative to IEDs, as well as chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear prevention, detection and response
capabilities, and the actions necessary to address any gaps. In a
similar fashion, our FY 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program
application kit and guidance requires each jurisdiction to conduct one
FSE utilizing an IED. We are strongly encouraging States to incorporate
a mass transit component into the exercise scenario.
ODP will work with an interagency Strategy Review Board (SRB)
consisting of representatives from DHS Directorates and Offices (such
as IAIP, TSA, and USCG), and representatives of other federal agencies
(such as the FTA) to evaluate the strategies and make recommendations
for approval or enhancement. Further, as the expenditure of funds is
tied to approval of the strategies, ODP has set a goal of completing
all review steps (including routing and approval notification) within
10 business days of receipt of the RTSS.
While the TSGP provides support and assistance to State, local, and
in some cases, private companies, the FY 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail
Security Grant Program provides funds and technical assistance to
Amtrak for a risk assessment and security enhancements. Under this
program, ODP awarded $7.1 million to Amtrak. Of these funds, $6,373,730
is for grants for security enhancements along Amtrak's Northeast
Corridor and at its hub in Chicago, Illinois. These represent the most
highly travel passenger routes in the Nation. An additional $726,270
will be used to provide technical assistance in the development of a
risk-based assessment of Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and Chicago area
operations. This assessment will help Amtrak identify and prioritize
needs for security countermeasures, emergency response capabilities,
and management of security enhancements.
In order to promote the regionally-based approach to preparedness
and security, the expenditure of these funds by Amtrak is contingent
upon having an updated Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan, which
is a comprehensive plan that provides written policies and procedures
to guide activities for homeland security and emergency preparedness.
Amtrak must also coordinate its funding allocation decisions with the
RTSSs being developed in the National Capital Region, Philadelphia, New
York, Boston, and Chicago. To facilitate this coordination, Amtrak is
required to provide a representative to the Regional Transit Security
Working Groups responsible for the development of the RTSS in these
urban areas.
Further, it should be noted that since September 11, 2001, the
Department has awarded more than $8.3 billion in assistance through the
State Homeland Security Grant Program and the UASI, of which funding
can be applied to the purchase of equipment for the prevention and
detection of attacks on transit systems. These funds can also be used
to support exercises that test State and local emergency prevention and
response to terrorist events, as well as training designed to develop
proficiency in preventing and responding to terrorist acts. Data from
the FY 2004 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report, which captures how
States are spending their homeland security funds, indicate that 23
States directed more than $34 million toward transit-related security
projects. Further, initial FY 2005 data from 39 States indicate that
they plan to devote more than $5.7 million for transit security-related
projects.
Also, through the FY 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program, the
Department has made more than $90 million available for the protection
of critical infrastructure and key resources. Under this program, we
know that States are eligible to receive more than $5 million to assist
in enhancing security at 102 sites in the transportation sector.
The 103 sites in the transportation sector can be further broken
down as follows:
Bridges: 47 sites
Busing: 2 sites
Ferries: 4 sites
Railways: 18 sites
Tunnels: 11 sites
Mass Transit (subways): 21 sites
The BZPP funds will greatly enhance preparedness and protection
efforts at our Nation's most critical infrastructure and key resources,
including those within the Nation's transportation system.
Technical Assistance
In addition to providing financial assistance, ODP also provides
extensive technical assistance (TA) to ensure that States and
localities can more effectively develop their security programs and
expend Federal homeland security resources in an effective manner.
Technical assistance is a process of providing help to resolve a
problem and/or create innovative approaches to prevention, response,
and recovery. TA seeks to provide state and local jurisdictions with
assistance that can accomplish one or more of the following objectives:
identify a problem; address an identified problem; address items in a
corrective action plan (CAP) from a completed exercise; and, fill
``gaps'' between equipment, training and exercise programs.
TA deliveries may take a variety of forms that can be combined or
modified to meet the specific needs of each requesting state/local
jurisdiction. As part of its overall effort in this area, ODP has
developed a Mass Transit TA Program to specifically address the unique
security challenges facing transit systems.
To support the FY 2005 TSGP, ODP is providing TA designed to assist
states, urban areas and eligible transit systems organize and form
their RTSWGs, develop their RTSS and effectively manage the
implementation of the strategy through the FY 2005 TSGP and other
available resources. This assistance includes workshops and a
facilitated strategy development session.
In addition, for those transit systems that need assistance in
conducting the required system-wide risk assessment necessary for
development of the SEPP, ODP's Mass Transit TA program also offers an
ODP Technical Assistance Team to support the agency with a risk-based
prioritization assessment. The overall risk assessment process includes
implementing the ODP Special Needs Jurisdiction Tool Kit, which allows
mass transit agencies to identify and prioritize security
countermeasures and emergency response capability needs based on
terrorist threats and relative risk as determined by both national and
local authorities. This process enables agencies to:
1. Prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response
capability needs based on terrorist threats and risk;
2. Develop a road map for future mass transit agency funding
allocations for terrorist attack risk reduction; and,
3. Prepare for future Federal funding requirements.
To date, ODP has completed comprehensive risk assessment deliveries
for seven (7) major transit systems, including the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority. ODP is currently providing this assistance to
an additional twelve (12) agencies, including the Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA).
In addition, lessons learned from its application nationwide are
being used to identify other areas of needs and drive the development
of additional assistance programs through a spiral development process.
For example, ODP is currently piloting a new TA program with New Jersey
Transit, a major transit system in the Northeast. Once fielded, this
program will assist transit agencies with development of continuity of
operations plans, a major area of need identified in the risk
assessments conducted to date.
Exercises:
From March 2004 through November 2005, ODP will have supported 11
exercises involving mass transit systems. Of these, ODP provided direct
support in either the planning or the execution for eight of the
exercises. The remaining three exercises were conducted with the
State's Department of Homeland Security funds. These exercises have
been conducted in a number of locations across the country, including
the NCR and New York City.
All exercises were conducted using the Homeland Security Exercise
and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). ODP has implemented the HSEEP to
provide a means to assess terrorism prevention, response, and recovery
capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels. HSEEP is a
threat- and performance-based exercise program that provides common
doctrine and policy for the planning, conduct, and evaluation of
exercises. In an attempt to standardize the language and concepts that
have been adopted and utilized by various agencies and organizations in
the exercise planning process, the HSEEP doctrine was designed to
ensure consistent use of standard terminology and processes throughout
all exercises.
For example, in September 2004, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) was
conducted, which simulated multiple terrorist bombing attacks, a
bubonic plague outbreak, extreme heat, and rolling blackouts. The CPX
was held at more than thirty command centers and involved hundreds of
command personnel throughout the NCR. The exercise involved 700 players
and 350 observers, including Federal, State, and local agencies.
Participating Federal agencies included the FBI, the Federal Protective
Service, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, the U.S. Capitol Police,
and the U.S. Supreme Court Police. The DC, Virginia, and Maryland
Emergency Management Agencies were involved, as well as the DC
Metropolitan Police Department. Additionally, surrounding counties from
Virginia and Maryland were involved. In addition to these Federal,
State and local agencies, Baltimore Gas & Electric, Dominion Virginia
Power, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
participated in this exercise. The participants' actions were guided by
NCR CPX guidance procedures, participating agencies' plans, policies,
and procedures, and ODP's HSEEP guidelines.
In New York City, ODP provided direct support for the Operation
Transit SAFE Full-Scale Exercise in May 2004. This simulated terrorist
scenario involved the detonation of two explosive devices, each placed
in a small backpack on northbound and southbound Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) subway trains at the Bowling Green
Station in lower Manhattan. Over 500 responders participated, including
local EMS providers and medical centers. In addition to multiple New
York City agencies, the FBI, the Greater New York Chapter of the
American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and Con Edison participated as
well. The participants' actions were guided by the Operation SAFE
Planning Team, emergency operations plans, the New York City Office of
Emergency Management, and ODP's HSEEP guidance.
ODP is currently working with FTA and TSA to examine ways to
leverage exercise programs already developed and funded by these
agencies, and to ensure coordination of our efforts.
Training:
Among the preeminent needs of the emergency prevention and response
community is training. Through a number of different course levels
(awareness, operations, planning, and management) as well as delivery
methods (classroom,web instruction, etc.), ODP offers a wide array of
courses for a broad spectrum of public safety disciplines.
To meet these needs, the Training Division offers fifty planning,
response, and incident management courses specific to the disciplines
that would respond to transit/rail incidents as part of a larger WMD/
terrorism curriculum. These courses build the foundation for all types
of responses whether man-made or natural. Examples of these are:
Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (awareness level); Incident
Response to Terrorist Bombings (operations level); and Prevention of
and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents. These courses are designed
to prepare emergency responders to perform effectively and safely
during bombing incidents at all locations of an incident scene. The
courses include detailed instruction on IEDs, explosive materials, and
explosive effects, and comprehensive training on critical response
actions during pre- and post-detonation operations. Extensive field
training, including explosives effects demonstrations, are included.
In addition, these courses address actions that emergency
responders can take to prevent and/or deter terrorist attacks involving
energetic materials. All of these courses include train-the-trainer
programs to assist in sustaining and multiplying the effectiveness of
deliveries throughout the nation. These examples are offered to
multiple disciplines [Law Enforcement (including Transit Police),
Emergency Medical Services, Fire Service, HazMat, Public Works, and
public Safety Communications]. In addition, ODP, in partnership with
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), is developing a
suite of Intelligence training courses for state and local responders.
This suite of courses will present information to include intelligence
gathering, the intelligence process (including data mining), types of
intelligence, channels of communication, intelligence networks, and
security of information and documentation of intelligence information.
In FY 2004, building upon its existing capacity and capability, ODP
awarded more than $33 million under the Competitive Training Grant
Program (CTGP). Fourteen training programs were selected through a
competitive, peer-panel review process which identified innovative
training programs to address six issue areas designated by ODP as areas
for increased attention. These areas were identified based on a trend
analysis of the State Homeland Security Strategies submitted to ODP
earlier in FY 2004. This analysis sought to identify shared training
gaps among the 56 U.S. States and Territories.
One of these awards was for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA). Under this award, MTA, in conjunction
with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), is
developing a turn-key curriculum for private and non-sworn
transportation security staff to prevent and respond to acts of
terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Examples of specific
topic areas within the curriculum are: Principles of Security and
Counter-Terrorism in Public Transportation; Physical Security in Public
Transportation; Security Surveillance in Public Transportation; and
Threat Analysis, Assessment, and Identification. The MTA project is an
example of coordination, uniting county supervisors, elected officials,
the LA Sheriff's Department, and union representation behind the common
goal of enhanced terrorism prevention and preparedness specifically for
mass transit security. Once completed, this curriculum will be
distributed nationwide through APTA and ODP to all state and local
public transportation agencies.
In FY 2005, ODP issued a second Competitive Training Grant Program
solicitation. Under the FY 2005 solicitation applicants again submitted
proposals based on issue areas identified in State Homeland Security
Strategies and more recently completed Initial Strategy Implementation
Plans (ISIPs) provided by the States and territories. Of the six issue
areas identified from the State Strategies and ISIPs, one focused on
transit security: Training to enhance the transit systems' (rail, bus,
ferry) capacity to prevent and/or manage the consequences of terrorist
attacks.
We are currently reviewing the findings and recommendations of the
CTGP peer review panels held this month and plan to announce proposals
selected for funding in the coming weeks. We will keep this Committee
posted on these selections and provide additional information as it
becomes available.
Citizen Corps:
SLGCP's Citizen Corps program is engaging citizens in the transit
safety and security of their community. The Washington, D.C. Metro
Citizen Corps is one example of how this community effort can work.
Transit police assigned to Washington D.C.'s subway system launched the
Metro Citizen Corps on September 1, 2004. Metro Transit Police
officers, Metro employees and a group of area residents who have
already participated in specialized training within their local
jurisdictions participate in day-long interactive coordination Train-
the-Trainer sessions. The citizen trainers are known as area Community
Emergency Response Team (CERT) coordinators and are from the District
of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland. CERT, a Citizen Corps program
partner, educates people about disaster preparedness for hazards that
may impact their area and trains them in basic disaster response
skills. Using the training learned in the classroom and during
exercises, CERT members can assist others in their neighborhood or
workplace following an event when professional responders are not
immediately available to help.
The D.C. CERT program was the first regional partner to participate
in the training. Through the program, Metro Transit Police train Metro
Citizen Corps volunteers in a number of different areas, including rail
safety, system evacuation routes, and tunnel walks. They also receive
information on the location of emergency trip stations and how to
access them in case of an emergency. Already more than 60 citizens, all
regular commuters, have gone through the training.
SLGCP's Citizen Corps program is also exploring a nationwide
partnership with the Department of Transportation's Transit Watch
program. Transit Watch is a nationwide safety and security awareness
program designed to encourage the active participation of transit
passengers and employees in working together to maintain a safe transit
environment. It provides information and instructions to transit
passengers and employees to ensure that they know what to do and whom
to contact in the event of an emergency in a transit setting. The
Transit Watch Toolkit containing a downloadable CD, fact sheet and
other materials is available at no-charge on the Transit Watch website
at http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/TransitWatch/
default.asp.
Conclusion:
In closing, ODP has and will continue to provide significant
resources and support to secure our Nation's passenger and transit
systems. The system-wide plans under development will help identify and
address key security needs to make our Nation's transit system safer
and function effectively. The Department, working alongside our
Federal, State, and non-governmental partners, will continue our
tireless efforts to ensure the safety of the commuting public and the
transit sector.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the
important work that the Office for Domestic Preparedness is undertaking
to secure our Nation's passenger and rail transit systems.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Beres.
Mr. Jamison?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JAMISON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Jamison. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on
behalf of the Federal Transit Administration regarding the
security of America's transit systems and, in particular, the
critical role of training and emergency preparedness.
We are all dismayed by the recent tragic and despicable
acts of violence in London. Our hearts go out to the victims,
their families and their countrymen who, stood shoulder to
shoulder with America in the wake of September 11.
July 7 was a grim reminder of how difficult it is to
balance economic prosperity, our freedoms and our security.
Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of
movement that American cherish and enjoy. Every workday,
transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14 million
passengers in the United States. To do that effectively,
transit must be open and accessible.
The very characteristics of public transit systems that
make them convenient and reliable also make providing effective
security an ongoing challenge. Therefore, even as we continue
to improve the security of our Nation's transit systems, we
must not lose sight of the need to improve our ability to
respond to emergencies in order to save lives and minimize
injuries.
Immediately following September 11, FTA undertook an
aggressive nationwide security program. With the assistance of
national and international security experts, FTA identified and
has focused on three important priorities: public awareness,
employee training and emergency preparedness.
Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus
is well-founded. Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit
security still exist, we know that capital expenditures alone
are not enough to assure security.
Perimeter fencing, securing yards, tunnels and bridges, and
even extensive use of security cameras did not and would not
have prevented either the London or Madrid attacks. The fact
is: good transit security is grounded in operations.
Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public
awareness messages has significantly increased. Nevertheless,
in most transit systems, there is still room for improvement.
In addition to its important role of reporting suspicious
activity and unattended bags, the public must be familiar with
the operation of emergency exit doors, understand emergency
evacuation procedures for each location on their route, and be
prepared to facilitate a prompt and effective emergency
response.
FTA will be focusing its efforts in the future on improving
the standard public awareness templates to help local transit
agencies incorporate this important information. In addition,
we are developing standard protocols for the content and
frequency of security announcements for each Homeland Security
threat level.
The actions taken by transit employees in the critical
moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can
significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of
deaths that result. Therefore, there is simply no substitute
for transit employee training that builds the skills to
prevent, detect and respond to security threats. These skills
can be acquired through rigorous emergency planning, emergency
drills and testing, and extensive training.
Since September 11, over 77,000 transit employees from
across the Nation have received FTA-funded security-related
training. We will continue to focus on expanding the reach of
important new training in the latest international
counterterrorism techniques, operational protocols for chemical
and biological agents, and terrorist activity recognition and
reaction.
While transit employee training is essential, there is no
substitute for a good emergency response plan that has been
tried and tested by the full array of emergency responders in
the community. To assist in building those relationships and
developing community-wide response plans, FTA, in conjunction
with Office for Domestic Preparedness, has sponsored 18
``connecting communities'' forums.
These forums brought together transit, law enforcement,
fire, medical, city and county officials for 3 days of regional
planning and response exercises. In fact, I was pleased to
participate with Congressman Reichert at our forum in Seattle
when he served as the sheriff of King County, Washington.
In addition, to date, 77 transit agencies have conducted
full-scale emergency response drills funded by the Federal
Transit Administration. FTA is currently updating its guidance
on how to conduct emergency drills based upon the results of
those drills. In addition, we plan to provide follow-up grants
to conduct more full-scale drills.
While we know that there is no substitute for practicing
emergency response drills in an operating environment, we
continue to look for ways to improve and practice skills more
frequently at a lower cost than full-scale community drills.
Therefore, FTA has piloted web-based emergency drills in
Boston, Portland, Seattle, San Francisco, Rock Island, Illinois
and Montgomery County, Maryland. This new approach will provide
transit agencies with new tools for conducting tabletop drills
more effectively, efficiently and affordably.
Mr. Chairman, thanks in large measure to the efforts of the
Nation's transit operators, transit is more secure and better
prepared to respond to emergencies than it has ever been. FTA
will continue to support transit agencies throughout the Nation
by providing security-related training for transit employees,
materials and guidance to educate transit passengers and
improve the emergency response planning and procedures.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I will
be pleased to answer any questions and to go into more detail
about our programs and policies. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert D. Jamison
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) regarding the security of America's
transit systems and in particular the critical role of training and
emergency preparedness.
We are all dismayed by the tragic and despicable acts of violence
in London on July 7 and July 21. Our hearts go out to the victims,
their families, and their countrymen who stood shoulder-to-shoulder
with America in the wake of September 11. July 7 was a grim reminder of
how difficult it is to balance economic prosperity, freedoms, and
security.
Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of movement that
Americans cherish and enjoy. They permit large numbers of people to
travel rapidly and efficiently between home, work, and other activities
on a daily basis. To do that effectively, transit must be open and
accessible.
Every workday, transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14
million passengers in the United States. In two weeks, transit and
commuter rail systems carry more passengers than Amtrak carries in a
year. In a single month, transit and commuter rail systems carry more
passengers than U.S. airlines carry in a year. On a daily basis,
700,000 to 800,000 people take the Long Island Rail Road, Amtrak,
NJTransit, and the New York City subways into Penn Station, and a
similar number use Metro North Railroad and the New York City subway
through Grand Central Terminal.Sec.
Prior to their destruction on September 11, the World
Trade Center and Fulton Street subway stations handled over
380,000 people each day--the equivalent of the entire
population of Miami, Sacramento, or Pittsburgh.
In 2004, 251 million trips were taken on Washington
DC's Metrorail.
The very characteristics of public transit systems that make them
convenient and reliable, also make providing effective security an
ongoing challenge. Each year, more than 2.7 billion passengers use over
1,000 stations to access America's heavy rail stations. Although
passenger screening devices similar to those used in airports have been
successfully tested in locations with limited access points and
relatively few passengers, the widespread application of current
passenger screening devices on mass transit--even on heavy rail--is
unrealistic. During peak periods in New York's Penn Station, for
example, more than 1,500 people per minute would have to be screened to
maintain current levels of mobility and access. Therefore, even as we
continue to improve the security of our Nation's transit systems, we
must not lose sight of the need to improve our ability to respond to
emergencies in order to save lives and minimize injuries.
FTA and America's Transit Systems
America's public transportation is provided by more than 6,000
locally governed and operated transit systems. These systems range from
very small bus-only operations in small and rural communities, to very
large multi-modal systems in urban areas that may combine bus, light
rail, subway, and commuter rail operations.
The Federal Transit Administration provides capital funding to
States and urbanized areas to develop new and extensions to existing
public transportation systems, and to improve and maintain existing
systems. Smaller urbanized areas with less than 200,000 population, may
use FTA formula funds for limited support of their operations. However,
FTA does not have regulatory authority over the day-to-day operations
of transit agencies.
Historically, FTA has shaped the practices of transit agencies
through its training programs, the development of best practices and
guidance, and by conducting research that is critical to the industry.
