[Senate Report 109-360]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 109-360
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COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
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November 16, 2006.--Ordered to be printed
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Mr. Roberts, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
SPECIAL REPORT
I. Introduction
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
dedicated much of its oversight efforts during the 108th
Congress to the study of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
issue, which resulted in the Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Senate Report 108-301),
published on July 9, 2004. In addition to this effort, the
Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005
reflect the Committee's attention to six priority areas: (1)
revitalization of the National Security Agency (NSA); (2)
improving human intelligence collection; (3) increased emphasis
on advanced research and development; (4) greater access to and
sharing of information across the Intelligence Community (IC);
(5) elimination of unnecessary programs; and (6) greater
organizational efficiency of the IC.
The SSCI was established in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400
to strengthen congressional oversight of the programs and
activities of U.S. intelligence agencies. Throughout its
history, the Committee has sought to carry out its oversight
responsibilities in a non-partisan manner. During the 108th
Congress, the Committee continued this tradition in crafting
important intelligence legislation, conducting investigations
and audits into IC and other national security issues, and
authorizing--and as necessary, increasing or reallocating--
funding for a wide array of U.S. intelligence activities.
As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee
performs an annual review of the intelligence budget submitted
by the President and prepares legislation authorizing
appropriations for the various civilian and military agencies
and departments comprising the IC. These entities include the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
intelligence capabilities of the military services, as well as
the intelligence-related components of the Department of State,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Department of
Homeland Security. The Committee makes recommendations to the
Senate Armed Services Committee on authorizations for the
intelligence-related components of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy,
U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. The Committee also
conducts periodic investigations, audits, and inspections of
intelligence activities and programs.
The Committee's charge is to ensure that the IC provides
the accurate and timely intelligence necessary to identify and
monitor threats to the national security and to support the
Executive and Legislative branches in their decisions on
national security matters; to ensure that U.S. military
commanders have intelligence support to allow them to prevail
swiftly and decisively on the battlefield; and, to ensure that
all intelligence activities and programs conform with the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America.
II. Legislation
A. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
During the 108th Congress, the Committee conducted annual
reviews of the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 budget
requests for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the
Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities programs of the Department
of Defense. In addition, the Committee reviewed supplemental
funding requests for the same fiscal years in support of
ongoing operations in Iraq and the global war on terror. As
part of its review, the Committee received testimony from
senior IC officials and evaluated the detailed budget
justification documents submitted by the Executive branch.
For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the Administration
continued its requests for substantial increases in funds for
the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Combined with large
supplemental budgets for both fiscal years, the IC received
unprecedented levels of funding during the 108th Congress. The
Committee endorsed these increases but expressed concern that
the IC is approaching a point where it will be difficult to
absorb further increases.
B. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
On May 8, 2003, the Committee reported an original bill, S.
1025, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
The bill and its classified supplement contained
recommendations for annual authorization levels of funds
appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government. In addition to
authorized funding levels and certain technical amendments, the
bill contained several unclassified substantive provisions,
including:
An amendment to Section 504 of the National Security
Act of 1947 to remove the criterion that reprogrammings
or transfers under that provision be based on
``unforeseen requirements'';
Modifications to Section 602 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-
359) to change unprogrammed construction notice-and-
wait periods and to raise notification thresholds for
certain construction and renovation projects;
Authorization for use of certain funds designated for
intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for
assistance to the Government of Colombia for
counterdrug activities;
Establishment of a pilot program to provide analysts
throughout the IC with access to data collected by the
National Security Agency (NSA);
Establishment of a pilot program to assess the
feasibility of a Reserve Officers' Training Corps-like
program to train intelligence analysts;
Extension of the National Commission for the Review
of the Research and Development Program of the United
States Intelligence Community;
Clarification and Modifications to Section 224 of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56) to preserve
valuable and necessary intelligence exemptions
contained in Section 204 of that Act;
Requirements for certain one-time reports and repeal
of some statutory reporting requirements that were
deemed of little continuing utility to the legislative
oversight process;
Extension for an indefinite period of the
Congressionally-directed reorganization of the
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office;
Modifications to the Safe Explosives Act (Secs. 1121-
28, Public Law 107-296) to ensure sufficient authority
for the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central
Intelligence to conduct the military and intelligence
activities of the U.S. Government;
Amendments to Section 313 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act to reflect the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security and to ensure
consistency with other similar provisions of law;
Expansion of the definition of ``financial
institution'' for purposes of Section 1114 of the Right
to Financial Privacy Act to reflect the growth in the
types of entities that provide financial services to
the public;
A requirement for a joint report by the National
Science Foundation and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy designed to enhance the U.S.
Government's approach to security evaluations;
Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA)
notification requirements under the CIA Act of 1949
regarding its personnel allowances and benefits similar
to those authorized for members of the Foreign Service;
Protection for certain CIA and NSA personnel from
tort liability when those personnel take reasonable
action to prevent or stop a ``crime of violence'' or to
protect an individual from bodily harm;
Exemption of certain NSA ``operational files'' from
the search and review requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA);
Provision of affordable living quarters for certain
students working at NSA laboratories; and
Authorization for IC elements within the Department
of Defense to award personal services contracts.
