[Senate Hearing 106-702]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-702
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 12, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-222 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Brzezinski, Hon. Zbigniew, Ph.D., counselor, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, and former National Security Advisor 14
Graham, Thomas E., Jr., Ph.D., senior associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.............. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 28
McFaul, Michael A., Ph.D., senior associate, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Washington, DC........................ 34
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Sestanovich, Hon. Steven R., Ambassador-at-Large and Special
Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent
States, Department of State, Washington, DC.................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses of Ambassador Sestanovich to additional questions
for the record............................................. 10
(iii)
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Smith and Lugar.
Senator Smith. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We
will call to order this meeting of the Subcommittee on European
Affairs. Senator Joe Biden is scheduled to be with us, but was
called to the White House at the last minute and hopes to be
here before the end of this hearing to participate in it. We
will welcome him then, but we will proceed now.
We are meeting to assess the Russian Presidential elections
held on March 26 and won by now President-elect Vladimir Putin.
I am pleased to have three panels this morning. Representing
the administration on our first panel will be Dr. Steven R.
Sestanovich, Ambassador at Large and Special Advisor to the
Secretary of State for the New Independent States.
The second panel will feature the Honorable Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, a counselor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Dr. Brzezinski served as President
Carter's National Security Advisor and has written extensively
on world affairs, including of course matters concerning
Russia.
The third panel will consist of Dr. Thomas E. Graham, Jr.,
and Dr. Michael A. McFaul, both of whom are senior associates
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Through
their public service and scholarly work, both individuals have
established reputations as being among our country's top Russia
analysts.
All of our witnesses are well qualified to address the
important subject that gathers us here this morning and I
appreciate their willingness to share with us their views.
Last month's Presidential election in Russia was an
important event for those, like myself, who seek to support
political reform in Russia and foster that country's
integration into the world's growing community of democracies.
These elections mark the completion of the first transfer of
power at the executive level in Russia since the breakup of the
Soviet Union. They also provide a useful lens through which to
assess the current direction of Russia's political evolution
and the coherence of our own policy toward Russia.
While it is reassuring that international observers found
the election to have essentially met the procedural
requirements of a free and fair ballot, many have questioned
whether we witnessed a democratic transfer of authority or a
manipulated succession. To many in the West, President Putin's
rise has been meteoric and puzzling on many levels. The change
of power from Yeltsin to Putin raised some question as to
President Yeltsin's motives in his retirement, not the least of
which included charges of vast corruption.
Indeed, the themes of the recent Presidential campaign and
the December 1999 Duma elections brought out some of the worst
in mudslinging, xenophobia, and authoritarian actions and
slogans. The role played by the Russian oligarchs in the
financing and conduct of these elections has been criticized on
many levels in Russia and overseas. It is my sincere hope that
the conduct of these elections will not transfer to the
policies of the party in power.
Another factor that we cannot avoid discussing today is
Russia's war in Chechnya, not only because of the actions
committed by Russian military forces, but also because this was
such a central theme in Mr. Putin's parliamentary and
Presidential campaigns. The--I do not know how to put it any
better--the brutality of the Russian forces in Chechnya has
prompted many in Congress to call for a significant shift in
U.S. policy toward Russia.
Others in the West have made their opposition to the
Chechen war quite clear. Last week on April 6, the Council of
Europe took a more than symbolic step to demonstrate its
opposition to the war against Chechnya. It suspended the voting
privileges of the Russian delegation. Perhaps the most
revealing fact of the Council's action is found in the debate
that preceded it. That debate included an appeal by Sergei
Kovalyov, one of Russia's leading human rights activists, to
impose sanctions against his own country.
One can ask, should we, the United States be siding with
this gentleman or with Putin? This would be the question we
might put before our distinguished witnesses today.
We do well to remember Russia's rejection of communism as a
sincere and indeed heroic attempt to achieve a lasting
democracy based on Western values. These values, however, are
not reflected in the cruel war in Chechnya, in Russia's
violation of international treaties, including the CFE treaty,
or its suppression of the press, its mistreatment of religious
minorities, or its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and missile technologies.
As a matter of our country's foreign policy, I believe it
proper to carefully modulate relations with the Russian
Government according to its conduct both within its borders and
abroad. That may require introducing stricter political
direction into the assistance we provide Russia.
For instance, each year since I joined the Senate I have
introduced an amendment to the foreign operations
appropriations bill that would prohibit many forms of direct
U.S. assistance to the Russian Government should it implement
laws that would result in the discrimination of minority
religious faiths. I am pleased to report that this type of
prompting has had a beneficial impact on the implementation of
the Russian Law on Religions. Many observers of religious
freedom have said that the idea of holding discrimination up to
the bright light of scrutiny has helped the situation in Russia
for many minority faiths.
I would like to commend the administration, including
Ambassador Sestanovich, for his work and dedication in the area
of religious freedom in Russia. In this same vein, I would
suggest that the United States might find a way to indicate to
Russia that their genuine effort to obtain a peaceful
negotiated solution to the Chechen war would be a good signal
to send to the world prior to any summit between the United
States and Russia.
This is not a call for isolationism. I would balk at knee-
jerk reaction to building barriers instead of breaking them
down as a tenet of diplomacy. I do believe that engagement
pursued in the correct manner can underscore our commitment to
fundamental values and our determination to base our
relationship with Russia, particularly its political elite,
upon those values.
Engagement, however, cannot be blind. We must pursue a
policy that brings results and progress, that benefit both our
nations and the world.
I look forward to discussing these and other issues with
our distinguished panelists, and we now turn to Ambassador
Sestanovich. Sir, we are grateful you are back and look forward
to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN R. SESTANOVICH, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE
AND SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE NEW
INDEPENDENT STATES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sestanovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really
do appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Russian
Presidential election and explore its implications for American
policy. Nothing can do more to help us get our Russia policy
right than regular consultation between Congress and the
administration, and on one issue that you singled out, that is
religious liberty, I would like to note that the coordination
that we have been able to develop has had exactly the
beneficial effects that you noted.
Let me begin with the election results, and in particular
with the headlines, which tell us a great deal about Russian
politics after Boris Yeltsin. I have six headlines. Let me put
six headlines out on the table. The first is, of course, the
election happened. We witnessed a constitutional process with
multiple candidates, very high turnout.
Senator Smith. What was the turnout?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Sixty-nine--your experts are going
to--they are qualified to come up with that number. I believe
it is in the high sixties, Senator. Very high turnout and,
according to most of the observers present, very few procedural
improprieties.
I recall the forecast of a very distinguished Russian
analyst after the 1996 election that the Russian voters would
never again have a chance to select their President at the
polls. In the past decade elections have become the only
legitimate way to select Russia's leaders.
A second headline is that Russia's voters showed even less
interest than 4 years ago in returning the Communists to power.
Mr. Zuganov, the Communist candidate, secured millions of votes
less this time than in 1996.
A third headline is that Russian politics remains the
politics of personality. While rejecting the Communist Party,
Russian voters did not turn to other parties. They turned to
Mr. Putin, it seems, because across the ideological spectrum
voters believed that his views were their views.
I would frame a fourth headline this way, and it echoes
some of the points you made, Mr. Chairman. The election
displayed the strength of Russian democracy, but also its
weaknesses. Speaking to the press on election night, Mr. Putin
openly acknowledged that there had not been equal access to the
media by all candidates. This is a problem that is hardly
unique to Russia, but it is no less serious for that. The
emergence of genuinely independent media remains a real
challenge in the deepening of democracy in Russia.
The fifth headline would be the signs of voter
dissatisfaction. Mr. Putin acknowledged that he had had to
respond--that he would have to respond to the tens of millions
of Russian voters who were expressing their dissatisfaction
with their standard of living, their economic prospects. Many
of his own voters were protest voters, too, and he will have to
answer to them as well.
Finally, while the Russian Presidential campaign was very
weak on substantive debate, one issue did more to define Mr.
Putin's political profile than any other and that was the war
in Chechnya. In seeking the Presidency, he said many things
that we found positive, but no statements on the campaign trail
spoke as loudly to us or to Russian voters as the military
campaign in Chechnya.
Mr. Chairman, we have by now all read many attempts to
explain who Vladimir Putin really is, but who he is will
increasingly be defined by what he does. We may learn less by
digging into his biography than by digging into his in box to
try to understand the political choices that he faces. No issue
will loom larger in Mr. Putin's in box than promoting economic
growth. Polls throughout the campaign indicated this was the
top issue on voters' minds.
Consider this. Over 35 percent of Russia's population lives
on just over one dollar a day. Rising oil prices and import
substitution have rallied the Russian economy in the past year
and created a budget surplus for the time being, but that would
quickly disappear if the price of oil dropped below $20 a
barrel.
Sustained growth will require much more structural reform
and much more capital investment. Mr. Putin has promised quick
action on the investment legislation, the tax code, production
sharing agreements. He has every reason to do so.
An equally large problem in his--in the Russian President's
in box is crime and corruption. You singled this out yourself,
Mr. Chairman. Taking on this issue is good politics for Mr.
Putin since three of four Russians believe that too little
progress has been made in creating a rule of law. But doing so
also has real practical significance for him as he begins to
try to do his job.
He has said money-laundering will be one of his top
priorities, and we understand from Russian officials that this
legislation may be pushed through as early as this month.
Legislation is also needed to stem corruption and organized
crime. But new laws alone will not be enough. Much work needs
to be done to strengthen their enforcement.
Mr. Putin can hardly ignore a third set of issues in is in
box, involving security cooperation with the West. In the past
decade, such cooperative efforts have led to the deactivation
of thousands of nuclear warheads and improved our security in
other ways.
The U.S. and Russia have also been partners in developing
the foundations of a stronger nonproliferation regime. Russia's
transfer of dangerous technology and know-how to Iran has not
been fully turned off, but we have made some progress. We
believe Mr. Putin and his team understand how this problem can
undermine our ability to cooperate across the board.
Strategic arms control is another issue in Mr. Putin's in
box that has already shown some movement, with the scheduling
of a Duma vote on START II for this Friday. Ratification of
START II would move us closer to real negotiations on deeper
reductions in Russian and American nuclear forces and on
countering the new threats we face, while preserving the
security of both sides.
Mr. Chairman, on economic and security issues alike Mr.
Putin's in box suggests the many opportunities before us for
enhanced Russian-American cooperation. You spoke of these. You
also spoke of the conflict in Chechnya, however, and the long
shadow that it cast over these opportunities and I completely
agree with your assessment.
The numbers from this conflict speak for themselves: a
quarter of a million people displaced, thousands of innocent
civilians dead or wounded, thousands of homes destroyed. It
will take decades and millions, perhaps billions, of dollars to
rebuild Chechnya.
Allegations about atrocities by the Russian forces have
only strengthened the concerns that I raised here last November
when I appeared before your committee about the Russian
Government's commitment to human rights and international
norms. In response to persistent pressure from the United
States and other Western nations, Russia has agreed to grant
ICRC access to detainees, has agreed to reestablish the OSCE
assistance group in Chechnya, and agreed to add Council of
Europe experts to the staff of Russia's new human rights
investigator for Chechnya.
These steps are a start, but they are only a start, and
speedy follow-on measures are essential. As you know, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva is seized with the issue
of Chechnya this week and its deliberations will test whether
Russia is seriously prepared to respond to international
concerns.
We have supported the call of Mary Robinson, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, for an independent Russian
commission of inquiry into human rights violations in the
Chechen war, a commission bolstered by the participation of
experts from international organizations. Such a commission
could investigate allegations, prepare a public report, and
refer cases to prosecutors for action. We have urged the
Russian Government to embrace this proposal and to take
credible steps showing that it will actually enforce
international standards of accountability.
Mr. Chairman, leadership change in Moscow does not by
itself alter the premises of American policy. We continue to
see an historic opportunity, as you have suggested, to add to
our security and that of our allies by reducing cold war
arsenals, stopping proliferation, building a stable and
undivided Europe, and, perhaps most important of all,
supporting the democratic transformation of Russia's political,
economic, and social institutions.
As President Clinton has said, a new Russian leader
committed to those goals and to the international norms on
which they rest will find in the United States an eager and
active partner.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Steven R. Sestanovich
``RUSSIA'S ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLICY''
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Russian
presidential election with you and your colleagues and to explore its
implications for American policy. Nothing can do more to help us get
our Russia policy right than regular consultation between Congress and
the Administration.
Let me begin with the election results. Your program today includes
some of our country's best commentators on post-Communist politics, to
help you dig beneath the surface of the news. Yet even the headlines
tell us a great deal about Russian politics after Boris Yeltsin.
The first headline is, of course, that the election happened. We
witnessed a constitutional process, with multiple candidates, very high
turnout, and--according to the many international observers on the
scene--few procedural improprieties. I recall the confident forecast of
a distinguished Russian analyst after the 1996 election, that Russian
voters would never again have the chance to pick their president at the
polls. In the past decade, elections have become the only legitimate
way to select Russia's leaders.
A second headline is that Russian voters showed even less interest
than they did four years ago in returning the Communists to power. Mr.
Zyuganov, the Communist standard bearer for the second time in a row,
received two million fewer votes than he did in the first round in
1996, and eight million fewer than he did in the second round that same
year.
A third headline: Russian politics, at least at the presidential
level, remains the politics of personality. It revolves around
individual leaders rather than around programmatic alternatives among
which the voters choose. While rebuffing the Communist party, Russian
voters have not transferred their allegiance to other parties. Polls
indicate that they turned to Mr. Putin because across the ideological
spectrum voters were confident that his views were their views.
I would frame a fourth headline this way: The election displayed
the strength of Russian democracy, but also its weaknesses. One of
these was highlighted by the Putin camp's misuse of state television,
to smear other candidates or to keep formidable rivals from entering
the race. Speaking to the press on election night, Mr. Putin himself
acknowledged that the opposition did not have equal access to the
media--a problem that is hardly unique to Russia, but no less serious
for that. The emergence of genuinely independent media remains a real
challenge in deepening democracy in Russia.
Fifth were signs of voter dissatisfaction. Yes, the Communist
party's appeal is down, but on the day after his victory Mr. Putin
acknowledged that he had to respond to the tens of millions of Russians
who, in voting against him, were protesting their standard of living
and economic prospects. Many of his own supporters, of course, were
protest voters too, and he will need to answer to them as well.
Finally, while the Russian presidential campaign was conspicuously
weak on substantive debate, one issue did more than any other to define
Mr. Putin's political profile, and that was the war in Chechnya. In
seeking the presidency he said many things that sounded positive to
Western ears--from his conciliatory remarks about NATO to his hints
about how he would approach economic reform. But no statements on the
campaign trail spoke as loudly as the Russian military campaign in
Chechnya.
Mr. Chairman, we have by now all read many attempts to explain who
Vladimir Putin really is. It can make for fascinating reading, but as a
guide to his future actions it's probably a vain effort. We may learn
who Mr. Putin has been, but who he is--and what place he will have in
Russia's historic transition--will increasingly be defined by what he
does. We may learn less by digging into his biography than by digging
into his inbox, to try to understand the political choices that he
faces.
No issue is likely to bulk larger in Mr. Putin's in-box than
promoting economic growth. Polls throughout the campaign indicated that
this was the top issue on voters' minds, and given the conditions in
which Russians find themselves today it could hardly have been
otherwise. Consider this: over 35% of Russia's population lives on just
over one dollar a day. Rising oil prices and import substitution have
rallied the Russian economy in the past year, and created a budget
surplus, but it would quickly disappear if the price of oil dropped
below $20 a barrel. Sustained growth will require much more structural
reform and much more capital investment. To improve its investment
climate, the new Russian government is going to have to fix its tax
laws and banking system. Mr. Putin has promised quick action on
investment legislation, the tax code and production-sharing agreements.
He has every reason to do so.
An equally big problem in the Russian president's in-box is crime
and corruption. Taking on this issue is good politics, since three of
four Russians believe that too little progress has been made toward
achieving the rule of law. But doing so also has real practical
significance for a new president who wants to do his job. His ability
to get things done, to get the bureaucracy to respond to his
directives, depends on choking off corruption among officials at all
levels. Mr. Putin has said new money laundering legislation will be one
of his top priorities. Legislation is also needed to stem corruption
and organized crime, but new laws alone will not be enough. Much work
needs to be done to strengthen their enforcement.
Mr. Putin can hardly ignore a third set of issues in his in-box,
involving security cooperation with the West. In the past decade such
cooperative efforts have led to the deactivation of almost 5,000
nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, improved security of
nuclear weapons and materials at more than 50 sites, and permitted the
purchase of more than 60 tons of highly enriched uranium that could
have been used by terrorists or outlaw states. Today, that cooperation
continues. Our Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative will help Russia
tighten export controls, improve security over its existing weapons of
mass destruction, and help thousands of former Soviet weapons
scientists to participate in peaceful research projects with commercial
applications.
The U.S. and Russia have also been partners in developing the
foundations of a stronger non-proliferation regime. Russia's transfer
of dangerous technology and know-how to Iran has not been fully turned
off, but we have made some progress. We believe Mr. Putin and his team
understand how this problem can undermine our ability to cooperate
across the board.
Strategic arms control is one issue in Mr. Putin's in-box that has
already shown movement, with the scheduling of a Duma vote on START II
for this Friday. Since last summer's G-8 summit in Cologne, we have
held discussions with the Russians on START III reductions and changes
in the ABM Treaty. Ratification of START II would move us closer to
real negotiations, on deeper reductions in Russian and American nuclear
forces and on countering the new threats we face while preserving the
security of both sides.
Mr. Chairman, on economic and security issues alike, Mr. Putin's
in-box suggests the many opportunities before us for enhanced Russian-
American cooperation. The conflict in Chechnya, however, casts a long
shadow over these opportunities. When I appeared before this committee
on November 4, I said that we did not dispute Russia's right to combat
a terrorist insurgency, but that we could not let this fact blind us to
the human cost of the conflict. Today the numbers speak for themselves:
a quarter of a million people displaced, thousands of innocent
civilians dead or wounded, and thousands of homes destroyed. It will
take decades and millions of dollars to rebuild Chechnya.
Allegations about atrocities by Russian forces have only
strengthened the concerns that I raised here last November about the
Russian Government's commitment to human rights and international
norms. In response to persistent pressure from the U.S. and other
western nations, Russia has agreed to grant ICRC access to detainees,
agreed to reestablish an OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya and agreed
to add Council of Europe experts to the staff of Russia's new human
rights ombudsman for Chechnya.
These steps are a start, but only a start, and speedy follow-on
measures are essential. The UN Commission on Human Rights is seized
with the issue of Chechnya this week, and its deliberations will test
whether Russia is prepared to respond to international concerns. The
U.S. has supported High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson's
call for an independent Russian commission of inquiry into human rights
violations, bolstered by the participation of experts from
international organizations. Such a commission could investigate
allegations, prepare a public report and refer cases to prosecutors for
action. We have urged the Russian government to embrace this proposal,
and take credible steps showing that it will actually enforce
international standards of accountability.
Mr. Chairman, leadership change in Moscow does not alter the
premises of American policy. We continue to see an historic opportunity
to add to our security, and that of our allies, by reducing Cold War
arsenals, stopping proliferation, building a stable and undivided
Europe, and supporting the democratic transformation of Russia's
political, economic, and social institutions. As President Clinton has
said, a new Russian leader committed to these goals, and to the
international norms on which they rest, will find in the United States
an eager and active partner.
Senator Smith. Mr. Ambassador, do we know whether the
bombing of these apartment buildings in Moscow, if those were
Chechens? Is there any proof that there is the linkage that is
asserted in the media?
Ambassador Sestanovich. There has been a Russian
investigation of this over many months. There have been from
time to time press conferences by Russian officials detailing
some pieces of evidence and referring to suspects. But I think
we cannot say that an investigative case has been made
establishing who was responsible for those bombings.
They are widely, as you now, widely assumed in Russia to
have been the work of Chechen organizations.
Senator Smith. Is that an unreasonable assumption?
