LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH: A POST-KATRINA REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE


HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 6, 2006



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LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH: A POST-KATRINA REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:13 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Presents: Representatives Tom Davis, Ros-Lehtinen, Gutknecht, Platts, Miller, Dent, Waxman, Owens, Cummings, Kucinich, Clay, Ruppersberger, Higgins, and Norton.

Staff present: David Marin, staff director; Chas Phillips, policy counsel; Rob White, communications director; Andrea LeBlanc, deputy director of communications; Grace Washbourne and Wimberly Fair, professional staff members; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie, deputy clerk; Phil Barnett, minority staff director/chief counsel; Michael McCarthy, minority counsel; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. Thank you for your patience. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

After Hurricane Katrina, donations from other countries poured into the U.S. Government. Offers of money, water, food, and medical supplies and other commodities came from more than 130 nations and a dozen international organizations. In cash alone, the United States has received \$126 million to date.

On behalf of the members of the committee and the people we represent, I want to thank those nations who rushed in to offer assistance and aid to those Americans affected by Hurricane Katrina. The list of countries who offered to help as reported by the State Department and the Department of Defense is enormous, and it reflects the goodwill of all people who come to the aid of those in need. The United States is eternally grateful for your generosity.

need. The United States is eternally grateful for your generosity. We are here today to find out if our government in effect looked this gift horse in the mouth. We will examine how prepared the Federal Government was to accept this unprecedented level of aid from foreign governments and whether the ad hoc procedures for accepting aid put in place after Katrina has been adequate. It appears that policies and procedures were lacking simply because no one in the Federal Government anticipated needing or receiving this assistance. It does no good to be offered money, food, water, or potentially life-saving medical supplies if we don't have procedures in place to get those donations into the hands of the people who need them.

The Government Accountability Office is here to talk about some of the problems they uncovered, among them about \$66 million of \$126 million donated has been allocated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist with long-term recovery of Gulf Coast citizens. The remaining \$60 million is being held by the Department of State in a non-interest bearing account. Why is this money not earning interest? Are there not people or organizations in New Orleans or southern Louisiana or the Mississippi Gulf Coast who could use the money?

Several thousand MREs, or meals ready to eat, were donated for the hurricane relief but were not used. Why? The Federal Government had difficulty accounting for in-kind assistance received. The ad hoc procedures put in place after Katrina didn't include policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of donated commodities such as food and water and medical supplies and to ensure that commodities were vetted through the State Department exceptions process. This resulted in incomplete knowledge of in-kind assistance received from foreign countries.

It appears in-kind contributions were not always properly tracked at those final destinations. In one case, this failure cost the U.S. Government approximately \$80,000 in storage fees. These are GAO's conclusions. FEMA may have a different view, and we have FEMA here today as well to give its side of the story.

I chaired the House Bipartisan Select Committee that investigated the Katrina disaster. I traveled to New Orleans and the Gulf Coast twice to see the damage and the recovery firsthand. The American people saw the destruction on their TV screens and the pages of their newspaper for weeks. I think they, like me, would want answers as to how this unprecedented amount of foreign assistance was used or not used.

The National Response Plan does contain procedures for accepting offers of international assistance and response to domestic incidents of national significance. The plan's international coordination support annex charges the State Department to coordinate and facilitate U.S. requests for aid as conveyed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or our Federal Agencies. The State Department also acts as an intermediary for offers of assistance, expediting delivery of such assistance whenever possible. In addition, international affairs offices within our government agencies are to act as primary partners with the State Department in such endeavors. Under this annex, the department may also engage the Red Cross and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Today we have witnesses from across the government, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, FEMA, the Department of Education, and the GAO to explain what procedures were used to accept and distribute foreign disaster assistance received during the aftermath of Katrina. We need to get to the bottom of how this coordination should work and if the current polices in place for the acceptance and use the foreign disaster assistance are adequate. Under what authority did the Department of State determine that it should hold foreign cash donations that were meant for domestic disaster assistance for Hurricane Katrina? Why did it take so long to decide where to distribute the money? When the decisions were made to give money for levy repair, why did the Army Corps of Engineers turn down the \$60 million? Why were they allowed to? How did the Department of Education become involved in the distribution of funds? And what led to the involvement of the National Security Council regarding the international cash donations?

Since the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for developing the National Response Plan, how does DHS or FEMA ensure the agencies involved in international assistance are prepared to manage international assistance? How does FEMA provide oversight for international assistance that is received in the United States for domestic incident? Equally important, does Congress understand how priorities for distribution are reached and are we helping to make sure that the people who need the foreign assistance are getting it?

On February 23rd, the White House released its report, "The Federal Response for Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned." The report recommended that the State and Homeland Security Departments lead an interagency effort to develop procedures for reviewing and accepting or rejecting any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic incident, including a mechanism to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance. These procedures are due to the Homeland Security Council June 1st.

I look forward today to hearing what changes need to be made so that this country can take advantage of the generosity of other countries in our time of tragedy.

I would now yield to our ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

Chairman Tom Davis Opening Statement Government Reform Committee Hearing, "Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance" April 6, 2006

After Hurricane Katrina, donations from other countries poured into the U.S. government. Offers of money, water, food, medical supplies and other commodities came from more than 130 nations and a dozen international organizations. In cash alone, the United States has received \$126 million to date.

On behalf of the Members of this Committee and the people we represent, I want to thank those nations who rushed in to offer assistance and aid to those Americans affected by Hurricane Katrina. The list of countries who offered help, as reported by the State Department and the Department of Defense, is enormous, and it reflects the goodwill of all peoples to come to the aid of those in need. The United States is eternally grateful for your generosity.

We are here today to find out if our government, in effect, looked this gift horse in the mouth. We will examine how prepared the federal government was to accept this unprecedented level of aid from foreign governments and whether the ad-hoc procedures for accepting aid put in place after Katrina have been adequate. It appears that policies and procedures were lacking, simply because no one in the federal government anticipated needing or receiving this assistance.

It does no good to be offered money, or water, or food, or potentially life-saving medical supplies if we don't have procedures in place to get those donations into the hands of the people who need them.

The Government Accountability Office is here to talk about some of the problems they uncovered. Among them:

- About \$66 million of the \$126 million donated has been allocated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist with the long-term recovery of Gulf coast citizens. The remaining \$60 million is being held by the Department of State in a non-interest bearing account. Why is this money not earning interest? Are there not people or organizations in New Orleans, or southern Louisiana, or the Mississippi Gulf Coast who could use this money?
- Several thousand MREs, or meals-ready-to-eat, were donated for the hurricane relief, but were not used. Why?

- The federal government had difficulty accounting for in-kind assistance received. The ad-hoc procedures put in place after Katrina did not include policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of donated commodities – such as food, water, and medical supplies – and to ensure that commodities were vetted through the State Department acceptance process. This resulted in incomplete knowledge of in-kind assistance received from foreign countries.
- It appears in-kind contributions were not always properly tracked to final destinations. In one case, this failure cost the U.S. government approximately \$80,000 in storage fees.

These are GAO's conclusions. I will note that the Federal Emergency Management Agency may have a different view, and we have FEMA here today as well to give its side of the story.

I chaired the House Bipartisan Select Committee that investigated the Katrina disaster. I traveled to New Orleans and the Gulf Coast twice to see the damage, and the recovery, first hand. The American people saw the destruction on their TV screens and in the pages of their newspapers for weeks. And I think they, like me, would want answers as to how this unprecedented amount of foreign assistance was used, or not used.

The National Response Plan does contain procedures for accepting offers of international assistance in response to a domestic Incident of National Significance. The plan's International Coordination Support Annex charges the State Department to coordinate and facilitate U.S. requests for aid as conveyed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or "other federal agencies." The State Department also acts as an intermediary for offers of assistance, expediting delivery of such assistance whenever possible. In addition, International Affairs offices within other government agencies are to act as "primary partners" with the State Department in such endeavors. Under this annex, the Department may also engage the Red Cross and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Today, we have witnesses from the across the government – Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, FEMA, the Department of Education and the Government Accountability Office – to explain what procedures were used to accept and distribute foreign disaster assistance received during the aftermath of Katrina.

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Under what authority did the Department of State determine it could hold foreign cash donations that were meant for domestic disaster assistance for Hurricane Katrina? Why did it take so long to decide where to distribute money? When the decision was made to give money for levee repair, why did the Army Corps of Engineers turn down

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Unfortunately, we will hear today of a new GAO report that finds serious waste and mismanagement of these international donations. More than 6 months after Katrina made landfall, nearly half of the funds donated by other nations have yet to be spent. The Army Corps of Engineers for reasons unknown decided not to accept \$60 million of this money for levy reconstruction. As a result, the \$60 million has been sitting in a State Department account that doesn't earn interest.

GAO says FEMA could have earned more than \$1 million in interest on this money, but the State Department wanted to keep control of it. Well, this is bureaucracy at its worst and the citizens of the Gulf Coast are suffering for it.

The Bush administration's mishandling of international donations for Hurricane Katrina comes on the heals of its mismanagement of international donations to rebuild Iraq. Just this week, the Army Corps admitted that a project to build 142 health clinics in Iraq would run out of money with just 20 clinics completed due in part to runaway contractor overhead costs as high as 50 percent. Army Corps officials said they would seek foreign donations to complete the work, but the top world health organization official for Iraq found the lack of progress, "shocking" and said, "that is affecting people's expectations and people's trust, I must say."

The same problems are recurring in the Gulf Coast except the funds being squandered are for Katrina relief and it is our citizens who are suffering. The State Department, the National Security Council, which have no experience administering domestic programs, have been controlling how international donations will be distributed. The Agency for International Development, which does have experience in rebuilding, seems to have been pushed to the sidelines just as it was in Iraq.

Meanwhile, donations remain in limbo for months, and other nations questioned whether their contributions were necessary or appreciated. We should all be grateful for the generosity of other nations. We should be equally grateful for the hard work of the many government officials and volunteers who have been working diligently to rebuild the Gulf Coast, but what we need to overcome is the bureaucracy and mismanagement that is frustrating their efforts and impeding recovery in the Gulf Coast.

I commend the chairman for holding this hearing and hope that this hearing will be a first step toward progress.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member Committee on Government Reform Hearing on "Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance"

April 6, 2006

This nation is grateful for the outpouring of support from around the world in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Nations large and small generously offered money, supplies, and technical aid to help us recover from this enormous natural disaster. Unfortunately, we'll hear today of a new GAO report that finds serious waste and mismanagement of these international donations.

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I commend the Chairman for holding this hearing and hope that this hearing will be a first step toward progress.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do any other Members wish to make statements?

The gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I have to tell you I really appreciate you calling this vitally important hearing to examine the Federal Government's system for accepting and distributing foreign donations intended for Hurricane Katrina relief, and as I listen to you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly to our ranking member, I can only say that a lot of what has happened with regard to Katrina either shows one of three things or a combination: a lack of empathy, incompetence, or a failure to synchronize conscience with conduct.

I guess what I have seen and what we have seen over and over again, Mr. Chairman, and I do applaud you for your Select Committee on the Gulf Coast problems and the way that was handled, but we have seen it over and over and over again, a failure on the part of the greatest government in the world to shoot straight. It is incredible to me. It is incredible to me that people could literally be begging for a piece of bread and a glass of water in the United States where 100 miles away there was probably a Safeway or a Giant that somebody could have put some food in a helicopter and got it to them, but yet and still, we with all of our phenomenal expertise and our ability to go clear across the world to deliver disaster relief, we can't seem to get it right.

One need not study the history of the United States very long to identify the legacy of generosity our Nation has shown to the world. In light of that tradition, it may come as a surprise that before Hurricane Katrina, America had never accepted international assistance following a disaster; however, as images from the Gulf Coast evoked grief and compassion throughout the world, some 76 foreign countries and international organizations were empathetic enough to provide cash, in-kind contributions, and military assistance to support our relief efforts.

While the Federal Government embraced the helping hand of the world community, it seemed ill-equipped to accept and distribute this international assistance effectively and efficiently due to inadequate planning and inadequate interagency communication. Incredible. Consequently, nearly half of the \$126 million in cash donations have yet, have yet, to be spent and donated relief supplies were distributed slowly if at all.

Specifically, the GAO reported that efforts to distribute international aid were plagued by the absence of a commodity tracking system and procedures to identify resource needs at FEMA, a divide between Federal agencies that included the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense and intergovernmental turf battles. For example, donations of meals ready to eat and medical supplies were poorly handled and failed to meet our health and safety standards. While thousands of Gulf Coast Americans were abandoned for days without food or water and called refugees, by the way, Federal officials were at times bewildered about what supplies were safe and therefore eligible for distribution.

I am also concerned that the international cash donations were deposited with the U.S. Treasury in a non-interest-generating account. It runs counter to common sense that such an account be utilized when an interest-bearing account could have thus far accrued \$1 million in interest. With an additional \$400 million in international cash donations expected, we must immediately address this problem. In doing so, we would generate millions of additional dollars that could be used to meet the critical needs of the Gulf Coast residents for housing, jobs, education, and reconstruction.

Mr. Chairman, 6 months after Hurricane Katrina, the need still exists for us to clarify what entity or entities have the authority and experience to best manage international aid. Moreover, we must make certain that contracts that are funded with international donations are awarded through a competitive process. This helps to ensure that we obtain the best goods and services at the best price. Make no mistake. Our international donors put faith in us that the assistance given to help Americans are efficiently and effectively utilized to provide meaningful relief to those in need. We must honor that trust by demonstrating that we are good stewards who are willing to take immediate action to strengthen our Nation's systems for accepting, managing, and distributing international assistance.

I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

Opening Statement of

Representative Elijah E. Cummings, D-Maryland

Full Committee Hearing Entitled "Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance"

> Committee on Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives 109th Congress

> > April 6, 2006

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for calling this vitally important hearing to examine the federal government's system for accepting and distributing foreign donations intended for Hurricane Katrina relief.

One need not study the history of the United States very long to identify the legacy of generosity our nation has shown to the world community. In light of that tradition, it may come as a surprise that before Hurricane Katrina, America had never accepted international assistance following a disaster. However, as images from the Gulf Coast evoked grief and compassion throughout the world, 76 foreign countries and international organizations were empathetic enough to provide cash, in-kind contributions, and military assistance to support our relief efforts.

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FEMA; a divide between federal agencies that included the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense; and intergovernmental turf battles.

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I am also concerned that international cash donations were deposited with the U.S. Treasury in a non-interest generating account. It runs counter to common sense that such an account be utilized when an interest bearing account could have thus far accrued over \$1 million in interest.

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I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and yield back the balance of my time.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Norton, do you want to say anything?

Ms. NORTON. I do want to. This is one of those hearings which astonish you, you really learn something very astonishing. I appreciate that you have called the hearing and hope that it will not only keep something like this from happening again, but hasten what are some pretty obvious remedies.

I start out with an understanding that if we had no experience with a hurricane like Katrina, we certainly had no experience with receiving cash donations from other countries. We are the country who donates to other countries. So I can certainly understand that we would not have in place a capacity to know how to do that and then to do it quickly.

I find this GAO report, however, depressing, Mr. Chairman, because we are talking about a little itty bit of money, \$126 million. It seems to me it is such a small amount of money that it leads me to another concern, and that is whether or not the government is sufficiently flexible in the face of something new to do what is required. I have regarded and I think there is no way to avoid believing that Katrina was a dress rehearsal for a terrorist attack; otherwise, why do we have these agencies all together in the Department of Homeland Security, and we have seen what happened when we had no notice that a hurricane was coming. Imagine what the chaos would have been with a surprise attack.

Here, we have 76 countries generously offering us aid. My first instincts given who some of these countries were would be to say perhaps we should not have accepted some of the aid, but should have said it is a wonderfully generous thing to do. That might have offended them. So I guess in the behavior of diplomacy, that is something you do, you accept the aid; but what kind of flexibility does it take to assign the money to a lead agency, use existing procedures even if you insist—and I don't know if this was a turf battle or not—that it go to an agency with no responsibility in the past for distributing funds on the domestic side? There are procedures, gazillions of procedures, one could borrow from, pick your agency, pick the one that best suits you, assign it to a lead agency, and there goes the money.

Apparently, early in September 2005, FEMA identified an account that could earn interest. Hey, FEMA was incompetent, but you know the account wasn't. Simply depositing the account, it seems to me, would have taken care of that. Of course, that would have meant that the administration would assign somebody to do this job, and that is what is most disturbing, that somebody wasn't put in charge of this little itty bit of money, small to us, small to our government, but when you consider what the need was out there at the time that this money began to flow in, the notion that there would have been chaos on what to do and still undistributed money and we are talking about so small an amount can hardly give this committee confidence in our ability to handle larger items, larger matters, associated with natural disasters and with terrorist attacks.

Here, we had the money, plenty of notice it is coming, procedures on the domestic side for distributing money, a small amount of money relative to what our government is used to handling and can't figure out what to do rapidly enough to matter to many. It is very disconcerting, particularly that there is money left now almost a year after the event needs to be fixed, but to me what is important is what it tells me about the larger effort and the lack of flexibility in the face of the unknown that our government has, the lack of an ability to move in keeping with the challenge that you are faced with, and that is the whole ball game on homeland security. If you can't do that for money you are glad to receive this late after the event, then I don't know how the committee can have confidence, and it has to do what you are doing, Mr. Chairman, and simply find out why.

I am going to try to stay as long as I can, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

We may have to be interrupted by votes on the floor. We expect a series of two votes. So it won't be lengthy. Why don't we get started with our very first distinguished panel.

We have Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino, who has been no stranger, who is the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the GAO; Mr. Scott Rowell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security; Mr. Gregory Gottlieb, who is Acting Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID; Mr. Casey Long, the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at FEMA; Ms. Deborah McCarthy, the Director of the Hurricane Katrina Task Force Working Group, U.S. Department of State; and Mr. Hudson La Force, the Senior Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education.

Thank you all for being here with us. It is our policy we swear you in before you testify. So if you would just rise and raise your right hands.

Ms. D'Agostino, you have someone behind you that is going to help you?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. Yes. McCoy Williams.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Thank you very much.

And DOD does. OK. Let me just state their names for the record, so it is on the record. We have Berand McConnell and Deborah Cagan. Is that right?

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[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Ms. D'Agostino, we will start with you. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT; SCOTT ROWELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, U.S. DE-PARTMENT OF DEFENSE; GREGORY C. GOTTLIEB, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER AS-SISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-MENT; CASEY LONG, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGE-MENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECU-RITY; DEBORAH McCARTHY, DIRECTOR OF THE HURRICANE KATRINA TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND HUDSON LA FORCE, SENIOR COUNSELOR TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today before you to discuss GAO's work on international assistance for Hurricane Katrina. My testimony is based on the report we issued today that reviewed how several departments and agencies dealt with the accountability for both international cash and in-kind donations. In-kind donations include food, medical, and other tangible items as well as technical assistance and support.

As you and the members have noted, Mr. Chairman, Hurricane Katrina was the first time the U.S. Government had been generously offered and welcomed such large amounts of international assistance for domestic disaster relief. The U.S. Government received \$126 million in cash from 36 foreign donors by December 31, 2005 and literally tons of in-kind items from 43 foreign donors.

Several departments and agencies were involved in agreeing to receive, accept, and distribute the international assistance, including the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Defense, and Treasury, and FEMA. Also, the National Security Council was involved in decisions about the international cash donations.

In summary, the agency has created ad hoc procedures to manage the acceptance and distribution of the cash and in-kind assistance. For cash donations, while we could account for all the funds that were received and disbursed, cash management policies were not in place to deal with their acceptance and use. Instead, the National Security Counsel established an interagency working group to decide how to use the foreign cash donations. State Department provided parameters to the working group regarding conditions it believed important for the use of the donated funds.

While the group was deciding how to spend them, the funds were kept in a State Department custodial account that did not pay interest. As a result, the funds's purchasing power was diminished and the opportunity to maximize the resources available for relief was lost.

The chart we provided today lists the key dates and events that took place regarding the cash donations. As you can see, by September 21st, \$115 million was received and FEMA had identified an interest-bearing account to accept the donations. On September 23rd, FEMA presented a number of items for funding to the interagency group, including living expenses, building materials, furniture, and transportation. Then on October 20th, the State Department transferred \$66 million to FEMA for a grant to provide case management assistance for up to 100,000 households affected by the hurricane.

As of March 2006, the remaining \$60 million was undistributed; however, on March 16th, the State Department and Department of Education signed a memorandum of agreement on the remaining \$60 million to support various educational needs in the affecting areas, including holding \$121 million in reserve for further potential projects. State also told us that at least \$400 million in additional cash donations could possibly arrive, making it even more important that good planning and cash management policies be in place going forward.

Now I will turn to the in-kind donations, and I have three key points about the accountability of these items. First, while the inkind assistance was reasonably accounted for as it arrived at Little Rock Air Force Base and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance did account for it, these goods, however, were not tracked to the FEMA distribution sites with confirmation of receipt from those sites.

Second, the lack of clear policies, inadequate information up front, and insufficient coordination with regulatory agencies resulted in the U.S. Government agreeing to receive food and medical items that could not be distributed in the United States.

Third, the ad hoc procedures allowed confusion as to which agency, FEMA or DOD, Defense, was to accept foreign military donations that were vetted through a State Department process that was created for that purpose. As a result, it is unclear today whether any agency properly accepted and took responsibility for the foreign military donations.

The administration's recently issued Lessons Learned Report you mentioned highlighted the need for improvements as well in policies and procedures. We also recommended a number of areas where such improvements could be made in managing and overseeing international cash and in-kind donations. Homeland Security and Defense Departments generally agreed with our recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I would be happy to respond to any questions.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, "Hurricane Katrina, Comprehensive Policies and Procedures are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance, April 2006, GAO-06-460," may be found in committee files.] [The prepared statement of Ms. D'Agostino follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office
Testimony
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
HURRICANE KATRINA
Policies and Procedures Are
Needed to Ensure
Appropriate Use of and
Accountability for
International Assistance
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
and McCoy Williams, Director Financial Management and Assurance
Å.
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

GAO Accountability integrity Reliability Highlights of GAO-06-600T, a testimony hefore the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

In response to Hurricane Katrina, countries and organizations donated to the United States government cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military assistance. The National Response Plan establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. The Federal Emergency Managen Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for accepting the assistance and coordinating its distribution. GAO's testimony covers (1) the amount and use of internationally donated cash and (2) the extent to which federal agencies with responsibilities for international in-kind assistance offered to the United States had policies and procedures to ensure the appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of that assistance.

What GAO Recommends

In its related report, (GAO-06-460) GAO made six recommendations designed to improve the policies, procedures, planning, and oversight of international cash and in-kind donations to the U.S. government in response to disasters. In comments on the draft report, DOD and DHS generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and cited actions being taken to further refine processes and procedures for managing international disaster donations to the United States.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-600T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431, or McCoy Williams, (202) 512-9095.

HURRICANE KATRINA

Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance

What GAO Found

April 6, 2006

Because the U.S. government had not received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance before, ad hoc procedures were developed to accept, receive and distribute the cash and in-kind assistance. Understandably, not all procedures would be in place at the outset to provide a higher level of accountability. The Administration recognized the need for improvement in its recent report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.

GAO was able to track the cash donations received to designated U.S. Treasury accounts or disbursed. In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage \$126 million in foreign cash donations to the U.S. government for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As cash donations arrived, a National Security Council (NSC)-led interagency working group was convened to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told GAO they had identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that use of those donated funds, once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of possible uses available if the funds were held and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, \$66 million of the donated funds were spent on a FEMA case management grant, and as of March 16, 2006, \$60 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at the Treasury that did not pay interest. Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. According to DOS, an additional \$400 million in international cash donations could arrive. It is important that cash management policies and spending plan options are considered and in place to deal with the forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is maintained for relief and reconstruction.

FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and militaries. In-kind donations included food and clothing, FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures. However, in the distribution of the assistance to FEMA sites, GAO found that no agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations. Also, lack of procedures, inadequate information up front about the donations, and insufficient coordination resulted in the U.S. government agreeing to receive food and medical items that were unsuitable for use in the United States and storage costs of about \$80,000. The procedures also allowed confusion about which agency was to accept and provide oversight of foreign military donations. DOD's lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD oversight.

United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the results of GAO's work concerning the accountability for international assistance for Hurricane Katrina, which is based on the report that we issued today.¹ Hurricane Katrina brought death, devastation, and destruction to the Gulf Coast states causing billions of dollars in damage and dislocating thousands of residents. In response to the disaster, many foreign countries and organizations offered cash and in-kind assistance, including foreign military donations, to the United States.⁴

In addition to relevant statutes, Executive Orders, and directives, the National Response Plan (NRP) is the framework for managing domestic events. According to the NRP, the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator for all offers of international assistance.⁹ For Hurricane Katrina, DOS established a task force to coordinate the offers of foreign assistance and to provide the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) information regarding the offers.⁴ FEMA used the Stafford Act⁵ to accept some of the assistance, and after acceptance, it was then responsible for coordinating the distribution of the assistance and ensuring it was distributed as intended. To accomplish these tasks, FEMA requested support from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an organization within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), to manage all logistics/operations support to coordinate the international in-kind assistance for FEMA. DOD was involved in the

¹GAO, Hurricane Kalrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).

 2 In-kind donations are noncash items such as food, clothing, blankets, and tents that were donated by foreign countries to the U.S. government. Foreign military donations came directly from foreign militaries to the United States and included such items as the use of amphibious ships, divers, and pumps.

³ Also, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management, and the Secretary of State is charged with the responsibility to coordinate international activities related to the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a domestic incident within the United States.

⁴ The U.S. government did not accept all offers of assistance. For example, the United States did not accept one offer of cash from a country due to ongoing U.S. sanctions against the country.

⁶ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5201 (b).

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receipt of disaster relief donations from foreign militaries. In addition to the agencies mentioned above, the National Security Council (NSC) also had a role to play in the federal response to the hurricane. The NRP section on principal organizational elements states that issues that require policy adjudication or that fall outside the Secretary of Homeland Security's areas of authority are elevated for resolution through the Homeland Security Council⁶ and the National Security Council system. The NRP also includes financial management guidance that states that federal agencies are to use proper federal financial principles, policies, regulations, and management controls to ensure proper accountability of funds. To safeguard assets, agencies can use the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government.' These standards provide federal agencies with the framework necessary to establish internal controls and thus safeguard and monitor assets and inventory to prevent waste, loss, or unauthorized use. Our testimony today is focused on (1) the amount of cash that foreign countries donated, and the extent to which cash had been used to assist in the relief efforts; and (2) the extent to which those federal agencies with responsibilities regarding the international assistance had policies and procedures in place to ensure the appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign military donations. Given that the U.S. government had never before received such substantial Summary amounts of international disaster assistance, ad hoc procedures were developed to manage the acceptance and distribution of the cash and inkind assistance. It is understandable that not all procedures would be in place at the outset to guide the acceptance and distribution of the assistance and provide a higher level of accountability

In the absence of guidance for international cash donations for a domestic disaster, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage cash donations

⁶ The Homeland Security Council ensures the coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promotes the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies.

 7 GAO, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD 00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

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from 36 countries that totaled \$126 million. DOS recorded the funds in a designated account at the U.S. Treasury, and we were able to account for the deposits and disbursements of the cash. As cash donations arrived, an NSC-led interagency working group was established to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told us that they had identified an account that could be credited with interest to receive the international cash donations and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that the use of the donated funds, if accepted under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than if the funds were held until accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, FEMA accepted \$66 million of donated funds under the Stafford Act and spent the funds on a case management grant to provide case workers to assist 100,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina. As of March 16, 2006, \$60 million had not been distributed and remained in an account at Treasury that did not pay interest.8 Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. Since Treasury did not have the authority to pay interest on the funds in the DOS account, the purchasing power of those funds held in the DOS account have decreased due to inflation. Further since an additional \$400 million or more in potential donations could materialize, it is important that cash management policies and plans be implemented to address the forthcoming funds to maintain the purchasing power of the donated funds.

At the time of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD lacked sufficient policies and procedures to adequately ensure appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations—including foreign military donations. Lacking this guidance, these agencies established ad hoc policies and procedures to account for the acceptance and distribution of assistance; however, the ad hoc policies and procedures did not include internal controls for the appropriate federal agencies to maintain adequate oversight of the assistance that would assure the assistance was received at designated distribution points. For example, FEMA and USAID/OFDA were unable to provide us evidence that they had determined or confirmed that international in-kind assistance arrived at FEMA distribution points. Also, the lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the nature and content of foreign

⁸ On March 16, 2006, DOS and the Department of Education (ED) signed a Memorandum of Agreement that states that \$60 million will be transferred to ED for use in school reconstruction projects and other projects in the Hurricane Katrina-affected areas. We did not review the details of this agreement.

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offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination before agreeing to receive items, resulted in food and medical items, such as Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and medical supplies that arrived and did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the United States. This resulted in storage costs of about \$80,000. For receiving foreign military donations for disaster relief, DOS established a process to coordinate with FEMA and DOD, but the procedures allowed for confusion about which agency was to accept these items. FEMA and DOD each assumed the other agency had accepted these donations under their respective gift authorities, but it is not clear either agency did so. As a result, even for the foreign military donations that were vetted through the DOS process, it is unclear whether any agency properly accepted or maintained oversight of these donations and knew how they were eventually used. In addition, DOD's lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS task force coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD knowledge or oversight.

Officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD acknowledged the need for delineated policies and procedures to manage international assistance in the event that the United States receives international assistance in the future. As called for by The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,9 officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD told us that by June 1, 2006, they will provide policies and procedures for managing international assistance to the Homeland Security Council. We made six recommendations that focus on specific areas for agencies with a role in international assistance to develop in the National Response Plan or other appropriate plan. Our recommendations complement the administration's recommendations, but are more specific in some areas, such as the management of cash donations. For example, we recommended that alternative cash management options be considered, including the placement of cash donations in an account that would pay interest while decisions are made regarding the use of the donations. We also recommended that oversight of in-kind donations be maintained by tracking the donations from the time of receipt to disbursement, to provide reasonable assurance that assistance is delivered as intended. In addition, we recommended that plans be established for the acceptance of donated items that include coordination with regulatory agencies, such as

⁸The White House, *The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).