The Armed Services Committee took S. 1025 on sequential
referral and reported the measure favorably with recommended
amendments, S. Rep. 108-80 (June 26, 2003).
S. 1025 was considered by the Senate on July 31, 2003. The
measure, with the amendments recommended by the Armed Services
Committee and additional amendments jointly proposed by
Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, was adopted by
unanimous consent. Of particular note, the amendments adopted
by the Senate:
Mandated the submission of Independent Cost Estimates
by elements of the IC concerning the costs of
acquisitions of major systems;
Required a report on the operations of the
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center;
and
Permitted CIA employees to deposit certain bonus pay
to Thrift Savings Plan Accounts.
The Senate then proceeded to consideration of H.R. 2417,
the version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004 passed by the House of Representatives, struck all
after the enacting clause, and inserted the text of S. 1025. As
amended, H.R. 2417 was passed by unanimous consent.
In conference on H.R. 2417, the conferees from the House
receded from their disagreement to the amendments of the
Senate, and the conferees agreed to an amendment containing
many provisions from both the House-passed andSenate-amended
versions of H.R. 2417. In addition to modifications or deletions of
some of the provisions noted above, the conferees:
Established an Office of Intelligence and Analysis
within the Department of the Treasury;
Authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
award certain personal services contracts;
Modified the sunset provision governing the effect of
certain sanction laws to intelligence activities;
Established a training program through the Department
of Homeland Security for State and local officials to
enhance information sharing activities between such
officials and the Federal Government;
Mandated a pilot project to promote the recruitment
and retention of women and minorities throughout the IC
and encouraged the IC to recruit former members of the
Armed Forces for civilian positions;
Authorized several counterintelligence reforms;
Required a report on the Terrorist Screening Center;
Ensured protection for classified information related
to certain judicial proceedings concerning money
laundering;
Required the Director of Central Intelligence and
Secretary of Defense to incorporate basic sensor
research into the measurement and signatures
intelligence (MASINT) systems of the United States; and
Authorized additional funds for NSA national security
scholarships.
The conference report passed both houses and was signed by
the President on December 13, 2003, becoming Public Law 108-
177.
C. EXTENSION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES
Following requests by the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and the
President, on February 26, 2004, the Committee reported a bill,
S. 2136, extending the report deadline of the 9/11 Commission
by two months, but requiring completion of all 9/11
Commission's activities in 30 fewer days. The bill also
authorized additional funding for the 9/11 Commission in order
for it to complete its work.
On February 27, 2004, the Senate passed S. 2136 by
unanimous consent.
The bill was referred to the House and passed without
objection on March 3, 2004.
The President signed the bill on March 16, 2004, enacting
the measure as Public Law 108-207.
D. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
On May 5, 2004, the Committee reported an original bill, S.
2386, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.
The bill and its classified supplement contained
recommendations for annual authorization levels of funds
appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government. In addition to
authorized funding levels, the bill contained several
unclassified substantive provisions:
Authorizing, for purposes of Section 504(a)(3) of the
National Security Act of 1947, funds appropriated for
fiscal year 2004 in excess of amounts specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations accompanying the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004;
Amending Section 504 of the National Security Act of
1947 to remove the ``unforeseen requirements''
criterion governing reprogrammings or transfers under
that provision;
Authorizing the use of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) to collect intelligence
information concerning non-United States persons who
engage in international terrorism without a known
affiliation with an international terrorist group;
Requiring additional reports from the Attorney
General under the FISA;
Repealing from S. Res. 400 (94th Cong.) the
limitation on length of service as a member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;
Authorizing a permanent extension of the CIA
voluntary separation incentive program;
Providing additional authority to enhance the cover
and ensure the secure operations of individuals serving
at the CIA under nonofficial cover;
Repealing the sunset provision governing the use of
commercial activities as security for intelligence
collection activities of the Department of Defense;
Providing an exemption from certain Privacy Act
requirements for human intelligence operations by the
Department of Defense; and
Authorizing the use of certain funds designated for
intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for
assistance to the Government of Colombia for
counterdrug activities.
The bill, S. 2386, was reported unanimously by the
Committee. It was referred to the Armed Services Committee and
reported favorably (S. Rep. 108-300) on July 8, 2004, with
recommendations for certain amendments.
S. 2386 was considered by the Senate on October 11, 2004.
The measure, with the amendments recommended by the Armed
Services Committee and additional amendments jointly proposed
by Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, was adopted
by unanimous consent. Of particular note, the amendments
adopted by the Senate:
Required an intelligence assessment on sanctuaries
for terrorists;
Extended the filing deadline for the report of the
National Commission for the Review of the Research and
Development Program of the United States IC; and
Provided a four-year extension for the activities of
the Public Interest Declassification Board;
Following passage of S. 2386, the Senate proceeded to
consideration of H.R. 4548, the version of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 passed by the House of
Representatives, struck all after the enacting clause, and
inserted the text of S. 2386. As amended, H.R. 4548 was passed
by unanimous consent.