Ambassador Sestanovich. They followed a military
confrontation between Russian forces and Chechen forces in
Dagestan, a confrontation in which the Chechen forces were
beaten back and, having suffered a serious defeat, they are
thought by many Russians to have retaliated through terrorist
bombings. But that is only a--that is a connection, that is the
most we can say about it at this time.
Senator Smith. Well, we do not dispute their right to
combat terrorism. That does not justify what has been done in
Chechnya.
Ambassador Sestanovich. We have made that very clear,
Senator.
Senator Smith. As I look to the future with Russia, I have
lots of hope and I have lots of misgivings. The way this
election campaign was conducted, when the government controls
the media there are people shut out of the process. That has
always been one of my concerns with proposals in our own
country, frankly, when the government begins to regulate who
gets to speak, who gets on TV.
I am not even suggesting there is any comparability, but I
have real concern that I have with the fairness of this
election and what was done and the ability of others to
respond. But you are saying here that Mr. Putin even admitted
as much on election night.
Ambassador Sestanovich. He certainly did acknowledge that
other candidates had disadvantages in their access to the
media.
Just for clarification, Mr. Chairman, I think it is
probably too strong to say the government controls the media.
There is in fact a very diverse media establishment in Russia
involving thousands of independent newspapers and hundreds of
independent television stations. They are heavily politicized
and their ownership often dictates their political line.
The special concern that I think is created with respect to
the role of the media in this election had to do with the role
of state television, which as I said is not the only television
network available for Russian viewers, but it is by far the
most widespread and clearly highly influential. That state
media was clearly used in a highly politicized way in this
election.
But we and the Russians are lucky that in many ways the
elements of a free media actually exist. That is why one can
read in the Russian media the most extreme criticisms of Mr.
Putin himself.
Senator Smith. I note his first foreign trips will be to
Belarus and the Ukraine, and I am wondering if you can speak to
what you think that says about their foreign policy and what
the relationships are now between those countries and Russia.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I believe those are stops on the
way to London.
Senator Smith. OK.
Ambassador Sestanovich. So there are three visits, and let
me comment on all of them. Relations with Belarus are those of,
as they say, kind of a nascent union, a kind of paper union at
least, between Russia and Belarus, one which does not, I might
note, prevent disagreements between them. Mr. Putin is reported
in the Russian media to have called President Lukashenko to
demand the release of Russian journalists who had been
mistreated in Belarus.
Ukraine is an interesting case because it is perhaps--
certainly one of the most important of the former Soviet
states, one which has very effectively created independence
over the past decade, and yet many Ukrainians wonder whether
they will be able to maintain that independence into the
future.
Mr. Putin has indicated an interest in close relations with
Ukraine and I am sure he is going to be pursuing those
relations when he is in Kiev. Some Ukrainians have, however,
complained about their dependence on Russian energy and the
possibility of manipulation of Russian--use of that lever by
Russia to influence Ukrainian policy.
Senator Smith. Talk to me about the Ex-Im loan that the
Secretary of State authorized, $500 million to Tyumen Oil
Company? This company is reportedly partly owned by the Alfa
Group, which in turn is controlled by Pyotr Aven, one of the
so-called oligarchs competing for influence in the Kremlin. I
am wondering if Chechnya had any bearing on this? Should it not
have been a reason to hold back, at least in terms of timing?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Mr. Chairman, as you will recall,
in December Secretary Albright invoked the Chafee amendment to
hold up the disbursement or action on this loan by the Ex-Im
Bank, citing a number of concerns that she had having to do in
particular with the protection of shareholder rights and the
rights of foreign investors, especially American investors, in
this deal.
In the interim, a number of these concerns have been
addressed. The Russian parties have been under some pressure to
negotiate the concerns, negotiate with American investors on
the concerns that they have had, and we have seen some movement
toward the resolution of this problem. On that basis, the
Secretary announced that she was removing her hold because we
felt that her action had served--she felt that her action had
served the purpose that she intended, which was to advance the
rule of law and to protect American businesses.
We did not link that issue to the Chechen war. I can tell
you from personal experience that every Russian official I have
talked to believes that we did and that those months of delay
were the result of our political disapproval of the Chechen
war. The Secretary's judgment was that the time had come to
recognize that the purposes she had wanted to serve by invoking
the amendment had been served.
Senator Smith. You are probably aware that Senator Biden
and I and 96 other Senators sent a letter to President Putin
regarding anti-semitism. I was both surprised and pleased at
his very prompt response to that in condemning anti-semitism,
and I am wondering because this seemed a different response
than earlier efforts. I wonder if you have any opinion as to
what prompted this prompt and favorable response?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I think under President Yeltsin and
now under President Putin the President of Russia has
consistently been responsive to concerns raised by American
officials, Members of the Senate and the administration, about
religious freedom in Russia and about anti-semitism in
particular. President Yeltsin frequently made strong statements
in this connection and President Putin's statement and the
letter of Ambassador Ushakov to you reflects that position.
Our concerns--and I know you share these, Senator--have to
do less with the position of the Russian President and more
with the trends that we see in society at large and sometimes
in the protection of religious liberty in localities, where the
constitutional protections that religious minorities should
have are not always enforced. But we continue to pay very close
attention to that issue, and I certainly believe that the kind
of interest that you have taken in this, you and your
colleagues have taken in this issue, helps to call it to the
attention of Russian leaders and to get results.
Senator Smith. I am hopeful, I am optimistic, about issues
of religious freedom with Mr. Putin's election. I assume you
share that optimism?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I think he has said the right
things on this subject. The issue, as it has been in the past,
will be enforcement of constitutional protections at all levels
and we will continue to work on that.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Good to
see you again.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. We are grateful for your testimony and
participation before this committee.
[Responses to additional questions for the record follow:]
Responses of Ambassador Steven R. Sestanovich to Additional Questions
for the Record
Question 1. When discussing the war in Chechnya, you stated that
the United States government ``did not dispute Russia's right to combat
a terrorist insurgency.'' Please enumerate the specific acts of
terrorism that have occurred in Russia that justify any use of force by
the Government of the Russian Federation in or against Chechnya and why
they do so.
Answer. On August 8, 1999, armed insurgent groups from Chechnya
entered the neighboring Russian Federation Republic of Dagestan with
the declared intent of creating a pan-Caucasus Islamic state separate
from the Russian Federation.
These groups, led by a self-ascribed Chechen field commander Shamil
Basayev and an Arab mujahedin who uses the nom de guerre ``Khattab,''
attacked Russian police and military installations and took control of
several towns in western Dagestan.
Russian authorities continue to investigate a series of deadly
explosions which took place in early September 1999. Although they have
not presented evidence that proves Chechen separatists are responsible
for these explosions, Russian authorities have linked Chechen groups to
these terrorist acts.
The Russian authorities faced--and still face--a very real threat
in Chechnya. The violent secessionism and extremism of Chechen rebels,
coupled with provocations in Dagestan and elsewhere were legitimate
security concerns.
But none of that begins to justify the Russian government's
decision to use massive force against civilians inside Chechnya.
Russia should take action against real terrorists, but not use
military force that endangers innocents or intensifies the conflict in
Chechnya. Russia should step up measures to prevent further terrorist
bombings, but should be careful not to make people from the Caucasus
second-class citizens, or in any other way trample on human rights or
civil liberties.
Question 2. In discussing the war in Chechnya, Secretary Albright
recently stated that she has ``consistently called on the Russian
government to enter a substantive dialogue with legitimate leaders in
the region to seek a long-term political resolution to this conflict.''
Do you regard Aslan Maskhadov, the democratically elected president of
Chechnya, to be a legitimate leader? If you do not regard him to be a
legitimate leader, why not? If you do regard him to be a legitimate
leader, have you encouraged the Russian government to enter a
substantive dialogue with him specifically? If you have not, why not?
Answer. We remain convinced that in order to achieve a lasting
political resolution to the conflict in Chechnya, Russia must enter
into substantive dialogue with local leaders who have a legitimate
claim to authority. But we recognize that the actions of prominent
Chechens has made identifying suitable partners for dialogue more
difficult.
On January 27, 1997 Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the
Russian Federation's Republic of Chechnya in elections that OSCE judged
to represent the will of the voters.
In the first two years of his presidency, both Russia and the
international community at large engaged in intense discussions with
Maskhadov to urge him to establish democratic institutions which would
provide for law and order and bring a halt to the scourge of hostage-
taking which limited the delivery of much-needed assistance. Maskhadov
traveled twice to the U.S.; we met with him at the Department of State,
as we would with any leader of one of Russia's regions.
But Maskhadov proved unable or unwilling to curtail the growing
power of outlaw groups in Chechnya. As a result, armed outlaw groups
were able to carry out the insurgent raids on the neighboring Russian
Federation Republic of Dagestan. Maskhadov blames the Russian ``special
services'' for their actions to diminish his authority and criticizes
the Russian government for not carrying out reparations and
reconstruction as agreed.
In 1999, Maskhadov's anti-democratic actions (such as his dismissal
of the parliament and formation of an Islamic Council) and his refusal
to condemn the insurgent raid into Dagestan led Moscow to discount him
as a potential partner for discussions.
It is up to the Russian authorities to identify partners for
discussion in Chechnya. We believe the OSCE Assistance Group can play a
facilitating role in such discussions. We are encouraged by recent
indications that Moscow may be again considering dialogue with
Maskhadov, or moving toward talks with other Chechen figures.
Question 3. What Chechen leaders must be involved in a political
dialogue with Russia that could lead to an enduring and just peace in
Chechnya?
Answer. We remain convinced that in order to achieve a political
resolution to the conflict in Chechnya, Russia must engage in a
dialogue with local leaders who have a legitimate claim to authority.
Actions taken by some elected Chechen leaders have made it
difficult for Russian authorities to engage them in dialogue. But for a
lasting resolution, leaders who have the support of the people of
Chechnya--as expressed in a democratic process--must be a part of the
discussion.
We welcomed the recent visit to Chechnya by the OSCE's Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; we believe the OSCE may be
able to assist in building local-level democratic institutions and,
when appropriate, in supervising elections so the people of Chechnya
can choose who will represent their views in discussion with the
Russian Federal authorities.
Question 4. To protest the conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya,
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly recently suspended the
voting rights of its Russian delegation. The Department of State stated
that it ``understands'' the Assembly's decision, but refuses to endorse
it. What are the specific reasons why the Department of State will not
endorse the Assembly's action?
Answer. When Russia voluntarily joined the Council of Europe, it
undertook specific commitments to respect human rights. This gives the
COE an important role to play in the Chechnya conflict.
One of Russia's moves to meet the concerns of the international
community over Chechnya was to invite two COE human rights experts to
join in the work of the Russian Human Rights Ombudsman for Chechnya.
Russia demonstrated the high regard with which it holds the Council of
Europe by accepting these experts even after the decision of the
Parliamentary Assembly to suspend the Russian delegation.
We believe that the international community can best impact the
situation in Chechnya by continuing to engage Russia over its concerns.
The Council of Europe continues to play an important role in this
process.
The United States holds Observer status within both the inter-
governmental and legislative components of the Council of Europe. The
COE has on several occasions invited representatives from the U.S.
Congress to participate as Observers in Parliamentary Assembly
deliberations. The Department will continue its dialogue on Chechnya
with European governments, and would welcome similar dialogue at the
legislative level between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary
institutions.
We note that the Parliamentary Assembly's recommendations on
Chechnya have been passed to the Council of Europe's Committee of
Ministers, comprised of COE member state governments, for further
deliberation. It is the Committee of Ministers' responsibility to
decide what, if any, action European governments will take based on the
Assembly's recommendations.
Question 5. Will you personally make the commitment that United
States will not discourage any member of the Council of Europe's
Committee of Ministers from endorsing the COE Parliamentary Assembly
call ``to suspend Russia's membership if it does not initiate a cease-
fire and engage in a political dialogue with a cross section of the
Chechen people?''
Answer. We share the objectives of the Council of Europe and have
urged Russia from the beginning of the conflict to end military action
in Chechnya and initiate a meaningful dialogue with legitimate Chechen
leaders.
The United States has observer status in the Council of Europe, and
thus cannot vote on issues before the Council of Europe's Committee of
Ministers. COE member states will decide for themselves what action, if
any, to take on the Parliamentary Assembly's recommendations. We note,
in this context, that Russia is a member of the Committee of Ministers
and will participate actively in any deliberations that take place in
that forum.
We are in frequent contact with European governments on issues
related to Chechnya and will continue to share our views about how best
to encourage Russia to uphold its commitments to the international
community and bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict in
Chechnya.
Question 6. Has the United States provided the Russian Federation
any satellite or other photographs, any equipment, any information, or
any counter-terrorism assistance that Russia has used or could use in
the war against Chechnya? If so, please specify exactly what has been
provided to Russia and the terms under which this occurred. If Russia
has violated those terms, please specify. (If necessary, please use a
classified annex.)
Answer. The United States and Russia cooperate bilaterally and
multilaterally, through such organizations as the G-8, on counter-
terrorism.
The United States has engaged with Russia in counter-terrorism
information sharing including analysis of Usama Bin Laden-related
terrorists.
The U.S. Department of State has not provided Russia any specific
equipment or counter-terrorism assistance and/or training that is
intended for use in the war in Chechnya.
Our assistance is provided for specific purposes. Some equipment
and/or training assistance might be considered ``dual-use;'' however,
we consistently exercise the rights and protections afforded U.S.
assistance under international agreements with Russia, to ensure that
no U.S. assistance goes to support Russian efforts in Chechnya.
As we recently reported to Congress, we will direct agencies to
take all the necessary steps to ensure that none of our assistance
benefits Russian military units credibly reported to be engaged in
combat operations in the Northern Caucasus.
I refer you to other agencies for details of their counter-
terrorism programs.
Question 7. Has the situation in Russia for journalists,
particularly those trying to report objectively on the war in Chechnya,
improved since last January? If not, what steps has or will the
Administration take to promote freedom of the press in Russia?
Answer. We are concerned about any potential threat to the
considerable progress Russia has made in the area of press freedom. The
Russian people need a free press to continue the unfinished job of
building a democratic society. These concerns have been highlighted by
restrictions on press coverage of the conflict in Chechnya and media
manipulation during the election campaign.
We have raised the issue of press freedom directly with President
elect Putin and other senior officials. For example, on her February
visit to Moscow, Under Secretary Lieberman delivered a blunt message to
the Russian Minister of Press and Television Mikhail Lesin. She
stressed that we do not want to see achievements in advancing in press
freedom over the past eight years reversed.
Similarly, we continue to press Russian authorities to resolve
fairly the case of Radio Liberty journalist Andrei Babitsky in a manner
consistent with freedom of the press and investigate the circumstances
surrounding his detention and disappearance. Embassy Moscow has met
with Mr. Babitsky and will continue to monitor his case closely.
The other aspect of press freedom that we are focusing on is the
concentration of ownership of media outlets. We have funded programs
that have helped support the development of 15,000 independent
newspapers and 300 independent television stations. Support of
independent media outlets will continue to be a key aspect of our
Freedom Support Act programs.
President-elect Putin said in a nationally televised interview in
February that he was ``deeply convinced that we absolutely cannot have
any development at all and the country will have no future if we
suppress civic freedoms and the press.'' We agree with that statement.
Journalists in Russia must be able to do their work without
unnecessary constraints, and we will continue to monitor and support
freedom of the press in Russia.
Question 8. What is the net worth of commercial contracts approved
by the United States Government concerning satellite launches services
involving Russian and American entities since the beginning of this
cooperation? Since September 1999?
Answer. It should be noted that the Department of State's Office of
Defense Trade Control (DTC) database captures values that have been
provided as actual or estimated; such is the requirement of under 22
CFR 124.12(a)(6). However, estimates are not accepted over $50 million
as such cases must be notified to Congress and thus must have a signed
contract. It should also be noted that the DTC database does not
readily capture the individual foreign licensees.
The following show the principal satellite launch programs to date
involving Russia:
LKEI Proton Launch Services........................... $4,500,000,000
Sea Launch............................................ $1,500,000,000
RD-180 Engine for Atlas............................... $1,300,000,000
Leo One Satellite on Eurokot Proton Launch Vehicle.... $124,200,000
QuickBird-1/-2 Launch on SL-8......................... $80,425,000
Misc. Launch Support and Cooperation\1\............... $267,642,000
-----------------
Total............................................. $7,772,267,000
\1\ (Includes programs such as Hall Thruster technology cooperation.)
The estimated net worth of commercial contracts approved by the
United States Government concerning satellite launches services
involving Russian and American entities since September 1999 is
$2,563,545,000.
Question 9. Please provide a list of American firms and Russian
governmental or commercial entities that are engaged in U.S.-Russian
satellite launch services and the estimated values of their contracts.
(If necessary to protect legitimate proprietary interests, please use a
classified annex.)
Answer. The following is a compilation of information drawn from
the files of the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls
and information solicited from the Federal Aviation Administration. The
following U.S. companies are engaged in selling launch services aboard
Russian launch vehicles or Ukrainian launch vehicles using major
Russian components. The values are estimates of their commercial
contracts:
LKEI Proton Launch Services........................... $4,500,000,000
(Lockheed Martin/Khrunichev/Energia)
Sea Launch Zenit-3SL.................................. $1,500,000,000
(Boeing/Energia/Yuzhnoye/Kvaerner)
RD-180 Engine for Atlas............................... $1,300,000,000
(Lockheed Martin/United Technologies/Energomash)
Assured Space Access (Kosmos-3M and Start-1).......... $20,500,000
Thiokol (Dnepr)....................................... (\1\)
-----------------
Total............................................. $7,320,500,000
\1\ No launches sold/no revenue.
Question 10. What are the relationships between the Tyumen Oil
Company, the Alfa Group, Pyotr Aven, and Mikhail Fridman? Are the Alfa
Group, Pyotr Aven, and Mikhail Fridman in positions that would enable
them to benefit from the $500 million in EXIM Bank loans to Tyumen Oil
Company recently approved by Secretary Albright?
Answer. The Secretary had placed a hold on Ex-Im's approval of the
loan guarantees until we could investigate some serious allegations
concerning abuse of investor rights by Tyumen Oil in a bankruptcy case.
After she determined that it was appropriate to allow Ex-Im to proceed
with its consideration of the loan guarantees, Ex-Im's board approved
financing for the two transactions.
Aven and Fridman are major shareholders in Alfa Group, a Russian
holding company which owns the controlling shares in Tyumen Oil Company
(TNK). Aven, Fridman and Alfa Group stand to benefit if the capital
improvements to the Tyumen's refinery at Ryazan and to the Samotlor oil
field, financed by loans guaranteed by Ex-Im Bank, increase production
and sales of crude oil and refined products by TNK. No funds guaranteed
by Ex-Im go directly to Aven, Fridman, Alfa Group or TNK; rather, the
funds are paid by the lenders to the U.S.-based suppliers of the $500
million in equipment purchased by TNK. The U.S. operations of those
suppliers (Halliburton, Inc. and ABB, Inc.), and their employees, will
benefit from the increased sales supported by the Ex-Im guarantees.
Question 11. What is the relationship between Pyotr Aven and
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin? Did Pyotr Aven play any direct
or indirect role in Putin's recent campaign for the Russian presidency?
Answer. According to Russian press reports, Aven and President
Putin have known each other since the early 1990's and have met since
Putin became acting President. Aven's Alfa Group has reportedly
supplied several staff members for the Presidential administration.
Alfa Group is also reported to have made financial contributions to
President Putin's election campaign.
Question 12. What is the relationship between Mikhail Fridman and
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin? Did Mikhail Fridman play any
direct or indirect role in Putin's recent campaign for the Russian
presidency?
Answer. Like Pyotr Aven, Fridman is a major shareholder in the
Russian holding company Alfa Group. According to Russian press
accounts, Aven's Alfa Group has supplied several staff members for the
Presidential administration. Alfa Group is also reported to have made
financial contributions to President Putin's election campaign.
Senator Smith. We are now honored to have Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski with us. He is no stranger to this room and this
committee. We invite him to come to the table and share with us
his very able perspective. Doctor, welcome. It is good to see
you, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, PH.D., COUNSELOR, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, AND FORMER NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR
Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, it is nice to see you. It is
nice to see some familiar faces behind you as well.
