[Senate Hearing 109-485]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-485
NATO: FROM COMMON DEFENSE TO COMMON SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska.................... 3
Jones, GEN James L., Jr., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Mons,
Belgium........................................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Additional Statement and Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 24
Jones, GEN James, Jr., responses to questions submitted by
Senator Lugar.................................................. 26
(iii)
NATO: FROM COMMON DEFENSE TO COMMON SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room
SD-419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar and Hagel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. Today the Foreign Relations
Committee meets to discuss the evolution of the NATO Alliance
and its operations in Afghanistan. We are especially honored to
welcome our good friend GEN James Jones, Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, to share with us his insights on NATO's
transformation and its role in Afghanistan and other regions
outside the Alliance's borders.
General Jones has brought energy and imagination to
nontraditional operations outside of Europe. In August, I had
the pleasure of joining General Jones in North Africa on a
humanitarian mission to facilitate the release of the last of
404 Moroccan prisoners of war held by the Polisario. The
release of these prisoners involved United States mediation
between Morocco and Algeria, two Muslim nations with whom we
are seeking closer ties. General Jones' military-to-military
contacts with these nations and the logistic support he was
able to deliver through the European Command were essential to
the success of this humanitarian mission. The ease with which
he and his personnel worked the Moroccans and Algerians
demonstrated how successful they have been in building ties to
militaries outside of Europe.
The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense
of continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the
cold war, the gravest threats to Europe and North America
originate from other regions of the world. This requires
Europeans and Americans to be bolder in remaking our alliances,
forging new structures, and changing our thinking. We must
reorient many of our national security institutions, of which
NATO is one of the most important. To be fully relevant to the
security and well-being of the people of its member nations,
NATO must think and act globally.
In particular, NATO must engage with nations on its
perimeter to promote security and stability. Many nations in
North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia
have suffered from instability and conflict generated by
demographics, religious extremism, autocratic governments, and
stagnant economic systems. I applaud NATO's Partnership for
Peace, Mediterranean Dialog, and Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, which seek to create partnerships with selected
countries across Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa. These
initiatives enhance our security and stability through new
regional engagement on common security issues, including
military-to-military cooperation. NATO has been a valuable
instrument for helping nations reform and professionalize their
militaries. It also has participated in many humanitarian
missions, including its recent 3-month effort in Pakistan
following the devastating October earthquake.
Geographic distance should not dissuade NATO leaders from
developing stronger links with nations willing to cooperate
with NATO missions and activities. Australia and New Zealand
already support the NATO operation in Afghanistan, and Japan
and South Korea have expressed their interest in closer links
to NATO.
In coming months, special attention must be paid to NATO's
support for the African Union and its peacekeeping mission in
Darfur. The African Union's efforts to respond to the genocidal
violence in Sudan have been augmented by NATO's assistance with
transportation, communication, and other logistical
requirements. Because of continuing violence in Sudan, last
week the U.N. Security Council asked the Secretary General to
begin planning for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Darfur. Such a
mission would reinforce and eventually absorb the African Union
contingent. The proposed U.N. force is likely to require
expanded NATO logistics support.
In 2002, the Bush aministration proposed the Prague
Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force, the NRF.
These initiatives were designed to facilitate the creation of
an agile, flexible, and expeditionary military capability that
can respond to security challenges beyond the borders of
Europe. While progress has been made, some members have fallen
behind in meeting these commitments. This must change if NATO
is to be fully effective.
NATO's effort to stabilize Afghanistan exemplifies the
challenges facing the Alliance in its transition to a global
mission responsive to its common security. We have witnessed a
steady political transition in Afghanistan since the fall of
the Taliban in 2001. The Afghans held successful Parliamentary
and Provincial elections last fall. The international community
displayed strong support for Afghanistan at the London Donor's
Conference just last week and the newly concluded Afghanistan
Compact is a credible plan for strengthening the security,
economy, and governance of the nation.
Despite the progress and renewed commitments, severe
threats to Afghanistan's future remain, especially from
terrorism, religious extremism, and the narcotics trade.
Overcoming these challenges will require a sustained
international commitment, of which NATO is the most important
component.
While Operation Enduring Freedom continues to prosecute the
war on terror in Afghanistan, NATO is poised to take on a more
robust security and reconstruction role. The decision by the
Netherlands last week to commit up to 1,700 troops to the NATO-
led reconstruction mission in southern Iraq was an important
affirmation of the importance of this mission. These expanded
NATO operations, first in southern Afghanistan and then in
eastern Afghanistan, will be a test of NATO's capacity to
defend its security ``in depth,'' far from Europe's borders.
Afghanistan presents a difficult environment, but NATO must
be resourceful, resilient, and ultimately successful. Failure
would be a disaster for global security. As NATO's Secretary
General commented last week, ``If we fail, the consequences of
terrorism will land on our doorstep, be it in Belgium,
Amsterdam, the United States, or whatever.''
We look forward very much to our discussion with General
Jones today and we thank him for his willingness to join us.
I'd like to recognize Senator Hagel's presence. Senator Hagel,
do you have a comment or a statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would echo what
you have just said and add my welcome to our distinguished
guest today, General Jones. Look forward to his testimony.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. General
Jones, will you please proceed. Please give a full report. As
I've mentioned to you privately, this is a day in which we want
to hear from you extensively about your experiences and your
mission.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hagel,
it's--thank you both for allowing me the opportunity to make a
presentation before this distinguished committee. I'm most
grateful for the invitation to come here this afternoon.
Today I'm appearing before you in my capacity as the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and also the commander of
United States European Command. In so doing, I will provide you
with a brief overview of current NATO activities and in my
remarks I will focus on NATO's greatest challenges this year in
2006 which is the expansion of the International Security
Assistance Force or ISAF mission across the southern and
eastern regions of Afghanistan, as well as NATO's efforts to
bring its premier transformational vehicle, the NATO Response
Force, to full operational capability by October of this year.
Before you, you have a brief summary of NATO's ongoing
missions and operations and this will provide you a reference
as we discuss these topics. Before I begin, I would like to
introduce one member of my party in particular, SGM Alfred
McMichael. Sergeant Major McMichael is completing his 36th year
on active duty as a U.S. Marine. He has served a long, and has
a long and distinguished, career. He was the sergeant major of
the Marine Corps when I was the commandant of the Marine Corps
in my tours from 1999 to 2003 and then agreed to come over and
become the first sergeant major of Allied Command Operations in
NATO.
And I entrusted him with a very simple mission statement
and that is to go forth and expose the value of noncommissioned
officers and staff noncommissioned officers to countries of the
Alliance who had no such experience. As you know, the eastern
block countries of the former Soviet Union do not have the NCO
structure in their armed forces. And in the 3 years that the
sergeant major has been here with his colleagues, nine
countries now have NCO and staff NCO programs that did not have
them before. He has accomplished this job with his usual
passion and enthusiasm and also a great deal of leadership and
personal style. He's a consummate diplomat and he has had a
vision and a purpose and he has achieved his mission
spectacularly and I would like to introduce a truly great
American and a great marine to you and certainly someone
without whom I could not have done my job at all. And he will
be leaving active duty this summer after 36 years of duty. I
know of no marine who's made a greater contribution, not only
to the Marine Corps, but also to the international community
that we're developing as we speak.
The Chairman. Would you ask him to stand, please, so we can
recognize him. Thank you so much for being a part of our
hearing. We're honored.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, as you both
know, NATO is rapidly transforming. At the Prague Summit in
November of 2002, NATO members signaled their recognition of
the changing security environment and the need to make major
shifts in both organization and military capabilities of the
Alliance. NATO is making progress and is perhaps in the midst,
in my view, of the most fundamental physical and philosophical
transformation in its history.
While NATO has achieved some notable successes since 2002
in transforming its military structure, the Alliance finds
itself at the strategic crossroads between the 20th and the
21st centuries. Nations of the Alliance now totaling 26
increasingly display greater political will to undertake
missions of great strategic distances in Afghanistan and Iraq
and even in Africa, and I've put a chart up here just to focus
your attention on the 30,000 or so NATO troops that are engaged
at great distances in the world.
This collective will signals that NATO is becoming more
proactive than reactive, more expeditionary than static, and
more diverse in its capabilities, and while this emergent NATO
is to be celebrated, encouraged, and supported, one cannot fail
to emphasize that the political will to do more is as yet not
completely accompanied by an equal political will to resource
in men, money, and material; this new-found appetite.
Despite nonbinding agreements at the Prague Summit of 2002
that nations should strive to maintain their defense budgets at
no less than 2 percent of their respective gross domestic
products, today only seven nations have achieved this goal.
Similarly, in terms of manpower pledges of nations for
support to headquarters and operations, we are currently not
meeting our goals in that regard.
Finally, our efforts to procure agreed upon strategic
capabilities, such as strategic lift, the Alliance ground
surveillance system, computer information systems and the like,
have not been funded adequately, thereby perpetuating critical
shortfalls in the Alliance.