Since September 11, we have used all of these techniques to
significantly influence the security practices of transit agencies.
Response to September 11
Immediately following September 11, 2001, FTA undertook an
aggressive nationwide security program and led the initial Federal
effort on transit security. With the creation of the Transportation
Security Administration in 2001 and the Department of Homeland Security
in 2003, lead responsibility for the Federal Government's activities in
the area of public transit security now rests by statute with DHS. DOT
recognizes that DHS has primary responsibility for transportation
security, and that DOT plays a supporting role, providing technical
assistance and assisting DHS when possible with implementation of its
security policies, as allowed by DOT statutory authority and available
resources. While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the
security of all transportation modes, as part of its own authority, FTA
conducts non-regulatory safety and security activities, including
safety and security related training, research, and demonstration
projects.
With the assistance of national and international security experts,
FTA identified and has focused on three important priorities: employee
training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness, and we continue
to work with our DHS partners in all of these areas.
FTA's initial response included conducting threat and vulnerability
assessments in 37 large transit systems, 30 of which carry almost 90
percent of all transit riders. These assessments, conducted with the
full cooperation and support of every transit agency involved and at no
cost to the transit agencies, formed the basis of our security efforts.
The assessments considered the entire transportation system and network
in each area, not just the physical assets of one mode or site. Each
assessment identified high risk and high consequence assets; evaluated
security gaps; made recommendations to reduce security risks to
acceptable levels; educated transit agencies on threat and
vulnerability analysis; and reviewed agencies' emergency response
plans, particularly their degree of coordination with emergency
responders throughout the region.
Based on these assessments, FTA sent technical assistance teams to
46 transit agencies, and will begin four additional technical
assistance visits in the next few months. These teams help transit
agencies strengthen their security and emergency preparedness plans;
implement immediate operational security improvements; and offer
tailored assistance based on threat assessments. The results have also
been utilized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess
the relative risks and requirements in the transit environment.
Further, as part of a $3 million program involving 83 transit agencies,
FTA funded emergency response drills conducted in conjunction with
local fire, police, and other emergency responders.
In 2002, to help guide transit agency priorities, FTA issued its
Top 20 Security Action Item List to improve transit safety and security
operations, particularly with regard to employee training, public
awareness, and emergency preparedness. Since that time, the
implementation of these action items by the 30 largest transit agencies
has been one of four core accountabilities of every FTA senior
executive, and I am pleased to report that FTA has achieved its goals
in this area every year.
In addition, to address concerns identified through its threat and
vulnerability assessments, FTA developed and disseminated standard
protocols for responding to chemical or biological incidents in rail
tunnels and transit vehicle environments. More recently, FTA has
developed Security Design Considerations for use by transit agencies as
they design or redesign infrastructure, communications, access control
systems, and other transit system components. Important considerations
include designing stations for easy detection, so people cannot leave
objects hidden out of sight; separating public and private spaces in
facilities, so that access to controls and equipment can be restricted;
and designing facilities for easy decontamination and recovery
operations. FTA is incorporating security design as a component of the
New Starts development and evaluation process.
Since 9/11, FTA has also significantly improved its ability to
communicate with transit agencies. We now utilize a voice system known
as Dialogics to communicate security messages verbally to the general
managers and security chiefs at the 30 largest transit agencies. This
system, which requires an affirmative acknowledgement that the message
has been received, has been utilized extensively by both DHS and FTA in
recent weeks. In addition, we maintain and utilize the capability to
communicate electronically with the general managers and security
chiefs of the 100 largest transit agencies.
We recognize that good intelligence must be America's first line of
defense against terrorism, and FTA has worked diligently with our
partners to improve intelligence sharing in the transit industry. FTA
funded and worked with the American Public Transportation Association
to create the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ST-ISAC), which is used by transit agencies throughout the
country to obtain and share intelligence information that is specific
to the industry. This system provides two-way communication between the
intelligence community and the transit industry, as well as transit-
specific intelligence analysis. The ST-ISAC is located at the
Transportation Security Operations Center, TSA's 24/7 communications
center that provides real time data on potential threats throughout all
modes of transportation. In addition, FTA worked with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to enable transit agencies to participate
on their local or regional FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF),
giving nearly all of the 30 largest transit agencies access to real-
time intelligence information regarding their community and the ability
to contribute information they may have regarding threats to their own
operations.
Response to London Attacks
In response to the London terror attacks, transit agencies across
the country implemented ``Orange Alert'' protective measures, even
before the threat level was officially raised. This quick response was
a direct result of the extensive work done in identifying best
practices, developing security-related guidance, and working
collaboratively to plan and test emergency response procedures.
Among the specific protective measures implemented by the 30
largest transit agencies immediately following the London attacks were:
Deployment of bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol transit
stations;
More frequent reminders to passengers about how to
identify and report suspicious activities and behaviors;
Deployment of transit police to the local police
department command center; and
Deployment of additional transit agency staff and law
enforcement personnel to increase patrols and visibility in
public areas.
In addition, I am pleased to report that DHS and FTA worked
cooperatively for the benefit and safety of transit riders across the
Nation. FTA provided input to DHS in the development of a DHS/FBI Joint
Advisory regarding recommended measures for mass transit and passenger
rail systems. DHS and FTA also consulted on the alert timing, level,
and actions; utilized shared communication systems to reach out
immediately to our transit agency partners; and met jointly with
transit agency leaders via teleconference.
As you know, the prevention of attacks like those in London will be
grounded in useful intelligence that is promptly shared with local
officials. Unfortunately, little intelligence was available prior to
those attacks.
Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit system security
still exist, we know that capital expenditures alone are not enough to
assure security. Perimeter fencing, securing yards, tunnels, and
bridges, facial recognition technology, and even extensive use of
security cameras did not and would not have prevented either the London
or Madrid attacks.
The fact is, good transit security is grounded in operations.
Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus on public
awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness is well-
founded. In light of that knowledge, I would like to share some
additional information about our efforts in these three areas, and our
plans for the coming year.
Public Awareness
Originally, many people were concerned that efforts to share
security-related information with the riding public would generate fear
and depress ridership. As a result, early efforts to increase public
awareness, including FTA's Transit Watch campaign materials, were
general in nature, telling passengers to be on the look-out for
suspicious individuals or activities. Over time, however, experience
and research have indicated that people feel more secure and are more
capable of responding if they receive more specific security-related
information.
As a result, transit agencies now focus their public awareness
efforts on the specific actions that passengers should take. For
example, one widely used public education campaign, originally
developed by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
instructs passengers to ask, ``Is That Your Bag'' if they see an
unattended bag or package. Another campaign, using the tag line ``See
Something, Say Something,'' tells passengers how to contact transit
officials if they see something that seems out-of-place. Public
awareness campaigns have also begun to focus more specifically on
emergency evacuation procedures.
Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public awareness
messages has significantly increased. Washington Metro has been a
leader in ensuring that detailed emergency evacuation information is
more widely and openly disseminated to transit riders and the general
public. Nevertheless, in most transit systems, there is still room for
improvement to ensure that the public is familiar with the operation of
emergency exit doors, understands the emergency evacuation procedures
for each location on their particular route, and is prepared to
facilitate a prompt and effective emergency response.
FTA will be focusing efforts to improve standard public awareness
templates to help local transit agencies incorporate this important
information. In addition, FTA is developing standard protocols for the
content and frequency of security announcements for each Homeland
Security threat level. Further, security and emergency preparedness
messages are being developed in a variety of languages in an effort to
better communicate with the diverse community of transit riders.
Employee Training
Transit employees are America's first line of defense and will be
our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or other
emergency on a transit system. The actions taken in the critical
moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can significantly
reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that result.
Therefore, there is simply no substitute for security awareness and
emergency response training for transit employees. We must rely on--and
cultivate--human capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to
security threats.
The 400,000-plus transit employees throughout America are the
``eyes and ears'' of our most important security system. Transit
employees travel the same routes, maintain the same facilities, and see
the same people every day as they go about their duties. They are in
the best position to identify unusual packages, suspicious substances,
and people who are acting suspiciously. But they need to develop an
understanding of what to look for and skills in how to respond. These
skills can be acquired through rigorous emergency planning, regular
emergency testing and drills, and extensive training.
FTA has developed and delivered guidance and security courses
through the National Transit Institute (NTI), the Transportation Safety
Institute (TSI) and Johns Hopkins University (JHU). Since September 11,
over 77,000 transit agency employees from across the Nation have
received security-related training. Among the newest training courses
now being offered are:
Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction. This
course incorporates the latest in international counter-
terrorism techniques to provide training to frontline transit
employees. To date, over 4,200 transit employees from 28 of the
30 largest transit agencies have taken this training.
Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers. This
course provides counter-terrorism management training to
transit managers and transit security officials. It offers an
effective approach to security planning and the tactical
deployment of law enforcement personnel. The course will be
delivered to the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in
August 2005.
Chemical/Biological Detection Protocols. This course
will provide agency-specific information for operations control
personnel and train operators on chemical and biological
incident management. The course is also slated for delivery to
the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005.
Despite widespread success and the significant numbers of transit
agency employees who have received training, we recognize that hurdles,
such as overtime costs and shift coverage, can negatively affect the
ability of transit agencies to take advantage of the free training
opportunities that are available through FTA. Therefore, we are working
with transit stakeholders to identify strategies that will permit as
many frontline employees as possible to be trained.
Emergency Preparedness
While transit employee training is important, there is no
substitute for a good emergency response plan that has been tried and
tested by the full array of emergency responders in a community.
However, the threat and vulnerability assessments conducted after
September 11 suggested that most transit agencies had not even
established working relationships with other emergency responders.
To assist in building these relationships and developing community-
wide response plans, FTA sponsored 18 Connecting Community Forums.
These forums brought together transit, law enforcement, fire, medical,
and city/county officials for three days of regional planning and
response exercises FTA will work with DHS's Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness and Transportation Security
Administration to hold ten additional Connecting Community Forums in
the coming year that are customized to address weaknesses in those
particular communities. Two of the forums will he held in conjunction
with small and/or rural transit agencies.
To date, 77 communities have conducted full-scale emergency
response drills funded by FTA. One important condition of these grants
was that the drills include the participation of local and regional
police, fire and emergency response agencies. There is no doubt that
the safety and security of our communities is significantly enhanced
when public transportation systems are linked to police, fire, medical
and other emergency response agencies. Community-wide planning,
emergency response drills, and unified emergency command centers make
this critical link effective. FTA is currently updating its guidance on
how to conduct emergency drills based on the results of the drills held
to date. In addition, we plan to provide additional grants to transit
agencies to conduct full-scale drills.
While we continue to believe that there is no substitute for
practicing emergency response skills in an operating environment, we
continue to look for ways to improve and practice skills more
frequently and at a lower cost than full-scale community drills.
Therefore, FTA has also piloted web-based emergency drills in Boston
(MBTA), Portland (Tri-Met), Seattle (Sound Transit), San Francisco
(BART), Rock Island, IL (Metrolink), and Montgomery County, MD (Ride
On). This approach will provide transit agencies, particularly small
and rural agencies, with a tool for conducting tabletop drills more
effectively, efficiently, and affordably.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the Nation's transit operators have responded
admirably to the new threat environment. Thanks to their efforts,
transit is more secure and more prepared to respond to emergencies than
it has ever been. FTA will continue to support transit agencies
throughout the Nation by providing security-related training for
transit employees, materials and guidance to educate transit
passengers, and improved emergency response planning and procedures.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide this important update on
transit safety and security, and look forward to working with you to
keep Americans safe and moving on public transportation.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Jamison.
Thank you, Mr. Beres.
I have a multipart question, which I think the parts are
all related.
Both Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation
do provide federal funding for mass transit, including anti-
terror activities. I would like to know, one, what is the level
of coordination between the two departments? Is there a
memorandum of understanding between the two departments? If you
can tell, how much money has been awarded since 9/11 which
would be related to antiterrorism as far as mass transit?
Also, if you can tell, the extent of money that would be
available to state and local governments to be used on mass
transit which is not specifically allocated to mass transit.
What I mean is money, for instance, just in the grant system,
$6 billion to $8 billion that is available out there. Is there
anything to prevent local municipalities from using that money
for mass transit, and to what extent do they request assistance
for mass transit, and to what extent are those requests denied?
Also, I ask on a somewhat related matter, since you have
oversight of mass transit security, in view of what happened in
London with the shoot-to-kill policy, are there any guidelines
coming from the federal government toward local and state
police entities regarding what to do with terrorist suicide
bombers on mass transit systems?
I will address the questions to the two of you.
Mr. Beres. Thank you, Chairman King.
We have awarded approximately $8.6 billion since September
11, all of which could be used for transit security. As you
know, this funding goes out to the states and/or designated
Urban Area Security Initiative jurisdictions and may have the
ability to allocate those funds for prevention, protection,
response or recovery activities that they see fit within their
jurisdictions based on an overall state or Urban Area Security
Initiative homeland security strategy that they have. So that
funding has been available to establish security and protective
measures within those jurisdictions.
Also, since September 11 and prior to the Madrid bombings,
we started allocating some funding directly to the transit
systems, which has become approximately $256 million,
specifically for transit systems since 9/11.
And we have worked very closely with FTA on the
coordination of these programs, the redesign of the transit
programs this year to take a more regional and collaborative
approach, use the activities that they have done in the past as
far as the assessments that they have requested, metro transit
agencies to do to make sure that we are not duplicating the
efforts that have already been done and to make sure that those
can feed in directly to our programs and to make sure that the
types of things that are allowable to be used are similar and
work with what FTA and the policies that they are looking at
across their programs and are consistent with those.
Mr. King. Mr. Jamison?
Mr. Jamison. Yes. Let me try to address most of your
questions in the order that you presented them.
First on coordination, I think it is pretty evident by our
testimony today that we have been working very closely with the
Office for Domestic Preparedness in coordinating our training
and emergency preparedness forums as well as a lot of our
security-related training.
We do have an overarching MOU with DHS, and we are very
close to signing a transit annex. However, I do not think we
need a piece of paper to work in close collaboration since
London. We have specifically been in close collaboration with
the Department of Homeland Security in the response to London
and the raising and lowering of the threat level, and we
continue to work closely with them.
I do think it is a valid point, though, that we need to
continue to make sure that we have one plan and that we
coordinate our resources to have the maximum input in the
transit environment, and we are working very hard to do that.
From your second point about funding availability,
separately from the funding that DHS has provided, the Federal
Transit Administration has provided approximately $25 million
worth of technical assistance drill grants and other guidance
and assistance materials to transit agencies.
From an eligibility standpoint, with our formula in urban
capital programs, which have a 1 percent safety and security
requirement, that equates to about $36 million a year that is
required to be spend on safety and security. And the programs
are eligible for capital expenditures, and these programs are
over $4 billion. If security capital is prioritized by the
transit agency, they can use those funds for that purpose.
And, finally, on the tragic incident in London, the
shooting incident, I do not have enough information to comment
on that specifically, but I think one thing is very apparent:
That is underscores the importance of good training from our
security forces and from our first-line responders.
We have put a lot of focus into a terrorist recognition and
response course that we are providing to the transit industry
that helps transit agency employees identify suspicious
behavior, know how to confront suspicious behavior, know how to
report suspicious behavior and know how to react to suspicious
behavior. And I think that event underscores the importance of
good training in our system.
Mr. King. Mr. Pascrell?
Mr. Pascrell. Yes.
Mr. Beres, the Department has stated several times, and you
have stated today, that billions of dollars have been available
for rail and transit security because states could have used
their state homeland security grant funds for transit security.
But you and I both know that states have to use most of those
funds, and history is there, to meet the urgent training and
equipment needs of police, fire fighters and paramedics.
Given this situation, isn't it a little disingenuous to
claim that billions of dollars have been made available for
transit security when you and I both know that states really
had no choice but to spend this money really on first
responders?
So what you are doing, in my estimation, and I would like
your opinion, is telling communities they have to choose
between first responders or transit with the very money that
you talked about. I would like to hear your answer.
Mr. Beres. Those programs, sir, are designed to take a
holistic approach to preparedness to prevent any attack from
occurring, whether it is in a transit system, on a bus or the
building, in the street, to be able to protect critical assets
within jurisdictions as local areas determine those being
critical assets, be able to respond across the system to any
type of event that should occur and able to recover should any
event occur.
We asked each state and urban area to do a risk assessment
to determine how they should allocate their funds and come up
with a strategy. Parts of those assessments were obviously
transit infrastructures within those urban areas, and then they
had the ability to take a look at their preparedness programs
from a holistic view to determine where they should allocate
their assets based on their risk approach and their risk
assessments.
And they had the ability to allocate protection measures
within those transit agencies as they saw fit or invest in
response if they felt that protective measures within those
transit agencies were not the best way to mitigate the risk at
the time or other prevention measures, including developing
fusion centers and sharing information across their agencies or
with other state agencies.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Beres, you know that we provide money
directly to the ports of this country. Why don't we do the same
thing to the transit systems throughout the United States of
America? Then we would know we know what our vulnerabilities
are. Then we would know where the money is going and if it is
properly spent. Why don't we do that way?
Mr. Beres. Well, we have recognized, sir, obviously, that
we do need to allocate some direct resources to the transit
agencies in this country, and we have done that, actually,
prior to the Madrid bombings and since then; that is, a total
of $256 million in direct assistance to transit authorities,
but--
Mr. Pascrell. In the last 3 years.
Mr. Beres. Right, understanding that those are still part
of a larger operational whole within a community and one asset
within those communities in which the overall preparedness look
from an urban area or a state should take into account how they
are going to respond if something should occur in the transit
system or anywhere else.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Jamison, are you satisfied with the
collaboration with the DHS on the strategy that you outlined
before? And when is the plan really going to be sent to the
Congress of the United States that was supposed to be to the
Congress by April 1 of this year?
Mr. Jamison. As for the specifics of the delivery date, I
would have to defer to the Department of Homeland Security,
which is in the process of finalizing that plan. I will say
that we have been pleased with the amount of input that we have
been able to provide, the collaboration and the new focus, I
should say, especially after London. Specifically DHS has
sought out our knowledge and our understanding of the industry,
as well as the programs and guidance that we developed, and is
incorporating this into the security plan.
Mr. Pascrell. What is the Department of Transportation's
role in the transportation security system?
Mr. Jamison. I think we play the important role of making
sure that we are funneling information to the Department of
Homeland Security so that they understand the industry and they
can utilize our expertise. The Federal Transit Administration
in particular, as you know, is primarily a grant-making agency.
However, we have historically developed training programs for
the industry on a broad variety of topics, we have developed
guidance and best practices on a broad variety of topics, and
we have conducted research that is critical to the industry.
We will continue to play those roles in transit security in
collaboration with DHS. In particular. we continue to make sure
that we are informing DHS of our knowledge of the industry as
they make prioritization decisions across the modes of
transportation on security funding.
Mr. King. Mr. Simmons?
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and for your
day-to-day work trying to secure our homeland and in this
particular instance our friends and neighbors who ride on the
mass transit systems, to include my daughter who rides mass
transit from Brooklyn to Manhattan twice a day, 5 days a week.
So I thank you for your work.
I chair the Intelligence and Information-Sharing
Subcommittee, so I would like to focus a little bit on the
topic of intelligence. And I noticed, Mr. Beres, that on page 8
of your testimony you state that the ODP is developing a suite
of intelligence training courses for state and local responders
by including information on intelligence gathering, data
mining, types of intelligence, channels of communication, et
cetera, et cetera, and I certainly welcome that activity. I
think the more intelligence training our people have, the
better off we are going to be.
I also agree with a statement that Mr. Jamison made on page
4 that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure
security. Clearly, in London, there were cameras, there were
all sorts of security devices, capital expenditures were made.
It was inadequate to prevent those attacks, and I remind my
colleagues that the Great Wall of China was a terrific capital
expenditure when it came to homeland security. So was the
Maginot Line for that matter, more recent capital expenditure.
But neither the Great Wall of China nor the Maginot Line
worked.
So we have to be smarter. Yes, we have to make some capital
expenditures, but we also have to develop those intelligence
capabilities that give us forewarning so that we can prevent
these attacks in the first place. I mean, we can spend an
infinite amount of money training for attacks on the assumption
that they are going to occur, but if we can prevent them, then
that is the best of all worlds.