In conference on H.R. 4548, the conferees from the House
receded from their disagreement to the amendments of the
Senate, and the conferees agreed to an amendment containing
many provisions from both the House-passed and Senate-amended
versions of H.R. 4548. In addition to modifications or
deletions of some of the provisions noted above, the conferees:
Established a Chief Information Officer for the IC;
Enhanced the authorities of the National Virtual
Translation Center;
Encouraged the cooperation of the IC with
Congressional investigation of the Iraq Oil-for-Food
Program of the United Nations;
Established an Emerging Technologies Panel for the
NSA;
Provided additional funding and authorized additional
programs relating to the education, training, and
recruitment of IC personnel;
Authorized a pilot project to establish a civilian
linguist reserve corps;
Required a report on the status, consolidation, and
improvement of education programs that are supported,
funded and carried out by the IC or otherwise intended
to aid in the recruitment, retention, or training of IC
personnel;
Mandated a report on the recruitment and retention of
Defense Language Institute instructors; and
Required additional information on terrorist groups
to be included in certain reporting requirements under
Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f)
The conference report passed both houses and was signed by
the President on December 23, 2004, becoming Public Law 108-
487.
III. Oversight Activities
A. INQUIRY INTO THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ
In June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
initiated a review of U.S. intelligence on the existence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Iraq's ties to terrorist
groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in
the region, and his violations of human rights.
The Committee staff had, for the previous several months,
already been examining aspects of intelligence activities
regarding Iraq, including the IC's intelligence support to the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) weapons inspections in Iraq and the IC's
analysis and collection of reporting related to the alleged
Niger-Iraq uranium deal.
On June 20, 2003, the Committee agreed to also examine: (1)
the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam
Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and
his repression of his own people; (2) the objectivity,
reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments
reached by the IC; (3) whether those judgments were properly
disseminated to policymakers in the Executive branch and
Congress; (4) whether any influence was brought to bear on
anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives;
and (5) other issues identified in the course of the
Committee's review.
In the months that followed, the Committee staff reviewed
approximately 100,000 pages of intelligence documents and
interviewed more than 200 individuals including intelligence
analysts and senior officials with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State, National
Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Staff also interviewed the Director of
Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
National Intelligence Officers, former intelligence analysts,
operations officers, signals intelligence collectors, imagery
analysts, nuclear experts with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Ambassadors, former United Nations inspectors,
Department of Defense weapons experts, State Department
officials, and National Security Council staff members. As part
of the investigative effort, the Committee held four closed
hearings on aspects of U.S. intelligence on Iraq: the Iraq-
Niger connection, the CIA and State Department Inspectors
General report on the review of the Iraq-Niger issue, the
history and continuity of weapons of mass destruction
assessments pertaining to Iraq, and Iraq prewar intelligence.
These efforts enabled the Committee to develop a full
understanding of the quality and quantity of intelligence
reporting on Iraq's WMD programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist
groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in
the region, and his violations of human rights. The Committee
also gained an understanding of how intelligence analysts
throughout the IC used that intelligence to develop their
assessments, how the assessments were disseminated to
policymakers, whether the assessments were reasonable,
objective, and independent of political consideration, and
whether any influence was brought to bear to shape their
analysis to support policy objectives.
In June 2004, the Committee unanimously approved a
classified 500-page report on the Committee's findings and
conclusions. An unclassified version of the report, which
included Members' ``Additional Views'' was released in July
2004 (S. Report 108-301).
The Committee concluded that most of the major key
judgments in the IC's National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either
overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying
intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in
analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of
intelligence. In particular, the Committee concluded that the
IC suffered from ``group think'' in that there was a collective
presumptionthat Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass
destruction program. This led analysts and managers to interpret
ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well
as to ignore or minimize evidence to the contrary. This ``group think''
dynamic was so strong that formalized IC mechanisms to challenge
assumptions, such as alternative analysis and red teams, were not used.
A number of continuing systemic weaknesses, including a lack of
information sharing and short-comings in human intelligence collection,
contributed to the IC's failure to develop a reasonable assessment of
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The Committee found no
evidence that Administration officials attempted to pressure analysts
to change their judgments related to Iraq's WMD programs.
The Committee found that the IC's analysis of Iraq's links
to al-Qaida prior to the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was
reasonable and objective based on the information available.
Moreover, the categories outlined by the CIA to help define the
``links'' between Iraq and al-Qaida--contacts, training, safe
haven, and operational cooperation--were an appropriate and
reasonable approach to the question. The Committee found that
the CIA had an extensive historical knowledge of Iraq's ties to
secular Palestinian groups and to the Mujahiddin e-Khalq, but
far less information on any potential Iraqi regime ties to al-
Qaida. Additionally, the Committee concluded that the CIA
reasonably assessed that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use
his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks.
