[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EAST TIMOR: A NEW BEGINNING?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2000
__________
Committee on International Relations
Serial No. 106-98
Committee on Foreign Relations
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations and the
Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
<67-455 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
PETER T. KING, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South Samoa
Carolina MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
MATT SALMON, Arizona SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JOHN McHUGH, New York ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JIM DAVIS, Florida
PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
Michael P. Ennis, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dr. Robert King, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Matt Reynolds, Counsel
Alicia A. O'Donnell, Staff Associate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................. 6
The Honorable C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State... 13
Mr. Charles Costello, Director for Democracy Programs, The Carter
Center......................................................... 29
Dr. Andrew MacIntyre, Associate Dean, Graduate School on
International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of
California, San Diego.......................................... 30
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Craig Thomas, a U.S. Senator from Wyoming.......... 40
The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from
Nebraska....................................................... 42
.................................................................
The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress from
California..................................................... 45
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York.................................................. 46
.................................................................
The Honorable Russell D. Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin. 47
Honorable Stanley Roth and the Honorable C. David Welch.......... 49
Mr. Charles Costello............................................. 59
Dr. Andrew MacIntyre............................................. 66
Additional material:
Report from the East Timor Action Network submitted by Hon. Tom
Lantos......................................................... 70
Report from East Timor by The Carter Center submitted by Mr.
Costello....................................................... 78
Statement submitted for the Record by Hon. Lincoln Chafee, a U.S.
Senator from Rhode Island...................................... 82
Questions submitted for the record to Assistant Secretaries Roth
and Welch by Senator Feingold.................................. 84
Questions submitted for the record to Assistant Secretaries Roth
and Welch by Representative Bereuter........................... 116
EAST TIMOR: A NEW BEGINNING?
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific, Joint with the U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met jointly, pursuant to notice, at 1:30
p.m., in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug
Bereuter [Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific] presiding.
Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
meets today in session, jointly with the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee counterpart, to receive testimony on the
political and economic future of East Timor in the aftermath of
a string of historic events. It is uncommon for the House and
Senate Asia-Pacific Subcommittees, or their equivalent names,
to meet jointly, but these have been very uncommon times in
East Timor, to say the least. That has resulted in our second
joint hearing on the subject in just 5 months. I certainly want
to warmly welcome Chairman Craig Thomas and other Senate
colleagues who may join us.
I also want to thank the Commerce Committee, particularly
Chairman Bliley and his staff, for making this hearing room
available to us, since our major hearing room is under
reconstruction at this moment.
I also want to indicate that the House Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific will be holding a separate hearing entitled
``Indonesia: Confronting the Political and Economic Crisis,''
next Wednesday afternoon at 1:30 in Room 2200 of the Rayburn
Building. This back-to-back pair of hearings will allow the
Subcommittee to devote the requisite amount of time and
attention that East Timor and Indonesia each individually
deserve. Today we will be concentrating on East Timor, and I
serve notice to my House colleagues that I intend to try to
avoid a focus on East Timor in the hearing next week. We need
to spend an equal amount of time on Indonesian-American
relations.
I have some comments that I will come back to now, but
because there are pending votes in the House and the Senate, I
will turn to Senator Thomas for any opening statement he might
like to make at this point, and then comment further and turn
it over to my colleague from California, Mr. Lantos. Senator
Thomas?
Senator Thomas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I, too,
am pleased to be able to meet together. We have done that a
couple of times, both, interestingly enough, on East Timor. I
guess that indicates some of the interest that we have in it.
Last September, of course, the outlook for Timor was pretty
bleak. After the August plebiscite, 78 percent voted for
independence, there was a great deal of problem with the
Indonesian military unleashing a reign of terror designed to
drive people from their homes and into the mountains and to
West Timor. Unknown numbers were killed.
Thankfully, much of that pressure has changed, and by
pushing from the international community, the Indonesian
government requested U.N. assistance, stabilizing East Timor,
had the International Force there, I think carried it out very
well. I certainly want to express my appreciation for the role
that Australia played in this mission.
Today the picture is somewhat brighter, I think. Military
violence has ended. Generally, the U.N. has established
hopefully a viable entity there to provide the transition. Some
refugees have, as I understand it, begun to return. The Human
Rights Commission has issued a scathing report on Indonesia's
military. That is not resolved yet, but certainly has something
to be said for it.