Senator Smith. Yes indeed.
Dr. Brzezinski. Let me reach for my opening comments, if I
may.
Senator Smith. Please do.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you and to discuss American-Russian relations. Perhaps
an appropriate way to begin is to pose the question: Is
democracy in Russia now more secure and more respected than was
the case earlier in this decade? Is the free enterprise system
more pervasive and more accepted?
Unfortunately, the answer has to be ``no.'' The sad fact is
that several years have been wasted, with the notions of
democracy, the free market, and partnership with America now in
disrepute in the minds of many Russians. A great deal of
responsibility for this deterioration is due, I am sorry to
say, to the naivete, incompetence, and self-deception with
which the administration has handled U.S. policy toward Russia.
The administration has been naive in prematurely claiming
years ago that President Yeltsin was a truly democratic
President of an established Russian democracy.
Moreover, the administration was incompetent in its
indiscriminate transfer of financial assistance to Russia
without adequate supervision, while declaring Russia to be
already an effectively privatized free-market economy. All of
this facilitated the emergence of a pervasively corrupt
economic system--one that enriched the few and impoverished the
many in Russia.
Furthermore, the administration has been cynical in its
disregard of Russian transgressions, most notably in Chechnya.
Five years ago during the first Chechnya war, the
administration uncritically accepted the Russian story that the
issue at stake was the preservation of the Russian union. In
the current war, the administration has bought hook, line, and
sinker the Russian notion that the conflict is about terrorism.
In short, by making the pursuit of good relations an end in
itself, the administration failed to encourage positive change
and to discourage negative conduct.
As President Putin consolidates his power, there is little
evidence that the administration has drawn any lessons from its
past failures. A case in point is the testimony offered a week
ago to the Senate by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
In it, he hailed, without any qualification whatsoever, ``the
completion of Russia's first democratic transfer of power at
the executive level in its 1,000-year history.'' That so-called
democratic transfer of power was effected by a palace coup that
produced Yeltsin's abrupt resignation, the forward shifting of
the date of the national elections, and the creation of a de
facto plebiscite on behalf of the acting President, who in the
mean time appealed to the public with highly nationalistic and
demagogic slogans, exploiting ethnic and racial prejudice
against the Chechens. None of that was noted by the Deputy
Secretary.
That is not all. The Deputy Secretary acknowledges that we
know very little about President Putin, but goes on to say the
following: ``Here is what we do know. Mr. Putin has affirmed
his support for Russia's constitution and its guarantee of
democratic government and basic freedoms for Russia's people.
He has declared himself a proponent of a competitive market
economy. He has promised quick action on tax reform and
investment legislation. He told Secretary Albright, when she
spent 3 hours with him on February 2, that he sees Russia as
part of Europe and the West, that he favors Russia's
integration with the global economy, that he wants to continue
the process of arms control and U.S.-Russian cooperation on
nonproliferation.''
According to Talbott, that is all we know. The truth is we
know much more than that. We know, for example that Mr. Putin
spent 15 years of his life working for the KGB, the agency that
specialized in the suppression of dissidents and in espionage
against the West. We know Mr. Putin's proclaimed admiration for
Mr. Andropov, one of the more ruthless leaders of the KGB. We
have heard his public salute of KGB-NKVD traditions, his blood-
curdling demagogy regarding the liquidation of the Chechens,
and his very direct appeals to Russian nationalism and big
power ambitions.
Nor should we ignore his reliance on the military and the
KGB as the principal instruments of Russia's state power, nor
his efforts to intimidate the mass media. Surely, these factors
are also relevant to any assessment of Mr. Putin's likely
conduct.
Administration spokesmen have repeatedly stated that Russia
is isolating itself by its conduct in Chechnya. Yet the fact is
that the administration has done absolutely nothing to make
that allegation stick. Quite the contrary, the administration
has gone out of its way to fraternize on a personal level with
senior Russian officials, even as heads of government of the
newly independent post-Soviet republics have found it difficult
to gain top-level access to administration officials.
What is equally troubling is the fact that some of Russia's
immediate and most affected neighbors, such as the Presidents
of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Estonia, have been
perplexed by the United States' disregard for the longer term
effects on Russian foreign policy of Moscow's reliance on
indiscriminate force in coping with Chechnya.
Moreover, it is tragically the case that the
administration's indifference to what has been happening in
Chechnya has probably contributed to the scale of the genocide
inflicted on the Chechens. The Kremlin paused several times in
the course of its military campaign in order to gauge the
reactions of the West. Yet all they heard from the President
were the words ``I have no sympathy for the Chechen rebels,''
which the Russians construed as a green light for their
ruthless policy. The President in effect even endorsed their
efforts ``to liberate Grozny.''
I fear that the administration's one-sided approach
reflects not only continued misreading of the Russian
situation, but above all, a politically driven desire to strike
some sort of a spectacular agreement with the Russians
regarding ratification of START and some compromise regarding
the ABM Treaty, thereby enabling the administration to claim
that it has obtained a green light from Russia for the
deployment of the planned national missile defense system.
It is therefore not surprising to me that Deputy Secretary
Talbott's testimony evoked strong bipartisan criticism. In his
response to Mr. Talbott, Senator Leahy, a Democrat, stated
bluntly that: ``As far as I am aware, the administration has
yet to call the atrocities by Russian soldiers in Chechnya what
they are--war crimes. There should be no ambiguity about that,
and I am afraid that failure to do so has damaged our
credibility. And the administration recently cleared the way
for a $500 million Export-Import Bank loan to a Russian oil
company. World Bank loans have also been made. We need to ask
why we are providing this kind of aid when Russia seems to have
enough money in the bank to wage a brutal military campaign.''
Senator McConnell was even more scathing in his criticism
of Mr. Talbott's testimony:
``It is noteworthy, Mr. Chairman, that the European
reaction to what has been happening has been more forthright.
The Council of Europe has recently suspended Russia's voting
rights. The French Foreign and Finance Ministers have recently
proposed a more critical and strategically guided re-
examination of the way aid is given to Russia.''
I hope the administration, even belatedly, draws the
necessary lessons from these developments. Ultimately, the
issue is not whether we should be engaged with Russia, for the
obvious answer to that is ``yes.'' The issue, however, is how
we should be engaged with Russia, and here the ability to
discriminate is the essential precondition of any effective
policy.
The goal that we should be pursuing is the inclusion of
Russia in a wider Atlantic-European community, based on the
same values and mutually respected rules of civilized behavior.
That historic goal will not be achieved if egregious instances
of the Kremlin's international misconduct are condoned or if
its domestic political regression is blithely ignored.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Dr. Brzezinski, you have been an observer of
Russia for many, many years and I wonder if, even as bad as it
is as you describe it in your testimony, is there any room--is
there any reason we should be optimistic that it is better than
it was in the Soviet Union, that there is reason that it can be
better still, given the personnel in place?
Dr. Brzezinski. Absolutely. I am a long-term optimist. I
am, however, a short-term pessimist. I think in the near term
we are seeing the emergence of a generation which perhaps can
be described with the words once applied by an American author
to the U.S. leadership in the sixties: ``the best and the
brightest.''
The best and the brightest in Russia in the late seventies
and in the eighties tended to gravitate to the KGB. They were
not true believers, they were cynics. They knew that the
ideology was finished. They had a good idea that the West was
doing much better than Russia. They had a sense of the internal
stagnation. They had a desire for reform. They also enjoyed
power and status and privilege. That is what they would like to
restore to Russia today.
I think Mr. Putin is the quintessential product of that
generation. Behind them, however, I think there is surfacing a
younger group still--who will come to power probably within a
decade or so--that realizes that the notion of recreating
Russia as a global superpower with a strategically dominated
space of its own--reflecting largely the space of the former
Soviet Union--is unattainable, and that Russia has no choice
but to fully opt for partnership with and membership in the
West.
So in the long run I am an optimist. I think the trend is
positive. But I think we cannot ignore a short-term regression
and we should be particularly careful not to condone patterns
of behavior that it might prove tempting for the Russian elite
to repeat elsewhere.
This is why I put so much emphasis on Chechnya. Chechnya to
me is not only a humanitarian tragedy to which the
administration has been paying lip service, it is also a
geopolitical warning sign that we have been largely ignoring
and tacitly condoning. In my view these distinctions have not
been sufficiently made.
I think our response to Chechnya has been too passive, and
we therefore risk the possibility that our passivity may
provide an opening wedge for pressure on Georgia. Georgia is
extremely vulnerable, and its stability depends largely on Mr.
Shevardnadze. We can already see some evidence of rising
Russian pressure on Estonia and Latvia. The Central Asian
republics are beginning, I think, to start their own
accommodation process with Moscow, largely because of the way
they interpret our passivity on Chechnya.
So it is the short term that concerns me. In the long run I
am a convinced optimist. I think Russia has no choice but to
opt for the West and we should facilitate that, but only by a
discriminating policy.
Senator Smith. I think it is finding that line of how to
discriminate, to be constructively engaged but not foolish in
the engagement, is I think what many are pursuing. As I listen
to your testimony and read it as you went along, it reminded me
of a lunch I recently enjoyed with former Secretary of State
George Schultz. During that lunch he held up President
Clinton's Time Magazine article praising Mr. Yeltsin as a true
democrat as an example of how the administration frankly is not
dealing with reality as it relates to Russia.
Based on what you have said here, I do not think you
disagree with him. Is that a fair characterization?
Dr. Brzezinski. No, I do not disagree. I must say that
article was truly dismaying. I am pretty sure that the
President did not write it. The administration lately has
turned itself into a factory of op-ed pieces. Almost every week
some administration top official has an op-ed somewhere under
his or her name, and I cannot see them writing it because
otherwise that is all that they would be doing.
So I doubt the President wrote it. But he signed it, he
agreed to it and his advisors signed off on it. It was a
disturbing piece because it contained that extraordinary phrase
about the Russian ``liberation of Grozny,'' which I think is
going to haunt the President and embarrass the United States
for a long time to come.
Moreover, the piece reflected a state of mind that I
believe is uncritical, overly tactical and probably very
heavily motivated by domestic political concerns. I have a
sense that domestic priorities tend to drive the foreign policy
shaping of this administration to a greater extent than usually
is the case with most administrations.
Senator Smith. I am very pleased to be joined by Senator
Richard Lugar of Indiana. I invite your statement, sir, and any
questions you might have.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In a forum that the chairman and I shared earlier this
morning, Larry Summers, our Secretary of the Treasury, used a
term which I see in Mike McFaul's testimony, that Putin may
become a Milosevic. On the more optimistic side, Secretary
Summers said he might be a DeGaulle or an Adenauer and that,
looking at it in financial terms, the differences are enormous
in terms of how this might turn out.
Taking the more optimistic view, I raised with Secretary
Summers and I raise with you: What do we know about the
economic people around Putin who might have the capacity to
make the reforms we are talking about? The thought is that
American investment or Western investment might flow to Russia
if the conditions were right, if Russia was congenial and
hospitable in ways that Ambassador Strauss, in his tenure, was
talking about--court reform, contract certainty, mortgage
money, and those things we generally associate with market
economics and with the West, Japan and others.
Are there people in your judgment in Russia who understand
these institutions sufficiently to legislate these changes, and
enough people to make them work, to the extent that this kind
of investment flow or change might occur?
The reason I ask this is that it seems to me that along
with the optimistic political scenario the administration
paints, there is a tendency now to say that the economy of
Russia is a whole lot better than it has been. Particularly
after the Russian devaluation and the crash that affected the
world economies. Perhaps in a relative sense that is true, and
the oil prices are often cited as a key. Every dollar higher in
the price of oil is another billion in Russian currency.
Somehow the demonetization that Brookings Institution and
others have described. It is hard to get from where things are
now to a situation that approximates normalcy of investment and
integration with the Western economies, which everyone feels
Mr. Putin might be the architect or the bridge.
Even if he attempted to do that, inadvertently, some
suggest that Mr. Putin might destroy democracy as others
alleged that Mr. Gorbachev destroyed communism.
How do you come out on this? Is there the capacity to make
the kinds of changes, to bring about a normalcy of
relationships in the economy, quite apart from the political
sense? Or, are we simply facing something that is not there and
we are likely to see a continuation, if not something worse?
Dr. Brzezinski. That is a very tough and searching
question. You started off by quoting, I take it, from Mr.
McFaul's reference to Putin as a potential Milosevic. I think
that is an interesting analogy. You then countered that
statement with Larry Summers' speculation that he may turn out
to be a DeGaulle or an Adenauer.
Senator Lugar. He thought it might go either way. Larry
thinks he might be a Milosevic, too, or maybe a DeGaulle.
Dr. Brzezinski. Yes. Let me suggest first of all that I do
not think the option is Adenauer or DeGaulle because both of
these men were deeply committed to democratic processes, deeply
committed. It was evident in their personal conduct. It was
evident in Adenauer even under the Nazis, and I do not think I
need to elaborate on DeGaulle's commitment.
Mr. Putin's background is very different. I think the real
choice is between Milosevic, if the adventurism of Chechnya
leads to Georgia or to the Baltic republics, or--and I do not
exclude this--Pinochet. It is a measure of how badly democracy
has deteriorated in Russia that to suggest a similarity to
Pinochet is to be optimistic as contrast to Milosevic.
Putin may turn out to be a Pinochet. That is to say, a
person who imposes order largely by the reliance on state
institutions, including repression and intimidation, and in so
doing begins also to cope with the economic situation. Here
again, I think we have to be very careful in our judgments. We
do not want Russia to be in anarchy, but let us not fall
overboard with joy if Russia becomes orderly. It is like
saying, ``well, is it not wonderful that Mussolini made the
trains run on time.'' The train schedule in Italy was very
chaotic before Mussolini came to power, but it was not
wonderful that it became orderly. A lot of other things were
lost in the process.
The question is how will Mr. Putin create a degree of
confidence and stability in Russian society so that an orderly
economic recovery can take place. You are quite right in noting
that right now Russia's economy looks better, but it is
extremely fragile and it is dependent, as both of you have
noted, on the world oil market. That market is going to go
down, and then what?
Beyond that, I think we have to take note of the degree to
which Mr. Putin is dealing with a truly ravaged society, which
is more than just in economic difficulty or perhaps in
political regression. Let me just give you a few key facts.
Russian male expectancy used to be 64; it is down to 59, the
level of the Central African Republic. In Russia deaths exceed
births by 2 million to 1.3 million. Russian population when
Russia became a separate state was 151 million in 1990; it is
now down to 145 million.
Some 800,000 Russians with higher education have left
Russia. And 20 percent of Russian first graders--these are
Russian statistics--20 percent of Russian first graders are
diagnosed with some form of retardation when they enter school.
Only 40 percent of Russia's new infants are born fully healthy.
Russia's GNP is now the equivalent of that of Belgium and The
Netherlands combined.
Russia ranked last in the 1999 global competitiveness
report. Russia ranked 82d out of 99 in Transparency
International's corruption index. To the west of Russia is
successful, integrating Europe. To the east of Russia is a
successfully developing China and a very successful Japan. To
the south of Russia are 300 million Moslems who are
increasingly alienated by what the Russians are doing in
Chechnya.
This is a terribly difficult situation that Putin will be
handling, and I think it will take a long time for Russia to
recover. The only way he can do this is by gradually
establishing predictable, transparent rules of procedure,
cultivating an increasingly democratic system, an opening to
the West.
Will he do it? He will not do it if we condone misconduct,
ignore transgressions, and simply applaud anything that he
does, which unfortunately has been the inclination of the
administration so far.
Senator Lugar. The mention of Pinochet denotes the
reputation that the regime had with the Chicago School of
Economics professors and other apostles of that school. I am
curious, if there is an economic order produced by a President
like Putin, whether he has a similar cadre or corps?
Dr. Brzezinski. Good question, good question. I am not sure
he has a similar cadre, although there are a number of people
who have been working with him that are apparently very able. I
think the lack of a Russian entrepreneurial is probably even
more of an issue, however. In Chile there was an
entrepreneurial tradition that Pinochet unleashed an
entrepreneurial class even while suppressing his opponents.
Beyond the oligarchs, I cannot see that there really is a
entrepreneurial class. And unfortunately, the so-called
privatization that has taken place in Russia has involved
massive theft of national resources by the oligarchs. This
theft must be thought of in a larger context. Sometimes people
who make excuses for Russia argue that the oligarchs are like
the American robber barons, that lived during the 1890's.
You may say whatever you wish about the legality or
morality of the Vanderbilts, Morgans, Carnegies, or
Rockefellers. There is one thing they all did, however. They
invested in America. The oligarchs are not investing in Russia.
They are investing in the Riviera, in California, in Florida,
in London, in Cyprus, and offshore in the Caribbean.
So I am not sure whether Putin has an entrepreneurial class
yet, and this is another reason why I am a short-term
pessimist. In the long run, however, I think they have no
choice but to adapt and things will eventually take off.
Senator Lugar. I think it is a very important insight.
Secretary Summers said the first indicator of health would be
the return of capital to Russia, as you say, the investment by
the robber barons in their own country. Absent that, it is
unlikely for capital to flow to Russia until capital, which has
been sent out, returns.
I just have one additional question, Mr. Chairman. The
Library of Congress head Jim Billington joined us this morning
and through his auspices I understand as many as a third of the
Duma members are coming to Washington in May to visit with
Members of Congress. Some are going to see Governors of our
States and trail them around or learn about our State
legislatures.
One consequence of the election, is that there are a large
number of new people in the Duma who are very different from
the Russians which we have all become accustomed, and who have
made these trips before.
Do you have any insights on the Duma members now and what
the effect might a trip of one-third of these members be when
they see our institutions in action? In other words, what
program should we be thinking of if we are to capitalize upon
that opportunity?
Dr. Brzezinski. I think the next two witnesses know the
details and the character of the Duma better than I, so I
cannot really answer you regarding the specific character of
the Duma. I think I do not know any more about it than you do.
But I do want to say that, one, the Billington program is
terrific and it deserves support. I think it is a wonderful way
of opening up the eyes of the emerging Russian elite to the
realities of a complex modern continental society such as ours.
Allow me to make a suggestion here. You have helped this
program, you have financed it, and I think it is a terrific
initiative. It should be continued and expanded, but it should
not be a Russia only or a Russia first program. Half the people
from the former Soviet Union are now in the independent states.
We have an enormous strategic interest in these states being
viable and remaining independent, precisely because Putin and
his generation are still talking about recreating some form of
preponderance over the former Soviet space.
We should make sure that for every Russian legislator who
comes here--and by God, we ought to bring as many as we can--
there ought to be an equivalent number of Ukrainians,
Georgians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and yes, even Belarussians, despite
the repressive character of Lukashenko's regime. You should
insist on this, because the administration has this tendency,
which I think is more of a mind set than a calculus, of
essentially operating on Russia-first basis.
It is a damn good program, but let us make it for
everybody. It is in our interest to do so, and it is in the
interest of consolidating geopolitical pluralism in the space
of the former Soviet Union.
Senator Lugar. That is an excellent suggestion.
Senator Smith. Very good. Thank you, Senator.
I just have two additional questions. I suppose if I
remember anything of your testimony this morning it will be the
word ``discriminating.'' I wonder if you can put a little more
meat on that bone. How ought our Government be more
discriminating in its policy toward Russia?
Dr. Brzezinski. The case of Chechnya is particularly very
relevant to that question. I think we have been
undiscriminating in the sense that we have only paid lip
service to Chechen civilian casualties while in fact condoning
what the Russians have been doing. I hope to God our activity
has gone no further than condoning, because, as you know, there
is now a debate in German press regarding alleged German
intelligence assistance to the Russians in the conflict against
the Chechens. In defending this activity some Germans are now
saying that they have not done as much as the Americans.
I hope that is not true, because I think that would be a
real blot on our own sense of traditions and what we stand for.
Senator Smith. But that allegation has been made?
Dr. Brzezinski. By the Germans.
Senator Smith. By the Germans.