Many IC agencies have taken the Committee's findings and
conclusions, in conjunction with the results of post-war
investigations of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs,
seriously and have implemented changes and reforms. The
Committee continued to monitor those efforts and call for
additional reform. On February 12, 2004, the Committee agreed
to include the following additional matters in its review:
The collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end
of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi
Freedom;
Whether public statements and reports and testimony
regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made
between the Gulf War period and the commencement of
Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by
intelligence information;
The postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism
and how they compare with prewar assessments;
Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
Any intelligence activities relating to Iraq
conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation
Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy; and
The use by the Intelligence Community of information
provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
The review was ongoing at the conclusion of the 108th
Congress.
B. HEARINGS
1. Intelligence reform
Following release of the Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (July 9, 2004), the Committee
turned its attention to the reform and reorganization of the
IC. On July 20, 2004, the Committee received testimony from two
panels regarding the need for IC reform, including
reexamination of the responsibilities and authorities of the
Director of Central Intelligence. The first witness, Senator
Dianne Feinstein, testified concerning her proposed
legislation, S. 190, the IC Leadership Act of 2003. Following
Senator Feinstein, the Committee heard testimony from Dr.
JohnJ. Hamre, Lieutenant General William E. Odom (United States Army
(Ret.)), and Mr. James R. Woolsey. During the August recess and
following the July 22, 2004, release of the Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorists Attacks upon the United States (9/11
Commission), the Committee conducted additional hearings on the need
for intelligence reform. On August 18, 2004, Dr. David Kay, Dr. Amy B.
Zegart, and General Charles G. Boyd (United States Air Force (Ret.))
testified before the Committee. On September 7, 2004, the Committee
held an open hearing on the 9/11 Commission report. The Committee heard
testimony from 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean, Vice Chair Lee
H. Hamilton, and Commissioner John F. Lehman. In addition to these open
hearings, the Committee also held a closed meeting on September 16,
2004, with Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, United States Air Force
(Ret.), then-Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board.
2. National security threats to the United States
Early in each session of the 108th Congress, the Committee
held hearings to review the IC's assessments on the current and
projected national security threats and issues of concern to
the United States. These hearings covered a wide range of
issues and were held in open and closed sessions. They provided
the heads of various IC organizations an opportunity to inform
the Committee and the American public about the threats facing
the country and how their organizations were poised to provide
information on and counter these threats.
On February 11, 2003, the Committee held open and closed
hearings on the current and projected threats to the United
States. Testifying before the Committee in open session were
the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert
Mueller, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice
Admiral Lowell Jacoby, and the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford.
On February 24, 2004, the Committee held open and closed
hearings on the current and projected threats to the United
States. Testifying in open session before the Committee were
the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet; the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert
Mueller; and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby. Testifying in closed session were
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John McLaughlin;
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert
Mueller; and the Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Major General Ronald Burgess, United States Army.
The Committee also routinely held hearings and received
threat updates from IC personnel. These issues frequently
covered the global war on terrorism, threats to major events
(such as the U.S. election, the Olympics, and the Democratic
and Republican National Conventions), and other substantive
developments of interest to the Committee in its oversight
role.
The transcripts of the open hearings, ``Current and
Projected National Security Threats to the United States'' [S.
Hrg. 108-161, dated February 11, 2003, and S. Hrg. 108-588,
dated February 24, 2004] were printed and made available to the
public.
3. Counterterrorism
The Committee focused on counterterrorism initiatives in
several hearings and received numerous briefings on worldwide
terrorist threats during the 108th Congress. While intelligence
briefings covered threats to U.S. and allied interests
worldwide, the Committee focused on the sustained threat to the
U.S. Homeland from al-Qaida, and on the IC's measures to
counter and disrupt the group. The IC briefed the Committee
weekly on current intelligence topics, which included terrorism
threat updates. In addition to these Member briefings,
Committee staff routinely received briefings on a range of
counterterrorism issues. These briefings covered substantive
and administrative issues to include resources, office
structure, and interagency cooperation.
The Committee closely monitored the development of the
Terrorist ThreatIntegration Center (TTIC), and continued to
monitor its evolution into the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
The TTIC was the first entity of its kind in the IC, and housed
analysts and ``assignees'' from not only the IC agencies, but also
representatives from agencies that constitute the largest consumers of
threat reporting and analysis.
4. Detainee abuse hearings
In the wake of specific revelations of detainee abuse at
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the Committee held hearings--in
addition to staff briefings--to ascertain the nature of the
involvement, if any, of intelligence entities in this scandal.
5. Counterproliferation
The accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a central
threat to U.S. national security. The IC's ability to monitor,
accurately assess and respond to WMD and delivery threats from
both state and non-state actors is essential. Because of the
importance of these capabilities, particularly as the nation is
engaged in the global war on terrorism, the Committee reviewed
the scope and trend of proliferation, in order to assess and
improve the IC's counter-proliferation capabilities.
The Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on
proliferation topics including global proliferation trends,
non-state proliferators, North Korean, Libyan, and Iranian
proliferation activities, and, as part of its formal review of
intelligence assessments on Iraq, the existence of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Committee
reviewed numerous IC products addressing the production and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, held several
staff briefings, and conducted hundreds of staff interviews
regarding intelligence assessments of Iraqi WMD programs.
