[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.N. REFERENDUM FOR WESTERN SAHARA: 9 YEARS AND COUNTING
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-147
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-165 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California [VACANCY]
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana [VACANCY]
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
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Subcommittee on Africa
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
TOM CAMPBELL, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado BARBARA LEE, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
Tom Sheehy, Subcommittee Staff Director
Charisse Glassman, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Malik M. Chaka, Professional Staff Member
Courtney Alexander, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Allen Keiswetter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State................. 2
APPENDIX
Member's prepared statements:
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
California and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa................ 12
The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from
Pennsylvania................................................... 13
The Honorable George Radanovich, a Representative in Congress
from California................................................ 15
Witness' prepared statement:
Allen Keiswetter................................................. 16
Additional Submissions:
Response by Mr. Keiswetter to additional question posed by Rep.
Pitts.......................................................... 21
U.N. REFERENDUM FOR WESTERN SAHARA: 9 YEARS AND COUNTING
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Wednesday, September 13, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on International Relations
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. in
room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Royce, Pitts
Mr. Royce. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will
come to order. Today, the Subcommittee will examine the
troubled peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. This
Subcommittee has closely watched MINURSO.
Over the years, we have held several hearings focusing on
it. Before that, Congress passed a resolution led by this
Subcommittee expressing support for former Secretary of State
James Baker's efforts as U.N. Special Envoy to move along the
stalemated process. A vote to determine whether resource-rich
Western Sahara is to be incorporated into Morocco or become an
independent state was originally set for January 1992. That was
more than 8 years ago.
Now, 8 years and some $440 million later, MINURSO
unfortunately is far from its goal. The U.N. itself is at a
point of reaching this conclusion. This May, in this report,
Secretary General Kofi Annan noted the prospects for holding a
referendum were as distant as ever. In his latest report, the
Secretary General observed that the problems between the
parties had deepened.
Special Envoy Baker has said recently that the referendum,
in his words, ``is in big trouble.'' His July meeting with the
parties in Geneva came to an abrupt end, with the Secretary
General reporting that these talks had seen the parties move,
in his words, ``move things backward.'' It is discouraging that
the Secretary General has cited problems wholly distinct from
the often-noted registration dispute, including the
implementation of a code of conduct for the planned referendum
campaign. Annan has reported that the process has been impeded
by ``fundamental differences between the parties over the
interpretation of purposes.''
It is clear to me that the U.S. and other countries have
been unwilling to pressure Morocco enough to achieve the
implementation of a fair referendum. This suggests it is
nearing time to shut down MINURSO. It costs some $45 million to
run, and the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping is once again at
stake. If peacekeeping is going to be strengthened and win
backing here, then we cannot afford to support interminable
missions with unachievable mandates.
The Administration testified to this Subcommittee that in
the face of no MINURSO progress, U.N. resources should not be
used for what then becomes a stop-gap measure. It expressed in
no uncertain terms that time was running out. That was 2 years
ago. If MINURSO is terminated under these circumstances, the
Administration has a responsibility to provide an honest
accounting of which party bears responsibility for its failure.
That is a point I made 2 years ago, and it is a point that
still holds.
Sadly, many Sahrawis have put their faith in a process that
appears to be a mirage. I wish it were different, and I should
note that Jim Baker has another meeting scheduled for later
this month at which he will try to pull a diplomatic rabbit out
of a hat, but short of that, I do not see why the U.S. should
continue approving U.N. resolutions extending MINURSO.
We will now hear from our witness, Allen L. Keiswetter, who
was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State from the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in July. He was previously the
director of Arabian Peninsula affairs. He holds the rank of
minister counselor. Ambassador Keiswetter joined the Foreign
Service in 1967. He is a graduate of Dartmouth College and
holds advanced degrees from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies and Harvard University. Ambassador, thank
you for joining us today, and if you would begin with your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF ALLEN L. KEISWETTER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr.Keiswetter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
greatly honored to have this opportunity to appear before you
regarding the Western Sahara. As you have noted, this is an
issue that expanded the past quarter-century and has
constituted instability and a financial burden on the countries
and peoples involved. I would like to address first the U.S.
interests and our role in the Western Sahara; second, recent
developments which you have already outlined; and, third, the
prospects and U.S. policy.