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	USDA and FDA, in advance to prevent items that cannot be distributed from coming into the United States. We also recommended that DOD develop and issue internal guidance to commanders to ensure that all foreign military donations for disaster relief are coordinated through DOS to ensure appropriate acceptance, coordination, and oversight of the donations. In commenting on our draft report, DOD and DHS generally agreed with our recommendations.
Cash Donation Management Policies, Procedures, and Plans Were Not in Place	In the absence of international cash donation management policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage the cash donations flowing to the U.S. government from other countries for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. By September 21, about \$115 million had been received and as of December 31, 2005, DOS reported that \$126 million had been donated by 36 countries. Our review noted that DOS's ad hoc procedures did ensure the proper recording of international cash donations and we were able to reconcile the funds received with those held in the designated DOS account at Treasury. Also, an NSC-led interagency working group was established to determine uses for the international cash donations for domestic disaster relief. In October 2005, \$66 million of the \$126 million donated had been accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act and used for a Hurricane Katrina relief grant. As of March 16, 2006, the other \$60 million from international donations remained undistributed. Once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, funds would be limited to use on activities in furtherance of the act. We were told that the NSC-led interagency working group did not transfer the funds to FEMA because it wanted to retain the flexibility to spend the donated funds on a wider range of assistance than is permitted under the Stafford Act. During this period and while deliberations were ongoing, the funds were kept in an account that did not pay interest, thereby diminishing the purchasing power of the donated funds and losing an opportunity to maximize the resources available for relief. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA could have held the funds in an account that can pay interest, but Treasury lacks the statutory authority to credit DOS-held funds with interest. A number of options could be considered to address this situation if there are dual goals of flexibility and maintaining purchasing power.
Key Events Involving the	Table I below shows the dates of low events in the specific set directly in the

Use of International Cash Donations Table 1 below shows the dates of key events in the receipt and distribution of the international cash donations according to documentation received and interviews with DOS and FEMA officials.

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Date	Event
August 29, 2005	Hurricane Katrina hit Gulf Coast region
September 2, 2005	DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force established
September 3, 2005	DOS provided deposit instructions to diplomatic and consular posts for foreign cash donations
September 6, 2005	FEMA identified account that can earn interest
September 21, 2005	About \$115 million in foreign donations received
September 23, 2005	FEMA presented items the funds could be spent on
October 20, 2005	DOS transferred \$66 million to FEMA
October 28, 2005	FEMA awarded case management services grant to United Methodist Committee on Relief
February 28, 2006	\$60 million in remaining donations undistributed
March 16, 2006	Memorandum of Agreement signed between DOS and Department of Education to spend remaining \$60 million

Source: GAO analysis.

In early September 2005, FEMA officials identified an account at the U.S. Treasury for recording international cash donations and a number of potential uses for the donations that would help meet relief needs of the disaster. By September 21, 2005, about \$115 million in foreign cash donations had been received. In a paper submitted to the NSC-led interagency working group, dated September 22, 2005, DOS recognized that every effort should be made to disburse the funds to provide swift and meaningful relief to Hurricane Katrina victims without compromising needed internal controls to ensure proper management and effective use of the cash donations and transparency. FEMA officials toid us that on September 23, 2005, they had identified and proposed to the NSC-led interagency working group that the international cash donations could be spent on the following items for individuals and families affected by Hurricane Katrina: social services assistance, medical transportation, adapting homes for medical and hadicap needs, job training and education, living expenses, building materials, furniture, and transportation. At NSC's request, on October 7, 2005 FEMA presented more detailed proposals for using the foreign donations. On October 20, 2005, with the NSC-led interagency working group consensus, DOS transferred to FEMA \$66 million of the international donations to finance case management services to help up to 100,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina define what their needs are and to obtain available assistance.

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As of February 2006, the remaining \$60 million had not been released, pending the NSC-led interagency working group determination about the acceptance and use of the remaining funds. DOS and FEMA officials told us that for the remaining \$60 million in donated funds, the NSC-led interagency working group had considered a series of proposals received from a number of both public and private entities. At the time of our review, we were told that the NSC-led interagency working group decided that the vital needs of schools in the Gulf Coast area would be an appropriate place to apply the donations, and that they were working with the Department of Education to finalize arrangements to provide funding to meet those needs. FEMA officials told us that under the Stafford Act, they could use donated funds for projects such as rebuilding schools, but projects for new schools buildings are not consistent with Stafford Act purposes unless replacing a damaged one. Also, according to DHS officials, the Act would have required that receiving entities match FEMA funds for these purposes. However, because of the devastation, the entities would have difficulty matching FEMA funds, which in essence limited FEMA from doing these types of projects. According to DHS, FEMA considered whether it would be useful for donated funds to contribute to the non-federal share for applicants having trouble meeting the non-federal share, but would need legislative authority to use it to match federal funds. We contacted NSC to further discuss these matters; however NSC did not respond to our requests for a meeting. On March 16, 2006, DOS and the Department of Education signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the use of \$60 million of the international cash donations.

Inadequate Cash Management Policies and Planning Reduced Purchasing Power of Some International Cash Donations for Disaster Relief

Advance planning is very important given the outstanding pledges of \$400 million or more that DOS officials indicated may still be received. While acknowledging that the U.S. government has never previously had occasion to accept such large amounts of international donations for disaster relief, going forward, advance planning is a useful tool to identify potential programs and projects prior to the occurrence of an event of such magnitude. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, while the NSC-led interagency working group reviewed various proposals on the use of the remaining \$60 million, DOS held the funds in an account at the U.S. Treasury that did not earn interest. Treasury lacks the statutory authority to credit those DOS-held funds with interest. For the time the funds were not used, their purchasing power diminished due to inflation. If these funds had been placed in an account that could have been credited with interest to offset the erosion of purchasing power, the amount of funds available for relief and recovery efforts would have increased while

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decision makers determined how to use them. The U.S. government would be responsible for paying the interest if these funds were held in an account at the Treasury that can pay interest. Although the Stafford Act does not apply to the donated funds maintained in the DOS account at Treasury, the Stafford Act does provide that excess funds accepted under the Act may be placed in Treasury securities, and the related interest paid on such investments would be credited to the account. Had the foreign monetary donations been placed in Treasury securities, we estimate that by February 23, 2006, the remaining funds for relief efforts would have increased by nearly \$1 million.¹⁰

The Administration's report, The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, released on February 23, 2006, recognized that there was no pre-established plan for handling international donations and that implementation of the procedures developed was a slow and often frustrating process. The report includes recommendations that DOS should establish before June 1, 2006, an interagency process to determine appropriate uses of international cash donations, and ensure timely use of these funds in a transparent and accountable manner, among others. DOS officials recognized that the ad hoc process needed to be formalized and planned to develop such procedures by June 1, 2006. When developing policies and procedures, it is important that consideration also be given to strategies that can help maintain the purchasing power of the international donations. If the goal is to maintain both purchasing power and flexibility, then among the options to consider are seeking statutory authority for DOS to record funds in a Treasury account that can pay interest similar to donations accepted under the Stafford Act pending decisions on how the funds would be used, or to allow DOS to deposit the funds in an existing Treasury account of another agency that can pay interest pending decisions on how the funds would be used.

¹⁸Interest was computed based on an estimated average annual yield of 5 percent for Treasury Government Account Series from October 21, 2005, to February 23, 2006.

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Lack of Guidance Regarding the Accountability for International In-Kind Assistance	In the absence of guidance, we found a lack of accountability in the management of the in-kind assistance. Specifically, FEMA did not have a process in place that confirmed that the in-kind assistance sent to distribution sites was received. The lack of guidance, inadequate information about the nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination also resulted in the arrival of food and medical assistance that could not be used in the United States. Also, the ad hoc procedures created to manage foreign military donations allowed for confusion about which agency—FEMA or DOI— should accept and be responsible for oversight of such donations.
Lack of Policies and Procedures to Confirm Receipt of Goods at Distribution Points	Because of the lack of guidance to track assistance, USAID/OFDA created a database to track the assistance as it arrived. We found that USAID/OFDA reasonably accounted for the assistance given the lack of information on the manifests and the amount of assistance that was arriving within a short time. However, on September 14, 2005, FEMA did request USAID/OFDA to track the assistance from receipt to final disposition. However, the system USAID/OFDA created did not include confirming that the assistance was received at the FEMA distribution sites. In part, USAID/OFDA did not set up these procedures on its own in this situation, because its mission is to deliver assistance in foreign countries and it had never distributed assistance within the United States. FEMA officials told us that they assumed USAID/OFDA had these controls in place. FEMA and USAID/OFDA officials could not provide us with evidence that confirmed that the assistance sent to distribution sites was received. Without these controls in place to ensure accountability for the assistance, FEMA does not know if all or part of these donations were received at FEMA distribution sites. Internal controls, such as a system to track that shipments are received at intended destinations, provides an agency with oversight, and for FEMA in this case, they help ensure that international donations are received at FEMA destination sites.
Inadequate Guidance, Information, and Coordination Resulted in the Arrival of Food and Medical Items That Could Not Be Used	We noted that the guidance the agencies created did not include policies and procedures to help ensure that food and medical supplies that the U.S. government agreed to receive and came into the United States met U.S. standards. The lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination with regulatory agencies before agreeing to receive them, resulted in food and medical items, such as MREs and medical supplies, that came into the United States even though they did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the

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United States. We noted that FEMA's list of items that could be used for disaster relief that was provided to DOS was very general and did not provide any exceptions, for example, about contents of MREs. DHS commented on our report that FEMA repeatedly requested from DOS additional information about the foreign items being offered and DOS did not respond. Both instances represent lost opportunities to have prevented the arrival of items that could not be distributed in the United States. The food items included MREs from five countries. Because of the magnitude of the disaster, some normal operating procedures governing the import of goods were waived. According to USDA and FDA officials, under normal procedures, entry documents containing specific information, which are filed with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, are transmitted to USDA and FDA for those agencies' use in determining if the commodities are appropriately admissible into the United States. Without consultation or prior notification to USDA or FDA, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection authorized suspension of some normal operating procedures for the import of regulated items like food and medical supplies. Consequently, USDA and FDA had no involvement in the decision making or process of agreeing to receive regulated product donations, including MREs and medical supplies, and no opportunity to ensure that they would all be acceptable for distribution before the donated goods arrived. Both USDA and FDA, based on regulations intended to protect public health, prevented distribution of some international donations, which resulted in the assistance being stored at a cost of about \$80,000. Policies and Procedures In the absence of policies and procedures, DOS, FEMA, and DOD created ad hoc policies and procedures to manage the receipt and distribution of Were Lacking in the foreign military goods and services. However, this guidance left open which agency—FEMA or DOD—was to formally accept the foreign Oversight of Foreign Military Donations military assistance and therefore each agency apparently assumed the other had done so under their respective gift authorities. As a result, it is unclear whether FEMA or DOD accepted or maintained oversight of the foreign military donations that were vetted through the DOS Task Force. The offers of foreign military assistance included, for example, the use of amphibious ships and diver salvage teams. FEMA did not maintain oversight of the foreign military donations that it accepted through the DOS task force. A FEMA official told us that they were unable to tell us how the foreign military donations were used because FEMA could not match the use of the donations with mission assignments it gave Northern Command. Moreover, FEMA and Northern Command officials told us of instances in which foreign military donations arrived in the United States Page 10 GAO-06-600T

that were not vetted through the DOS task force. For example, we were told of military MREs that were shipped to a military base and distributed directly to hurricane victims. For the shipments that were not vetted through the Task Force, DOS, FEMA, and DOD officials could not provide us information on the type, amount, or use of the items. As a result, the agencies cannot determine if these items of assistance were safeguarded and used as intended. In closing, since the U.S. government had never before received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance, we recognize that DOS, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD created ad hoc procedures to manage the receipt, acceptance, and distribution of the assistance as best they could. Going forward, it will be important to have in place clear policies, procedures, and plans on managing and using both cash and inkind donations in a manner that provides accountability and transparency. If properly implemented, the six recommendations included in our report issued today will help to ensure that the cognizant agencies fulfill their responsibilities to effectively manage and maintain appropriate and adequate internal control over foreign donations. Mr. Chairman, this concludes GAO's prepared statement. We would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have. For further information on this testimony, please contact either Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov or McCoy Williams at GAO Contacts and Staff (202) 512-9095 or williamsm1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Acknowledgments Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Kay Daly, Lorelei St. James, Jay Spaan, Pamela Valentine, and Leonard Zapata.

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GAO

International Cash Donations Received and Used – Key Dates

Date	Event
August 29, 2005	Hurricane Katrina hit Gulf Coast Region
September 2, 2005	DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force Established
September 3, 2005	DOS provides deposit instructions to diplomatic and consular posts for foreign cash donations
Early September 2005	FEMA identified account that can earn interest
September 21, 2005	About \$115 million in foreign donations received
September 23, 2005	FEMA presented items the funds could have been spent on
October 20, 2005	DOS transferred \$66 million to FEMA
October 28, 2005	FEMA awarded case management services grant to United Methodist Committee on Relief
February 28, 2006	\$60 million in remaining donations undistributed

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Rowell.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT ROWELL

Mr. ROWELL. Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today on international disaster relief received by the United States as a result of Hurricane Katrina. In order to save the maximum amount of time for questions, I would like to submit my formal prepared testimony for the record, but provide the committee a brief verbal summary.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Great. Everyone's entire statement is in the record.

Mr. ROWELL. I would also like to take this opportunity to introduce Mr. Berand McConnell, Director of Interagency Coordination from the U.S. Northern Command, and Ms. Deborah Cagan from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. I have asked these two individuals to join me at today's hearing to provide any additional details to your questions on the Department of Defense's involvement in the receipt of international disaster relief assistance.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history and proved to be the deadliest storm to strike since 1928. The international assistance received by the United States in the wake of this disaster was tremendous. 151 nations and international organizations offered assistance. Many of these same nations had accepted donations from the United States in previous disasters in their our countries. This generosity displayed by our friends and neighbors continued until well after Hurricane Katrina had passed.

When it became clear that the United States was going to accept international assistance in response to Katrina, the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance contacted the U.S. Northern Command in order to establish an appropriate location for the delivery of international donations. Working with U.S. Northern Command's logistics director, OFDA identified Little Rock Air Force Base Arkansas as the central collection point for foreign relief donations.

Little Rock Air Force Base was selected because of its proximity to the affected area and because the supplies that were arriving could then be loaded on trucks and moved out immediately. Although it was not a major hurricane relief staging area and was not responsible for warehousing relief supplies, Little Rock Air Force Base served as a vital transportation hub in the response.

The receipt of international donations was a mission led by OFDA; however, the men and women of Little Rock Air Force Base provided needed assistance to OFDA contract support on base. Overall for the Hurricane Katrina response, relationships between USAID, OFDA, and U.S. Northern Command worked well.

As with any significant event, the lessons learned from Katrina, the Katrina experience, are critical to future success. For the Department of Defense, the three recommendations identified in the GAO report require our attention.

We concur with the recommendations one through three. Specifically, recommendations one and two speak to the need for policies and procedures to ensure that foreign military offers of assistance for domestic disasters are coordinated with the Department of State and that internal DOD guidance to our military commanders on this issue is clear and for recommendation three, which speaks on this issue is clear and for recommendation three, which speaks to the need for Federal Departments, DOD among them, to have appropriate State guidance on how offers of assistance are proc-essed, match existing requirements, meet U.S. standards, and are delivered to the right locations. Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this commit-tee for your leadership, interest in, and support of the Depart-ment's homeland defense and civil support missions with the par-ticular focus today on intermediated disactor relief accidence re

ticular focus today on international disaster relief assistance received by this country as a result of Katrina, and I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rowell follows:]

Statement by

Scott W. Rowell

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

(Strategy, Plans, and Resources)

Before the 109th Congress

Committee on

Government Reform

United States House of Representatives

April 6, 2006

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Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to address you today on international disaster relief assistance received by the United States as a result of Hurricanc Katrina. It is a pleasure to be joined by representatives of the Departments of State (DoS) and Education, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Introduction

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most challenging natural disasters in U.S. history – in terms of persons displaced, businesses disrupted, commerce affected, and in projected aggregate economic losses. In terms of its magnitude, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history, and proved to be the deadliest storm to strike since 1928.

International assistance received by the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was tremendous. 151 nations, international organizations, and political entities offered assistance. Many of these same nations had accepted donations from the United States in previous disasters in their own countries. This generosity displayed by our friends and neighbors continued until well after Hurricane Katrina had passed.

Responsibilities under the International Coordination Support Annex

Under the International Coordination Support Annex of the National Response Plan (NRP), DoS is the primary coordinating U.S. Government agency responsible for "international coordination in support of the Federal Government's response to a domestic Incident of National Significance." In accordance with the Annex, the role of the Department of State is "to fully support Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities in effective incident management and preparedness planning."

With specific regard to international assistance, the Annex provides that DoS "acts as the intermediary for foreign offers of assistance to the U.S. Government" and works with other agencies to expedite delivery of such assistance. The Annex, however, does not provide the detailed means by which to handle assistance supplies once they arrive in the United States. The "Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," report released on February 23, 2006 as a result of the White House Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Review, noted this deficiency and has called for the roles and responsibilities under the International Coordination Support Annex to be clarified further.

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations

When it became clear that the United States was going to accept international assistance in response to Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Agency for International Development (UASID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), through the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG), contacted U.S. Northern Command in order to establish an appropriate location for the delivery of international donations. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was identified as the central collection point for foreign relief donations.

Little Rock Air Force Base was selected because of its proximity to the Hurricane Katrina-affected areas, and because the supplies that were arriving could then be loaded on trucks and moved out immediately. Although it was not a major hurricane relief staging area, and was not responsible for the warehousing of relief supplies, Little Rock Air Force Base served as a vital transportation hub in the response. The receipt of international donations was a mission led by OFDA; however, the men and women of Little Rock Air Force Base provided needed assistance to OFDA-contracted support on base.

Examples of International Assistance

Although listing all 151 of the international donations to the United States for response and recovery to Hurricane Katrina would be impractical, noting these few examples will demonstrate the extraordinary worldwide response to this catastrophic disaster:

<u>Mexico</u> – The Mexican Armed Forces was a proud and vital contributor to the Hurricane Katrina response. To assist in rescue operations, the Mexican Navy sent the *MS Papaloapan*, carrying two helicopters, eight all-terrain vehicles, seven amphibious vehicles, two tankers, radio communications equipment, medical personnel, and 250 tons of food. Additionally, Mexican Army personnel were deployed to San Antonio, Texas, where they set up field kitchens and provided meals for the victims of Hurricane Katrina as they departed the devastated areas in and around New Orleans.

<u>Canada</u> – The Canadian government organized "Operation UNISON," which involved more than 1,000 personnel from the Canadian Forces and Canadian Coast Guard. This task force comprised three warships – HMCS *Athabaskan*, HMCS *Toronto*, and HMCS *Ville de Quebec* – along with the Canadian Coast Guard vessel CCGS *Sir William Alexander* and four helicopters. Moreover, Canada provided a team of 35 military divers to assist the U.S. Navy's efforts in clearing navigational hazards, including unsecured and sunken vessels and debris, and to inspect flood-damaged levees.

<u>Singapore</u> – The Republic of Singapore Air Force assigned four CH-47 Chinook helicopters to Louisiana to assist in relief operations. These four aircraft, based in Grand Prairie, Texas, arrived in Ft. Polk, Louisiana to aid rescue operations, mainly in resupplying and airlifting missions. Forty-one personnel, including pilots, aircrew, and technicians, were deployed as part of this mission, and worked with the Texas Army National Guard in the relief efforts.

Lessons Learned

As with all Department of Defense operations, we have made it a priority to capture lessons learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina. We have been doing so ever since the hurricane made landfall. DoD has also fully supported the White House Comprehensive Review of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina. The findings of the resulting report indicate that coordination of the receipt of international assistance for Hurricane Katrina, in the beginning of the operation, was difficult.

As a result of the deficiencies identified by the Comprehensive Review, the following are some of the recommendations for improving the receipt and distribution of international assistance during a disaster:

- The Department of State (DOS) should lead the revision of the International Coordination Support Annex to the NRP, clarifying responsibilities of DOS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DoD, and other supporting agencies in response to domestic incidents.
- DHS and DOS should revise the NRP to include DoD and USDA Food Safety Inspection Service as cooperating agencies to the International Coordination Support Annex.

The recommendations note that including DoD more directly in foreign assistance management would leverage existing relationships with partner military establishments and help to ensure that staging areas for the acceptance of foreign aid are pre-planned and quickly available.

We continue to work with our interagency partners to implement the recommendations of the Comprehensive Review. As we move towards the 2006 hurricane season, in coordination with Federal interagency partners, we are already making steady progress in implementing 11 critical actions.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this Committee for your leadership, interest in, and support of, the Department's homeland defense and civil support missions, with a particular focus today on international disaster relief assistance received by the United States as a result of Hurricane Katrina. I look forward to any questions you may have.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Rowell, thank you. Mr. Gottlieb, you will probably be the last one we get in before the break, and then we will probably take a 15, 20-minute break.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY GOTTLIEB

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for this opportunity to testify today. I will present a synopsis of USAID's role during Hurricane Katrina and what we are doing to make improvements in case there is a next time.

Hurricane Katrina response was the first of its kind for the USAID, which is a signatory agency to the National Response Plan. Although USAID coordinates often with FEMA, until Katrina, USAID had never before been asked to provide significant support for domestic response. Our role in the Hurricane Katrina response was one of our most challenging and unusual experiences.

On August 29th, the day the hurricane came ashore on the Gulf Coast, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which has a long history of coordination with FEMA, offered any assistance it could provide. On August 31st, the USAID Administrator offered the entire agency's support to FEMA.

Through formal mission assignments from FEMA, USAID began its work on Hurricane Katrina shortly thereafter. In probably its most important role, USAID provided support for handling internationally donated resources and commodities. FEMA, the Department of State, and USAID came to agreement on a division of labor.

The State Department task force would receive international offers of assistance from countries around the globe. FEMA would determine which offers to accept, and USAID would coordinate the overall process, including the logistics, of receiving the donated goods and integrating them into the FEMA distribution system.

USAID was perhaps uniquely qualified to fill this function. On the one hand from its extensive experience responding to disasters overseas, USAID understood the operational responsibilities of FEMA. On the other hand, from its experience as an operational foreign assistance agency, USAID understood the foreign policy concerns of the Department of State.

Since international assistance of this magnitude had never been previously received, ad hoc systems were rapidly developed by FEMA, State, and USAID. While these systems were not perfect, the cooperation among these three agencies was outstanding and in the end performed remarkably well. The mechanisms established during Katrina have become a rough model for a more formalized and codified management tool that is currently being created.

On behalf of the overall effort and at FEMA's request, USAID activated a response management team in Washington and dispatched USAID personnel throughout the Gulf Coast. USAID disaster response systems lend themselves to easy integration with FEMA because both agencies operate on the principals of the Incident Command System.

During the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, USAID provided a variety of staff, commodities, and services in support of the overall domestic response efforts. Some highlights include: The response management team in Washington became a hub for coordination of international offers of assistance, working closely with State and FEMA. The work was in some ways more complex than some of the largest foreign responses we have ever orchestrated. In particular, the response management team hosted a variety of liaison officers from domestic U.S. Government Agencies, including State, Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, and USDA. We also for first time hosted international counterparts, including NATO, several United Nation's officers, the European Union, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The response management team worked to integrate international partners into Federal and regional agencies, coordinating field visits throughout the affected regions. USAID also created systems and procedures to support the review, acceptance, and delivery of international donations. Specifically, the RNT negotiated and communicated official dispatch procedures for supplies that had been received from international donors and also created a comprehensive data base to organize and track transportation of commodity offers and donations.

I have brought with me today copies of our final dispatch spread sheet from Little Rock which indicates the distribution points for all commodities received. We believe this will show the effectiveness of the dispatch system to donation points. Overall, USAID deployed a total of 24 field officers to the affected region in the first several weeks of the response. We facilitated a total of 52 flights of donated goods from international donors and consolidated all of these at Little Rock Air Force Base. From that reception point, USAID processed more than 2,500 metric tons of donated goods and transported 142 truckloads of foreign donated commodities to distribution centers.

Let me just say in conclusion through its unprecedented involvement in a domestic disaster response, USAID has learned many lessons. There is a unique and valuable interagency role for USAID during incidents of national significance. USAID staff members adapt quickly and our systems function well within the context of the domestic response, a proficiency that we have come to expect in a foreign environment. Experience gained by USAID overseas is valued and beneficial when applied in the United States and, as with most things, nothing works perfectly the first time. Finally, USAID has learned that it can look constructively and

Finally, USAID has learned that it can look constructively and critically at itself to continually improve its performance and is already working hard to ensure that it will.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gottlieb follows:]

<u>Statement of</u> <u>Gregory Gottlieb</u> <u>Acting Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</u> <u>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance</u> <u>U.S. Agency for International Development</u>

Before the Committee on Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives

April 6, 2006

Introduction

The Hurricane Katrina response was the first of its kind for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is a signatory agency to the National Response Plan (NRP), and was also a signatory agency to the Federal Response Plan, the predecessor to the NRP. Until Katrina, although USAID coordinates often with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), USAID had never before been asked to provide significant support for a domestic response. Our role in the Hurricane Katrina response was one of the most challenging and unusual experiences in our staff members' collective memories.

Since the effort to manage significant amounts international assistance had never been done previously, ad hoc systems were developed by FEMA, USAID and the Department of State. While these systems were not perfect, the cooperation among these three agencies was outstanding and, in the end, performed well. The mechanisms established during Katrina have become a rough model for a more formalized and codified management tool that is currently being created.

In the sections to follow, we outline in more detail why USAID was uniquely able to perform its role, what it accomplished, and what is being done to improve its performance for the next major disaster.

Why USAID/OFDA?

As a signatory to the National Response Plan, USAID is committed to supporting the domestic response to an Incident of National Significance. On August 29, 2005, the day the hurricane came ashore along the Gulf Coast, the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which has a long history of coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), offered any assistance it could provide. On August 31, the USAID Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios, offered the entire agency's support to FEMA.

Through formal Mission Assignments from DHS/FEMA, USAID began its work on Hurricane Katrina shortly thereafter. In probably its most important role, USAID provided support for handling internationally donated resources and commodities. FEMA, the Department of State and USAID came to agreement on a division of labor -- the State Department Task Force would receive international offers of assistance from countries around the globe, while FEMA would determine which offers to accept, and USAID would coordinate the overall process, including the logistics of receiving the donated goods and integrating them into the FEMA distribution system. USAID was perhaps uniquely qualified to fill this function. On one hand, from its extensive experience responding to disasters overseas, USAID understood the operational responsibilities of FEMA. On the other hand, from its experience as an operational Foreign Assistance agency, USAID understood the foreign policy concerns of the Department of State. USAID was a natural partner between FEMA and the State Department.

On behalf of the overall effort, and at FEMA's request, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance activated a Response Management Team in Washington, and dispatched USAID personnel throughout the Gulf Coast. USAID's disaster response management systems lend themselves to easy integration with FEMA's domestic capabilities. USAID/OFDA has designed and trained its headquarters and field team to operate on the principles of the Incident Command System, which also forms the backbone of FEMA's response management systems.

What did USAID Accomplish?

During the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, USAID provided a variety of staff, commodities and services in support of the overall domestic response effort. This assistance was requested by FEMA in separate Mission Assignments (MAs),

which were received by USAID on September 2, 2005, including the following three:

- 1604DR-MS-AID-01 for technical expertise in IDP planning and logistics/operations to assist with international offers of assistance
- 1604DR-MS-AID-02 for volunteers to staff FEMA Call Center
- 1604DR-MS-AID-03 for USAID/OFDA support for handling internationally donated resources/commodities

Staff Support and Coordination in DC

On September 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as the Special Coordinator for the Department of State and USAID's Hurricane Katrina response. USAID then activated a Response Management Team (RMT) based at the Quincy Street facility in Arlington, Virginia with a mandate to vet and facilitate formal offers of assistance from other governments. USAID also dispatched staff to FEMA headquarters in Washington and to the State Department Task Force to ensure effective communication and coordination.

The RMT became a hub for the coordination of international offers of assistance, working closely with the Department of State and FEMA. During the course of the response effort, the RMT hosted a variety of liaison officers from domestic U.S. Government (USG) agencies including the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The RMT also provided space and established ongoing coordination with a number of international counterparts including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The USAID/RMT worked to integrate staff from these international partner organizations into federal and regional responding agencies, coordinating field visits throughout the affected region.

USAID also created systems and procedures to support the review, acceptance and delivery of international donations. Specifically, the USAID/RMT negotiated and communicated official dispatch procedures for supplies that had been received from international donors. The USAID/RMT also created a comprehensive database to organize and track transportation of commodity offers and donations.

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Finally, USAID solicited and organized volunteers to staff a FEMA call center in Washington. Approximately 200 USAID employees responded to an initial e-mail request. Ultimately, thirty-four volunteers accepted 12-hour rotations at the center.

Staff Support and Coordination in the Field

USAID deployed a total of 24 Field Officers to the affected region in the first several weeks of the response. These staff members coordinated with FEMA Joint Field Offices, Emergency Management personnel from affected states and counties and parishes, and private voluntary organizations to identify users for the donated goods from international donors. After donated goods were delivered to consignees, the Field Officers made on-site visits to ensure that supplies reached the intended beneficiaries. USAID Field Officers also helped to host international visitors to the affected region, including diplomatic missions from Thailand, the UN and the EU. Some specialized technical experts conducted safety and security assessments in affected areas. In accomplishing these tasks, USAID Field Officers traveled throughout Louisiana and Mississippi and visited key coordination sites in Mobile, Alabama; Little Rock, Arkansas; Denton, Texas; and the Department of Defense, Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

USAID deployed two translators to Mobile, Alabama to facilitate services to Vietnamese speakers at the FEMA Disaster Recovery Center and to conduct outreach to the local Vietnamese community in Bayou La Batre.

Supplies and Services

In its role to provide support for handling internationally donated resources and commodities, USAID facilitated a total of 52 flights of donated goods from international donors, including foodstuffs, medical items, blankets, shelter materials, hygiene items and other supplies. USAID worked closely with DOD/NORTHCOM to receive and disburse supplies from a consolidated reception point at Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas. From that reception point, USAID processed more than 2,500 metric tons of donated goods and transported 143 truckloads of foreign-donated commodities to distribution centers in Louisiana (81), Mississippi (30), Texas (27), Arkansas (4) and Alabama (1).

At the request of FEMA, USAID accessed supplies from its cache at Dobbins Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia, providing relief workers with personal protective equipment, masks, gloves, wipes, water pumps, and field decontamination and shower units. These supplies were consigned to a number of recipient organizations, including:

• The Georgia National Guard to help meet the immediate needs of evacuees;

The Federal Occupational Health offices to support the reestablishment of U.S. Post Office services, Veteran's Hospitals, Immigration and Customs port-of-entry facilities, and U.S. Government (USG) buildings; and
 Local responders in New Orleans.

USAID Kawasaki "Mules" from the cache were also used to ferry evacuee baggage at airports.

What is being done to prepare for next time?