6. Human intelligence
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) was a prominent topic of
concern for the Committee during the entire period of the 108th
Congress. The Committee held one hearing dedicated solely to
the Future of HUMINT, but the issue was a central facet of
other closed and open hearings. The number of formal hearings,
however, does not convey the full sense of urgency concerning
HUMINT in the 108th Congress. Committee Members and staff
combined dozens of visits to IC facilities and other staff-
level discussions with experts to further examine HUMINT
processes.
In particular, the Committee examined HUMINT as part of its
inquiry into prewar analysis of Iraq's WMD capabilities. The
Committee noted the poor condition of U.S. HUMINT capabilities
focused on the Iraqi target. The Committee's concerns are
documented at length in the Committee's report on The U.S.
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on
Iraq. The HUMINT concerns also guided Committee Members in
deliberations related to the enactment of the ``Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.''
7. USA PATRIOT Act
In addition to receipt of reports under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, continuing oversight of Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence activities, and
review of IC information access concerns, the Committee held a
closed hearing on October 23, 2003 to review the modifications
to intelligence and national security authorities made by the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56 (October 26, 2001).
Witnesses appearing at this hearing from the Department of
Justice and FBI testified regarding the continuing intelligence
and national security importance of the modifications to law
found in the USA PATRIOT Act. The witnesses explained how the
USA PATRIOT Act removed barriers to information sharing, closed
investigative gaps where existing authorities had not provided
sufficient legal authority, and updated authorities to reflect
advances in technology. The witnesses also addressed civil
liberties and privacy concerns, explaining how authorities
provided by the Act are consistent with the Constitution, and
reiterating the importance of Congressional oversight to the
intelligence process.
8. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The Committee held a closed hearing on the potential
effects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
on the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States Government. Administration officials from the
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Department of
State, and the United States Navy (and, on a separate panel, a
former Judge Advocate General for the United States Navy)
testified that United States accession to the treaty would do
no harm to the intelligence activities of the United States and
would provide useful protections for United States military and
commercial maritime operations. At two other panels, two former
Secretaries of the Navy and a former United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations expressed continued
reservations about the treaty, including particular concerns
about the potential impact of the treaty's dispute resolution
procedures on United States national security.
9. Covert action quarterly review
The Committee continued to conduct rigorous oversight of
covert action programs during the 108th Congress. Unlike
intelligence collection and analysis, which are intended to
gather and understand information about national security
issues, covert action programs are policy tools that can be a
significant factor in accomplishing foreign policy objectives.
The Committee reviewed these programs to ensure their means and
objectives were consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, were
conducted in accordance with all applicable American laws and
were consistent with the ideals and principles of our nation.
During the 108th Congress, the Committee reviewed written
quarterly reports and held periodic hearings and briefings with
Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State officials.
C. COMMUNITY ISSUES
1. Independent cost estimates
The Committee became increasingly concerned by the cost
growth of major IC acquisitions. These substantial cost
increases reduce the availability of funds for other programs
and new initiatives within the IC. Additionally, to address
funding shortfalls resulting from unanticipated acquisition
costs, IC funds are often shifted from program to program and
from fiscal year to fiscal year, hindering effective financial
management.
Prior to Committee action to address the growth in
acquisition costs, the budget for major systems generally
reflected cost estimates prepared by the IC component
responsible for acquiring and operating the system. The
magnitude and frequency of cost growth in major systems
indicated to the Committee a systemic bias within the IC to
underestimate the costs of such acquisitions. The Committee
recognized that the use of independent cost estimates prepared
by offices outside the acquiring and operating components had
resulted in more accurate projections of the costs of major
systems.
During floor consideration of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, the Senate adopted a
Committee amendment formalizing the process for development of
independent cost estimates for major IC acquisitions. Section
312 of that Act required the Director of Central Intelligence,
in consultation with the head of the element responsible for
acquiring and operating the system at issue, to prepare, and
update as required, an independent cost estimate of the full
life-cycle cost of development, procurement, and operation of
any system projected to cost more than $500 million. The
provision also required the President's budget request to
reflect the amounts identified in the independent cost
estimates, or if not, explain why the amount requested differed
from the independent cost estimate. The Committee will monitor
Executive branch compliance with this provision, including
prohibitions on the obligation or expenditure of funds for the
development or procurement of major systems without statutory
independent cost estimates.
2. Information access
The Committee took an active role in improving information
access across the IC. The Committee remains extremely concerned
that the Community is not managed as an information enterprise,
but rather as a loose affiliation of agencies. As the Committee
noted in its report accompanying S. 2386, the Intelligence
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, elements within the IC
acted as though they own the intelligence data they collect,
rather than treating that data as belonging to the U.S.
Government. As a result of the Community's failure to repudiate
outdated restrictions on information access and a refusal to
revisit legal interpretations and policy decisions that predate
the threats now confronting the United States, impediments to
information access are re-emerging in the very programs
designed to address the problem.