A peaceful settlement would enhance the stability of the
Maghreb region, as well as the stability of the Mediterranean
Basin more generally. It offers the prospect of strengthening
political, economic, and commercial cooperation for the
betterment of all concerned. Unresolved, this dispute
constrains the opportunities of the region and leaves several
hundred thousand Sahrawis with a bleak and uncertain future. If
the situation deteriorates, a return to violence would bring
new suffering and hardship, threaten potential political and
economic liberalizing trends in Algeria and Morocco, and pose
serious risks for the stability of Maghreb, with serious
implications for Southern Europe.
With these interests at stake, we continue to strongly
support the mediation efforts of the United Nations undertaken
since the late-1980's. We remain committed to an early and
durable, peaceful solution to this long-running conflict. This
can happen only with the full cooperation of all of the
parties. These principles undergird our support for the mission
of the United Nations Secretary General's personal envoy,
former Secretary of State James Baker. We believe the U.N.
remains in the best position to bring about a solution to this
case.
It was U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar who began
implementation of the ``cease-fire-and-referendum'' framework
solution agreed to by the parties. This plan laid out the
mechanisms for resolving whether the territory would become
independent or a province of Morocco based on a vote of the
native population. In essence, it required the identification
of eligible voters, the return of refugees to the territory,
and a vote under the auspices of the United Nations.
Despite this framework agreement nearly a decade ago, there
has been only slow progress toward implementation. Serious
political differences between the parties continued to block
prospects for an early vote on the future of the territory. By
December 1999, MINURSO had succeeded in completing the
contentious Phase I of the referendum process, the
identification of potential voters. Indeed, an impressive total
of more than 200,000 prospective voters were processed in the
course of this exercise, and about 90,000 were found eligible.
However, the referendum remains pending because of disputes
over the voting lists. The parties continue to disagree over
the grounds for appeals by those persons not included in the
list of eligible voters.
As you have noted, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has
said that dispute over the appeals ``allows the impossibility
of holding the referendum before the Year 2002 or even
beyond.'' The number of appeals now total more than 130,000.
The question is how to respect the rights of the voting
applicants while avoiding a retreat to use a long
identification process.
Another obstacle in the resolution of this conflict has
been the repatriation of refugees. The parties have not come to
an agreement regarding the draft refugee-repatriation protocol
presented by the U.N. High Commission on Refugees. So far, the
parties have also not agreed to implement proposed cross-
border, confidence-building measures that would improve the lot
of the 120,000 or so refugees that had been preregistered.
Despite these obstacles, the U.N. continues to facilitate
talks. In February of this year, U.N. Secretary General Annan
asked his personal envoy, James Baker, to consult with the
parties to explore ways to achieve an early, peaceful, and
durable settlement. He recommended to the U.N. Security Council
that it extend MINURSO's mandate until May 31st of this year to
provide time to meet with the parties. In an effort to either
reconcile differences over the implementation of the settlement
plan or find alternative approaches to help solve the dispute
over the Western Sahara, Mr. Baker visited Algeria, Morocco,
the Western Sahara, and Tindouf, Algeria, where he met with the
POLISARIO leadership.
In May, Secretary General Annan invited Morocco and
POLISARIO, as well as observers from Algeria and Mauritania, to
talks in London presided by Mr. Baker. It was the parties'
first direct contact since 1997. The talks permitted a frank
exchange of views that were inconclusive.
In late May, the U.N. Security Council voted to extend the
MINURSO mandate until the 31st of July in an effort to provide
additional time to address the remaining issues. A second round
of talks was convened on June 28th in London. The parties were
asked to bring specific solutions to resolve all outstanding
settlement plan issues or be prepared to consider and discuss
other ways to achieve ``an early, durable, and agreed
resolution of dispute.'' Because of the lack of progress, Baker
called on the parties to meet again, emphasizing the need for
flexibility on both sides, either toward moving forward with
the U.N. settlement process or perhaps through a solution that
rested in between full independence and full integration of the
Western Sahara into Morocco.