And, Mr. Jamison, you made the statement that prevention of
attacks like those in London will be grounded in useful
intelligence. Unfortunately, little intelligence was available
prior to those attacks.
For both of you, from the standpoint of prevention, from
the standpoint of intelligence warning to prevent attacks, how
can we do better? What more can we do? Where should we be
focusing? It would seem to me that a relatively modest
expenditure of money for prevention and intelligence capability
would save us a huge expense of cleaning up the mess after the
fact.
Mr. Jamison. I guess I will take it first.
Congressman I agree with your comment that intelligence is
critical in that transit security, as we learned from London,
is definitely dependent on good intelligence as well as good
training and emergency preparedness and public awareness.
You know, I am not an intelligence expert but I do realize
the importance of getting good information to transit security
officials, so they are able to develop a strategy and deploy
their security forces, explosion detection forces and other
response techniques and preparedness techniques based on the
threat that they know they are going to be facing.
We focused on that early at DOT. We helped fund and develop
a transportation ISACs Information Sharing and Analysis Center,
that allowed us to put transit experts into a private
confidential setting to interpret intelligence information and
get it to the transit industry.
We also focused on making sure that all the transit
agencies were represented on their local JTTFs FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force, the ones that had not been able to
participate in get on those forums. I am pleased to say that
that flow of information has gotten much better extremely. But
I am going to rely on the intelligence experts to tell me what
we need to do to get better and more accurate intelligence.
Mr. Beres. I have got to agree with your comments 100
percent. I believe if something has occurred, it is too late.
We are cleaning up and trying to mitigate the damage after
that. We need to make sure that we have the ability to prevent
something from occurring so that we do not have to get into the
response and recovery mode afterwards.
I think we have an opportunity, and we have tried to press
this through our grant programs, to harness our state and local
partners that are out there, whether they are law enforcement
officials, fire fighters, departments of transportation, other
public works people who are on the ground every single day, in
communities, within transit agencies, to have the ability to
notice things that are out of place or wrong, take them to a
place within their local community, be it a terrorism early
warning group or an intelligence fusion center, and then share
that information across the country back up to the Department
of Homeland Security or to the JTTFs within those communities
also.
And we are working very hard to provide training to state
and local public safety officials and others to notice what is
out of place and the types of things to look for and also
develop, as I mentioned earlier in my testimony, a suite of
intelligence analyst courses so when that information reaches a
fusion center at a state and local level the Department and the
FBI and others have confidence in the training that those
analysts have so that the analysis is good and solid analysis
when it comes back up to us so that we can have the consistency
in that information.
Mr. King. Gentleman from North Carolina?
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, you have both talked about this whole issue of
how you are working together to coordinate your public
awareness campaigns. Let me ask this question: To what extent
does FTA and DHS coordinate their public awareness campaigns?
It follows on this very same thing, if you are not
preparing and making people aware, then you are going to be
cleaning up. So to what extent are you coordinating?
Mr. Jamison. Well, let me take that. First of all, early
on, after we--
Mr. Etheridge. And let me ask you to go one step farther as
you are doing it. In addition to that, if you are not
coordinating, then aren't we sending a mixed message and people
are not really sure what is going on?
Mr. Jamison. Let me respond to your second point first. I
think it is very important that we have one message as the
federal government, and that we do not duplicate programs
unless there is a need to have several different delivery
mechanisms to have an impact.
Early on, we recognized the need for public awareness after
we completed 37 vulnerability assessments across the nation's
largest transit agencies and early that public awareness--quite
honestly we learned a lot of this from our colleagues in
London--that effective public awareness campaigns are very
important. So we developed a national strategy, a template for
the ``Transit Watch'' program that we sent out to all the
transit agencies in the country. It allowed them to use a
standard template for posters, for messages on the PA
announcement, for advertisements, and so forth and so on.
And as we started working with DHS and with the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, they recognized that we had gone a long
way and they built upon our programs without recreating
programs. I think that is a good example of the way we need to
move forward on all of our programs, recognizing the work that
has been done, the strengths and weaknesses of our federal
partners and continuing to work together to improve transit
security.
Mr. Etheridge. To what extent are you coordinating, though,
that is my question. I mean, if I walked out on the street and
I stopped someone coming off the subway or somewhere else and I
asked that question, what kind of answer would I get?
Mr. Jamison. I do not understand exactly what you are
asking me. We are coordinating very closely to make sure that
the funding requirement or the eligibility for funding that is
available to roll out public awareness training and those types
of activities is in coordination with DHS. Each individual
transit agency takes our guidance and takes the funding that is
developed by DHS and customizes that for their, a unique
operating environment, their unique locations, their unique
evacuation plans, and then rolls that out.
Quite honestly, we have learned a lot from the transit
agencies that have been on the cutting edge of that, and we
continue to bring that information in to the national
headquarters level, refine it and get it out to the other
transit agencies so that they can learn from the experience of
the nation as a whole.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Beres?
Mr. Beres. Just to reiterate Mr. Jamison's comments, that
they have developed a program that we did not go back and
redevelop. They put it out there amongst the transit agencies,
we reference that in our grant guidance and other publications
that we have out, that funds may be used to implement those
programs so they can tailor their awareness campaigns as they
see appropriate, as Mr. Jamison mentioned. And that is how the
coordination works.
A great benefit is obviously us not going back and
reinventing the wheel on something that has already been
created by FTA but leveraging our resources that we have at the
state and local level to help implement the things that have
already been done at that level.
Mr. Etheridge. Do we have any kind of assessment measure to
know what kind of results we are getting?
Mr. Jamison. Actually, we are going to try to do a lot more
work in that area, but I must say that the Federal Transit
Administration 3 years ago put together a top 20 checklist of
priority items that we felt transit agencies need to conduct in
order to improve their security level, and we held our managers
accountable for making sure that those were implemented at the
largest agencies across the nation.
Public awareness is high on that list, and every month we
double check and make sure that we still have effectiveness in
each of those areas. As I mentioned in my--
Mr. Etheridge. Well, my question is, are we doing an
assessment to know how the dollars are being spent, and are we
getting the results for the dollars we are spending? You know,
we do it to public schools, it is called a test.
Mr. Beres. Right. We have been developing through Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8, a series of target
capabilities that each jurisdiction must be able to meet, and
the tests that we will end up doing will be performance-based
series of exercises to determine how well they are working to
meet their prevention capabilities, their response capabilities
and others.
Even during this time right now, before those capabilities
have been completed, we do have specific guidance in our
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program where when we do
exercises within a transit agency, that we evaluate all the
different capabilities primarily in this case full response,
one of which would be how the public evacuation plans and those
things work during the exercise themselves, which would have a
direct effect on some of the public awareness.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Feedback on this I think is so critical because you are
talking about life and death, and prevention is the critical
piece of it. It gets to be what Mr. Simmons said earlier, you
know, you can prevent it up-front, but you never know how well
you are doing unless you do some kind of assessment into where
you are coming out.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. King. I thank the gentleman for his line of
questioning.
The gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce?
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Beres, to continue the line of questioning by Mr.
Etheridge there, exactly how are you going about setting up
this yardstick, this assessment tool?
Mr. Beres. We have been working on this for quite some time
now, working with our federal partners and our state and local
partners to identify first the universe of tasks that are
required across the government, state and local levels, to
handle prevention and response and recovery aspects and
protection pieces. And then we have put those tasks into what
we call 36 universal capabilities, 36 different capabilities
that we believe jurisdictions must have to be able to prevent,
respond or recover to incidents.
Mr. Pearce. So are we measuring those things now?
Mr. Beres. What we are doing right now is putting the
final--
Mr. Pearce. Are we measuring those things now?
Mr. Beres. We are measuring the majority of those things
right now through our Homeland Security Exercise Program. We
are putting the final touches on some of our--
Mr. Pearce. So you actually go out and assess them. Mr.
Etheridge was on point. Do you go out and assess those in our
communities and why not?
Mr. Beres. At the request of--actually, all of our dollars
when state and locals are doing an exercise using any of our
funds, they must use our homeland security exercise
evaluations.
Mr. Pearce. You are talking about exercises, and the two of
us are talking about assessment, and I am asking do you assess
them in the communities right now? Do the communities know
anything about it?
Mr. Beres. I think we are--
Mr. Pearce. Our office submitted to you about 4 months ago
to Mr. Corey Gruber in ODP a certified community preparedness
initiative that we went to a local university that does
homeland security training. We thought that measurement tools
were pretty critical too and assessment was pretty critical for
the first responders. And your people have been sitting on that
over there for 4 months. Meanwhile, you are preparing a
duplicate thing, and people like Mr. Etheridge and myself find
some level of frustration that we are not moving anywhere.
Mr. Jamison, as far as the transit security grants, you
have got about $250 million out there, about 4 percent. Four
percent has been utilized. The 4 percent that has been
utilized, do you have a team that goes around and looks at the
money that has been spent to see if it has been spent properly?
Mr. Jamison. Actually, we do not.
Mr. Pearce. You know, we wasted $239 million on the
northern border and the southern border from cameras that did
not work, cameras that would not put in. So what verification
do you intend as a department to go in and make sure this money
is not squandered like the last $239 million that supposedly
went for security cameras?
Mr. Jamison. First of all, I agree with your point that we
must make sure that capital expenditures are made from a risk
assessment standpoint, that funds are provided based on the
threat environment, and also that transit-agencies have the
operational resources and the necessary maintenance and
operations plans to make them effective.
However, you are referring to the Department of Homeland
Security Grant Program, so I will defer to my colleague, Tim,
on the follow-up on how--
Mr. Pearce. Tim, are you all the ones that oversee the
Transit Security Grant Program of $250 million?
Mr. Beres. We are. And we have a monitoring program that we
go out after the projects have been implemented to go out and
determine--
Mr. Pearce. Is this the same monitoring program that was
used by ICM?
Mr. Beres. That was not a program that we managed in our
office, and I am not familiar with their monitoring protocol.
Mr. Pearce. But you have been out and you have seen the
cameras working?
Mr. Beres. As those projects are finished, yes, sir, we
would go out and monitor those projects to make sure that what
they said they were going to spend the money on was spent
accordingly and that those are functional.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Jamison, there has been a great stir about
an overall strategic plan. Why don't we just mirror the plan
that the European countries use, Britain or any of the ones
that have had attacks?
Mr. Jamison. I think that the knowledge that we gain from
international attacks is pulled into the plan. All of the
strategy that we discussed--
Mr. Pearce. No, I am asking, why don't we just mirror the
plans that they have in place? Surely, they have got strategic
plans in place, don't they?
Mr. Jamison. We have pulled a lot of the components--
Mr. Pearce. Not you all, the British. Do they have a plan?
Mr. Jamison. I understand. We have pulled several
components of British transit security best practices into the
guidance that we provided and we will continue to do that. And
I think we need to make sure that we follow up in a few weeks
with the British and determine what new measures that they are
taking, because they have dealt with this many more times than
we have in the United States.
Mr. Pearce. You both have mentioned the importance of
protecting against IEDs. Are you familiar with the blocking
mechanism that we are using in Iraq right now?
Mr. Jamison. I am not specifically familiar with it.
Mr. Pearce. Well, we have an mechanism that will block the
signal that is used to trigger an IED, and neither one of you
are aware of it.
Mr. Beres. No, I have heard of it.
Mr. Pearce. Heard of it. Are you, as an agency, actively
engaging in it? If you are going to protect from IEDs, it seems
like it would be a long way along the trek to having a blocking
mechanisms on our train.
Mr. Chairman, our time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. King. Gentleman from the state of Washington, Mr.
Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. I am still trying to understand the
administration's position, and I know my friend from New Jersey
has already talked about this, but you are saying that $8.6
billion has been appropriated for the Urban Area Security
Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program and
that can be used for transit security. Is that correct?
Mr. Beres. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. How much of it has been used for transit
security?
Mr. Beres. When we ran our last numbers that we were
looking at, I believe, in fiscal year 2004, it was
approximately $25 million of that money had been used
specifically for transit security items and somewhere around--I
believe, actually, that was the total--about $20 million in
fiscal year 2004 and $5 million out of the initial plans for
using fiscal year 2005 funds related specifically to transit
security.
Mr. Dicks. 2004 was, what did you say again?
Mr. Beres. About $20 million, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Now, the American public transportation survey
says that $6 billion is needed. Certainly, the Feds cannot fund
all of that, but is $25 million enough?
Mr. Beres. Well, I am not familiar with that study or what
pieces they were looking at in that study. I think what you
have to look at too is the totality of the $8.6 billion and how
it is being used in the communities for overall response,
prevention and recovery activities, not just those specific to
security enhancements at transit agencies. We have also, as I
mentioned earlier, dedicated $256 million specifically for
transit security enhancements.
Mr. Dicks. Is that through the Transit Security Grant
Program?
Mr. Beres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And that is part of the Urban Area Security
Initiative?
Mr. Beres. It is.
Mr. Dicks. We have a number of $142 million in transit
security grants, rail and ferry in fiscal year 2005 to major
metropolitan transit authorities throughout the United States.
I guess the point I am trying to get to is, the people who
looked at this think we are not doing enough, and what is the
position of the Department? I guess now with the Transit
Security Grant Program--but it actually only goes to the
largest cities, right?
Mr. Beres. It goes to the highest threat urban areas.
Mr. Dicks. So the other communities would have to take part
of their first responder money and then use that for transit
security, because they would not have another source of
funding, would they?
Mr. Beres. If they had a major transit system within their
area, but the 25 largest and highest risk transit agencies are
within those high threat urban areas.
Mr. Dicks. Now, I also understand that there was a major
study--I am trying to find it here--there was a major study
that was supposed to be done in April--oh, here it is. On April
5, 2005, Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Michael Jackson
wrote the committee to report that the national transportation
security strategy that was required to be completed and
submitted to Congress before April 1, 2005 was not going to be
finished.
One of the reasons Deputy Jackson stated for the missed
deadline was the need for further collaboration with the
Department of Transportation. Given the events over the last 2
weeks, we believe that this strategy should be created sooner
rather than later. Can you give us the status of this
particular report?
Mr. Beres. That report is not being directly managed
through my office. I will be happy to go back to the Department
and find out what the status is for the committee, but I do not
have any knowledge right now of what the status of that report
is.
Mr. Dicks. Now, I also understand that there have been
meetings between the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Transportation, and you have signed a memorandum,
and the memorandum stated that the Department of Homeland
Security has the lead for transportation security. Is that
correct?
Mr. Beres. That is correct.
Mr. Jamison. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. What is the Department of Transportation's role
in transportation security? None whatsoever? It is all Homeland
Security?
Mr. Jamison. Well, as I mentioned before, I think we play a
very valuable role in providing industry information, secondary
information and specific knowledge to our individual modes. We
need to make sure we feed that information into Homeland
Security, as they use that information to prioritize threats,
vulnerabilities and consequences across the transportation
modes.
We have been very heavily involved in providing input into
the strategy that you mentioned earlier. We are awaiting the
finalization of that by the Department of Homeland Security as
well, but we play a very vital role in that area.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
And the other gentleman from the state of Washington,
Sheriff Reichert?
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you, Mr. Jamison.
Mr. Jamison. Good to see you.
Mr. Reichert. I have to come at this again, as I do just
about every homeland security hearing from the street level and
where the rubber meets the road or cops hit the street, so to
speak.
Everything you have said are words that we have heard
before: Cops across the country, law enforcement agencies,
sheriffs' offices, police departments. I really appreciate the
holistic point of view, I think that is certainly a way to go.
We have to have a strategy. We should have studies, we have to
have training, we have to have equipment, working groups and
exercises and strategies, and all those words sound good. But,
again, when it gets down to doing the job, cops want action and
that is part of what is lacking.
You know, just a few weeks ago, Commissioner Kelly of NYPD
and the sheriff from Minneapolis-St. Paul testified that they
are using resources from both of their police departments, and
New York is an example that is certainly by far an extreme
example, but they are spending $178 million a year of their own
money on homeland security.
Pre-September 11 they had 12 officers assigned to
counterintelligence and intelligence work within their city.
Now, they have over 1,000. All of those officers, some, are
spread across the world in other countries to gather
intelligence not only on things happening in their city, in
their airports but also in their transit system.
They feel like I think most law enforcement agencies like
the federal government's let them down. I mean, it is good,
again, to be trained.
Brian Jenkins said, ``Cops are it. We are going to win this
at the local level.'' According to Commissioner Kelly, we are
protecting national interests here. We are doing a job for the
national government, for the security of this nation.
My point is that at some juncture here the Department of
Homeland Security has to step up and say, ``Local government
cannot afford to provide bodies, personnel.'' Everything else
is there for us, but for NYPD to put out $178 million and 1,000
police officers and take them from duties that they were
involved in before in fighting crime in that city is wrong. I
need some federal assistance from the federal government.
For my sheriff's office in Seattle, to take 5 people out of
1,100 employees, we are happy to do it, we want to protect this
country, but we need help in providing personnel, especially
when it comes to the metro systems, which we are responsible
for in the Seattle area, the King County Sheriff's Office.
Can you respond to future plans to help us in providing
personnel for the analysis of intelligence, prioritization of
intelligence, assigning risk and threat and providing personnel
to help protect our metro systems and our transit systems?
Mr. Beres. Yes, sir. The Department views this in obviously
all of homeland security as a shared responsibility between the
federal government and the local units of government that has
law enforcement responsibility operationally to prevent an
activity from occurring within their own jurisdictions. And
what we have done is allow some of our funds to be used, a
certain percentage of our funds to be used to pay for overtime
and back bill for participation on terrorism early warning
groups--
Mr. Reichert. I hate to interrupt for just a second. You
saw what happened in London. It was the first responders who
were there to respond to those bombings in London, and that is
the kind of help we need.
Mr. Beres. Yes, sir. The Department right now has not
looked at using any of our grant funds for any hiring programs
at this point, but--
Mr. Reichert. Would you be willing to do that, examine that
possibility, please?
Mr. Beres. I will take that back, absolutely.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul?
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And this has been touched on before, but we have $250
million in transit security grants that have been authorized,
but only 4 percent have been drawn down of that $250 million.
We also have about $8.2 billion in homeland security grants,
and yet 70 percent of that funding remains in the pipeline.
Some would argue we need to, in the Congress, appropriate
more money for this purpose. It seems to me, given these
figures, that the money is there, it is just not being drawn
down and spent properly. Would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Beres. I believe that the draw-down figures do not give
an accurate picture of activity on those grants. They are an
easy number to look at because they are very valuable. It is
like looking at your checking account and what is in and what
is out, but it does not show precisely what obligations have
been made on those funds and what outlays have been made on
those funds.
It could very well be that funding has been laid out for
certain pieces of equipment that is out there that has not been
received or was received and damaged and they are sending it
back, they have not paid the invoices. Having worked in federal
assistance programs for the past 11 years, generally what you
see are the draw-downs on funds are not made till the end of
the grants anyway. And these are 2-year grants, so generally
you see those draw-downs occur at the very end.
The other part of this is that much of the funding can be
allowed for exercises and training and for planning, which
could occur over a 2-year period, and they would draw-down that
funding as they acquired those costs and attended training or
conducted exercises.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Jamison, you care to comment?
Mr. Jamison. I think it is just very important that as we
embark on capital spending and as we prioritize those funds,
that we make sure that we spend them in the correct manner, as
the chairman indicated earlier. We must make sure we get the
most out of that money and make sure that we have the
operational resources to support capital spending. And I think
that is some of the delay that you have seen in spending those
funds, as people try to understand and implement--on very
different systems across the country--individual
counterterrorism and countermeasures to make their systems more
secure.
Mr. McCaul. And so in a sense these numbers may be a little
bit misleading is what you are saying. Do you believe that the
amount appropriated is sufficient for our transit security
needs at this critical time in our history?
Mr. Beres. I believe the secretary was before the full
committee yesterday, and I will echo what his words were on
this issue, which is anything that--the funding that should be
appropriated should give the Department the maximum amount of
flexibility to allocate the funds based on risk. And taking a
look at risk, whether it is transit or ports, other places,
people and all the other different things, and I believe that
is the way we should look at this issue of having flexibility
in allocating the funding.