The Committee's review of the Community's pre-war
assessments on Iraq highlighted the effect of such restrictions
on data access by intelligence analysts. In its Report of the
Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence
Community's Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, the
Committee concluded, inter alia, that the IC's failure to
provide access to information across the Community to cleared
analysts with a legitimate need-to-know contributed to the IC's
flawed assessments on Iraq. For example, the Committee found
that the CIA's excessive compartmentalization and failure to
share information regarding Iraq's alleged mobile biological
weapons program and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program
``left analysts and policymakers with an incomplete and, at
times, misleading picture of these issues.'' \1\ The Committee
also concluded that the CIA's practice of providing source
information and operational detail only to CIA analysts
``limited the level of discussion and debate that should have
taken place across the Community on [Iraq's interactions with
al-Qaida].'' \2\ Emphasizing the importance of improving
information access across the Community, the Committee wrote,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. IC's
Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rpt. 108-301, 26.
\2\ Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S.
Intelligence Community's Pre-war Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S.
Rpt. 108-301, 33.
The process by which the IC calculates the benefits and
risks of sharing sensitive human intelligence is skewed too
heavily toward withholding information. This issue has been
raised repeatedly with the IC, particularly after the lack of
information sharing was found to have played a key role in the
intelligence failures of 9/11. The Committee believes that the
IC must reconsider whether the risks of expanding access to
cleared analysts are truly greater than the risks of keeping
information so tightly compartmented that the analysts who need
it to make informed judgments are kept in the dark.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Ibid, pp. 26-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to encourage management of the IC as an
information enterprise, and thereby enhance the Community's
capacity to undertake ``all source fusion'' analysis, the
Committee initiated a number of efforts to remove outdated
restrictions on information and data access. For example, in S.
Rept. 108-258, the Committee directed the Director of Central
Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Defense, to complete by February 1, 2005, an
Information Sharing Working Group (ISWG) review identifying
impediments to information access in existing IC and Department
of Defense policies and laws. Additionally, Section 317 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, P.L. 108-
381, established a pilot program to assess the feasibility and
advisability of permitting analysts of various elements of the
IC to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of
other Community elements. Finally, Section 354 of P.L. 108-381
required the President to identify current policies and
regulations that impede the sharing of classified information
horizontally across and among Federal departments and agencies
and vertically between the Federal Government and State and
local agencies; and to propose appropriate modifications of
policy, law, and regulations to eliminate these impediments in
order to facilitate access to such classified information.
3. Oversight of IC Inspectors General
The Committee continued to monitor the activities of the
Inspectors General (IGs) of the IC during the 108th Congress.
This oversight included: review of numerous IG products,
including audit reports, inspection reports, reports of
investigation, and semi-annual reports of IG activities; visits
to IG offices for updates on plans and procedures; and
attendance and participation at several IG conferences. In
addition to a variety of hearings focused on issues reviewed by
the IC IGs, the Committee arranged a number of briefings with
Community program and IG personnel in order to follow up on the
status of IG recommendations. Examples include employee
grievances, management of operational activities, contracting
procedures, effective use of resources on new technology,
covert action programs, and financial management practices.
During the 108th Congress, the Committee continued its work
to ensure the effectiveness and independence of the
administrative Inspectors General at the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Committee reinforced
the importance of the IG function through its regular
interaction with the agency directors, the IGs, and their
staffs. In response to language in the Committee's Intelligence
Authorization Bills, the administrative IGs also submitted
annual reports to the Committee detailing their requests for
fiscal and personnel resources, and the plan for their use.
These reports included the programs and activities of their
agency scheduled for review during the fiscal year, comments on
the office's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel,
any concerns relating to the independence and effectiveness of
the IG's office, and an overall assessment of the agency's
response to the IG's recommendations during the previous year.
These annual reports served as a basis for Committee oversight
throughout the year.
4. IC compliance with Federal financial accounting standards
The Committee continued to closely monitor the IC's
financial management practices during the 108th Congress.
During the previous Congress, in the report accompanying S.
1428 (S. Rpt. 107-63), the Committee instructed the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to ensure
that the NSA, the DIA, the NGA, and the CIA receive an audit of
their financial statements no later than March 1, 2005, to be
performed by a statutory Inspector General or a qualified
independent public accountant.
Reports issued by the Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA
Inspectors General in 2002 indicated that the NSA, DIA, NGA,
and CIA were unable to produce auditable financial statements,
and this remained the case in 2004. In recognition of the
difficulties in acquiring the systems necessary to produce
financial statements, the Committee indicated in Senate Report
108-44, accompanying S. 1025, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004, that it would consider an extension
of the auditable financial statement due date, provided that
the relevant agencies offered evidence of significant progress
in this area.
Based on information provided by the agencies in 2004, the
Committee recognized that meaningful measures had been devoted
to producing auditable financial statements but concluded that
maintaining the original March 1, 2005, deadline would be
counterproductive in that it would require audits that would
divert resources from actual financial system improvements.