In late-June, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously
to extend MINURSO's mandate to October 31st, with the
expectation that the parties will meet again in direct talks
under Baker's auspices to resolve the multiple problems related
to implementation of the settlement plan and to try to agree
upon a mutually acceptable, political solution to the dispute.
Those talks are slated for later this month, perhaps in Berlin.
When the parties meet again, we hope they will make clear
their commitment to a process by which they will achieve a
peaceful settlement. However, public statements by the parties
to the dispute in recent weeks have tended to narrow rather
than broaden the opportunity for progress. Thus, in preparation
for the forthcoming meeting, we have encouraged the parties at
the highest levels to approach the next round with flexibility
and a cooperative attitude.
Mr. Chairman, we are working hard to help bring about an
early, durable, and peaceful resolution to the conflict, one
which is mutually agreed, takes into account the political
rights and well-being of all parties involved, and promotes the
stability of the region. The effort of former Secretary Baker
has given us a chance to do this.
There are two possibilities on the table. First, the
holding of a referendum, provided the parties can agree to its
technicalities, and after nearly a decade, as you have said,
that possibility still seems years away. Second, finding a
mutually acceptable, political solution. Mr. Baker is still in
the process of exploring alternatives.
The United States opposes any solution being imposed on the
parties. That, in our view, will not work. The parties
themselves have to agree on the way ahead. We hope the steps
will be taken toward that end at the next meeting. The U.N.
effort has the support of the U.S. and others in the
international community, as experienced by the unanimously
endorsed renewal of the mandate of MINURSO by the UNSC. We
continue to urge the parties to take advantage of this
important opportunity as their best chance to resolve this
dispute.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we have encouraged the parties at
high levels to approach the Baker-led talks with flexibility
and a cooperative attitude. We have sought to urge improvement
of relations between Algeria and Morocco, a key element to any
durable progress on the Western Sahara. We have continued our
efforts to deepen our ties to each of the parties through
programs such as the U.S.-North Africa Economic Partnership.
Finally, we have continued to support MINURSO, which has served
as a safety net for regional stability.
What I have described are elements of a U.S. policy of
preventative diplomacy aimed at helping to resolve the long-
standing conflict and thereby bringing greater peace and
stability to the Maghreb region and all of its people. I will
be glad to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keiswetter appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Royce. Very good. Let me just say that we have
witnessed Moroccan authorities waging a media crackdown.
The government has sacked three managers of the state-run
TV channel and has banned editions of two newspapers for
recording interviews with the leader of the POLISARIO front. We
have seen the Moroccan delegation walk out, refusing to discuss
the appeals issues. We have seen 130,000 appeals being made,
mostly from the Moroccan side. After 198,000 people were
interviewed for voting, Morocco is refusing to allow the
referendum to go ahead until the appeals have been individually
examined and, based upon the process that they are calling for,
this will take at least 2 years.
So, it has been made clear to this Subcommittee that it has
been Morocco that has been the greatest impediment to the
registration process to begin with. We heard this from the
witnesses at our last hearing, the recent press accounts, from
correspondence, from close observers in the operation,
including a number of U.S. military officers who served in
MINURSO. Morocco is now flooding MINURSO with voter-
registration appeals, as I say, in what appears to be a
stalling tactic.
Do you agree, Ambassador, that Morocco bears the greatest
responsibility for MINURSO's current deadlock?
Mr. Keiswetter. Mr. Chairman, our policy is not to take
sides with this dispute. In fact, our policy is to support the
efforts of the U.N. Secretary General and of Mr. Baker. In both
of these cases they have said that the lack of progress, the
responsibility for the lack of progress, lies on both sides,
not just on one side, and I think this is clear in the various
reports that they have issued over the past couple of years. So
we have, in fact, been generous, we have been supportive of the
U.N.'s efforts, and we have urged all parties to the dispute at
high levels, in fact, to be flexible, to use imagination, and
to cooperate on either of the approaches that former Secretary
Baker has outlined. So that is my answer to you.