Encouragingly however, the recently concluded Munich
Security Conference which you just referred to, Mr. Chairman,
lent great support to the primacy of NATO as the premier venue
for transatlantic discussions and future actions with regard to
security issues. Chancellor Merkel's eloquent speech at the
conference on Saturday the 4th of February was instrumental in
the conference's reaffirmation of NATO's enduring value to our
transatlantic relationship.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, it is clear that publics on
both sides of the Atlantic clearly understood what the Alliance
represented during the cold war. We were united despite
occasional ``family disagreements'' around the central anchor
point of prevailing over the threat posed by the former Soviet
Union. Regrettably, I doubt that our publics today on either
side of the ocean fully understand the need, nature, and
purpose of the Alliance in the post-cold-war era of the 21st
century. On that score we can and must do better.
As we head toward the NATO Summit of November 2006, in
Riga, Latvia, NATO will strive to redefine itself in a world
facing asymmetric challenges posed by nonstate actors, emerging
threats to energy supplies, and perhaps critical
infrastructures, and a requirement for more proactive
activities, security, stability, and reconstruction to deter
future crises from developing, all of which include the many
facets of terrorism and all of which will define NATO's
activities in 2006 and beyond.
Our Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is
outlining an ambitious agenda for this year which will include
new and revitalized partnership programs with special emphasis
placed on the NATO Russia and NATO Ukraine relationships,
possibilities for further NATO enlargement in the future, and
the development of new collective capabilities for NATO's
military use.
From an operational standpoint, NATO is experiencing one of
the busiest times in its history with over 28,000 NATO and non-
NATO troops from 42 nations serving under the NATO flag. We are
conducting operations on three continents and I believe that
this operations tempo will continue to increase in 2006.
In Iraq, NATO has deployed a successful training mission to
Baghdad to assist the government's efforts to establish
security and stability. NATO's in-country staff officer mission
complements the work of the United States-led multinational
security transition command in Iraq to train Iraq security
forces. In September 2005, with support from the NATO training
mission, Iraq opened its National Defense University. NATO has
also provided numerous training opportunities for Iraqi
officers and civilian leaders in educational facilities across
Europe and coordinated the acquisition and delivery of donated
military equipment from NATO nations to the Iraqi security
forces.
In Africa, as I testified before you last September, NATO
and the European Union jointly responded to an African Union
request to airlift forces for the African Union mission in
Sudan from across Africa. NATO generated and coordinated the
majority of the airlift, provided personnel to assist with
staff capacity building activities in key African Union
headquarters, and deployed training teams to work with their
African Union counterparts. NATO support is committed until May
2006. A NATO African Union strategic partnership is developing
and extensions or expansion of NATO support beyond May 2006, if
requested by the African Union, may be forthcoming.
Closer to Europe, NATO's only Article V operation,
Operation Active Endeavor, continues to not only counter
terrorism and illegal activities in the Mediterranean but
provides an opportunity for non-NATO partnership for peace and
Mediterranean dialog nations to enhance their involvement and
interoperability. In 2006, indeed this month, two Russian
vessels will deploy to Operation Active Endeavor, join the
mission along with Ukrainian vessels anticipated next year.
Formal discussions have commenced on the possible involvement
of Algerian, Israeli, Moroccan, and Georgian participation as
well.
May I take a moment, Mr. Chairman, to underscore the value
of your trip to Algeria and Morocco just a few months ago to
assist and to coordinate the release of 404 prisoners and their
return from Algeria to Morocco which has been the anchor point
of a resurgence of good will toward the United States in the
North African region.
On mainland Europe, we recently observed the 10th
anniversary of international involvement in the Balkans.
Through its security sector reform initiatives, NATO has
successfully set the conditions in the region for the peaceful
transition to democratic institutions and progress toward
politically subordinate and reformed militaries. Working
closely with the European Union, political institutional
incentives linked to the standards of behavior have encouraged
Balkan States to recognize the benefits of closer integration
with the European Union and NATO and led to considerable
progress in the capture of persons indicted for war crimes,
however, more work remains to be done in this area.
NATO's forces in Kosova are undergoing a transition to a
lighter and more mobile and deployable structure that exploits
technology and a more agile and better trained force to manage
the security situation. As the Kosova status talks develop over
the coming months and consensus is hopefully reached between
ethnic Kosovar, Albanian, and Serbian communities, NATO should
be postured to reduce force levels significantly in the
Province and in the Balkans in general.
NATO's most ambitious operation, the International Security
Assistance Force, known as ISAF, currently encompasses half of
the territorial landmass of Afghanistan and will expand into
the south and then to the east in 2006. This chart to my left
is a graphic pictorial of the diversity that is present in
Afghanistan in the sectors and the stages by which NATO has
expanded. First, going to the north then to the west near Herat
and now shortly to the south and then around to the east, if
you will, in a counterclockwise direction.
As NATO assumes the responsibility for security and
stability, its force levels will ultimately surpass that of the
coalition's and will constitute one of the largest operations
in Alliance history. It will go from 9,000 troops at present to
25,000 when expansion is complete. It is envisioned that when
expansion is complete that the United States will still be the
largest troop-contributing nation to the mission.
In ISAF, NATO has built it on the coalition concept of
provincial reconstruction teams and successfully supported the
Government of Afghanistan and its Presidential National
Assembly in provincial council elections. Expansion will
present NATO with many new and complex challenges but NATO and
U.S. coalition commanders are working very closely to ensure
that the transition of responsibility is effective and
continues to provide credible, professional, and legitimate
Afghan political and security infrastructures.
Finally, through its primary transformational vehicle, the
NATO Response Force, the Alliance attempts to meet emerging
crises across the full spectrum of military missions at
strategic distance and in the most challenging of environments.
Most recently and due to its agility, flexibility, and
expeditionary nature, the NATO Response Force was selected to
assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both Hurricane
Katrina and in the wake of the Pakistan earthquake. But the NRF
faces challenges. Force generation efforts for future NATO
Response Force rotations are not producing a complete and
balanced force which is a cause for concern. The principle
reason for this problem, I believe, is that NATO has not
reformed its 20th century funding mechanisms that require
nations to pay all costs associated with the transport and
sustainment of their deployed forces. We have yet to take into
account the full impact of the 21st century expeditionary
nature of NATO operations. NATO's funding arrangements were
appropriate when forces did not deploy outside the European
theater of operations such as during the cold war. However,
with operations being conducted today at great distances our
current approach to resourcing our operations actually acts as
a disincentive for nations to contribute forces for
deployments.
While NATO has made progress in approving revised funding
guidelines to fund critically needed strategic lift in support
of this year's NRF certification exercise scheduled for June in
Cape Verde, Africa, as well as the operational and strategic
reserve forces, much work remains to be accomplished.
As we speak today, full operational capability for the NRF
by October of this year is still at risk.
As I conclude these opening remarks, I'd like to leave you
with a final thought. Today the transatlantic security link
embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is viable,
vital, and vibrant. The proposals being considered by the
nations in 2006, if adopted, will go a long way toward helping
NATO enhance its increasingly critical role in providing
collective security and strategic stability. NATO has been, and
needs to remain, a great alliance. Great alliances should be
expected to do great things. It is possible, even probable in
my view, that NATO's most important contributions and most
important missions still lie in its future.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the privilege to make
these opening remarks and I'd be happy to respond to any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN James L. Jones, Jr., USMC, Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe,
Mons, Belgium
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of this
committee, I am very grateful for your invitation to come and speak to
you this afternoon. Today, I am appearing before you as the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe; in doing so, I will provide you with a brief
overview of current NATO activities. In my remarks, I will focus on
NATO's greatest challenges in 2006, namely the expansion of the
International Security Assistance Force or ISAF mission across the
southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, as well as NATO's efforts
to bring its premier transformational vehicle, the NATO Response Force,
to full operational capability. We have distributed to each of you a
brief summary of NATO's ongoing missions and operations. This will
provide you a reference as we discuss these topics.
NATO is rapidly transforming. At the Prague Summit in November
2002, NATO member nations signaled their recognition of the changing
security environment and the need to make major shifts in both
organization and its military capabilities. NATO is making progress and
is perhaps in the midst of the most fundamental physical and
philosphical transformation in its history.
While NATO has achieved some notable success since 2002 in
transforming its military structure, the Alliance finds itself at the
stategic crossroads between centuries. Nations of the Alliance, now
totalling 26, increasingly display greater political will to undertake
missions at great strategic distances (Afganistan, Iraq, and even
Africa). This collective will signals that NATO is becoming more
proactive than reactive, more expeditionary than static, and more
diverse in its capabilities. While this emergent NATO is to be
celebrated, encouraged, and supported, one cannot fail to emphasize
that the political will to do more is, as yet, not accompanied by an
equal political will to resource--in men, money, and material--this
new-found appetite.
Despite nonbinding agreements, at the Prague Summit of 2002, that
nations should strive to maintain their defense budgets at no less than
2 percent of their respective GDP, today only seven nations have
achieved this goal. Similarly, in terms of manpower pledges of nations
for support to headquarters and operations, we are currently not
meeting our goals. Finally our efforts to produce agreed upon strategic
capabilities (i.e., Strat Lift, Alliance Ground Surveillance System,
Computer Info System) have not been funded adequately thereby
perpetuating critical shortfalls in the Alliance.