However, the job is not finished. The infrastructure for
democracy cannot be established easily, and I think has not
been established, lacks the basic rudiments of self-government.
There are forces that see the situation, intend to destabilize
it from the border on West Timor. I think there are going to be
problems economically, certainly for attracting people to come
there and be able to support themselves, so this is a challenge
we face, certainly.
As you say, we are talking about East Timor today. However,
that question is not in a vacuum. There are other issues with
regard to Indonesia which may have a great deal to do with East
Timor.
I am very pleased to be here today, and I am pleased to
have our testifiers here, and who are more familiar with the
situation than we, and that is the purpose. So thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Senator Thomas.
We last met on the subject of East Timor on September 9th,
and murder and mayhem in East Timor were dominating headlines
around the world. The Indonesian military, in particular,
appeared to have been deliberately unwilling or perhaps in some
cases unable to uphold the responsibility demanded to provide
peace and security during and after the referendum in which an
overwhelming majority of East Timorese voted for independence.
One of the immediate concerns that we have, of course, is
to ensure that there is basic nutritional, health, and housing
services that are reaching the population of East Timor, and of
course the still vexing problem of the repatriation of those
East Timorese refugees who fled to other parts of Indonesia,
and particularly to West Timor, where some are still being held
as virtual prisoners by armed militia. Ensuring unrestricted
international access to and safe passage home for these
refugees is indeed Indonesia's obligation, and Jakarta's
continued failure in this regard will only exacerbate
Indonesia's standing in the international community, with grave
risk to Indonesia's own fragile transition process.
The recent decision by the Indonesian government commission
of inquiry to charge senior members of the Indonesian militia
and military for human rights abuses in East Timor is a very
important first step toward the closure of this bloody chapter
in East Timor's history, and appears to be the kind of strong,
positive action for which the U.S. and others have called.
While these indictments have an important bearing on U.S.-
Indonesian relations, we must not allow this set of issues
along to halt the proper engagement with Indonesia's military
or do crucial damage to our overall relations with Indonesia. I
strongly believe that previous well-intentioned but in some
cases special-interest motivated congressional actions, which
were focused almost exclusively on East Timor, have largely
been counterproductive for America's interests in Indonesia.
Now we have a chance to step back and certainly most
energetically examine Indonesian-American relations.
I don't believe we should repeat, of course, those
mistakes, if there have been some, nor should we do anything to
unintentionally undercut the bold actions of President Wahid to
investigate and prosecute those responsible for human rights
abuses in East Timor, by once again conditioning broader U.S.
relations with Indonesia primarily on developments in or with
regard to East Timor. I also believe that we should give that
important internal process a chance to succeed before
proceeding any further with a Bosnia-style international
tribunal for East Timor.
Those are my views and concerns. I am willing to listen to
information, of course, to the contrary. I want to say, before
I turn to my colleague, Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Member, that I
will introduce at this point the distinguished two panels of
witnesses.
Testifying for the administration will be the Honorable
Stanley Roth, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs. Secretary, we welcome you back to the
Subcommittee, where you rendered long and extraordinary service
as the distinguished Staff Director for the Subcommittee.
Also testifying for the Administration and concentrating on
United Nations operations in East Timor will be the Honorable
C. David Welch, an Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs. A career Foreign Service
officer, Mr. Welch has held a number of important positions
with the State Department in Washington and throughout the
Middle East and Asia.
We are also honored to have an excellent second panel of
distinguished witnesses. Mr. Charles Costello is presently the
director of the Carter Center's Democracy Program, and led the
Carter Center's election observer delegation to East Timor.
Prior to joining the Carter Center, Mr. Costello had a lengthy
and successful career with the U.S. Agency for International
Development, where he directed AID's Center for Democracy and
Governance.
Second, Dr. Andrew MacIntyre is a leading authority on the
politics of economic reform in Southeast Asia, and is presently
associate professor and director of the ASEAN-Pacific Project
at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific
Studies at the University of California-San Diego. He
previously served as associate dean of that school. While he
certainly is well respected and recognized for his outstanding
writing and presentations on Indonesia and other ASEAN
countries, it is his research and analysis on East Timor and
its future which makes him an especially valuable witness to
our joint Subcommittees today.