Following Hurricane Katrina, the White House, Homeland Security Council tasked the Department of State to lead an interagency review of the National Response Plan, International Coordination Support Annex and develop operational policies, plans, and procedures to ensure the efficient and effective use of foreign disaster assistance. An interagency Steering Committee was formed in January 2006 to oversee the effort, with representatives from DHS, FEMA, Department of State (DOS), USAID, Department of Defense's Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and the American Red Cross. One of the first actions taken by the Steering Committee was the establishment of Working Groups to develop policies and procedures for managing international donations. The Working Groups comprise representatives from DOS, FEMA, USAID, NORTHCOM, and regulatory agencies that oversee the export of commodities to the United States (e.g., Customs and Border Protection, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of Agriculture). The Steering Committee assigned the following tasks:

In-Kind Donations

- Develop a list of resources that the U.S. might request from international partners in the aftermath of a national disaster. Specify the authority that may be needed to be waived to allow entry of each resource, and how the authority could be waived.
- Develop a list of resources that might be offered by foreign nations or international organizations during future domestic disasters. Identify which of these resources could enter the country with minimal difficulty, and which resources should not be accepted due to current restrictions or the difficulty of clearing the items for entry into the U.S.
- Review legal authorities and decide if legislative changes are required to broadly accept specific international donations.
- Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for reviewing, accepting or rejecting offers of international assistance.

 Identify tools required for international donations, such as a database to track incoming resources.

Cash Donations

- Determine who needs to be involved in addressing cash donations.
- Develop and codify mechanism to accept cash donations to include guidelines, and use of funds.
- Develop additional options to use cash donations.
- Develop an awareness and education package for on how to manage cash donations in the future.

Subsequent to the establishment of the Steering Committee and Working Groups, the White House, Homeland Security Council (HSC) released "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned." The report contains nine recommendations for improving the foreign assistance aspect of national preparedness and response, including three recommendations regarding foreign cash and in-kind donations.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also prepared a report on the management of international assistance during Hurricane Katrina. The draft report, which will soon be released, contains recommendations to ensure the appropriate use of and accountability for international assistance.

The Working Groups have addressed both the HSC and GAO recommendations and in the following sections outline how these recommendations will be addressed. The Working Groups will submit their deliverables to the Steering Committee in early April for initial review. Final products are close to completion in anticipation of the next hurricane season.

HSC Recommendations

HSC recommendation #90 states that DOS and DHS should lead an interagency effort that will quickly develop procedures to review accept or reject any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic incident. This should include an appropriate mechanism, led by DHS and supported by DOS and Treasury, to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance received in support of victim needs. Working Group 1 has developed a set of procedures to review, accept, or reject offers of international assistance, and has drafted a manual that provides detailed standard operating procedures and agency roles and responsibilities. The manual is currently being reviewed by Working Group 1 members and will be submitted to the Steering Committee in early April 2006.

HSC recommendation #91 states that DHS should lead an interagency effort to create and routinely update a prioritized list of anticipated disaster needs for foreign assistance and a list of items that cannot be accepted.

Working Group 1 is working on lists in response to this recommendation, which will include resources FEMA or another federal agency working under FEMA authority might request from overseas, as well as resources that cannot or should not be accepted due to current restrictions or the difficulty of clearing the items for entry into the US.

HSC recommendation #92 states DOS should establish an interagency process to: determine appropriate uses of international cash donations; to ensure timely use of these funds in a transparent and accountable manner; to meet internal Federal government accounting requirements; and to communicate to donors how their funds were used.

DOS has convened a subgroup of Working Group 1, including representatives from DHS/FEMA, Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the National Security Council (NSC), and is developing procedures to ensure that foreign cash donations are swiftly applied to unfunded response needs, as well as unfunded recovery needs where appropriate, in a transparent manner that can be easily communicated to donors. DHS/FEMA is developing a list of unfunded response needs that ordinarily arise soon after a domestic disaster to which foreign donations could be immediately applied. DOS is working with Treasury and other agencies to ensure that funds are properly accounted for upon receipt from foreign donors.

HSC recommendation #93 states that Public and Diplomatic Communications during domestic emergencies should both encourage cash donations -- preferably to recognized nonprofit voluntary organizations with relevant experience -- and emphasize that donations of equipment or personnel should address disaster needs.

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DOS is developing standard language to be used in department communications issued in the aftermath of large domestic disasters. The language will be included in the International Assistance System Manual.

GAO Recommendations

A GAO recommendation is to maintain oversight of foreign donated in-kind assets by tracking them from receipt to disbursement, to reasonably assure that assistance is delivered where it is intended.

The Working Group 1 has provided recommendations for the design of a database that would be used to track all donated in-kind assets from receipt to disbursement. The Working Group has also developed standard operating procedures for the disbursement of donated in-kind assets, which includes documentation of delivery to a FEMA-authorized consignee.

A GAO recommendation is to Establish plans for the acceptance of foreign donated items that include coordinating with regulatory agencies, such as USDA and FDA, in advance, in order to prevent the acceptance of items that are prohibited from distribution in the United States, regardless of waivers that might be established to expedite the importing of foreign assistance; these plans should also include DOS obtaining information on acceptable or non-acceptable items in order to communicate to the international community what is needed or what cannot be accepted.

Regulatory agencies are well represented in the Working Groups and have played a key role in the development of policies and procedures for reviewing offers of assistance, as well as the identification of items that should not be accepted due to regulatory or logistical constraints. In the aftermath of a national domestic disaster, regulatory agency liaisons will provide technical advice to USAID, FEMA, and DOS on which items can and cannot be accepted.

Conclusion

While the agencies performed well to this unprecedented event, gaps were revealed during this response. The HSC recommendations outline many of these lessons which the working groups are now are working on with the intention of finalizing in anticipation of next hurricane season.

<u>Statement of</u> <u>Gregory Gottlieb</u> <u>Acting Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</u> <u>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance</u> <u>U.S. Agency for International Development</u>

<u>Before the</u> <u>Committee on Government Reform</u> <u>U.S. House of Representatives</u>

<u>April 6, 2004</u>

The following is an attachment to Mr. Gottlieb's statement.

Batement of Gregory Gottlieb Acting Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development. Before the Committee on Costormment Reform U.S. House of Representatives, April 6, 2006 (11.8.11) 1 Hinto Do.A., Variane 1000

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perore the Committee on Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives, April 6, 2006	USAID 1 ittle Rock: Katrina Emergency International OEDA Goods N
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No.	<u>v</u>
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			Dispatch			Waybill			
Date	No.trucks	Pro#	Req#	Commodity	Comm Group	Quantity Quantity	Quantity Origin	Destination	Remarks
06.September	18			MRE	Food	158,591 s	158,591 see MREs UK	Camp Beauregard,LA	
07.September	5			MRE	Food	42,000 €	42,000 see MREs UK	Camp Beauregard,LA	
08.September	1		JA-MS-01	Adult Camp Beds Collapsable	Furnishing	300	300 Italy	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
			JA-MS-01	Blankets,Wool, (160 x 210 cm)	Furnishing	300	300 Italy	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		,	JA-MS-01	Centrefugal Pump on Trailer (Diesel)	Water	•	1 Italy	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		,	JA-MS-01	Self-Inflating Life Raft	Water	9	6 Italy	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		,	JA-MS-01	Chlorine Tabs (3.5g)	Water	11,200	11.200 Italy	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		,	JA-MS-01	Baby Food	Food	•	Italy	MEMA.Jackson.MS	
		,	JA-MS-01	Misc Foodstuffs	Food	6.000	Italy	MEMA.Jackson.MS	
		,	JA-MS-01	Disposable Surgical Sheets	Med Non Drugs	300	Italy	MEMA Jackson MS	
08.September	ß			MRE	Food	65,100 s	65,100 see MREs UK	Camp Beauregard, LA	
09.September	10			MRE	Food	88,550 s	88.550 see MREs UK	Camp Beauregard.LA	
09.September	-	_	UNICEF	School in Box	Education	75	75 UNICEF Denmark		To UNICEF NGO
		~	UNICEF	Recreation Kit	Education	75	75 UNICEF Denmark Meridian.MS	Meridian.MS	To UNICEF NGO
09.September	2	~	UNICEF	School in Box	Education	160	160 UNICEF Denmark Little Rock	Little Rock	To UNICEF NGO
		_	UNICEF	Recreation Kit	Education	665	665 UNICEF Denmark	Little Rock	To UNICEF NGO
10.September	ŀ	5002	LA-BR-08	Baby Wipes	Baby goods	26	Israel	Camp Beauregard, LA	
	-	5005 L	LA-BR-08	Diapers	Baby goods	~	Israel	Camp Beauregard, LA	
			LA-BR-08	Cots	Furnishing	320	320 Israel	Camp Beauregard LA	
	۴.	5004 L	5004 LA-BR-08	Cots	Furnishing	280	280 Israel	Camp Beauregard LA	
		~	LA-BR-08	Baby Wipes	Baby goods	10	Israel	Camp Beauregard, LA	
		5006 L	LA-BR-08	Generators 3KVA	Power distr	128	128 China	Camp Beauregard, LA	
			LA-BR-08	Generators 1KVA	Power distr	106	106 China	Camp Beauregard, LA	
	-	5001 0	5001 JA-MS-03	Diapers	Baby goods	14	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		.,	JA-MS-03	Baby Wipes	Baby goods	5	israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	-	5000 נ	5000 JA-MS-03	Tents & Structure, large	Shelter	30	30 Russia	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		-)	JA-MS-03	Tents & Structure, small	Shelter	30	30 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		Ĵ	JA-MS-03	Fig Jam	Food	2,016	2,016 Egypt	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		•	JA-MS-03	Baby Formula	Food	22	Egypt	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		•	JA-MS-03	Buckets	Water san	250	250 Spain	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		7	JA-MS-03	Baby food/juices (pear and carrot)	Food	168	168 Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		7	JA-MS-03	Shovels	tools	9 6	Spain	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		ר	JA-MS-03	Baby Wipes	Baby goods	2	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	-	5007 L	5007 LA-BR-08	Bedsheets	Furnishing	24,800	24,800 China	Camp Beauregard, LA	
	•	5008 L	5008 LA-BR-08	Generators 3KVA	Power distr	50	50 China	Camp Beauregard, LA	
		-	LA-BR-08	Generators 1KVA	Power distr	100	100 China	Camp Beauregard,LA	
		-	LA-BR-08	Plastic tarps	Shelter	200	200 France	Camp Beauregard, LA	
			LA-BR-08	Tents and poles	Shelter	40	China	Camp Beauregard, LA	
			LA-BR-08	Diapers	Baby goods	7	Tunisia	Camp Beauregard,LA	
	-	5009 L	LA-BR-08	Generators 1KVA	Power distr	96	96 China	Camp Beauregard, LA	
		_	LA-BR-08	Blankets,	Furnishing	672	672 Egypt	Camp Beauregard, LA	
		 - -	A-BR-08	Diapers	Baby goods	5	Tunisia	Camp Beauregard,LA	
-	-	, D106	90-SM-AL 0100	Generators 3KVA	Power distr	66	93 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
			IA-MS-06	Baby food/juices (pear and carrot)	Food	1,000	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	-	2002 -	2003 LA-BR-04	Blankets	Furnishing	1,372	1.372 Egypt	Camp Beauregard, LA	

		Calified turis fist	F000	3	27,000 Ihailand	Hattlesburg, MS	
		Canned spicy sardines	Food	120	18,000 Thailand	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		Rice	Food	65	65 Thailand	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		Cookies	Food	42	Israel	MEMA.Jackson.MS	
		Crackers	Food	320	Israel	MEMA Jackson MS	
		Baby food/inicae (poor and parrot)	Lood T	001		MERIA Indiana MC	
		Detroined (pear and carron)	Lood	3 4	ISI GE		
		Detergent	water san	4	i unisia	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		Tents smail	Shelter	55	45 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
*	5012	Canned spicy sardines	Food	120	18,000 Thailand	Salvation Army Pascagoula, MS	
		Canned tuna fish	Food	8	27,000 Thailand	MEMA.Jackson.MS	
		Rice	Food	62	62 Thailand	MEMA. Jackson. MS	
		Conkies	Food	42	Israel	MEMA Jackson MS	
		Crarkare		100	ion of	MENAA Jackson MS	
		Debu foodficions (acce and count)			1000		
		Davy Ioounjuices (pear and carrot)		121	121 GET	MEMAJURICKSON, MS	
		Soap bars	Water san	200	6000 Tunisia	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
		Chiorine	Water san	120	120 Tunisia	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
2 Santamhar 1	E013 1A MC 40		orieller	0,00		MEMA, Jackson, MS	
1 1001	DI-SIN-MC SIDE	Canned spicy sardines	1000	081	19,500 Inalland	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Canned tuna fish	Food	8	27,000 Thailand	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Rice	Food	62	62 Thailand	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Cookies	Food	42	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Crackers	Food	320	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Baby food/juices (pear and carrot)	Food	120	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Soap bars	Water san	500	6000 Tunisia	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Chlorine	Water san	120	120 Tunisia	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Tents, smail	Shelter	76	76 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
-	5014 LA-BR-11	Blankets	Furnishing	148	1480 Tunisia	LEMA, LA (Louisiana Emergency Mgmt Agency)	y Mgmt Agency)
	5015 LA-BR-11	Blankets	Furnishing	4	140 Tunisia	LEMA, LA	; ; ;
	LA-BR-11	Blankets	Furnishing	120	960 Israel	LEMA, LA	
	LA-BR-11	Blankets	Furnishing	450	450 Egypt	LEMA, LA	
	LA-BR-11	Corrugated ctn boxes	Miscellaneous	£	Israel	LEMA, LA	
	LA-BR-11	Bedsheets	Furnishing	16	Israel	LEMA, LA	
	LA-BR-11	Bedsheets	Furnishing	60	600 Tunisia	LEMA, LA	
-	5016 LA-BR-11	Blankets		2000	2000 Russia	LEMA, LA	
-	5017 JA-MS-10	Child clothing	an an	0000	10000 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
t-	5019 JA-MS-10	Blankets	Furnishing	105	105 Egypt	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
-	5020 JA-MS-10	Tea	Food	30	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Assorted footwear	clothing	24	israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Dressing sets	Med Non Drugs	25	Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Rice	Food	68	68 Thailand	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Mattresses w/pillow	Furnishing	26	26 Spain	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-06	Cots	Furnishing	156	156 Israel	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Blankets	Furnishing	3400	3400 Thailand	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
			,			Multi Agency Staging Area,	Didn't pass through
1 N/A		Generators	Power distr	150	150 Japan	Jackson,MS	Little Rock AFB
3.September 1	5021 JA-MS-10	Structure of tents	Shelter	170	170 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
4	5022 JA-MS-10	Tents	Shelter	200	200 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
	JA-MS-10	Structure of tents	Shelter	80	30 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
*-	5023 DC-02	Tents & Structure	Shelter	43	43 Russia	Camp Beauregard,LA	
*-	5024 JA-MS-10	Tents & Structure	Shelter	200	200 China	MEMA, Jackson, MS	
.	5025 DC-02	Tents & Structure	Shelter	29	29 Russia	Camp Beauregard, LA	
	JA-MS-10	Tents & Structure	Shelter	23	23 Russia	MEMA.Jackson.MS	

	.	5030 JA-MS-06 UNICEF	Cots School In a Box	Furnishing Education	392 250	392 Czech Republic	MEMA, Jackson, MS Little Rock AK	for Ontonuerd
	-	UNICEF	School In a Box	Education	250	250 Denmark-UNICEF	Little Rock AK	for Onforward
		UNICEF	School In a Box	Education	60	60 Denmark-UNICEF		
	-	UNICEF	School In a Box	Education	100	100 Denmark-UNICEF	Baton Rouge A	
	÷	UNICEF	School in a Box	Education	00	100 Denmark-UNICEF	Houston, TX	
 September 	-	5031 MS-14	Bedsheet	Furnishing	950	950 Spain	Grater Delta Relief. MS	
			Biankets	Furnishing	450	450 Spain	Grater Deita Relief. MS	
			Foam Mattresses	Furnishing	e	243 İsrael	Grater Delta Relief. MS	
			Fig Jam	Food	111	Favot	Grater Delta Relief MS	
			Crackers	Food	4	erael	Grater Dette Relief MS	
			Cookies	Food	r >	lerge!	Crater Delta Delta Deltaf MC	
			Tuna canned fish		- 5	21 BOD Thailand	Crater Delta Perint, MC	
	Ŧ	5032 F A.NO.12	Disnere	Dobu stando	1			
	-	71-01-01 7000		spool doods	4	Israel	National Guard, LA	
			Instant cereal	-000	1,200	Israel	National Guard, LA	
			Hygien Kit	Hygien items	2	India	National Guard, LA	
	-	5033 MS-14	Instant cereal	Food	680	Israel	Grater Delta Relief, MS	
			Canned spicy sardines	Food	8 6	14,700 Israet	Grater Delta Relief. MS	
			Hygien Kit	Hvgien items	-	India	Grater Delta Relief MS	
 September 			Communication System	Telecoms	ŝ	3 Sweden	Erricson Dallas TX	for confineration
		5035 MS-JA-011	_	Baby goods	4	Israel	MEMA lackson MS	0
				Food	65	israel	MEMA Jackson MS	
			Rice	Ecod	88	20 Thoiland		
			Bedsheet	Furnishing	5 5	0.550 India	MEMA Increase MC	
			Canned enior cardines		5 -			
			Concilia milk	Food	102	0 304 leroal		
		5036 I A.NRO.13		Sholton	10.			
		5037 A-NBO-13		Sheller	4	26 China	Hammond Rec. Listr. Centre, LA	
	-			Shelter Shelter	8	20 CZECN Kepublic	Hammond Rec. Distr. Centre, LA	
	÷	CF CON V 1 BCC3		Stretter	2		Hammond Kec. Uistr. Centre, LA	
	-	3030 LA-1000-13		Shelter	e i	6 Czech Republic	Hammond Rec.Distr.Centre,LA	
				Sheiter	2	10 France	Hammond Rec. Distr. Centre, LA	
			Fents & Structure	Shelter	9	10 France	Hammond Rec.Distr.Centre,LA	
			Tents & Structure	Shelter	28	28 Tunisia	Hammond Rec.Distr.Centre,LA	
	*	5041 LA-NBO-14 Water	Water	Water	0	Spain	Hahnville, LA (Kitchen # 14 - Landry Elementary School	andry Elementary Schoo
	-	5040 LA-NO-14	Water	Water	10	Tunisia	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)	Complex)
September p.m.	v	5044 LA-BR-008	Diapers	Baby goods	-	Israel	Marrero. LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)	Complex)
			Baby food, carrot	Food	211	Israel	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex	Complex)
			Baby formula, similac	Food	÷	Israel	Marrero I.A (Ft. Knox Storage Complex	Complex)
			Cookies	Food	: -	Israel	Marrero I.A. (Ft. Knox Storade Complex)	Complex)
			Hygien Kit	Hvaien items	*	India	Marrero I A (Et Knox Storage Complex)	Complex)
			Soap	Hvalen items	•	India	Marrero 1 A (Ft Knox Storage Complex)	Complex)
			Water	Water	4	Israel/Tunisia	Marrero I.A (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)	Complex)
		LA-NO-001	Clothes	Furnishina	72	Israel	Marrero LA (Ft Knox Storage Complex)	Complex)
	-	5045 MS-JA-015	Cookies	Food		srae	Jackson MS (Multi Anency Stanion Area	min Area)
			Bedsheet	Furnishing	9	India	Jackson, MS (Multi Agency Staging Area	iding Area)
			Blankets	Furnishing	85	1.275 India	Jackson MS (Multi Agency Staging Area	ninn Area)
		5046 MS-JA-015	Cookies	Food	2	srael	Jackson, MS (Multi Agency Staging Area	iding Area)
			Baby food, carrot	Food	198	Israel	Jackson, MS (Multi Agency Staging Area)	iding Area)
			Blankets	Furnishing	133	9,975 India	Jackson, MS (Multi Agency Staging Area	iging Area)
16.September	F	5047 LA-BR-007	Cots	Furnishing	1,000	1,000 Luxemburg	Red Cross, Walicer, LA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	336	336 Luxemburg	Red Cross, Walicer, LA	
	•			,		D		

Multidgency Waterh.v. New Iberia, LA Multidgency Waterh.Av. New Iberia, LA	A muturgency variant-xiv. New Netheria, LA Beed Company, Hwy 15, Coean Springs, MS Seed Company, Hwy 15, Coean Springs, MS MultiAgency Wareh Av, New Iberia, LA MultiAgency Wareh Av, New Iberia, LA	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex) Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex) Red Cross, Reserve, LA Red Cross, Walker, LA Red Cross, Walker, LA MittikAeneru, Varienh Av. New Iberia, LA	Chalmette, LA - FEMA/St. Bernard Parish Chalmette, LA - FEMA/St. Bernard Parish Chalmette, LA - FEMA/St. Bernard Parish Chalmette, LA - FEMA/St. Bernard Parish Marrero, LA (FL Knox Storage Complex) Marrero, LA (FL Knox Storage Complex) FEMA, Fort Worth, TX FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia	214 Sussia 7 India 7 India 87 India 87 India 56 India 47 Austria 270 Austria 205 Slovakia 205 Austria 205 Austria 205 Austria	Korea Korea Korea 3 Tunisa Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea	2 Israel 1000 Slovakia 640 Korea 115 Slovakia 900 Slovakia 640 Korea 640 Korea 3,080 Norwey 2,500 Slovakia 3,000 Korea 1,200 Thaliand 1,200 Thaliand 1,200 Thaliand 1,540 Livenhurc
105 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35	2145 214 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	2 100 640 640 900 640 840 2 2 2 3,080 2500 3,080 1200 1200 1200 1680 1680
Med Non Drugs Med Non Drugs Amed Non Drugs 1 Med Non Drugs Med Non Drugs Med Non Drugs	Sheet who youngs Sheeter Sheeter Sheeter Sheeter Sheeter Sheeter Sheeter Sheeter Furnishing Termishing	Furnishing miscellanouus sanitation Shetter Shetter Shetter Shetter Furnishing miscellanous baby goods Furnishing	Med Non Drugs Med Non Drugs Clothing Drugs Med Non Drugs Med Non Drugs Med Non Drugs Edining Furnishing Furnishing Furnishing Furnishing Furnishing Furnishing
Steria oction absorbent rols 250 g Med Non Drugs Steria oction absorbent rols 200 med Non Drugs Wound healing three sheret surgical in Med Non Drugs Steria have sherets rapikin (drape) 151 Med Non Drugs Steria have sherets rapikin (drape) 151 Med Non Drugs Steria gause bandage 6110 med Non Drugs	Active more sincers instant (in day) 4-2. Weet values of the Heary canvas water Proof Shelter Heary canvas Water Proof Shelter Shelter Heary canvas Water Proof Shelter Shelter Heary canvas Water Proof Shelter Plates sheeting rools Shelter Plates sheeting rools Shelter Cots Cots Shelter	Chuber gloves Dust masks Trash bags Farps tents Tants & Structure Dust masks Dust masks Cots Cots	Wheel chairs First Aid Kits, First Aid Kits, Liquid Soap, disinfectant (manisoft) First Aid Kits, First Aid Kits, Bankets Blankets Blankets Blankets Blankets Blankets Blankets Blankets Blankets Blankets
	5049 MS-JA-016 5050 MS-JA-016 5051 MS-JA-016 5051 MS-JA-016 5052 LA-BR-09	5053 LA-BR-10 5055 LA-BR-010 5054 LA-BR-010 5054 LA-BR-010	5053 LA-BR-012 5054 LA-BR-012 5055 LA-BR-012 5055 DC-004 5055 DC-004 5061 DC-004 5062 DC-004
	* * * *	*	
		17.September	18. September

la September	-	506/ DC-004	Blankets Blankets Blankets	Furnishing Furnishing	150 120	150 Czech 120 Israel	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
			blankets Generators	Furnishing Power Dietr	0001	1,800 Thailand	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX FEMA Fort Worth, TX
20.September	1 50	5067/b LA-BR-009	1	Med Non Drugs	25	25 Israel	Alexandria, LA - State Multi-Agency Warehouse
			Whellchairs	Med Non Drugs	4	4 Spain	Alexandria, LA - State Multi-Agency Warehouse
			Handicap wheeled toilet	Med Non Drugs	6	10 Israel	Alexandria, LA - State Multi-Agency Warehouse
			Crutches	Med Non Drugs		80 İsrael	Alexandria, LA - State Multi-Agency Warehouse
			Crutches	Med Non Drugs	9	102 Spain	Alexandria, LA - State Multi-Agency Warehouse
			Elevated toilet seats	Furnishing	120	120 İsrael	Alexandria, LA - State Mutti-Agency Warehouse
			Assorted bandages	Med Non Drugs	÷	Russia	Alexandria, LA - State Multi-Agency Warehouse
	-	5071 DC-004	Blankets	Furnishing	40	2200 Denmark	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
	-	5072 MS-GP-017	Mobile storage tents/Rub-Hail	Shelter	2	2 Denmark	Gulfport, MS - City of Gulfport Distribution Center
		5068 DC-004	Blankets	Furnishing	50	2750 Denmark	MA, New Iberia, LA
	-	5070 DC-004	Blankets	Furnishing	50	2750 Denmark	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
			Blankets	Furnishing	096	960 Czech	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
	-	5069 DC-004	Blankets	Furnishing	18	1800 Norway	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
			Blankets	Furnishing	ň	165 Denmark	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
			Blankets	Furnishing	12	120 Slovakia	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
			Blankets	Furnishing	100	100 Chile	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
21.September	٢	5073 DC-004	Blankets	Furnishing	23	2300 Norway	FEMA, Fort Worth, TX
	¥~•	5074 AI-MO-001	Bedsheet	Furnishing	80	800 Chile	Multi Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
			Diapers	Baby goods	170	Chile	Multi Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
			First aid Kits	Med Non drugs	6	700 Slovenia	Mutti Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
			Blankets	Furnishing	100	100 Chile	Multi Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
			Blankets	Furnishing	120	120 Czech	Multi Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
			Blankets	Furnishing	5	500 Norway	Multi Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
				Med Non Drugs	2	Russia	Multi Agency wareh. Mobile, AL
	•	5075 LA-BR-014		Food	124	Egypt	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
			Baby food/juices (pear)	Food	953	Israel	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
			Baby formula	Food	<u>95</u>	Israel	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
			MREs	Food	740 se	740 see MREs UK	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
			Cots	Furnishing	86	86 Slovakia	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
			First aid Kits	Med Non drugs	700	700 Slovenia	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
				Med Non Drugs	2	Russia	Marrero, LA (Ft. Knox Storage Complex)
	*-	5076 LA-BR-016	_	Furnishing	11	71 Slovenia	Wisner, LA - Seed Company
			First aid kits	Med Non Drugs	:	495 Denmark	Wisner, LA - Seed Company
			Bendages	Med Non Drugs	7	Russia	Wisner, LA - Seed Company
		5078 LA-BR-016		Furnishing	122	122 Slovenia	Wisner, LA - Seed Company
	۴	5077 LA-BR-015	First aid kits	Med Non Drugs	10	450 Denmark	Baton Rouge, LA - American Red Cross
			Blankets	Furnishing	42	1260 Czech	Baton Rouge, LA - American Red Cross
			Blankets	Furnishing	48	288 Slovenia	Baton Rouge, LA - American Red Cross
			Blankets	Furníshing	5	100 Norway	Baton Rouge, LA - American Red Cross

23.September	*	5079 DC-005	Blankets	Furnishing	52	2340 Czech	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
	-	5080 DC-005	Blankets	Furnishing	26	2340 Czech	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
	*	5081 LA-BR-017	First aid kits	Med Non Drugs	1440	1440 Denmark	Pascagula, MS - Salvation Army	~
			Tarpaulins	Shelter	117	234 Finland	Pascagula, MS - Salvation Army	~
			Assorted bandages	Med Non Drugs	7	Russia	Pascagula, MS - Salvation Army	~
	-	5082 DC-005	Blankets	Fumishing	17	1530 Czech	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	120	120 Israel	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	300	300 Slovakia	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	50	300 Slovenia	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
24. September	-	5083 DC-005	Blankets	Furnishing	61	1220 Norway	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	12	360 Czech	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	-	60 Slovenia	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	13	195 Slovenia	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
26.September	.	5085 LA-BR-015 Bedsheets	Bedsheets	Furnishing	2	800 Finland	Baton Rouge, LA - American Red Cross	double dropping truck
			Towels	Furnishing	*	535 Greece	Baton Rouge, LA - American Red Cross	double dropping truck
				•			Baton Rouge, LA - American	
			First aid kits	Furnishing	-	210 Finland	Red Cross Alexandria 1.4 Econd Book of	double dropping truck
		5084 LA-BR-020	5084 LA-BR-020 Beds w/matresses	Furnishing	12	58 Slovenia	Center LA	double dropping truck
					:		Alexandria, LA - Food Bank of	
			Bedsheets	Furnishing	10	4000 Finjand	Center LA	double dropping truck
	-	5087 LA-BR-016 Towels	Towels	Furnishing	9	1450 Greece	Wisner, LA - Seed Company	double dropping truck
			Tarpaulins	Shelter	ŝ	6 Finland	Wisner, LA - Seed Company	double dropping truck
			ice boxes	Furnishing	*-	15 Finland	Wisner, LA - Seed Company	double dropping truck
			Blankets	Furnishing	72	72 Slovenia	Wisner, LA - Seed Company	double dropping truck
			Pillowcases	Furnishing	*-	850 Finland	Wisner, LA - Seed Company	double dropping truck
			Thermosheet	Med Non Drugs	-	5000 Finland	Wisner, LA - Seed Company Hammond I.A - Convoy of	double dropping truck
		5088 LA-BR-019 First aid kits	First aid kits	Med Non Drugs	24	1080 Denmark	Hope Distribution Center	double dropping truck
					55		Hammond, LA - Convoy of	double desering truck
			FIST and Mis	wea won arugs	430	480 SIQVERIA	Hammond, LA - Convoy of	woon Buildoin armon
			Assorted bandages	Med Non Drugs	9	Russia	Hope Distribution Center	double dropping truck
27 Sentember	÷		Sweet Com	Lood F	00001	12000 Theilend	Baton Rouge, LA - American Part Cross	didn't pass through
				-	00031	Miami OFDA		didn't pass through
	ŝ		Blankets	Furnishing	38125	38125 Stock	Dallas, TX - FEMA	LRAFB
	-	5089 DC-005	Blankets	Furnishing	1520	1520 Czech Republic?	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
			Blankets	Furnishing	1800	1800 Czech Republic	Fort Worth TX -FEMA	
	**	5090 MS-GP-017 Tent & Poles	Tent & Poles	Shetter	ŧ	11 Romania	Gulfport, MS - City of Gulfport Distribution Center	double dropping truck
							Oscean spring, MS - Ministers	,
		5091 LA-BR-017-t Blankets	: Blankets	Furnishing	80	80 Czech Republic?	Alliance Decess spring MS - Ministare	double drapping truck
			Blankets	Gunichica	001	180 Crach Banuhlic		double draceine to ob

Blankets Furmishing Blankets Furmishinn
cy Kits
ents for clinics Shelter
infectant (Skinman sci
Plaster of Paris Med Non Drugs
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Assorted Sterile gause bandage and c Med Non Drugs
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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I am going to declare, I would say, about a 15-minute recess, maybe 20 minutes you can count on, and then we will finish up.