Dr. Brzezinski. In the case of Chechnya there are things we
could have done to show that we mean that we are seriously
concerned. Take one specific example. The Russians have been
invited to the G-7. It is not a decisionmaking body, but it is
a summit of the advanced industrial democracies. It is a kind
of a club and membership in the club confers status.
Russia is not an advanced economy. Russia is by no means a
democracy. Yet it was included in order to give President
Yeltsin status. And Yeltsin at one time appealed to the best
instincts of the Russian people. He said to the Russian people
on more than one occasion: The imperial burden is a cross; we
do not benefit from it; freedom for others is in our interest.
Putin, in contrast, has appealed to the worst instincts in
his campaign about Chechnya and in his campaign about
rebuilding the state. I would disinvite the Russians from the
G-7, simply say to them: Look, I am sorry, but your conduct is
not compatible with the standards of advanced industrial
democracies; we will meet without you.
The Council of Europe has just suspended Russia's
membership. I do not know what our reaction to that has been,
but at least some European diplomats have indicated that the
administration was not particularly happy, that the Europeans
worked up the guts to suspend Russia's voting rights.
It is these things that we could have done to lend
credibility to the notion that what the Russians are doing is
not compatible with standards that we expect, and to
demonstrate that this behavior is isolating Russia. There are
also some options in the economic area, as Senator Leahy
mentioned. There are things we could have done while
maintaining the Nunn-Lugar approach, that is, by continuing
arms control negotiations, which is in our mutual interest,
while indicating that in the long run we do want to see Russia
as a component of a larger Atlanticist Europe. I believe this
should be our strategic objective.
This is why I personally advocate the enlargement of NATO,
but making it very clear that NATO ought to be open to
everybody that wishes and qualifies for membership.
Senator Smith. Including Russia?
Dr. Brzezinski. Including Russia if it wishes and
qualifies.
Senator Smith. And qualifies.
Dr. Brzezinski. Those are fairly big if's.
Senator Smith. Dr. Brzezinski, this last question you
should feel no obligation to answer, but I have to ask you why
it is that you denied use to Ian Brzezinski of the family car
between the years of 1978 and 1980.
Dr. Brzezinski. Is this an official complaint?
Senator Smith. It is a question asked only in humor.
We thank you very much, doctor.
Dr. Brzezinski. Strong factual background, too.
Thank you very much. It is good to be with both of you.
Senator Smith. We are grateful for your testimony. You make
such an enormous contribution every time you come here and have
to our country on so many occasions, and we thank you, sir.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Smith. We are now pleased to call forward our next
witnesses. We welcome Dr. Thomas E. Graham and Dr. Michael A.
McFaul, both of whom are senior associates at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Gentlemen, we welcome you.
Dr. Graham, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GRAHAM, JR., PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I deeply
appreciate the opportunity to speak before this committee on
the implications of Russia's Presidential elections for Russian
democracy and U.S.-Russian relations. Let me also add that it
is a pleasure to appear on this panel with my colleague Mike
McFaul. I think our testimony will demonstrate that, at a
minimum, there is pluralism of opinion, some would say
incipient democracy, at the Endowment and that is all for the
good.
This is a very timely hearing. It is no secret to this
committee that U.S.-Russian relations are in deep trouble. In
fact, I think we could argue that U.S.-Russian relations,
despite a certain thaw over the past few weeks, are at their
lowest point since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Talk of
strategic partnership has been replaced on the Russian side by
rhetoric that is reminiscent of the cold war at times. If you
look around this room you can see that the American political
establishment is suffering from a severe case of Russia
fatigue.
Russia's financial collapse of 1998, Kosovo, the bank
scandals of last summer, and Chechnya have all taken their
toll. I do not think I need to explain to you why Russia still
matters. I think we will also agree that it is time and
important to put an end to the deterioration in our
relationships and to preferably put them on a better track, and
Mr. Putin's election and the emergence of a new leadership in
Russia provides us with an opportunity.
Much, of course, is going to depend on what the Russian
leadership decides to do. Mr. Chairman, as you have already
noted, the continuation of the brutal campaign in Chechnya is
going to impede any near-term improvement. For our part, as we
begin to rethink our policy toward Russia we need to take a
hard look at Mr. Putin, we need to appreciate the complexity of
the problems he is facing and the constraints on his ability to
act.
That is, we need to avoid recreating that cycle of great
expectations followed by deep disappointment and mutual
recriminations that has bedeviled the relationship over the
past several years.
So to begin, who is Mr. Putin and what does his election as
President portend for U.S.-Russia relations? Mr. Chairman, as
you have already noted, Putin's election should raise concern
about the state of democracy in Russia today. To be sure, the
elections themselves probably met minimal standards for being
declared free and fair. Turnout was just under 69 percent, the
voters had a choice of 11 candidates ranging across the
political spectrum. No one has yet offered credible evidence of
massive fraud that would have denied Mr. Putin victory in the
first round.
But I think you will agree that democracy goes beyond the
simple mechanics of voting and vote counting to deeper
political structures and attitudes. Here I think there are
concerns. Putin's phenomenal rise from political obscurity to
the highest office in Russia in 8 months underscores how
unstructured Russian society is and how easy it is to
manipulate the electorate.
The Kremlin's cynical use of its near monopoly of the media
last fall to destroy Putin's rivals with half-truths and
fabrications was hardly democratic in spirit, even if those
opponents used similar tactics. But more troublesome is the
near total absence in Russia of accountability to the public,
the bedrock of democracy. Civil society is exceedingly weak. It
has not grown much over the last decade. Russia lacks a dense
network of civic organizations that could act as a check on
government behavior, particularly between elections.
Now, the reverse side of this lack of accountability is
that Putin's so-called popular mandate brings him very little
in the political arena in which he now finds himself, one that
is dominated by rival and competing elites. To put it in the
simplest terms, the people are not about to go out in the
streets in support of Mr. Putin as they did for Mr. Yeltsin a
decade ago. Mr. Putin is going to require other resources in
order to deal with and manage these elite audiences.
I think we should not overestimate his chances. He faces
serious constraints. Four stand out. First, while the Russian
constitution invests the President with vast powers, in
practice his power is much less. As a result of the devolution,
fragmentation, privatization, and erosion of state power, he
must now compete with multiple autonomous centers of power in
the guise of regional barons and business magnates, or
oligarchs as they are often called.
The Russian President simply cannot take on all the
competing powers at once. At best, he can exploit the
differences among them to gradually enhance his own power and
authority and to rebuild the state as an autonomous entity in
Russian politics.
Second, Putin faces very severe resource constraints.
Although tax collection has improved somewhat over the past
several months, the Russian Federal budget still amounts to
about 25 billion U.S. dollars at current exchange rates,
roughly what the United States spends on the intelligence
community alone. Putin simply does not have the resources to
spend more on the military and the security services, pay off
pension and wage arrears, rebuild the shattered public health
system and deteriorating educational system, and so on. He is
going to have to make difficult choices.
Third, Putin also has severe constraints in the area of
human resources. He does not have enough loyalists to staff the
key positions in the government. The conventional wisdom in
Moscow is that you need about 400 people to staff the
government properly. According to Kremlin insiders, Putin has a
very small bench, perhaps as few as 40. And this means that he
is going to have to reach outside to others and, given the
nature of Russian politics, this is going to become a coalition
government Russian-style, based not on parties but on
political-economic coalitions in elite circles. This is
necessarily going to undermine the effectiveness and
cohesiveness of his government.
Fourth and perhaps most important, there should be serious
questions about Mr. Putin's leadership abilities. His KGB days
in Leningrad and East Germany, his 6 years as a deputy mayor in
St. Petersburg, and his positions in Moscow since 1996 all
suggest a man of limited horizons and narrow goals. Nothing
suggests that he ever harbored ambitions to rise to the
pinnacle of power in Russia. Little indicates that he has
developed the political skills necessary to manage what has
become a very unruly Russian political system.
Putin may surprise us, as other great figures have in
Russian history. But at the moment I think we are right to
reserve judgment.
Now, despite these constraints on Putin, I think there is
still room for progress on some issues of interest to us. Over
the past decade a broad, shallow consensus has emerged across
the political spectrum, emphatically including the Communists,
as Russians have come to realize there can be no return to the
Soviet past, even if many vehemently disagree with the policies
of the past decade.
Ideological cleavages have given way to a competition among
vested political-economic interests as the defining feature of
Russian politics. This change--and I think Mike will speak
about this somewhat more--is reflected in the composition of
the new Duma, which is dominated by non-ideological, pragmatic,
some would say cynical, deputies.
Moreover, the Russian Government will have more room for
maneuver because of an improved economic outlook. As has
already been noted, the economy grew for the first time last
year, at roughly 3 percent. The forecast for this year is
growth of perhaps as high as 5 percent.
So what can we expect? On the economic front, we are likely
to see progress in building a more favorable environment for
investment, including a new tax code, movement on production
sharing arrangements, and improved protection of minority
shareholders rights. The outlook for land reform is less
certain. This is a contentious issue, but support is growing. I
would point out that already more than a quarter of Russia's
regions, 89 regions, have passed laws allowing for the free
buying and selling of land, despite the lack of an overarching
Federal code. So I think this is a sign of progress.
But the point I want to make here is that it is unlikely we
are going to see a great reform in the economic realm in the
near future, as some are predicting. The problems are still
very difficult. We will see a small step forward, but nothing
more than that.
On domestic politics, I think the situation is much less
promising. Putin's own comments on the press, the way he dealt
with the Radio Liberty correspondent, Mr. Babitsky, earlier
this year, suggest a man who has limited commitment to at least
some democratic freedoms. Progress is also likely to be slow on
two other key issues, corruption and Chechnya.
Corruption is a massive problem in Russia. There are no
simple solutions. Mr. Putin's actions to date, rather than his
words, suggest that he is going to move very slowly and
cautiously on this. In fact, he has granted something of
immunity to his former boss, Mr. Baradin, who is implicated in
the Mavatec scandals of last summer. Mr. Baradin is very happy
about that. I think we should be somewhat more concerned.
On Chechnya, I think it is clear that Mr. Putin still needs
to bring this to a victorious end. He needs that because his
position is dependent on support from the military and the
military is still intent on crushing the Chechen rebels. So I
doubt that we are going to see serious improvement in this area
over the near future.
Finally, on foreign policy, the broad outlines of Mr.
Putin's foreign policy have become evident over the past
several weeks with the publication and discussion of three
documents: a national security doctrine, a military doctrine,
and a foreign policy concept. Just three points.
First, these documents make clear that the major threat to
Russia's security and wellbeing is internal decline and decay.
As a result, the first goal of Russian foreign policy is to
help create conditions that are conducive to internal
reconstruction. This entails ensuring continued Russian access
to Western technology, credits, and know-how. It entails
continuing to work to integrate Russia into the global economy.
Second, Russia's attitude toward the outside world is
changing. In an earlier version of the national security
concept it adopted in 1997, Russia saw the West as relatively
benign. The latest documents make it clear, however, that the
West is seen as something of a looming threat.
Third, the Russian political elite is well aware that the
disarray and lack of coordination in foreign policy
decisionmaking and implementation have only exacerbated
problems arising from Moscow's shrinking resource base. The
rapid turnover in key personnel--five prime ministers, three
foreign ministers, three defense ministers, and seven security
council secretaries since January 1, 1996--give you a sense of
how problematic this has been.
If Mr. Putin can, as he claims he will try to do, impose
greater coherence on Russia foreign policy, we could see Russia
play a much more active role abroad, despite his current
weakness.
Now, given these fundamental concerns, I think Mr. Putin is
going to try to re-engage the West and particularly the United
States, as he has over the past 3\1/2\ months. As has been
already noted, we are likely to see progress on START II. It
could be ratified by the Duma as early as this Friday. Mr.
Putin I think is going to step up engagement on ABM Treaty
modifications, START III, National Missile Defense.
This does not mean that any of this is going to be easy. It
would be hard to do under the best of circumstances and we are
far from there at this point. But the point is that with Mr.
Putin we will probably have a better chance to sit down and
discuss these issues than we did in the last months and years
of Yeltsin's Presidency, simply because there is likely to be
more coherence in the Russian political establishment.
Finally, some thoughts on U.S. policy. I think it is clear
from what has been said today that Putin's Russia is not going
to be an ideal Russia, but it is a Russia that we can deal with
and a Russia that we need to deal with. Our first task should
be to rebuild the trust that has been lost over the past few
years because that is indispensable to productive negotiation
on strategic issues and nonproliferation concerns that lie at
the top of our agenda with Russia.
We can begin to do this in part by talking in less
grandiose terms and more realistically about the quality of our
relations with Russia. The administration's earlier talk of
strategic partnership created expectations in Russia that we
were never prepared to meet and our failure to meet them led
many Russians to ascribe to us pernicious motives we never in
fact entertained.
Now is the time for a little honesty. We should make clear
that the intensity of our engagement with Russia will vary from
issue to issue. On some, such as the strategic nuclear balance,
nonproliferation, Russia will be a central focus of our policy.
On others, such as many global economic matters, Russia will be
a secondary consideration at best.
We also need to lay down very clearly what our position is
on Chechnya and the fact that continuation of this military
campaign is going to impede progress in other areas. It is
simply inconceivable that we will build the public support we
need in this country for constructive engagement with Russia if
Chechnya continues.
In addition, I think as we seek to re-engage Russia we need
to appreciate Russia's limited capacity to engage. It takes two
to engage and, given Russia's dire socioeconomic conditions,
its declining resource base, it has very little capacity to
engage. It is therefore imperative that we work with Russia on
issues where it really matters, that we set realistic goals,
places where we have chances of success. That will produce the
type of public support we need in the United States for
continued engagement.
Finally, in engaging Russia I would urge that we retain a
respectful distance from the Russian political leadership, in
sharp contrast to the way the administration approached Yeltsin
over the past several years. These overly close relations I
think only warp our perception of what is actually happening in
Russia, they diminish the support we have within Russia itself
and then in particular they blind us to the down sides of
developments in Russia and limit our capacity to react to them
properly.
Now, the type of engagement that I am describing I think
lacks the high drama of the 1990's. Some will find it
pedestrian. But I think that only by lowering our expectations,
by understanding where our interests overlap and conflict with
Russia's, and by acknowledging the limits on our ability to
cooperate, in short only through greater realism than we have
demonstrated over the past decade, can we hope to put on track
our relations with Russia, a country that still remains
extremely important to our security and will so well into the
future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Graham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Thomas E. Graham, Jr.
Although there has been a certain thaw in our relations with Russia
over the past few weeks, it is still safe to say that they have reached
their nadir since the breakup of the Soviet Union. During the past
year, senior Russian government officials have at times resorted to
rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War. The United States is treated with
increasing suspicion in commentary in Russia's mainstream press.
Department of State polling has traced a steady decline in favorable
opinion of the United States among Russians from over 70 percent in
1993 to just 47 percent earlier this year.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the once prevailing image of
Russia as an aspiring democracy has given way to one of Russia as a
hapless land of massive corruption, pervaded by organized crime. The
American political establishment suffers from a severe case of Russia
fatigue. Growing numbers of Americans believe that Russia simply does
not matter that much any longer in the world and that the United States
can and should pursue its interests with little reference to Russia.
Few Americans would advocate gratuitously harming Russia, but equally
few are prepared to spend much time, energy, or money to nurture good
relations with Russia.
Three events over the past year and a half were pivotal in fueling
this deterioration in relations: Russia's financial collapse in August
1998, the Kosovo conflict, and Chechnya.
The financial collapse marked the failure of the grand project of
quickly building a vibrant democracy and robust market economy in
Russia along Western lines. For many Russians, it confirmed suspicions
that the West was not trying to help their country rebuild but rather
seeking to turn it into a third-rate power. In the West, and
particularly in the United States, we began to take a more sinister
view of Russia. Because we tend to think there is something natural
about the emergence of democracies and market economies, many Americans
see the problems in Russia as a sign of some profound moral flaw in
Russia's national character.
The Kosovo conflict, at a time when NATO was adopting a new
strategic doctrine and adding new members, confirmed Russians' worst
fears about the Alliance. Moreover, Kosovo underscored just how far
Russia's international standing had fallen during the nineties and how
little its voice mattered in world affairs, even in Europe, a region of
vital significance to Russia. While many in the West hailed the role
that then President Yeltsin played in bringing the conflict to an end
on NATO's terms, much of the Russian political elite interpreted this
as a sign of Russia's weakness; some even saw it as a betrayal of
Russia's interests. While most Americans saw the Russian ``dash to
Pristina'' as an ill-conceived act of desperation, most Russians
applauded it as a demonstration of Russia's will and ability to carry
out a military operation even in the face of NATO's opposition.
Chechnya has dramatically underscored the gap between Russian and
American elites and broader publics. While we have been appalled by the
brutality of Moscow's military operation, Russians have approved it as
necessary to putting an end to the terrorist threat emanating from
Chechnya, restoring order to a Russian territory, and safeguarding the
country's territorial integrity. Against the background of what
Russians saw as an illegal and inhumane NATO air campaign in Kosovo,
Russians have been incensed by the West's criticism of their actions in
Chechnya. The criticism is, to their minds, evidence of a double
standard, of a refusal to treat Russia as an equal, and of an
unwillingness to appreciate the depths of the problems Russia now
confronts, problems, moreover, that many Russians believe arose out of
their following Western advice over the past decade.
Both Russian and American leaders would like to halt--and if
possible reverse--this deterioration in relations before it does
irreparable harm. Each side recognizes that the other will remain
critical to its own security and well-being well into the future. The
emergence of a new leadership in Russia, the transfer of power from
President Yeltsin to President Putin, provides an opportunity to put
the relationship back on track. Whether this opportunity will be seized
remains an open question. Much, to be sure, will depend on the course
the new Russian leadership takes. There are actions, for example, in
Chechnya and, more broadly, in the area of human rights and civic
freedoms, that the Russian government could take that would undermine
all hopes for near-term improvement in relations.
At the same time, in plotting our course toward improved relations,
we need to take a hard look at Putin, appreciate the complexity of the
problems confronting him and the constraints on his ability to act,
separate the substance from the style of Russian foreign policy and
determine where differences over substance preclude productive
interaction, and articulate clearly what we need from Russia to build
public support at home for active engagement with Russia. Moreover, we
need to keep our goals in line with Russia's capabilities if we are to
avoid the cycle of great expectations followed by profound
disappointment and mutual acrimony that has bedeviled the relationship
over the last several years.
RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY FRAGILE AT BEST
Putin's election as president on March 26 marked the first
democratic transfer of power in Russian history, the Clinton
Administration and many commentators have maintained. And, indeed, the
election probably met minimal standards for being declared democratic
and free and fair. Turnout was just under 69 percent; the voters had a
choice of eleven candidates representing a range of political views.
While there have been charges of fraud, and it is likely that fraud did
occur in some districts, no one has offered credible evidence of
massive fraud that would have denied Putin victory in the first round.
The official electoral results were in line with pre-election polling.
The only surprise was that the communist party candidate did better
than expected, and that was unlikely the result of widespread fraud.
Consequently, we can be confident that Putin's election at some level
represents the will of the Russian people.
This is not to say that all is well with democracy in Russia. Far
from it, particularly when one looks beyond the simple mechanics of
voting and vote counting to the deeper political structures and the
vitality of democratic virtues. At a minimum, Putin's phenomenal rise
from political obscurity to Russia's highest office in eight months
should give pause to anyone concerned about the consolidation of
democracy. The rapidity with which Russians swung from overwhelming
support for former Prime Minister Primakov to overwhelming support for
Putin underscores how unstructured Russian society is, how poorly
societal interests are articulated, and, thus, how easy the electorate
is to manipulate. That Putin's rise came against the background of a
shockingly brutal, but seemingly successful, military operation in
Chechnya should raise concerns about the standing in Russian society of
the democratic virtues of tolerance and compromise. The Kremlin's
cynical use of its near monopoly of the media last fall to destroy
Putin's rivals with half-truths and fabrications was hardly democratic
in spirit, even if those opponents engaged in similar tactics.