So we welcome all of you distinguished gentlemen from both
panels. I would ask my colleagues for unanimous consent that my
entire statement may be made a part of the record. Hearing no
objection, I will now turn to the distinguished Ranking Member,
Mr. Lantos.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have no
prepared statement. I would like to make a few observations, if
I may. I also would like to include in the record the written
statement of the East Timor Action Network.
Mr. Bereuter. Without objection, that will be in the
record.
[The prepared statement of the East Timor Action Network
appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Lantos. As you know, Mr. Chairman, it was the
Congressional Human Rights Caucus which held the first hearing
on East Timor of any congressional entity many years ago, and
indeed it was the Congressional Human Rights Caucus which held
the first hearing on Kosovo many years ago, at a time when
neither East Timor nor Kosovo were on anybody's radar screen. I
am mentioning this because there is a very naive and, in my
judgment, mistaken assumption that those of us who are
concerned with human rights issues in a very intensive manner
are dealing with the soft, difficult to define, nebulous arena
of international affairs, unlike people who deal with economics
or military matters and the like.
But in point of fact, recent experience very clearly
demonstrates that unless the human rights issues are attended
to early on, unless the problems are nipped in the bud, unless
the problems are approached at a time when far more peaceful,
constructive, mutually beneficial solutions are available, we
sooner or later find ourselves, as we did in the case of
Kosovo, with a major NATO war, the first NATO war in NATO's 50-
year history.
In the case of East Timor we find ourselves with a
catastrophe: a referendum opting for independence because there
was not enough pressure on the previous Indonesian government
to address the human rights and other concerns of the East
Timorese people. Of course the nightmare of deliberate and
wanton destruction of the infrastructure of a whole society,
leaving aside the enormous human damage and tragedy which
unfolded.
I am mentioning this because it seems to me that important
elements in our society, both in and out of government,
continue to either believe in the mistaken notion or pretend to
believe in the mistaken notion that the human rights issues are
soft secondary issues and they really do not need the kind of
attention that we give to problems once the crisis is here, as
it was in the case of Kosovo as every night we watched tens of
thousands of Kosovars dragging their weary bones into Macedonia
and Albania, and as we watched in horror as the militias and
the Indonesian military perpetrated the outrages in East Timor.
There is one other observation I would like to make, and
perhaps our Full Committee will need to hold hearings on this.
One of the most fascinating aspects of this post-Cold War era
is that we are simultaneously observing processes of
integration in many parts of the world, particularly in Europe
through the European Union, but not the only example, and
fragmentation. It is very difficult for most, even for
specialists, to make sense of these two simultaneous but
clearly contradictory phenomena.
Most outstanding examples, of course, are Soviet Union and
its disintegration, and the former Yugoslavia and its
disintegration, but Indonesia is not a bad example, because
East Timor is clearly not the only area which is interested in
attaining either some degree of autonomy or independence,
whether it is the Ucher region, whether it is Bali or other
areas. My first trip to Indonesia was in 1956, at the time of
the Sukarno dictatorship, where while the same centrifugal
tendencies were in evidence, they were not on the front pages
of our newspapers.
What we find now is that in many societies, in Asia and in
Europe and in Africa, the processes of integration and
fragmentation are unfolding simultaneously, and we stumble into
the creation of new states--whether we call them states or not
is secondary--such as Kosovo or East Timor. In some cases the
very viability of these states is very much in doubt, and the
chances are East Timor for many years to come will be an
international ward.
So I want to commend you for holding this hearing and make
a general observation that I hope when the human rights
community in the future will point to budding crises, our
voices will be more carefully listened to, because unless they
are, we will have many more Kosovos and many more East Timors,
with tens of billions of dollars in international financial
costs and of course the unmeasurable human tragedy and
suffering, which in the case of the former Yugoslavia by now
are close to 300,000 innocent men, women and children who have
been killed in one way or another since the breakup of
Yugoslavia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Lantos, for your reminder and
observations which I think are entirely appropriate. Whether or
not they are formal Members, I think every Member of the House
should be a Member of the Human Rights Caucus, and I appreciate
the leadership you have brought to it as co-chairman, founding
co-chairman, I believe.