Encouragingly, the recently concluded Munich Security Conference
lent great support to the primacy of NATO as the premier venue for
transatlantic discussions and future actions with regard to all
security issues. Chancellor Merckel's eloquent speech at the conference
on Saturday, 4 February, was instrumental in the conference's
reaffirmation of NATO's enduring value to our transatlantic
relationship.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it is clear
that publics on both sides of the Atlantic clearly understood what the
Alliance represented during the cold war. We were united, despite
occasional ``family disagreements,'' around the central ``anchor
point'' of prevailing over the threat posed by the former Soviet Union.
Regrettably, I doubt that our publics today, on either side of the
ocean, understand the need, nature, and purpose of the Alliance in the
post-cold-war era of the 21st century.
As we head toward the NATO Summit of November 2006 in Riga, Latvia,
NATO will strive to redefine itself in a world facing asymetric
challenges posed by nonstate actors, emerging threats to energy supply
and perhaps critical infrastructures, and a requirement for more
proactive activities (security, stability, and reconstruction) to deter
future crises from developing--all of which include the many facets of
terrorism, and all of which will define NATO's activities in 2006 and
beyond. NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer is outlining an
ambitious agenda for this year, which will include new and revitalized
partnership programs, with special emphasis placed on the NATO-Russia
and NATO-Ukraine relationships; possibilities for further NATO
enlargement in the future; and the development of new collective
capabilities for NATO's use.
From an operational standpoint, NATO is experiencing one of the
busiest times in its history, with over 28,000 NATO and non-NATO troops
from 42 nations serving under the NATO flag. We are conducting
operations on three continents, and I believe that this operations
tempo will continue to increase in 2006.
In Iraq, NATO has deployed a successful training mission to Baghdad
to assist the government's efforts to establish security and stability.
NATO's in-country staff officer mission complements the work of the
U.S.-led multinational security transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to
train Iraqi security forces. In September 2005, with support from the
NATO training mission, Iraq opened its National Defense University.
NATO has also provided numerous training opportunities for Iraqi
officers and civilian leaders in educational facilities across Europe
and coordinated the acquisition and delivery of donated military
equipment from NATO nations to the Iraqi security forces.
In Africa, as I testified before you last September, NATO and the
European Union jointly responded to an African Union (AU) request to
airlift forces for the AU mission in Sudan (Darfur) from across Africa.
NATO generated and coordinated the majority of airlift, provided
personnel to assist with staff capacity-building activities in key AU
headquarters, and deployed training teams to work with their AU
counterparts. NATO's support is committed until May 2006. A NATO-AU
strategic partnership is developing, and extensions or expansion of
NATO support beyond May 2006, if requested by the AU, may be
forthcoming.
Closer to Europe, NATO's only Article V operation, Operation Active
Endeavour (OAE), continues not only to counter terrorism and illegal
activities in the Mediterranean, but provides an opportunity for non-
NATO ``partnership for peace'' and ``Mediterranean dialogue'' nations
to enhance their involvement and interoperability. In 2006, Russian
vessels will deploy to OAE, with Ukrainian vessels anticipated in 2007.
Formal discussions have commenced on the possible involvement of
Algerian, Israeli, Moroccan, and Georgian participation as well.
On mainland Europe, we recently observed the 10th anniversary of
international involvement in the Balkans. Through its security sector
reform initiatives, NATO has successfully set the conditions in the
region for the peaceful transition to democratic institutions and
progress toward politically subordinate and reformed militaries.
Working closely with the European Union, political and institutional
incentives linked to standards of behavior have encouraged Balkan
States to recognize the benefits of closer integration with the EU and
NATO and led to a considerable progress in the capture of persons
indicted for war crimes. However, more work remains to be done in this
region.
NATO's Forces in Kosovo are undergoing a transition to a lighter,
more mobile and deployable structure that exploits technology and a
more agile and better trained force to manage the security situation.
As the Kosovo status talks develop over the coming months and consensus
is hopefully reached between ethnic Kosovar Albanian and Serbian
communities, NATO should be postured to reduce force levels
significantly in the province and in the Balkans in general.
NATO's most ambitious operation, the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), currently encompasses half of the territorial
landmass of Afghanistan and will expand into the south and then the
east in 2006. As NATO assumes responsibility for security and
stability, its force levels will ultimately surpass the coalition's,
and will constitute one of the largest operations in Alliance history--
from 9,000 troops at present to 25,000 when expansion is complete. It
is envisioned that when expansion is complete, the United States will
be the largest troop-contributing nation to this mission.
In ISAF, NATO has built on the coalition concept of provincial
reconstruction teams and successfully supported the Government of
Afghanistan in its Presidential, National Assembly, and Provincial
Council elections. Expansion will present NATO with many new and
complex challenges, but NATO and U.S. coalition commanders are working
very closely to ensure that the transition of responsibility is
effective and continues to develop credible, professional, and
legitimate Afghan political and security structures.
Finally, through its primary transformational vehicle--the NATO
Response Force (NRF)--the Alliance attempts to meet emerging crises
across the full spectrum of military missions, at strategic distance,
and in the most challenging of environments. Most recently, and due to
its agility, flexibility, and expeditionary nature, the NRF was
selected to assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both
Hurricane Katrina and in the wake of the Pakistan earthquake.
But the NRF faces challenges. Force generation efforts for future
NRF rotations are not producing a complete and balanced force, which is
a cause for concern. The principal reason for this problem, I believe,
is that NATO has not reformed its 20th century funding mechanisms that
require nations to pay all costs associated with the transport and
sustainment of their deployed forces. We have yet to take into account
the full impact of the 21st century expeditionary nature of NATO
operations. NATO's funding arrangements were appropriate when forces
did not deploy outside the European Theater of operations, such as
during the cold war. However, with operations being conducted today at
strategic distances, our current approach to resourcing our operations
actually acts as a disincentive to nations contributing forces for
deployments. While NATO has made progress in approving revised funding
guidelines to fund critically needed strategic lift in support of this
year's NRF certification exercise, scheduled for June in Cape Verde, as
well as the operational and strategic reserve forces, much work remains
to be accomplished. As we speak today, full operational capability for
the NRF by October is at risk.
As I conclude these opening remarks, I'd like to leave you with a
final thought: Today, the transatlantic security link embodied by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization is viable, vital, and vibrant. The
proposals being considered by the nations in 2006, if adopted, will go
a long way toward helping NATO enhance its increasingly critical role
in providing collective security and strategic stability. NATO has
been, and needs to remain, a great alliance. Great alliances should be
expected to do great things. It is possible, even probable in my view,
that NATO's most important contributions and most important missions
are still in its future.
Mr. Chairman. Well, thank you very much, General Jones.
We'll have rounds of questions and alternate between Senator
Hagel and myself and others who may join us during the course
of the questions.
Let me begin by mentioning as you have, that the NATO
countries have affirmed that the success of NATO and the
success of ISAF are vital to their security interests. They've
accepted the fact that the defense of Europe is not the issue,
that threats to NATO countries are from outside. Describe what
you find to be the political difficulties that lead to this
budget situation that you described in which 2 percent of GDP
has been strongly suggested as a level of support. NATO nations
have regularly agreed with that, but only seven nations have
met that in the current year.
Now, just anecdotally reading the press, I think we all
understand that each nation in NATO has very pressing needs for
health care, education, and a social safety net for the elderly
and the poor. The demands of publics in each of those countries
are insistent with regard to these. The rate of economic growth
in some of the NATO countries has been limited even in the
larger countries. They have devoted maybe 1 percent, as opposed
to the 3 or 4 percent the United States has to their military
budgets, so there's some constrictions there, obviously, in
terms of income. You must feel this almost each day of your
leadership as you work with these various countries. Is it
going to be possible realistically for countries to measure up
to the 2 percent level?
And then second, the other challenge you've mentioned. If
we are going to operate out of area, the forces and the backup,
the logistic support will literally be lifted to the area. At
the time of the first conflict stages in Afghanistan,
frequently NATO nations complained that they were not being
called upon, that Article V had been invoked and yet their
sacrifices were not being requested. But the practical answer
to that frequently was that there was no ability on the part of
the nations to literally lift their forces to Afghanistan or to
the theaters that might be involved. It is not clear that that
has changed materially.
So address, if you will, the political factors, and the
likelihood of countries overcoming those to get to the level of
support that seems to be accepted as the budget's standard, and
then the lift of capacity, the communications support, quite
apart from the infrastructure, to get to the places outside of
Europe.
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are pressing
problems in the Alliance and I might just start off by saying
that such problems are understandable in the context of what
NATO was built to do in the 20th century versus what we're
asking it to do right now. Large fixed land masses, heavyset
tank divisions massed along the border to defend against
possible attack by the Warsaw Pact countries was the order of
the day and NATO never really had the ambition to move to very
long distance. Our response to an invasion was defensive. It
would have been massive but it was defensive. We never really
developed a force to take the first strike, if you will, at
least with the land armies.