Mr. Royce. I think we have some responsibility to the
parties in the dispute who have invested a certain amount of
faith in the process and a certain amount of faith that we are
going to make an honest effort to not string them along but
instead to see this through to a conclusion. I had a couple of
other questions I wanted to ask you.
One is the Administration's report to Congress on MINURSO.
It states that according to the UNHCR, the vast majority of
refugees say they fear for their safety should they return to
Moroccan-controlled the Western Sahara. Are those concerns
legitimate?
Mr. Keiswetter. I think they are legitimate in the sense
that they feel them and that they accurately reflect the views
that these people express, in fact, to U.N. agencies. Since we
have not unfortunately been able to even arrange some of the
preliminary steps that will lead toward this, such as family
visits back and forth across the berm, I think we have not yet
had a chance, in fact, to test whether there is justification.
So the answer is these are the fears accurately reported.
Whether they are legitimate or not, I do not know.
Mr. Royce. As I mentioned in my opening statement, it was 2
years ago when the Administration said that MINURSO's time is
running out. Today, you have testified that after nearly a
decade the possibility of holding the referendum still seems
years away, at best, in your words. Is the Administration
planning to end its support of MINURSO if Special Envoy Baker
fails to make progress or will it continue?
Mr. Keiswetter. This is an excellent question. As you may
know, MINURSO's mandate is renewed at very short intervals. It
renewed most recently at a 3-month interval; before that, for a
2-month interval.
Mr. Royce. It expires in October.
Mr. Keiswetter. Yes. So one of the reasons, in fact, for
this is for accountability in the sense that you have
suggested, but I would like to emphasize what MINURSO does in a
broader sense.
I have described it in my testimony as a ``safety net.'' It
does a lot of things. First of all, it helps monitor and keep
the cease-fire. This has been very important at various times,
particularly recently, when Algeria went through a period of
crisis. It also is responsible, of course, for such efforts as
coordinating demining. Then, in addition to that, there are the
duties that it has and responsibilities that it has for the
process of identification and the appeals, and it is proper for
this process to go forward.
Mr. Royce. True, true, but the parties did not agree to a
Cyprus-like, peacekeeping agreement. They agreed to have an
election, and the United States signed on to the agreement
under which there was going to be an election. So now we are
talking about the upside of the fact that this has evolved into
a Cyprus-style peacekeeping agreement, and I am trying to ask,
do we actually have a commitment to move forward and push
forward to have an honest election?
Mr. Keiswetter. The answer is Mr. Baker is doing his best
to try to resolve this problem, and he has asked the parties,
in fact, to consider two possibilities that I have outlined to
you: either coming to grips with the problems with holding a
referendum or, on the other hand, considering other mutually
acceptable, critical solutions.
Mr. Royce. I am going to turn now to Congressman Pitts, but
before I do, I would ask when this comes to an end. Is there
ever any intention of having accountability of saying what
actually happened and what parties were holding up the process?
Will there be, after the fact, some accountability? I would
just like to know that for the record.
Mr. Keiswetter. Mr. Baker has said that when the end comes,
that he would, in fact, name names and give accountability.
Mr. Royce. Right, and Mr. Baker is working for the United
Nations at this time and doing a yeoman's job on this, and I
have met with him. I appreciate all he is trying to do, but
ultimately it becomes the responsibility of the Administration
and of the Congress, and at some point I think we have to come
to grips with the reality of what happened and why enough
pressure was not brought to bear on bringing about an agreement
for an election. But with that said, I am going to turn to Mr.
Pitts of Pennsylvania, and I am going to go make this vote.
Thank you, Mr. Keiswetter.
Mr. Keiswetter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pitts. (A Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania,
and Member of the Budget and Armed Services Committees)
[Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this timely hearing on the Western Sahara and the final
implementation of the settlement plan. I will submit my entire
statement for the record, but I would like to make a couple of
comments.
I think it is vital at this time that all parties to the
settlement plan signed by the United States' Special Envoy and
former Secretary of State James Baker and the implementation.
Despite the International Court of Justice ruling in 1975 that
Morocco had no claim to the territory, Morocco continued to
assert the Western Sahara as part of its country.