One observation. I do think it is probably an error for our
Committee to be divided up so that we have a separate Human
Rights Subcommittee and also has major responsibilities for
international operations. It seems to me that the human rights
responsibilities ought to go directly with each geographic
Subcommittee and be an integral part of our process here, and I
think our division now perhaps does not serve us well.
I would like now to turn to our witnesses, and without any
objection, any Members' statements, opening statements, will be
made a part of the record. We will call first upon the
Honorable Stanley Roth for such comments as you might like to
make. The statements of you and other witnesses will be made a
part of the record in their entirety, and you may proceed as
you wish. Take 10 minutes or so, whatever you would like in
that respect, and any kind of summary you want to present will
be quite welcome. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Mr. Roth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Committee, I will take advantage of your
offer. I have submitted a rather detailed written statement. It
is a joint statement both for my colleague, Assistant Secretary
David Welch, and myself, so we won't be giving two testimonies
from the State Department. What I really want to do is to
assume a level of knowledge of these two Committees and not go
back and review what happened last year, which I think you are
intimately familiar with instead I'd like to start with a
current assessment of where we are and where we are going.
I would like to make one comment based on Mr. Lantos'
remarks, because I think in one sense you are not giving enough
credit to the accomplishments of the human rights community,
including yourself. If you think back to the events of 1975 and
to the events of 1999, I think you will see a powerful
difference.
In 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor, there was no
major international response. In fact, Australia even
recognized the incorporation. There was no concerted pressure
on Indonesia to change policy. Somewhere between 50,000 and
200,000 people, probably at the higher end of that spectrum,
died. The tragedy was absolutely off the scales in terms of
enormity particularly when you think about the percentage of
East Timor's population that perished.
As awful, unnecessary and painful as it was what happened
in 1999, was different. The pressure from the international
community, including, I am proud to say, the United States,
both administration and Congress--I think we were together on
this--was successful in mobilizing very quickly pressure on
Indonesia to allow an international force in. As a result the
casualties were a small fraction of what they were the previous
time.
I am not suggesting that anyone should feel good about what
happened, because obviously prevention of the tragedy would
have been far more desirable than what actually occurred. But I
think that there is a difference now in human rights and how
they are valued by countries. The fact that many Asian
countries are joined with a number of Western countries in
mobilizing this coalition is significant. So there has been
considerable success in this 20-plus years that you have been
talking about, both on East Timor and on other human rights
problems.
Now, let me start on the situation in East Timor itself.
What I propose to do is talk first about East Timor, and than
about West Timor, primarily the refugees; talk a little bit
about the question of aid levels, a little bit about
peacekeeping; and finish up on the question of accountability.
First, with East Timor, if you compare the situation now to
the hearing you held 5 months ago, approximately, the
difference is obvious. At that point there was no security in
East Timor, the destruction was continuing, we didn't know what
the level of fatalities or damage was, and the situation looked
grim.
If you look at it now, it is fair to say that East Timor
has been secured. The Australians did a brilliant job as the
head of the multinational force in establishing security very
quickly in East Timor. Many of the concerns that we had in
September did not materialize. There has not been civil war in
East Timor. There have not been concerted militia actions, only
a handful of incidents. There has not been cross-border
fighting. There have not been raids from West Timor into East
Timor. East Timor is secure in terms of military forces. That
is a huge accomplishment.
We are now in the process of making the transition--I know
how much you love the acronym soup--from INTERFET to UNTAET,
which are the names of the international operations. What it
means in operational terms and in terms of peacekeeping is a
transition from the Australian-led force to the force that now
will be headed by a Filipino commander.
It is, of course, a very large force, established by U.N.
resolution, and I will get to that in a minute. A very able
United Nations administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who has
done a brilliant job in trying to manage the situation, working
far more closely with the East Timorese themselves and
ameliorating many of the problems that had started to fester
before he arrived in terms of relations with the Timorese and
the U.N. force. Now he is dealing not primarily with security
issues but rather with the very difficult set of humanitarian
and development issues that East Timor will have to address.
In fact, one of the sad ironies now is, the greatest threat
to the security of East Timor is crime rather than military
violence. We have had 40-plus murders not related to politics
in the past few months, which is an unacceptable level and
something that we have to do something about. But the problems,
as I am trying to emphasize, are ones that are not subject to
immediate fixes.