So with the disappearance of the Soviet Union we found
ourselves with this very, very large fixed organization, static
organization, and, also if you will, a mentality that
essentially said, well, we don't use NATO until we have to
react to something and if there's nothing there then so much
the better. And so NATO's ability to take this large static
force and transform it into something that you see on this
chart to my right, and the various distances, was really not
something that could be done overnight. That kind of
transformation, especially with 19 countries and now 26, is
very hard to do, and many of our Warsaw Pact--former Warsaw
Pact, now member nations--had very large land armies also built
on the idea that they would never leave the European landmass.
Many of them are conscripted armies. The idea of a professional
force was certainly not in their vocabulary when they became--
until they became NATO members.
So part of the challenge is how do you retool the force so
that it can be useful and how do you convert the apparatus that
supports all of this, the budgeting, the funding, not only in
the NATO community but also in each nation, and those problems
are different. It's hard for me to speculate as to whether we
can achieve 2 percent. On the face of it, I would think we
could. It doesn't seem to be--it doesn't seem to be an awful
lot to ask given what NATO is about to do, but, obviously,
nations have a difficult time doing that. Part of the problems
that they have doing that is that many of them have invested
certain ways.
For example, certain countries have--of their budget--are
paying 70 to 75 percent of their defense budget on salaries,
for example. When you are past 50 percent on manpower costs,
you really have little ability to do much of anything else by
way of transformation. I can honestly say that I believe that
every country is really trying to do the right thing. It's just
takes a while to turn the ship around. I would be hopeful that
we can see the budget's turnaround, particularly in the face of
these threats and I think as NATO reinvents itself and
reexplains itself to our publics, I think that there will be
more of a demand that NATO, as an alliance, be asked to do more
things in a proactive way, in a crisis preventive mode, in a
security mode, than it has been in the past.
But that's going to take time and it's going to take
concerted political leadership to convince 26 nations that this
is something that clearly has to be done. So, on the one hand,
we can be optimistic and glad that the Alliance is doing what
it's doing, and on the other hand, we do have to realistically
put forth some concerns that we can't keep going in the way of
doing more without being able to change the way we fund these
operations.
And having said that, I'd like--I also support the
Secretary General of NATO in his efforts to bring about some
aspects of common funding to our operations instead of leaving
the full cost to the nations who generously provide their
forces. And certainly the smaller nations would be victimized
by that because they will never have the budgets to be able to
provide rotating battalions and squadrons, especially as our
missions tend to be for longer duration and over great
strategic distances.
With regard to out-of-area operations, this is, in fact, a
new era for NATO and because we are still largely tooled for
the other century where nations were responsible for the total
expense and total support of their deployed forces, we now have
what we call national support elements that follow the national
forces, not under NATO but under national command to provide
the logistics, to provide the capabilities and the support that
their forces need at these great distances.
So in order to bring about greater efficiencies, we are,
for the first time, working at multinational logistics,
multinational intelligence architecture, multinational
communications that are fully interoperable, and multinational
common funding ideas for such things as strategic airlift and
other things that we currently have as a major shortfall.
I think we'll make good progress in that, toward that. I
think that this is something that the Alliance will discuss
during the balance of the year and perhaps by the NATO Summit
we can get some decisions that will move NATO into that
direction.
The Chairman. Let me ask, given the debate that goes on in
our own government about the future of our Armed Forces,
certainly thought has been given to the fact that large fixed
armies, large groups of people moving in what used to be
conventional ways, may not be appropriate for the kinds of
threats the United States seems to find with cell groups,
insurgents, guerilla warfare. Therefore, the need for
flexibility, the need for very different kinds of instruments
of war is required. You're describing, I think correctly, the
fact that European countries had fixed armies that did not
anticipate going anywhere. We're going to defend the heartland,
or at least the neighbors. Suddenly they try to transform to a
situation in which they might have to go somewhere and have
logistics support. The issue probably arises for them now, what
about the debate in the United States? How does this influence
our military doctrine if we're going to fight insurgents or
cell groups?
While we're in the midst of this great reorganization, what
sort of training do we undertake, or what kind of missions are
likely in terms of threats to us? We've defined the whole issue
as being no longer necessarily the defense of Europe but the
meeting of threats well outside of Europe.
I'm just curious, as the NATO commanders meet, or the
national leaders and so forth, leaving aside the summit, a
conspicuous meeting of this sort, is there discussion of
military doctrine within these countries? Given the number of
them and the number of varieties of debates, I suspect this
makes the cohesion of all of this, the leadership of NATO,
especially daunting. But if you can, as an insider, describe
really what is going on.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, it is daunting but there's a
lot of energy associated with these discussions. The fact of
the matter is that when it comes to transformation most, if not
all, of our allies take a keen interest in what it is the
United States is doing and through--and fully understand where
we were and where we've come in transformation and study very
closely the general trend lines and most specifically
associated with joint forces command in Norfolk which is the
center of our transformation.
In my theater in the NATO context and in the European
command, the components, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines,
play a dominant role in assisting our allies in achieving
interoperability and achieving transformational capabilities,
and that's why our forward basing in Europe is still very, very
important. It certainly does not have to be as robust as it was
during the cold war but the footprint that we've proposed for
UCOM's transformation will allow us greater strategic agility
with the forces that we have at greater strategic distances.
The types of--for the foreseeable future the types of threats
that we face will be better defeated by proactive presence and
chosen very carefully, obviously, but by engaging with our
allies in a concerted effort to bring about transformation in
regions that left unattended could be the next, the future
Afghanistans and Iraqs in the next 10 or 15 years.
And so I would say, that one of principal elements of
transformation of NATO is that there's a greater understanding
that mass does not equal capability. It's what you're able to
do with what you have that matters, and in that context we are
also telling new members like the Baltic States, asking them
not to invest in air forces since we have enough and we--by
Article V--we guarantee their security anyway.
So there's an awful lot of dialog going on and countries
are very focused. They are transforming their forces, they are
shrinking the mass and trying to develop new capabilities.
Where I get concerned is where they reduce their forces and
size and also reduce their budgets. To me that's not
transformation, it's just--that's lesser capability. The value
of transformation is to reduce the mass of your force, maintain
your budgets if not increase the budgets, and then apply those
savings toward new technologies and capabilities. The countries
that are doing that are making great contributions. So my
feeling is we're moving in the right direction. We need to do
the things that I mentioned in my opening statements to
accelerate it, but generally this is a new concept and, as I
mentioned, I think we have two kinds of transformation in the
Alliance, one physical and the other cultural. What do you do
with the forces that you have, what is NATO willing to do with
it? Are we really willing to be a proactive alliance which I
think is really the destiny of our future operations.
The Chairman. I'd like to recognize Senator Hagel for
questions.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and again, General
Jones, welcome. I would add my recognition to the sergeant
major who is seated behind you for his years of contributions
and service to our country. Sergeant Major, thank you.
When I was in the Army for a brief time, generals always
scared me but sergeant majors frightened the hell out me and I
don't think that has ever changed.
But it is because of the sergeant majors of our Armed
Forces as you have appropriately recognized General Jones, that
we have built the finest noncommissioned officer corps really
in the history of the world and it's because of people like the
gentleman sitting behind you who have been responsible for
that, so thank you.
I would also like you to say hello to General Wald and
thank him for his service and for all the good work that he has
done for our country and continues to do. Much of what you have
reflected on here, as you know better than anyone, General
Jones, has been because of the relationship that you and
General Wald have had, and the work that he has given and the
leadership he's provided. So please give General Wald our
thanks as well.
As you know, because of you and General Wald, General
Jones, I've had some opportunities over the last few years to
spend some time with you and your team in some of the areas
that you have noted in your statement and I have seen firsthand
the kind of work and imagination and focus that you have
brought to our efforts in relationship with our partners in
NATO and they are transformational, yes, but they are really in
line as much as any time, I think, in the history of our
country or the world with the changing dynamics of challenges
and opportunities that face all of us.
In respect to that point, as you have noted in your opening
comments and as I had an opportunity to read your white paper
this morning which you have given us. Would you expand a bit on
the concept that you've talked about here on potential NATO
partnerships outside the boundaries of the original concept of
NATO. You, I think, referenced Australia, Japan, other
relationships. How would that play out, what kind of
commitments would be born and expected, what kind of mission
statements might be included in that? Thank you.
General Jones. Senator, thank you very much for mentioning
General Wald who is the deputy commander of the United States
European Command and who's been there just a little bit longer
than I have. That's slightly over 3 years. There isn't a day
that goes by that I don't give thanks for General Wald and his
leadership of UCOM.
As you know, his headquarters--our headquarters is in
Stuttgart, Germany. NATO's military headquarters is in Mons,
Belgium, and I find myself spending most of my time either in
Belgium or in some country around our 91 country area of
operation and it is a source of immense gratification and
confidence and pleasure that I've had the privilege of working
with Chuck Wald for the last 3 years.
Most of the initiatives that have really taken off and
blossomed concerning Africa have been as a result of the vision
and the efforts and the persistency of Chuck Wald. Similarly,
our U.S. interests in the Caspian Guard initiatives in the
Caucasus also are the product of his tenacity and his vision.