Tribal links do not establish sovereignty over a nation.
That idea was used by Saddam Hussein to justify his invasion
and attempted takeover of Kuwait. I visited some of the refugee
camps in the Sahara Desert to talk to some of the people and
the officials, and I am a little concerned about what I hear
now regarding abandoning and disregarding the right of the
people to vote for self-determination.
I would like to ask you if it is accurate that the U.S.
Government, since 1975, on several occasions has made
statements in support of the right of the people of the Western
Sahara to self-determination, if this is accurate, please
elaborate on how it is possible for the current Administration,
according to a number of reports, to search for a resolution of
the conflict which will completely deny the right to self-
determination, Mr. Keiswetter.
[Statement of Mr. Pitts appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Keiswetter. Mr. Congressman, let me begin by saying
that the first part of your question, that the U.S., of course,
had endorsed repeatedly the U.N. settlement plan, which
includes identification of the voters, the appeals process, and
then the actual referendum. That offer is still strongly
supported by us and is still on the table. But as the chairman
noted a few minutes ago, the first election referendum was to
be held in January 1992. It is now more than 8 years later, and
it is still pending.
This is, in fact, one of the very strong reasons that has
motivated former Secretary Baker to ask the question of is
there some other way, and he has suggested that this, in fact,
could be some option that would be not full integration into
Morocco and not full independence. He also said that it could
be the alternative of, in fact, somehow reaching a political
arrangement that will allow the referendum to go ahead, and he
is now in the process of exploring these options.
So when the parties meet again, now later this month, both
of those topics are under discussion, and we would hope that
there could be progress made toward making a decision by the
parties as to how they want to go ahead.
Mr. Pitts. The other parts of the negotiated settlement
plan; does the State Department believe that the parties are
still behold to the other terms of the agreement?
Mr. Keiswetter. In terms of repatriation and so on and so
forth, I think, as I have outlined in my testimony, there has
not been a great deal of progress on any of the fronts. For
example, on refugees, some 120,000 have been preregistered, but
on the other hand, we still do not have agreement on
confidence-building measures that will allow families to visit
across the berm.
Mr. Pitts. The group, MINURSO, I think that is an acronym
that stands for United Nations Mission for Referendum?
Mr. Keiswetter. It is a French acronym.
Mr. Pitts. Does the State Department believe MINURSO should
continue to exist?
Mr. Keiswetter. We have repeatedly endorsed and voted for
the continuation of MINURSO, and we have kept it under a very
short leash of 1-month periods, 2 months, and recently 3
months, so that its performance can be evaluated. But that
being said, it has several functions that we think are
important to preserving stability.
First is sort of a safety net that it has provided in
monitoring the cease-fire and preserving the cease-fire during
difficult times, for example, when Algeria went through a
period of crisis here recently. It also provides some breathing
room for the new leadership in both countries to modernize. It
undertakes such programs as coordination of demining. All of
this is in addition to the principal jobs that I think you may
be more familiar with that concern the identification of voters
and the appeals proposal. Frankly, if we go forward with the
referendum, it is vital to sorting out the details of the
referendum and to making it work.
Mr. Pitts. I understand that the POLISARIO did agree to the
confidence-building measures, that it was Morocco that has not
agreed to that. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Keiswetter. If you have in mind here in particular the
family visits, they were discussed at the last meeting of the
technical committee in Geneva in July, and I think it is fair
to say that both sides agreed in principle to the confidence-
building measure of family visits. But since then, they have
been unable to agree on the language describing how this would
work. So I think the answer is both agreed in principle, but
there are now disagreements about the specific language that
would make it work.
Mr. Pitts. Now, then, on the process of determining who are
legitimate voters for the referendum, what is the status of
that, and who is agreeing, and who is disagreeing, and why are
they agreeing?
Mr. Keiswetter. The United Nations, MINURSO, has examined
more than 200,000, I believe the latest statistic that I saw
was something 244,000 individual cases. It has found about
90,000 to be eligible voters. In addition to this now, there
have been more than 130,000 that have contested those
decisions. Almost all of these, not all, but almost all, are,
in fact, people who were excluded from the rolls and think they
should be included in the rolls.