Mr. McCaul. My second question has to do with the analysis
of what happened in Madrid and now recently in London.
Typically, an organization will draw down lessons learned to
better protect if, God forbid, it happens or there is a threat
in our country.
What are the lessons learned from these two bombings that
Homeland Security has taken? And, secondly, what technologies
are we looking at? I know in the London subway they have
cameras, surveillance cameras. Are we looking at something
along those lines?
Mr. Beres. Many of the requests for use of our funds have
revolved around the use of cameras and close-circuit
television. We are in the London subways. I know we are looking
at lessons learned. In London, there is a joint contact group
that is headed up by the Executive Director of our office that
works with the British government on all things that are
preparedness. We will end up taking those lessons learned as
appropriate and putting those into our guidance and training
and exercise program, as those become available and as we see
where they fit in our vast array of programs that we have.
Mr. McCaul. Well, of course time is of the essence at this
point. I would hope that you could do that rather quickly. And
of course Madrid, I think, would provide some guidance as well.
Mr. Beres. Agreed.
Mr. Jamison. And I will comment on that very quickly. We
continue to look back at Madrid and we have been looking at
London and will continue to look at London to make sure we are
pulling that information into guidance that we prepare for the
transit agencies.
Lessons learned from Madrid: they did not have a lot of
measures in place that London had in place, including a public
awareness campaign and good training for a lot of their front-
line employees. You know, London had those things in place.
They are one of the best prepared subways in the world.
However, even the CCTV closed circuit television and some other
technologies did not prevent the attack.
And I think that reinforces the point that we have got to
make sure that we have got our operational personnel security
trained, and we focus on good intelligence to make sure that we
can direct that detection capability to the places that we need
to deploy it. Also, to make sure that our passengers are
helping us pinpoint suspicious activity, and that we are
prepared to respond in case something happens. And we continue
to work those areas, and we will continue to follow up.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
The time for the questioning of the first panel has
expired, and the line of questioning has ended. However, I
agree with Mr. Pascrell, I will ask one final question without
opening up a second line of questioning.
This really follows what Mr. McCaul was saying. On the
question of technology research, apart from just looking at
lessons learned from London and Madrid, it has become obvious
through the testimony and through the questioning that mass
transit is so different from aviation, it is a much larger
problem in many ways.
What are you doing as far as technology research to find
out what will work? We cannot put cameras in every station,
everywhere in the country, we cannot use everything that is
being suggested. But what are you doing to find out, as far as
through technology research, to find out where we can get the
best results from the best type of new technology and what are
you doing in that regard?
Mr. Beres. I know our Directorate of Science and Technology
is working on all different types of detection technologies and
other types of technologies that would help in the detection
and protection of critical assets. I would defer and like to
take that question back to the Department to get back to you on
the specific things that they are working at and provide that
back to the committee.
Mr. King. I would appreciate if you would go back and have
them get the information as soon as possible to us. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks. One of the realities is we are facing these
suicide bombers, and when you are looking at this, I mean, from
a technology perspective, it would be interesting for the
committee to know what specifically we are looking at to deal
with suicide bombers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Mr. Jamison?
Mr. Jamison. You know, we must continue to pursue screening
technologies, chemical-biological sensors, surveillance
techniques, intrusion detection technology, automatic vehicle
locators so that we can track our equipment. And we have
conducted research in chem-bio sensors and intrusion detection,
those types of surveillance activities, but I must reiterate,
as we continue to pursue that, security is hugely operational;
London has told us that.
We must continue to focus on training, even as we pursue
those technologies, and make sure that when we do have an event
that we can respond and continue to train. But we continue to
pursue research in those areas.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Jamison.
I want to thank the witnesses, Mr. Beres, Mr. Jamison, for
their testimony. It was very informative, very responsive. So
thank you for your time, thank you for what you are doing for
our country.
The witnesses are excused, and we ask the second panel to
come forward.
Mr. Beres. Thank you.
Mr. Jamison. Thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
I would like to welcome all of our witnesses to the second
panel and thank you for your appearances here today.
We have Chief Polly Hanson, Metro Transit Police
Department, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
Chief Bill Morange, deputy executive director, director of
security, New York State MTA; Mr. Paul Lennon, director of
intelligence and emergency preparedness management, L.A. County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority; and Mr. Christopher
Kozub, associate director, National Transit Institute.
I would like to ask Chief Hanson if she would go first.
And, again, I would ask all the witnesses if they could
possibly keep their statements to 5 minutes or less, and we
will certainly incorporate the full testimony as part of the
record.
Chief Hanson?
STATEMENT OF POLLY HANSON, CHIEF OF METRO POLICE, WASHINGTON
METRO AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Chief Hanson. Thank you, Chairman King and members of the
committee. Good morning, and thank you for asking WMATA, which
is the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority here in
Washington, D.C., to testify this morning.
I am Polly Hanson, chief of the Metro Transit Police.
By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an
interstate compact agency through enactment of legislation by
the Congress and the Commonwealth of Virginia, state of
Maryland, District of Columbia. Each day we move 1.2 million
trips on our rail and bus systems. We are the second largest
subway system and fifth largest bus system in the United
States. We are widely recognized as being critical to the
operation of the federal government.
Over 150,000 federal employees, about 45 percent of the
region's federal employees, participate in our MetroCheck
Program, and nearly half of all Metrorail stations serve
federal facilities. Approximately 10 percent of Metro's daily
ridership uses stations next to the Capitol and the Pentagon.
The Metro Transit Police was established in 1976. We are
the nation's only non federal tri-state police force. We have
an authorized strength of 400 sworn transit police officers and
101 special police officers, like guards. Our purpose is to
prevent crime, protect Metro's customers, employees, facilities
and revenues, enforce laws, ordinances and rules and
regulations.
As the largest transit provider for the National Capital
Region, Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security
with the seriousness is demands. WMATA's approach to transit
security involves a partnership between employees, customers
and the transit police and other police departments in the
region and the federal government. Our training initiatives
designed to enhance both WMATA and the region's emergency
preparedness reflect these partnerships.
Just this spring, we launched a new training initiative
entitled, ``Managing Metro Emergencies.'' The training was
devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as
well as a recent series of service disruptions that forced
thousands of customers to evacuate the Metrorail system. The
``Managing Metro Emergencies'' course is providing
approximately 1,500 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue,
Department of Transportation and WMATA personnel with enhanced
training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and
recovering from a major service disruption in our system and
was funded with Regional Urban Area Security Initiative ODP
funds.
WMATA also intends to use a portion of its fiscal year 2005
Department of Homeland Security Bus Transit Grant allocation
towards the development of an anti-terror training initiatives
focused on bus operators, and all the local and regional bus
operators that feed into WMATA's bus systems will be invited to
participate.
We have an emergency response facility that opened in 2002.
It is the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that
is available 24 hours per day, 7 days a week to train emergency
personnel. It includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional
emergency responders to train for disasters'smoke/fire,
collisions.
WMATA's emergency management team has trained over 2,000
federal, local, state emergency personnel each year, and it was
awarded the APTA Innovation Award in 2004.
We continue to be an active participant in various regional
exercises. We have sponsored a series of tabletop exercises
with key regional players, the federal agencies, as part of our
effort to enhance continuity of operations following the
September 11, and WMATA also participates in regional drills
and exercises sponsored by DHS, the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments and other local jurisdictions in the
NCR.
I note, Mr. Chairman, that your subcommittee also has
jurisdiction over science and technology issues, and you have
brought up those issues today. I would like to take a moment to
tell you about some of our initiatives.
We continue to serve as test bed for the federal government
and a model for the country on transit security initiatives. We
have a chemical detector system, commonly known as PROTECT. It
has become a model for other transit agencies across the
nation. Working with federal partners at DHS and DOT, WMATA
continues to train and provide technical assistance on the
PROTECT system to anybody interested. And that is just not here
in the United States but our partners around the world.
We are actively engaged with the Department of Homeland
Security in efforts to leverage advances by PROTECT, maybe with
toxic industrial chemicals and other emergency and emerging
applications in chem, bio and explosive detection areas.
In January of this year, the Metro Transit Police and TSA
collaborated to enhance security at Metro stations during the
presidential inauguration. It was the first time a partnership
like this happened. We had the use of federal screeners with
explosive trace detection gear, and canine teams from all over
the United States supplemented our teams of canine officers to
enhance the security of our system.
And some of the lessons learned and SOPs developed will be
made available to other transit properties and applied to other
transit special events across the country.
We are also working with DHS on expanding the application
and training of personnel in the area of behavioral assessment
screening. I think it is now called SPOT, and this is training
provided by TSA.
We have a long-standing productive relationship with FTA on
a wide range of emergency preparedness initiatives. The FTA has
provided WMATA and other transit agencies with technical
assistance, support for continuity of operations planning,
emergency drills, ongoing security forums and research
conducted through the Volpe Center and the Transportation
Safety Institute.
In the case of training, the relationship is a two-way
street with WMATA providing FTA with in-kind instructional
support.
A critical component toward ensuring that all training we
conduct with our employees, first responders and federal
government raises the region's emergency preparedness level is
all to constantly engage our customers. We have increased
public announcements to our customers. Our recent campaign is,
``See it, Say it''--we hand these out at Metro stations--and,
``Is that your bag,'' that was developed after Madrid, which
was noted by then former Department of Homeland Security
Undersecretary Hutchinson as an effective tool for raising
passenger awareness.
We are also conducting open houses at rail stations where
transit police and our Safety and Communications Department
hand out literature, disseminate emergency preparedness and
safety brochures and also expand upon emergency procedures that
can be found at our web site.
Last year, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens
Corps Program that provides Metro-specific training ranging
from rail safety and emergency preparedness and response to
identification of terrorist activity. It builds on a citizen
corps program. The participants come from Citizen Emergency
Response Teams already organized in the District, Maryland and
Virginia.
We appreciates the important contributions training
provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and
response capabilities, but, however, we realize there is always
room for improvement. And we will continue to seek
opportunities to communicate more effectively with our
customers, reinforce SOPs with all employees and work with our
many partners in the National Capital Region and our own
operations and public safety personnel to refine, expand upon
the progress achieved to date. I am here and happy to answer
any questions you may have, sir.
[The statement of Chief Hanson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Polly L. Hanson
Chairman King and Members of the Committee, good morning and thank
you for asking WMATA to testify at this hearing. I am Polly Hanson,
Chief of the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) for the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
Background on WMATA and MTPD
By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an Interstate
Compact agency through enactment of legislation by the U.S. Congress,
and by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the
District of Columbia. The Metro System was designed to serve the
constituencies of the National Capital Region, including employees of
the federal government, the residents of the region, the citizens of
our nation who come to Washington to do business with the federal
government, and the millions of people who visit from throughout the
world.
Since the mid 1960's, there has been dramatic growth and change in
the National Capital Region. As population and employment in this
region has skyrocketed, the demands on and expectations of WMATA have
also grown exponentially. Each day we provide 1.2 million trips on our
rail and bus systems. We are the second largest subway system and fifth
largest bus system in the United States. Metro is widely recognized as
being critical to the operation of the federal government. Over 150,000
federal employees (45 percent of the region's federal employees)
participate in the Metrochek program. Nearly half of all Metrorail
stations serve federal facilities, approximately 10 percent of Metro's
daily ridership uses stations next to the Capitol and Pentagon.
The Metro Transit Police Department was established in 1976. MTPD
is the nation's first non federal tri-state transit police force. We
have authorized strength of 400 sworn transit police officers and 101
special police officers. Our purpose is to prevent crime, protect
Metro's customers, employees, facilities and revenues and enforce laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations.
WMATA's Regional Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives
As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region,
Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the
seriousness is demands. WMATA's approach to transit security involves a
partnership between employees, customers, the transit police and other
public safety departments in the region, and the federal government.
Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the
region's emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships.
Just this spring, Metro Transit Police launched a new training
initiative entitled ``Managing Metro Emergencies.'' The training was
devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a
recent series of service disruptions that forced thousands of customers
to evacuate the Metrorail system. The ``Managing Metro Emergencies''
course is providing approximately 1,500 regional law enforcement, fire
and rescue, department of transportation and WMATA personnel enhanced
training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a
major service disruption in our system. WMATA also intends to use a
portion of its FY05 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bus Transit
Grant allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training
initiative focused on bus operations. All the local and regional bus
operators that feed into WMATA's bus systems will be invited to
participate.
WMATA's Emergency Response Training Facility opened in 2002, and is
the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available
24 hours per day, seven days a week to train emergency personnel. The
facility includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency
responders to train for disasters such as smoke/fire, collisions and
potential terrorist incidents in a transit/tunnel environment. WMATA's
emergency management team trains an estimated 2000 federal, state and
local emergency personnel each year. The facility was awarded the
American Public Transportation Association's Management Innovation
Award for 2004.
WMATA also continues to be an active participant in various
regional exercises. WMATA sponsored a series of table top exercises
with all key regional players, including federal agencies, as part of
our effort to enhance continuity of operations planning (COOP)
following the September 11, 2001 attacks. WMATA also participates in
regional drills and exercises sponsored by the DHS, the Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments and various local jurisdictions in
the National Capital Region.
Leveraging Federal Partnerships in Technology Development and Security
Procedures
I note Mr. Chairman that your subcommittee also has jurisdiction
over science and technology issues and would like to take a moment to
also discuss our training initiatives associated with our partnerships
with the federal government in emerging detection technologies that are
applicable to the transit environment.
WMATA continues to serve as a test-bed for the federal government
and model for the country on new transit security initiatives. Metro's
chemical detector system, commonly referred to as ``PROTECT,'' has
become a model for other transit agencies across the nation and around
the world. The early warning data flowing from PROTECT is fully
integrated into our Operations Control Center and the data and live
images can also be accessed at safe zones for use by incident
commanders in the region responsible for responding to an event.
Federal partners who worked with WMATA in the development of the
PROTECT system include the Departments of Justice, Energy,
Transportation and Homeland Security. Working with our federal
partners, WMATA continues to offer training and technical assistance on
the PROTECT system to interested transit systems in the United States
and around the world. WMATA is actively engaging the Department of
Homeland Security in efforts to leverage the advances obtained by the
PROTECT program to other emerging applications in the chemical,
biological and explosive detection areas.
In January of this year, Metro Transit Police and Department of
Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
collaborated to enhance security at Metrorail stations and on trains
during the days surrounding the presidential inauguration. The
partnership with TSA, which included the use of federal screeners
equipped with explosive trace detection gear and canines teams
supplementing Metro's teams of officers and explosive detection
canines, performed without a hitch and is being applied to other
special events across the country. We are also working with DHS on
expanding the application and training of personnel in the area of
behavior assessment screening of passengers in a transit environment.
In accordance with HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Metro
Transit Police officers have been NIMS/ICS trained and certified, and
we have started to expand the training to key management and operations
personnel.
WMATA also has a long standing productive working relationship with
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) on a wide range of emergency
preparedness initiatives linked to training and exercises. The FTA has
provided WMATA and other transit agencies technical assistance and
support for continuity of operations planning (COOP), emergency drills,
ongoing security forums and research coordinated through the Volpe
Center, and emergency training through the Transportation Safety
Institute. In the case of training, the relationship has been a two-way
street, with WMATA providing the FTA with in-kind instructional support
for rail safety and emergency management courses.
Public Awareness/Education Campaigns
A critical component towards ensuring that all the training we
conduct with our employees, first responders and federal government
raises the region's emergency preparedness level is to also constantly
engage our customers. WMATA has increased public announcements to our
customers, stressing the need to be attentive to their surroundings.
Our recent public outreach efforts include campaigns known as, ``See
it, Say it'' and ``Is that your bag?,'' which was cited by former
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary Hutchinson as an
effective tool for raising passenger awareness and involvement in the
transit environment. We are also conducting monthly ``Open Houses'' at
rail stations during the morning rush hour. During these events,
officials from the Metro Transit Police and our safety and
communications departments are on hand to answer questions from
customers as well as distribute emergency preparedness/safety brochures
and expanding upon emergency evacuation procedures that can be found at
our web site: www.wmata.com.
Last year, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps
program that provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail safety
and emergency preparedness and response to identification of terrorist
activity. Citizen participation initially consists of Citizen Emergency
Response Teams (CERT) already organized in the District of Columbia,
suburban Maryland and Northern Virginia.
In 2003, WMATA, the American Red Cross of the National Capital
Area, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Transit
Administration co-sponsored a new national program designed to provide
vital emergency preparedness information to the millions of American
citizens who ride the subways, commuter trains and buses each day. The
program, a partnership that also includes the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) features the distribution of
``Together We Prepare'' brochures to customers of transit systems.
Conclusion WMATA appreciates the important contribution training
provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response
capabilities and will continue to seek opportunities to work with our
many partners in the National Capital Region to refine and expand upon
the progress achieved to date. I would be happy to answer any questions
posed by the Committee.
Mr. King. Thank you very much, Chief Hanson, for your
testimony.
Our next witness is Chief Bill Morange. I will just add a
personal note. Before going to the MTA, he was in the NYPD for
39 years. He was actually chief of patrol on 9/11.
As I understand, as you were coming out of the Battery
tunnel, the second jet went into the south tower, almost
directly overhead. So you certainly have on-the-ground
experience and real-life experience.
And with that, Chief Morange, I will ask for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MORANGE, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY STATE OF NEW YORK
Chief Morange. Thank you, sir.
Good morning, Chairman King and members of the
subcommittee. My name is William A. Morange, and I am the
deputy executive director and director of security for the New
York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss what the MTA has
done and continues to do in light of 9/11, the Madrid incident
in 2004 and the most recent events in London to train to
respond to terrorists and other emergency incidents in our vast
transportation system.
Before I address the specifics of the topic at hand, permit
me to tell you a little bit about the MTA. As you may know, the
MTA is the largest multi-modal transportation provider in the
Western Hemisphere and is comprised of several operating
entities: the MTA New York City Transit, MTA Long Island Rail
Road, MTA Long Island Bus, the MTA Metro-North Railroad, MTA
Bus Company and the MTA Bridges and Tunnels.
We provide some 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each
day in a 4,000 square mile, 14 counties, 2-state metropolitan
region, using 8,577 subway and commuter rail cars operating
over 2,058 miles of track and over 6,000 buses covering in
excess of 3,200 route miles. Our grand total of 2.4 billion
rides a year accounts for approximately one-third of all
transit rides taken in the United States. In addition, our 7
bridges and 2 tunnels carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a
day.
I know that you have my remarks for the record, so I would
like to just tell you a little bit about myself and also how we
have become prepared in the MTA.
As you well know, as you said, Chairman, I was the chief of
patrol for the New York City Police Department on 9/11, and 6
weeks prior to 9/11, we had a tabletop exercise that was done
by the Office of Emergency Management, which was held in 7
World Trade. And the scenario called for the closing down of
Manhattan. And all of us old chiefs looked at one another and
said there is no way that we will ever close down Manhattan.
Well, 6 weeks later, as you said, Mr. Chairman, when the
second plane hit, I came out of the Battery underpass, and I
thought the second building exploded and I said on the air,
``Car 5, the second building has exploded.'' And my driver at
that time, who was my son, turned to me and said, ``No, it did
not.'' He said, ``I seen the nose come through.'' And we were
showered with all kinds of debris and all.
But later on that day, after we moved our command post 4
times, we wound up at Pier 40 uptown, and we closed down
Manhattan from Canal Street down. And it hit me like a ton of
bricks that that was one I thought we would never see and we
wound up closing down Manhattan.
And I found out on that day how important the
transportation industry is in our country, because we had to
get people out of Manhattan, and we also needed equipment to
come in to help in the rescue, which later on turned into
recovery. And I found out that we were able to get equipment
from New York City Transit, from Metro North and also from Long
Island Railroad to bring in heavy duty equipment so that we
could move a lot of the debris.
We were also looking for ways to take people out of
Manhattan, and we were using buses to take people out of
Manhattan into Upper Manhattan. We were putting people on the
Long Island Railroad, onto Metro North to make sure that they
left the city.