He's an extraordinary member of the Armed Forces, an
extraordinarily gifted leader, valued friend, and is really
the--really deserves much, much of the credit of anything good
that UCOM is doing and I'm very grateful to have had him for
these 3 years.
The prospect of future partnerships in NATO is one of the
subjects that the Secretary General is interested in developing
as we head toward the summit in Riga in November. As you can
see by the map on Afghanistan, you'll see a number of flags
there that represent non-NATO countries. In fact, in the north
and in the west of Afghanistan right now, which is NATO's area
of operation, we have 35 countries operating in partnership
with NATO. As you know, we're an alliance of 26 so 9 countries
in addition to our NATO members are working with us.
Australia, which you mentioned in your question, is
scheduled to join in the expansion toward stage three in the
south, later on this year in the summertime, and so we have a
tradition now in habitual relations of associations with
different countries. As you know, we have a standing committee
for Russia and the Ukraine. As I mentioned, we're joining two
fully qualified interoperable Russian warships to Operation
Active Endeavor this month in the Mediterranean. So the
precedent of working with other countries from geographically
diverse regions in the world is there. It works, it's
effective, it will be a political decision in NATO as to how
they wish to formalize that in however way. I wouldn't be able
to predict how that might come out but clearly the appetite and
the trend is for more such relationships and at the military-
to-military level, of course, that's a good thing. So we'll
just have to wait and see how it turns out but there are many
countries on the books that are trying to have a formal
relationship with NATO. The last one to come to my attention is
President Karzai wishes to have a formal relationship with NATO
for Afghanistan. We'll just have to wait and see how that works
out politically but the appetite to welcome offers from other
countries is certainly there.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. The Russian relationship that you
have just noted in using a couple of examples of the military-
to-military relationship, depending on a number of
uncontrollables and dynamics that will unfold as the world
evolves over the next few years, how do you see a relationship
with Russia developing in the context of NATO, what we saw over
the last few years how Russia was absorbed into, at least, a
framework of a relationship. It appears that it has worked
pretty well evidenced by the continuation of the military-to-
military relationship. How do you see that evolving?
General Jones. Well, whether my answer is as a U.S. officer
or as NATO officer, it will evolve in the context of political
guidance and approval. Having said that, the approval and the
guidance that we have has allowed for a evolving relationship
that has been very satisfying on both counts.
And, of course, our counterparts in Russia would obviously
not be authorized to engage as they are with either NATO or the
United States European Command had they not had their political
approval as well. So in NATO I've had official exchanges with
my counterpart in Moscow, have been received in Moscow as a
NATO commander. I've received him in Mons as the Chief of
Defense of the Russian Federations Armed Forces. More of those
are scheduled to take place. The NATO/Russia level of ambition
is for, I think, around 50 measurable events this year for
working toward achieving greater interoperability. We have a
good working dialog and I have a Russian general officer and
his staff permanently at SHAPE to work on these mutual issues.
In the United States European Command, we have under the
leadership of General Bell, who I asked to take the lead
because it's primarily an army-to-army relationship but
although not limited exclusively to that. General Bell, who
recently left for new duties in Korea, was absolutely
instrumental in developing a very, very good relationship which
resulted in, among other things, Russian NCO's coming to school
at our base at Grafenwoehr, Germany, and going through NCO
courses, lectures by the sergeant major of the United States
Army Europe at the Russian Military Academy about NCO's and
their role in the American Army, and many, many such exchanges
of Russian military personnel and U.S. personnel which have
been very satisfying and, I imagine, that will continue,
certainly as far ahead as I can see, through the rest of this
year.
So within the context of what our respective governments
authorize us to do, I think we're doing some good things and
building long-term ties and relationships between people at all
levels who know each other, understand each other, and
gradually I think the mystique or the mysterious element
between--that might have existed at some point is dissipating
in terms of the military to military relationships.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. You noted in your remarks and
then certainly it's in the white paper of Sudan, Darfur, NATO's
role evolving especially in lift capacity and other areas of
support. What do you gauge as the most significant threat to
the continent of Africa when you look at as you also noted oil,
natural gas resources on the west coast, other significant
geopolitical strategic factors there?
In answering that if you would also address NATO's
involvement now, their continued involvement, how training,
what is appropriate, and any way you'd like to enlarge upon
that.
Thank you.
General Jones. Africa is such an immense continent and it's
one that I have grown more and more interested in as I spend
more time in Europe. And, of course, the UCOM European Command
has responsibility for the majority of Africa with the
exception of the Horn of Africa which is a central command
responsibility, but I'd like to add very quickly that General
Abizaid and I have made the lines that exist in the unified
command line virtually blurry because where his interests end
or where mine begin and when mine end and his begin are very,
very soft lines and we work very well together, both commands
work very well together to make sure that we do the right thing
and help each other be successful.
And in that context, missions like the Joint Task Force
Horn of Africa, to me are symbolic of, and representative of,
the types of missions that we're likely to be engaged in for
the foreseeable future after the shooting stops in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This JTF Horn of Africa has done some very, very
important things for the region that they're involved in.
And I guess the way to answer your question, Senator, is
that for a continent like Africa it seems to me that a regional
approach is absolutely vital because the African Union, and
indeed Africans, now see themselves as five different regions.
And that seems to be a good way, I think, to address the future
of Africa.
I wouldn't say that the threats that face Africa can be
encompassed in one or two words because it depends on what
region we're talking about. The ones that I know best,
obviously, are North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa and Western
Africa. I'm learning about others, as we all are, but one of
the things I've been impressed with is that in North Africa and
Sub-Saharan Africa the common concern by all of those countries
is what's going on inside their borders that they might not
know about. They're concerned about the spread of radical
fundamentalism, they're concerned about the recruiting of
warriors for the fundamentalist movement to not only be trained
in their vast ungoverned spaces in some cases, but also
migrating to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan and then coming back
to Africa to their countries to destabilize their countries.
The United States has been working very closely with the
North African and Sub-Saharan African countries, the majority
of them, and has been very helpful in helping them train their
Armed Forces, understand their--what's going on in their
countries using our own assets and others and providing the
means by which we can help them help themselves in capturing
terrorists and people that are wanted by a number of
governments and who are now behind bars.
In West Africa, obviously in Nigeria, you have a consortium
of approximately 10 nations in an area that, I think, is worthy
of significant attention by the United States because of its
immense potential from an energy standpoint, but also from the
standpoint of how we would like the future to be shaped there.
Nigeria, as an example, is a country that has a northern half
that is Muslim, a southern half that is Christian. It's a
country that's the seventh largest oil producing country in the
world but it is a country that has--I think it's widely
recognized--has a series of problems; recently had a fairly
significant hostage situation. At sea there are problems
associated with piracy.
One oil company executive, whose company works out of
Nigeria, has told me that his company plans on losing $1
billion in revenue each year due to illegal bunkering--that's
to say tapping of their pipelines. So this is an important
region for the world, really, and for our own domestic
interests and, I believe, that in those areas and elsewhere in
Africa, that we have a great opportunity to invest our assets,
use our forces, at fairly low level of financial--from a
financial expense standpoint and to achieve results far out of
proportion to the investment.
Put another way, I believe that the correct strategy for
Africa is to be more proactive and less reactive. Using Liberia
as an example where we seem to go to Liberia every 5 years to
fix something, our strategy now is to help Liberians help
themselves but with a continual level of engagement, very low
level: Special Operations Forces, Marines, engineers, the
correct advisors to help their security structures take hold
and do the things that we can to help these struggling
democracies so that they can be successful over the long haul.
Obviously, in Africa, the American military is not going to
solve the whole problem and I believe that the future in such
areas will be--we will be successful to the extent that we can
integrate all aspects of our national influence and so the
future from my standpoint in engagement and in theater security
strategies should be one that is much more cohesive, much more
all-encompassing in terms of our interagency, much more
understandable by all of us so that we understand what our
purposes are, and I would advocate that more empowerment at the
regional level from the standpoint of resources to bring about
change in a rapid--as rapid a manner as possible.
Senator Hagel. General Jones, thank you. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Let me
just pick up for a moment on the African discussion because
both in my opening statement and you in your opening statement,
General Jones, have discussed briefly our trip this summer. I
want to just, for the record, give an illustration of the
importance of General Jones' command and NATO in Africa. The
specifics of my going to Africa were because the National
Security Council and the White House were hopeful, because of
conversation with President Bouteflika of Algeria, that the 404
remaining Moroccan prisoners held by the Polisario, not under
control of Algeria but with influence, might be released
because of the desire for better relations between President
Bouteflika and the King of Morocco. So this went on and off
several times. We finally were on again, but the circumstances
were such that President Bouteflika felt, after a 3-hour
conversation that we had that he would not be able to accompany
me to the Polisario as had been the original plan. Our
Ambassador, because we do not recognize the Polisario, could
not go down 500 miles into the desert either. To the rescue
came General Jones who could. Now, his ability to do this came
because of the nature of his command. Even more importantly,
General Jones was able to furnish two large aircraft at the
airport there in Tindouf and 38 marines aboard the aircraft.