Accordingly, in S. Rpt. 108-258, accompanying S. 2386, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the
Committee extended the due date set in the report accompanying
S. 1428 (S. Rpt. 107-63), for the NSA, DIA, and NGA by two
years, to March 1, 2007, to allow for audits of the Fiscal Year
2006 financial statements. This change does not affect the CIA,
which was required by Public Law 107-289 to submit audited
financial statements for Fiscal Year 2004.
D. INVESTIGATIONS AND INQUIRIES
1. Captain Michael ``Scott'' Speicher
Following numerous hearings, Member briefings, staff-led
meetings, and the production of a lengthy classified report in
prior years, during the 108th Congress, the Committee continued
its involvement in the case of U.S. Navy Captain Michael
``Scott'' Speicher, who was shot down over Iraq on January 17,
1991, the first night of Operation Desert Storm. He was
declared Killed In Action (KIA) in May 1991; the Navy changed
his status to Missing In Action (MIA) in January 2001; and the
Navy designated him Missing/Captured in October 2002. Through
staff and member briefings, the Committee continued its
oversight of IC efforts to ascertain the fate of Captain
Speicher.
E. AUDITS
The Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff was created
in 1988 to provide ``a credible independent arm for committee
review of covert action programs and other specific IC
functions and issues.'' During the 108th Congress, the staff of
three full-time auditors led or provided significant support to
the Committee's review of a number of administrative and
operational issues relating to the agencies of the IC. In
addition, the Audit and Investigations Staff completed five in-
depth reviews of specific intelligence programs or issues.
These reviews included the following:
1. The NRO's Future Imagery Architecture Program
During 2003, the Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff
examined the acquisition management processes for the National
Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)
program. The audit focused on the NRO's contract administration
and financial management mechanisms as they related to FIA, in
addition to a general overview of the FIA program. The National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's segment of the FIA program
also was examined.
2. Joint Inquiry Committee recommendations
The Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence Joint Inquiry into IC Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (the ``Joint
Inquiry''), was issued in December 2002. The Report contained
19 recommendations relating to improving the U.S. Government's
ability to combat terrorism at home and abroad. During the
108th Congress, the Audit and Investigations Staff conducted a
review of the status of these recommendations. The review
determined that many of the recommendations had been or were in
the process of being implemented, although several had yet to
be fully addressed.
3. IC information sharing
In 2003, the Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff was
tasked with reviewing the current status of information sharing
across the IC, to include its interactions with state, local,
and private sector entities. The review determined that the
Community has undertaken a number of initiatives since
September 11, 2001, to enhance the sharing of information
related to countering terrorism. The Audit and Investigations
Staff found that progress in increasing the sharing of
information was being made organizationally, technologically,
and culturally throughout the IC. Problem areas noted during
this review include the need for increased senior management
attention, additional financial resources, electronic
interconnectivity, and further breaking down of historical,
cultural barriers.
4. Central Intelligence Agency Program
In 2004, the Audit and Investigations Staff reviewed the
past several years of the Central Intelligence Agency Program,
with a focus on emergency supplemental funding, to ensure that
the CIA could accurately and efficiently track the use of its
appropriated funding.
5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
At the end of the 108th Congress, the Audit and
Investigations Staff was completing a review of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The last Committee review
of the FISA was completed in July 1998. Since 1998 there have
been a number of developments that have had an effect on the
statute itself, as well as its implementation.
IV. Confirmations
A. PORTER J. GOSS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
On September 7, 2004, the President formally submitted to
the Senate the nomination of Congressman Porter J. Goss to
serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. On September 13
and 14, 2004, the Committee held public hearings on Mr. Goss's
nomination. At the time of his nomination, Mr. Goss had served
in the House of Representatives for nearly 16 years as the
Representative of the 14th Congressional District of Florida,
and the final seven years as Chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. From 1960 to 1962, Mr. Goss
served as an intelligence officer in the United States Army
and, from 1962 to 1972, served as a member of the clandestine
service of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the National
Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence
serves as the head of the United States IC, as the principal
advisor to the President on intelligence matters, as well as
head of the Central Intelligence Agency.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Following Mr. Goss's confirmation, the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Title I of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee favorably reported Mr. Goss's nomination to
the full Senate on September 20, 2004. The Senate considered
and approved his nomination on September 22, 2004, following a
roll call vote.
B. LARRY C. KINDSVATER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
On May 11, 2004, the President nominated Larry C.
Kindsvater to serve as the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management. On July 15, 2004, the
Committee held a closed hearing on Mr. Kindsvater's nomination
to permit a more thorough discussion of sensitive intelligence
matters. At the time of his nomination, Mr. Kindsvater had
served the United States in numerous positions within the IC,
including the preceding four years as Executive Director for IC
Affairs. From 1972 through 1994, Mr. Kindsvater served in
various analytic and leadership positions in the Central
Intelligence Agency. From 1994 through his nomination, Mr.