The reason why I talk about the drill that happened 6 weeks
prior was that a lot of senior leadership was lost on the day
of 9/11, and I know there were a lot of reports come out about
different things that were done and some things that might have
been wrong with communications and all, but everything worked
that day because everybody knew one another. And they knew one
another because of their first names, because they were used to
going to drills because we have done drills before, and they
were used to talking to one another and they knew from other
agencies.
You know, at one time, one would say that the New York City
Police Department was an entity of itself; it had 40,000
people. On that day, everybody molded together and worked
together and that is what it is all about.
Also, in the MTA, we make it a point that all of our chiefs
along the right-of-ways and all get involved with all the OEMs,
they do drills with all of the counties that our right-of-ways
go through, and we get to know all of the other responders. It
is probably the most important part of any response to any
incident is that people get to know who one another is.
And I still say to this day that because of the way we
prepared prior to 9/11 some things did work. There were things
out there that really did work, and people have said it was
probably one of the biggest rescue missions that there ever
was. But, again, like I say, people were working along with one
another.
And also I know we were talking earlier about the
importance of all of our technology and all, but I really feel
that the most important technology that is out there right
there today is the human element. And it is very important that
our customers and that our employees are fully made aware of
their surroundings. And that is something that falls on us and
that we have to continually make sure that we put out ad
campaigns, that we talk to our employees.
In the MTA, in New York State, we have give out pamphlets
to all our employees, to the 66,000 employees, telling them
what to look for. We have the See Something, Say Something
Program, which in that program it started in early 2002. We
have all kinds of advertisements on our vending machines. We
have it on the Web site. We continually make announcements on
the trains. We put posters all around. We do ``seat'' drops on
the commuter rails.
And it is something that we constantly change. Every 6
months we look for a different way of displaying our ``See
Something, Say Something.'' And it works because our calls for
suspicious packages have gone up tremendously since the start
of this program.
And also we have changed many ways with our employees.
Like, we have track workers that used to go out and just look
for safety issues, and we would tell them, ``You go out and
look for?you know what belongs on those tracks, we do not know
what belongs on those tracks. We want you to go out and look
out and let us know what you see is different, and we will
respond.'' We increased our canine units by--we had no dogs
whatsoever before 9/11, and now we have 25 explosive detection
canines.
Just to give you some of the facts about the MTA?
Mr. King. If you could, sir, wrap it up, because we have
other witnesses.
Chief Morange. Since 9/11, the MTA has spent over $240
million on a series of operating and capital initiatives and
enhanced security across the MTA system. We hired 200
additional MTA police officers, we hired 200 additional bridge
and tunnel officers. We incurred $35 million in MTA overtime,
police overtime, and also we have spent over $100 million in
capital projects of our own money.
[The statement of Chief Morange follows:]
Remarks of William A. Morange
Good Morning Chairman King and members of the Subcommittee. My name
is William A. Morange, and I am the Deputy Executive Director and
Director of Security of the New York State Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (MTA.)
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss what the MTA has done and
continues to do in light of 9/11, the Madrid incident in 2004 and the
most recent events in London, to train to respond to terrorist and
other emergency incidents in our vast transportation system.
Before I address the specifics of the topic at hand, permit me to
tell you a bit about the MTA. As you may know, the MTA is the largest
multi-modal transit provider in the Western Hemisphere and is comprised
of several operating entities:
MTA New York City Transit (NYCT)
MTA Long Island Rail Road (LIRR)
MTA Long Island Bus (LIBus)
MTA Metro-North Railroad (MNR)
MTA Bus Company (MTABus)
MTA Bridges and Tunnels (B&T)
We provide some 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each day in a
4,000 square mile, 14 county, two-state metropolitan region, using
8,577 subway and commuter rail cars operating over 2,058 miles of track
and over 6,000 buses covering in excess of 3,200 route miles. Our grand
total of 2.4 billion rides a year accounts for approximately one-third
of all transit rides taken in the United States. In addition, our 7
bridges and 2 tunnels carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day.
The events of September 11th were certainly traumatic for our
region and our system. We were front and center at Ground Zero, with
three separate subway stations directly serving the World Trade Center
site and with hundreds of local and express buses disembarking
passengers at the perimeter of the complex. It is safe to suggest that
more than 80% of the Trade Center's 50,000 workers took one or more MTA
services to get to work each day.
But as tragic as the day was for New Yorkers and the nation, there
was one overwhelmingly positive outcome on 9/11 for the MTA and for ALL
our customers and employees. Despite the fact that our Cortland Street
1&9 station was completely destroyed by the collapse of the twin
towers; that four other stations were completely put out of service for
as much as a year after the tragedy, and; that Church and West Streets,
major north- and south-bound local and express bus routes were blocked
by massive amounts of debris, not a single MTA customer or employee was
killed or seriously injured in or on our system that day.
Why, you may ask? Was it simply luck? Perhaps in part, but much of
the answer lies in the MTA's long abiding commitment to preparing for
emergencies. Our operating agencies have traditionally done more than
simply writing volumes of emergency operating and response plans that
sit on shelves. For many years, they have taken part in realistic
multi-agency, multi-modal drills of those plans several times a year.
On 9/11 in accordance with our plans and our drills, our subways
whisked tens of thousands of riders from the virtual center of the
World Trade Center site to safe locations north and south. Our buses
carried hundreds of thousands of evacuees off Manhattan island. Our
railroads transported shocked commuters safely to their homes and
returned with dedicated rescue workers who had no other way to get into
the City to help. Our bridges and tunnels played not only key
evacuation roles, but, in the case of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel,
became the lifeline for emergency personnel and rescue equipment
heading toward the scene.
Some of those activities had been anticipated in previous emergency
drills--though admittedly not on as large or dramatic a scale.
Nonetheless, the experience, lessons learned, and perhaps most
importantly, the relationships forged in those exercises certainly
saved lives that day.
Since 9/11 we actually had a real life opportunity to test what we
do on a regional scale and our preparation once again proved to be
invaluable to protecting our customers and employees. When the lights
went out on August 14th, 2003, we--along with our partners in emergency
preparedness throughout the region--were able to execute the safe
evacuation of over 400,000 subway and rail customers from both
underground and elevated parts of our system. We are proud that there
were also no customer or employee injuries in those instances--a truly
amazing feat in that the entire service region I described earlier was
affected.
What I'd like to do is take you through what each of our agencies
did prior to 9/11--and continue to do--on a regular basis to prepare
for emergencies in terms of both physical drills--with hundreds of
participants--and table-top drills. I would then like to wrap up by
describing what we have done to involve and educate our customers about
how to prepare for potential emergency situations, something we believe
is key to their safety.
New York City Transit (NYCT)
NYCT is the largest member of the MTA family, operating over 8,000
subway and 46,000 bus trips a day within the City of New York. NYCT's
Office of System Safety (OSS) oversees/coordinates four emergency
drills annually: two for the Dept. of Subways; one for the Dept. of
Buses, and; one for the Staten Island Railway. This just happens to be
the same number of drills that were conducted pre-9/11. Only the size
and scope of those drills may have changed a bit.
Depending on the type of drill, participants hail from other parts
of the MTA transportation family (i.e. the MTA PD, the LIRR, LIBus and
MNR); the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the New York City
Fire Department (FDNY), the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and the
Office of Emergency Management (OEM).
Drills are conducted at key locations throughout the system,
including at support facilities such as our Coney Island Rail Yard and
at the MTA's Transit Museum where a decommissioned station and more
than a dozen old subway cars provide true-to-life underground
conditions.
After each event, OSS produces a series of ``lessons learned,''
``critiques'' and ``follow-ups'' that are tracked, corrected and
incorporated into the next exercise.
Finally, in addition to performing emergency drills, all key NYCT
operating employees are provided ongoing formal ``eyes and ears''
training; fire protection and evacuation training; and Dupont Safety
training. To date, some 45,000 employees have been through these
courses and personnel are rotated through that training on a regular
basis.
Long Island Rail Road (LIRR); Metro-North Railroad (MNR) & Long Island
Bus (LIBus)
While Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations require one
full-scale drill annually, the LIRR conducts a minimum of four major
full-scale emergency preparedness exercises/drills annually, including
one in New York's Pennsylvania Station, the busiest railroad station in
the country. Likewise, Metro-North Railroad conducts a number of drills
during the year, including one in Grand Central Terminal.
Like those at NYCT, the carefully crafted emergency scenarios
require emergency responders to demonstrate skills in communications,
fire fighting, rescue, extrication, hazardous material and first aid.
Since the LIRR operates in three of NYC's five boroughs (Manhattan,
Brooklyn and Queens) as well as the counties of Nassau and Suffolk on
Long Island, drills include a variety of players, most notably sister
agency MTA LIBus, but also other members of the MTA family, including
the MTA PD and NYCT. Other participants include the NYPD, the FDNY, NYC
EMS as well as a host of county, village and town Police, Fire and
Emergency Medical Services throughout Nassau and Suffolk.
Metro-North, which serves two of NYC's five boroughs (Manhattan and
the Bronx) as well as Westchester, Orange, Rockland, Dutchess and
Putnam counties in New York and Fairfield and New Haven counties in
Connecticut, conducts its own drills with a similar mix of NYC
agencies, as well as county, village and town police and emergency
service personnel from both New York and Connecticut.
Railroad emergency preparedness training is conducted at a number
of locations: The LIRR uses Penn Station, its Hillside maintenance
facility, field sites throughout Long Island and the Nassau County Fire
Academy. Two retired LIRR railcars at the Fire Academy also help
provide commuter railroad-focused training to federal and state law
enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the NYS Police.
All major LIRR & MNR terminals, such as Flatbush/Atlantic Ave
Terminal, Jamaica Station, Grand Central Terminal, 125th Street, New
Haven, as well as shop/yard facilities in New York and Connecticut have
Emergency Action Plans that factor into the exercises and drills.
In addition to MTA-sponsored full-scale exercises, both railroads
and LIBus participate in numerous tabletop, functional and full-scale
emergency response and counter-terrorism exercises hosted by local
emergency response agencies and county OEMs throughout their service
areas.
Beyond drills and table-top exercises, both the LIRR and MNR
provide ongoing training sessions for their own train crews as well as
emergency responders from the NYPD, FDNY and EMS officials in the
counties they serve. The LIRR is also intimately involved in the Penn
Station Emergency Response Committee and the Penn Station Security Task
Force which are comprised of operations, law enforcement and safety
representatives from the LIRR, Amtrak and New Jersey Transit and
representatives from the NYPD, FDNY, NYC OEM as well as State and
Federal agencies.
As is the case with NYCT, both railroads? exercises include
extensive and formal critique/debriefing sessions that may, in fact,
result in practice tabletop scenarios that test out new changes in
procedures and protocols.
MTA Bridges and Tunnels
MTA B&T operates 7 bridges and 2 tunnels within the City of New
York. The most notable of those facilities include the nation's longest
suspension bridge, the Verrazano Narrows Bridge, as well as the
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and the Queens Midtown Tunnel, two of the
busiest in the world. All told those facilities carry approximately
900,000 vehicles a day.
Prior to 9-11 B&T exercises largely supported the NYPD's own
mobilization exercises. Up to that point, one of its biggest
preparations was drilling the regional disaster recovery plan for Y2K.
But B&T was also part of major Special Events planning, such as for the
NYC Marathon, which begins on the Verrazano Bridge. Those plans always
included emergency contingencies that were practiced in pre-event
drills.
On 9-11, B&T's traffic and emergency response effort was
transformed dramatically as the Towers collapsed.
The Brooklyn Battery tunnel, itself engulfed in dust and debris,
became the site of a major evacuation effort, as more than 500
customers were rescued by B&T personnel. Shortly thereafter 287
abandoned vehicles were removed from the Manhattan-bound tubes in order
to allow emergency vehicles to pass.
In the ensuing months, as many as 30 dump trucks an hour
transported debris from the site. All this was handled in a very
coordinated fashion with the NYPD and NYC OEM due to previously
established exercise relationships.
B&T has since conducted over twenty emergency preparedness drills.
Many have been full scale multi-agency (MTA PD, NYPD, FDNY, MTA, OEM)
exercises that have tested preparedness; response; inter-agency
cooperation; perimeter security; Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
mitigation; Hazardous Materials Spills, and; decontamination.
B&T also participated in a state-wide exercise, conducted by the
NYS Public Service Commission, designed to evaluate the NYS emergency
load reduction program.
As with its sister agencies in the MTA family, B&T is singularly
focused on providing its employees with both formal and informal
training opportunities that provide a safe and secure working
environment. In that vein, B&T has also been fully engaged in Dupont
Safety training since 1996.
Other MTA-Wide Emergency Preparedness Activities
Certainly, as you've heard from me today, we're committed to
aggressively training and drilling our employees for potential
emergencies. But over the past three and a half years we've also
focused on making sure that our customers are aware of how they should
respond in certain situations.
Through the creation of the widely recognized ``If You See
Something, Say Something'' customer information campaign, we've
informed our customers about being vigilant and in the process have
enlisted their help by giving them an outlet to report suspicious
activities: 1-888-NYC-SAFE. Since 2002, we?ve produced print ads,
10,000 posters a year and are in the process of producing a See
Something, Say Something radio ad. Public response has been extremely
positive and we have shared our materials with dozens of transit
systems and municipalities around the country and the globe.
Over the last year--and in direct response to the lessons learned
from the Madrid bombings--we both customized our ads to focus on
packages left in transit vehicles and produced Customer Train
Evacuation Brochures and internet-based evacuation videos that show how
to properly evacuate subway and commuter railroad cars in an emergency.
Over 6,000 printed copies of this information were posted on our subway
and rail cars and we made both the printed material and videos
available to our customers on our website, www.mta.info. In addition,
we've made hundreds of these videos available to local police
departments, community groups and the general public since February.
This year as a supplement to the more formalized training of our
operating personnel, we also produced 65,000 Employee Safety Guides for
all our employees that tells them what to look for and how to react in
emergencies.
There is no question about the MTA's commitment--philosophically
and organizationally--to doing whatever we can to be prepared for
emergency situations, be they large or small. We believe that the
current aggressive schedule of emergency drills that we conduct each
year helps in the effort to protect our customers and our employees and
to give them the peace of mind necessary to continue to go about their
daily routines.
Thank you and I look forward to any questions you may have.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Director Lennon?
STATEMENT OF PAUL LENNON, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND
EMERGENCY, PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT, LOS ANGELES COUNTY
METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Chairman King and Congressman
Pascrell and members of the subcommittee for providing the Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority an
opportunity to discuss the key role that training plays in
effectively responding to a terrorist attack on mass transit
property.
On January 26, 2005, a tragic rail incident occurred in the
Los Angeles area. The accident was the deadliest passenger rail
incident in the United States since 1999, killing 11 and
injuring over 180 individuals. That accident, it would be later
be found, was caused by a deranged individual and not a
terrorist, but its effects were just as devastating as the
attacks the rocked London on July 7, 2005.
The response to the January 26th train disaster by the City
of Los Angeles, my agency, Metro, the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department and the Los Angeles Police Department and
Fire Department units, the City of Glendale's first responders
and numerous other emergency first-responders was immediate,
positive and overwhelming. Within 5 minutes the first triage
unit was set up and a host of other support services were put
into place only moments later.
The reason I cite the January 26th rail accident is simple:
The tragic event provides a vivid illustration, which is fresh
in my mind and those of my fellow transit security colleagues,
that training to respond to a terrorist attack is vital. In
fact, to ensure a rapid and effective response in the event of
a terrorist attack on one of our rail cars, our buses or one of
our hundreds of stations or facilities in Los Angeles County,
training is not merely an option, it is mandatory.
We trained at my agency to make mistakes, so we do not make
mistakes when our exercises go from the comfort of a tabletop
drill to a real world terrorist attack.
The key elements of our agency's program focuses on
preparing to respond and preparing to prevent. First, we are
focused on enhancing our interaction and coordination with our
security partners at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department and with all other law enforcement and first
responder agencies with jurisdiction within Los Angeles County.
We can have the largest security force with the most modern
equipment, but if they are not seamlessly communicating,
coordinating and controlling our security and first responder
assets, then we are not exercising command over any given
threat. In point of fact, the lack of such coordination wd not
do proper justice to the talent and technologies that are
brought to play under such scenarios.
With respect to my comment that we prepare to respond, it
is for this reason that the LACMTA has a robust training
program that conducts major interagency threat-focused security
exercises. Our training regimen includes both tabletop and very
realistic, on-ground simulations and exercises.
The ``real-world'' on-ground simulations we conduct are
tests of each agency's first-response personnel and their
training for their adequacy and ability to interface with other
peer groups. The findings and result of these exercises are
shared in the post-exercise critiques and debriefings,
involving all the agencies that participated. These critiques,
in turn, provide valuable lessons learned which are used to
enhance the training of personnel of the agencies involved and
to identify new needs, technologies and equipment that would be
of benefit to agencies in dealing with actual threats.
In terms of preparing to prevent a terrorist incident, we
are very cognizant of the critical role our employees play.
They are our eyes, ears and voice in our nation's war against
terrorism. We share the goals and tenets of the ``System
Security Awareness for Transit Employees'' training course that
was developed by the Federal Transit Administration and the
National Transit Institute at Rutgers University. That
excellent course, crafted in 2002, provided a very professional
program to provide training and relevant materials to transit
operators and other front-line employees.
To effectively educate our employees at the LACMTA, we have
also borrowed the best practices from some of the top transit
systems in North America. New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority's ``See Something, Say Something'' Program is but one
example. The Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority's
commitment to raise public and employee awareness of possible
terrorist threats is yet another fine example of a program with
an appropriate focus.
The LACMTA has provided training for over 9,000 of our
employees in situational awareness. This encompasses the who,
what, why, where and how of dealing with unattended packages
and suspicious behaviors.
Our agency has also involved our law enforcement and
security teams in a highly visible program of public engagement
in which our deputy sheriffs move in, and through, our
stations, trains and buses, making our customers aware of their
presence through personal contact.
We recognize that to conduct such comprehensive employee
training and public awareness programs entails major costs,
both in terms of labor and materials. Yet, the LACMTA views
these programs as a proper investment in its employees as well
as a major hardening effort by our agency against possible
terrorist threats.
When the attacks on London's mass transit system occurred
on the 7th and 21st of this month, our previous and ongoing
training regimen gave us, and will continue to give us, the
capability to initiate an immediate and forceful response. That
response is in place today on our expansive rail and bus
networks even as I share this testimony with you.
Protecting a service area that spans 1,433 square miles is
no simple task for the employees of the LACMTA. The fact that
they have the training and know-how in responding to a possible
terrorist incident gives them the confidence to assure the
general public that all possible measures are being undertaken
to protect their welfare.
Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share this
information on behalf of the LACMTA with members of this
distinguished subcommittee.
[The statement of Mr. Lennon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul J. Lennon
Thank you Chairman King, Congressman Pascrell and Members of
thesubcommittee for providing the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (LACMTA) an opportunity to discuss the key
role training playsin effectively responding to a terrorist attack on a
mass transit property.
On January 26, 2005 a tragic rail incident occurred in the Los
Angeles area. The accident was the deadliest passenger rail incident in
the United States since 1999, killing 11 and injuring over 180
individuals. The accident, it would be later be found, was caused by a
deranged individual and not a terrorist--but its effects were just as
devastating as the attacks the rocked London on July 7, 2005.
The response to the January 26th train disaster by the City of Los
Angeles, my agency, the City of Glendale's first responders and
numerous other emergency first-responders was immediate, positive and
overwhelming. Within five minutes the first triage unit was set up and
a host of other support services were put into place only moments
later.
The reason I cite the January 26th rail accident is simple. That
tragic event provides a vivid illustration, which is fresh in my mind
and those of my fellow transit security colleagues, that training to
respond to a terrorist attack is vital. In fact, to ensure a rapid and
effective response in the event of a terrorist attack on one of our
rail cars, our buses or one of our hundreds of stations or facilities
in Los Angeles County, training is not merely an option, it is
mandatory.
We train at my agency to make mistakes, so we do not make mistakes
when our exercises go from the comfort of a table-top drill to a real
world terrorist attack.
Today I would like to share with members of this subcommittee
several of the training techniques that the LACMTA has successfully
used to prepare ourselves for a terrorist attack, like that which
struck London earlier this month or earlier attacks on mass transit
properties in Moscow and Madrid.