Logistically, and practically, that was tremendously important.
In the event we got the 404 prisoners out of the camp. Some of
them were in very dire straits in terms of their medical
condition. Many had been prisoners for over 20 years in the
desert. That was a remarkable feat.
I mention these things because of the flexibility to be
able to do these things and General Jones' own flexibility in
terms of schedule, the aircraft, the fact that it did work. It
was the time the Polisario wanted to release people, and so
they were released. And then we found, as the General will
recall, that the King of Morocco, who we anticipated would be
excited about the situation, was, in fact, giving public
statements of enragement, once again venting his thoughts about
the Algerians and what they had meant all this time.
Nevertheless, at the airport, when the people came off the
planes and we greeted them warmly, in good campaign style and
so forth, the Moroccan officials responded to this, formed a
line, began shaking hands, much to their credit in the Moroccan
press. The King did decide to have a meeting the next day and
General Jones was available for that meeting. He went with me
and our Ambassador to see the King, which was very important to
try to seal the sense of good will that came from our mission
and likewise from his, both as an American but more
importantly, in this case, as the NATO commander.
And I mention all of these things, and I could mention
more, to illustrate that the range of NATO now is very broad.
Much of the excitement that I see has come from General Jones'
leadership, and that of his other persons with him who have
seen the possibilities. In this case, two Muslim countries, one
of them very energy rich, all with traditions of various sorts,
next door to some other countries that are difficult--a very,
very important area.
Now, let me just progress from that discussion to something
altogether different. And that is that it's been suggested that
not all nations in NATO necessarily have the same military
doctrines or goals. It may be unfair, but let me just ask
frankly. It's been suggested, for example, that the French do
not believe that NATO should be involved in counterinsurgency
operations. If that is true, fair enough. If it's not, please
expunge it from the record. But are there differences, as we go
into these new missions, and counterinsurgency is a part of it,
the guerrilla fighting or the breakup of cells, are there
arguments over what the role is, or what kind of tactics
certain countries will have, as opposed to others? How in the
world do you put together a force under those conditions?
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you well know,
in the Alliance of 26 countries, all of whom must agree 100
percent before you embark on any mission, all of whom must
agree on the rules of engagement for that mission, and all of
whom can provide their forces and attach certain restrictions
on the use of those forces in support of those missions, this
is--this presents--as the Alliance gets bigger and bigger, it
presents obviously a bigger and bigger problem for all of us.
Everybody in NATO, all members understand that for
commanders to be successful, they have to have a force with a
clearly defined mission and as few impediments in accomplishing
that mission as possible. However, in the case of some of our
missions, notably Afghanistan and Iraq, where there are
political differences, very serious political differences, it
is possible to get an agreement on the missions and yet have
countries decide to either opt in or opt out depending on their
national policies. To their credit, they don't wish to derail
the mission but they do reserve the right to participate in the
way that they see fit. And such is the case in Afghanistan.
There are different views in the Alliance, some born over
the history of the Alliance, as to how NATO itself should be
used, whether or not NATO should be proactive in its use or
whether it should largely be reactive. There are different
views on how the NATO Response Force, which is really the
transformational engine of change in the Alliance that was
agreed upon in the Prague Summit of 2002 how that force should
or should not be used. This is all part and parcel of NATO's
general trend toward transformation and doing things
differently and thinking about things differently for its
future.
In the case of Afghanistan, we have come up with a solution
of a command structure that will allow for NATO to expand to
full control of the entire operation. It will be a NATO
operation. The United States will be one of the contributing
countries. I would imagine that by the time we finish this,
sometime this year, that the commander of the operation will be
a British officer and we will have a NATO operation that will
take on the whole spectrum of conflict, less the more
aggressive hunt for the terrorists and notably the more
aggressive counterterrorism mission.
NATO's preference is to focus on the antiterrorism which is
more defensive in nature and we are--we have reached a 26-
member consensus on how to do that. It provides for a direct
line to General Abizaid, who will command the forces that have
signed up for that particular mission, and a system whereby all
the others will report to the commander of the NATO forces for
the balance of those missions. And we have figured out how to
deconflict the two and to live in--to make it cohesive and to
make it effective. And so I'm not--I have no doubt that we'll
be successful in doing that.
But to get back to your question, there are differences of
views at the national political levels of what NATO should or
should not do. It's not necessarily just always about
counterterrorism. There are different views as to whether NATO
should engage in the training of police forces, for example.
The training of a police force is a significant problem in
Afghanistan. It has not gone--it is not as advanced as the
training of the Afghan National Army, for example, and there
are different views on whether NATO should do a mission like
that. There are different views on whether NATO should
participate in counterdrug operations. The biggest problem in
Afghanistan has to do with counterdrugs. There are strong views
in the Alliance as to what the role is for NATO in that
campaign as well.
This is the essence of NATO. It's--we eventually come to an
agreement----
The Chairman. As you point out there's shifting around
forces to begin with. And we've described that business of
evolution. The discussion of missions probably also is an
agenda item as the countries come together. I think you've
described well the pragmatic decision you've come to in
Afghanistan. It may not be the same one you would come to in
country ``X'' or ``Y'' or what have you down the trail because
that might evolve likewise.
General Jones. Yeah. I should add, Mr. Chairman, if I
could, that the counterterrorism is a recognized mission under
NATO doctrine. As a matter of fact, Operation Active Endeavor
is an Article V counterterrorism mission that many nations
participate in, albeit a naval mission.
In the case of France--France has 250 special operations
soldiers working under United States command in Afghanistan on
the counterterror mission itself, so on the aggressive end of
things.
The Chairman. That's an important point to make.
General Jones. It's a mixed--while France may have a
different view on what NATO should be doing, I think we should
point out that France is the third largest contributing nation
in terms of troops to all NATO missions and is providing very,
very--has now for several years provided some very fine forces
in support of our counterterrorist operations in the more
difficult missions in Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Can you go a little bit further into another
potential mission? There have been hints in the last few months
that from time to time energy resources might be utilized for
national strategic purposes, namely, that the country may cut
off energy resources to another country. And this is an act
that does not involve aircraft flying over a country or tanks
coming through or troops on the ground, but in a strategic
sense of national welfare or betterment, it could be
devastating, given the dependance that so many European
countries have on Russia, specifically. Algeria, for example,
is, I understand, the second largest supplier of natural gas to
Europe, one of the other areas in which you have been working
quietly and strategically.
What kind of discussion, if any, has proceeded in NATO
channels about those sorts of threats, which are entirely
different from military aggression or even insurgency or cells
of terrorists and so forth, but potentially devastating to the
welfare and the economies of countries, maybe even their vital
being if they're a small country? What is to be done with
regard to this?
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, the discussions on those
issues are currently ongoing. As a matter of fact, some of the
Verkunde Conference in Munich, this weekend, was devoted to
that. Mr. Sergey Ivanov from Russia was there, the Deputy Prime
Minister, to answer questions which are very topical given the
recent temporary disruption of oil coming from Russia which
sent some shock waves through Europe, as well, because they
fully realize the extent of their dependance on Russian gas.
This topic is developing, literally as we speak, and I
think the Allies, the member nations, are, in fact, now very
interested in not only the implications of the cut-offs, if you
will, or the manipulation that could be made politically of
something that could be very, very destabilizing to various
economies. But also they are considering what it is that an
organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could
do to assure the security of the delivery of energy and also
the protection of some of our critical infrastructures at the
strategic level.
This is a question of trying to decide where national
responsibilities end and the strategic Alliance
responsibilities might begin. Very embryonic discussions but
certainly very topical in terms of the timing and ongoing as we
speak, the Secretary General and the Ambassadors are
considering just what part of the coming summit in November
this should play.
So to me this is part and parcel of gradual recognition
that rather than just sit back and wait for things to happen,
what are the things--the question is what are the things that
NATO could be doing to preclude bad things from happening, and
what is it that we could do to affect the landscape, is really
gradually emerging.
I think one of the things that people are concerned with
is, obviously, not only the flow of energy but the fact, the
possibility that nonnation state actors, terrorists for
example, could significantly impede the flow of oil through
terrorists actions. And the question comes, what is it that an
organization like NATO could do to assure those kinds of
securities as well as the destination points to where the
energy comes, whether it's by sea, by land, by train, by air,
by truck. Those kinds of questions are now being discussed and
I think that's very healthy and it's certainly a way I think
that NATO can better explain itself to its publics in the
future.
The Chairman. Yesterday, I had the privilege, at the
invitation of our Ambassador to NATO, to address the Security
Council of the United Nations. I talked about the energy
situation that you describe as sort of embryonic in your
policy. I suggested that it might be for the Security Council
an embryonic situation as they take a look at their
responsibilities.
The other suggestion is an older one, and that is that with
regard to weapons of mass destruction, each country that has
them ought to declare what it has, secure what it has, and call
upon the assistance of others if you don't have the money and
the technical expertise to do that, and then to think
carefully, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty participants are
doing, about the legitimate needs of people for energy.