Thank you for your patience.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I want to thank you all for your patience. I think, Mr. Long, we can start with you. Is that where we left off?

STATEMENT OF CASEY LONG

Mr. LONG. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Casey Long, and I am the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security. I want to thank you for inviting me here today to discuss international assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and how that assistance was used.

It is important to note that the United States had never before accepted international assistance on such a large scale as it did during Hurricane Katrina. The outpouring of international aid was both heartwarming and beneficial, but also created some difficulties. In total, 151 nations and international organizations offered financial and material assistance. In response to this outpouring of generosity, FEMA with their Federal partners quickly developed a system to manage international assistance. Today I hope to explain to you that system and what we intend to do in the future to manage both material and cash donations.

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United States, the U.S. Government began to receive offers of assistance from foreign governments and private organizations. On September 1st, the administration indicated that the U.S. Government was accepting all offers of international assistance in principle. Consistent with its role in the National Response Plan [NRP], the State Department set up a Hurricane Katrina task force and took on the duty of receiving those offers of international assistance.

As the lead agency in coordinating the Federal response to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies, FEMA has the authority to request assistance in responding to these disasters from other Federal agencies. Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, FEMA turned to the agency that has expertise working with the international community in responding to disasters, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA].

On September 2nd, FEMA formally tasked OFDA to manage logistics and operations of international donations in response to Katrina. On Saturday, September 3rd, FEMA convened those departments and agencies that might play a role in managing national donations. These departments and agencies included other components of DHS such as Customs and Border Protection, the State Department, OFDA, the Department of Defense, Health and Human Services, and the American Red Cross, all of whom are signatories to the NRP. Collectively, this group met to discuss the roles and responsibility of each agency and to determine how the United States was going to management international material donations. The outcome of this meeting was a system for accepting and using or declining commodities from international donors, which worked as follows: The State Department would act as the focal point for receiving and responding to international offers of assistance. FEMA would identify the potential requirements and communicate acceptance of offers to State. OFDA would manage the operations and distribution for those international donations.

Despite the fact that the U.S. Government had never managed such a large quantity of donated international assistance before, we successfully accepted blankets, cots, tents, generators, school supplies, and other materials. Ultimately, on FEMA's behalf, OFDA distributed 143 truckloads of international donations to distribution centers in Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas.

Since additional decisions were required to determine how to send monetary donations, pledges of cash were handled under a different system. State received and held donated funds in a custodial account until a decision about how these funds would be used was made. When it became apparent that the Nation's cash would be coming in from foreign sources, FEMA also identified an account to hold a portion of these funds. An interagency group was convened to discuss how international donations, cash donations, would be accepted and distributed. FEMA identified types of activities for which the donated funds could be used to help meet the needs of communities and individuals impacted by the disaster, and we provided these options to the monetary donations working group.

Later, FEMA provided this working group with a more detailed proposal for individual case management which proposed that the funds be used to assist disaster victims by identifying immediate needs and helping them reach a level of self-sufficiency and begin the process of recovery. As a result, a portion of the cash donations were transferred to FEMA and awarded for a case management initiative.

Last November, FEMA initiated meetings to form an interagency work group made up of departments and agencies that participated in Hurricane Katrina's international donations effort. This effort corresponded with recommendations from the Homeland Security Council to develop a process for international assistance. The working group has begun formalizing an international assistance system. Participants include DHS components of FEMA, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, the State Department, Defense, Agriculture, USAID, FDA, the American Red Cross, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, among others.

Much progress has been made to develop standardized procedures to review and accept or decline international offers of assistance and to respond to international inquiries. By June 1st, the interagency group expects to agree to a system on managing offers of international assistance.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me here today. If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]

Statement of Casey Long, Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security

Good morning, Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Casey Long and I am the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

I want to thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the outpouring of international assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and how that assistance was used. Before I begin my testimony, I would like to describe FEMA's Office of International Affairs (OIA) and the kinds of activities we normally undertake. The mission of FEMA's Office of International Affairs is to support DHS's international obligations and to execute FEMA's international agreements. We also execute international technical-assistance projects, facilitate participation in international training and exercises and support civil emergency planning efforts at NATO.

Thus, as the program office in FEMA designated to oversee international activities, FEMA's Office of International Affairs helped coordinate international assistance in the response to Hurricane Katrina. It is important to note that the United States had never before accepted international assistance on such a large scale as it did during Hurricane Katrina. After Hurricane Katrina hit, the outpouring of international aid was both heartwarming and beneficial, but it also created some difficult challenges.

One hundred fifty-one (151) nations and international organizations offered financial or material assistance. To coordinate and effectively use these offers, FEMA quickly developed a system with our Federal partners including the Department of State (DOS), which acted as the intermediary for offers of international assistance to the United States Government (USG) as required by the National Response Plan (NRP).

Today, I hope to explain to you the system that was developed and what we intend to do in the future, both for materials and cash-donation assistance. First, I would like to establish a timeline of what happened with international donations. Second, I would like to explain how we developed the system to handle international offers of assistance and the structure of that system. Finally, I would like to explain to you how FEMA and our Federal partners are working to formalize procedures to receive international assistance in the future.

Accepting Material Donations

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United States, on Monday, August 29th, the USG received offers of assistance from governments and private organizations in Canada, France, and Honduras. On Tuesday, August 30th, Russia, Japan, NATO, and Venezuela also offered assistance. These offers ranged in nature from private citizens offering lodging, to offers of blankets, tents, and generators. On Wednesday, August 31st and Thursday, September 1st, the USG received similar offers to assist in relief efforts. Among the donors were countries such as

Australia, Belgium, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands and international organizations such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

On September 1st, the Administration indicated that the U. S. was accepting all offers of international assistance 'in principle.' Consistent with its role under the NRP, DOS's Hurricane Katrina Task Force took on the duty of receiving offers of assistance from foreign governments and entities and communicating the acceptance/declination of these offers.

DHS and FEMA have the lead role in coordinating the Federal response to a major disaster. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended, gives FEMA the authority to request assistance from Federal partners to implement its disaster response. Accordingly, on September 2nd, FEMA turned to the agency that has diplomatic expertise working with the international community in a disaster context, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and formally tasked USAID/OFDA to manage the logistics and operations of incoming international donations.

FEMA formally tasked USAID/OFDA for multiple reasons. First, as a signatory to the NRP, USAID is committed to the principles underlying the NRP and committed to support DHS/FEMA in responding to incidents of national significance. Second, FEMA has an ongoing working relationship with USAID/OFDA and recognizes USAID/OFDA's excellent logistics capability. Third, FEMA tasked USAID/OFDA because they know the international emergency-management community. USAID/OFDA has a good understanding of the kinds of emergency supplies that may be offered by our international emergency partners. USAID/OFDA also works closely with major international relief organizations such as the United Nations.

On Saturday, September 3rd, FEMA convened the departments/agencies that were to play a role in accepting and distributing international donations. DHS, DHS/FEMA, DOS, USAID/OFDA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the American Red Cross (ARC) met to discuss roles and responsibilities of each agency and to determine how the United States was going to accept and receive international material donations. The outcome of this meeting was a system for accepting commodities from international donors, which worked as follows:

- State Department was the focal point for receiving and responding to offers of assistance from foreign governments.
- USAID/OFDA worked with FEMA to determine whether specific offers were acceptable and could be used.
- When FEMA identified a potential requirement for something that could be addressed by an international donation, FEMA communicated acceptance and specifics for that offer.
- DOS communicated USG acceptance of the resource to the donor country.
- USAID/OFDA, along with DOD personnel at Little Rock Air Force Base, managed logistical operations for incoming international donations. A USG team, led by USAID/OFDA with representatives from CBP, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), was formed to receive international resources.

• When the resource was in-country, USAID/OFDA coordinated with FEMA in transporting it to the distribution point.

See Flowchartⁱ

Also on September 3rd, as FEMA worked with State and local officials to determine needs and how to fulfill these needs, FEMA provided DOS with a list of resources that FEMA might be able to use in disaster operations. Once USAID/OFDA stood up operations, they took over the function of matching needs to offers of assistance, obtaining resource specifications to help FEMA determine if they could use the donation, and communicating FEMA acceptances or declinations to DOS.

To facilitate the 24/7 FEMA operations, some USAID/OFDA staff members were physically colocated at FEMA headquarters. FEMA also asked USAID/OFDA to deploy to the Joint Field Office (JFO) in the affected region. This proved to be invaluable support for the logisticians and response providers at headquarters and in the field.

For all donations that the USG received in the U.S., DHS took precautions to ensure that they could be distributed and would not place extra burdens on response operations. However, despite our best efforts to quickly put together with DOS and USAID/OFDA a mechanism to manage material offers, it was difficult to rapidly integrate such a large quantity of foreign assistance into the ongoing disaster response. Some of these challenges included incidental goods being shipped along with accepted items; lack of specificity in qualifying USG acceptance; and a lack of understanding of the specifics of the offers.

Nevertheless, despite that the USG had never managed such a large quantity of international assistance before, the USG did successfully accept blankets, cots, tents, generators, school supplies, and other materials. Ultimately, USAID/OFDA distributed 143 truckloads of international donations to distribution centers in Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi, Texas and Arkansas.

Accepting Cash Donations

Since additional decisions were needed to determine how to spend monetary donations, pledges of cash were handled under a different system. DOS received and retained donated funds in a DOS custodial account pending determination of use of funds. When it became apparent that donations of cash would be coming from foreign sources, FEMA identified an account that could be used to hold donated funds. FEMA also identified programs and needs that would not be eligible for FEMA assistance, but that could benefit from monetary donations.

An interagency group convened to discuss how foreign cash donations would be accepted and distributed. FEMA was invited to attend the Interagency Work Group and FEMA identified types of activities for which the donated funds could be used to address the needs of communities and individuals affected by the disaster, and the Work Group discussed parameters to appropriately use the funds.

On October 7, FEMA provided the Work Group a more detailed proposal for case management of disaster victims displaced by the Hurricane. Specifically, FEMA proposed that funds be provided to case managers who would assist disaster victims by identifying immediate needs and helping victims reach a level of self-sufficiency. Following interagency working group consideration \$66 million in cash donations was distributed to this case-management initiative.


The Future of International Coordination


Beginning in November, as part of our after-action review of disaster-response efforts, FEMA initiated meetings of the departments and agencies that had participated in the receipt of international donations following Hurricane Katrina. Knowing that the next hurricane season was less than a year away, FEMA wanted to build on lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina and formalize a system to identify requirements and accept international offers of assistance so that valuable time would not be spent developing the system in the midst of future disaster response.

These meetings led to formalizing an interagency workgroup of the departments and agencies that participated in Hurricane Katrina's international donations effort. This working group has begun formalizing an international coordination system. Participants included components of DHS such as FEMA, CBP and ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement)/CIS (Citizenship and Immigration Services and other departments and agencies such as USAID, DOS, DOD, FDA, USDA, ARC, and the US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE). Much progress has been made to develop standardized procedures to review and accept or decline international offers of assistance and to respond to international inquiries. By June 1st, and once approved by the Homeland Security Council, DHS expects to have an interagency system in place for coordination of international assistance offered in response to a catastrophic event in the United States.

I hope that my testimony serves this committee well. Once again, I thank you for having me here today. If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.

Handling International Offers of Assistance





Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Ms. McCarthy.

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH MCCARTHY

Ms. McCARTHY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I would like to immediately go to the issue of how we managed the cash donations and how we came to decisions on how best to place them, and I would like to start off by first saying that we have placed the balance of the funds that we have received. \$60.4 million were transferred on March 17th to the Department of Education. So the amounts of money that we have received, the \$126 million, have been transferred to FEMA and to the Department of Education.

I wanted to note a couple of things with regards to the cash process and noting, for one, that on September 15th at a Homeland Security meeting, the Department of State agreed and was given the lead in developing options on how to distribute and utilize the funds. Subsequently, the Department of State and the National Security Council initiated as many have referred to here an interagency process. FEMA was requested and provided proposals for consideration for use of the funds. It was agreed in the interagency to use the funds immediately for immediate needs, and the case management system met that requirement.

Subsequently, we obviously entered into a memorandum of agreement with FEMA. Then the interagency looked for ways to place the money into tangible reconstruction projects where there were unmet needs. We considered a number of options and ultimately decided through the interagency that the funds should go to support schools, K through 12 and universities, in the affected area where there were unmet needs for reconstruction, bricks and mortar, libraries, scholarships for students, and financial and ability to retain some staff and faculty. On March 16th, as I noted, we signed an agreement with the Department of Education, and we transferred the moneys on March 17th.

We have obviously learned a lesson on how to process the money, and in the wake of the recommendations of the Homeland Security Council, we are developing guidelines to set up an interagency process that would be more swift, more effective in moving international donations should we get them and accept them in another crisis. We are under a short time line to report to the Homeland Security Council by June 1st and we are well on way.

I want to note one other thing just before I sum up on a conclusion, and that is we need to recognize that moneys came in not only from governments, but this country received a huge amount of assistance, the sum total of which has never been calculated, from private individuals and organizations, and I want to mention a few: The donation of an entire life savings by a senior citizen in Europe who arrived at one of our embassies and asked that this gift be accepted in return for her having been liberated by U.S. soldiers from a concentration camp in World War II. She could not afford to give her savings but she did; the donation from one family in France of a check of approximately \$602,000; millions of dollars in private donations from individuals and companies in Japan; funds raised by our own State Department foreign service nations; and last but not least, the offers of many Canadians to open up their homes to take in displaced people as they had after September 11th when our planes were stranded.

To sum up a few things, our Nation received, as we have noted, an unprecedented amount of international assistance reflective that the people and governments around the world are prepared to support us and stand with us in our hour of need. We want to thank the international community and all those private citizens who gave so generously. We have ensured the best we could that the gifts made reached those affected by Hurricane Katrina.

gave so generously. We have ensured the best we could that the gifts made reached those affected by Hurricane Katrina. We believe that in a major domestic crisis, it is likely that we will again receive generous offers, particularly from neighbors and close partners. Should we decide to accept them, we will have the mechanisms in place to quickly process the assistance given. I would like to thank you for having the opportunity to discuss

I would like to thank you for having the opportunity to discuss the international support we received during Katrina. It is an unknown aspect of this crisis, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McCarthy follows:]

DEBORAH MCCARTHY- KATRINA WORKING GROUP

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM APRIL 6, 10:00 AM

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,

In response to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, this nation received an amazing outpouring of offers of assistance from around the globe, from countries rich and poor, from private companies both large and small, from associations, from students and from senior citizens. As the world viewed the devastation across the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, as it saw the suffering of those displaced, it responded with extraordinary generosity. Just as many nations and entities have received our bountiful assistance in their hour of need, they gave in ours.

In all, 151 nations, political entities and international organizations offered material and/or cash assistance to the United States Government. Beyond these gifts to the United States Government, there were hundreds if not thousands of gifts made directly to the states affected, to charitable organizations, or to those who suffered the Hurricane's devastation. There is no precise measure of the total amount of public and private international assistance given, but perhaps there need not be.

For, beyond the dollar value that can be attributed to the international assistance given by foreign citizens and governments, is the significance of their gestures of generosity. Their gestures demonstrated that the United States and the American people have strong support around the world.

In September of last year, I directed the Katrina Task Force, which was established at the State Department to assess and process international

offers of assistance and to help foreign missions find and assist their missing citizens. Since the Task Force was disbanded on September 18, I have been the Director of the Katrina Working Group in the Department. Our work has focused on 1) processing further offers of assistance; 2) thanking donors; 3) ensuring that cash donations to the USG received from foreign governments and private entities were used to benefit the victims of the Hurricane; and 4) participating in an interagency process to establish detailed procedures to handle likely offers of foreign assistance in future domestic crises, in fulfillment of the recommendations made by the Homeland Security Council.

This morning, I will outline the responsibilities of the Department of State under the National Response Plan, provide an overview of the international donations accepted by the USG and describe how they were processed, indicate the lessons learned from Katrina, and what we are doing to address the procedural gaps that have been identified.

We believe that, in the event of a future major domestic disaster, countries, particularly our close neighbors and partners, are again likely to be generous and forthcoming in offering assistance. As in the case of Hurricane Katrina, if there is an executive branch decision to accept such offers, we will have in place a detailed and efficient procedure to swiftly process the assistance proffered by the international community.

Responsibilities of the Department of State under the National Response Plan:

The National Response Plan's International Coordination Support Annex identifies the Department of State as the primary coordinating agency for the management of international assistance in response to an Incident of National Significance.

The Secretary of State is responsible for maintaining relations with foreign nations and coordinating the international aspects of a domestic

incident. In this capacity, the Department administers responses to both foreign offers of assistance and domestic requests for foreign aid. The Department, together with federal/state/local authorities, also has responsibilities regarding the protection of foreign missions and their official personnel, and plays a liaison role between foreign and domestic authorities in the provision of information and emergency assistance to foreign nationals.

In the wake of Katrina and the remarkable response from around the world, the Administration determined that we would, in principle, accept all offers of foreign assistance.

Flow and types of International Offers of Assistance:

The offers poured in immediately after Katrina's landfall, rising from 7 offers on August 30 to 122 by September 9. Material offers included tarps, beds, use of ships, helicopters, generators, children's clothing, first aid kits, food, high speed pumps, towels, water, diapers, life rafts, chlorine tablets, disinfectants, water purification equipment, education kits, and cleaning as well as medical supplies. Many countries offered specialized search and rescue, forensic and emergency medical personnel.

These offers described above were from governments. Private individuals also made numerous gifts, with the bulk going directly to NGOs or private groups in the affected areas. I must mention several of these: 1) the donation of an entire life's savings by a senior citizen in Europe who arrived at one of our Embassies and asked that this gift be accepted in return for her having been liberated by US soldiers from a concentration camp after World War II; 2) the donation from one family in France of a check for 500,000 euros or 602,000 U.S. dollars; 3) the millions of dollars in private donations from individuals and companies in Japan; 4) the funds raised by many of our own Foreign Service Nationals in our Missions overseas; and 5) the offers of many Canadians

to open up their homes to take in displaced people as they had after 9/11 when planes were stranded.

Management of the International Offers of Assistance:

In accordance with the National Response Plan, the Department both coordinated offers of assistance from foreign entities and informed governments of specific requests for assistance based on needs conveyed to the Department by FEMA. On August 30, our Operations Center reached out to FEMA's Office of International Affairs to offer the State Department's help in tracking international offers of assistance as well as "welfare and whereabouts" inquiries regarding foreign citizens. On September 2, the Department made the decision to establish a Task Force to coordinate State Department activities and to link with key agencies, including the Department of Defense, as well as with the United Nations and other international organizations which offered assistance.

DHS and the Department of State agreed that the USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) with its long experience in handling assistance programs, would be the proper entity to convey offers of assistance to FEMA, coordinate responses and, for those offers accepted by the U.S. government be the logistical point of contact for receipt of the material. The State Department's Task Force established a mechanism for tracking international offers. An USAID/OFDA representative was included on the Task Force. State officers were also assigned to the USAID/OFDA Response Management Team (RMT). A daily interagency videoconference was established to coordinate relief shipments.

As FEMA determined its operational requirements and identified needed resources from the international assistance offers, DOS coordinated acceptance messages with our overseas embassies and directed that

logistical arrangements be coordinated with USAID/OFDA for receipt of the gifts.

To assist in the distribution of the assistance, the Department established a forward office (State Department South) with 70 persons to support the Joint Interagency Field office in Baton Rouge. Led by a Senior Officer, the office included representatives from State bureaus as well as USAID/OFDA.

USAID/OFDA and FEMA used Little Rock as staging areas for international commodities, and USAID/OFDA leased a warehouse to receive these resources and coordinate distribution of the material with FEMA.

A significant portion of the material international assistance received came from NATO countries and partners as well as Mexico. The acceptance and delivery of much of this assistance was coordinated with NORTHCOM and other DOD elements. To facilitate NORTHCOM's receiving assistance rapidly, instead of requiring FEMA to validate a military need, some offers were coordinated directly by NORTHCOM, with the State Department's Task Force advised of that coordination.

To help transport airlift of European assistance, NATO stood up the EADRCC (Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre), and provided a liaison located with the USAID/OFDA staff to assist in coordinating NATO airlift. Diplomatic clearances for flights carrying assistance from military channels were coordinated through the Department of State's Task Force. Those for civilian flights were coordinated through TSA.

The Task Force prepared a series of messages to our Missions overseas providing guidance and updates on the handling of international offers of assistance, both material and cash. Posts were informed via cable on specific acceptance of offers of assistance with instructions provided to either establish contact with USAID/OFDA prior to any movement of material or to request specific approval of any cash donations to the USG.

In an unanticipated outpouring of generosity, foreign governments and international organizations provided \$126 million in cash donations to the U.S. Government.

The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Treasury, determined that a specific pre-existing deposit account, "19 X 6755, General Deposits, Department of State", was the most appropriate vehicle to place the donations in our role as temporary custodian of the funds given by foreign entities. Funds maintained in Treasury accounts do not ordinarily accumulate interest absent specific statutory authority.

To establish a point of reconciliation, the Department reviewed and documented the balance of the 19 X 6755 account at the baseline date of July 31, 2005. The account had a prior year balance but no current year activity. All subsequent collections related to Hurricane Katrina relief donations were recorded in the Department's accounting system under this account symbol for reconciliation with the Treasury account balance. Additional monitoring was added in the Office of Accounting Operations to review overseas collection transaction recording between our overseas and Headquarters financial systems. All Hurricane Katrina relief receipts were also independently monitored and reported on an inception-to-date cumulative daily collections report provided to senior State Department officials, by the Office of the Managing Director, Global Financial Operations, Bureau of Resource Management.

On September 15 at a Homeland Security Council meeting, the Department of State agreed to take the lead in developing options on how to distribute and utilize the donated funds. Subsequently, the Department of State and National Security Council initiated an interagency -working level process to review potential uses for the international cash donations. At a meeting on September 23, 2005, FEMA was requested to provide proposals for use of the funds for

consideration at an October 7 meeting. It was subsequently agreed to provide FEMA \$66 million of the foreign donations to use for case management services for hurricane victims. DHS and DOS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which specified that DHS/FEMA would assume full responsibility for these funds upon transfer, including providing for sufficient internal controls, transparent accountability, adherence to relevant Federal financial procedures and regulations, and would provide information to the Department to report to donors. The MOA was signed on October 19, 2005 and the funds were transferred from State to DHS on October 20.

The interagency group, led by the Department, then focused on directing the balance of the funds toward immediate, tangible reconstruction programs for which the generosity of donors could be easily recognized. After considering various options, it was ultimately decided through the interagency group that funds should be directed to support the needs of schools devastated by the Hurricane, including by providing funds for reconstruction, equipment, support for faculty, scholarships and financial support for students. On March 16, 2006, the Department of State signed an MOA with the Department of Education for projects to assist schools affected by the hurricane, and on March 17, 2006, \$66 million was transferred to the Department of Education.

Lessons Learned:

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned includes a number of recommendations for the Department of State and other agencies in the NRP with regards to the management of foreign assistance and foreign nationals in cases of domestic crisis. As enumerated in recommendations 89 to 97, more detailed procedures are needed to process offers of international assistance, and to ensure that the needs of foreign missions are included in the international coordination support annex of the NRP.

7

The specific recommendations are listed below:

1. DOS should lead the revision of the International Coordination Support Annex to the NRP, clarifying responsibilities of State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and other supporting agencies in response to domestic incidents. This revision should begin immediately.

2. Prior to June 1, 2006, State and DHS should lead an interagency effort that will quickly develop procedures to review, accept or reject any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic incident. This should include an appropriate mechanism, led by DHS and supported by State and Treasury, to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance received in support of victim needs. These operating procedures should include:

- a. A coordination process among Federal agencies and nongovernmental partners to solicit, accept, receive, integrate and distribute foreign assistance;
- b. An expedited review process for international aid that addresses both critical needs and legitimate foreign policy objectives;
- c. The inclusion of a USAID representative to the Joint Field Office (JFO);
- d. The inclusion of a representative from USAID/OFDA on the State Department Task Force and a DOS representative on USAID/OFDA's RMT to improve interagency coordination; also the addition of a DHS representative to both task forces to provide more efficient information sharing about assistance needs on the ground.

What we are doing to address the gaps identified: The Department of State, along with the agencies testifying this morning and others not

present, is participating in several working groups. One is focusing on material donations and is developing a manual on the processing of offers of assistance. Another is developing procedures for handling cash donations to enable a rapid application of gifts received. A third is focusing on developing guidelines to keep foreign missions abreast of USG response in cases of major disasters. Still another is addressing the issues related to public communications with foreign media. These groups are on target to meet deadlines given by the HSC, which will review their work.

Conclusion:

Our nation received an unprecedented amount of international assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, reflective of the fact that people and governments around the world are prepared to support us and stand with us in our hour of need.

We want to thank the international community and all those private citizens who gave so generously. We have ensured that the gifts made reached those affected by the Hurricane Katrina.

We believe that in a major domestic crisis, it is likely that we will again receive generous and additional offers of assistance from the international community, particularly from neighbors and close partners. Should the U.S. Government decide to accept in principle international offers to meet the crisis, we will have the mechanisms in place to quickly process the assistance given.

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss the international support we received during Katrina and look forward to responding to your questions.

UNCLASSIFIED

Management of Foreign Assistance Received for Hurricane Katrina Relief

In response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, the United States has received a generous outpouring of financial assistance from foreign governments and other foreign entities. Under the International Coordination Support Annex of the National Response Plan, the Department of State, in collaboration with the Agency for International Development (USAID), "acts as the intermediary for foreign offers of assistance to the U.S. Government..." The Department and USAID "work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to respond appropriately to such requests" and "expedite delivery of assistance" that is accepted.

Given the international interest and generosity displayed by contributions from foreign governments for relief efforts, guidelines for the future management of the donated funds should be established. Many of the guidelines discussed below are drawn from donor experience in other countries (where the United States has been a donor). This assumes a designated U.S. Government account, likely assigned to FEMA or some other agency with appropriate gift acceptance and grant authorities for domestic relief and reconstruction, and the swift transfer of donated funds from the Department of State deposit account.

Accountability and transparency

- The Department of State has a fiduciary responsibility to account for all donations it receives to the point that such funds are transferred to another agency.
- Subsequent tracking, management and reporting of foreign assistance, including those mentioned below, are the responsibility of the receiving agency, in coordination with OMB, and other appropriate agencies.
- Ongoing management of the funds by the agency receiving them from State should allow for strong accountability and transparency as to their use, down to project level.
- To do this, the funds should be separately tracked by the receiving agency, for example in a sub-account to allow for the accounting of individual or partially aggregated donations, and not used as general budget support.

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- Smaller financial contributions (particularly those under \$1 million) could be combined for a larger project -- to facilitate tracking and accounting for smaller donations -- but the combining of donors should be vetted with the State Department for diplomatic sensitivities.
- If the recipient agency is not configured to provide this degree of tracking of foreign donations, it could potentially pass through the contributions and attendant requirements to one or a few implementing agencies (such as the Army Corps of Engineers).

Swift Delivery of Assistance

- In order to expedite the delivery of assistance received, the agency and/or organization (with the account described above) that will direct the application of donations received for relief efforts must be identified.
- The Department of State should move quickly to transfer relief funds and any donor intentions for their disposition to the agency identified above.
- Given the anticipated interest in how the foreign assistance is used, every effort should be made to disburse the funds to provide swift and meaningful relief to Katrina's victims without compromising needed internal controls to insure proper management and effective use of the donations.

Appropriateness of use:

- Although foreign donors have not earmarked their contributions for specific projects, every effort should be made by the receiving agency to notify donors via the appropriate State Department regional bureau on the intended use for the contributions (above a certain threshold level -- e.g. \$5 million).
- Foreign donations should not be used for overhead.
- Where possible, very large donations (e.g. over \$10 million) should be used for a clearly identifiable purpose and even potentially marked with a plaque or other recognition of the donor. All countries expecting such recognition should get it. To the extent possible, all donors should be recognized in some appropriate way.

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Coordination:

• Use of the foreign funds should be well coordinated within the overall federal effort and with those at the state and local levels to avoid duplication of effort.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. La Force.

STATEMENT OF HUDSON LA FORCE III

Mr. LA FORCE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of Secretary Margaret Spellings, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the actions Education is taking to distribute funds received from international donors following Hurricane Katrina. We regard these international donations as one important element of our total effort to provide assistance to schools and colleges directly impacted by the hurricanes last summer and to those schools who have enrolled students displaced by those storms.

Within days of when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Secretary Spellings sent high level officials to the affected States to gain firsthand information about the situation and the needs in those jurisdictions. We focused on listening to the issues faced by educators in the Gulf States and developing solutions that would work for schools, colleges, and students. We have provided significant technical and financial assistance to States, school districts, and colleges and have granted waivers when necessary to support State and local school leaders in managing their response to the disaster.

On December 30th, President Bush signed into law the Hurricane Education Recovery Act which gave education \$1.6 billion for hurricane relief activities. Included was \$750 million to help public and private schools in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama restart their schools, \$645 million to public and private schools across the Nation for the costs they have incurred in enrolling displaced students, and \$190 million for colleges in Louisiana and Mississippi.

We made the first allocation of over \$250 million less than 1 week after President Bush signed the law, made the first allocation of aid for displaced students 1 week after final applications were due from the States, and as of today have fully allocated nearly \$1.5 million of the \$1.6 billion appropriation. The only remaining funds are a portion of the aid for displaced students which by statute is intended to be made in four quarterly payments across the school year.

We are actively engaged with the States and our Inspector General in monitoring the use of these funds. In January, we began discussions with the Department of State regarding approximately \$60 million in donations that State had received from foreign donors. We developed a proposed strategy for using this aid and on February 16th presented that strategy to an interagency task force comprised of officials from the Departments of State and Homeland Security, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding. The task force decided that education should receive and manage these foreign donations.

On March 16th, we entered into a memorandum of agreement with State under which Education has accepted these donations and will allocate the funds to educational institutions in Louisiana and Mississippi. The agreement provides a framework for education to maintain the funds in a separate trust account and to administer them in an accountable and transparent manner, including proper Internet controls and performance measures. While we have not yet made final decisions on the distribution of this aid, we do know that it will go to schools and colleges in the hardest hit areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, and we expect to make those final decisions and disburse the money in May. I believe that we have established and maintained an effective working relationship with State on this matter, and if the Federal Government were to receive education assistance from foreign sources in the future, we would be ready to do so again.

Education has learned important lessons about crisis management and response from our Katrina experiences. We are using those lessons to inform ongoing agency activities in emergency response and crisis management, including our preparedness for the potential flu pandemic. We are working with the Homeland Security Council and other agencies to implement the recommendations of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned Report and are reviewing our internal capabilities for crisis planning and response and our capabilities to work with State and local education leaders in emergency situations.