The key part of our agency's training program focuses on preparing
to respond and preparing to prevent.
First, we are focused on enhancing our interaction and coordination
with our security partners at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department and with all other law enforcement and first responder
agencies with jurisdiction within Los Angeles County. We can have the
largest security force, with the most modern equipment, but if they are
not seamlessly communicating, coordinating and controlling our security
and first responder assets, then we are not exercising command over any
given threat.
In point of fact, the lack of such coordination does not do proper
justice to the talent and technologies that are brought to play under
such scenarios.
With respect to my comment that we prepare to respond, it is for
this reason that the LACMTA has a robust training program that conducts
major interagency threat-focused security exercises. Our training
regimen includes both table-top and very realistic, on-ground,
simulations and exercises.
These exercises involve, in some cases, as many as thirty agencies
that are focused on multiple threats. These exercises anticipate
responses to individual or groups of terrorists, weapons of mass
destruction, explosives and combinations thereof. Such exercises are
always played out initially with a table-top exercise, where all the
potential agency players and representatives are given insight into not
only the threat faced, but also the role they will be expected to play.
The ``real-world'' on-ground simulations we conduct are tests of
each agency's first-response personnel and their training for their
adequacy and ability to interface with other peer groups. The findings
and result of these exercises are shared in the post-exercise critiques
and de-briefings, involving all the agencies that participated. These
critiques in turn provide valuable lessons learned which are used to
enhance the training of personnel of the agencies involved and to
identify new needs, technologies and equipment that would be of benefit
to agencies in dealing with actual threats.
In terms of preparing to prevent a terrorist incident, we are very
cognizant of the critical role our employees play. They are our ?eyes,
ears and voice? in our nation's war against terrorism.
We share the goals of the ``System Security Awareness for Transit
Employees'' training course that was developed by the Federal Transit
Administration and the National Transit Institute at Rutgers
University. That excellent course, crafted in 2002, provided a very
professional program to provide training and relevant materials to
transit operators and other front-line employees.
To effectively educate our employees at the LACMTA we have also
borrowed the best practices from some of the top transit systems in
North America. New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority's ``See
Something?. . .Say Something!'' program is but one example. The
Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority's commitment to raise
public and employee awareness of possible terrorist threats is yet
another fine example of a program with an appropriate focus.
The LACMTA has provided training for over 9,000 of our employee in
situational awareness. This encompasses the who's, what's, why's,
where's and how's of dealing with unattended packages and suspicious
behavior.
Our agency has also involved our law enforcement and security teams
in a highly visible program of public engagement in which our deputy
sheriffs move in, and through, our stations, trains and buses, making
our customers aware of their presence.
We recognize that to conduct such comprehensive employee training
and public awareness programs entails major costs, both in terms of
labor and materials. Yet, the LACMTA views these programs as a proper
investment in its employees as well as a major ``hardening'' effort by
our agency against possible terrorist threats.
If one mind-set permeates the LACMTA's security posture it is a
pro-active attitude to properly train our security personnel, our
front-line employees and the general public.
When the attacks on London's mass transit systems occurred on the
7th and 21st of this month our previous and ongoing rigorous training
regimen gave us and will continue to give us the capability to initiate
an immediate and forceful response. That response is in place today on
our expansive rail and bus network, even as I share this testimony with
you.
Protecting a service area the spans 1,433 square miles is no simple
task for the employees of the LACMTA. The fact that they have the
training and know-how in responding to a possible terrorist incident
gives them the confidence to assure the general public that all
possible measures are being undertaken to protect their welfare.
Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share this
information, on behalf of the LACMTA, with members of this
distinguished subcommittee.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Lennon. I appreciate your
testimony.
Now, Mr. Kozub.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOZUB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
TRANSIT INSTITUTE
Mr. Kozub. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
participate in this hearing and share some thoughts and
insights.
I am Christopher Kozub, the associate director at the
National Transit Institute for the Workplace Safety and
Security Program. As the chairman said, the testimonies will be
entered, so instead of going laboriously through mine word for
word, I am simply going to highlight a few points that I think
complement some of the other testimonies you may have heard
today.
As Deputy Administrator Jamison pointed out, much of
security, while technology is a key component of it, is
operations based. There are three things that we, as a resource
to the FTA and to other modal agencies as well as system
agencies within DHS, have clearly recognized.
Employee training is one of the center points of any good
system security program. Employees need to be trained, as some
of the other panelists have observed, to participate in a
number of these systemwide programs. To encourage passengers
and customers to report things that they see, whether it is an
unattended package or suspicious behavior, requires them to
report that information to an employee. Employees must be
trained how to assess and analyze that information in order to
effectively forward it on through the proper channels into law
enforcement.
Employees then themselves need to be trained on how to
observe and properly report information that is suspicious in
nature so that it can be followed up and investigated upon.
And, ultimately, if prevention measures do not work, they
need to be trained on how to effectively handle an incident,
respond to it appropriately, as they are truly, while not
trained to the degree of a law enforcement or fire and rescue
personnel, they are the first person on the scene representing
that agency and must take actions within the first few seconds
and minutes to help shape and model the outcome of that
incident so that when trained law enforcement and fire people
do show up that the incident can be handled in a much more
expeditious and safe fashion.
We at NTI have been working with the FTA closely these past
several years since 9/11 to put forth a number of training
programs. Chief Morange from New York mentioned a pamphlet that
they hand out. We, working with the FTA, have provided the
transit industry close to a half million security pamphlets
targeted at employee awareness and information of what is
suspicious, what should be reported and what should be followed
up on.
We also have facilitated, either directly or through
agencies such as those represented here today, the training of
employees. We have reached through those training efforts
73,000 employees. While that number is something to make note
of, the unfortunate reality is it only represents 20 percent of
the total workforce of frontline employees within the transit
industry. We have a lot more training to do, the agencies have
a lot more training to do to effectively reach the majority if
not all of the workforce out there putting service on the
street.
We have also worked outside of our direct relationship with
the FTA with other modal agencies and other agencies within
DHS. Working initially under the direction of the FTA, we
produced a training program targeted at DOT, or Transportation
employees. This effectively has helped reach close to 20,000
employees who are out there working on the highways and
bridges. After all, transit, 60 percent of it, is being
delivered in a bus, operates on these very roads, bridges and
tunnels.
Another effort that we have undertaken, working with
initially with the Washington State ferry system that is the
largest system in the country but then eventually other systems
and the Coast Guard, we have modified our programs to reach to
the ferry and similar maritime sectors to effectively train
over 1,000 people, not including the entire workforce of
Washington State ferries in system security awareness.
Lastly, we have worked closely with Amtrak, several freight
railroads and most of all TSA within DHS who has funded this
effort to produce a program that will deliver system security
awareness to freight and passenger railroads of the country.
Again, many of our commuter railroads operate, are operated by
or on the same infrastructure that is operated and controlled
by freight railroads and/or Amtrak. To this date, Amtrak has
used this program to reach over half of their 20,000 employees.
So along with what we have done in the transit traditional
sector, those sectors such as highways and freight and Amtrak,
which are all part of our transit and transportation system, we
have reached effectively over 100,000 employees simply with the
facilitated training effort that we have put forth.
What we have noticed, however, and while drills are being
conducted through federally funded efforts and systems such as
those represented on the panel here with me today, have done
very good local efforts to coordinate their training and their
response plans. There is no national effort to establish
competencies or standards for an emergency responder to respond
to a transit incident.
We, for many decades, have had national standards, codes
and even regulations promulgated by such agencies, such as the
FAA on what are the minimum competencies and training standards
to respond to an aviation incident. We still do not have any
national effort or standard put forth to do that on the transit
or surface transportation side.
In the events that happened this past month, the
International Association of Fire Chiefs referenced the
document put out by the U.S. Fire Administration, a study
course entitled, ``Emergency Response to Terrorist Incident.''
Unfortunately, when we reviewed that course, there were only
three very insignificant references to transit in the entire
course.
I use that example because I think it clearly illustrates
the lack of national recognition to the fact that emergency
responders, unless partaking in the programs that are done at
the local effort, do not have the training resources and are
not aware of the competencies that need to be there on how to
handle what is potentially some of the biggest mass casualty
incidents that they may encounter in their entire career.
In closing, I would just like to make a simple comment. One
of the words that are often used is system security. System
security in transit is very critical, because system security
needs to look at the entire system. What Madrid taught us is
that simple security efforts such as law enforcement around
major terminals is not enough. It needs to be every outlying
station, every park-and-ride facility, every point of entry on
a system needs to have equal protection if the system is going
to be protected.
Similarly, there has been much discussion about cameras and
other technology. While all technology should be reviewed,
should be researched for its application into this sector and
into this industry, true security will happen in a systemic
fashion; meaning, training of employees, alertness and
diligence of passengers, good, solid law enforcement efforts
within the transit agency and the community, coordinated
efforts with other community responses, as well as the
application and implementation of technology.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to
participate here and welcome any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Kozub follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Kozub
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to speak with you today and share some insights
on the security of the United States' transit systems, and specifically
the importance of emergency preparedness and response training for
transit employees and emergency responders.
My name is Christopher Kozub, and I am the Associate Director for
Workplace Safety and Security at the National Transit Institute (NTI)
at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Although the recent,
tragic events in London have once again brought the issue of transit
system security to the forefront of media headlines and American minds,
NTI has served the safety and security training needs of transit
agencies and their employees for a number of years. Under the direction
of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and in partnership with
transit system management and labor organizations, NTI has been
steadfastly focused on developing and delivering security training
materials since the attacks of September 11th. It is NTI's overall
mission to provide training and education in support of public
transportation and quality of life in the United States. When this
quality of life is threatened, we must reevaluate our actions and
precautions, not only in awareness and prevention measures, but in our
reactions and response to terrorist threats and incidents.
Collectively, the nation's transit systems are responsible for
providing a reliable, efficient, and rapid commute for 14 million
passengers daily. Their biggest responsibility and priority however,
must always be the safety and security of those passengers and the
employees who are delivering this service. When transit's
infrastructure and operations are threatened or attacked, as it was
twice in London this month, the desired effect to disrupt commerce,
instill fear, and bring a bustling, thriving region to a grinding halt,
is achieved. Unfortunately, the London incidents are merely the latest
in a series of attacks on the world's transit systems.
On March 20, 1995, Tokyo subway riders, at the height
of the morning rush hour, were targeted in a deadly nerve gas
attack by a doomsday cult, killing a dozen people, including
two frontline employees and injuring approximately 5,000 more.
The first indication that anything was wrong was when
passengers began to experience watering eyes and difficulty
breathing--classic symptoms of exposure to the tasteless,
colorless, and odorless Sarin agent that was used in the
attack. Unfortunately, the two employees were killed when
trying to remove the agent dispersal device. Neither one had
received any training related to security awareness or incident
response.
On October 17, 1995, eight people died and more than
200 were injured when a terrorist detonated a bomb on the Paris
Metro. In the investigation police found the remains of a six
pound cooking gas canister that had been filled with explosives
and screws--to serve as shrapnel.
On February 6, 2004, an explosion in a Moscow Metro
rail car killed 39 people and wounded 129 others, again during
the morning rush hour. As with the most recent London bombings,
the explosive device was thought to have been stored in a
backpack or briefcase.
On March 11, 2004, a coordinated series of ten
explosions aboard four packed commuter trains in Madrid killed
191 people and injured over 1,500 others. The attacks were
carried out by terrorists boarding the system at outlying
stations, deploying their device laden packages on the trains,
and exiting before the predetermined time of detonation. This
incident clearly illustrated that in order to secure a rail or
transit system, security measures must be implemented and
maintained system-wide.
On July 7, 2005, the London Transit system was
attacked by four suicide bombers. Three of the devices were
detonated on separate trains deep in the tubes of London's
Underground. The fourth was detonated over 30 minutes later on
a double-decker bus. In total 56 people, including the four
attackers, were killed and 700 others were injured.
Two weeks later on July 21, 2005, another four attacks
were attempted on London's transit system in which only one
person was injured, but the system, and to a great extent
London, were crippled for a considerable amount of time.
This list obviously, does not include all of the hundreds of lesser
bombings and attacks that have occurred against rail and bus transit
systems throughout the world over the past ten years. While the
following table shows the total number of surface transportation
terrorist attacks for each year since 1995, including injuries and
fatalities, it should be noted that the ratio of injuries and
fatalities per incident is significantly higher for transportation
targets than most other terrorist targets combined. This fact continues
to make surface transportation systems, particularly transit
operations, attractive targets for terrorist attacks.
Terrorist attacks against surface transportation targets:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incidents 12 10 7 106 49 73 104 159 64 96 680
Injuries 5,313 256 156 553 231 355 695 846 580 1041 10,026
Fatalities 67 69 21 232 35 36 328 200 168 416 1,572
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN CAPITAL
Ironically, in an industry such as transit, which is seemingly
burgeoning with technological ideas and investments, it is interesting
to see how many reports, interviews, and testimonies regarding the
referenced events, validate the limitations of employing currently-
available security technology within the transit operating environment.
Additionally, post-incident information often reveals the critical
importance of the frontline employee in minimizing the impact of an
incident. This was clearly proven on September 11th when PATH system
employees quickly loaded and dispatched trains from the World Trade
Center station.
While we should not abandon research and deployment of new
technologies, we need to recognize what has been proven to work here
and now: employee training.
Encouraging passengers to report suspicious activity
often relies on employees receiving and forwarding that
information. This requires employees to be trained on how to
assess this information and pass it forward through proper
channels.
Preventing attacks relies on an alert and diligent
workforce that can identify and react properly to suspicious
activity and threats.
The outcome of an effective emergency response is
often contingent on what frontline employees do or don't do in
the first few minutes of an incident.
The FTA has clearly recognized this and has directed NTI and other
resources to develop a number of courses and materials to better
prepare employees for these responsibilities. This training focuses on
improving their ability to observe, recognize, and report suspicious
objects and activities, and being more cognizant of pre-attack
activities. Heightened awareness of their on-the-job surroundings, and
a familiarity with the warning signs of potential threats, will lead to
increased security and safety on our nation's transit systems.
These materials have been developed through partnerships that bring
transit system management, safety and security experts, organized
labor, trade associations, and the FTA together to ensure that
everyone's concerns and issues are being addressed. The FTA and NTI
have also considered the various methods utilized by each transit
system to train their employees and have produced a range of materials
in a variety of formats. This approach has lead to the development of
materials that can be used for instructor-lead training and
interactive, computer-based training. These efforts are complimented by
the production and distribution of videos and reference materials.
A number of transit systems have also recognized this and are
utilizing NTI's materials to provide employee training. Since September
11, 2001, almost 73,000 transit employees at more than 530 transit
agencies have been trained. This includes 51,000 employees who work for
the top 30 systems which are located in the most densely populated
regions of the country. Agencies such as Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA), Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter
Railroad Corporation (METRA), San Francisco Municipal Railway, Denver
Regional Transit District and New Jersey Transit have made
comprehensive efforts to train the majority of their frontline
employees.
Unfortunately the number 73,000 only represents approximately
twenty percent of the transit industry's total workforce. Consequently,
a large number of frontline transit employees in this country still
lack proper training and preparedness for preventing and/or responding
to incidents. This is largely due, according to many transit systems,
to a lack of funding. While the materials from NTI are provided to
transit agencies free-of-charge, and a portion of the training is
actually conducted by NTI instructors, also free-of charge, systems
still need to pay employees to keep buses and trains moving while other
employees participate in training. Unlike other sectors, ``in-service
training'' in transit and other transportation modes is incongruent
with keeping service on the street.
This training must also be conducted on an ongoing cycle. An
employee can not be expected to effectively retain and apply
information and skills which they are only exposed to once. There must
be a continuing process of frequent informational reminders and
periodic refresher training to keep the material at the forefront of
their thinking and thus carried out in their actions.
As such, while funding security technology research and deployment
such as smart devices, chemical sensors, and cameras is important, a
much greater emphasis and value needs to be placed on employee training
and preparedness in order to effectively secure and safeguard the lives
of transit passengers and employees.
NTI'S CONTINUING AND DIVERSIFIED ROLE IN SECURITY TRAINING
While continuing to focus on our primary commitment to the FTA and
the safety and security of transit industry employees, NTI has enhanced
these efforts by collaborating on additional projects that have built
upon these experiences and effectively served a broader range of
transportation employees.
With an average of 60% of the nation's daily transit
trips occurring on buses, NTI, under the direction of the FTA,
developed a modified version of the system security course to
address Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel. Currently
1,744 DOT employees from 15 different agencies have received
this training. These deliveries, as well as the development of
an interactive CD-ROM version of the DOT course, have been
funded by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program of
the Transportation Research Board, within the National Academy
of Sciences. Additionally, 9,800; 7,435; 1,450; and 450
employees have been trained internally by the Texas, Washington
State, New Jersey and North Carolina DOTs, respectively.
Under heightened security concerns, the FTA and NTI
assisted the Washington State Ferry (WSF) system in an effort
to produce a comprehensive system security training program
that included instructor-lead course material, a video, and an
employee pocket guide. WSF then used these materials to train
all of their vessel and terminal employees. Based on this
project, NTI developed a training course for the rest of the
ferry operations in the country. In compliance with the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and
specific portions of United States Coast Guard regulations
currently in force for maritime security of vessels and
maritime security of facilities, NTI has, to date, provided
training in system security awareness to approximately 1,000
passenger vessel employees.
Further adaptation of the NTI system security course
occurred after being approached by Amtrak. With a need to train
their 20,000 employees across the country in security
awareness, Amtrak wisely decided to adopt the same program that
was being used by a number of commuter rail systems throughout
the country. With Amtrak and many of the commuter rail systems
sharing much of the same infrastructure with freight railroads,
the project grew to include the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), the Association of American Railroads, and the American
Short Line and Regional Railroad Association. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has funded this
effort to produce a computer-based, security awareness training
program that will provide a consistent baseline of security
training for all freight and passenger rail employees
throughout the country. The passenger component of this project
was completed in January 2005 and Amtrak has used the material
to train approximately 10,000 of their employees to date. The
freight component is under final development and the completed
project will be released in the near future.
These activities clearly illustrate that through prudent leadership
by agencies such as the FTA and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Federal Government can produce quality and very cost-
effective programs that will have near-term, positive effects on the
safety and security of many modes of surface transportation. This is of
particular significance given the continuing move toward inter-modal
networks.
Currently, NTI, the FTA and agencies within DHS are working on
several new programs to continue this process:
A course is being developed to better train and
prepare transit system operations control center personnel in
assessing and responding to reports of chemical, biological,
and explosive attacks within rail system tunnels. The course
will compliment the existing FTA guidance document ``Guidelines
for Managing Suspected Chemical and Biological Agent Incidents
in Rail Tunnel Systems.'' Argonne National Labs, a leading
source of expertise on chemical and biological terrorism and
author of the FTA guidance document, is working with NTI to
develop and deliver the new course. Initial deliveries are
scheduled to begin in August 2005.
The FTA and NTI are also in the process of developing
a series of training programs for transit employees on
Incident/Emergency Management. These courses and corresponding
materials will incorporate the new, nationally adopted NIMS
(National Incident Management System) model so that transit
employees, along with their colleagues in emergency response,
will be able to effectively work together during an incident.
The first of these courses will focus on the concept of
passenger management during an incident. This has been
identified as a challenge and an issue at every transit system
attack and accident. Employees who are responsible for the
safety and security of passengers during an incident need a
clear understanding of the various behavioral characteristics
that they'll confront in an emergency so that they can most
effectively direct them to safety.
The FTA, TSA, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness
(ODP) within the Department of Homeland Security have partnered
with NTI to revise and deliver the FTA ``Connecting
Communities'' forums. These forums were originally delivered in
17 cities to bring together transit systems and emergency
responders. The revised program will incorporate the NIMS
concept and will focus on a more substantive and facilitated
discussion between the participants. The goal of these 12
workshops is to strengthen relationships between transit
representatives and emergency response officers and develop an
outline for a transit incident response plan. Among other
aspects, this plan will include resource identification and
availability, localized model response plans, and a proposed
schedule for inter-agency, table-top and functional training
exercises.