For example, Europeans may say that one way out of the jam
is to have nuclear powerplants, more of them, built on European
soil. NATO members may gain a degree of energy independence in
this way. However, one must examine the whole business of how
fuel comes to nations in legitimate ways, how spent fuel might
be disposed of, how that separation is made between civilian
use and potential military weaponization. And likewise, how the
enforcement situation of all this is to come, and what kind of
responsibilities nations have, to make certain that there is
not proliferation, that there is not misuse of experiments.
Now, whether it be Iran and that particular neighborhood
now, or other countries later, this is clearly an issue in
which countries may not have come to conclusions as to what
role they're prepared to play. But has this been a topic of
debate also in NATO, quite apart from our negotiators working
with the three European states, and now with others in the
IAEA?
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I think that, again, having
just come back from the Munich Security Conference, the
question of Iran was very topical as well and on everybody's
lips and the synergy between the American view and the European
view, if I could use European as a European identity, if you
will, on this issue is very, very much--seems to be very much
aligned from the standpoint of concern and solidarity in
expressing what it is that Iran must do to comply with the will
of the international community. The Chancellor of Germany,
Angela Merkel, was very clear on that in her address to the
conference as well. So this serves a little bit as a forcing
function within the Alliance as well and the European Union
that those discussions will increasingly, on the subject of
proliferation, will most likely also be on the rise in the
future as well.
The Chairman. The out-of-area movement to Afghanistan is
monumental in its significance of the Alliance. Now here come
sets of issues that are not exactly routine military. As you're
trying to rearrange the forces to meet new challenges outside
the continent, here come challenges that may hit inside the
continent, but in very different ways. In the past perhaps
people would say, well, a different group of people in our
government deals with this, this is not exactly a Department of
Defense function. But then others would say, well, it comes
awfully close, in terms of national security, or at least the
coordination between our diplomats and our equivalent of the
Pentagon or the National Security Council. This really requires
a coordination that we may not be prepared for individually as
countries, quite apart from in an alliance with all sorts of
other national interests involved. And I know this is much on
your mind. That's why I wanted to provide a forum for you to
indicate that this has been on the mind not only of yourself as
NATO Commander, but likewise your colleagues in the other
countries that you're visiting with, and that there is some
synergy of movement to get this on the table and begin to
massage it before a crisis comes.
General Jones. I think it also serves to remind us as we
focus on insurgencies and terrorism that every now and then we
shouldn't forget that there are also nation states out there
that could cause a great deal of damage as well.
And certainly the discussions on Iran remind us that it's
not just about disparate to identify groups, sometimes a nation
will rise and present a clear--a clear danger to the stability
and peace of the threat to our collective security and we have
to be ready for the worst case at all times.
The Chairman. On the good side though, miraculously, and
this has not entered our discussion today, all of the countries
that belong to NATO that comprise this Europe which may not be
completely whole and free yet, but, as the President described
it, is now very large, have not offered a hint of potential
aggression against one another.
That is remarkable, given the history of the last
millennium, in which this is the only 50-year period in which
that was not the case. As we talk about all of the threats that
we've discussed today, outside of the box and so forth, inside
the box it's still a remarkable story which sometimes is taken
for granted. People say, well, what has NATO done for me
recently or so forth. Well, the fact is historically, just the
fact that NATO is there, is well-governed, that there's good
dialog, that there's reaching out to these important problems,
is itself just a remarkable achievement that we ought to
celebrate at a hearing on NATO like this one.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and to
those who sometimes ask me the same thing, what's the value of
NATO? I mean, what does it do and so we have long answers and
short answers and I'll give you the short answer, but one of
them is to just ask people if they understand what the growth
of NATO has been just in the last 10 or 15 years to 26
countries today and the fact that one indication of the health
of the Alliance is that there isn't one nation that's trying to
leave NATO, and quite to the contrary there's probably 10 or 12
lined up that are really anxious to become NATO members.
So clearly there's value there and people understand it and
all you have to do is travel around a little bit and you get
that sense. And even nontraditional relationships with
countries along the North African littoral, for example, are
blossoming, again, under the NATO level of influence. I had one
Chief of Defense of a North African country ask me why
Operation Active Endeavor did not have a landward function to
the south, of course, and meaning that his country would
welcome that. I found that astounding and certainly indicative
of an alliance that is held in high esteem, increasingly high
esteem by many people. And an alliance that not only exists to
provide the heavy hand, if you will, of military operations,
but also the softer hand of humanitarian and disaster relief
such as the very successful, recently completed, virtually just
a few days ago, operation in Pakistan, which I think really
showed NATO to that part of the world in a completely different
light than their preconceived notions of NATO as essentially a
war fighting force which only did heavy-handed military
operations and were absolutely stunned to discover the capacity
that NATO had to bring comfort to people who had lost
everything in the aftermath of the earthquake and to save lives
and to do things that frankly surprised many people in that
part of the world.
The Chairman. Yes, it is a place with lots of ice and snow
and poor roads and all of the worst conditions for humanitarian
work. Let me just conclude by saying that you have many
supporters of NATO here on the home front, people who have
served in administrations of the past and the present and all.
I've received word from some of these friends that they would
like to begin to get together for informal dinner meetings such
as we've had in the past. In the past we thought about who
ought to be new members and then evolved into what sort of new
missions might come from all of this.
But I think there is a cadre of support, Democrats,
Republicans, people from many administrations, that have
watched the evolution of this and who are very hopeful of being
helpful in terms of our own dialog here in our debates which
are sometimes watched by others. So I offer that word of
assurance that the debates that you are having and the
strenuous business, as you've described, the embryonic debates
of new missions and goals, are being followed carefully and
supportively. We're hopeful that we'll be able to take
constructive action as you and others call upon us.
We thank you so much for this testimony, for the very
useful materials that you have given to all members of the
committee and our staffs, and for your own personal testimony
today. So saying, the hearing is adjourned.
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Prepared Statement and Questions and Answers Submitted for
the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from
Delaware
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening a hearing on this important
issue. I also want to thank General Jones for his extraordinary
leadership of the Alliance. The American people and the citizens of
NATO's other members are very well served by your diplomatic skill and
strategic vision.
Over the last 15 years, relentless change has been one of the few
constants in the realm of Euro-Atlantic security. Some of those present
may remember the inaugural meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation
Council in December 1991. Toward the end of the assembly, which brought
together longtime NATO members and representatives from the newly
democratizing nations of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Ambassador
announced that his country had dissolved during the meeting and that
from that time on he would only represent the Russian Federation.
The end of the Soviet threat precipitated some of the changes
facing NATO today, but it was just one of many transformational events
that NATO has confronted in recent years. From the conflicts in the
Balkans, to the invocation of article 5 following the 9/11 attacks, to
the conflict in Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Darfur, NATO is addressing
security challenges today that go well beyond its original mandate of
protecting Europe from the Red Army.
The evolution of NATO's mission and mandate is in itself an
indication that the Alliance is doing something right. Even more than
equipment, training, or numbers, adaptability has traditionally been
the single most important attribute of any successful military force,
and NATO has demonstrated a willingness to adapt when faced with new
challenges. However, the changes that have taken place to date, while
positive, will not be enough to guarantee NATO's relevance in the
future.
In order to remain the world's preeminent security alliance, NATO
needs to accelerate its evolution in at least three key areas related
to the Alliance's capability, credibility, and equity.
CAPABILITY
The military operations NATO has engaged in since the mid-1990s
have demonstrated the Alliance's overwhelming might. But they have also
exposed some vast capability gaps between the United States and Europe.
To ensure that future generations of United States and European troops
will be able to train and deploy together, we must bridge this divide.
The primary responsibility for training and equipping our European
allies falls on European governments. Our NATO partners need to develop
military forces that are more capable, adaptable, and deployable. The
NATO Reaction Force (NRF) represents a step in the right direction--I
applaud the European countries that have contributed to that effort.
The United States must give priority to our ongoing commitments in Iraq
and Afghanistan. But, in time, I hope we will participate in the NRF,
as well. The NRF will only achieve its goal of creating an agile,
competent force if it receives sustained funding and regular exercise.
NATO's member states should work together to guarantee that those needs
are satisfied.
One of the greatest challenges to NATO's capabilities is the
planned expansion of its responsibilities in Afghanistan. Over the next
few months, NATO troops will start taking over from United States units
in significant portions of southern Afghanistan. For the first time,
NATO will be shouldering responsibility for a major portion of the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism work in that country.
This transition should free up thousands of American troops for
much-needed rotation back home, or for other necessary deployments. But
there are still many unanswered questions about NATO's mission in
Afghanistan: Will the NATO troops that replace American units be up to
the vital task of tracking down and defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban?
Will they have the necessary training, weapons, mobility and logistics,
and intelligence capacities? Will there be smooth cooperation and
interoperability between NATO troops and other coalition partners such
as Japan, South Korea, and Jordan? Will NATO be able to work with the
nascent Afghan National Army? Perhaps most importantly, will the
European nations supplying NATO troops give them sufficiently tough
rules of engagement?
Over the next few months, we will all watch as NATO answers these
questions.