Now, part of the problem here is the circumstances in which
this occurs. The voting rolls are based on the Spanish census
of 1974, and so it is dated, and there have to be certain
adjustments to it to make it fair. It does not include, for
example, Sahrawis that were not residents in either area at the
time. Now, I can only quote the U.N. Secretary General on this
issue, in which he said that both of the parties see, in fact,
the voter base as being important to the outcome and in sort of
getting out the vote. So there are, I think, problems on both
sides here.
Mr. Pitts. Have there not been about 130,000 appeals?
Mr. Keiswetter. Yes. That is true. That is the figure, of
130,000. That is the number of appeals.
Mr. Pitts. How many are from Morocco? What percentage?
Mr. Keiswetter. A large percentage of them are, almost all,
in fact, because they are people who were Sahrawis but maybe
residents in Morocco and other extenuating circumstances. One
of the biggest problems is the two-chiefs problem. To, in fact,
be enrolled and be declared eligible, there have to be two
tribal chiefs who will vouch for the voter. In many cases there
is only one tribal chief. So these are the problems that
MINURSO faces.
Mr. Pitts. So of the 130,000, what, better than 98 percent
are from Morocco, and maybe 1 percent or less are from the
POLISARIO fields?
Mr. Keiswetter. I do not think it is fair to say that they
are exactly from Morocco. I do have some statistics here. This
shows 75 percent, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Pitts. Seventy-five percent?
Mr. Keiswetter. I will be glad to provide this to you. It
is from the Secretary General's report, which gives a full
breakdown by location, and whether it is because of an
exclusion or inclusion. I will be glad to provide that.
[The submitted break down appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Pitts. Thank you. On a humanitarian note, when I was
over there, I visited victims of land mines. There are still
millions of land mines. There was a team, I believe, from
Norway ready to remove land mines, and they were having a
problem getting permission from the government of Morocco to go
in and remove those land mines. Has the State Department taken
a position or advocated anything about removal of land mines?
Mr. Keiswetter. We would encourage the effort. I do not
know anything specific about the case that you mentioned.
Mr. Pitts. But has the State Department urged the removal
of land mines?
Mr. Keiswetter. Yes. We have encouraged all of these
confidence-building and humanitarian measures. We think this is
one of the major justifications for MINURSO.
Mr. Pitts. The point is, there are innocent victims,
children for instance, I saw a little girl who had her leg
blown off from a land mine, that are being harmed just from the
existence of these mines. When you have got an international
organization willing to go in and remove wherever the
impediment is, I think we ought to be advocating to try to
remove those impediments and start removing some of the land
mines.
What about the return of POW's from both sides? Are you
familiar with the situation, and what has the State Department
done to try to get an exchange?
Mr. Keiswetter. I am generally familiar with the situation.
As I understand it, at the moment there are only Moroccan POW's
held by the POLISARIO, and now many of them have been held for
more than 25 years. We would hope that progress could be made
on this issue, as well as part of a confidence-building
exercise between the parties.
Mr. Pitts. Now, are they being held by the Sahrawis, or are
they not being permitted to return to Morocco by the Moroccan
government? Do you know?
Mr. Keiswetter. Mr. Congressman, I would like to get back
to you on the details of that, because while I have
impressions, I think it is important to be accurate.
Mr. Pitts. I visited with about 70 POW's who were Moroccan,
some who have been there for 20 years, and was told that they
were free to return, that they had not received permission to
return. Now, maybe that has occurred since then, but I think if
we can start exchanging, get the POW's back, also, identify
missing persons, there are lists of many missing persons,
exchange lists, removing land mines, do the humanitarian
things, many of these kinds of efforts toward a peaceful
settlement would be very helpful.
The State Department has an opportunity, I think, and a
responsibility to take a position and try to facilitate these
matters.
Thank you. I do not have any more questions. I do not know
if the chair is coming back. He is not? So thank you very much,
and we will adjourn the hearing at this time.
Mr. Keiswetter. It is a pleasure to talk with you.
[Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
september 13, 2000
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