PREPARING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS FOR TRANSIT INCIDENTS
While programs such as the ``Connecting Communities'' forums are
important steps in improving interagency planning and response, they
are merely the beginning of a long-overdue effort within transit and
more so, the emergency response sector, to improve training and
preparedness.
Some agencies such as those represented by my distinguished
colleagues have made great strides in developing programs with their
local emergency services. Washington Area Metropolitan Transit
Administration (WMATA) has created a life-safety center and training
program to better prepare local, state and federal responders for
incidents within the WMATA system. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transit Administration (LACMTA) has worked with the LA County Sheriff's
office to train 200 of their officers in transit security and incident
management concepts. A great many other agencies have and continue to
conduct training drills to test the interoperability of their internal
and external responders, resources, and procedures.
Quite often, response to a passenger rail or rail transit incident
has been done from a ``seat-of-the-pants'' perspective, not through the
application of skills and knowledge obtained through a comprehensive
training program. Although some training efforts are being carried out
at the local level, there has yet to be a national recognition of the
need to identify minimum competencies and develop baseline training
standards for this type of response.
As opposed to many of the facilities and operations that police and
fire departments interact with, transit systems possess unique
characteristics that may often contradict traditional response
measures.
The presence of potentially live third-rail or
overhead catenary, poses a real and present danger to initial
responders.
Alternative fuel and hybrid buses present response
challenges and safety hazards to responders
Initial tactics for transit incidents may need to
consider maintaining system operation so that people can be
moved quickly away from the scene and then evacuated or the
``shelter in place'' concept as opposed to immediate mass
evacuation.
The large number of potential victims and ambulatory
passengers at the scene may present the most significant
challenge of the incident. This could be further compounded by
the location of the incident: either in a tunnel or on a
bridge.
Unfortunately, these command decisions can only be made by police
and fire officers who have a clear understanding of a transit systems
infrastructure and operation.
Aviation incidents, which also possess unique challenges and
hazards to responders are often mass fatality, not mass casualty
incidents, and therefore are quickly categorized as a recovery, not a
rescue operation. Response measures for aviation incidents however have
been addressed in a variety of national regulations, promulgated by the
Federal Aviation Administration and standards put forth by the National
Fire Protection Administration. In comparison, transit incidents which,
as statistically proven, can result in hundreds if not thousands of
injuries, therefore demanding a faster, more coordinated rescue effort,
have rarely been addressed through any national training effort.
Following the London attacks of July 7th, the International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) issued a press release urging fire
chiefs to review their response plans for transit emergencies. In the
release the IAFC referenced the Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-
Study Course, produced by the United States Fire Administration, as a
noteworthy resource. Unfortunately, the current version of this course
has only three, rather insignificant references to transit in the
entire text, once again illustrating the lack of inclusion of transit
in emergency preparedness training at the national level.
While, as DHS Secretary Chertoff observed, response to transit
incidents is a local and state responsibility--because of the immediate
need to triage and treat victims--the need to nationalize an effort to
identify competencies and create standards for training still exists.
Similar to what the FTA has done through NTI and other resources to
serve the transit industry, a Federal agency, or agencies, needs to
take on the responsibility to move this effort forward. Only when the
dialogue on emergency responder preparedness and training for transit
incidents is brought to the national level, will it become a priority
for all transit systems and their respective response agencies.
In closing, the efforts put forth by the FTA have been some of the
most effective and successful security prevention and incident response
programs in any sector. These efforts need to continue not only in
terms of developing new programs, but more importantly in the expanded
delivery and implementation of existing materials and courses. Clearly,
including transit employees as a key component of a system security
program is a prudent measure that will present an invaluable return for
a relatively minimal investment in initial and ongoing training. And
while there have been, and continue to be, many effective, coordinated
programs in emergency preparedness conducted at the local level, we as
a nation, to paraphrase Robert Frost, have promises to keep and miles
to go before we sleep.
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to share
my insights and provide information on the current state of transit
incident preparedness. I look forward to continuing to work with you
and my colleagues to improve the safety and security of transit
passengers and employees and the effectiveness of emergency responders
in managing transit incidents.crule
Mr. King. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Kozub.
I will address my questions in the interest of time to the
three law enforcement witnesses, and it is a four-part
question. One is, in view of the suicide incidents in London
and the shoot-to-kill policy, what steps, if any, are you
taking in training your officers regarding suicide bombers?
Number two, if you can comment on the policy of random
inspections which has been carried out in a number of
localities, including the NYPD.
Thirdly, a point I mentioned before to encourage retired
police officers who are well trained and are armed to travel
mass transit by giving them passes to work back and forth. Many
of these men and women are in their 40s and 50s and are well
equipped and well trained.
And, finally, if you can turn it around, if you could get
anything you needed from the federal government so that you
could guarantee the money was being well spent, what would you
be asking for the federal government to give you which it is
not doing now?
We will start with Chief Hanson.
Chief Hanson. Well, in regards to suicide bombers, I think
we have been working with local law enforcement, particularly
the Capitol Police. In fact, we are having a training session
today. I think the Capitol Police went over to Israel and
really looked at some of the dynamics over there. We had worked
with them earlier, particularly when we started bringing long
guns into our system to develop procedures and we are
reinforcing that now in light of London.
Mr. Dicks. What is a long gun?
Chief Hanson. A long gun is a weapon with a longer gun as
opposed to hand gun. In our environment, there are MP5s, which
could be qualified as a machine gun. A shotgun is a long gun,
but it is?am I answering the question?
So we do have procedures and we are reinforcing those
procedures today with local law enforcement colleagues.
In regard to random searches, we are going to New York on
Thursday. We had examined and discussed this internally
ourselves. We will be very interested in seeing how it is done
in New York and seeing the application for WMATA.
What we do is we have a program here, we are local law
enforcement. The police officers and sheriffs in the region
that represent WMATA. There are six jurisdictions, Maryland,
Virginia and the District of Columbia. The law enforcement
officers in those regions are allowed to ride when in uniform
and in casual clothes, and that applies to sheriffs too. So
that really kind of leverages our numbers. We do not do the
retired program, they are active police officers that are
allowed to use our system.
On any given day, the Metropolitan Police have 300 people
going to court, and the majority of those people are encouraged
to ride the rails. We do training with local law enforcement,
so they will well versed in the intricacies and challenges of
operating in a transit environment.
And then in regards to what would we want, I think it is a
variety of different things. Certainly, more funding for
training, for equipment. I would like to see more done in
technology.
Mr. King. Mr. Morange?
Chief Morange. As far as suicide bombers, we instruct our
officers, we also put out posters on what to look for, how
people act nervous, what type of clothing they may be wearing,
if someone's wearing heavy clothing in the warm weather, to
look for loose-fitting clothing where they may be bulky
underneath. We also put it in our pamphlet for all our
employees so that they are continuously made aware of what they
should be looking for.
As far as random searches, we have started the random
searches last week. The public seems to be very happy with it.
They feel comfortable with what we are doing right now. NYPD is
doing it throughout the New York City transit system, and we
are doing it on the commuter rails. And, again, like I say, the
public is really in favor of it at this time.
As far as riding public transportation right now, all law
enforcement personnel have passes to rid it. As far as
retirees, I would bring that back to MTA for consideration.
And the last, as far as how the federal government other
than funds, we would definitely be looking for the technology
that is out there to let us know what kind of technology works,
because right now a lot of vendors and all come up and tell you
they have the best thing since whatever, and when you look at
it, it does not work.
And that is one of the reasons why we do not want to just
throw money right out there until we know what works, because
we do not want to go back 2 years from now and have to change
what we already did. What we are looking for is what works,
what is off the shelf and what is maintainable.
Mr. King. Mr. Lennon?
Mr. Lennon. Thank you.
As far as suicide bombers, we have had the Israelis to come
in here with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. There
has been extensive training provided in recognition and
reaction. We have also trained our employees on what to look
for. So I think that program is?we started a program that looks
really well focused with our employees and our law enforcement
people. Again, the lessons of 7/7 and 7/21 will just reinforce
those measures.
Random searches, we are probably also be setting up
probably. We have already talked about this before this hearing
about sending a team to New York City and also Boston for their
experiences conducting random searches with regards to both the
RNC and the DNC.
With regards to the use by off-duty police officers and
retired police officers, that is something that has never come
up in Los Angeles as an issue, and I think what we do have is a
high use by uniform police officers and detectives using our
transit systems, our commuter railroads and our existing bus
and rail systems, but I will bring that back to my system
study. And with our new mayor there, Mayor Villaraigosa, he may
very much be interested in pursuing this with his colleagues in
other communities.
As far as the?I will only echo what Bill has said to my
right and Polly Hanson We were thoroughly overwhelmed with the
types of technologies that were made available or could be made
available to us with a very limited amount of funding that was
made available to us.
We know what we want. We have conducted the assessments. We
know exactly what we need across the board. We share, we are
almost an incestuous industry. We talk. We talk about the
applications, we talk about the equipment that is required. So
we know how to spend the money, but, again, it is focused on we
need more presence out there in terms of law enforcement. That
is one key application, plus the technology.
One thing I think that we really need to focus on, and it
is just a cap-off in terms of what I have already heard this
morning with regards to my colleagues that were here before us,
is that if there is one area that we need to focus on and that
is involving the public in a much more holistic role on this
particular thing. We have a tendency to think in terms of the
transit systems and indeed the employees and our law
enforcement as being the ones that are responsible for
security.
Indeed, the persons that go, that are having the party this
coming Saturday night think in terms of the people that are
responsible for their security is the law enforcement. We need
across the country, at a national level, at the local level, to
involve the public. We almost have to have an Israeli focus on
security. We have to involve the public beyond just the transit
systems in making them aware and being part of the solution and
not part of the problem. Thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Lennon.
The ranking member, Mr. Pascrell, has had to go to the
floor.
Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Polly, I was very impressed with your tunnel and the fact
that it is available for training and exercises. Is there
another one in the country? Is that the only one?
Chief Hanson. It is the only one, sir, and we make it
available to anybody that wants to. We have done the Marines,
we have done the FBI, Joint Terrorism Task Force, we have done
local police and fire fighters.
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you, we were talking about the
funding for this effort and that Transportation now has turned
this over to Department of Homeland Security. Are you worried
about that? Do you think you are going to get less money now
because of this? Was the Federal Transit Administration a
source of grants for these kind of safety projects?
Chief Hanson. The Federal Transit Administration supplies
support in the way of training, the type of public outreach
campaigns. The capital money that they give transit properties
can be used for security initiatives.
Mr. Dicks. Can they still be used even after this new?
Chief Hanson. Well, because it is capital money that could
be used for an upgrade of your security cameras, which has a
dual purpose. But the fact of the matter is that accessing
urban area security money that goes to regions and local states
has been very difficult for transit properties.
Mr. Dicks. Well, how much have you gotten under this new
program?
Chief Hanson. Well, I am going to be real honest and go
back to September 11, before?
Mr. Dicks. Well, you should be.
Chief Hanson. Okay. Before the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, WMATA was the recipient of $49 million,
and that was from both Congress and the White House, and it was
spent on things you could see and touch, intrusion alarm
upgrades, canines, explosive detection equipment, personal
protective equipment for our employees.
Since the creation of DHS and ODP's Transit Grant Program,
WMATA will or has received about $15 million, $3.7 million in
fiscal year 2003?
Mr. Dicks. So you got $46 million before and now $15
million since.
Chief Hanson. $49 million.
Mr. Dicks. $49 million before.
Chief Hanson. And $15 million, including the money that we
hope to get in fiscal year 2005.
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Bill, what is your situation? How much did you get before
DHS?what did you get recently?
Chief Morange. Well, just to give you a little rundown on
the federal side, FEMA for our capital programs we received
$143 million. For ODP grants for 2003, we received $27.7
million. In 2004, from ODP, we received $14.1 million. And also
in 2003, from ODP, for our MTA PD radio, we received $6.6
million. In addition, from FTA, we received $188,000 to perform
drills.
Mr. Dicks. Paul?
Mr. Lennon. Prior to 9/11, we had a minimum amount of
funding, primarily was focused on grants from the FTA, which
was well received, but it was measured in the thousands of
dollars. Since 9/11, we received approximately $6.8 million in
direct grants from the Office of Domestic Preparedness,
Homeland Security monies, and we have received another like
amount, about $6.9 million in monies that came through the
Office of Domestic Preparedness, through the states, shared
grants for projects for Los Angeles County and Orange County to
do additional exercises and things like that. So it is about
half has been through the state and half has come directly from
the federal government.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
Mr. Kozub, you mentioned safety regulations, the FAA has it
for workers involved in aviation but they do not have it for
other forms of transportation. Who should do that? Who should
have the responsibility for creating these rights in the
federal government?
Mr. Kozub. Right now, the FTA no regulatory authority over
transit systems as a DOT modal agency unless there was a
regrouping there. The reality is, I believe, in my?
Mr. Dicks. But Congress could give them the authority. Is
that what you are suggesting?
Mr. Kozub. I am not suggesting. I am saying that is a
possibility. What I am suggesting from an operational
perspective is working with many of the systems that I have
worked with across the country there is a desire on the part of
many of the systems to do the training. However, the local
funding, as you brought up during the first panel, is often
dissected between other local issues and priorities and
priorities within the agency, such as cameras and other
tangible capital equipment.
So quite often, unfortunately, the need to train employees,
which has been shown time and again as a very effective
security measure, is often put toward the bottom of the list.
So whether it is done through a regulatory proposition through
the FTA or another federal agency?
Mr. Dicks. Or just providing the money.
Mr. Kozub. ?or simply providing the resources and the
funding to do the job I think might be a more expeditious
channel to go through.
Mr. Dicks. And nobody does that at this juncture.
Mr. Kozub. To provide funding?
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Kozub. Some of the agencies we have worked with have
used some of their ODP or statewide DHS funding, but, no, there
is no funding that I am aware of that.
Mr. Dicks. There is no dedicated source.
Mr. Kozub. No.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Congressman Reichert?
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I agree with a lot of what the panel has said this morning
in regard to training communication coordination and working
with the community. Sounds like community policing to me, and I
think that that worked rather well in King County when I was
the sheriff in Seattle just a few months ago.
I would like to just go back and address a couple of
comments made by some of the panelists. And thank you all for
your service, by the way.
Mr. Morange, you say you hired 400 additional officers
after September 11?200 metropolitan and 200 bridges.
Chief Morange. Two hundred MTA police officers, and it was
260 additional bridge and tunnel officers, or peace officers.
Mr. Reichert. Where did that money come from?
Chief Morange. That money came directly from the MTA.
Mr. Reichert. Now, you talked about the grants, $143
million, $27 million, $14.1 million, $6.5 million, $188,000.
Any of that money go for personnel?
Chief Morange. No. All of that money went strictly for
equipment intrusion, fencing, lighting, and the $143 million is
for capital construction.
Mr. Reichert. Yes. And you had an additional 25 bomb dogs
and handlers, right?
Chief Morange. That was all MTA.
Mr. Reichert. Okay. And, Chief Hanson, since September 11,
have you hired any additional officers because of the added
responsibilities of homeland security?
Chief Hanson. I did apply for a COPS grant and got 10
police positions as a result of an analysis. We wanted to
reduce the size of our beat area so that we could have people
on six post assignments. I have had other increases that are
directly related to other infrastructure improvements, such as
increased number of garage spaces at WMATA, but besides the
COPS grant, which is only partially paid for, all those are
paid for by the local jurisdictions who pay for WMATA.
Mr. Reichert. Did you receive the COPS grant?
Chief Hanson. Yes, I did, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Is that grant still in effect today?
Chief Hanson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Did you apply for a similar grant today, do
you know? Could you?
Chief Hanson. I do not believe so, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Lennon, same question, have you hired
additional police officers?
Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir, we have. Yes, we have. We have
increased approximately 26 police officers, sheriff's deputies
and put them to the system in the last 3 years. We have also
put 110 fair enforcement officers, which are not post-
certified, not peace officers, but to heighten the presence and
focused on code enforcement, but their presence has been duly
noted. So we have got about 135. We have increased staff to 135
but it has all been local money.
Mr. Reichert. Local money.
Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Mr. Kozub, you made a point to say that from a systems
perspective, a systems approach to this problem of protecting
our transit across the country, that every park-and-ride, every
outlying station and every tunnel must be protected. Does that
part of that protection include people, personnel?
Mr. Kozub. A big part of that protection includes the
people and the personnel. As we have heard before, the
customers, many times transit systems, whether a subway system,
bus or rail, have repeat customers. The same people get on the
same train or the same bus every morning. They are some of the
best at observing and knowing if someone is acting a little
suspiciously or if there is a package or some other presence
there that is out of the norm.
The employees that work those regular routes and facilities
are also very cognizant of what is normal and what is not
normal. It is basic training and communication to these
audiences that need to motivate them, to give them the
confidence to report things, and it is also the cultural and
system process within an agency itself that needs to have the
follow up. You need to have the follow-up law enforcement
within an agency that can follow up on these leads and do the
traditional police work that needs to be done.
Mr. Dicks. I guess the final point I would like to make,
and you have actually made it for me, as the sheriff in King
County in my previous life, I struggled with the same problems
that you are struggling with right now. We had responsibility,
and have today, for the Metro system.
As we move forward in time, in the future, the difficulty
in putting people and personnel in places that we know they are
going to be needed to protect our transit systems across this
country is going to become more and more difficult. The bottom
line question is, how are we going to pay for that?
You do not have to answer that, I will just leave it like
that. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Congressman Reichert.
Mr. Etheridge?
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you
for being with us this morning in your testimony.
We talked a lot about communications, understanding,
listening. Let me ask each of you very quickly, Will, about
this whole issue of interoperability. Obviously, first thing we
want to do is prevent, but beyond that we ought to be able to
communicate with first responders.
Share withy us, if you would, how interoperability between
you folks and first responders, is that a problem? Have you
solved it? Do you need help? Where are we in that process,
because I think it is a critical piece, and it seems to pop up
every time we have a major problem.
Would you talk to us about that for a moment?
Chief Hanson. Do you want me to go first, sir?
Mr. Etheridge. Please.
Chief Hanson. Okay. WMATA and the metropolitan region,
through COG, the Council of Governments here, has done a number
of things. They have used Urban Area Security initiative ODP
money to buy a cache of radios that can be accessed by both
fleece and fire. There are SOPs that support that. That system
does allow for interoperability at an incident, and they have
been used several times for special events by both fleece and
fire in this region.
This region was fortunate to participate in some federally
supported projects. Originally, the project was called,
``Agile,'' and now it is called, ``Merge,'' so it does allow
some interoperability with police departments in this region.
Recently, fire fighters received money from Urban Area
Security Initiative money to improve their communication in the
Metro by increasing the lines that are necessary for fire
fighters or for police departments to go down in our system and
still have communication, which I thin is important to note.
Our environments are very different from being up on the
street.
So while there might be interoperability for police and
fire fighters above the street, the transit environment because
of the concrete and underground there is a different dynamic
but there have been efforts, there is technical assistance
available from ODP, and I would encourage more money in areas
like that, not just to make the recommendations but once the
recommendations are made by ODP for the funding to be there,
then to help regions or properties or transit police and local
fire fighters to be able to obtain those recommendations.
Mr. Etheridge. So you are not saying the communication is
adequate currently.
Chief Hanson. I think that more can be done. I think in
this particular region things have been done and things have
been done with ODP Urban Area Security money.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Morange?
Chief Morange. As you well know, in the MTA, in 1998, they
merged the Long Island Railroad with the Metro North Police, so
a lot of their communication was done via locomotive and
conductors' frequencies. Now, presently, we are part of the
NYSWN Program, which is the New York State Wireless System.
We are a pilot program, and we are looking all along the
right-of-ways of improving our communication, and this system
that once it is placed in was obtaining the frequencies and
all, because the frequencies were not available. And now under
the NYSWN Program, they are going to be made available to us.
We are part of the pilot program. We have $50 million of our
money invested right now. And I feel that this is really going
to be a positive for the entire transportation industry and the
MTA.
As far as New York City, there are fiber optic cables and
all and different systems that are in the tunnels so that they
could communicate above grounds. They continually look to see
where they can improve the system. I know the fire department
uses it now. They are working on it along with the New York
City Police Department to improve the communications there.