CREDIBILITY
A second area in which NATO needs to evolve relates to its
credibility. To retain the respect NATO acquired during the military
campaigns in the Balkans, NATO members must not stand by and watch when
atrocities are committed on their doorstep.
NATO has taken the unprecedented step of assisting the African
Union with its mission in Darfur, Sudan. Such cooperation is a first
for both organizations. I fully support NATO's assistance to the
African Union in Sudan--and I believe that it could do even more.
The United Nations Security Council just passed a resolution
authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur. But even if all goes
as planned--and that is a big if--it will be a year before such a
mission is fully deployed. The African Union has done an admirable job
in Darfur. But it has never had the men, material, or mandate to stop
the violence. And the security situation there continues to degenerate.
The people of Darfur cannot wait a year for it to improve. NATO could
help by providing a small contingent to bridge the gap between the AU's
mandate and the full deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping
mission. A relatively small number of NATO troops--to serve as
advisors, to help with command and control, intelligence gathering and
dissemination, communications and logistics--would help the AU
substantially improve the security environment in Darfur.
Both Congress and the administration have called what is going on
in Sudan, genocide. We must use all the resources at our disposal--
including NATO--to stop it.
EQUITY
Last, as NATO continues to expand--and I hope NATO will continue to
expand--the Alliance needs to address the equity issues that stem from
its current system of burden-sharing. When the allies founded NATO in
1949, the nations of Europe were still digging their way out of the
rubble and poverty left by World War II. Under those circumstances, an
arrangement in which each country picked up the costs of its own NATO
activities was the best available means of defending Europe from the
Soviet Union, despite the fact that it placed a disproportionate
financial burden on the United States. Fortunately, a lot has changed
in the intervening years and it is now time to revisit the way in which
NATO funds its operations.
The current system in which costs ``fall where they lie'' creates a
warped incentive for inaction. Financially, NATO members can sometimes
do better by sitting back and letting others address threats to their
security. NATO needs a more equitable system with incentives for
participation in NATO operations. Specifically, I hope that future
funding mechanisms will encourage countries to commit resources early
when security problems arise. Prevention is usually far less costly in
blood and treasure than crisis management after the fact.
Mr. Chairman, alliances are like any other relationship; you should
only expect out of them what you're willing to put into them. In the
case of NATO, its history demonstrates that it is worthy of our
support. I hope we will be able to work with our allies to ensure that
NATO remains indispensable to global peace and security. For today, I
look forward to General Jones' testimony on how we can achieve that
goal.
______
Responses of GEN James Jones, Jr., to Questions from Senator George
Voinovich
Question. I want to thank you for a thought-provoking discussion
about how NATO can promote common security and export stability. Please
elaborate on how NATO can expand its role in security, stability, and
reconstruction, capabilities that NATO established during operation in
the Balkans and Afghanistan. Specifically, I am interested in the
concrete steps that NATO would take in order to prevent instability
during its root phases rather than reacting to it once a situation has
become critical to common security. One proposal is to do more to train
and professionalize other militaries so that they do a better job to
handle instability internally. Are there specific regions in the world
where you believe NATO should be getting involved now and/or where NATO
should be working more closely with professional militaries?
Answer. NATO has, since the end of the cold war, reached out to its
neighbors and built partnerships to improve regional security and to
help partners reform their militaries. Successful programs such as
Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and most recently
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have helped foster increasingly strong
relationships with nations to the east of Europe, around the rim of the
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Through these partnership programs
we are building lines of communication and understanding, and helping
train and educate partners' militaries to operate alongside NATO but
also more effectively internally. Officer's and NCO's from partner
nations train in NATO defense and education establishments, and partner
units work alongside NATO units on exercises and on some operations.
Through these activities partners' soldiers and officers see NATO
militaries working within democratic institutions, respecting the rule
of law and human rights.
A proactive, preventative approach to security and stability is
considerably cheaper than a reactive one. NATO has the skills and
standing to help train professional militaries in areas of instability.
However, NATO's expertise lies in training at the operational and
strategic level. Most instability also needs to be addressed at the
tactical level and this is best done on bilateral basis. Therefore any
NATO approach to addressing regional or local instability would need to
be done in conjunction with a bilateral actor or with a lead NATO
nation conducting the tactical level training. NATO has, by its
partnership programs and recent operations, demonstrated its ambition
to work in those areas of the world where instability has an impact
upon the security of NATO nations. I do not see this level of ambition
or area of interest diminishing.
Question. Please elaborate on how NATO is working with PfP nations
to prepare them for possible future integration or cooperation with
NATO. How might cooperation with PfP nations, the EU, or the OSCE
expand under your vision for NATO's future?
Answer. NATO encourages PfP nations to participate in NATO
operations once they have reached NATO-established standards and
achieved NATO certification. The path to operational participation for
partners often starts many years before the first individual joins a
mission headquarters or the first partner unit joins a multinational
formation. Participation in a partnership program is not a guarantee of
operational participation, the partner has to ``add value'' and be able
to operate effectively at the level and in the environment they are
required. Partnership usually begins with exchanges of personnel at
training establishments and schools, developing to establishing
understanding on procedures and standards through discussion and
exercises, and concluding with an ability to operate within a NATO-led
operation alongside NATO nations' units and formations.
NATO's only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavour, (an
operation to counter terrorism in the Mediterranean), is proving to be
a helpful model to demonstrate the success of this method. Russian
ships are currently training with NATO ships off Italy and will
formally join the operation in the summer. Ukraine, Israel, Morocco,
Georgia, Algeria, Croatia, Sweden, and Albania are each at various
practical or discussion stages with regard to this operation which is
proving to be a useful ``entry'' operation for nations who may not
previously have considered working alongside NATO. Partners provide
individuals and units to other NATO operations in the Balkans and
Afghanistan. However, it is quite possible that successful partnerships
in Operation Active Endeavour will lead to increased participation by
partners in other NATO operations and, in due course, within NATO's
primary transformation vehicle, the NATO Response Force, once it
reaches full operating capability this year.
NATO has a strong military-to-military relationship with the EU
currently and works cooperatively and in a complementary manner in the
Balkans and more recently in support of the African Union Mission in
Sudan. Deputy SACEUR is the operational head of EU operations and the
lead on NATO operations. The EU's operational headquarters is based at
SHAPE and there are NATO and EU liaison cells in our respective
military planning headquarters. This relationship will, I believe,
strengthen and find a natural, complementary balance.
NATO is currently exploring its relationships with other regional
and international actors like the United Nations and African Union. In
a similar vein, any future relationship will most likely be
complementary, cooperative, and mutually beneficial.
Question. What is the likelihood that other members of the Alliance
would support a more proactive role in common security and affirm the
commitment at the 2006 NATO Summit? Which countries would be most
supportive of this vision? Which countries would oppose this vision? In
the same vein, how do you think other security organizations would
react to a pronounced vision of common security at the 2006 NATO
Summit? Are there organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization or other groups, that would respond negatively to the
concept of NATO exporting stability and promoting common security? What
would you propose the Alliance do to alleviate concerns?
Answer. At the NATO Heads of State Summit in Riga, Latvia, this
November, nations have another opportunity to restate NATO's enduring
value toward the new security environment and to what is certain to be
a more expanded character of the Alliance. We should encourage nations
to take on a more proactive and agile approach to our common security.
One of Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer's key objectives has been
to improve NATO's working relationships with various international
organizations, to include those that focus on security (such as the
European Union). Although NATO does not have formal relations with
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Alliance could assist
in alleviating any concerns they may have over the transformation of
NATO in a 26+1 format, with partner and other nations who are members
of those international organizations.
Question. I understand that NATO continues to formally review
KFOR's mission at 6-month intervals. These reviews provide a basis for
assessing current force levels, future requirements, force structure,
force reductions, and the eventual withdrawal of KFOR. I understand
that the transformation is aimed at creating a more efficient structure
for KFOR and eliminating redundant administrative and support forces
while maintaining the force levels of maneuver troops. I am concerned
about the perception of U.S. withdrawal from KFOR while the
negotiations on Kosovo's future status are at initial stages and
instability, continues to pervade the region. Additionally, I believe
U.S. presence symbolizes the priority that our country places on
security in the regions. Do you agree that KFOR is critical to security
in Kosovo and that U.S. presence is important to the mission,
practically or symobolically? Do you believe there is a possibility
that instability could reemerge in the region? What conditions would
need to be met before KFOR can withdraw from Kosovo?
Answer. Kosovo is at a critical juncture in its history. NATO has
helped maintain security and stability in that region for some time. As
an alliance we should stand together and give no reason for the parties
involved in the status talks to believe our collective will to see
through what we started has in any way reduced. NATO has the will to
maintain its presence until stability is restored. However, restoration
of long-term stability is very much a decision of the Balkan States and
not simply an issue of military security. The people of the Balkans
will need to recognize the economic and political benefits a more
stable and secure environment brings. NATO must, therefore, work in
partnership with other organizations and, in particular, the European
Union. A definitive timetable for withdrawing KFOR would depend on the
outcome of the status talks, and the steps taken by the international
community to support any agreements that are reached.