This concludes my statement, and I am happy to respond to any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. La Force follows:]

Statement of Hudson La Force III Senior Counselor to the Secretary U.S. Department of Education

On the Distribution of International Assistance In the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina

Before the House Committee on Government Reform April 6, 2006

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, on behalf of Secretary Margaret Spellings, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the actions the Department is taking in distributing funds received from international donors to support recovery efforts by schools and colleges affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Background

We regard our administration of these international donations as just one important element in our effort to provide assistance to schools and colleges directly in the path of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, and to the educational institutions that have enrolled students displaced by those storms. As you may know, we responded to those storms quickly and, we believe, comprehensively. Within days of when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Secretary Spellings sent high-level officials to the affected States to gain first-hand information about the situation and the needs in those jurisdictions. We focused on listening to the issues faced by educators in the Gulf States, and developing solutions that would work for schools, colleges and students. We subsequently provided significant technical and financial assistance to States, school districts, and colleges, and have granted waivers when necessary to support State and local school leaders in managing their response to the disaster.

For example, on September 30 we used Charter School Program funds that were available at the end of the fiscal year to make a special, competitive grant of \$20.9 million to the State of Louisiana to help reopen charter schools damaged by the hurricanes, to help create new charter schools, and to expand the capacity of existing charter schools to enroll displaced students. As another example, the Department redirected \$30 million in unspent Federal campus-based student aid funds to help hurricane-affected colleges meet the increased student demand for such aid. In addition, we established the Hurricane Help for Schools website, which links schools in the Gulf region that need books, clothing, and other supplies with individuals and organizations willing to donate those good and services. To date, this website has facilitated hundreds of these linkages.

On December 30, President Bush signed into law the FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act, which gave the Department \$1.6 billion for hurricane relief activities. From that

appropriation, \$750 million is helping public and private schools in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas that were closed as a result of the two hurricanes to restart their operations, \$645 million is for "Emergency Impact Aid" payments to public and private schools nationally for the costs they have incurred in enrolling displaced students, \$5 million is for efforts to help students made homeless by the hurricanes, \$190 million is for college recovery efforts in Louisiana and Mississippi, and the remaining \$10 million is for reimbursing institutions of higher education that took in displaced students. The Department has acted quickly and decisively in administering and distributing these funds, working in partnership with education officials in the States. As of this date, we have allocated over 90 percent of this special appropriation; the only remaining funds are a portion of the Emergency Impact Aid, which, by statute, is to be distributed in four quarterly payments over the course of the school year.

In sum, ever since Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the Gulf, the Department has been highly engaged, at all levels, in helping school and college administrators to cope with the aftermath of the storms, and in providing them with many forms of assistance and support. We are proud of what we have accomplished so far, but recognize that the recovery effort is far from over. Our efforts continue.

Distribution of International Donations for Education

In early January, we began discussions with the Department of State regarding the dispensation of approximately \$60 million that State had received from public and private sources in foreign nations. We developed a proposed strategy for using this aid and, on February 16, presented it to an interagency task force comprised of officials from the Departments of State and Homeland Security, the National Security Council, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Office of Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Recovery. The task force then made the decision that Education should receive and manage these foreign donations.

On March 16, we entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with State, under which our Department is accepting these donations and will allocate the funds to educational institutions in Louisiana and Mississippi. This memorandum provides a framework for Education to maintain the funds in a separate trust account and to administer them in an accountable and transparent manner. While we have not yet made final decisions on the distribution of this aid, we do know that it will go to schools and colleges in the hardesthit areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, and we expect to make those final decisions and disburse the aid by mid-May.

Lessons for the Future

I believe that we have established and maintained an effective working relationship with State on this matter and that, if the Federal Government were to receive education assistance from foreign entities or individuals in the future, we would be ready to do something similar.

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More generally, the Department has learned important lessons about crisis management and response from our post-Katrina experiences, and they will inform many of our efforts across the agency. For example, under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program, we make competitive Emergency Response and Crisis Management grants, to help school systems prepare to respond to natural and man-made emergencies. Although the original focus of these grants was on the threat of terrorism or such incidents as school shootings, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have shown that natural disasters are an equally important threat, and we have thus expanded the program's focus. Our response to the hurricanes is also influencing how we help school authorities plan for the potential of a flu pandemic. Just a few weeks ago, we sent schools and colleges a checklist to held them prepare for that eventuality. In addition, the Department is working with the Homeland Security Council and other agencies to implement the recommendations of the *Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* report. We are reviewing our internal capabilities for crisis planning and response, and evaluating our capacity to communicate with State and local education officials in emergency situations.

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

The good news is I am the only one here. The bad news is there is no time limit. So I get to ask what I need to ask.

I will start with Mr. Long. Is it accurate that FEMA has not invested the \$66 million in international funds yet?

Mr. LONG. I don't know. I know that the money was transferred into a FEMA account, and then it is my understanding that as the UMCOR got up and running that we would then transfer upon receipt. As to how we would utilize those funds, FEMA would then transfer the money to UMCOR to utilize those, but I don't have a current status as to where the money resides.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is there anyone here from GAO that can answer that? What is your understanding of the money?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is our understanding also, that is the case.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But these funds sat in non-interest bearing accounts. Is that accurate?

Mr. WILLIAMS. We identified \$60 million that had been in noninterest bearing accounts. Chairman TOM DAVIS. For how long?

Mr. WILLIAMS. From the September timeframe when the money first started to come into the organization, and I would feel it was through March 16th.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Six months, 7 months.

Mr. WILLIAMS. About 7 months or so, and we estimate that if it had been invested, it would have earned nearly \$1 million.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Long, do you know why that is? Is there some law that makes it go to a non-interest-bearing account or anything?

Mr. LONG. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Can you repeat that question?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Why would the money go to a non-interest-bearing account? Is there a prohibition in law about putting it in an interest-bearing account or was it thought that it would be there a short period and it just languished there?

Mr. LONG. It is my understanding that the FEMA account is interest-bearing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is that correct?

Ms. D'Agostino. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So was any money lost as a result of going into the-did we lose any money in the investments, I guess is my question.

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. By not placing it in the FEMA account, the FEMA interest-bearing account, yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. How long did that happen? Was it a 6month period?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. We calculated about \$1 million in interest would have been gained on the moneys had they been in the FEMA account.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. McCarthy, you sat on the money, not you personally, but State sat on the money for 6 months?

Ms. McCARTHY. I think Mr. Chairman, I think we need to clarify something here, which is absent specific authority, funds held in the U.S. Treasury do not ordinarily accumulate interest. We discussed with Treasury and OMB that we had a specific State Department account and it would be the appropriate place to place the money as it flowed in over time. It didn't come in in one fell swoop, and it was determined at the time that the donations in this account could not earn interest.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Why not?

Ms. McCarthy. I would have to ask my legal team here.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Go ahead. Ask them.

Ms. McCARTHY. Absent statutory authority, our moneys could not earn the interest.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Ms. McCarthy. That is the key element, and another element to consider is—

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I gather you would welcome statutory authority in a case like this so we don't leave \$1 million on the table.

Ms. McCARTHY. We are discussing in the interagency group right now that is looking at how best to stand up a team immediately and an interagency, we are discussing precisely that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, hurricane season officially starts shortly, and moving things through this Congress even when they are easy takes a period of time. We will probably just initiate something on that right away and try to work with your team.

I think that is something we all ought to be a little embarrassed about, not that it is anybody's fault. I understand the rationale, but when money is pouring in, maybe somebody should have said this ought to go in an account where it can earn some interest.

Ms. McCARTHY. One of the things we may have to keep in mind is that the interest, I suppose, that these funds—again, I am not from Treasury, but if these funds earn interest in U.S. Government investment mechanisms, those who are paying the interest are the U.S. taxpayers.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, basically you are using it for debt reduction instead of for its intended purpose. That is all. I mean, I know everything is fungible, accounts and everything like that, but I think in a case like this, this is \$1 million that really should have been earmarked for the coast and should have gone to the coast as opposed to debt reduction. I understand Government think and how this works, but at a time when you still have a lot of people along the coast that are looking for help and aid and everything else, that is my only point.

So I think from a statutory point of view, we would like to get this to a conclusion sooner or later, which is probably moving. I know what the government pays in interest. I don't know if we could have gotten something better off in a different marketplace or not, but I think that explains it.

Now, FEMA has not invested the \$66 million in international funds yet; is that right, Mr. Long, and what is it about the United Methodist Committee of Relief Contract? Can you tell us a little bit more about that?

Mr. LONG. The interagency group upon receiving international donations collectively as a group decided that case management would be an appropriate use of those funds. After that decision was made, FEMA pulled together a panel and reviewed proposals in the November timeframe and based on reviewing those proposals decided that UMCOR was a cost-effective efficient way to utilize those funds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, Ms. McCarthy, FEMA has told the committee and GAO that they provided the State Department-led task force with uses for \$326 million on September 23rd, identifying that the international cash donations could be spent on social service assistance, medical transportation, adopting homes for medical and handicap needs, job training, education, living expenses, building materials, and so forth. Why did the task force decide not to give the entire amount to FEMA for these purposes?

Ms. McCARTHY. If I can respond, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sure. I was asking you.

Ms. McCARTHY. The initial allocation was for the case management system, which would be for people to go out and determine the longer-term needs of those who had been affected by the hurricane. The other proposals as reviewed by the interagency needed further development and would flow from the case management system, and essentially what we decided to do in the interagency process is to look for something that was tangible immediate reconstruction and not wait for the development of what would be the results of the case management system, the citizens would need "X" or "Y" or housing, etc., because that process was going to take a longer time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I mean, I know these are foreign dollars flowing and somebody has to hold them, but I wonder if the State Department is competent. I mean they are not really part of the FEMA and recovery efforts as we look at this in the future. I don't know if that is something we are looking at, but it is just not something you are used to, the State Department is used to, overseeing. Right?

Ms. McCARTHY. Correct. It is not something we are used to overseeing, and that is why in the interagency process that we set up, we pulled in agencies who have a better feel for what is occurring on the ground, and in the future, that is what we would do. Obviously, the nature of the crisis is hard to determine. It could be manmade. It could be natural-made. And the moneys could go to one agency or another. That is essentially what we are discussing right now, to set up at least a mechanism to determine which agency would be the appropriate one to then process the money depending on the nature of the crisis.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Rowell, during the aftermath of Katrina, what process did DOD use to route foreign military assistance through the State-led task force charged with the responsibility for recording all offers of assistance? Was it an effective process?

Mr. ROWELL. Mr. Chairman, let me ask you to restate the question, please.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What process did DOD use to route the foreign military assistance that came in through the Department of State-led task force charged with the responsibility of recording all offers of assistance?

Mr. ROWELL. Sir, let me ask Mr. Berand McConnell to address that, please.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That would be fine.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Good morning, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning

Mr. MCCONNELL. The NORTHCOM role in particular followed essentially the same procedures that you have heard already described, which is to say when an offer of foreign assistance was received directly, we would refer those to the State-led task force for determination as to whether that task force would go to accepting the offer. Our part directly was to validate with General Honre and his task force whether those offers met a valid military need and then we made a recommendation on that point.

If all the pieces aligned, to include the Department of State task force agreement, we communicated directly with the military representatives to facilitate delivery

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. D'Agostino, GAO reports that the Federal Government didn't have the policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of donated commodities and to ensure that the commodities were vetted through the Department of State acceptance process, but FEMA reports to the committee yesterday that everything went through the DOS acceptance process. Can you resolve that for us?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. Apparently not everything went through the DOS acceptance process, and, in fact, there is actually still confusion about particularly the foreign military donations, who actually accepted them and was responsible for them. Basically, as we understand it from DOD, well, actually NORTHCOM General Counsel, they believed that because they used the task force process at the State Department that FEMA accepted the foreign military donations, and FEMA has also told us that they did not accept anything that went through the foreign military donations.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I mean, this is part of the debate going on with Congress about should FEMA be part of Homeland Security or should it be attached to the Office of the President. Obviously, if this were in the White House or attached right there, this stuff moves very, very quickly. It looks here like we have a bureaucratic jumble. Everybody is getting sign-offs and everything and money is sitting in accounts and it is not getting out there.

Mr. McConnell. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, please. Mr. MCCONNELL. Maybe I misunderstood the question. The interagency process either accepted or declined the military offers. Once the acceptance of those things, purely military goods, was complete, then they

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What kind of things did you decline?

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don't know that we declined anything, because the things that we accepted were divers, nurses. Ships from various countries came in to provide that sort of support. I don't know that once something was defined as a purely military offer, I do not believe we declined anything.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. My information shows that some of the items that were declined, we had some Japanese self-defense force units. Jordan offered two field hospitals. France offered an enabled frigate and hospital ship. Israel and Germany offered ground-based cellular communication systems, Switzerland two disaster relief platoons.

Mr. ROWELL. Mr. Chairman, we will have to take that one for the record. We are not prepared to speak to that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There have been widespread news reports about items that were offered from countries that we weren't prepared to take and turned back. Does GAO want to add anything to that?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. No, we don't.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just named a few. We have a couple of pages of things that were declined at this point.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, I agree with you that there were things that were declined. As far as NORTHCOM was concerned, our process was part of the interagency process. Those things that we were able to validate against General Honres' requirements, we recommended for the interagency process.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Mr. La Force, in your joint memorandum of agreement with the Department of State, which I think is in Attachment A, are you familiar with what I am talking about?

Mr. LA FORCE. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It indicates that the department will dedicate funds to Xavier and Dillard Universities, the Louisiana Department of Education, and the Laura Bush Foundation for American Libraries. In your written testimony, you say that you haven't yet decided who to give the money to. Is this like a draft?

Mr. LA FORCE. The attachment to the memorandum is a summary of the proposals that we had received at the time the memorandum was signed. We have received additional proposals since that time and have made no decisions about the actual grant awards that we would be making.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. McCarthy, you reported to this committee that State-led interagency working group offered international funds to the Army Corps of Engineers for the rebuilding of levies and that the Corps turned down the offer. Is that basically the gist of it?

Ms. McCARTHY. In the interagency effort to move the money swiftly for reconstruction, yes, we did approach the Corps, and once they had made a determination based on the moneys they received in the supplemental, they indicated to us that they did not need the international funds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. I am just trying to understand it. The Corps reports to the committee this morning that the Department of State was looking for options regarding how they could best allocate the foreign donations, but they never actually offered to give the money to the Corps. The Corps said they referred State's inquiry to the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding who is responsible for overseeing all of the recovery operations because they felt they would have a better feel as to where the greatest needs were.

Ms. MCCARTHY. Sir, I am not privy to how internally they deliberated and who they went to, but ultimately the response to us on approximately November 22nd was that they did not and would not need these funds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Ms. D'Agostino, does GAO believe that the current process that is currently in operation for acceptance and distribution of international assistance is transparent enough for proper oversight by Congress?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. Certain aspects of the process were very transparent and we were able to get very good records and access and information on. I would say that certain aspects regarding the role of the National Security Council were not as transparent.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Long, how does FEMA provide oversight for international assistance it has received in the United States for domestic incidents?

Mr. LONG. We would utilize standard case management oversight. Just to give you a brief overview of how FEMA manages these sorts of engagements, one would be to review the financial status, provide progress reports and close-out reports. In the case of UMCOR, we conduct site visits where we would go over a routine checklist of business and administrative systems, review the subgrantee selection and monitoring process. We monitor by telephone to maintain consistent communication, and there is consultation with the program officer at the time of payment requests and also at the time of progress reports, and then there is review of audit reports as well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Let me ask this: I will start with Ms. D'Agostino, if you can shed some light on it. The National Security Council had a large role in determining how internationally donated funds would be used. What led to the involvement of the National Security Council regarding international cash donations? Any idea?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. The only thing I can tell you is that part of the National Response Plan acknowledges that there may be policy issues that need to be elevated to either the Homeland Security Council or the National Security Council. Since these were international cash donations and the State Department is a member of the NSC, I assume that is why they went the route of the NSC.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Can anybody shed light on that? Is somebody afraid we would take some bad money from somebody? The NSC seems that it is really not equipped to decide how this stuff ought to be sent and accepted and stuff. Can anybody shed any light on that?

Ms. McCARTHY. If I could clarify, the NSC offered to pull together agencies working with us so we would start a deliberative process. I don't think one can infer from that they had veto making authority. It was an interagency deliberative process. They pulled the agencies together for meeting.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Until just a week or two ago, we still had some of these commodities sitting in a warehouse in Arkansas; is that right?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. That is our understanding.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. While everybody is meeting and discussing and everything else.

Ms. McCarthy, as you interpret it, what kind of authority does the NRP give the Department of State for making decisions about handing foreign assistance to the United States? As you interpret it, what kind of authority does the NRP give the Department of State to make decisions about spending foreign assistance given to the United States? What is the current thought?

Ms. McCARTHY. Essentially, we act as an intermediary for foreign offers of assistance under the NRP and we work with other agencies to respond to requests and expedite the delivery of assistance. That in a nutshell is essentially our role under the NRP.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Mr. Long, GAO reports that FEMA and USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance were unable to provide the GAO with evidence that they had determined or confirmed that international in-kind assistance arrived at FEMA distribution sites. Can you shed any light on that? Mr. GOTTLIEB. Mr. Chairman, I think I mentioned in my re-

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Mr. Chairman, I think I mentioned in my remarks that we actually recently received from our dispatch agent, DHL, a thorough listing of all that came into Little Rock, what those donations were, who the donors were, and the distribution points to which those are were dispatched. I believe we left 30 copies with the clerk.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. So I think if you look—

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We just got them. OK. That is fine.

Mr. Long, let me ask you this: If matching funds that are required for State and local governments for public assistance was an issue and not using Stafford Act funds, could the Stafford Act be amended to permit international donations to be used for such matching funds? Do you have any thought on that?

Mr. LONG. I was just informed that it would require statutory action.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So that is something we could consider from our end?

Mr. LONG. Yes. It is something we could consider.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is FEMA seeking statutory authority to change the Stafford Act to allow it to use international funds for other uses currently permitted under the act? That is what we are asking. That is something else we ought to look at.

Mr. LONG. We are currently looking at all the changes that should be considered to be made to the Stafford Act based on what happened in Katrina.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask this for the panel, if somebody can answer it: Who is responsible for tracking who received in-kind donations to their final destinations, from the beginning to the end, receiving them and going to the end with this process? Who is ultimately responsible for that? We have all these different agencies up here. We have all these task forces. Ultimately, who makes those decisions, or it is just so diffuse at this point that you just kind of have to get GAO involved to try to follow the cash?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Mr. Chairman, if I can respond in part and I think Mr. Long may respond afterwards, I think the way the system developed, which is fairly rapidly after we—

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Kind of ad hoc?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Ad hoc, but because we didn't have a system, that is the best we can call it, but it was pretty clear what our role was at OFDA, and that was once a decision had been made to accept an offer, after OFDA then liaised with wherever that donor was, whether it was consolidated goods from a NATO air base or it was Britain or wherever it was, and then those planes were directed into Little Rock. At Little Rock Air Force Base, that is where we had our logisticians. We were working with DOD. They helped us with some of the offloads. We then engaged the services of DHL to help us then dispatch those goods to destination points that were given to us through consultation with FEMA.

So in the documents to which I referred earlier, it shows many, many destinations throughout Mississippi and Louisiana and Alabama where we actually dispatched those. Now, after that point, that was the end point for us. We sent it to a distribution center. Chairman TOM DAVIS. You sign off at that point?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. That is where we sign off, yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Then who gets it? I guess FEMA gets it. Mr. LONG. At that point, when the goods landed in Little Rock, FEMA would be in communication with OFDA as to where to distribute those based on need. If the goods were transferred to a Federal staging area, which would be FEMA warehouse or distribution center, we then, yes, would take physical receipt of those goods.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Rowell, let me ask did we have any issues with DOD coordinating with the Department of State, ensuring permission or visa for foreign military ships and planes and personnel during this emergency? Did it run pretty smoothly or did you run into some red tape in moving and getting people in and out?

Mr. ROWELL. Our information is even though this was an ad hoc and quickly formed group, I have to say that the people at this table and the folks that supported them, it went well after we got our sea legs, if you will, and DOD has no problem.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So we don't need any statutory or any changes in a case like this to make sure that it functions should this happen again? We are asking this not to come back and chew everybody out for what happened this time around, but-

Mr. ROWELL. In my discussions in the department, I know of no conversations regarding a change to statutory authority.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. This was the largest storm in recorded history in the United States, and I think as we take a look at that, and I have been down there three times and I know many of you have been down, even though it was predicted, it was predictable, we learned a lot and a lot of mistakes got made. The key is to make sure the next time around we are ready and we can be a smooth efficient machine.

We are going to wrestle up here with some major issues on organization. Frankly, we know FEMA is having trouble filling the slots at this point. There is some concern that being attached to the Department of Homeland Security, that it can't operate as quickly and efficiently under the National Response Plan. It really never got a chance to operate in this particular case because Michael Brown who was on the ground kind of didn't believe in the plan to begin with. He had handled emergencies before. He just tried to circumvent it and deal directly with the White House.

So, look, a lot of things happened that in retrospect today we would all do differently. You are just spokesmen for your different agencies. What we are trying to elicit here is the kind of statutory changes so we can give these departments the flexibility you need

to get the job done should something like this occur again. That is ultimately what we are after.

Any other comments before we close the hearing? I appreciate everybody's patience today.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Just one brief one, sir, and that is I am here as the NORTHCOM kind of representative, and just speaking from an operational basis, I think in many ways this is a very good news story. Yes, there was no system, there was no anticipation that there would be a need for this kind of a system, but once the people on the ground started to work together—and particularly kudos to the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance who has impressed the men and women of JTF Katrina very well—I think this in some ways as a good news story in allowing us to proceed along the lines that you just described.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I am not sure I disagree with that. I think one of the problems is that we have institutional barriers, some statutory, some regulatory, that made it harder for people to get the jobs done, and that is really what we are trying to solicit here.

I was down on the ground and saw people working 24–7. I saw volunteers, fire departments, and emergency personnel from all over the country coming in and making this work. I saw people in the face of the storm who had made some early decisions decide they were going to put everything into saving lives, which meant some other things had to go by the wayside and did a remarkable job of actually limiting loss of the life once the levies broke and once some of the initial decisions that they probably wished had gone otherwise came about, and there were a lot of heroes in this story, and I don't mean to detract from that at all.

We are really ultimately after institutionally what do we need to do to make sure that we can be a smooth-running machine. I know you have to deal with the rules and regulations that are passed by Congress and in some cases regulations that come through the agencies, and you are subject to that, and when you violate them, we will call you up and say why did you do that. Of course, emergency situations are different, and one of the things we found with FEMA and the folks on the ground—the Governor of Louisiana talked about this, even Michael Brown when the military came in—they were mission-oriented. They were not driven by regulations, and they were able to get things done a lot quicker than some other elements of the government that seemed to be just constrained by regulations. In emergencies, you have to look at the mission. You have to get the job done. It sometimes goes outside the box. We are seeing this all the time.

Anyway, I appreciate everybody sharing their thoughts with us today, coming before us. I am sure if we had it to do over again, we would all do it differently, but so would we up here. We are just trying to see what we need to do so that the next time, we give you the tools.

I appreciate your patience. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

Rep. Dennis Kucinich Committee on Government Reform "Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance." April 6, 2005

Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Davis, for holding this important oversight hearing to examine the acceptance and distribution of international aid donations for Hurricane Katrina relief. I appreciate that you have kept your promise to hold a series of hearings on the subject of Hurricane Katrina as you said you would in September of last year. I am grateful for your leadership in this regard.

After Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States on August 29, 2005, causing widespread flooding and significant property and infrastructure damage to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, over 76 countries and international organizations from around the world offered humanitarian aid in a variety of forms. Initially, the United States was reluctant to accept donations and aid from foreign countries other than Canada and the United Kingdom. After all, the United States had never before accepted international aid for disaster relief. As time passed and reports of damage grew grimmer, however, the United States began accepting many of the generous offers of aid.

Today's hearing will look at several GAO findings of how the federal government botched up the receipt and distribution of this international aid. It should come as no surprise that the federal government ineffectively managed this international aid, as the overall federal response to the hurricane was both inadequate and appalling, from the suspension of the Davis Bacon fair wage provisions to the massive use of no bid contracts that mostly went to out-of-state contactors, not to mention countless other failures that cost money and lives.

However, rather than focusing on FEMA's lack of organization or poor interagency communications, I'd like to highlight another major shortcoming: the United States' rejection of offers of aid from select countries for narrow political reasons. For example, Cuba offered 1,586 doctors and 26 tons of medicine for U.S. victims, but this aid was not accepted. While the United States' policy towards Cuba has been four decades of official hostility, was that sufficient reason to reject their unconditional offer of much needed healthcare?

Acceptance of humanitarian aid from a country at odds with our own country's official policy would not have been without precedent. In the past, humanitarian considerations have often surpassed political concerns in dealing with disaster relief. In fact, disaster relief has even served to bridge countries with poor relations. When devastating earthquakes hit both Turkey and Greece in 1999, not only did the two countries assist each other, but the bilateral relations between the two countries vastly improved after disaster assistance was exchanged. For example, Turkey and Greece co-sponsored a joint UN resolution on the establishment of a "Standby Disaster Response Unit." Later, the Political Directors of both Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministries established a joint mechanism to prepare for Turkey's membership to the European Union.

Venezuela offered our country another generous **minute** aid package, including two mobile hospital units, 120 rescue and first aid experts, 10 water purification plants, 18 power generation plants, 50 tons of food, and 20 tons of bottled water, however this offer was also rejected. Yet we have **no <u>official</u> policy** of hostility towards Venezuela. What was the justification for rejecting this aid?

I believe that in the aftermath of Katrina, the United States should have accepted any help that we were offered. Our country and especially the citizens of the Gulf coast region needed that aid. But Washington bureaucrats implacably turned their eyes from the needs of U.S. citizens, and remained

firmly opposed to the diplomatic humanitarian gestures from Cuba and Venezuela.

The rejection of aid from those countries was not only a missed opportunity to aid our suffering citizens, but also a missed opportunity for the U.S. to positively engage with countries with which we have strained or nonexistent diplomatic relations. Often the silver lining of tragedies is that wounds are healed between those with differences, as those differences seem somehow less significant when faced with massive loss and destruction. Sadly, Hurricane Katrina brought no silver lining with its dark clouds. It was a colossal disaster in every sense.

I would like to hear today's panelists try to justify our government's rejection of aid from Cuba and Venezuela in a time of desperate need. I sincerely hope that this hearing will help to establish a healthier acceptance policy for any aid our country may be offered should there be any future disasters. Thank you.

Sent: Wed Apr 05 19:18:34 2006 Subject: Request for Information from Corps of Engineers

In late fall 2005, the State Department contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) regarding the possible availability of foreign donations they had received to assist New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The State Department requested information from ACE on funding needs that could be met by a portion of \$60 million dollars they had received from foreign governments. Our understanding was that there were stipulations on how this money could be spent - it had to be put towards efforts in the New Orleans area and a portion of the money had to be used to address education needs.

At the time, all of the Corps' requirements were being adequately funded in the supplemental appropriation acts that were moving forward.

After discussion within the Corps, we suggested that the inquiry be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding at DHS. It is my understanding that they served in an advisory role and worked with the State Department to coordinate the transfer of available funds to the US Department of Education. Since Education already had a grant program in place and the money had to be used in New Orleans with an education component, they were deemed to be the logical distributor of the additional funds from foreign donors.

Thanks. Please let me know if you have additional questions. Jennifer

Jennifer A. Greer Chief, Future Directions Branch Civil Works Directorate 202-761-4113 202-761-4370 (fax)

Can u answer these questions for clarification:

Did ACE report to State working group that they were receiving adequate funds and did not need money? Why did ACE suggest the inquiry be directed to DHS Office indicated below? ACE Response:

State was looking for options regarding how they could best allocate the foreign donations. They never actually offered to give the money to the Corps. Since the Department of Homeland Security GCR office is responsible for overseeing all Gulf Coast Recovery operations we felt they would have a better feel as to where the greatest needs were. That's why we referred them to the GRC office. We have been working closely with that office ever since it was formed. Jen

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

"Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance"

Index of Attached Documents:

- I. Department of State Interagency Task Force Record of International Assistance
- II. FEMA Mission Assignments to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- III. U.S. Northern Command Briefing on International Military Support
- IV. United Methodist Committee on Relief Contract
- V. Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Education on Use of International Monetary Donations

Donor Nation Dates Type Accepted Offers of A Description		Accepted Offers of Assistance Description	Cash Collected/Items Received By USC	
Afghanistan	9/21/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged	\$99,800.00
Albania	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$300,000 pledged	
Andorra	9/21/205	Government	Relief Supplies sent to local hospitals	Received
Argentina	9/27/2005	Government	GOA sent a multi-disciplinary (White	Arrived
-	[ł	Helmet) team with expertise in social,	
			psychological, and medical assistance	
			related to disaster relief.	
Armenia	10/7/2005	Government	USD \$200,000 pledged	\$200,000.00
Australia	9/6/2005	Government	Emergency managers sent to assist with	Arrived
			community recovery	
	9/1/2005	Government	GOA donated \$10 million (\$7,649,062) to	
			Red Cross for Katrina disaster assistance.	
Austria	9/15/2005	Government	500 tarps (10mx4m), 300 camp beds	Arrived
Azerbaijan	9/6/2005	Government	USD \$500,000 cash pledged	\$500,000.00
Bahamas	9/8/2005	Government	USD \$50,000 cash.pledged	\$50,000.00
Bahrain	9/7/2005	Government	USD \$5,000,000 pledged	\$4,999,975.50
Bangladesh	9/12/2005	Government		
Barbados	9/13/2005	Government	FM Billie Miller - Barbados donated an	
			unspecified amount to the Red Cross	
Belgium	9/2/2005	Government	(10 personnel) to work with Red Cross),	Arriveo
			coordination/liaison team (4 personnel),	
			civil engineering team (10 personnel),	
			diving team, balloon lamps.	
Bolivia	9/13/2005	Government	5 Civil Defense officers for week-long	Arrived
			Subject Matter Expert Exchange visit with	
			Mississippi Natinal Guard	
Bosnia/Herzegovina	10/12/2005	Government	USD \$76,362 pledged	\$61,406.16
Botswana	11/3/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged	\$100,000.00
Brunei	9/28/2005	Government	USD \$1,000,000 pledged	\$1,000,000.00
Cambodia	9/13/2005		USD \$20,000 pledged from King	\$20,000.00
Cameroon	9/15/2005	Government	CFA 250 million (approx.) \$380,000	\$374,531.84
Canada	9/11/2005	Government	2 Griffon helicopters to US CG District	Received
			(Cape Cod and Virginia)	
	9/11/2005	Government	Military: 2 fleet diving unit teams (of 17	Received
			and 18 divers) - 5 support personnel/self-	
			sustaining	
	9/8/2005	Government	Military: Canadian Ship w/ medical supplies	Received
	8/29/2005	Government	Canadian National Emergency Stockpile	Received
			System offered 31,400 blankets, 20,000	10001700
			cots, 26,000 examination/rescue gloves,	
			5000 isolation gowns, etc.	