Kindsvater served as a member of the DCI's Community Management
Staff, focusing primarily on budget and resource management
issues. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
directs the operations of the Community Management Staff and
provides management and oversight, through three Assistant
Directors of Central Intelligence, for the collection, analysis
and production, and management functions of the IC.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Title I
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public
Law 108-458 (December 17, 2004), dissolved the position of Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management as a
statutory position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee favorably reported Mr. Kindsvater's
nomination to the full Senate on July 21, 2004. The Senate
considered and approved his nomination on July 22, 2004, by
unanimous consent.
C. FRANK LIBUTTI, UNDER SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
On April 28, 2003, the President nominated Frank Libutti to
serve as Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security. The
Committee held a public hearing on June 17, 2003 to consider
Mr. Libutti's nomination. Prior to his nomination, Mr. Libutti
had served as the New York City Deputy Police Commissioner for
Counterterrorism. From 1966 to 2001, Mr. Libutti served as an
officer in the Marine Corps. He retired as a lieutenant
general.
The Committee favorably reported Mr. Libutti's nomination
to the full Senate on June 18, 2003. The Senate considered and
approved his nomination on June 23, 2003, by unanimous consent.
D. OTHER NOMINATIONS
Consistent with the Committee's jurisdiction over the
intelligence activities and programs of the United States
Government, the Committee held two additional closed sessions
to discuss issues with Presidential nominees for IC positions
within the Administration. On March 4, 2003, Dr. Stephen A.
Cambone, then the President's nominee for the position of Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, briefed the Committee
regarding the role of the new position in the management and
oversight of the intelligence activities of the Department of
Defense and the relationship of the position to the Director of
Central Intelligence. On July 13, 2004, Mr. Thomas Fingar, then
the President's nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary
of State for Intelligence and Research, appeared before the
Committee to discuss his plans for the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, an element of the IC under the National Security
Act of 1947.
Based on the amendments made to S. Res. 400, 94th Cong.
(May 19, 1976), by S. Res. 445, 108th Cong. (Oct. 9, 2004),
future Presidential nominees for all civilian positions within
the IC, requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to the
appointments, will be referred to this Committee. Under the
terms of Sec. 17 of S. Res. 400, as amended, only this
Committee will have jurisdiction to report such nominations to
the full Senate.
V. Support to the Senate
The Committee undertook a number of activities to support
the Senate's deliberations. In addition to its unclassified
reports, the Committee sought to support Senate deliberations
by inviting the participation of members outside the Committee
in briefings and hearings on issues of shared jurisdiction or
interest. The Committee prepared, and made available for the
Senate, compendia of intelligence information regarding topics
relevant to current legislation. Members outside the Committee
frequently sought and received intelligence briefings by
members of the Committee staff. Members also requested and
received assistance in resolving issues through the actions of
elements of the IC. Finally, the Committee routinely invited
staff from other committees to briefings on intelligence issues
of common concern.
VI. Appendix
SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS
A. Number of meetings
During the 108th Congress, the Committee held a total of
216 on-the-record meetings, briefings, and hearings. There were
13 hearings held on the IC budget, including the Conference
sessions with the House. Three nomination hearings were held.
B. Bills and Resolutions originated by the Committee
1. S. Res. 27--An original resolution authorizing
expenditures by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
2. S. 1025--Intelligence Authorization Bill for
Fiscal Year 2004.
3. S. 2136--To extend the final report date and
termination date of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
4. S. 2386--Intelligence Authorization Bill for
Fiscal Year 2005.
C. Bills referred to the Committee
1. S. 266--To provide for the access and handling by
personnel of State and local governments of classified
information to facilitate preparation and response to
terrorist attacks, and for other purposes.
2. S. 410--To establish the Homeland Intelligence
Agency, and for other purposes.
3. S. 190--To establish the Director of National
Intelligence as head of the IC, to modify and enhance
authorities and responsibilities relating to the
administration of intelligence and the IC, and for
other purposes.
4. S. 1212--To identify certain sites as key
resources for protection by the Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of
the Department of Homeland Security and for other
purposes.
5. S. 1520--To amend the National Security Act of
1947 to reorganize and improve the leadership of the
Intelligence Community of the United States, to provide
for the enhancement of the counterterrorism activities
of the United States Government, and for other
purposes.
6. S. 2040--To extend the date for the submittal of
the final report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, to provide
additional funding for the Commission, and for other
purposes.
7. S. 2672--To establish an Independent National
Security Classification Board in the executive branch,
and for other purposes.
8. S. 2854--To facilitate alternative analyses of
intelligence by the Intelligence Community.
D. Publications
1. S. Hrg. 108-161--Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States.
2. S. Hrg. 108-182--Hearing on Nomination of Frank
Libutti to be Under Secretary for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland
Security.
3. Report 108-52--Special Report of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, Committee Activities January
3, 2001 to November 22, 2002.
4. Report 108-44--Report to Accompany S. 1025.
5. Report 108-258--Report to Accompany S. 2836.
6. S. Rept. 108-301--Report on the U.S. Intelligence
Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.
7. S. Hrg. 108-655--Intelligence Community Reform.
8. S. Hrg. 108-588--Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States.