They do look at the dead spots and they work on it from there.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Lennon?
Mr. Lennon. Communications have always been a major
priority for the citizens of Los Angeles and our emergency
respond team has made sure that since we have built the Red
Line tunnel, we have made sure that communications for both the
Sheriff's Department and for the fire departments as well as
for the LAPD has been of paramount importance and they can
communicate below ground as well above ground.
Interoperability, I would characterize probably right now
as being adequate for the situation. It can be enhanced, and I
believe it is a priority, both for the fire and the police
departments to do that.
Again, our exercises that we have conducted, multiagency
exercises, have reinforced the need for always continually
enhancing our communications.
Mr. Kozub. On a national level, communications is basically
a two-part problem. Communications from technology, as the
chief just recognized, yes, there needs to be more emphasis
placed on getting the equipment into the right hands so it can
be used at the right time.
However, as Chief Morange pointed out, the successes that
have been seen in past incidents have largely been due to
interrelationships, not just technological capabilities but the
preexisting relationships between the policy makers, decision
makers that need to manage an incident, both from the transit
side and the emergency services side.
So you need to look at both components, getting the right
radios that can talk to each other, but you need to have
training and drills and tabletops that can bring these people
together hopefully before something would happen.
Mr. Etheridge. So you develop relationships.
Mr. Kozub. Exactly.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia?
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate your calling this hearing, because I think the
American people want to see whether we are paying any attention
to London and its possible effects here. So I think you have
done a public service and particularly in hearing from this
panel, which is straight from the ground where it counts.
The Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, of course,
here may be ahead of some others, perhaps not New York, I am
not sure, but ahead of some other transportation systems,
although I must tell you, to hear you testify about $15 million
since 9/11 was not very comforting, Chief Hanson.
Let me indicate that here there is an additional
responsibility. There is the federal responsibility for 200,000
federal employees, that the federal government actually
subsidizes to get them on the Metro every day because otherwise
the roads would be so choked, you could not even get to the
Capitol or to Washington. Now if of course something to the
system which the federal government has encouraged to use,
particularly given the large number of federal employees, we
would be in very hot water.
I really have two questions. One is to try to straighten
out this dedicated versus other more general funds, and the
other has to do with thinking outside the box all together
about public transit security.
Now, there was earlier testimony that everybody understands
we are talking basically in dedicated funding about $250
million. Then when you ask, okay, what kinds of things would
dedicated funding be used for, training would be one, overtime,
I understand, is another. If you get to the word, ``capital
improvement,'' then you really stop me. That is such a huge
expense that it seems to me once you decide to use money for
that, you do not get to the other things.
Which brings me to the $8.6 billion that we are told that
you all would just go get it, it is there, and use for this
purpose. Testimony earlier, $25 million from the, I will call
it, large emergency responder, I will pool those two sets of
grants, in 2004 used for public transportation security, $5
million, I understand, in 2005.
I am trying to find out what difference dedicated funding
means and whether there is a reluctance given the concern about
first responder funding to simply take money from first
responder funding or whether it would matter to local
jurisdictions to have a pot of money that they knew would be
dedicated to that, they knew up-front and would be used for
that. We had a major debate on interoperability here on the
authorization proposal.
In New York, for example, continue to scream about first
responder money. What difference does dedicated funding make or
does it not make a difference? We have had dedicated funding
for air security, we have had it for port security. Does it
make any difference or do you think that the pot of money from
the other set of grants could be used by major transportation
systems just as well?
Could I hear from each of you on that?
Chief Hanson. I think dedicated funding is appropriate and
necessary. I think that transit properties throughout the
United States have had problems accessing regional, state,
local, Urban Area Security Initiative money because there are
competing priorities. It is a political process.
I think prior to London people do not get it when it comes
to transit. I think people now understand their local
responsibilities in relation to securing infrastructure. You
certainly get it with your secure transit and other initiatives
to improve the infrastructure security of vital corridors in
this country. However, locally, I am not sure folks are really
engaged. We are competing with other priorities that folks have
locally.
I do think that there needs to be some tie-in, and the ODP
threat risk vulnerability assessments are appropriate. You go
get one, you have a list of priorities that have been outlined
by the folks writing the check, and when you get dedicated
funding that comes right to the transit property, you go down
that list. And there are ways to ensure that it is being
appropriately spent.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
Mr. Morange?
Chief Morange. Well, in New York, we continue to look for
all types of funding and dedicated funding. As far as any
grants, sometimes we would like that there are certain
parameters that are put on how we can spend that money, and we
would like to show that maybe there is another way that we can
spend it and should be spending it.
I also believe that it is very important for the first
responders, because that is one of our major weapons that we
have against terrorism in our transit system.
So, again, when it comes to any type of funding, we
continually go out to look for funding, but we would like some
kind of way that maybe instead of having to spend it exactly
the way, to show that maybe there is a way that it could be
spent in another area where it would be just as good.
Ms. Norton. For?
Chief Morange. For transportation, yes.
Ms. Norton. For transportation funding.
Mr. Lennon?
Mr. Lennon. Yes. Thank you. There is no question about it,
I agree with the people to my immediate right. We really do
need a dedicated funding stream for transit. The way the money
is being allocated to the states sets up circumstances of
competing priorities here.
We are talking about first responder communities here that
really do need the money, there is no question about it. But
when you go west of the Mississippi, in the case of California
and specifically Los Angeles, we have a very, very vocal first
responder community, very, very Professional, et cetera, but
the focus on public transportation isn't there in terms of the
funding stream, albeit the people that use it, we have 1.3
million riders every day using our public transit.
But we will find, when the smoke clears, that the majority
of the monies do not get to the transit system itself. It goes
to the first responder communities. That is why it is
imperative for us to have a dedicated funding stream to the
transit systems to ensure that they get what they need.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Kozub?
Mr. Kozub. Thank you. As I mentioned before, dedicated
funding is a very vital component to this. It is emergency
responder training, and I have been in the emergency services
and the fire service for 25 years myself. It is a very vital
component, as I have identified in the past.
But one thing that cannot be ignored is training, not only
initial training but continuing training for the frontline
employees is very vital to that whole process. When the
emergency responders get there, it is what has been done by
those employees in the first few seconds and few minutes that
is going to determine whether those fire and police units are
on the scene for 2 hours or 2 days.
So we cannot look at the emergency response as just those
showing up in uniform on dedicated vehicles. Emergency response
happens from the minute and the second an incident happens and
goes from there.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask one more question.
It is a really thinking out of the box question. People rightly
say, because it is the only analogy they can point to, how do
you spend the kind of money that you spend on air travel and?we
do not have that kind of money. I would be the first to agree
with them.
The chairman asked about random searches. In a real sense,
I think that describes the pitiful state of where we are on
mass transit funding. It is not that you do not know what to
do. You are doing all that you have at your disposal now.
But may I ask you whether you think at the federal level we
should be encouraging our great entrepreneurial inventive
private sector to help us think through an entirely new
approach for mass transit security, where you would put a
problem to them?limited resources, 19 billion passenger rides
every year'some of the people you would be talking to would be
technology people, some of the people you would be talking to
would simply be analytical people.
So the two-part question would be, help us think through
technology that would be within our means that could help us
protect mass transit where people have to go and come quickly.
And the other part of the question would be simply
analytical: Even without the technology, the people who think
about security, what are the best ways to in fact reinvent
security on mass transit?
Do you think that that kind of proposition put out to the
public, to security experts on the one hand, to people with
technology on the other hand, would be the kind of federal
leadership that would help you to solve the new problems that
London and Madrid now present to you, essentially, as it is now
to solve for yourselves?
Chief Hanson. Couple of things that I am thinking outside
of the box. Science and technology and DHS should be doing
that, and they should be leveraging those kind of opportunities
and partnerships. Our PROTECT Program was taking military
technology and seeing if that could work in a transit property,
and it was very successful.
I agree with my colleague over here, there needs to be a
list of standards and they cannot come out after you have
bought all the equipment. It would help if there was a list of
standards, and transit chiefs and transit properties have been
asking for that for some time. There are a lot of snake oil
salesmen. They see we have the money. They are calling every
day wanting to sell us stuff. Somebody needs to do the
evaluations to tell us what works and what does not.
And on a very low tech dimension, I would suggest that
September is National Preparedness Month. Let's get serious
about it. Our kids do fire drills in schools and why don't our
businesses and the folks who use transit get serious about
preparedness during that month and try another alternative way
to get to work, really seriously look at planning at home and
sheltering in place and the other kind of activities that if we
are really serious about preparedness, we should be engaging in
as a nation and a country.
I want to go back to Mr. Kozub whose training is absolutely
fabulous. This video is dynamic. We just put it on our Intranet
so all employees can access it. There are challenges in
training operational employees. The emphasis has been on cops
and fire fighters. Our operational employees are out there
every day, and there is backfill overtime money for cops and
fire fighters. There needs to be for our operational employees.
It is very hard to take them out of the system?bus operators,
train operators, custodians?to do the kind of training that Mr.
Kozub has designed and is absolutely fabulous.
So some of those are things that I think would really help
us get where we need to go.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Morange?
Mr. King. If I could just interrupt, Chief Morange. To
follow up on what Chief Hanson said about using military-type
equipment. You also had some experience with that and it did
not work out, as I recall.
Chief Morange. Well, presently, we have the PROTECT system
in Grand Central Terminal and we have been trying that out. And
we also are looking to take it over from DHS.
Mr. King. Wasn't there a system proposed to you by the Army
that did not work in New York?
Chief Morange. Well, the Army was something different. When
I first came over, the Army was going to do some of the
technology and all, but according to contracts and all, it just
could not be done. But they talked about Lockheed Martin and
other--Grumman and all that were involved in this type of
technology, which we are looking into today. But we do, through
DHS, use the PROTECT system, and we are also involved with New
York City with the Biowatch Program.
But getting into technology and the young minds, this is
the greatest country in the world, and there are a lot of young
minds that are out there, and I think that that is something
that we should all be looking to tap and see what is out there,
what we can do, and it should come through, one agency where
they are just looking at that technology for us.
As far as involving everyone, today, security is everyone's
business, and it is evident by the way you go into any of these
transportation systems today and you see something, say
something, the eyes and ear programs, how they all work, how a
lot of people are making a lot more calls, and it is our
responsibility that we respond to all of these calls and do
what is proper.
I mean, our employees, we have got 65,000 employees that we
constantly tell them how important they are, ``It does not
matter what your assignment is in the system, you are very
important to us.'' And I think what you say about as far as
involving everyone, involving the business community and all,
that is a great idea in addition to having all this technology
looked at and what is out there.
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Lennon.
Mr. Lennon. I think my colleagues have really pretty much
summarized it very, very adequately, but I think you raised the
right question, and that was the question that we have been
talking about for 2 years. The snake oil salespeople that Polly
has talked about has been an anathema to us in the industry.
When you look at the technology that is in play right here
at National Airport, it is the same technology that we used
back in the seventies, shortly after I got out of the Marines.
You came through after the federal sky marshals, the
hijackings. It has been upgraded somewhat but we are still
doing it, we are still queuing up to wait in line, to go
through metal detectors. We are adding chemical detectors, we
are talking about explosive detectors too. If we challenge the
convention wisdom out there, as Bill has indicated, you get
people focused on where we need to go with this.
Using transit as probably the ultimate beneficiary, we will
come up with a solution within a year to 2 years. We have never
challenged the public.
The other part, as I have already indicated, we need to
really engage the public. We are doing everything that we can
right now to train our employees. We are heightening public
awareness at the local level. We need to engage the national
public with a national mindset of what they need to be doing.
We need to be a seamless focus on counting terrorism right now.
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Kozub?
Mr. Kozub. I am not going to repeat anything that has been
said. I will just throw in one caveat. Technology is a good
step. There needs to be more research. However, let's not
forget that the PROTECT system in WMATA requires one of Chief
Hanson's officers within a control room that if it is set off
to respond appropriately. A camera is a very good tool that can
view a variety of areas, but you need a human being sitting
there, viewing the output of that camera and assessing and
analyzing that information and making snap decisions to respond
to it appropriately.
So while we need to look at exploring more technology, the
research of it, the application of it, we also need to look at
the human factor of all the technology and what is capable of
one person or a group of people and a response and analytical
perspective on a daily basis.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Finally, I am not even suggesting that
technology is the answer, because I am not sure. I am
suggesting that I would want to find out. I would want to ask
these folks who can now tell us about how, for example, to
use?that did not take much. It did not take us very long to
find out that if you had a cell phone, you can now use a cell
phone to set off a bomb throughout the New York subway or the
Metro system, and that is pretty low tech. They can do that. It
seems to me the same kind of technology might be able to help
us stop that.
But quite apart from that, I am also concerned?
Mr. King. Can you wrap it up, because we have to go to?
Ms. Norton. Yes. I am also concerned that there are other
ways to approach mass transit. Ways that are very different
from approaching air travel security need to be thought
through, whether or not they involve technology.
Thank you very much.
Mr. King. Thank the gentlelady.
And the ranking member of the full committee, gentleman
from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I,
too, join the other members in saying that this is quite an
interesting panel.
Couple questions. We heard the term, ``no standards,''
technology not being what it is, can the three transit
authorities tell me whether or not you have ever received a
directive from DHS about technology in terms of what is
applicable for transit security?
Chief Hanson. There are a variety of particulars that come
out. We recently participated in something that ODP facilitated
for us where trash cans are being tested. Many of us, the TSA
requirement is to have bomb-containment cans or clear plastic,
so we are very interested in ensuring that the products that we
purchase with federal dollars do what they say they are going
to do.
There are other information bulletins that they put out.
What they really have done, though, is to look at what we are
doing and recommend things that they know. They do in DHS have
science and technology as the directorate that I think could do
more to advance. The recommendations are testing of some of the
things that were discussed today and new technologies that are
out there.
Chief Morange. We have met with DHS. We have talked about
standards that other agencies are using amongst ourselves to
find out what are the best practices that are out there. They
also have been involved with us with doing certain pilot
programs.
So it is a continuous effort of looking for what is out
there, and we do get help from all agencies involved. I think
it is not so much when we look at as far as receiving
assistance and all. I think it is so much that all of us
getting together, and I believe that is the most important
part. We were down at the DHS. We did talk about explosive-
detecting dogs, we talked about the trash containers. A lot of
us brought up the fact that we did not feel that these trash
containers were tested. We asked that they would be looked at.
So we also bring back certain thing that we would like to see
happen.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Lennon.
Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. The trash containers are the perfect
example, I think, and probably the most prevalent example of
what was recommended to us by TSA. They have a value, but what
has to be conditioned in applying that value is where you place
those trash barrels. Those barrels direct the explosion, a
vertical plane, depending on the height of the ceiling, the
fact that you are in a subway may or may not be the best place
to put those barrels. We got the barrels through grant monies,
I might add, and we are apply to our outdoor rail station
because of what we have found in conducting our own tests.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am glad you talked about that but one
other question is, what if I told you that as of today, we have
no transit security plan that has been presented to Congress,
even though we require that a transit security be produced by
April 2 of this year. And so whatever we are doing, it is based
on what somebody thinks they should do. Because the Department
has failed to meet the congressional mandate on producing a
transit security plan for this country.
Chief Hanson. What I would say is that the transit
properties have been required to put forward plans and are
required to present them to the FTA during a triennial review
or any other audit that is conducted because FTA provides
capital funds. What I would also say is that transit properties
were required to submit plans to ODP in order to qualify for
the next round of urban area security or transit grant monies.
So we have certainly developed plans and put them together and
submitted them to the appropriate folks. I am not at liberty to
discuss what happened after that, but we have done our part.
Mr. Thompson. And maybe I need to put the tail on the
question to say, have you been consulted by the Department as
to what a good transit security plan would include?
Chief Hanson. FTA actually brought a number of the people
that are at this table together to discuss that, and many of us
were a part of making recommendations as to what should be in
those plans and then guidance was published by FTA outlining
what things should be in the plan.
Mr. Thompson. But you have not seen the plan.
Chief Hanson. Well, I have put together my plan, and I have
seen their recommendations for the plan. But many of us at this
table were a part of suggesting what would be appropriate to be
in the plan.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Morange?
Chief Morange. I think it is like Chief Hanson said. We
have submitted our plans, we have talked?and I really believe
that putting together a transit plan is not as easy as it may
seem because of the different variables that are in the
systems. An also if you take the New York City transit system,
I mean, it is 100 years old.
So, I mean, basic plans, yes, you could put in, but, again,
you have to continually bring all of the transit agencies
together so that they could share their best practices. And it
is a continuous changing thing.
Mr. Thompson. Well, Mr. Lennon, I will put it to you, say,
if you indulge me. I am not talking about your individual
department plans, which obviously you have done a very credible
job. What I am concerned about is the fact that we do not have
a national transit security plan for America.
All of you have done your individual plans, but you run
major operations yourself. And I am trying to get whether or
not you have either been involved in helping DHS to do this
soon to be produced transit security plan. Do you know of one
in the works. Would you like to be included in consultation of
such a plan?
I know what you do individually, but we are charged with
doing it for all of America and we are yet to have it.
Mr. Lennon. Let me respond to that. We have been contacted
by TSA when it first came into existence for copies about my
security plan. I think they tapped into all the other major
real transit systems and multimodal transit systems for copies
of their plans. And that has been occurring for the past 2
years. We have shared our plan with the representatives from
TSA when they touched down.
We know they have been looking at our plan. The feedback
that they gave us, as Chief Hanson has pointed out, that they
noted the uniqueness. So I know they have seen other plans.
They have noted the uniqueness of our system but noted the
commonalities in our plan that are similar to the chief here
and the chief further on. And that is because of the FTA's role
in developing standards.
So there are standards for a system security plan despite
the anomalies and the differences amongst all of us. We all
have plans in place. We drill to our plans.
If you tell me that would I like additional input into a
national plan, most certainly, we would all welcome that, I
think if nothing else, because I would like to see my plan as
the role model, and so would Chief Hanson and so would Chief
Morange. I think the communication is in place at our levels.
We focus less on the uniqueness of my system versus Chief
Hanson's or Chief Morange's. What we do is we come together
multiple times during the year, our staff does too, and we do
it as a national level through the APTA conferences and through
round tables that the FTA hosts. And we share our best
practices as well as our plans.
I think we are at a very, very standard preparatory for
response, too, at this point in time.
Mr. Thompson. Not to cut you off, but I think we just have
been fortunate that we have had good people running transit
authorities in this country..
Mr. Lennon. I agree.
Mr. Thompson. But our charge that we gave the Department is
to come up with a plan for the country, and they have not done
that.
Mr. Chairman, I think maybe part of this hearing is that we
need to, since we had the secretary before us yesterday, remind
him that the committee and Congress, for that matter is still
waiting on this transit security plan for Americans, noting the
fact that within each individual transit authority they already
have their own, but I think we have to have some national
standards.
Mr. King. There is no doubt the plan is overdue. There is
also no doubt that there is a strong bipartisan consensus on
this committee that the plan should be put together as quickly
as possible. I will certainly discuss it with Chairman Cox, and
if Mr. Pascrell wants to discuss it, we can certainly submit a
joint statement to the secretary to reemphasize the importance
that we attach to that plan.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. King. I thank the ranking member.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. In
addition to everything else, you have shown how complex the
issue is, you have shown how wide-ranging it is. In New York, I
am somewhat reassured that we have gotten over $190 million for
the MTA in recent years, but I also realize the large job that
is still out there. And if it is true in New York, it is true
in Washington, it is true in Los Angeles, it is true everywhere
in the country.
So this is an issue that requires, as the ranking member
said, for Homeland Security to be directly involved, and
thankfully we do have people such as yourselves at the local
level.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony today, and,
more importantly, for the job you do day in and day out,
because, as Eleanor Holmes Norton said, you really are the
troops that are on the front lines. We are in a war, you are on
the front lines, you are doing a great job. We want to thank
you for it.
And with that, members of the committee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to
respond to them if you would in writing. We will keep the
record open for 10 days. And also I ask unanimous consent that
a letter from the American Public Transportation Association be
admitted into the record. Without objection, so ordered.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]