	9/7/2005	Government	Medical Supplies: Crutches (1483),	Received
	9/ 1/2005	Government		Received
			Wheelchairs (110), Vinyl gloves (126,970),	
			Surgical masks (13,900), Bandages,	
		~	compress, etc. (17,000 +)	
	9/6/2005	Government	Transport: Canadian Air Force	
			transported 27 Canadian Red Cross workers	
			and 5 FAC officals to Houston TX	
	9/19/2005	Government	Electrical crews, paramedics, police,	
			firefighters, generators: By Mayor of	
			Ottawa to Ambassador.	
	9/19/2005	Government	Electric Power: Manitoba Hydro offered	
			100 staff to help restore power.	
	9/8/2005	Government	Cash: Alberta pledged C\$5 million	
			contribution to Bush-Clinton Katrina fund	
Chile	9/15/2005	Government	Government of Chile offered bottles of	Received
			water; disposable diapers; 500	10001700
			sheets/blankets; 200 body bags; 5 water	
			pumps, & small bandages, etc.	
China	9/6/2005	Government	USD \$5,000,000 pledged	\$5,000,000,00
	9/0/2003	Government	China provided a \$100,000 check to Charge	\$5,000,000.00
	9/1/2003	Government		
			Sedney in Beijing to pass to the Chinese	
	0/10/0005		Red Cross September 1.	
	9/12/2005	Government	Offered relief supplies: Tents: 5-7 person	Received
			(590), Tents 12 person (410), small gasoline	
			or diesel generators: 1-kilowatt (300), 3-	
			Kilowatt (300). Generators 220V/110V	
	ł		capable; bedsheets (24,800) childrens'	
	_		garments (10,000).	
Colombia	9/15/2005	Government	GOC offered 4 English-speaking mental	Received
			health experts	
Cyprus	11/14/2005	Government	Cypriot Council of Ministers pledged	\$50,000.00
			\$50,000 aid	
Czech Republic	9/15/2005	Government	24,000 blankets, 600 camp beds, 14 large	Received
			tents, 25,500 Aquasteril kits	
Denmark	9/15/2005	Government	10,000 blankets, 2 rubber halls, 3500 First	Received
			Aid kits	
Djibouti	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$50,000 pledged	\$50,000.00
Dominican	9/21/2005	Government	USD \$50K pledged	\$50,000.00
East Timor	9/30/2005		USD \$500.00 pledged	
Egypt	9/15/2005	Government	6000 blankets, powdered milk, jam, 10,000	
			sets of underwear	
EL Salvador		Government	Cash pledged	
Equatorial Guinea	9/23/2005	Government	USD \$500,000 pledged Bush-Clinton fund	
Ethiopia	9/23/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged Bush-Clinton Fund.	
Fiji Islands	9/28/2005	Government	USD \$30,000 pledged	\$29,977.50
Finland	9/3/2005		Finland's 3 logisticians worked with IRC	Received

		·	Ter	
	9/16/2005	Government	Sheets 9 000; Small tarps 200; First aid kits	Received
	0/6/2007		200; 1000 Pillow covers	
	9/6/2005	Government	Unspecified cash through the Finnish Red	
	0/11/10005		Cross to the American Red Cross	
France	9/14/2005	Government	600 tents, 18.1 tons of relief supplies,	Received
	0/15/0005		kitchen sets, and 17 naval divers, MREs	
<u>.</u> .	9/15/2005		EOD Diving Team: 16 Divers w/ equip;	Arrived
Gabon	9/12/2005	Government	USD \$500,000 from GOG pledged	\$499,975.00
Georgia	9/14/2005	Government	USD \$50,000 to Red Cross pledged	\$50,000.00
Germany			15 high speed pumps for removal of water,	Received
			with 94 personnel to operate them; On 9/8	
			German water pumps began flowing into	
			the Joint Operating Area (JOA) to assist	
	0/0/0005		with water removal.	
	9/9/2005	Government	100,000 MREs - in response to NATO	Arrived
			request; two shipments sent. 15 metric tons	
~	10/0 /000		arrived September 6.	
Ghana		Government	USD \$200,000 pledged	\$200,000.00 Received
Greece	9/15/2005			
Guinea	9/15/2005	Government		
Guyana	9/15/2005	Government		
Haiti	10/6/2005	Government	uent USD \$36,000 pledged Habitat for Humanity	
Iceland	9/20/2005	Government	USD \$500,000 pledged Bush-Clinton fund	
India	9/14/2005	Government	3000 personal hygiene kits, 3000 sheets,	Received
			3000 blankets, 150 extra large tarps.	
	9/11/2005	Government	USD \$5,000,000 pledged to Red Cross	Received
Indonesia	10/4/2005	Government	USD \$200,000 to ARC pledged	
Iraq	9/10/05	Government	USD \$1 million pledged to the Iraqi Red	
		L	Crescent - donated to ARC	
Ireland	9/28/2005	Government	Amount actually received by Irish Red	ARC confirms
			Cross = 700,000 Euros.	receipt
Israel	9/6/2005	Government	Israeli delegation: 80 tons of relief supplies	Received
			including water, UHT milk, toddler food	
			substance, diapers, mattresses, cookies,	
			pairs of wooden crutches, bathing seats,	
			tripod walking sticks, 2-wheel rolettos,	
			adult wheelchairs, child weelchairs	
			elevators, adult diapers, folding beds, 1000	
			wool blankets, 200 polytillin (nylon) rolls,	
			2000 cardboard boxes, 100 first aid kits	
	9/6/2005	Government	GOI sent four officials to Washington 9/7	
			both to serve as resource and to prepare and	
			coordinate GOI relief efforts.	
Italy	9/15/2005	Government	300 adult camp beds, 300 blankets, 600	Supplies & 8
			sheets, 1 suction pump, 6 life rafts, 11,200	emergency staff
			chlorine tablets, 1000 lbs baby food formula,	received
			6000 lbs Misc foodstuffs	

Japan	9/13/2005	Government	Blankets (150K), generators (150 x 60Hz),	
2 up un			electric cord reels (150).	
	9/6/2005	Government	USD \$200,000 pledged to ARC	*******
Jordan	9/14/2005	Government	First Aid Kits	
Kenya	9/28/2005	Government	\$102,409 dollars (7,650,000 Kenya	
,-			shillings) to Bush-Clinton Fund pledged	
Korea (Republic of) 11/30/2005	Government	Up to \$30 million in cash and in kind	\$3,814,069.28
			D130pledged	
	9/12/2005	Government	Water, tarps and plastic. Bedding, blankets,	
	1		medical supplies, comfort kits, baby	
		1	formula and diapers, coolers, large tents, vet	
			supplies, cleaning supplies, 2000	
		1	emergency relief sets, emergency food	
			(10,000 pieces), rain suits (5,035),	
	1		contamination/biohazard suits (5,000),	
			toiletry/Sanitary Items (60 boxes), feminine	
			hygiene products (30 boxes), Cleaning	
	-		supplies	
	9/12/2005	Government	Released 96,000 barrels of oil/day for 30	······································
			days from their Strategic Petroleum Reserve	
			(SPR) for a total of approx. 2.5 million	
			barrels.	
Kosovo	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$ 495,000 to ARC pledged	ARC confirms receipt
Kuwait	9/14/2005	Government	\$400 million cash pledged in oil products	A
			proceeds, USD \$100 million to NGOs	
Laos	9/15/2005	Government	USD \$25,000 pledged	\$25,000.00
Liechtenstein	9/14/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged to the Red Cross	In progress
Liberia	9/8/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged to NGOs	
Lithuania	9/28/2005	Government	EU\$ 10,000 (\$12,300) pledged	ARC confirms
				receipt
Luxembourg	9/15/2005	Government	Team of 5 people with two jeeps - water	Arrived
	1		purification or pumping; 1000 camp beds,	
		l	2000 blankets	
Macedonia	9/12/2005	Government	Blankets to the State of Louisiana	Received
Malaysia	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$1,000,000 pledged to the Red Cross	
Maldives	9/14/2005	Government	USD \$25,000 pledged to Red Cross	
Malta	9/12/2005	Government	USD \$12000 pledged	\$12,000.00
Marshall Islands	9/11/2005	Government	USD \$10,000 pledged to Amer. Red Cross	<u> </u>
Mexico	9/7/2005	Government	Proteccion Civil (Mexican disaster relief)	
			sent 4 senior experts in medical disaster	
· ·····			coordination	1
	9/9/2005	Government	3,000 lunches and 4,720 dinners served to	
L			evacuces on 9/9 per NORTHCOM.	

	9/20/2005	Government	SEDENA (Mexican Defense) sent 49	
			vehicles carrying relief supplies such as	
			water, medicine, vitamins, blankets, etc.	
			donated by various GOM entities. They also	
		1	donated two full field kitchen sets capable	ļ
			of feeding 7000 people, 3 meals a day for	
			20 days, and water purification units.	
	9/11/2005	Government	MARINA - (Mexican Navy) deployed the	
			amphibous ship PAPALOAPAN. Ship	
			contained 8 "Urales" (semi-amphibous	
			vehicles); 7 amphibous vehicles; one water	
			truck with 10,000 liters of potable water;	
		1	one fuel truck with 15,000 liters of fuel; one	
			naval engineering team (experienced in	
			reparing dikes and canals); 200,000 liters of	4
			potable water; 2 MI-17 helicopters with	
		ļ	rescue hoist cable.	
	9/9/2005	Government	20 tons of rice, 20 tons of milk, 2 tons of	
			diposable diapers, 2 tons of comforters and	
			1 ton of drinking water	
	9/9/2005	Government	Truck convoy of UHT milk crossed the	
			border at Eagle Pass (from Coahuila to	
			Texas)	
Mongolia	9/14/2005	Government	USD \$50,000 pledged to ARC	
Morocco	9/29/2005	Government	USD \$500,000 pledged to ARC	
Nairobi	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged	\$102,409.64
Nepal	9/22/2005	Government	USD \$25,000 pledged	\$24,975.00
Netherlands	9/15/2005	Government	3 high capacity dewatering pumps; 1 scania	3 pumps received
			support truck and trailer; 9 - 0.9x18 meter	
			discharge pipes; 2-six meter containers.	
	9/15/2005	Government	M/S Van Amstel, a frigate with supplies	Arrived
			and relief personnel (including two Lynx	
			helicopters, 2000 MREs, a diver and	
			engineer team) sent for search, rescue,	
			medical care, five USCG personnel with	
			law enforcement on board	
	8/31/2005	Government	The Government also offered to help	Levee inspection
			rebuild levees, provide a water management	team arrived
			team.	
New Zealand	9/6/2005	Government	USD 1.4 million pledged through the Red	
AT	0/10/000		Cross (\$2M New Zealand Dollars)	
Nigeria	9/13/2005	Government	USD \$1,000,000 pledged	\$1,000,000.00
Norway	9/12/2005	Government	Norwegian Red Cross made general offer of	Awaiting ARC
	9/3/2005	Causani	assistance to American Red Cross	confirmation
	19/3/2005	Government	Pledged 10 million kroner (roughly \$1.54	Supplies (blankets)
Pakistan	0/20/2005	Carrows	million USD) in relief supplies & cash.	arrived
r anistall	9/20/2005	Government	USD 1 million pledged to the ARC	

	9/11/2005	Government	Pakistan in kind donation: 5000-6000	
	5/11/2005		family sized tents; 2000 bedsheets; 2000	
	1		pillows; 1000-1500 plastic sheets; 500	
			coolers (approximate value: 500,000)	
Palau	12/6/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged	\$100,000.00
Palestinian	9/16/2005	Government	USD \$10,000 pledged to ARC	\$100,000
Authority	5/10/2005		CDD \$10,000 ploaged to The	
Papua New Guinea	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$10,000 pledged	
Peru	9/15/2005	Government	16000 bandages	Received
Portugal	9/8/2005	Government	General offer of assistance; 500,000 barrels	1.000110
i on ugan	1.012000		of oil (2% of reserves) as part of the IAE	
	1		response to the disruption of oil supplies	
			caused by Hurricane Katrina.	
Oatar	9/8/2005	Government	USD \$100,000,000 pledged for use locally	
Zum	2000		across the Gulf states affected by Katrina.	
			across and Guil blacks arrected by Full ha.	
Romania	9/15/2005	Government	20 military tents, 100 isothermal tents	Tents arrived
			(designed for mountain rangers) and 64	
			packaging units (4 boxpallets and 60 pallets	
Russia	9/20/2005	Government	bottled water, two 20 kilowatt generators, 2	Arrived: 16 tons of
			20-kilowatt generators,3 water purifying	bandages, and other
			stations, first-aid kits and bandages, 13 tons	
			disinfectant;10,000 MREs, 4000 blankets,	blankets
			101 30-person tents, 20 ten person tents	í í
Rwanda	9/27/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged	\$100,000.00
Saint Vincent and	9/13/2005	Government	GOSV pledged USD \$20,000 to American	
Grenadines			Red Cross	
Samoa	9/12/2005	Government	\$10,000 cash donation via GOS to ARC.	
San Marino	9/8/2005	Government	General assistance via the Intl. community.	
Sao Tome and	9/11/2005	Government	USD \$18,000 pledged	
Principe				
Saudi Arabia	9/9/2005	Government	USD \$100 Million pledged for use locally	
			across the Gulf states affected by Katrina	
Senegal	9/28/2005	Government	USD \$100000 pledged	\$100,000.00
Singapore	9/6/2005	Government	Four CH-47 Singaporean Air Force	
			helicopters attached to the Texas National	
	1		Guard as part of long-term training	
			arrangement. 3 additional personnel	
	1		(experience in safety, hygiene, and	
			psychological well-being of military	
	ļ		personnel).	
Slovak Republic	9/15/2005	Government	2,500 blankets, 500 camp beds, 1000 first	Arrived
			aid kits and 600 liters of liquid soap.	
Slovenia	9/16/2005	Government	780 blankets, 250 camp beds, 250	Arrived
			mattresses, 2000 First Aid kit	
South Africa	9/23/2005	Government	USD \$2,000,000 pledged to Red Cross	

Spain	9/8/2005	Government	2 planeloads of tents (20), bedding, water purification equipment, MREs (6,200) and other items+D9.	Arrived
	9/8/2005	Government	70,000 barrels of oil per day for 30 days as part of the IEA effort to release oil reserves onto the market	
Sri Lanka	9/1/2005	Government	USD \$25,000 pledged to the Red Cross.	
Sweden	9/1/2003	Government	Offer of C-130 Hercules for transportation	
Sweden	9/15/2005	Government	of humanitarian aid to New Orleans from	
			September 4 - 9, 2005.	
Thailand	9/11/2005	Government	8,100 kg rice (unknown type), 7075 kg rice (unknown type), 7,490 kgs blankets; 4,845 kg canned food	Received
Thailand	9/13/2005	Government	Forensic team including 5 experts with	
		_	specialization in mass casualty response and	
			morgue/forensic mass casualty assistance	
Togo	12/16/2005	Government	President pledged USD \$100,000	\$103,492.23
Trinidad and	9/27/2005	Government	USD \$2,000,000 pledged directly to four	
Tobago			organizations. Habitat for Humanity, Bush-	
			Clinton Katrina Fund, The Congressional	
			Black Caucus and Former Sen. John	
			Breaux.	
Tunisia	9/15/2005	Government	20 tons of blankets, sheets, and other relief	
			supplies.	
Turkey	9/14/2005	Government	USD \$1,500,000 pledged to Turkey's Red	ARC confirms
TT 1	0/22/2005		Crescent for Red Cross	receipt
Uganda	9/22/2005	Government	USD \$200,000 to the Bush, Clinton,	
Ukraine	0/10/2005	9	Katrina Fund pledged	
Ukraine	9/19/2005	Government	Air transportation using AN-124 aircraft	Assistance provided
			Associated with Dutch pumps (funding all	
			costs associated with the effort totalling	
TT 1 1 1 1	0.01.0005		approx. \$200,000).	
United Arab Emirates	9/21/2005	Government	USD \$100 million cash pledged	\$99,999,975.00
United Kingdom	9/6/2005	Government	A Civilian Disaster Expert	
Childe Kingdolli	9/1/2005	Government	DfID (USAID's equivalent) offered relief	
	5/1/2003	Government	supplies pre-positioned in Miami for the	
			Latin & Caribbean region.	
		I	isaan o Canobean region.	

	9/9/2005	Government	500,000 MREs airlifted to the US between	Relief assistance
			09/05/05 and 09/10/05	received, including
			1,000 field kitchens to feed 40 people each	MREs
		1	Tents for 500 people	
	1		10,000 blankets in store. 2,900 transported	
			10,000 camp beds	
			Approximately 10,000 tarpaulins,	
			Coordinating team deployed to US to the	
			Office of Disaster Assistance 09/06/05	
			Bottled water and water purification assets	
Venezuela	9/13/2005	Government	USD \$5,000,000 pledged to ARC and state	
			governments	
	8/30/2005	Government	GOV offered assistance directly to	
			Louisiana Governor Blanco	
	9/13/2005	Government	Arrangements made to send 1,000,000	
			barrels of gas to Louisiana	
Vietnam	9/8/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged.	
Yemen	9/5/2005	Government	USD \$100,000 pledged to the Red Cross	
European	9/1/2005	Organization	Activated its Civil Protection Cooperative	Used to facilitate
Commission			Mechanism which maintains contact	assistance
			database in civil emergency matters in 25	
			EU member states plus extra five European	
			countries	
ICRC	9/1/2005	Organization	Provided specialized wherabouts tracing	
		-	system in use on ARC website for displaced	
			persons	
NATO	9/20/2005	Organization	From 09/12-10/02/05 - 12 NATO flights	Received
		_	delivered almost 189 tons of relief goods.	
			39 NATO and partner countries offered	
			assistance to the U.S.	
Org of American	8/31/2005	Organization	OAS made \$25,000 contribution from its	
States (OAS)		-	Emergency Fund. OAS encouraged	
			donations to the American Red Cross and	
			created a specific fund to receive donations	
	1		from member states.	
UN WHO	10/7/2005	Organization	10 Senior Public Health Officers, 5 Health	
		-	Logisticians and 3 Emergency Health Kits	
			suitable for 100,000 people for 3 months.	
			24 trauma kits, 44 health kits, 10 burn	
			dressing modules, 14 diarrhea Profile kits D	
			& F.	
UN-Habitat	9/5/2005	Organization	5-10 staff exp emerg shelters and UNDAC	
			trained	

UNICEF	9/14/2005	Organization	Pre-packed emergency supplies: EDUCATION -school in a box for 18,800 children, recreation kits for 30,000. WatSan - 60,000 water purification tablets, 6 collapsible water bladders each 5,000 litres capacity, 61,000 Jerry cans, 500,000 bars soap, 9 million doses of ORS, 14,000 cokking sets, 40,000 blankets, 3 rub halls for storage. Services Available: Psycho- social support senior staff available to work	
U.S. Embassy - Beirut, Lebanon	10/25/2005	USG	in Operations Cell at the State Department. U.S. Embassy Employees pledges	\$19,300.00
United Nations	9/13/2005	Organization	Staff of the United Nations Disaster Assistance and Coordination (UNDAC) teams - highly trained and experienced specialists in emergency coordination, specialists staff in logistics, medical, coordination, emergency education, water sanitation, shelter, environmental and traumatized children water supplies (purification tablets, shelter items (tents, plastic sheeting), Emergency health supplies and public health kits for up to 300,000 people, Vaccination materials, Emergency recreation for children, Emergency education kits.	
Dalai Lama	9/13/2005	Private	USD \$100,000 pledged	
Taiwan	10/4/2005	Private	USD \$2,000,000 pledged	\$2,000,000.00

ARC: American Red Cross IRC: International Red Cross

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)			See reverse side ter Paperwork Burden Disclosut are Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007		
I. TRACK	NG INFORMATIC	N (FEMA Use Only)					
State: MS (Mi	ssissippi) Incident:2005	5082401-Humicene Katrina	Evacuation		Act Ion Re	quest #: 1509-32740	
		S; HURRICANE KATRINA			Date/Time	Rec'd: 09/03/2005 04:47	
IL ASSIST	TANCE REQUEST	TED				C See Attached	
Assistance Re This Mission A	equested: ssignment is to fund U	ISAID-OFDA to perform res	ponse support foi	r handling of internationally (ionated res	ources/commodities.	
Quantity: 1 (Ouantity: 1 (Each) Date/Time Required: 09/02/2005 Internal Control #: NRCC155						
	tion: Where Required,						
	estor Name: Vanessa			24-hour Ph #s:(202) 646-	2495	Date: 09/03/2005	
POC Name:		BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s:(301) 447-	1069	Date: 09/03/2005	
	ving Official (Required	for DFA and TA):				Date:	
III. INITIAI	FEDERAL COOL	RDINATION (Operation	s Section)	1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 -			
T		Date/Time:	Priority:				
Action to:	C) ESF#: 32 Other:	09/03/2005 04:43	D 1 Lifesavin 20 2 Life sust	· .	0 3 High 0 4 Medi		
IV. DESC	IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)					C See Attached	
commodifies I	will provide assistant to support response and	d recovery efforts for Hurric	ane Katrina.	WARDON OF BUSINESSON	, our rated	resources, equipment and/or	
Assigned Age	ancy: AID (AGCY INTER	INATIONAL DEVELOP)		Projected Start Date: 09/02/200	05	Projected End Date: 09/30/2005	
20 New of	and the second se	ant to MA #:		Total Cost Estimate:	\$17,050,0	00.00	
Assigned Age	ency POC Name: VANE	SSA QUINN		Phone and fax #s: (202) 646-24	95	
V. COOR	DINATION (FEMAU	se Only)					
Type of MA:		deral Assistance ire (0%, 10%, 25%)		al Assistance lost Share (0%)		I Operations Support Cost Share (0%)	
	hare Percent: 0.0%			State Cost Share Amoun		0	
Fund Citation	1: 2005-06-1604DR-90	44-XXXX-2501-D		Appropriation code: 70X	0702		
Mission Assi	gnment Coordinator (Pre	eparer): DEBRA CLARK				Date: 09/03/2005	
** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chief (Program Approval): BURTON CLARK					Date: 09/03/2005		
** Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds Review): BUTERBAUGH, SHIRLEY L.					Date: 09/13/2005		
VI. APPROVAL							
* State Approving Official (Required for DFA and TA):					Date:		
** Federal Approving Official (Required for all): CLAYTON SPANGENBERG					Date: 09/03/2005		
VII. OBLI	GATION (FEMA Use	Only)					
Mission Assi	gnment #: 1604DR-MS-A	ND-03		on: \$17,050,000.00		Date/Time Obligated: 09/13/2005	
Amendment Signature	required for Direct Feder	al Assistance and Technic		nt. \$17,050,000.00 ision Assignments.		Initials: IFMIS	
** Signature	required for all Mission / 0-129, Oct 02	hoor and the second					

DHS-FEMA-0037-0001873

Ft	EDERAL EMERGEN MISSION AS	NCY	See reverse side for Paperwork Burden Disclosure Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007		
L TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA USe Only)							
State: MS (I	Aississippi) Incident:200	5082401-Hurricane Katrina	Evacuation		Action Re	Request #: 1509-32739	
Program Co	de/Event #: 1604DR-M	S: HURRICANE KATRINA			Date/Time	Rec'd: 09/03/2005 C4:38	
II. ASSIS	II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED See Attached						
	Requested: volunteers to staff FEM/ Xurran 202-646-2945	A phone bank.					
Quantity: 1	(Fach)	Date/Time Required: 0	9/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCC	159		
		C Street, SW, Washington,		Allering Connor #1 (110)			
	uestor Name: Cristye F			24-hour Ph #s:(202) 646-;	2460	Date: 09/03/2005	
POC Name:		BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s:(301) 447-		Date: 09/03/2005	
						Date:	
	State Approving Official (Required for DFA and TA): III, INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)						
	CI ESF #:	Date/Time:	Priority:				
Action to:	St Other:	09/03/2005 04:34	CI 1 Lilesavin K2 2 Lile sust		D 3 High D 4 Medi		
IV. DES	CRIPTION (Assigned	Acency Action Officer)			J 4 Medi	See Attached	
and recover	A will provide personnel y efforts for Hurricane Ka 42 USC 5170a-5170b an	trina.	h multi-language	skills to handle internations	l offers of a	ssistance to support response	
Assigned A	gency: AID (AGCY INTER	NATIONAL DEVELOP)		Projected Start Date: 09/02/200	5	Projected End Date: 09/30/2005	
2 New o	And the second designed and the second designed and the second designed and the second designed and the second	nt to MA #:		Total Cost Estimate:	\$1,100,00	1	
Assigned A	gency POC Name: BEN (CURRAN		Phone and fax #s: (202) 646-2945			
	DINATION (FEMAU						
Type of MA		leral Assistance re (0%, 10%, 25%)		al Assistance ost Share (0%)		Operations Support Cost Share (0%)	
	Share Percent: 0.0%	······································		State Cost Share Amount	\$0.0	0	
Fund Citatio	n: 2005-06-1604DR-90	44-XXXX-2501-D	*****	Appropriation code: 70X0	702	p	
Mission Ass	ignment Coordinator (Pro	parer): DEBRA CLARK				Date: 09/03/2005	
** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chief (Program Approval); BURTON CLARK				Date: 09/03/2005			
Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds Review): BUTERBAUGH, SHIRLEY L Date: 09/13/2005 VI. APPROVAL					Date: 09/13/2005		
State Approving Official (Reguired for DFA and TA): Date:							
			NCENDEDO				
Federal Approving Citicial (Required for all): CLAYTON SPANGENBERG Date: 09/03/2005 VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)							
	ignment #:1604DR-MS-A		Amt. This Actio	0: \$1,100,000.00		Date/Time Obligated: 09/13/2005	
Amendmen	#: 00		Cumulative Am	\$1,100,000.00		Obligated: 09/13/2005 Initials: IFMIS	
* Signature	required for Direct Federa required for all Mission /	al Assistance and Technica	al Assistance Mis	sion Assignments.			
L Orginature	90-129, Oct 02	saigranomis.					

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DHS-FEMA-0037-0001874

FI		CY MANAGEMENT AGE SSIGNMENT (MA)	ENCY	See reverse side f Paperwork Burden Disc Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007	
L TRAC	KING INFORMATIO	ON (FEMA Use Only)					
State: MS (I	Mississippi) Incident:200	5082401-Hurricane Katrina	Evecuation		Action Re	quest #: 1509-32737	
Program Co	de/Event #: 1604DR-M	S: HURRICANE KATRINA			Date/Time	e Rec'd; 09/03/2005 04:20	
	STANCE REQUES					D See Attached	
Assistance Technical ex	Requested: openise in Internally Disp	laced Persons (IDP) plann	ing and logistics/o	perations to work internation	al offers of	assistance.	
Quantity: 1	(Fach)	Date/Time Required: 0	9/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCC	155		
	cation: Where Required						
	uestor Name; Cristye I			24-hour Ph #s:(202) 648-	460	Date: 09/03/2005	
	POC Name: CLARK, BURTON A 24-hour Ph #s;(301) 447-1069						
	roving Official (Required	(or DFA and TA):				Date: 09/03/2005 Date:	
		RDINATION (Operation	ns Section)			1.0000	
	1	Date/Time:	Priority:	۰۰ بر هاند ۲۰۰ ماهند ۲۰۰ _ک ینگاند ۲۰۰ بر اطلاح می ا			
Action to:	D ESF#: 30 Other:	09/03/2005 04:17	C 1 Lifesavin	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	J 3 High		
	1	L	20 2 Life sust	aining	3 4 Medi		
and the second se	CRIPTION (Assigned			nent Monthly Progress Repo		A See Attached	
Pursuant to	42 USC 5170a - 5170b a		atrina.	Projected	1,1 / ²	Destant	
Assigned A	gency: AID (AGCY INTEF	INATIONAL DEVELOP)		Start Date: 09/02/200	5	Projected End Date: 09/30/2005	
⊠ New o	r D Amendme	ent lo MA #:		Total Cost Estimate:	\$144,000.	00	
Assigned A	gency POC Name: FRAN	MCCARTHY		Phone and fax #s: (2	02) 646-25	81	
V. COOP	IDINATION (FEMA U						
Type of MA		deral Assistance Ire (0%, 10%, 25%)		al Assistance ost Share (0%)		al Operations Support Cost Share (0%)	
State Cost	Share Percent: 0.0%			State Cost Share Amount	\$0.0	0	
	on: 2005-06-1604DR-90	044-XXXX-2501-D		Appropriation code: 70X0			
Mission Assignment Coordinator (Preparer): DEBRA CLARK						Date: 09/03/2005	
						Date: 09/03/2005	
* Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds Review): BUTERBAUGH, SHIRLEY L					Date: 09/13/2005		
VI. APPROVAL							
State Approving Official (Required for DFA and TA): Date:						Date:	
		ed for all): CLAYTON SPA	NGENBERG			Date: 09/03/2005	
VII. OBL	IGATION (FEMA Use	Only)	- <u></u>				
Mission As	signment #:1604DR-MS-A	ND-01	Amt. This Actio	on: \$144,000.00		Date/Time Obligated: 09/13/2005	
Amendmen	t#: 00		Cumulative Am	1L \$144,000.00		Initials: IFMIS	
	e required for Direct Feder e required for all Mission	al Assistance and Technic	al Assistance Mis	sion Assignments.			
		www.gt.p.rigt.n.rg.					