More troublesome is the near total absence in Russia of
accountability to the public, the bedrock of democracy. As many
commentators have pointed out, Putin failed to lay out a detailed
political and economic program during the presidential campaign. He
sent contradictory signals on his commitment to economic reform and
democracy, telling different audiences what they wanted to hear. This
is hardly unheard of in countries we call democratic without
reservation. But the point is that the Russian public has no effective
means to hold Putin accountable. Russia lacks a dense network of civic
organizations to put pressure on the government between elections and
check its behavior. Moreover, other elected officials, who might act as
a democratic check on Putin, are no more beholden to their electorates
than he is.
CONSTRAINTS CONFRONTING PUTIN
The reverse side of this lack of accountability is that Putin's
popular mandate brings him very little in the political arena in which
he must now operate, one that is dominated by the competing elite
circles and coalitions that have emerged over the past decade. There
are few ways he can mobilize his popular support for political
advantage now that the elections are over. There are no indications,
for example, that the people are about to take to the streets in
support of Putin as they did for Yeltsin a decade ago. Putin will
require other resources to manage and discipline these elites, a task
that is essential to his carrying out his agenda, whatever it might
turn out to be. We should not overestimate his chances. He faces
serious constraints. Four stand out.
First, although the Russian Constitution invests the president with
vast powers, something that has given rise to the myth of a
``superpresidency,'' in practice, his power is much less. Over the past
decade, multiple autonomous centers of power have emerged as a result
of the devolution, fragmentation, privatization, and erosion of state
power. In relative terms, considerable power now lies in the hands of
regional elites and business magnates, or ``oligarchs'' as they are
often called.
The levers that Russian leaders once used to control regional
elites have all atrophied. The dense, countrywide administrative
structures of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union collapsed with
the breakup of the Soviet Union and have yet to be replaced. Law
enforcement agencies and the courts, even if nominally subordinate to
Moscow, often do the bidding of regional leaders, because their
officials are dependent on the goodwill of those leaders for housing,
conveniences, and other amenities. Regional military commanders often
cut deals with local elites to ensure an adequate flow of energy and
provisions to their garrisons. As a result, the loyalty of the
institutions of coercion to the Kremlin is dubious at best outside of
Moscow.
The Russian president may be the strongest of all the centers of
power, and he may be able to enforce his will on one or more of the
competing centers. But even one-on-one, victory is not ensured; within
just the past week Putin had to back down from an effort to depose the
governor of his home region, St. Petersburg, a man for whom he has
expressed contempt in public, because of the governor's formidable
regional political machine. This failure only underscores the point
that Putin certainly lacks the resources to take all the competing
power centers on at once. In other words, he cannot govern the country
against the wishes of the regional barons and oligarchs. At best, he
can exploit the contradictions among them to expand his own room for
maneuver, enhance his own power and authority, and rebuild the state as
an autonomous entity. Success in such an effort is uncertain, however;
it will require considerable political will, imagination, skill, and
time.
Second, the resources are lacking for the vigorous pursuit of
rebuilding the state, which Putin has set as his primary goal. In the
past decade, Russia has experienced a socio-economic collapse
unprecedented for a great power not defeated in a major war. The
economy has been cut in half Russia's GNP is now roughly 7 percent of
the United States'. Although tax collection has improved over the past
several months, the Russian federal budget still amounts to about $25
billion at current exchange rates, that is, roughly what the United
States spends on the Intelligence Community alone. Putin does not have
resources to spend more on the military and security services, pay off
pension and wage arrears, rebuild a shattered public health system and
a deteriorating educational system, build up an independent judiciary,
aggressively combat corruption, create the institutions of a well-
functioning market cconomy, and so on. He will have to make difficult
choices.
Third, Putin lacks sufficient loyalists to man the government. The
conventional wisdom in Moscow is that it takes some 400 people to staff
the key positions in the government and presidential administration.
According to informed Moscow sources, Putin's bench of loyalist is very
narrow, perhaps as few as forty people, largely drawn from his security
services associates from St. Petersburg. Many of these individuals
already hold important positions in Moscow, such as Sergey Ivanov,
Security Council secretary, and Nikolay Petrushev, FSB director.
Consequently, Putin will have to reach out beyond his loyalists to
staff the government. Even if he appoints ``technocrats,'' as he most
likely will, they will be connected to one or another elite coalition
vying for power and influence in Moscow; that is simply the nature of
the Russian politics. This will produce a coalition government Russian-
style, based not on political parties, but on elite coalitions and
lobbies. Such a coalition will inevitably erode the cohesion and
effectiveness of Putin's government.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, there should be serious
questions about Putin's leadership abilities. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom in Washington, we know much about Putin, more, for
example, than we knew about either Gorbachev or Yeltsin when they
assumed power. Little in his biography, however, is encouraging on the
key question of whether he is prepared to lead Russia. His KGB days in
Leningrad and East Germany, his term as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg
in the early nineties, and his positions in Moscow since 1996 all
suggest a man of limited horizons and narrow goals. He has spent most
of his career as a deputy or less; rarely, has he been in charge. There
is nothing in his background to suggest that he ever harbored ambitions
to rise to the pinnacle of power in Russia, nothing to indicate that he
has honed the political skills needed to impose his will on Russia's
unruly political system. He may know the West better than any Russian
leader since Lenin, because of his KGB experience, but he probably
understands Russia more poorly than any Russian leader in the twentieth
century--there is little evidence that he traveled widely around the
country before he became Prime Minister last August.
Putin may surprise us, as have other gray figures in Russian
history. He may turn out to be a forceful, energetic, effective leader
with a compelling vision of what Russian can be both at home and abroad
around which he can rally competing elites. Certainly, that is what the
numerous Kremlin emissaries to this town over the past few months would
like us to believe. At the moment, however, we are right to have our
doubts.
EMERGING ELITE CONSENSUS
Despite the constraints on Putin, there is still room for progress
on the economic front, in the consolidation of society, and in the
pursuit of a more coherent foreign policy. With a different president
perhaps even more progress could be made, for the past decade has not
passed in vain, despite all the frustrations, disappointments, and
setbacks. A broad, if shallow, consensus has emerged across the
political spectrum--including most emphatically the communists--as
Russians have come to realize that there can be no return to the Soviet
past, even if many vehemently disagree with the policies of the past
decade. Ideological cleavages have given way to competition among
vested political/economic issues as the defining feature of Russian
politics. This change is reflected in the composition of the new Duma,
which is dominated by non-ideological, pragmatic--some would say
cynical--deputies.
For all the resentment of the West, mainstream political figures
admit that Russians themselves bear ultimate responsibility for what
has become of their country. Moreover, in the past two to three years,
they have come to accept the predicament their country faces. Putin
himself made this point emphatically in a document he released at the
end of last year, before Yeltsin's resignation, entitled ``Russia at
the Turn of the Millennium.'' Among other things, he noted that the
Russian economy would have to grow at 8 percent a year for the next
fifteen years for Russians to enjoy the standard of living now enjoyed
by Spain and Portugal. Finally, Russians now realize that they must
rely first of all on themselves in any effort to rebuild their country
and regain their standing in the world.
In addition to this consensus, an improved economic outlook will
give the Russian government more room for maneuver. The financial
collapse of August 1998 turned out to be a blessing in disguise. The
sharp devaluation of the ruble followed by a sharp rise in oil prices
has fueled an economic recovery over the past year. In 1999, the
economy turned in its first year of undoubted economic growth in the
past decade, with GNP rising by over 3 percent. Forecasts for this year
are for continued growth, perhaps as high as 5 percent. In the absence
of more thoroughgoing reforms, this recovery remains fragile. But, for
the moment, it has brought more money into the economy, increased tax
collection, and put considerably more resources at the government's
disposal.
What will this consensus and increased resources mean for Russian
economic policy, domestic politics, and foreign policy over the near
term?
On the economic front, we are likely to see progress on building a
more favorable environment for investment, both domestic and private.
But we are unlikely to see the radical breakthrough some are
predicting: Even if the government comes up with a radical plan,
implementation will be spotty, for that will require millions of
Russians to change deep-seated habits and weak government institutions,
particularly the judiciary, to enforce new legislation. Nevertheless,
over the next several months, we are likely to see a new tax code that
reduces and rationalizes taxes, progress on production sharing
arrangements, and improved protection of minority shareholders' rights.
The outlook for land reform is less certain. It remains a contentious
issue, as it is in all societies moving away from traditional to more
market-based forms of landholding, but support for land reform is
growing. Over a quarter of Russia's eighty-nine regions have already
passed laws permitting the buying and selling of land, despite the
absence of an overarching federal land code.
On domestic politics, Putin has set his primary goal as rebuilding
the state. Progress will be slow, as Putin will have to sort out
arrangements with still powerful regional elites if he is to create a
flexible, productive federal system. Restoring order, another of
Putin's priorities, could put some democratic freedoms at risk,
particularly since Putin will have to rely on security services that
have been left largely unreformed since the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Moreover, Putin's own comments on the press, including his
labeling of RFE/RL correspondent Babitsky as a traitor for reporting on
the Chechen side of the Chechen conflict, suggest less than a full
commitment to some democratic freedoms.
Progress is also likely to be slow on two issues of great
importance to the United States: corruption and the war in Chechnya.
The corruption problem is massive; there are no simple quick solutions.
Moreover, since virtually everyone is guilty in some way, unless the
issue is treated with extreme care, any anti-corruption campaign risks
looking like a politically motivated attack on one's opponents. Such an
approach would create more problems than it would solve, while
undermining efforts to democratize Russia. Bringing the Chechen
conflict to a ``victorious'' end remains an imperative for Putin, in
part because the military's loyalty is critical to his own power
position and the military is intent on crushing the Chechen rebels.
Moreover, in the eyes of the Russian public it is still his most
visible success. Without major successes in other areas, Putin will
have little room for negotiating a political solution to Chechnya. That
said, as Chechnya looks increasingly like a quagmire, he will be
seeking a face-saving way out of the conflict.
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PUTIN
The broad outlines of Putin's foreign policy have emerged over the
past several weeks in three documents that have been released or
discussed publicly: the national security concept, the military
doctrine, and the foreign policy concept. These documents have been in
the works for several months and reflect not simply Putin's preferences
but those of the Russian political elite as a whole. Three aspects of
these documents merit particular stress.
First, they make clear that the major threat to Russia's security
arises from internal decline and decay. As a result, the first goal of
Russian foreign policy is to help create conditions that are conducive
to internal reconstruction. This entails ensuring continued Russian
access to Western money, technology, and markets, which is critical to
economic recovery, as well as working to integrate Russia into the
global economy as smoothly as possible. In the short-term, it also
calls for stepped up efforts to restore relations with the IMF and to
move ahead on debt restructuring or relief with the Paris Club.
Most important, the requirements of internal reconstruction require
that Russia avoid confrontation whenever and wherever possible. In
particular, the Russian leadership understands that it cannot afford a
complete break in relations with the West, even if it wants to pursue
its own interests more aggressively in Europe, the Middle East, East
Asia, and the CIS. In addition, while the Kremlin will continue to talk
of Russia as a major force in world affairs, in practice it will tend
to focus on those few areas that are genuinely critical to its own
recovery, which include strategic relations with the United States,
European security matters, the Caspian region, Iran, and the CIS, as
well as admission to the World Trade Organization and access to Western
markets. In other words, Russia will act like a regional, rather than a
world, power, no matter what the rhetoric.
Second, as a result of developments over the past few years,
Russia's attitude toward the outside world has changed. In an earlier
version of the national security concept adopted in 1997, Russia saw
the outside world, and particularly the West, as relatively benign. The
latest foreign policy documents make it clear, however, that the West
looms as something of a threat. The opening paragraphs of the new
national security doctrine, for example, sharply contrast Russia's
effort to build a multipolar world in which economic and political
factors play an increasingly greater role with the alleged effort of
the West led by the United States' to dominate international relations
through unilateral actions, often involving the use of force.
Third, the Russian political elite is well aware that disarray and
lack of coordination in foreign policy decision-making and
implementation have only exacerbated problems arising from Moscow's
shrinking resource base. The rapid turnover in key personnel--five
Prime Ministers, three Foreign Ministers, three Defense Ministers, five
Ministers of Finance, five heads of the Presidential Administration,
and seven Security Council secretaries since January 1, 1996--has
hampered the pursuit of a coherent foreign policy, as have rivalries
among ministries and large commercial entities, such as the gas
monopoly, Gazprom, and one of Russia's leading oil companies, Lukoil.
In the past, it often seemed that Russian policy was not so much set by
the government as by the agencies that had assets to bring to bear on
the issue, with decisions being made on the basis of narrow
bureaucratic concerns rather than national interests. If Putin can
impose greater coordination and coherence on Russian foreign policy--a
big if--Russia could play a much more effective and active role abroad
despite its current weakness.
Given these fundamental concerns, Putin will likely continue to
reengage the West, and the United States in particular, as he has since
he became acting President three and a half months ago. He is pressing
for Duma ratification of START-2, which could occur this Friday. He
will engage more actively in discussions of ABM Treaty modification,
START-3, and national missile defense, despite deep-seated concerns
about U.S. policies on missile defense. He will seek to invigorate
Russia's contacts with NATO, as was evident in his decision earlier
this year to meet with NATO's secretary general over the objections of
his military.
If Putin turns out to be a strong leader, despite continuing
doubts, the West could have greater confidence in his ability to cut
deals and make them stick. That would be a major improvement over the
last years of the Yeltsin era. Nevertheless, it would be a grave
mistake to think that rapid progress can be made on many of the issues
on the U.S.-Russian agenda: ABM modification/START-3, Russian-Iranian
relations, Caspian pipelines, and so on. These are complex matters that
would be difficult to resolve even with much greater mutual trust than
now exists.
U.S. POLICY
Despite all the uncertainties about Putin and his policies, the
United States should seize the opportunity of a new Russian leadership
to reengage Russia in an effort to reverse the deterioration in our
relations. This is not the place to go into to detail on how to
approach specific issues, but some guidelines are in order.
The first task is to rebuild the trust that has been lost over the
past few years, for that is indispensable to productive negotiation on
strategic issues and non-proliferation concerns that lie at the top of
our agenda with Russia. We can begin to do this in part by talking in
less grandiose terms and more realistically about the quality of our
relations with Russia. The Administration's earlier talk of ``strategic
partnership'' created expectations in Russia that we were never
prepared to meet, and our failure to meet them led many Russians to
ascribe to us pernicious motives we never in fact entertained. Now is
the time for a little honesty. Our relationship with Russia is not yet
one of genuine partnership, nor is it likely to become one over the
next few years. Building such a relationship is a worthy goal, but, for
the moment, we have a mixed relationship of cooperation, competition,
and neglect, depending on the specific issue. There is nothing unusual
or wrong with this. This is the type of relations we enjoy with most
countries around the world. We need to say this publicly.
In line with the real nature of our relations, we should make clear
in our public pronouncements and private conversations that the
intensity of our engagement with Russia will vary from issue to issue.
On some issues, such as the strategic nuclear balance and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, Russia will be the central focus of our
policy. On others, such as European security, it will be one among a
number of key players, but not necessarily the most important. On still
others, such as security in East Asia, it will play a lesser role. On a
range of global economic matters, it will be a secondary consideration
at best. We also need to make clear that the continuation of Russia's
brutal war in Chechnya will put strict limits on how far relations can
improve.
In addition, as we seek to reengage with Russia, we need to
appreciate Russia's limited capacity to engage, both material and
psychological. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States
set realistic goals that take into account Russia's dwindling resources
and focus on issues where Russia remains relevant. That will produce
the best chances for the success that is necessary to build public
support in the United States for continued constructive engagement. On
issues of economic and domestic political development, we should resist
demanding too much of Russia, as we have in the past. We need to
appreciate the full complexity of the challenges facing Russia as it
moves away from its Soviet past and recognize that our own
understanding of the processes underway there is far from complete.
Instead of pressing programs on Russians, we should let them take the
initiative, while underscoring our readiness to help if the programs
and policies they adopt make political and economic sense.
Finally, in engaging Russia, we should remain a respectful distance
from the Russian leadership, in sharp contrast to the Clinton
Administration's approach with Yeltsin. Intense relations will only
warp our perceptions of developments in Russia, in particular by
blinding us to the downsides, as happened with the Administration's
embrace of Yeltsin. At the same time, we need to build a broader
network of contacts, in Moscow and in the regions, both to obtain a
fuller and more balanced picture of the situation in Russia and to help
rebuild the reservoir of goodwill that has been drained over the last
seven years.
Such engagement might lack the high drama of the past few years,
and it might sound pedestrian to some. But only by lowering our
expectations, by understanding where our interests overlap and conflict
with Russia's, and by acknowledging the limits on our ability to
cooperate, in short, only through greater realism, can we hope to put
back on track relations with a country that will continue to be vital
to our own security and well-being well into the future.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Dr. McFaul, I think we will go to you next and then to
questions.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. MC FAUL, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. McFaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting
me here today.
I have a longer statement which I have submitted to the
committee and I am just going to summarize my remarks by
answering three questions: First, why did Putin win? Second,
what does it mean for Russian democracy? And third, what does
it mean for the United States?
First, why did Putin win? Obviously, the jump start for his
electoral success was his actions regarding the war in
Chechnya. There is no question about it that the rise of Mr.
Putin in popularity coincides and correlates very directly in
the fall of 1999 with his actions in Chechnya.
However, there are two caveats to this argument and I think
it is important for us to realize this. First, when you look at
the opinion polls--and I conducted opinion polls that I myself
commissioned, and wrote; these are not done by other agencies--
there are two very striking things. They were responding to the
feeling of insecurity in Russia and not necessarily responding
to the imperial design of Russia in Chechnya.
In fact, in our polls in December of 2,000 Putin
supporters, that is those who plan to support Mr. Putin in the
Presidential election, 32 percent said we should support the
inclusion of Chechnya into Russia at whatever cost, but 28
percent of Putin supporters, not Russians in general, said we
should let Chechnya be a free and independent state.
That is a very striking conclusion in terms of what we
traditionally think about who Mr. Putin is. I think therefore
you have to look beyond the question of Chechnya to answer the
question of why did Putin win.
The second factor is what I would call an optimistic vote
for the future. This is very clear in the studies we have done
both in the focus groups and opinion polls. That is, everybody
saw in Mr. Putin something they wanted. So in the laundry list,
for instance the day before the election, sitting listening to
18 to 35 year olds in Moscow say, why are you planning to vote
for Putin, they listed everything from his conduct of the war
in Chechnya, somebody else argued that I am voting for Mr.
Putin because I want him to eliminate all people of non-Russian
ethnicity from Moscow--that was a statement by a guy that
looked like he should be on MTV, by the way; a very frightening
thought in my opinion.
But then a third a young woman said: I support Mr. Putin
because I want my grandmother to have a higher pension. A
fourth young lady said: I support Mr. Putin because I want
increased spending for education. The list could go on.
That is, this is a vote for the future and, precisely
because Putin did not lay down his set of policies--and if I
were running his campaign I would have recommended the same--
everybody could see in this candidate what they wanted to see.
It was a vote for the future, not for the past. In particular,
his youth was very important to his supporters in determining
whether they should support him or not.
A third factor, often forgotten in our analysis here was
the incredibly weak opposition that Mr. Putin faced in this
election. We oftentimes forget this, but I think when the
historians write the story of Russian politics in the 1990's
they will not focus on the brilliance of the Kremlin, they will
focus on the ineptitude of the opposition, and first and
foremost the Communist Party.
A fourth factor was the early vote. Mr. Putin owes Mr.
Yeltsin a lot by having pushed up the electoral calendar to
March instead of June, because Mr. Putin fell from 55 million
people--now I am quoting their own campaign headquarters
numbers--who were going to support him in January to 40 million
in March. Think about that. I am looking at two men who have
run for office many a time. Imagine losing 15 million
supporters in 3 months. Had that election happened in June we
might have seen a very different kind of outcome.
That leads me to the final non-factor, which was the
campaign. Much has been made of the television control from Mr.
Putin, the fact that he won because of that. That was part of
it, but I would just remind you that in controlling the state
television during that period he managed to lose 15 million
voters in 3 months. Not much of a campaign in my estimation.