East Timor was poor before the violence of this past
September. It is even poorer as a result of the destruction of
infrastructure, particularly an estimated 70 percent of the
houses. It is going to take a long time to reconstruct this
society, where the teachers have basically left, where the
medical establishment has basically left, the civil servants
have basically left. I think there are five lawyers in that
half of an island.
You can see the magnitude of the task to be done in terms
of setting up institutions, setting up government, providing
education, carrying out development. I fully expect that there
is going to be a vast array of problems. You are going to hear
stories that it is not going quickly enough, that the
priorities are wrong, that the U.N. should be doing things
differently, that aid isn't flowing fast enough. We will work
on those problems. I am not suggesting they are spurious but
those are the same problems we face in every area where you
have to deal with reconstruction on as vast a scale as this.
Compared to where we had been, when we didn't know that an
independent East Timor, rather, was going to exist, I think we
have come a long way.
I look at East Timor in three phases. We have the
humanitarian phase, which is dealing with the immediate
consequences of the fighting, the violence that happened last
September; the reconstruction phase; and, nearly
simultaneously, the preparations for independence. There is
still a lot of work to be done in terms of writing a
constitution, holding elections, preparing the institutions so
that somewhere down the line--it is not really clear to me
whether it will be a 1\1/2\ year, 2 years, or 3 years, it will
depend on progress--that East Timor formally becomes
independent. But I think those are the phases that have to take
place.
Now, the situation in West Timor. This is a far more
complex situation than is commonly understood. First, the
success. There has been a very major refugee return. At least
135,000 refugees have gone back. That is out of an estimated
total, and we don't really have the precise figure, of
somewhere between 225,000 and 275,000. I am not sure we will
ever have the accurate figures, but the figures I am getting
now include roughly 100,000 refugees remaining. That could be
off by 10,000 to 15,000, but that gives you a sense of the
order of magnitude.
Now, what is different from when you had a last hearing in
September? In September you had a situation where the refugees
had been taken to West Timor there almost overwhelmingly by
force. They were bused out, they were forced out at gunpoint,
they were terrorized until they left. You had a situation where
you had a large number of people, almost a quarter of a
million, who basically were there against their will, or at
least most of them we thought were there against their will,
and with very little access from the international community.
Now you have a situation where there is much better access
by the international community, but let me be clear, by no
means perfect access. It varies not only by place but by the
week. We just had a visit by the U.N. team to West Timor and
they said at this point the Kupang area is not getting good
access, whereas Atambua is getting very good access. This
changes by the day.
But overall there is international access. A lot of
refugees have returned, and, most importantly, we now have a
situation where we believe that the majority of the refugees
who wanted to return have returned. You have a situation where
you now have people, who were either involved with the militias
or were civil servants.
There was an extraordinarily large civil service in East
Timor that can't be justified now. There was featherbedding.
You had 28,000 civil servants. It is going to be less than half
of that. Many of those civil servants don't want to go back if
they have no salaries, and would rather collect their
Indonesian pension.
So you have groups of people who don't want to go back
ever. You also have groups of people who don't want to go back
now, either because they have planted a crop and they want to
wait for it to harvest or because it is the rainy season and
travel conditions are poor; or, more ominously, because the
intimidation hasn't ended and they are afraid to go back. There
are still militias present in some places and there still are
examples of harassment. There are people who are afraid because
they think it won't be safe for them to go back to East Timor.
There has been a tremendous amount of disinformation from
the militia groups but also, regrettably, in recent weeks there
have been some incidents in East Timor itself, in terms of
incidents against Chinese, against what are called ``Muslims''
meaning non-Christian Timorese. There are some genuine examples
where people are afraid to go back because of what has happened
to people who have gone back. I am not trying to exaggerate the
situation nor create equivalence. It is nothing like the
violence that happened in September, but there is real fear in
some elements in the camps.
So what we have is a far more complicated picture where,
even though the number of refugees is high, at least 100,000, I
can't tell you that there are 100,000 people that are being
held against their will. That would be a gross exaggeration.