DHS-FEMA-0037-0001875

·Fl	EDERAL EMERGEN MISSION A	CY MANAGEMENT AGE SSIGNMENT (MA)	NCY	Sea reverse side f Paperwork Burden Diac Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007
L TRAC	KING INFORMATIO	ON (FEMA Use Only)				
State: MS (Vississippi) Incident:200	5082401-Hurricane Katrina	Evacuation		Act ion Re	quest #: 1509-32740
		S: HURRICANE KATRINA			Date/Tim	e Rec'd; 09/09/2005 04:47
IL ASSI	STANCE REQUES	TED				C See Attached
Assistance This Mission	Requested: Assignment is to fund l	ISAID-OFDA to perform res	sponse support foi	hasdling of internationally a	ionated res	ources/commodities.
Quantity:	(Fech)	Date/Time Required: 0	9/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCO	7156	******
	cation; Where Required					
	Sector Name: Veness		·····	24-hour Ph #5:(202) 646-	2495	Date: 09/03/2005
POC Name		BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s:(301) 447-		Date: 09/03/2005
1	roving Official (Required					Date:
		RDINATION (Operation	ts Section)	********		[1/308;
	T	Date/Time:	Priority:	*****		
Action to:	DL ESF#: DB Other:	09/03/2005 04:43	D 1 Lifesavin 2 Life sust		0 3 High 0 -4 Medi	
IV. DES	CRIPTION (Assigned	Agency Action Officer)		*****		C See Attached
Mission Sta	temers: Your agency is	responsible for submitting a	Mission Assignn	nent Monthly Progress Repo	NO FEMA	to include cost data when Report can be accessed and
commodrise	s to support responses an		ordination and d ane Katrina.	stribution of international	y domated	resources, equipment and/or Projected
	OBICY AID (AGCY INTER			Start Date: 09/02/200	5	End Date: 09/30/2005
D New c		ant to MA #:		Total Cost Estimate:	\$17,050,00	00.00
	gency POC Name: VANE			Phone and fax #s: (3	202) 6546-24	95
	RDINATION (FEMAL		Cl Technic			
Type of MA		leral Assistance re (0%, 10%, 25%)		al Assistance ost Share (0%)	C Federa State (Operations Support Cost Share (0%)
	Share Percent: 0.0%			State Cost Share Amount	\$0.00)
Fund Citati	on: 2005-06-1604DR-90	H4-XXXX-2501-D		Appropriation code: 70XX	0702	
Mission As	signment Coordinator (Pre	eparer): DEBRA CLARK				Date: 09/03/2005
		(Program Approval): BUR				Date: 09/03/2005
Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds Review): BUTERBAUGH, SHIRLEY L					Date: 09/13/2005	
VI. APP	ROVAL		·····	·····		
	roving Official (Required f					Date:
	IGATION (FEMA Use	nd for all): CLAYTON SPAL	NGENBERG			Date: 09/03/2005
			<u> </u>			Date/Time
	signment #:1504DR-MS-A	1D-03		n: \$17.050,000,00		Obligated: 09/13/2005
Amendmen * Skgnature ** Skgnature	required for Direct Federa required for Direct Federa required for all Mission A	al Assistance and Technica	Assistance Misi	t \$17,050,000.00 ion Assignments.	l	Initials: IFMIS
	90-129, Oct 02					

DHS-FEMA-0077-0000905 FL

FEDERAL EMERGEN	CY MANAGEMENT AGE SSIGNMENT (MA)	NCY	See reverse side t Paperwork Burden Dise Notice		Expires No	. 3067-0278 ovember 30, 307
I. TRACKING INFORMATI	ON (FEMA Use Only)					
State: MS (Mississippi) Incident200		Evacuation		Action Re	quest #: 1509-	32739
Program Code/Event #: 1604DR-M				1	Rec'd: 09/03	
II. ASSISTANCE REQUES				1.0.00001000	D See Atta	and the second design of the s
Assistance Requested: Multi-lingual volunteers to atail FEM PCC: Ben Curran 202-846-2945	A phone bank.					
Quantity: 1 (Each)	Date/Time Required: 0	9/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCO	0159		
Delivery Location; DHS/FEMA, 500						
Initiator/Requestor Name: Cristve			24-hour Ph #s:(202) 648-	2460	Date: 09	03/2005
	BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s:(301) 447-		1	03/2005
* State Approving Official (Required					Date:	A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR OF
III, INITIAL FEDERAL COO		ns Section)			1.030;	
Action to: D ESF #: D Other:	Date/Time: 09/03/2005 04:34	Priority: Di 1 Lifesavin Di 2 Life sust		0. Знідт		Normal
	1,	W 2 LIN SUSS	80813 0	Ci 4 Medi		
IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Mission Statement: Your agency is						
and recovery efforts for Hurricane Ki Pursuant to 42 USC 5170a-5170b al Assigned Agency: AID (AGCY INTER	nd CFR Title 44.		Projected		Projected	
	and a second second second second second second second second second second second second second second second		Start Date: 09/02/200		End Date:	09/30/2005
R New or D Amendm	***************************************		Total Cost Estimate:	\$1,100,00		
Assigned Agency POC Name: BEN			Phone and fax #s: (202) 646-29	45	
V. COORDINATION (FEMAL Type of MA: D Direct Fe	deral Assistance	CI Technic	al Assistance	E Fadao		
	are (0%, 10%, 25%)		ost Share (0%)		I Operations Si Cost Share (0%	
State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%			State Cost Share Amount	the second second second second second second second second second second second second second second second s	0	
Fund Citation: 2005-06-1604DR-9	044-XXXX-2501-D		Appropriation code: 70X0	1702	·····	
Mission Assignment Coordinator (Pr	epareri: DEBRA CLARK				Date: 09/03	/2005
** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chie	f (Program Approval): BUF	ITON CLARK			Date: 09/03	2005
Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds VI. APPROVAL	Review): BUTERBAUGH	, SHIRLEY L		·····	Date: 09/13	/2005
* State Approving Official (Required	for DFA and TA):				Data	
** Federal Approving Official (Regula		NGENBERG			Date:	
VI. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use					Date: 09/03	2005
Mission Assignment #: 1604DR-MS-	VD-02	Amt. This Actio	n: \$1,100.000.00		Date/Time Obligated:	09/13/2005
Amendment#: 00		Cumulative Am	+ \$1,100.000.00			19/13/2005 FMIS
 Signature required for Direct Feder Signature required for al Mission 	al Assistance and Technic	al Assistance Mis	ion Assignments.			

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DHS-FEMA-0077-0000906 FL

FEDERAL EMERGENCI MISSION ASSI	MANAGEMENT AGE IGHMENT (MA)	ENCY	See reverse side to Paperwork Burden Disc Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007	
I. TRACKING INFORMATION	(FEMA Use Only)					
State: MS (Mississippi) incident:200508	2401-Hunicane Katrina	Evacuation		Action Re	quest #: 1509-32737	
Program Code/Event #: 1604DR-MS: HURRICANE KATRINA Date/Time Rec'd: 09/03/2005 04:						
II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED U See Attached						
Assistance Requested: Technical experise in Internally Displac	ed Persons (IDP) planni	ing and logistica/o	perations to work internation.	ai offers of	Aseistance.	
Quantity: 1 (Each) D	155					
Delivery Location: Where Required,						
Initiator/Requestor Name: Cristve Pari	(er		24-hour Ph #s:(202) 646-2	460	Date: 09/03/2005	
POC Name: · CLARK, BU	RTON A		24-hour Ph #5:(301) 447-1	089	Data: 09/03/2005	
* State Approving Official (Required for	DFA and TA);				Date:	
III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORD		ns Section)			An	
	ate/Time:	Priority:				
Action to: 00 Cor #:	09/03/2005 04:17	C 1 Lifesavin				
IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned A	ancy Action Officer)			4 Medi	W See Attached	
USAID-OFDA will provide personnel wi assistance to support response recovery Pursuant to 42 USC 5170a - 5170b and		ly Displaced Pers atrina,	ions planning and logistics/	operations	to work international offers of	
Assigned Agency: AID (AGCY INTERNA	TIONAL DEVELOP)		Projected			
10 New or CAmendment				(Projected	
Assigned Agency POC Name: FRAN M			Start Date: 09/02/2008		End Date: 09/30/2005	
V COODDINATION PERSON	CARTHY	······	Start Date: 09/02/2005 Total Cost Estimate:	\$144,000.0	End Date: 09/30/2005	
V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use)	Onivá	······································	Start Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (2)		End Date: 09/30/2005	
V. COOPEDINATION (FEMA 034) Type of MA: Direct Federa State Cost Share (Onityi I Assistance		Start Date: 09/02/2005 Total Cost Estimate:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa	End Date: 09/30/2005	
Type of MA: Direct Federa State Cost Share (State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%	Only) I Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%)		Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Date: 09/30/2005 00 81 1 Operations Support Cost Share (0%)	
Type of MA: Direct Federa State Cost Share (Only) I Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%)		Start Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cost Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance E sst Share (0%)	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Date: 09/30/2005 00 81 1 Operations Support Cost Share (0%)	
Type of MA: Direct Federa State Cost Share (State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%	Dniy) I Assistance IV%, 10%, 25%) XXXX-2501-D		Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Date: 09/30/2005 00 81 1 Operations Support Cost Share (0%)	
Type of MA: D Direct Federa State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%. Fund Citation: 2005/06-1804D/R-9044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Project Othos/Branch Chief (Pr	Only) J Assistance U%, 10%, 25%) XXXXX-2501-0 YXXXX-2501-0 reft: DEBRA CLARK rogram Approval): BUR	State Co	Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Dain: 09/30/2005 50 51 J Operations Support Cost Share (0%) 5	
Type of MA: D Direct Federa State Cost Share Percent: 0.0% Fund Citation: 2005-06-1604DR-8044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chief (Pi ** Compareller/Funda Control (Funda Rem	Only) J Assistance U%, 10%, 25%) XXXXX-2501-0 YXXXX-2501-0 reft: DEBRA CLARK rogram Approval): BUR	State Co	Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Dain: 09/30/2005 50 51 51 52 53 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54	
Type of MA: D Direct Federa State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%. Fund Citation: 2005/06-1804D/R-9044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Project Othos/Branch Chief (Pr	Dniy) I Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%) XXXX-2501-D YXXXX-2501-D YXXXX-2501-D YXXX-2501-D YXXX-2501-D YXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	State Co	Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Dain: 09/00/2005 00 11 10 Operations Support 20 Share (0%) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	
Type of MA: D Direct Federa State Cost Share Percent: 0.0% Fund Citation: 2005-06-1804DIR-9044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Protect Ottoar/Branch Chief (P ** Comparoller/Funds Control (Funds Ren VI. APPROVAL ** State Approving Official (Paguired for D	Dniyi J Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%) XXXXX-2501-D Terf: DEBRA CLARK regram Approval); BUR regram Approval); BUR PA and TA);	State C	Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Dain: 09/00/2005 00 11 12 Operations Support 20 Operations S	
Type of MA: D Direct Federa State Cost Share Percent: 0.0% Fund Citation: 2005-06-1804DIR-9044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Protect Officer/Branch Chief (A ** Comparoller/Funds Control (Funds Rim VI. APPROVAL	Only) i Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%) XXXXX-25%) ref; DEBRA CLARK (orgam Approval); BUR (rew): BUTERBAUGH, Vew): BUTERBAUGH, DFA and TA): x all; CLAYTON SPAN	State C	Stan Date: 09/02/2002 Total Cest Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance asi Share (0%) State Cost Share Amount:	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Dain: 09/00/2005 00 11 10 Operations Support 20 Share (0%) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	
Type of MA: Direct Federer State Cost Share / Fund Gitation: 2005-06-1004DR-9044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Child (Pr ** Comparole/Funds Control (Funds Rim VI. APPROVAL * State Approving Official (Required for D	Dniyi i Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%) XXXXX-25%) XXXXX-25%) Terf: DEBRA CLARK (cogram Approval): BUR (cogram Approval): BUR	State C	Star Date: 09/02/2006 Total Cost Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance at assistance at State Cost Stare Amount: Appropriation codis: 70/02/	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Date: 09/02/2005 00 13 Opensions Support 20 Opensions Support 20 Opensions Support 20 Date: 09/03/2005 Date: 09/03/2005 Date: 09/03/2005 Date: 09/03/2005 Date: 09/03/2005 Date: 09/03/2005	
Type of MA: D Direct Federa State Cost Share Percent: 0.0% Fund Citation: 2005-06-1804DIR-9044- Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepar ** FEMA Project Ottoar/Branch Chief (P ** Compatible/Funds Control (Funds Rim VI. APPROVAL ** State Approving Ottoal (Required for C ** Federa Approving Ottoal (Required for C VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Ont	Drivy) A Assistance 0%, 10%, 25%) XXXXX-25%) Terf: DEBRA CLARK regram Approval); BUR regram Approval); BUR regram Approval); BUR PA and TA); xr all); CLAYTON SPAN y) 21.	State C	Star Date: 09/02/2006 Total Cost Estimate: Phone and tax #s: (21 al Assistance at al Assistance at State Cost Stare Amount: Appropriation code: 70/007 	\$144,000,0 (2) 646-250 Federa State (\$0.00	End Dain: 09/30/2005 00 11 10 Operations Support 10 Operations S	

DHS-FEMA-0077-0000907 FL

	NCY MANAGEMENT AG ASSIGNMENT (MA)	ENCY	See reverse side f Paperwork Burden Disc Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007
I. TRACKING INFORMAT	ION (FEMA Use Only)		J	····.	1
State: MS (Mississippi) Incident:20		a Evacuation		Antion Dr	equest #: 1509-32737
Program Code/Event #: 1604DR-					e Rec'd: 09/03/2005 04:20
IL ASSISTANCE REQUES		2		Daterian	C See Attached
Assistance Requested: Technical expertise in internally Dis	splaced Persons (IDP) plan	ning and logistics/c	perations to work internation	al offers of	assistance.
Quantity: 1 (Each)	Date/Time Required:	09/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCC	155	***
Delivery Location: Where Require					
Initiator/Requestor Name: Cristye			24-hour Ph #s:(202) 646-2	460	Date: 09/03/2005
POC Name: CLARM	K, BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s:(301) 447-1		Date: 09/03/2005
* State Approving Official (Require	d for DFA and TA);				Date:
III. INITIAL FEDERAL COO		ins Section)	······································		
Action to: D ESF #: B Other:	Date/Time: 09/03/2005 04:17	Priority: D 1 Lifesavin 20 2 Life sust		1 3 High I 4 Medi	
IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigne	d Agency Action Officer)				2 See Attached
assistance to support response reco Pursuant to 42 USC 5170a - 5170b Assigned Agency: AID (AGCY INTE	and CFR Title 44		Projected		Projected
	HNATIONAL DEVELOP)		Start Date: 09/02/2005]	End Date: 09/30/2005
				\$144,000.0	
Assigned Agency POC Name: FRA V. COORDINATION (FEMA)			Phone and fax #s: {20	2) 646-258	1
Type of MA: D Direct Fe	aderal Assistance lare (0%, 10%, 25%)		I Assistance 2 st Share (0%)		Operations Support ost Share (0%)
State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%			State Cost Share Amount:	\$0.00	
Fund Citation: 2005-06-1604DR-9	044-XXXX-2501-D		Appropriation code: 70X070	2	
vission Assignment Coordinator (Pr	reparer): DEBRA CLARK				Date: 09/03/2005
* FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chie	ef (Program Approval): BUP	TON CLARK			Date: 09/03/2005
Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds VI. APPROVAL	Review): BUTERBAUGH	SHIRLEY L.			Date: 09/13/2005
State Approving Official (Required					Date:
* Federal Approving Official (Regult /II. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use		NGENBERG			Date: 09/03/2005
Alssion Assignment #:1604DR-MS-/	410-01	Amt. This Action	. \$144.000.00	1	Date/Time Obligated: 09/13/2005
mendment #: 00					
Signature required for Unect Hade	ral Assistance and Technica	Cumulative Amt.	5144 000 00		Obligated: 09/13/2005 Initiais: IFMIS

DHS 0000938

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEM MISSION ASSIGNMENT (I		See reverse side f Paperwork Burden Disc Notice		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278 Expires November 30, 2007
I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use	Only)			······
State: MS (Mississippi) incident:2005082401-Humca	ne Katrina Evacuation		Action Re	equest #: 1509-32739
Program Code/Event #: 1604DR-MS: HURRICANE	KATRINA		Date/Tim	e Rec'd: 09/03/2005 04:38
IL ASSISTANCE REQUESTED				D See Attached
Assistance Requested: Multi-Hingual volunteers to stalf FEMA phone bank. POC: Ben Curran 202-846-2945				
Quantity: 1 (Each) Date/Time Rec	wired: 09/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCC	159	
Oelivery Location: DHS/FEMA, 500 C Street, SW, W		I linearian counterw. Antes	100	
Initiator/Requestor Name: Cristye Parker		24-hour Ph #s:(202) 646-2	460	Date: 09/03/2005
POC Name: CLARK, BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s:(301) 447-1		Date: 09/03/2005
* State Approving Official (Required for DFA and TA)				Date:
III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (L Daie.
Action to: D ESF #: Date/Time: 20 Other: 09/03/2005	Priority:) 3 High) 4 Medi	
IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action	Officer)			See Attached
USAID-OFDA will provide personnel phone bank vol. and recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina. Pursuant to 42 USC 5170a-5170b and CFR Title 44. Assigned Agency: AID (AGCY INTERNATIONAL DEV		Projected		Projected
S New or D Amendment to MA #:		Start Date: 09/02/2005		End Date: 09/30/2005
Assigned Agency POC Name: BEN CURRAN	******		\$1,100,000	
V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)		1 FROME AND 12X #5: 124	2) 646-294	13
Type of MA: Direct Federal Assistance State Cost Share (0%, 10%, 259		al Assistance 12 cost Share (0%)		Operations Support Cost Share (0%)
State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%		State Cost Share Amount:	\$0.00	
Fund Citation: 2005-08-1804DR-9044-XXXX-2501-C)	Appropriation code: 70X07	02	
Mission Assignment Coordinator (Preparer): DEBRA (LARK			Date: 09/03/2005
** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chief (Program Appro	val): BURTON CLARK			Date: 09/03/2005
** Comptroller/Funds Control (Funds Review): BUTER	ABAUGH, SHIRLEY L.			Date: 09/13/2005
* State Approving Official (Required for DFA and TA):				Date:
** Federal Approving Official (Required for all): CLAYT VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)	ON SPANGENBERG			Date: 09/03/2005
Mission Assignment #: 1604DR-MS-AID-02	Amt. This Actic	n: \$1,100,000.00		Date/Time
Amendment #: 00	Cumutative Am	+ \$1 100 000 00		Obligated: 09/13/2005 Initials: IFMIS
Signature required for Direct Federal Assistance and Signature required for all Mission Assignments. MA Form 90-129, Oct 02	recrimical Assistance Miss	sion Assignments.		

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DHS 0000939

FEDERAL EMERGE	NCY MANAGEMENT AG	ENCY	See reverse side t		O.M.B. NO. 3067-0278
MISSION	ASSIGNMENT (MA)		Paperwork Burden Dise Notice	losure	Expires November 30, 2007
I. TRACKING INFORMAT	FION (FEMA Use Only)				
State: MS (Mississippi) Incident:2	005082401-Hurricane Katrin	a Evacuation		Action Re	equest #: 1509-32740
Program Code/Event #: 1604DR	MS: HURRICANE KATRINA	\		Date/Tim	e Rec'd; 09/03/2005 04:47
II. ASSISTANCE REQUE	STED				C See Attached
Assistance Requested: This Mission Assignment is to fund	t USAID-OFDA to perform te	esponse support fo	r handling of Internationally o	ionated res	ources/commodities.
Quantity: 1 (Each)	Date/Time Required:	09/02/2005	Internal Control #: NRCC	156	
Delivery Location: Where Require			1.2000000000000000000000000000000000000		
Initiator/Requestor Name: Vane:		*****************	24-hour Ph #8:(202) 646-2	495	Date: 09/03/2005
	K, BURTON A		24-hour Ph #s: (301) 447-1		Date: 09/03/2005
* State Approving Official (Regula					Date:
III. INITIAL FEDERAL CO		ns Section)			1 Date.
D FSF#	Date/Time:	Priority:			
Action to: D ESF #: 39 Other;	09/03/2005 04:43	D 1 Lifesavin D 2 Life sust		I 3 High I 4 Medi	
IV. DESCRIPTION (Assign	ed Agency Action Officer)			- + meu	See Attached
commodifiés to support response a			Projected		Projected
Assigned Agency: AID (AGCY INTI			Start Date: 09/02/2005		End Date: 09/30/2005
	ment to MA #:		Total Cost Estimate:	\$17,050,00	0.00
Assigned Agency POC Name: VAN			Phone and fax #s: (20	2) 646-249	95
V. COORDINATION (FEMA Type of MA: D Direct F	Use Only) ederal Assistance	C) Technics			
	hare (0%, 10%, 25%)		al Assistance IX ISI Share (0%)	1 000/4	Operations Support Cost Share (0%)
State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%			State Cost Share Amount:	\$0.00	
Fund Citation: 2005-06-1604DR-	9044-XXXX-2501-D		Appropriation code: 70X07	22	
Mission Assignment Coordinator (F	reparer): DEBRA CLARK				Date: 09/03/2005
* FEMA Project Officer/Branch Ch	ef (Program Approval): BUR	TON CLARK			Date: 09/03/2005
** Comptroller/Funds Control (Fund	s Review): BUTERBAUGH	SHIRLEY L			Date: 09/13/2005
VI. APPROVAL	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
State Approving Official (Required	(for DFA and TA):				Date:
Federal Approving Official (Requ VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use		NGENBERG			Date: 09/03/2005
dission Assignment #: 1604DR-MS-	AID-03	Amt. This Action	\$17,050,000.00		Date/Time Obligated: 09/13/2005
mendment #: 00		Cumulation Amt	\$17,050,000,00		Obligated: 09/13/2005 Initials: IFMIS
Signature required for Direct Fede	tal Areistanco and Technica				
Signature required for all Mission	Accionmente	Assistance Missi	on Assignments.	······	

DHS 0000940



International Mil Support

UNCLASSIFIED

- 44 countries offering money, personnel, or general aide relief (cots, blankets, food stuffs)
 - 45 countries offering equipment /military assets
- OSNORTHCOM Staff and JTF-Katrina reviewed consolidated list coordinated by TF State
- Provided consolidated list of proposed NC/DOD needs
- Recommend acceptance of International
 - Assistance offers to DOS
- ・Bottom line: Propose what we need immediately, what we may need, and what we do not need to JS/OSD and DOS

<i>A</i>	Accepted - International Mil Support Assets PROJECTED TASK ARIVAL AMP'N	UNCLAN MU SUP	UNCLASSIFIED Support
2x - Fleet Dive Unit (Lant /Pac) Personnel – 35 x divers 5 x support Equipment – Self Sustaining	Harbour clearance Chop to 2d F ID and removal of Nav Fwd deploy hazards Pascagoula Levee inspection	fleet to	052100Z SEP Commenced Dive ops 06 Sept
5X Paxs - Eng Support Regt: (Combat Divers – UDT)	Harbour clearance Northem (ID and removal of Nav via CCGV hazards WILLIAM Levee inspection ALEXAND	GOM DER	Departed 061700Z SEP
2 x CH146 (Griffon)	USCG SAR backfill USCG Disi Cape Cod, Virginia	JSCG District 1, Cape Cod, Virginia	
Naval TG: HMCS ATHABASKAN (DDH) w/ 1xCH124 HMCS TORONTO (FFH) w/ 1xCH124 HMCS VILLE DE QUEBEC (FFH) w/ 1xCH124 CCGV WILLIAM ALEXANDER	Assist in hurricane recovery ops	n Gulf	Departed 061700Z SEP ETA 101200Z SEP

MMTF

UNCLASSIFIED	Accepted - International Mil Support	ARRIVAL LOCATION AMP'N	TF-20 Sea Echelon Ship clear by State 9/5, CDR coordinating departs 1200 9/5, arrives 9/7.	exas Trucks enroute LY Evac NC EXORD - 5 th Army	On scene 08 Sep Per JOC/JFMCC update, TF20 – Coordinating On Scene with Dutch, have TACON TF-20 comm's	DOS approved. Coordinating Dip clearance w/French Embassy and Mil DATT ETA: TBD MDSU TWO w/ 2d fleet	DOS approved. TBD: Coordinating Dip Enroute from Martinique clearance w/French To be TACON to TF-20 Embassy and Mil DATT
	natio		TF-20 Sea Echelo CDR coordinating Comm Plan distrib	FEMA – Texas USA KELLY Evac center	On scene 08 Sep TF20 – Coordinati with Dutch, have comm's	DOS approved. Coordinating Dip clearance w/Fren Embassy and Mil	DOS approved. Coordinating Dip clearance w/Fren Embassy and Mil
	d – Interi	PROJECTED TASK	Relief mission	Relief mission	Helo platform w/ high volume pumping	Relief mission	OPLAT surveys and clearance
	Accepte	ASSETS	1 x Amphibious ship MS PAPALOAPAN -MI-17 Helos -6X6 APCs	SEDENA (Mexican Defence) 49 trucks carrying relief supplies	HNLMS Van Amstel multi purpose Frigate	EOD Diving Team 16 Divers Wequip 01 Nurse	Saivage Tug
Charles Calify	No. Contraction of the second se	COUNTRY	Mexico	Mexico	Netherlands	France	France

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Accepted - International Mil Support

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COUNTRY	ASSETS	PROJECTED TASK	ARRIVAL LOCATION	AMP'N
India	Naval Dive and Salvage team	Dive / Salvage recovery TBD ops	TBD	Coord Indian Embassy - Awaiting input JFMCC / TF 20
Netherlands	High Capacity Water Pumps 2 separate offers - - 4 pumps - 9 pumps	US Army Corps of Engineers – Water removal /flood control	NOLA	DOS Cleared, Coordinating Transportation

UNCLASSIFIED



International Mil Support

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>sideration</u>	AMP'N	Awaiting JFMCC /TF-20 Cord			
Additional Items Offered, Still Under Consideration	ARRIVAL LOCATION	Halifax Canada Training			
Items Offered, <u>Second</u>	PROJECTED TASK	Dive / Salvage recovery ops			
Additional	ASSETS	5 man military dive team			
	COUNTRY	Norway			
				V	NM7F 00417-05

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	Additional I	Additional Items Offered, <u>Not Required</u>	lot Required	
COUNTRY	ASSETS	PROJECTED TASK	ARRIVAL LOCATION	AMP'N
UK	HMS Cumbertand RFA Wave Knight	Humanitarian Relief assistance		JFMCC – Not required
Japan	Japanese Self Defence Force units	SAR / medical teams		
Jordan	2 field hospitals	Humanitarian Relief Medical Support		TF Katrina – not required
France	Naval Frigate and Hospital Ship	Humanitarian Relief assistance		JFMCC – Not required
Israel / Germany	Ground based Cellular Telecommunications System	Communications - Cell coverage		Not required – J6
Switzerland	2 Disaster Relief Platoons (100 soldiers)	Security / Mass Care		Not required -

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Z CONTROL STAT

## International Mil Support Cont'd

### Additional Itams Offered Not Required

	Additional	Additional Items Offered, Not Required	<u>Not Required</u>	
COUNTRY	ASSETS	PROJECTED TASK	ARRIVAL LOCATION	AMP'N
Colombia	C-130	Transportation	TBD	Cord with SOUTHCOM support cell
France	2 – 6 mil heavy lift aircraft	Transportation	TBD	Coord French Embassy DATT / TF State as required
Romania	1-2 C-130s	Transportation	TBD	TF-Katrina / JFACC
Russia	IL-76 cargo plane	Transportation	Russia	Awaiting Input – JTF-K / JFACC
Sweden	1 C-130	Transportation	TBD	Awaiting input JTF-K / JFACC

MM7F 00417-05

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Program Name: National Case Management Consortium

CFDA Number: 97.084

GRANTEE: United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)

AGREEMENT NUMBER: EMW-2006-GR-0056

AMENDMENT NUMBER:

### ARTICLE I - AUTHORIZATION:

- A. Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, as amended, Title I, Sec. 102
- B. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as amended by P.L. 106-390, including Sec. 701(b)
  - C. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations

### ARTICLE II - PROGRAM NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

The Grantee shall perform the work described in the proposal submitted September 27, 2005 entitled "National Case Management Consortium", the response to evaluation questions dated October 6, 2005 which is made part of these Grant Agreement Articles by reference.

### ARTICLE III - PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE/BUDGET PERIOD

- A. **Project Period:** The Project Period shall be a maximum of twenty-four (24) months, beginning October 28, 2005 through October 27, 2007 and will correspond to the applicable approved Budget Period, unless extensions have been authorized.
- B. Budget Period: The Budget Period shall be from the effective date of this grant agreement through the following 24 months: October 28, 2005 through October 27, 2007.
- C. Costs: The Grantee shall only incur costs or obligate funds within the Budget Period for approved activities or within the approved Period of Performance.

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### ARTICLE IV - AMOUNT OF AWARD

A. Approved Budget: The approved budget for this award by category is:

Personnel	\$ 2,705,832.00
Fringe Benefit	\$ 510,886.00
Travel	\$ 708,000.00
Equipment	\$ 163,000.00
Supplies	\$ .00
Contractual	\$ 60,692,500.00
Construction	\$.00
Other	\$ 638,857.00
TOTAL DIRECT	\$ 65,419,075.00
Indirect Charges	\$ 580,925.00
TOTAL BUDGET	\$ 66,000,000.00
Estimated Consortium Contributions:	\$ 35,000,000.00
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS	\$101,000,000.00

B. There is no cost-share or match required for this funding. The Department of Homeland Security will pay up to 100% of the costs identified in the approved budget listed under Article IV.A., Approved Budget. While there is no required cost share associated with these funds, the Consortium estimates that its contributions will total \$35,000,000.00 in cash and in-kind contributions including up to \$5,000,000.00 00 for subgrants to non-Consortium agencies. The maximum funding amount for DHS/FEMA is \$66,000,000.00. If costs exceed the maximum amount of DHS approved funding, the Grantee shall pay the costs in excess of the approved budget. If the Consortium estimated contribution is not significantly less than \$35,000,000.00, there shall be no reduction in the DHS/FEMA award.

### ARTICLE V - REQUEST FOR ADVANCE/REIMBURSEMENT

- A. FEMA uses the Direct Deposit/Electronic Funds Transfer (DD/EFT) method of payment to Grantees. To enroll in the DD/EFT, the Recipient must complete a Standard Form 1199A, Direct Deposit Form.
  - The Grantee may be paid in advance, or reimbursed by completing the Standard Form (SF) 270, Request for Advance/Reimbursement. In accordance with Treasury regulations at 31 CFR Part 205, the Grantee shall maintain procedures to minimize the time elapsing between the transfer of funds and the disbursement of said funds. (See 44 CFR, Part 13.21(i) regarding payment of interest earned on advances.

### 2. The Grantee may use the Internet at:

### http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/grants/sf270.pdf and

http://www.fms.treas.gov/eft/1199a.pdf, to download the Standard Forms 270 and 1199A, respectively.

### ARTICLE VI - FINANCIAL REPORTS

- A. Quarterly Reports: The Grantee shall submit quarterly Financial Status Reports of the Federal and Consortium contributions on SF 269, Financial Status Report, to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office within 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter: January 30, April 30, July 30, October 30.
- B. Final Report: The final Financial Status Report is due 90 days from the expiration date of the Period of Performance.

The addresses are as follows:

### DHS/FEMA

Financial and Acquisition Management Division Grants Management Branch 500 C Street, SW, Room 334 Washington, DC 20472 Attn: Arlene Ramsey

DHS/FEMA 500 C Street, SW, Room 614 Washington, DC 20472 Attn: Libby Turner

### ARTICLE VII - PERFORMANCE REPORTS

Performance reports are due to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office quarterly. The reports shall describe the status of the grant activity, progress towards meeting objectives and any problems, delays, or adverse conditions which will materially impair the ability to meet the objective of the award. A final report will be submitted to the FEMA Office Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office listed in Article VII, 90 days after project completion.