Likewise, Mr. Yavlinsky, a man I know and admire and
believe ran a brilliant campaign this time, and by the way who
spent millions of dollars in this campaign, violating their own
campaign laws, had no restrictions this time for the first time
ever in running, managed not to get beyond his traditional core
electorate of about 6 percent. And Zyuganov, who spent no money
on television, managed to do 4 percentage points better in a 3-
month period.
So I think it is a very complicated situation looking at
why Mr. Putin won, and not just the war in Chechnya. This
election was about, in my opinion, the end of the Russian
revolution of the 1990's and a vote for something new and
different, and Mr. Putin, everybody can see that in him.
What does this election mean for democracy? I think it is
one step forward and two steps backward. There is no doubt
about it that this was not an even playing field. There is no
doubt about it that parties did not play the role that they
should in consolidated democracies in forming and structuring
the vote. It troubles me that Mr. Putin became popular because
of this anti-democratic action in Chechnya.
The fact that he comes from the KGB also troubles me. I
have spent a good 15 years of my life defending and helping
people who are trying to escape the control of the KGB, and
even at times during the 1990's I myself have been hassled by
that organization. So it is hard for me to look at somebody
from their ranks becoming President of Russia and think that
this is a good sign for democracy.
Finally, as I have written before, there is no doubt about
it--and here I agree with my colleague Tom Graham--that Mr.
Putin has not demonstrated that he is committed to democracy.
On the contrary, he has demonstrated that he is indifferent to
democracy. I would just remind you of the list. Look at what he
has done in Chechnya, look at how he treated Mr. Babitsky and
his attitude toward the press in general. Look at the
statements they have floated regarding changing the electoral
law in a way that would be anti-party in my opinion. He has
floated the idea of appointing Governors rather than electing
them and has even talked about extending the Presidential term.
Now, any one of those initiatives in and of itself would
not be a step backward for democracy, but combined I think they
demonstrate that democracy is something that when it is
convenient he will abide by it. I think personally, having met
him in the early nineties, he is too modern of a guy to want to
go back to some kind of authoritarian regime. He kind of knows
in his heart that democracy is part of being modern. And yet he
has other priorities, state-building and market reform, that he
thinks are more important, and therefore he is willing to
sacrifice democratic practices in the name of these other
agenda items.
But democracy in all countries is not made just by one man
at the top or cannot be determined the trajectory of that
democracy just by one vote. I think it is premature to suggest
today, as many in this town now do, that Russia is not a
democracy. On the contrary, I think we have to ask the
question, well, compared to what?
Let me remind you, the elections were held according to the
constitution. Let me remind you that two-thirds of the
electorate showed up. Let me also emphasize here, this is a
very sophisticated electorate, a very literate society. Our
opinion polls and focus groups show quite strikingly, in my
opinion, that they knew what they were doing. They were not
just lambs being led to vote because that is the way they do
it. No, they made a decision to go vote.
Now, compared to the United States, compared to Poland
today, compared even to the early 1990's, Russia is not a
democracy and the trajectory is in the wrong direction. But it
would be wrong, I think, to argue that there are not democrats,
democratic institutions, and people that espouse democratic
values in Russia today.
In other words, one of the things that I think is dangerous
is to say there is no democracy in Russia, therefore there is
nothing left to preserve or fight for. I think that would be a
premature decision made in the midst of Russia's tumultuous
transition, and we simply cannot do it today.
First, elections are still consequential. If you do not
believe that, I would advise you to invite the four Governors
who lost last December and the dozens of Duma deputies that
lost their seats and ask them what they think about elections.
It was pretty consequential for their careers. Incumbency rates
are much higher in the United States and the U.S. Senate than
it is in the State Duma today. Elections for those losers are
very consequential.
Second, parties still exist. They are weak, but they are
there and they need to be supported.
Third, there are tens of thousands of non-governmental
organizations. They are still there. They are weaker than they
were 5 years ago, but they are still there and they are
fighting.
Fourth, there is still independent media in Russia, again
weaker than they were 2 years ago but still fighting.
Fifth, the most important thing I believe is the people of
Russia. When asked point blank, do you think we should elect
your leaders or have them appointed, two-thirds say they should
be elected. When asked, do you think there should be one person
on the ballot or two, 80 percent said that there should be two
people on the ballot. That is, I think there is something worth
fighting for in terms of Russian democracy.
So finally, my third question, what does this mean for U.S.
policy? I think we are heading to very difficult waters, quite
frankly, because Putin is going to send us very mixed signals.
I think he is going to be very positive on the economic side.
To answer your question earlier, Senator Lugar, he has hired
the best and the brightest. He has the Chicago School guys
there. They are writing very pretty words. Words do not
necessarily translate into policy, and maybe during questions
we can talk about that, but in terms of the people he is
leaning on for advice, they are in my opinion the right people.
So I think we are going to see positive signs on that front.
Second--we have already seen it--we are going to see
positive signs on the arms control front and in general a kind
of pragmatic approach to Western relations, not the emotional,
erratic approach that we had with Mr. Yeltsin, the kind of love
affair we had with him where sort of one day we are on, one day
we are off. This is going to be a much more businesslike
relationship with Mr. Putin.
But third, we are going to see negative signs on democracy.
Therefore the question before you and before U.S. policymakers
in general is going to be how to--and here I totally agree with
Dr. Brzezinski--have a discriminating policy, to react
positively on the economic side and the arms control side and
negatively when we see steps that are going away from
democracy.
Now, some think we should just take that trade. Some think
we spent way too much time focusing on domestic politics in
Russia; it was misguided, it was naive, it is none of our
business, and it worsened the U.S.-Russian relationship,
negative attitudes in Russia are a result of our democracy and
economic assistance.
I emphatically disagree with that approach to international
relations and U.S. policy toward Russia in general. In fact, I
would like to go back to the Reagan years and remind you of
what Ronald Reagan said about U.S.-Soviet relations, because I
think much of what he said and outlined as a strategy, is still
relevant today. Because I do not believe that the state in
Russia has made its transition to democracy fully, we therefore
need to have state to state relations, but we also, as
President Reagan said, need to continue to engage Russian
society and to promote the development of human rights and
democracy in that country.
Let me remind you that every time President Reagan went to
Russia he met with the leaders of the Soviet Union, but he also
met with the human rights activists fighting for democracy. I
think that needs to be our approach today. After all, the cold
war did not end because of some brilliant arms control
negotiators in Geneva finding a new solution to help end the
cold war. The cold war ended because of regime change within
the Soviet Union, and the cold war will begin again if the
regime change goes in the opposite direction.
So I think this makes it very clear, what we need to do. We
need to react positively to economic reform issues and be in a
reactive mode, not a prescribing mode, at this point. They know
what they need to do on the economic side.
But on democracy I think we need to be proactive. We need
to be supporting Russian democrats, not withdrawing the
support, as you have been doing in terms of our assistance
program toward Russia in the last few years. This means
standing by democrats in Russia symbolically. It means standing
by these democratic organizations, both before the Senate when
there are summits to say that we recognize these people as an
integral part of our relationship with Russia--and to answer
your question, Mr. Chairman, whether we should listen to Mr.
Putin or to Mr. Kovalyov, my instincts are with Mr. Kovalyov,
not with Mr. Putin.
We need to raise awareness of abuses, as you have done over
the years. I think we need to do much more of that, both anti-
semitism, on Chechnya, and in a whole wide range of other
issues. We need to increase our democratic assistance, not
decrease it.
Here let me be very clear about what I mean. No money to
the Russian state. The Russian state does not need our money.
The Russian state has plenty of money today. It means small
amounts of money to Russians, not Russia. We need to start
being more discriminating about that and reach out to societal
groups that are seeking to check the power of the Russian state
and not deal so much with the state any more.
Here I think this means small assistance, not big
assistance, and first and foremost I think it means education,
increase all of our educational programs, all of our exchange
programs. I teach at Stanford University. I have several
students from Russia and other Newly Independent States, and I
can tell you 4 years of education at Stanford has radically
changed the way they think about Russia. I think we need to do
much, much more on that front.
Finally, I just want to say one last thing. There are still
democrats in Russia, with a small ``d'', not a big ``D'',
fighting to make it a better place. They believe truly--I have
just come back from Russia 2 weeks ago--that they believe that
we are abandoning them now. They think on the one hand we want
arms control and so we do not care about democracy any more.
They think that the ``who lost Russia'' debate has now taken
over, so they are getting flushed away, if you will, with all
the other things that I think rightly should be changed.
I think we have to refocus our attention on these people.
As long as there is one democrat in Russia still standing,
still fighting to make Russia a more democratic place, I think
we should be standing next to them.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McFaul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael A. McFaul
``RUSSIA'S 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIAN
DEMOCRACY AND U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS''
In all democracies around the world, national elections generate
important data about the condition of the political system and the
concerns, hopes, and beliefs of society. In new democracies such as
Russia, national elections are even more important as they provide
crucial measures of democratic consolidation or the lack thereof.
Russia's latest presidential election, completed on March 26, 2000,
represented one step forward and two steps backward for Russian
democracy. For the first time in Russia's history, power within the
Kremlin changed hands through an electoral process. The election did
occur and was conducted as prescribed by the constitution. More than
two-thirds of the eligible voters participated, and they appeared to
make informed choices between a range of candidates who offered
alternative platforms, policies, and leadership styles. The differences
between presidential candidates Vladimir Putin, Gennady Zyuganov, and
Grigory Yavlinsky, were real and the Russian voter--judging by my own
research using polls and focus groups--appeared to know the difference.
\1\ At the same time, this election did not occur on a level playing
field. Vladimir Putin enjoyed tremendous resources advantages that
tainted the process. Although weak in some arenas, the Russian state
still enjoys too much power regarding the electoral process, while
societal organizations--political parties, civic organizations, trade
unions, and independent business groups--remain too weak to shape the
outcomes of elections.
Does this recent election represent a fundamental turn away from
democratic practices or a temporary setback for democratic
consolidation in Russia? It is too early to tell. However, prematurely
answering this question in either the affirmative or the negative will
most certainly generate distortions of analysis and bad policy. Putin
may turn out to be Russia's Milosevic. He may develop into a weak
leader presiding over a feudal order, dominated by oligarchs and
regional barons, in which the people have little say. But he may also
lead Russia out of its chaotic, revolutionary, and anarchic recent past
and into a more stable decade of economic growth and political
stability. So far, he has provided mixed signals on which direction he
wants to take Russia.
During this uncertain time in Russia, the task before U.S. foreign
policymakers is to remain true to our principles and defend our
national security interests which, in my opinion, includes the
development of democracy in Russia. Unfortunately, this will be a
difficult task in the next few years since Russian leaders will
continue to send mixed signals. To fully embrace Putin is foolhardy. To
fully reject the new president of Russia is equally shortsighted. U.S.
foreign policymakers must be prepared to respond to positive steps
initiated from the Kremlin but also react against negative developments
as they occur.
To demonstrate why Russian democracy is alive but not well and then
outline U.S. policy recommendations for addressing this situation
within Russia, this testimony proceeds in four parts. Section one
explains why Putin won. Section two suggests what Putin's electoral
victory might mean for Russian policy. Section three discusses the
implications of this recent electoral cycle for Russian democracy.
Section four outlines a set of policy prescriptions for the United
States that follow from the analysis of the first three sections of
this testimony.
I. WHY PUTIN WON
The first step in coming to grips with a post-Yeltsin Russia is to
understand why Putin won the March 2000 presidential election. The
election reveals much about the evolution of Russia's political system
and the mood of Russian society.
The simple story for why Putin won is the following. Putin was
chosen by Yeltsin and his band of oligarchs as a loyal successor, who
would (1) keep them out of jail, and (2) preserve the basic system of
oligarchic capitalism, in which oligarchs make money not by producing
goods and services sold for a profit in the market, but by stealing
from the state. To get him elected, they had to provoke a war with
Chechnya as a way to boost Putin's popularity. Some assert that this
cabal even blew up apartment buildings in Moscow and elsewhere last
fall, and murdered innocent Russian citizens as a way to bolster
support for the war and Putin. The ``popular'' war, however, could only
sustain Putin for so long. Therefore, Yeltsin resigned on December 31,
1999 to allow the presidential election to happen in March instead of
June. As acting president, Putin had at his disposal all the resources
of the Russian state, which he wielded convincingly to run away with
election victory.
There is much truth to this simple account. Yet, to know the rest
of the story, one has to question the genius of the Kremlin and the
stupidity of the Chechens as well as bring others actors into the
analysis, including first and foremost the voters and the other
presidential candidates.
The Chechen War
Why do we always think that the people in the Kremlin are so smart
and everyone else in Russia is so dumb? In the summer of 1999, no one
believed that a quick little war with the Chechens would be the formula
to deliver electoral success the following year. On the contrary, when
Yeltsin ordered the Russian military to respond to the Chechen
incursion into Dagestan in August 1999, most electoral analysts in
Russia thought that the counter offensive would result in another
unpopular military debacle. If the entire event was staged to assist
Putin's electoral prospects, then Shamil Basaev--the Chechen commander
who lead the military intervention in Dagestan to free the people of
Dagestan from Russian imperialism--must either be a traitor or a fool.
Basaev, it should be remembered, is the same Chechen commander who
managed to seize a Russian hospital in southern Russia in the August
1995, killed hundreds of Russians citizens, and then escaped. His
record in the field suggests that he is neither a traitor nor a fool.
However, he did overestimate the anti-imperial sentiment in
Dagestan and underestimate the resolve of the Russian state to respond.
As Prime Minister and with the blessing of Boris Yeltsin, Putin acted
decisively. Everyone who has discussed the Chechen war with Putin
personally will tell you that Russia's new president expresses real
passion about his resolve ``destroy the Chechen terrorists.'' For the
first time since 1941, a military force invaded Russia last summer. To
argue that the Russian military response to this incursion was
motivated solely by electoral calculations, therefore, is inaccurate.
Any responsible leader of any country would have responded in a similar
way. Terrorist attacks on apartments buildings in Moscow and elsewhere
shortly after the invasion heightened the feeling of a nation under
siege within the Russian population. \2\ Society demanded a response
from its leaders and Putin responded.
What was different about this particular response was its
``success'' or appearance of success. In the first Chechen war, Russian
forces appeared to be losing the war right away, in part because they
performed so miserably and in part because the rational for the war was
not embraced by either the Russian army or the population as a whole.
An independent media, lead by the national television network NTV,
reported on military setbacks and continued to question the purposes of
the war. After several months of fighting, a solid majority in Russia
did not support the war. Compelled by electoral concerns, Yeltsin
called for a cease-fire in April 1996 and then allowed his envoy,
Aleksandr Lebed, to broker a temporary settlement with the Chechen
government. The second war started under very different circumstances.
First, the Russian military and the Russian people believed that the
rationale for the war was self-defense. A majority of Russian citizens
supported the counter offensive from the very beginning and have
continued to support the invasion of Chechnya throughout the military
campaign. Second, the Russian army used different tactics in this
campaign relying on air power to a much greater extent than the first
war. The complete demolition of Grozny is the gruesome result of this
change in tactics. Third, the media coverage of the war within Russia
has been much less critical of both the military tactics and the
political rational. Over time, NTV has become more critical of the war
aims and the means deployed, but only lately and not nearly to the same
degree as in the last war. All other major media outlets firmly support
the Kremlin's position.
Consequently, this second Chechen war has been a popular war in
Russia. Public support has remained steady at roughly 60 percent
throughout the war and has not wavered, as many predicted, when Russian
casualties increased. Without question, this popular support for the
war translated into positive ratings for Putin as a political leader.
Opinion polls conducted in the fall of 1999 demonstrated that people
were most obliged to Putin for accepting responsibility for the
security of the Russian people. He looked like a leader at the top who
was taking charge during an uncertain, insecure time and then delivered
on his promise to provide stability and security. By the end of 1999,
he enjoyed an astonishing 72 percent approval rating. \3\
A Vote for the Future, not the Past
Putin's decisive response to the sense of insecurity that prevailed
in Russia in the fall is the reason why he initially rose in the poils.
However, Putin's policy in Chechnya is not the only reason why Putin
maintained a positive approval rating throughout the spring of this
year. In fact, our polls of Russian voters in December 1999-January
2000 showed that 28 percent of those planning to vote for Putin
believed that Chechnya should be allowed to leave the Russian
Federation, while roughly the same number of his supporters--35
percent--believed that Russia should keep Chechnya at all costs. This
distribution of opinions roughly reflects the distribution of opinions
on this question among all Russians. \4\ Therefore, Putin's execution
of the Chechen war is not the only reason why Russian voters supported
him. Other factors--more psychological than material in nature--also
came into play.
First, Putin symbolized for voters the end of revolution. For the
first several years of the last decade, Russian politics were polarized
by the struggle between communists and anti-communists. Unlike the more
successful transitions from communist rule in Poland or Hungary, the
debate about communism as a political and economic system continued in
Russia for many years after the Soviet collapse. A period of volatile
and unpredictable politics resulted. In his last years of power,
Yeltsin further fueled political instability by constantly changing
prime ministers. Putin's coming to power signaled for many an end to
this volatile period--the Thermidor of Russia's current revolution. His
youth and energy also punctuated the end of an old and sick ruler at
the top. The voters welcomed this generational change. In focus groups
that I commissioned in December 1999 and March 2000, Russian voters
uniformly stated that Putin's youth was a positive attribute.
Second, Putin's lack of a record as a public leader allowed voters
to believe anything they wanted about him. In focus groups that I
commissioned on the eve of the March 2000, participants generated a
long and diverse list of expectations they had about Russia's future
under Putin's leadership. The list included everything from order in
Chechnya, respect for Russia on the international stage, and a
crackdown on crime to higher pensions, a better educational system, and
more job opportunities for young people. In other words, supporters
were casting their votes for Putin as a future leader, and were not
supporting him for his past achievements, his ideological beliefs, or
his policy positions. Putin and his campaign managers understood this
mood in the Russian electorate and therefore deliberately refrained
from articulating a program or set of policies before the election. To
do so would have alienated a part of Putin's rather eclectic electoral
base.
This electoral motivation is radically different than what we
witnessed among supporters of Yeltsin in 1996. In that election, voters
knew exactly what they were getting with Yeltsin and had no illusions
about a more promising future. Yeltsin won 54 percent of the vote in
the second round of the 1996 election even though his approval rating
was 29 percent at the time. In 1996, people were voting against
communism, supporting the lesser of two evils. In 2000, Putin
supporters have a much more positive assessment of their leaders and
are much more optimistic about the future. They were more motivated by
this emotional feeling about the future and less motivated by
individual material interests, ideological beliefs, or party
identification. For instance, when asked in a January 2000 poll, about
their attitudes about Russia's political future, 41 percent of
respondents believed that the new year would be an improvement over the
last year, while only 9 percent believed that the political situation
would worsen. Likewise, regarding the economic situation in the
country, 39 percent believed that the economy would improve in 2000
while only 12 percent believed that the economy would worsen. \5\ The
last time that Russians were so optimistic about the future was the
fall of 1991.
Strikingly, Putin's support was national in scope and not
influenced by age or even income level. He did just as well in rural
areas as urban areas and won as many votes from poor as he captured
from the rich. Amazingly, he won the most votes in 84 out of 89
regions. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, his chief opponent, won in
only 4 regions, while Aman Tuleev received the highest number of votes
in the region where he is governor, Kemerovo Oblast. In contrast,
Zyuganov placed first in 25 regions in the second round of the 1996
presidential vote.
The Absence of an Effective Opposition
In addition to Chechnya and this psychological yearning for a
better future within the Russian electorate, a third important reason
why Putin won was the weak competition he faced. Often forgotten in
analyses of Russian politics, the real story of the 1990s is not how
clever the Kremlin has been, but how ineffective the opponents of the
Kremlin have performed. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(CPRF) has continued to dominate the space of opposition parties in
Russian electoral politics and yet this party has not generated new
leaders or a new image. The contrast between the modern, Western-
oriented, and young leader of the left in Poland, Mr. Kwasniewski, and
the traditional, anti-Western, and old leader of the left in Russia,
Mr. Zyuganov, could not be more striking.