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### ARTICLE VIII -- GRANT MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

Officials for the NDSP grant agreement are as follows:

A. **Project Manager:** The Project Manager (PM), designated by the Grantee, is responsible for performance of the activities approved in the award:

The Project Manager is:

Rev. Kristin L. Sachen Assistant General Secretary UMCOR Program/Emergency Services International 475 Riverside Drive, Room 330 New York, NY 10115 212-870-3909 Fax: 212-870-3624 ksachen@gbgm-umc.org

B. DHS Project Officer: The DHS Project Officer (PO) shall be an official who will be responsible for the technical monitoring of the stages of work and technical performance of the activities described in the program narrative statement.

The DHS Project Officer is:

Ms. Libby Turner Federal Coordinating Officer DHS/FEMA 500 C Street, SW, Room 614 Washington, DC 20472 202-646-4395 Fax: 202-646-2730 Libby.Turner@dhs.gov

C. DHS Assistance Officer: The DHS Assistance Officer (AO) is the DHS official who has full authority to negotiate, administer and execute all business matters of the Grant award:

The DHS Assistance Officer is:

Mr. Richard W. Goodman DHS/FEMA Grants Management Branch 500 C Street, SW, Room 334 Washington, DC 20472 202-646-4181 Fax: 202-646-4156 Richard.Goodman@dhs.gov

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### ARTICLE IX - GRANT AWARD AMENDMENTS

All budget and program plan revisions shall be in compliance with OMB Circular A-110, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations; and A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. In addition to these requirements, the Grantee shall submit and receive written prior approval before implementation for the following:

### A. Budget Revisions:

- Grantee must obtain prior approval from DHS/FEMA for transfers of funds between direct cost categories in the approved budget when such cumulative transfers among those direct cost categories exceed ten percent of the total budget.
- Transfer of funds to entities, except those identified in the approved application, requires prior DHS/FEMA approval.
- Need for additional funds. DHS is not obligated to provide additional funds prior to the submission and approval of consecutive continuation options based on satisfactory performance and availability of funds.
- 4. If a Grantee estimates that it will have unobligated funds remaining after the end of the performance period, the Grantee should report this to DHS/FEMA at the earliest possible time and ask for disposition instructions.

### **B. Extension Request:**

- Requests for additional time extensions to the Period of Performance will be considered, but will not be granted automatically and must be supported by adequate justification in order to be processed. The justification is a written explanation of the reason or reasons for the delay; an outline of remaining funds available to support the extended period of performance; and a description of performance measures necessary to complete the project.
- 2. Extensions to the Period of Performance shall be authorized only in writing by the DHS Assistance Officer.
- There is no DHS obligation to provide additional funding as a result of time extensions approved.
- Financial and Performance Status Reports must be current, and the extension justification must be submitted or extension requests will not be processed.

### ARTICLE X - PREAWARD COSTS

Preaward costs may be approved for up to ninety (90) calendar days prior to the effective date of the Grant. The following conditions apply:

- A. The costs have been incurred with the understanding that they were incurred at the Grantee's risk and may not be reimbursed, if adequate funding has not been awarded to cover preaward costs and approved activities to be completed under the award.
- B. The costs must be necessary for the effective and economical conduct of the project.
- C. The costs are in compliance with the appropriate OMB Cost Principles.
- D. The costs are supported with source documentation.

### ARTICLE XI - OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The other terms and conditions of the agreement are as follows:

- A. Buy America. The Grantee, Sub-grantees and contractors receiving funds from this grant shall comply with the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.) unless it is determined that it is inconsistent with the public interest, impracticable to comply with such a requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost of articles, materials, or supplies. The exception shall be noted in the specifications and documentation to justify the exception will be retained in the grant file for record.
- B. Copyright. The Grantee is free to copyright original work developed in the course of or under this agreement. DHS reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and to authorize others to use, the work performed under this award for Government purposes. Publication resulting from work performed under this agreement shall include an acknowledgement of financial support from DHS and include a statement that the publication does not necessarily reflect the DHS views.

### C. Publication and Acknowledgement of DHS Sponsorship.

- One copy of <u>each article planned</u> for publication will be submitted to the DHS Project Officer simultaneously with its submission for publication. Following publication, a copy of each published paper shall be submitted to the DHS Project Officer.
- The Grantee agrees that when releasing information relating to this Grant, the release shall include a statement that the project or effort undertaken was or is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security.

- 3. Disclaimer: The Grantee is responsible for assuring that every publication submission (including World Wide Web pages) based on or developed under this award, except scientific articles or papers appearing in scientific, technical or professional journals, contains the following disclaimer: "Any opinions, findings, and conclusion or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Homeland Security."
- For the purpose of this requirement, information includes news releases, articles, manuscripts, brochures, advertisements, still and motion pictures, speeches, trade association proceedings and symposia.
- 5. Publications: In compliance with the Section 623 of Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, and reenacted in Section 621 of the fiscal year 1994 Appropriations Act requires that all grantees disclose the amount and percentage of Federal funding and funding from non-governmental sources when making public announcements about Federally-funded projects in the amount of \$500,000 or more.
- D. Patent Rights. Grantees are subject to applicable regulations governing patents and inventions, including government-wide regulations issued by the Department of Commerce, 37 CFR Part 401,"Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations and Small Business Firms under Government Grants, Contracts and Cooperative Agreements."
- E. Environmental Standards. By accepting funds under this Grant, the grantee assures that it will:
  - Comply with applicable provisions of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.) and Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.), as implemented by Executive Order 11738 [3 CFR, 1971-1975 comp., p. 799] and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules at 40 CFR Part 15. In accordance with the EPA rules, the Grants further agrees that it will:
    - a. Not use any facility on the EPA's List of Violating Facilities in performing any award that is nonexempt under 40 CFR 15.5 (awards of less than \$100,000, and certain other awards, exempt from the EPA regulations), as long as the facility remains on the list.
    - b. Notify the awarding agency if it intends to use a facility in performing this award that is on the List of Violating Facilities or the Grantee knows has been recommended to be placed on the List of Violating Facilities.

- 2. Identify to the awarding agency any impact this award may have on:
  - a. The quality of the human environment, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, at 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and to prepare Environmental Impact (e.g., physical disturbance of a site such as breaking of ground) until the agency provides written notification of compliance with environmental impact analysis process.
  - b. Coastal barriers and provide help the agency may need to comply with Coastal Barriers Resource Act (16 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.), concerning preservation of barrier resources.
  - c. Any existing or proposed component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers system, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the Wild and Scenic River Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1271, et seq.).
- F. Refunds. The Grantee shall transfer to DHS the appropriate share, based on the Federal support percentage, of any refund, rebate, credit or other amounts arising from performance of this agreement, along with accrued interest. The Grantee shall take necessary action to effect prompt collection of all monies due or which may become due and to cooperate with DHS in any claim or suit in connection with amounts due.

### G. Overpayment and Earned Interest.

<u>Overpayment.</u> Within ninety (90) days from the expiration date of the Performance Period, overpayment of funds shall be remitted to the Assistance Officer by check payable to DHS. An overpayment represents the difference between allowable actual expenditures and total DHS payment received by the Grantee.

- H. Program Income. Program income is income earned as a result of Grantee or subgrantee grant-supported activity, or earned as a result of the grant agreement during the Period of Performance. Program income shall be added to the award of funds under this grant and shall be used to expand the approved program activities. The Grantee shall submit a written list of expanded activities to be accomplished as a result of the program Income funds. This list shall be submitted to the DHS AO for review and the approval within 20 days of receipt of program income.
- I. Security. The Grantee shall not be granted access to classified information under this Grant. If security restriction should happen to apply to certain aspects of the proposed activity, the Grantee will be informed. In the event that the scientific work under this Grant may either need classification or involve access to or storage of any classified data, the Government shall make a decision on the need to classify, or require such access or storage within 30 days after receipt of a written notice from the Grantee. If the decision is affirmative, the Government may invoke the Termination clause, as appropriate.

- J. Controlled Unclassified Information. The parties understand that information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this Grant may be export controlled, sensitive, for official use only, or, otherwise protected by law, executive order or regulation. The Grantee is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Nothing in this Grant shall be construed to permit any disclosure in violation of those restrictions.
- K. Travel. Allowability of Travel Expenses. Expenses for transportation, lodging, subsistence and related items incurred by project personnel and by outside consultants employed on the project (GPM) Section 614 who are in travel status on business related to an DHS-supported project are allowable as prescribed in the governing cost principles. The requirements for prior approval detained in the governing cost principles are waived.
- L. Cargo Preference. The Grantee agrees that it will comply with the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (46 U.S.C. 1241), as implemented by Department of Transportation regulations at 46 CFR 381.7, which require that at least 50 of equipment, materials or Grant, and which may be transported by ocean vessel, shall be transported on privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels, if available.
- M. Fly America Act. Preference for U.S. Flag Air Carriers: Travel supported by U.S. Government funds under this Grant shall use U.S.-flag air carriers (air carriers holding certificates under 49 U.S.C. 41102) for international air transportation of people and property to the extent that such service is available, in accordance with the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. 40118) and the interpretative guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the United States in the March 31, 1981, amendment to Comptroller General Decision B138942.
- N. Site Visits. DHS, through authorized representatives, has the right, at all reasonable times, to make site visits to review project accomplishments and management control systems and to provide such technical assistance as may be required. If any site visit is made by DHS on the premises of the grantee or a contractor under an award, the grantee shall provide and shall require its contractors to provide all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safety and convenience of the Government representatives in the performance of their duties. All site visits and evaluations shall be performed in such a manner that will not unduly delay the work.
- O. Equipment Purchase. In accordance with 44 CFR 13.36(a), when procuring property and services under a grant, a State will follow the same policies and procedures it uses for procurements from its non-Federal funds. The State will ensure that every purchase order or other contract includes any clauses required by Federal statutes and executive orders and their implementing regulations.
- P. To the extent required by individual States, applicants should comply with State procedures consistent with E.O. 12372.

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### ARTICLE XII - AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

Grantees and Sub-grantees must follow the audit requirements under OMB Circular A-133. Non-Federal entities that expend \$500,000 or more Federal funds in a year shall have a single or program-specific audit conducted for that year in accordance with the provisions of A-133.

### ARTICLE XIII - GOVERNING PROVISIONS

The Grantee and any subgrantee shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations. A nonexclusive list of regulations commonly applicable to DHS grants are listed below:

### A. Administrative Requirements

- OMB Circular A-102, State and Local Governments (10/07/94, amended 08/29/97)
- OMB Circular A-110, Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations (11/19/93, amended 09/30/99), and
- 3. 44 CFR Part 13

### B. Cost Principles

- 1. OMB Circular A-87, State and Local Governments (05/04/95, amended 08/29/97)
- 2. OMB Circular A-21, Educational Institutions (08/08/00)
- 3. OMB Circular A-122, Non Profit Organizations (05/19/98)

### C. Audit Requirements

OMB Circular A-133, States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations (06/24/97, includes revisions published in the *Federal Register* 06/27/03)

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Program Name: National Case Management Consortium

CFDA Number: 97.001

GRANTEE: United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)

AGREEMENT NUMBER: EMW-2006-GR-0056

AMENDMENT NUMBER:

### ARTICLE I - AUTHORIZATION:

- A. Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, as amended, Title I, Sec. 102
- B. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as amended by P.L.
- 106-390, including Sec. 701(b)
- C. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations

### ARTICLE II - PROGRAM NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

The Grantee shall perform the work described in the proposal submitted September 27, 2005 entitled "National Case Management Consortium", the response to evaluation questions dated October 6, 2005 which is made part of these Grant Agreement Articles by reference.

### ARTICLE III - PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE/BUDGET PERIOD

- A. Project Period: The Project Period shall be a maximum of twenty-four (24) months, beginning ______ through _____ and will correspond to the applicable approved Budget Period, unless extensions have been authorized.
- B. Budget Period: The Budget Period shall be from the effective date of this grant agreement through the following 24 months: ______.
- C. Costs: The Grantee shall only incur costs or obligate funds within the Budget Period for approved activities or within the approved Period of Performance.

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### ARTICLE IV - AMOUNT OF AWARD

A. Approved Budget: The approved budget for this award by category is:

Personnel	\$ 2,705,832.00
Fringe Benefit	\$ 510,886.00
Travel	\$ 708,000.00
Equipment	\$ 163,000.00
Supplies	\$ .00
Contractual	\$ 60,692,500.00
Construction	\$ .00
Other	\$ 638,857.00
TOTAL DIRECT	\$ 65,419,075.00
Indirect Charges	\$ 580,925.00
TOTAL BUDGET	\$ 66,000,000.00
Estimated Consortium Contributions:	\$ 35,000,000.00
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS	\$101,000,000.00

B. There is no cost-share or match required for this funding. The Department of Homeland Security will pay up to 100% of the costs identified in the approved budget listed under Article IV.A., Approved Budget. While there is no required cost share associated with these funds, the Consortium estimates that its contributions will total \$35,000,000.00 in cash and in-kind contributions including up to \$5,000,000.00.00 for subgrants to non-Consortium agencies. The maximum funding amount for DHS/FEMA is \$66,000,000.00. If costs exceed the maximum amount of DHS approved funding, the Grantee shall pay the costs in excess of the approved budget. If the Consortium estimated contribution is not significantly less than \$35,000,000.00, there shall be no reduction in the DHS/FEMA award.

### ARTICLE V - REQUEST FOR ADVANCE/REIMBURSEMENT

- A. FEMA uses the Direct Deposit/Electronic Funds Transfer (DD/EFT) method of payment to Grantees. To enroll in the DD/EFT, the Recipient must complete a Standard Form 1199A, Direct Deposit Form.
  - The Grantee may be paid in advance, or reimbursed by completing the Standard Form (SF) 270, Request for Advance/Reimbursement. In accordance with Treasury regulations at 31 CFR Part 205, the Grantee shall maintain procedures to minimize the time elapsing between the transfer of funds and the disbursement of said funds. (See 44 CFR, Part 13.21(i) regarding payment of interest earned on advances.

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### 2. The Grantee may use the Internet at:

# http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/grants/sf270.pdf and

http://www.fms.treas.gov/eft/1199a.pdf, to download the Standard Forms 270 and 1199A, respectively.

#### **ARTICLE VI - FINANCIAL REPORTS**

- A. Quarterly Reports: The Grantee shall submit quarterly Financial Status Reports of the Federal and Consortium contributions on SF 269, Financial Status Report, to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office within 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter: January 30, April 30, July 30, October 30.
- B. Final Report: The final Financial Status Report is due 90 days from the expiration date of the Period of Performance.

The addresses are as follows:

DHS/FEMA Financial and Acquisition Management Division Grants Management Branch 500 C Street, SW, Room 334 Washington, DC 20472 Attn: Arlene Ramsey

DHS/FEMA 500 C Street, SW, Room Washington, DC 20472 Attn: Libby Turner

#### **ARTICLE VII – PERFORMANCE REPORTS**

Performance reports are due to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office quarterly. The reports shall describe the status of the grant activity, progress towards meeting objectives and any problems, delays, or adverse conditions which will materially impair the ability to meet the objective of the award. A final report will be submitted to the FEMA Office Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office listed in Article VII, 90 days after project completion.

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#### ARTICLE VIII - GRANT MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

Officials for the NDSP grant agreement are as follows:

A. **Project Manager:** The Project Manager (PM), designated by the Grantee, is responsible for performance of the activities approved in the award:

The Project Manager is:

Rev. Kristin L. Sachen Assistant General Secretary UMCOR Program/Emergency Services International 475 Riverside Drive, Room 330 New York, NY 10115 212-870-3909 Fax: 212-870-3624 ksachen@gbgm-umc.org

B. DHS Project Officer: The DHS Project Officer (PO) shall be an official who will be responsible for the technical monitoring of the stages of work and technical performance of the activities described in the program narrative statement.

The DHS Project Officer is:

Ms. Libby Turner Federal Coordinating Officer DHS/FEMA 500 C Street, SW, Room Washington, DC 20472 202-646-4395 Fax: Libby.Turner@dhs.gov

C. DHS Assistance Officer: The DHS Assistance Officer (AO) is the DHS official who has full authority to negotiate, administer and execute all business matters of the Grant award:

The DHS Assistance Officer is:

Mr. Richard W. Goodman DHS/FEMA Grants Management Branch 500 C Street, SW, Room 334 Washington, DC 20472 202-646-4181 Fax: 202-646-4156 <u>Richard.Goodman@dhs.gov</u>

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#### ARTICLE IX - GRANT AWARD AMENDMENTS

All budget and program plan revisions shall be in compliance with OMB Circular A-110, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations; and A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. In addition to these requirements, the Grantee shall submit and receive written prior approval before implementation for the following:

## A. Budget Revisions:

- Grantee must obtain prior approval from DHS/FEMA for transfers of funds between direct cost categories in the approved budget when such cumulative transfers among those direct cost categories exceed ten percent of the total budget.
- Transfer of funds to entities, except those identified in the approved application, requires prior DHS/FEMA approval.
- Need for additional funds. DHS is not obligated to provide additional funds prior to the submission and approval of consecutive continuation options based on satisfactory performance and availability of funds.
- 4. If a Grantee estimates that it will have unobligated funds remaining after the end of the performance period, the Grantee should report this to DHS/FEMA at the earliest possible time and ask for disposition instructions.

#### **B. Extension Request:**

- Requests for additional time extensions to the Period of Performance will be considered, but will not be granted automatically and must be supported by adequate justification in order to be processed. The justification is a written explanation of the reason or reasons for the delay; an outline of remaining funds available to support the extended period of performance; and a description of performance measures necessary to complete the project.
- 2. Extensions to the Period of Performance shall be authorized only in writing by the DHS Assistance Officer.
- 3. There is no DHS obligation to provide additional funding as a result of time extensions approved.
- Financial and Performance Status Reports must be current, and the extension justification must be submitted or extension requests will not be processed.

#### ARTICLE X - PREAWARD COSTS

Preaward costs may be approved for up to ninety (90) calendar days prior to the effective date of the Grant. The following conditions apply:

- A. The costs have been incurred with the understanding that they were incurred at the Grantee's risk and may not be reimbursed, if adequate funding has not been awarded to cover preaward costs and approved activities to be completed under the award.
- B. The costs must be necessary for the effective and economical conduct of the project.
- C. The costs are in compliance with the appropriate OMB Cost Principles.
- D. The costs are supported with source documentation.

### ARTICLE XI - OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The other terms and conditions of the agreement are as follows:

- A. Buy America. The Grantee, Sub-grantees and contractors receiving funds from this grant shall comply with the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.) unless it is determined that it is inconsistent with the public interest, impracticable to comply with such a requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost of articles, materials, or supplies. The exception shall be noted in the specifications and documentation to justify the exception will be retained in the grant file for record.
- B. Copyright. The Grantee is free to copyright original work developed in the course of or under this agreement. DHS reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and to authorize others to use, the work performed under this award for Government purposes. Publication resulting from work performed under this agreement shall include an acknowledgement of financial support from DHS and include a statement that the publication does not necessarily reflect the DHS views.
- C. Publication and Acknowledgement of DHS Sponsorship.
  - One copy of <u>each article planned</u> for publication will be submitted to the DHS Project Officer simultaneously with its submission for publication. Following publication, a copy of each published paper shall be submitted to the DHS Project Officer.
  - The Grantee agrees that when releasing information relating to this Grant, the release shall include a statement that the project or effort undertaken was or is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security.

- 3. Disclaimer: The Grantee is responsible for assuring that every publication submission (including World Wide Web pages) based on or developed under this award, except scientific articles or papers appearing in scientific, technical or professional journals, contains the following disclaimer: "Any opinions, findings, and conclusion or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Homeland Security."
- 4. For the purpose of this requirement, information includes news releases, articles, manuscripts, brochures, advertisements, still and motion pictures, speeches, trade association proceedings and symposia.
- 5. Publications: In compliance with the Section 623 of Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, and reenacted in Section 621 of the fiscal year 1994 Appropriations Act requires that all grantees disclose the amount and percentage of Federal funding and funding from non-governmental sources when making public announcements about Federally-funded projects in the amount of \$500,000 or more.
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- E. Environmental Standards. By accepting funds under this Grant, the grantee assures that it will:

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- 1. Comply with applicable provisions of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.) and Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.), as implemented by Executive Order 11738 [3 CFR, 1971-1975 comp., p. 799] and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules at 40 CFR Part 15. In accordance with the EPA rules, the Grants further agrees that it will:
  - a. Not use any facility on the EPA's List of Violating Facilities in performing any award that is nonexempt under 40 CFR 15.5 (awards of less than \$100,000, and certain other awards, exempt from the EPA regulations), as long as the facility remains on the list.
  - b. Notify the awarding agency if it intends to use a facility in performing this award that is on the List of Violating Facilities or the Grantee knows has been recommended to be placed on the List of Violating Facilities.

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  - a. The quality of the human environment, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, at 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and to prepare Environmental Impact (e.g., physical disturbance of a site such as breaking of ground) until the agency provides written notification of compliance with environmental impact analysis process.
  - b. Coastal barriers and provide help the agency may need to comply with Coastal Barriers Resource Act (16 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.), concerning preservation of barrier resources.
  - c. Any existing or proposed component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers system, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the Wild and Scenic River Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1271, et seq.).
- F. Refunds. The Grantee shall transfer to DHS the appropriate share, based on the Federal support percentage, of any refund, rebate, credit or other amounts arising from performance of this agreement, along with accrued interest. The Grantee shall take necessary action to effect prompt collection of all monies due or which may become due and to cooperate with DHS in any claim or suit in connection with amounts due.

## G. Overpayment and Earned Interest.

<u>Overpayment.</u> Within ninety (90) days from the expiration date of the Performance Period, overpayment of funds shall be remitted to the Assistance Officer by check payable to DHS. An overpayment represents the difference between allowable actual expenditures and total DHS payment received by the Grantee.

- H. Program Income. Program income is income earned as a result of Grantee or subgrantee grant-supported activity, or earned as a result of the grant agreement during the Period of Performance. Program income shall be added to the award of funds under this grant and shall be used to expand the approved program activities. The Grantee shall submit a written list of expanded activities to be accomplished as a result of the program Income funds. This list shall be submitted to the DHS AO for review and the approval within 20 days of receipt of program income.
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- J. Controlled Unclassified Information. The parties understand that information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this Grant may be export controlled, sensitive, for official use only, or, otherwise protected by law, executive order or regulation. The Grantee is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Nothing in this Grant shall be construed to permit any disclosure in violation of those restrictions.
- K. Travel. Allowability of Travel Expenses. Expenses for transportation, lodging, subsistence and related items incurred by project personnel and by outside consultants employed on the project (GPM) Section 614 who are in travel status on business related to an DHS-supported project are allowable as prescribed in the governing cost principles. The requirements for prior approval detained in the governing cost principles are waived.
- L. Cargo Preference. The Grantee agrees that it will comply with the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (46 U.S.C. 1241), as implemented by Department of Transportation regulations at 46 CFR 381.7, which require that at least 50 of equipment, materials or Grant, and which may be transported by ocean vessel, shall be transported on privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels, if available.
- M. Fly America Act. Preference for U.S. Flag Air Carriers: Travel supported by U.S. Government funds under this Grant shall use U.S.-flag air carriers (air carriers holding certificates under 49 U.S.C. 41102) for international air transportation of people and property to the extent that such service is available, in accordance with the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. 40118) and the interpretative guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the United States in the March 31, 1981, amendment to Comptroller General Decision B138942.
- N. Site Visits. DHS, through authorized representatives, has the right, at all reasonable times, to make site visits to review project accomplishments and management control systems and to provide such technical assistance as may be required. If any site visit is made by DHS on the premises of the grantee or a contractor under an award, the grantee shall provide and shall require its contractors to provide all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safety and convenience of the Government representatives in the performance of their duties. All site visits and evaluations shall be performed in such a manner that will not unduly delay the work.
- O. Equipment Purchase. In accordance with 44 CFR 13.36(a), when procuring property and services under a grant, a State will follow the same policies and procedures it uses for procurements from its non-Federal funds. The State will ensure that every purchase order or other contract includes any clauses required by Federal statutes and executive orders and their implementing regulations.
- P. To the extent required by individual States, applicants should comply with State procedures consistent with E.O. 12372.

### ARTICLE XII - AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

Grantees and Sub-grantees must follow the audit requirements under OMB Circular A-133. Non-Federal entities that expend \$500,000 or more Federal funds in a year shall have a single or program-specific audit conducted for that year in accordance with the provisions of A-133.

### ARTICLE XIII - GOVERNING PROVISIONS

The Grantee and any subgrantee shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations. A nonexclusive list of regulations commonly applicable to DHS grants are listed below:

### A. Administrative Requirements

- 1. OMB Circular A-102, State and Local Governments (10/07/94, amended 08/29/97)
- 2. OMB Circular A-110, Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations (11/19/93, amended 09/30/99), and
- 3. 44 CFR Part 13

#### **B.** Cost Principles

- OMB Circular A-87, State and Local Governments (05/04/95, amended 08/29/97)
   OMB Circular A-21, Educational Institutions (08/08/00)
- 3. OMB Circular A-122, Non Profit Organizations (05/19/98)

## C. Audit Requirements

OMB Circular A-133, States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations (06/24/97, includes revisions published in the Federal Register 06/27/03)

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DHS-FEMA-0037-0001919 DHS-FEMA-0030-0001199 and 1200 DHS-FEMA-0077-0000951 DHS-0000896

3/16/06 CC: Hedson <u>—</u> Argie Dice <u>—</u> Norm Soctoro <u>—</u>

#### MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND

#### THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

#### I. Introduction

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a number of foreign governments and international entities generously made donations of financial assistance to the U.S. Government (USG) to support Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts. As provided for in the National Response Plan, the Department of State ("DOS") has acted as the intermediary for these foreign offers of assistance. DOS is currently holding donated funds in a custodial "deposit account" within the Treasury. To date, the USG has received \$126.4 million in foreign monetary donations. Of that amount, \$66 million has been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security to finance case management services for Hurricane Katrina victims.

In early January 2006, DOS asked the Department of Education ("ED") to develop a proposal to use the remaining balance of donations on hand – approximately \$60.4 million – to finance educational initiatives in Louisiana and Mississippi. ED agreed to accept the donations pursuant to its gift acceptance authority for the purpose of aiding the work of ED. ED developed a proposal for the use of these gift funds and will work with both public and private institutions to support the ongoing efforts to rebuild and restore educational institutions at all levels in the areas of Louisiana and Mississippi most directly affected by Hurricane Katrina. ED's proposal is described in Attachment A. ED expects to disburse the gift funds within two months of receipt. All recognize the need for transparency and accountability in the use of foreign donations for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts. This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) seeks to establish mechanisms so that foreign donations are properly managed and used in an accountable and transparent manner, resulting in identifiable educational benefits to Louisiana and Mississippi schools and institutions of higher education that were adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina.

#### II. Authorities

- ED: 20 U.S.C. § 3481; 20 U.S.C. § 3475;
- DOS: 22 U.S.C. § 2656;
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 5.

### III. Responsibilities

### A. Department of Education

1. ED shall assume full responsibility for accountability of the foreign donations made for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts that DOS will transfer pursuant to section III.B.1. In fulfilling this responsibility, ED will impose conditions to promote accountability for and transparency in the use of funds, including, but not limited to, requirements to ensure that recipients:

a. obligate and expend the funds in accordance with prudent management practices, to include internal controls sufficient to protect against waste, fraud and mismanagement;

b. maintain records of the use of the funds in accordance with standard accounting practices, so that a clear audit trail is maintained; and c. develop performance measures to evaluate the effective use of these funds.

2. Upon transfer by DOS and until disbursement to recipients, ED shall maintain the foreign donations in trust account 91X8258 established in the Treasury for contributions received under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 3481. These funds shall be tracked separately from other appropriated or gift funds.

3. Funds transferred pursuant to this MOA shall be used for educational initiatives in the areas of Louisiana and Mississippi adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina, as described in Attachment A.

4. The Inspector General of ED may audit the administration of the funds provided under this MOA by ED and the recipients.

5. On a quarterly basis, ED will provide DOS with documentation and information on the use of funds transferred under this MOA, including information that may be shared with foreign donors.

#### Department of State

В.

1. Upon the signing of this MOA, the Department of State shall transfer to ED \$60,441,249.93 in foreign donations made for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts which are currently being held in Treasury account 19X6755.

2. DOS may, with the approval of ED, transfer additional foreign donations for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts which may be received after this MOA is executed.

3. DOS shall continue to serve as intermediary between

the USG and the foreign donors. DOS shall provide updates as necessary to foreign donors on the use of their donations for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts.

## IV. Disposition of Remaining Funds

If any funds transferred pursuant to this MOA remain available upon termination of all projects described in Attachment A, the Parties to this MOA shall jointly determine the disposition of these remaining funds.

### V. Modification

This MOA will be effective upon signature of the Parties and may be executed in counterparts. The MOA may be amended in writing as mutually agreed by the Parties.

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Signed March 16, 2006:

Henrietta Fore U.S. Department of State Under Secretary for Management

el Clark

Michell Clark U.S. Department of Education Assistant Secretary Office of Management

## ATTACHMENT A

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PROPOSALS FOR FOREIGN DONATIONS The funding levels in the proposals do not necessarily reflect ED's actual funding levels

- Xavier University: Xavier University of Louisiana is a historically black university located in New Orleans. Xavier submitted an \$18.5 million funding request and proposes to use the funds for physical damage not covered by either insurance or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), financial aid for students, and faculty and staff retention;
- Dillard University: Dillard University is a historically black university located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Dillard submitted a \$12 million funding request and proposes to use the funds for physical damage not covered by either insurance or FEMA, financial aid to students, and faculty and staff retention;
- Louisiana Department of Education: The Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) submitted a \$20 million funding request for the Orleans Parish schools and proposes to use the funds for library books and resources, computer hardware and infrastructure, and long-range planning to re-establish educational services in Orleans Parish;
- Anticipated proposal from a non-profit organization on behalf of New Orleans schools for funds to restore libraries and science labs, provide student scholarships for needy students, and teacher salaries;
- The Laura Bush Foundation for America's Libraries: The Laura Bush Foundation for America's Libraries submitted a \$5 million funding request and proposes to use the funds to purchase books, furniture, and equipment for school libraries adversely impacted by the hurricane;
- Reserve: ED proposes to reserve \$21 million. Additional grant options will surface
  once the availability of the foreign donations is more widely known and understood.
  ED will hold these reserve funds for a short period after receipt to allow other
  potential grantees a reasonable opportunity to submit funding proposals. Any funds
  remaining in this reserve after additional project proposals have been considered
  would be distributed to the historically black colleges and universities, including
  those in Mississippi, which have submitted proposals.