Years ago, well before we had even heard of Vladimir Putin, all
experts on Russian electoral dynamics knew that whoever emerged as the
candidate of the ``party of power'' would win the 2000 election. The
reasoning is simple when one remembers the solid and consistent
electorate support for Zyuganov and Russia's two-ballot electoral
system. Gennady Zyuganov, the head of the CPRF, was assured a second
place showing and possibly a first place showing in the first round no
matter who ran against him in this presidential election. His voters
have consistently supported him and his party for the last decade.
There was no reason to believe that they would not support him in this
election. At the same time, polls also have showed for years that
Zyuganov would lose to almost everyone in a run-off. The only
presidential contender he could beat was Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
Consequently, Putin and his associates were eager to see Zyuganov and
the CPRF do well in the parliamentary vote to insure that he would
participate in the presidential election.
We also knew that Grigory Yavlinsky, the head of the liberal
opposition in Russia and the party head of Yabloko, would run for
president in 2000. Yet, no serious analyst ever believed that Yavlinsky
stood a chance of getting into a second round. Like Zyuganov, Yavlinsky
also has his loyal electorate, but his core of supporters has never
exceeded more than 5 percent of the voting electorate.
The only real question, then, was who would emerge from the so-
called party of power. Two years ago, Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov looked
poised to assume this mantle. Then last year, former prime minister
Yevgeny Primakov emerged as a more likely candidate, especially after
the extremely unpopular Boris Yeltsin fired him as prime minister.
Primakov's popularity soared and many regional leaders and part of the
Moscow elite rallied to his cause. As a symbol of stability in a time
of uncertainty, Primakov skyrocketed in the polls. Having navigated
Russia out of a financial crisis that began in August 1998, Primakov
earned a reputation as a pragmatist who would chart a slow,
``centrist'' reform course somewhere between radical reform and
communist restoration. He originally joined the Fatherland-All Russia
electoral bloc as a means to jump-start his presidential bid and as a
strategy for building parliamentary support for his presidency.
These plans proved premature. In fact, Primakov's participation in
the parliamentary election exacted real damage to his prospects as a
presidential candidate. During the fall campaign, the Kremlin's media
empire launched a full-scale negative campaign against Primakov and his
bloc. With varying degrees of truth and evidence, the Kremlin's media
accused the former prime minister of being a feeble invalid, a lackey
of NATO, a Chechen sympathiser, a closet communist, and a destabilizing
force in international affairs who had ordered the assassination
attempt against Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze. This smear
campaign, in combination with Putin's spectacular rise in popularity,
helped to undermine popular support for Fatherland-All Russia. They won
only 12 percent of the popular vote, while the Putin-endorsed Unity
bloc won 24 percent.
In effect, the parliamentary vote served as a presidential primary
for the party of power. Primakov lost this primary and pulled out of
the presidential race.
With Primakov out of the race, there was never any question that
Putin would win the presidential election. The only real question was
whether Putin could win more than 50 percent the first round and avoid
a run-off He did, capturing 52.9 percent of the vote in the first round
compared to Zyuganov's 29.2 percent.
The Early Election
The final critical factor to Putin's electoral success was the
early date of the election. By resigning on December 31, 1999 and
thereby moving the electoral calendar forward three months, Yeltsin
delivered to Putin the most important campaign present of all.
According to Putin's own advisors, his popularity peaked in mid-January
when 55 million eligible voters were prepared to vote for him. On
election day on March 26, 2000, only forty million voters cast their
ballot for the acting president. In other words, Putin lost the support
of five million voters every month between January and March. Putin
campaign strategy of no campaign was only viable in a short-campaign
season. If the vote had occurred in June, Putin most certainly would
have faced a run-off.
The Insignfficance of the Campaign Itself
This rapid decline in support suggests that the tremendous
television coverage that Putin received during this period as acting
president did not bolster his electoral prospects. Nor, however, did
Yavlinsky's massive media campaign increase his electoral support. At
the same time, Zyuganov devoted very few resources to television and
yet managed to capture thirty percent of the electorate. In other
words, there appeared to be little correlation between money and
television time on the one hand and electoral performance on the other.
Winners and Losers
Putin was the obvious winner of this election. As in all
presidential systems, he will now serve for a fixed four-year term. The
ebbs and flows of his popular approval rating will matter very little
for the next three years. The fact that he won by only a few percentage
points also will fade in importance over time.
Putin's small margin of victory, however, does have a few immediate
implications as well as other more intangible psychological effects.
Because Putin just squeaked by in the first round, he and his team are
much less likely to dissolve the Duma and call for new parliamentary
elections anytime soon. In the wake of the strong showing for the pro-
Putin Unity bloc in the December 1999 vote and Putin's skyrocketing
support earlier in the year, some of his allies, including the new
leaders of the Unity bloc, had called for new elections for the Duma
immediately after the presidential vote. They believed that Unity could
win an even larger share of the parliamentary seats after Putin's
election. Now, however, such a move is unlikely since most now believe
that a new parliamentary vote would yield basically the same result as
last December. This is a positive outcome, which will result in stable
executive-legislative relations for the foreseeable future.
Putin's small margin of victory is also likely to make him more
cautious in taking steps against those who helped him win. Before the
election, for instance, Putin's advisors spoke brashly about removing
``difficult'' governors from office. With this smaller mandate, Putin
is now less likely to move aggressively against regional leaders. He
must tread especially lightly in those places where regional leaders
probably falsified the results to help push Putin over the 50 percent
threshold. If Putin strikes out against these regional leaders, they
might be tempted to expose their falsification efforts, which in turn
could call into question the legitimacy of the election results more
generally. For the same reasons, Putin might now be more cautious about
taking actions against the oligarchs, especially those that helped him
win. He is also less likely to pursue constitutional amendments such as
extending the presidential term to seven years. More generally, Putin
does not start his first elected term with the same momentum that he
would have had with a more decisive victory.
Gennady Zyuganov and the CPRF must be satisfied with their
performance in the first round, even if they were unable to force a
second round. Citing the results of their own parallel vote count, CPRF
officials claim that the result were falsified and that Putin did not
win 50 percent in the first round. \6\ However, they have not pursued
this issue vigorously. Many believe that they are not pursuing a court
investigation of the election results because Zyuganov believes that
the CPRF can cooperate with Putin in forming a coalition government.
Communist leaders assert that Zyuganov's showing gives them a mandate
to participate in the new government. On election night, Putin made
very conciliatory comments about Zyuganov and the communists,
reflecting that their strong showing demonstrates that many Russian
citizens are dissatisfied with the status quo. Boris Yeltsin would have
never made such a comment on election night.
Putin, however, is not likely to include communists in major
positions in his new government. He understands the importance of
creating an ideologically unified team. At the same time, he is likely
to continue to consult and cooperate with the communists on a whole
range of issues where they hold similar positions. And this list is
long, and includes continuing the war in Chechnya, greater support for
the military industrial complex and intelligence services, and the
building of a stronger state. More generally, Putin is much more of a
nationalist than Yeltsin and therefore shares the worldview of many
prominent CPRF leaders.
For Zyuganov personally, his strong showing--five points above what
the CPRF won just three months earlier in the parliamentary vote--
insures that he will remain the leader of the CPRF for the foreseeable
future. The Kremlin had backed Aman Tuleev, hoping that the popular
Siberian governor might win a large portion of the communist and
protest vote and therefore weaken the lock of the CPRF on this part of
the electorate. Outside of Kemerovo, however, support for Tuleev was
minimal.
Russia's liberals suffered a major setback in this presidential
election. The Union of Right Forces (SPS)--a coalition of liberals
headed by former prime ministers Sergei Kiryenko and Yegor Gaidar,
former deputy prime ministers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, and a
handful of other prominent figures such as Samara governor Konstantin
Titov and businesswomen Irma Kakamada--emerge from the December 1999
parliamentary vote with real momentum. To the surprise of everyone,
they placed fourth in this election, winning 8.5 percent of the popular
vote. Importantly, they surpassed the total of their rival, Yabloko, by
new more than two percentage points. For many, their smashing electoral
victory marked the rebirth of Russian liberalism. However, they then
squandered this momentum by demonstrating indecision in the
presidential election. SPS failed to endorse a presidential candidate,
even though one of its founding members, Governor Titov, was on the
ballot. Some, such as Kiryenko and Chubais, backed Putin while others
wavered. In the end, SPS had no impact on the presidential vote.
Yavlinsky, however, fared no better. In this presidential vote,
Yavlinsky was flush with money. Without question, he spent more on his
campaign than any other candidate. \7\ He also enjoyed access to all
major television networks. He did endure some slanderous attacks from
ORT, the largest television network, only days before the vote. \8\
But, few experts believed that these attacks had any effect. By most
expert accounts (including my own), Yavlinsky also ran a very
professional campaign, his best performance to date. And yet, despite
an excellent and well-funded campaign, marginal harassment form the
state authorities, and no real competitors for the liberal vote,
Yavlinsky won only 5.8 percent of the vote, well below his 7.4 percent
showing in 1996 showing and only a fraction above what his party
garnered in the December 1999 parliamentary vote. This result was a
major defeat for Yavlinsky personally and for Russian liberals as a
whole.
This election was also a setback for nationalist leaders and
parties independent of the Kremlin. Zhirinovsky fared very poorly,
winning a paltry 2.7 percent, and all the other nationalist hopefuls
did not win more than one percent of the vote. This outcome is very
different from 1996, when General Alexander Lebed won a strong double-
digit third place showing, which then allowed him to play a critical
endorsement role for Yeltsin in the second round.
In several respects, this first round of the 2000 vote resembled
the second round of the 1996 vote. Third party candidates played a much
smaller role in this last election. The biggest losers in this election
were liberal and nationalist parties whose candidates performed so
poorly that one has to wonder if they will be able to survive as
political movements in Russia in the future.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIAN POLICY
Because Putin ran an issue-free presidential campaign, we know very
little about what he intends to do as president. Putin himself probably
is still forming views on the thousands of issues that he must now
address. This is not a man who spent decades preparing to become
president. The first time he ran for political office, after all, was
last month! At the same time, we do have some clues regarding his
priorities.
We know that Putin is committed to preserving Russia's territorial
integrity. For years, many in the West have written about the
fragmentation of power within the Russian Federation, the weakness of
the center, and the possible disintegration of the Russian state
altogether. These threats have been greatly exaggerated. Chechnya's
desire for independence from Russia is the exception, not the rule,
among Russia's other republics. No other republic or oblast has ever
made a credible threat to leave the federation. Under Putin, we will
witness attempts to strengthen the center's control over the regions.
Regarding economic reform, Putin's initial signals have been clear
and positive. Putin has invited a young team of economists many of whom
formerly worked for former prime minister Yegor Gaidar to draft a
comprehensive reform program. \9\ The new program covers all the right
subjects, including tax reform, deregulation, social policy
restructuring, and new bankruptcy procedures. Words are just words. It
remains to be seen if Putin has the will and the political skill to
execute these plans. \10\ At this early stage, however, there is little
doubt among those liberal economists currently working for him that he
intends to pursue radical market reforms.
Regarding foreign policy, Putin's initial signals have been less
clear, but still mostly positive. He does not speak fondly of multi-
polarity or use in the tired language of balance of power politics.
Instead, he wants to make Russia a normal, Western power. His
international heroes come not from the East or the South, but the West.
\11\ In his short time in office, he has devoted particular attention
to England. He appears to want to give a greater focus to Europe and
place less emphasis on Russia's relations with the United States. Yet,
even with the United States, Putin appears ready to cooperate on key
issues such as Start II ratification, Start III negotiations, and
modification of the ABM treaty. At the same time, Putin has emphasized
the need to expand Russian arms exports, a new initiative that could
include the transfer of nuclear technologies to countries such as Iran.
The area in which Putin's views are most murky concerns democracy.
Putin does not aspire to become a dictator. In words, he had pledged
his loyalty to the constitution and has not supported (yet) calls for
the creation of new authoritarian regime like Pinochet in Chile as a
means for jumpstarting market reform. \12\ Yet, he is also not a
passionate defender of democracy. In his first several months in
office, Putin has demonstrated that he is willing to use the power of
the state and ignore the democratic rights of society in the pursuit of
his objectives. For Putin, the ends justify the means.
In the realm of electoral politics, Putin and his allies wielded
the power of the Russian state in ways that exacted considerable damage
to democratic institutions. Putin and his allies created a party,
Unity, out of thin air in October 1999, which then won nearly a quarter
of the vote in December. State television incessantly promoted the new
party and destroyed its opponents with a barrage of negative
advertising never before seen in Russian politics. Putin then used
national television to broadcast his anti-campaign campaign for the
presidency.
More gruesome has been Putin's indifference to the human rights of
his own citizens in Chechnya. Russia has a right to defend its borders.
Yet, the atrocious violations of human rights in the cause of defending
Russia's borders reveals the low priority Putin assigns to democratic
principles.
Independent journalists and academics also have felt the power of
the Russian state under Putin. Reporters such as Andrei Babitsky from
Radio Free Europe have suffered the consequences of reporting news from
Chechnya that inconveniences the Kremlin. Commentators and columnists
critical of Putin report that many newspapers are unwilling now to
carry their articles. Self-censorship has returned to Russia.
To date, many of Putin statements of political reform also sound
anti-democratic. Putin advisers speak openly about eliminating
proportional representation from the Duma electoral law, a revision
that would practically eliminate all pro-democratic political parties
in Russia. Putin and his aides also have expressed support for the
highly anti-democratic idea of appointing rather than electing
governors. Putin has even hinted that he would like to extend the term
of the Russian president to seven years, instead of four. Individually,
none of these innovations would spell the end of democracy. In
combination, however, they could recreate a system dominated by a
single ``party of power,'' i.e., the Kremlin.
Despite all of these ominous signs, it would be wrong to conclude
that Putin is an ``anti-democrat.'' The Russian president is simply too
modern and too Western-oriented to believe in dictatorship. Rather,
Putin is indifferent to democratic principles and practices, believing
perhaps that Russia might have to sacrifice democracy in the short run
to achieve ``more important'' economic and state building goals. He
will continue to allow for an independent press, elections, and
individual liberties just as long as they do not come in conflict with
his agenda of securing Russia's borders, strengthening the Russian
state, and promoting market reform. But what happens, however, when
democracy does become inconvenient for him?
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY
The rise or fall of democracy in Russia does not depend solely on
Putin's view about democracy. If the shape of the political system in
Russia depended exclusively on Putin's preferences, then the polity
could not be considered a democracy. Many in the West and Russia now
make this assertion. It has become fashionable to assert that Russia is
not a democracy. The rise of Putin is the latest confirming evidence.
Some assert that Russia has never been a democracy. The tens of
thousands of people who took to the streets throughout Russia a decade
ago did not have any impact on the way decisions get made in Russia.
Instead, contemporary Russia is compared at best to the late Soviet
period in which a small group people at the top decide who will be
president, who will be governor, or in short, who will make all
political decisions. Others have even likened contemporary Russia to
feudal Europe, a system in which a handful of princes--now called
oligarchs and regional barons--decide all, while the peasants and serfs
decided nothing.
Such historical analogies to Russia's past, however, are
dangerously distorting. They suggest that no change in Russia has
occurred in the last decade or the last four hundred years. These
arguments imply cultural continuity in Russia; Russian leaders are
authoritarian and Russia people support them because Russians leaders
and Russian society have always supported dictatorship. This line of
argument also suggests that there is no threat to Russian democracy
today, because there is no democracy to be threatened.
To be sure, Russian democracy is weak and unconsolidated. Russia is
not a liberal democracy. Pluralist institutions of interest
intermediation are weak, mass-based interest groups are marginal, and
institutions that could help to redress this imbalance--such as
parliament, the party system, and the judiciary--lack strength and
independence. The absence of these democracy-supporting institutions
means that Russia's democracy is more fragile than a liberal democracy.
In addition, a deeper attribute of democratic stability--a normative
commitment to the democratic process by both the elite and society--is
still not apparent in Russia. Although all major political actors in
Russia recognize elections as ``the only game in town'' and behave
accordingly, anti-democratic attitudes still linger in Russian elite
circles and society as a whole. \13\ Finally, the rise of a leader with
Putin's background and the process by which he was elected are not
positive signs for democratic consolidation. No one who fought for the
destruction of the Soviet police state can be happy that a former KGB
officer has now become the president of Russia.
Yet, when assessing Russian democracy and its prospects, the real
question is compared to what? Compared to American democracy today,
Russian democracy has a long way to go. Compared to Polish democracy
today, Russian democracy is way behind. Yet, compared to other states
that emerged from the Soviet Union, Russia does appear to have made
progress in building a democratic political order. The degree of
freedom of speech in Russia towers above Uzbekistan; the consequences
of elections in Russia are much greater than in Kazakhstan. Even when
contemporary Russia is compared to its own past, be it Soviet communism
or tsarist absolutism, the current system is vastly more democratic.
Peasants did not vote, did not read independent newspapers, and did not
travel freely. Nor did Soviet citizens. Princes were not removed from
power by the ballot box as were four out of nine regional leaders and
hundreds of Duma deputies in the December 1999 election. The next time
you hear someone argue that elections in Russia do not matter, ask one
of these electoral losers if they agree. Moreover, let us not forget
that two-thirds of an extremely educated population opted to
participate in these elections of parliament and president. If
elections were meaningless, then why did these people bother to show
up?
The more interesting question is not whether Russia is a democracy
or not, but rather to ask what is the trajectory for the future.
Putin's victory and the process of that victory are not positive steps.
Yet, it would be premature to generalize about the long-term future of
Russian democracy from this one election. The same party can stay in
power for decades in established democracies. Only time will tell if
Putin's electoral is the beginning of the creation of one-party state
or just a rather accidental consequence of a popular war, hopes of the
future, and a weak opposition. At this period in Russia's history, the
Russian people actually want a leader with a strong hand who promises
to build a stronger state. Such desires are common after years of
revolutionary turmoil. Those who claim that this election was
undemocratic must demonstrate that the demos--the people--were
prevented from voting into office someone more desirable for the
majority. The demand for some other kind of candidate does not appear
to be robust, and most certainly did not constitute a majority among
Russian voters.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA
The Putin era will constitute a very difficult period for U.S.
policymakers. Putin's policies and actions will be neither all good nor
all bad. For instance, he may proceed with economic reform, cooperate
on arms control issues, but do little to crack down on corruption or
defend democratic principles. How to respond to such mixed signals will
present a major challenge to U.S. policymakers. There are no more good-
guys and bad-guys, or communists and anti-communists, but only shades
of gray in Russia today.
In developing a new strategy to deal with the Putin era--and a new
strategy is necessary--the fundamental principles of U.S. policy
towards the Soviet Union and then Russian must be remembered. For
several decades, the United States was right to oppose Soviet
imperialism, communist economics, and totalitarian politics. At
different moments during the Cold War, U.S. politicians and diplomats
argued for detente with Soviet dictators and a lack of attention on
internal maters within the Soviet Union for the sake of allegedly more
importance strategic goals such as arms control and ``stability'' in
U.S.-Soviet relations. In hindsight, we can now see that this strategy
was wrong. Clever diplomacy, greater respect for Soviet concerns, or
arms control did not end the Cold War. Rather, it was the collapse of
communism and the emergence of democracy within the Soviet Union and
then Russia that suspended the international rivalry between the United
States and the Soviet Union. It will be regime change in the opposite
direction in Russia that will rekindle the Russian threat to the United
States.
Consequently, the new refrain in Washington today about the need to
focus less on Russia's internal problems and more on state-to-state
relations is dangerous and shortsighted. U.S. policymakers must
continue to see the development of a market economy and a political
democracy in Russia as U.S. national security interests. If Russian
democracy fails and a nationalist dictatorship eventually consolidates,
we will go back to spending trillions on defense to deter this rogue
state with thousands of nuclear weapons. After all, remember why we are
about to spend billions on National Missile Defense to defend our
borders against North Korea and other rogues states. The threat from
North Korea is not only military capacity. Rather, the threat comes
from the intentions of an erratic regime not answerable to its people.
In fact, every country in the world that now threatens U.S. national
security interests is an authoritarian regime. If Russia reverts back
to dictatorship, the United States is much more likely to drift towards
confrontation with this great nation. And no one will remember who
ratified the Start II treaty or who negotiated the modifications to the
ABM treaty.
How to remain engaged in Russia's reforms, however, must be
rethought. Policies that worked in the past may not always work or be
necessary in the future.
Economic reform
Regarding economic reform, the United States should refrain from
prescribing formulas, and instead react to positive proposals
originating from Russia. A decade ago, technical assistance for
economic reform was critical and played a positive role in educating
Russia's new leader about economic principles. That era, however, is
over. Russian economists know what they must do regarding structural
reforms. If they provide a program for tackling the issues of
structural reform, then Western lending institutions such as the IMF
and World Bank should respond in accordance with the level of
commitment discerned in Moscow. Above all else, however, the IMF, the
World Bank or any other Western agency should not deliver economic
assistance based on political or strategic motivations. Rather, these
institutions should focus exclusively on what they know best, economic
reform. The converse is equally true. Sound economic assistance
programs--if truly sound--should not be held captive to the ebbs and
flows of the politics of U.S.-Russian relations. The IMF works best
when it is acting like an independent bank--i.e., like the Federal
Reserve--and works least effectively when it acts like another
political arm of the U.S. government.
In return for more autonomy over decisions of when and how much to
lend to Russia, the IMF and World Bank must make their decisionmaking
processes more transparent. Greater openness will expose IMF and World
Bank decisions to greater scrutiny, which can only improve the quality
of decisions. Equally important, greater transparency will allow more
Russians to understand and therefore engage in influencing the IMF-
Russian relationship. More information about the execution of an IMF
program should also be made available to the public as a way to help
counter corruption.
Regarding U.S. bilateral economic aid to Russia, all economic
assistance to the Russian state, including humanitarian assistance
should be cut. These programs are either unnecessary or fuel
corruption. Only programs that assist Russian society directly should
be continued. To their credit, the Clinton Administration gradually has
reoriented U.S. assistance from the Russian state to Russian society,
but a full shift in focus now needs to be completed.
Political Reform
Regarding democracy, the United States must become even more
engaged in defending and assisting those individuals and organizations
within Russia willing to fight for democratic institutions and values.
Unlike the debate about the market, the debate about democracy in
Russia is not over. As long as advocates for democracy within Russia
still remain active and engaged in this battle of Russian democracy, we
must continue to support their struggle with ideas, educational
opportunities, moral support, and technical assistance.
Because Putin wants cooperation with the West, the Clinton
Administration now has an opportunity to help the cause of Russian
democracy. Rather than shower Putin with faint praise about his
businesslike demeanor as a way to secure the Russian president's
support for arms control treaties, Clinton and his foreign policy team
need to stress that the preservation of democracy in Russia is a
precondition for cooperation. In parallel to a more constructive
engagement of Putin regarding issues of human rights, the United States
also needs to give greater support to Russian societal forces still
fighting to preserve Russian democracy.
This means empowering democratic activists in Russia through high-
level meetings with U.S. officials. President Ronald Reagan never went
to the Soviet Union to meet with Soviet leaders without holding
separate meetings with societal leaders. This practice must return.
Independent journalists, human rights activists, civic organizers,
business leaders, and trade unions officials must be engaged,
celebrated, and defended when the Russian state abuses their rights.
The Clinton Administration was right to push for greater access to
Chechnya by international agencies such as the International Red Cross.
Likewise, the move by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE) to suspend Russia's voting rights in the council should
be applauded. The West must maintain the same standards when
investigating abuses of human rights conducted by Chechen fighters.
This campaign for ending the war in Chechnya and investigating human
rights violations on all sides must be sustained and cannot be forsaken
for short-term gains in arms control negotiations.
A renewed strategy for defending Russian democracy also means
increasing, not decreasing as currently planned, assistance programs
designed to strengthen the independent media, trade unions, political
parties, civil society and the rule of law. Heroes in the struggle
against Soviet communism such as Sergei Kovalev have warned that Russia
democrats are facing their most difficult test in the coming years. Why
are we abandoning these people now? Critics say that U.S. assistance to
these agents of democratic change taint their image within Russia. I
say that we should let Russia's democrats make decisions about their
image at home. Let them decide the level of engagement they desire to
pursue with their Western counterparts.
In the political realm, all of U.S. assistance should be
transferred exclusively through non-governmental actors. This means
continuing lending to small businesses, and supporting the development
of political parties, civic organizations, business associations, and
trade unions--not state bureaucrats. This means supporting public
interest law organizations and providing seed money for a Russian Civil
Liberties Union rather than giving money to Russian law enforcement
officials. State reform in Russia will not be generated from within the
state. Rather, state institutions will reform only when there are
strong societal groups in place that can pressure them to do so.
Likewise, the comparative empirical record of the post-communist
transitions demonstrates that the best way to fight corruption is
through greater democracy--i.e., greater empowerment of society as a
control on state activities--not greater resources for state police
agencies. In fact, after a decade of post-communist transition, one of
the most surprising outcomes is the positive correlation between
democracy and economic growth. \14\
More generally, programs that increase contacts between Russians
and Americans must be expanded. America's most effective tool in
promoting markets and democracy is the example of the United States
itself. The more Russians are exposed to this model, the better. This
exposure can come from military-to-military programs, sister city
programs, or business-to-business meetings, but educational programs
especially for young Russians must be emphasized above all else. Tens
of thousands of Russian students, not dozens, should be enrolled in
American universities. Mass civic education projects within Russia,
with a focus on expanding internet access, also should be expanded.
While hundreds of business schools have sprouted throughout Russia,
there are virtually no public policy schools and only a handful of
organizations dedicated to the dissemination of materials on democracy.
Because the concept of democracy in Russia has been discredited by all
the nasty policies undertaken in its name, those seeking to resurrect
democratic ideals must be fully supported. More generally, any program
that increases the flow of information about entrepreneurial and civic
ventures throughout Russia should be encouraged. The demonstration
effect of a profitable small business in Perm will mean much more to a
future entrepreneur in Novosibirsk than an example of success from the
Silicon Valley. In providing this kind of assistance to Russian
society, organizations that provide small amounts of support to many
rather than large amounts to a few should take the lead in dispersing
American assistance in Russia.
Keeping Our Eye on the Big Picture
Ten years from now, Putin's rise to power may look like the initial
stage of authoritarian restoration in Russia and the beginning of
sustained conflict in U.S.-Russian relations. The Yeltsin-Clinton era,
despite all the setbacks, may seem like the good old days of U.S.-
Russian cooperation. If this scenario unfolds, the U.S. policy of
engagement with Russia will look in retrospect like a naive project
pursued by romantic liberals who did not understand the world in which
they lived.
It is equally plausible, however, to assume that ten years from now
our current debate about Russian dictatorship and failed U.S. policy
towards Russia will look like a premature conclusion made by an
impatient and exhausted American foreign policy community. Over the
long-term, Russia's size, natural resources, educated population, and
strategic location in Europe and Asia suggest that Russia will play a
major role in the international system. Whether Russia makes this re-
entry as a member of the intemational society of core Western states,
or as a rogue state seeking to threaten this international society
depends in large measure on the kinds of institutions that shape
economic and political activity within Russia in the years to come.
Several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is still a
chance that Russia will consolidate a market economy and a democratic
polity, and that Russia therefore will join rather than threaten the
community of democratic and capitalist states. That this window of
opportunity is still open; considering all that Russia has endured over
the last decade, is surprising.
Now, therefore, is not the time to declare Russia lost and abandon
the strategy of engagement. Though resurgent, anti-Western forces in
Russia do not enjoy a monopoly over policymaking in either domestic or
international affairs. Disagreements between Russian and American
diplomats over Iraq, Iran, or Serbia, past failures regarding aid
programs, the threat of authoritarian rule within Russia, or the
growing ill will between Russians and Americans more generally are not
arguments for abandoning engagement, but evidence for the need to
reorient and reinvigorate the policy.
NOTES
\1\ Together with Professor Timothy Colton from Harvard University,
I am midstream in a major research project on the Russian 1999
parliamentary elections and the 2000 presidential elections. This
research project includes several national surveys of voters, focus
groups conducted before and after both elections, and qualitative
analyses of all the major campaigns. The National Science Foundation,
the National Council for East and Eurasian Studies, and Mott
Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York have provided
generous financial assistance to support this research.
\2\ To this day, we still do not know who was responsible for these
terrorist attacks. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of
the Russian people believe--whether rightly or wrongly--that the
Chechens executed these attacks.
\3\ Agenstvo Regional'nykli Politcheskikh Issledovanii (ARPI),
Regional'nyi Sotsiologicheskii Monitoring, No 49 (December 10-12, 1999)
p. 39. The sample size of this survey was 3,000 respondents in 52
subjects of the Russian Federation.
\4\ More specifically, our pre-Duma election survey conducted in
late November and early December of 1600 Russian citizens asked a
general opinion question about Chechnya. Respondents were given a five-
point scale, where 1 was labeled ``Keep Chechnya at all costs'' and 5
was labeled ``Allow Chechnya to leave the Russian Federation.'' The
distribution of altitudes was: 33 percent position 1 (keep at all
costs), 12 percent position 2, 14 percent position 3, 6 percent
position 4, and 27 percent position 5 (let them leave); another 8
percent were undecided. In our post-Duma poll, conducted in late
December and early January, we asked about voting intention in the
presidential election. This is the fascinating thing. Of respondents
who intended to vote for Putin, 35 percent favored position 1 on
Chechnya (i.e., keep at all costs), 13 percent favored position 2, 12
percent favored position 3, 5 percent position 4, and 28 percent
position 5 (the most dovish position). Opinions on Chechnya among
prospective Putin voters are within a few percentage points of the
distribution of altitudes within the entire population. In other words,
61 percent of Russians in the most hawkish category on the war intended
to vote for Putin and 59 percent (the same!!) of Russians in the most
dovish category intended to vote for Putin.
\5\ Fond 11Obshchestvennoe mnenie,'' (FOM), Soobshcheniya Fonda
``Obshchestvennoe mnenie,'' No. 001 (536), January 12, 2000, p. 30.
\6\ ``Russia Communist say election results were rigged,'' Reuters,
April 4, 2000.
\7\ Of course, Putin enjoyed more time on television in his
official capacity as president, but his campaign did not produce any
television advertisements and refused to use the free national
television airtime allotted to him as a candidate. Putin also did not
participate in any presidential debates.
\8\ ORT commentators asserted that Yavlinsky and his Yabloko were
funded by German and Jewish organizations. They also showed clips of
homosexuals announcing that they planned to vote Yavlinsky and
intimated that Yavlinsky himself was gay.
\9\ Under the direction of German Gref at the Strategy Center
formed by Putin last year, this team of economists and lawyers in many
ways represents the most liberal thinkers in Russia. Initially, Gref
invited everyone to submit proposals to the Center. Over time however,
a core group of former government officials from the Gaidar government
have assumed primary responsibility for the drafting of key components
of the new economic plans. The lists of specialists includes Vladimir
Mau, Aleksei Ulukaev, Sergei Sinelnikov (all former Gaidar aides and
deputies), Oleg Vyugin, Andrei Illarionov, Mikhail Dmitriev, and their
chief mentor, Yevgenii Yasin.
\10\ Some of these liberal economists currently working for the
Putin team worry that expectations are too high right now. In a
situation similar to 1992, people expect quick economic results. When
they do not occur, radical economic reform ideas could be blamed and
therefore discredited once again.
\11\ See Ot Pervogo Litsa: razgovory s Vladinziroin Putinyin
(Moscow: Vagrius Books, 2000).
\12\ Most recently Pyotr Aven, president of Alfa bank, has urged
Putin to pursue such a strategy. See Ian Traynor, ``Putin urged to
apply the Pinochet stick,'' The Guardian, March 31, 2000.
\14\ See Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem, and Edda Zoli, ``Does
Democracy Facilitate the Economic Transition? An Empirical Study of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,'' unpublished
manuscript, World Bank, June 1999; and chapter five of the Transition
Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition (London: European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1999).
Senator Smith. Thank you both very much.
As evidence of our democratic bona fides, what you hear
outside is a protest on PNTR.
This has been excellent. You both have mentioned that Putin
will probably seek accommodation with the West on arms control
and economic relations, but what about its agenda on the near
abroad? What do you see Russia doing with Belarus, Ukraine, and
all of the Muslim states below it?
Dr. Graham. Look, I think that the Russian Government, Mr.
Putin himself, see this as something still of an extension of
domestic politics in Russia. They are foreign, but not quite
foreign. And Mr. Putin's goal, I think as shared broadly across
the Russian political elite, is to try to both rebuild the
Russian economy and at the same time extend its influence into
the surrounding areas, the former Soviet Union. And obviously
there is already an agreement to move toward something of a
more confederate type of relationship with Belarus. I would
expect that to continue, at least at the rhetorical level.
There are going to be some difficult issues to work out in
terms of monetary systems, fiscal systems, and so forth.
Ukraine, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, I think you are
going to try to see Mr. Putin put together what I call the more
coherent Russian foreign policy that will increase Russian
presence and pressure in those areas, using the oil and gas,
the energy levers, as a way of redirecting some of--focusing
the thinking of some leaders, particularly Mr. Kuchma in
Ukraine.
I think you are going to see similar things happening in
the South Caucasus. Mr. Putin and the Russian political leaders
are aware that successions are looming in most of the three, or
two of the three trans-Caucasian states. They want to make sure
that Russia's interests are taken into account. I think you
will see a similar thing in Central Asia.
But this is going to be a real focal point of Russian
foreign policy. The key issue will be in fact whether Putin is
able to discipline the policy, foreign policy machine in
Moscow, and then also all those large enterprises, energy in
particular enterprises, that have major interests in the former
Soviet Union.
Dr. McFaul. Let me just add two things. First, I think we
are going to see a turning inward in general in Russia under
Mr. Putin. I do not think he sees himself and his role in
Russia right now to play a large international role. Unlike Mr.
Yeltsin, who took these kind of meetings, the G-7 or the G-8,
whatever we call it now, very seriously in terms of his
international status, I do not think that is going to be the
case with Mr. Putin.
Second, I think he is going to be pragmatic in these
relationships. I do not see, quite frankly, any support in any
sector of society in Russia for the recreation of the Soviet
Union or imperial design on the Newly Independent States.
What worries me is the third observation, which is that I
think we tend to overestimate Mr. Putin's control over the
army, over the FSB, and all sorts of areas. Let me just give
you one example anecdotally. I know that myself and other
academics in Russia and journalists in Russia have experienced
more monitoring from the FSB in the last year and a half. I do
not think that was a directive from Mr. Putin. On the contrary,
I think the lower level guys who are doing this saw a guy like
Mr. Putin at the top and said: Oh, now we have carte blanche,
now we have got the green light to do whatever we want; we can
go out and hassle these academics, right.
Similarly, I worry about that in the Caucasus, and I think
Georgia might be a flash point in that regard. That is, should
the war escalate, should there be some chasing of Chechen
rebels into Georgia, and some commander wanting to do good, he
thinks, by his chief commanding officer in Moscow decides to go
in. That might not be a directive from Mr. Putin, but I think
the consequences for us would be very serious. That is the kind
of thing that I worry about, especially in Georgia today.
Senator Smith. I wonder if--you talked about corruption and
some of the tolerance for it ongoing. It just seems to me that
will continue to be a cancer in the Russian Government and the
Russian life if ultimately there are not some laws that the new
generation that Dr. Brzezinski talked about can utilize to
effect some change in that.
Or is this just so embedded, so ingrained, that it cannot
change? Do you see Putin implementing laws, criminal laws that
will ultimately provide a vehicle, a mechanism, to root this
out?
Dr. Graham. Let me just say that--and we have had hearings
on this before--this corruption problem is massive. It in fact
defines the way the political system operates. It is this
intertwining of power and property in the public and private
sphere in Russia. That is not something that emerged in the
past decade. It has been an historic attribute of the Russian
state.
Dealing with that, separating the government from the
business community, is going to take a long time. It cannot be
done overnight. Now, Mr. Putin and the Duma may pass some
legislation that would provide a basis for dealing with
corruption, call for more transparency. The real problem is
that of implementation. Even if you are Mr. Putin and you want
to go after this, how do you go after it, the corruption, in a
way that looks equitable, that does not appear to be your
settling scores with your political opponents?
You can go after Mr. Bherezovsky. That would be wildly
popular in Russia today. But that is only a single figure. If
you try to go after some of the other oligarchs, where do you
stop? Is Mr. Chubais on your list? Is Mr. Chernomyrdin on your
list? Is Mr. Baradin, Putin's earlier employer, on your list?
How do you fashion this in a way that looks like the
motives really are dealing with corruption and not a political
settling of scores? So I think in the short run this is very
difficult to do and I would question whether Mr. Putin has the
political vision and the political skill in order to be able to
conduct that type of policy.
I think as you look out over the longer term, particularly
at a new generation of entrepreneurs that are arising in
Russia, that are looking not only toward a domestic market,
which is still important for them, maybe their first priority,
but also want to be accepted as major capitalists on the global
arena, that they are going to see that different standards of
behavior are required, a different type of discipline is
required. That is ultimately I think going to create the
pressure groups inside Russia to begin to build an independent
judiciary, to pass the appropriate laws, and gradually deal
with what is a pervasive corruption problem.
What we can do to help on this really is encourage Russia's
integration into the global economy, to bring these businessmen
out into an environment that will compel them to deal in a
different way if they are going to succeed.
Dr. McFaul. If I could add just two comments. First of all,
Russia is right in the middle of the post-Soviet countries in
terms of level of corruption, which is to say that this is a
post-Communist phenomenon, not a Russian phenomenon.
Second, there is a very positive correlation within now the
post-Communist world--and now I am talking about the entire
post-Communist world--between low levels of corruption and
democracy. In fact, it is a very striking correlation, Poland
being one of the best, Uzbekhistan, Tajikistan being on the low
side. I mention that because I think there is a misconception
oftentimes in this city and most certainly in Moscow about how
to deal with corruption. The idea is we need better laws and
more policemen, right? Implementation, as Tom Graham just said.
That is part of it, but that is only part of it. It is also
stronger civil society, stronger democracy. Let me give you one
example from our own experience. We had an election,
Presidential election, in 1996. There were some allegations of
corruption, as you recall, people doing things they should not
have been doing, people taking money from people they should
not have, right.
Why do we know that? We know it because of two things. We
knew it because of an independent media and we knew it because
there is an opposition party, in this case the Republican
Party, that had an interest in exposing that corruption and had
the power to do so. It was not because of the LAPD, it was not
because we hired a bunch of new guys to go around and to crack
down on the oligarchs. It was because of transparency, in short
because of democracy.
So I think when you are thinking of solutions for fighting
corruption in Russia we need to be much more creative about
things like expanding Internet access to NGO's, supporting an
NGO. A very courageous man, Dimitri Vaseley, let me tell you
about him. He used to run the Federal Security and Exchange
Commission in Russia and resigned when there was just simply
too much corruption, reprivatization, illegal seizing of assets
in a St. Petersburg factory. He has now set up a
nongovernmental organization which is trying to disseminate
information about minority investor shareholder rights.
That is the kind of person you need to support, not the MVD
or the FSB, the kind of Putin solutions. That to me scares me.
That will just lead to more corruption, not less.
Senator Smith. I think it is a wonderful distinction you
have made between standing with Russians and not with Russia
per se, and that there is a real difference and we need to be
more discriminating in how we help and where we help and whom
we help.
So gentlemen, our time is spent. I thank you both for the
great contributions you have made to our understanding on this
committee today about this very important issue, and hopefully
this hearing has been listened to by our friends in Russia and
lessons will be learned by them as well, because I think we all
look forward to a day when there is more, not less, contact and
better, not worse, relations.
So we thank you. I am going to leave open the record for
questions that colleagues of mine may have for the
administration or any of our witnesses today. For that, we
thank you.
Dr. Graham. Thank you.
Dr. McFaul. Thank you.
Senator Smith. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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