The challenge for the Indonesian government is to separate
the people who want to go back from those who don't, to either
create jobs in West Timor or arrange transmigration out of
Timor, for those who have no intention of ever going back to
close down the militias, make sure there is no harassment, and
making sure that those people who do want to go back, whether
there are 10,000, 20,000 or 40,000, whatever number it is, can
go back; in other words, to bring to closure this chapter in
the refugee saga.
This continues to be a very high priority for the
Administration. I personally raised this issue with the Foreign
Minister of Indonesia last week, and reminded him of the Leahy
Amendment and the fact that the United States will not be able
to resume normal relations, or at least training and FMF
military sales, until the refugee problem is addressed and
finalized. I made it clear that they should not delude
themselves that the current situation is satisfactory. We could
not meet the Leahy condition today, and I have told them that
that is the policy of the administration, and that message has
been delivered at many levels.
More briefly, in terms of aid, I think you are aware that
there was an international donors conference. This is an
excellent example of burden-sharing, which is something that
Congress generally is insistent on in international situations.
Australia, Portugal, Japan, are all major donors, along with
ourselves. A total of $522 million was pledged at the donors
conference in Tokyo over a 3-year period, so that there is a
massive amount of aid, roughly comparable to the need,
available for East Timor.
In terms of U.S. aid, I am afraid I don't have the degree
of detail you would like this week. I hope to have it for you
next week. That is because we are finishing consultations, with
both the House and the Senate, on how to spend the $25 million
that was earmarked in the last appropriation bill for East
Timor in ESF. But the overwhelming majority of that will be
spent by AID for development, and there will be some
contributions to international trust funds as well.
In addition to these funds, there will be further funds
that will be spent, not out of the earmarked funds, for
civilian police. You may have seen the figure in my statement,
about $8.5 million, to pay the salaries of American civilian
police. We believe that is a crucial component in dealing with
the crime situation. During the Indonesia hearing next week, I
hope to be able to give you a precise breakdown of how we would
spend that $25 million. But the United States can be proud that
it is one of the largest donors and is continuing to help the
people of East Timor.
In terms of international peacekeeping, I think you are
familiar with the three different phases of the international
operations, starting with UNAMET, going to INTERFET, and now
ending up with UNTAET. At every step of the process we have not
been in the leadership role in the number of personnel, but we
have played significantly. We had a number of civilian police,
30 civilian police, 3 military observers, in the first phase.
We had more civilian police, 45, and 3 military observers
in the second phase, plus some forces on the ground that
President Clinton announced in September in response to the
violence. I can't give you one level figure for these since the
number varied, but at a maximum it was about 200 people on the
ground in East Timor plus a number offshore and in Australia.
As for the third phase, that decision is on the President's
desk and expected, I hope, even later today, but the concept is
consistent. We will maintain the basic principle of what we
have done, since September. There will be no combat troops, I
can tell you that, consistent with what was decided in
September.
There will be a modest presence, which is important to show
that we are still committed to a peaceful resolution, but it
will not be a large force. They will be primarily rotational
units that will be exercising under the discretion of the
CINCPAC. They will not be formally attached to the U.N.
peacekeeping mission. We will have, again, more details for you
as soon as the President signs the formal order. We will be
happy to brief staff and Members and to testify next week, but
again, there will be no conceptual break with what we have been
doing thus far, on which the Congress has been fully briefed.
Finally on the subject of the commissions of inquiry and
the accountability issue, there are two different processes. As
you know, they both came to a head on the same day last week.
There was the Indonesian process that you referenced in your
opening remarks. It turned out to be a much harder hitting
report than had been anticipated. It named 33 individuals,
including 6 generals, the Governor of the province, the head of
several of the militia groups. It was, by anybody's definition,
a hard-hitting report.
That is not, however, by any means the end of the process.
It is the beginning. These names have now been turned over to
the Indonesian attorney general for investigation. He has
announced that he will make recommendations within 90 days, and
possibly sooner, by the end of March, as to who should be
prosecuted. Then there is the question of what happens in the
prosecutions themselves, in terms of convictions.
At the same time, there is an international process with an
international commission of inquiry. Their report has been
submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations. That
was a less detailed report actually than the Indonesian report,
and it has called for continued international involvement in
the investigation and in the judicial processes.
The Secretary General has indicated, in his cover letter
submitting that report to the United Nations, that it is his
desire--which, I should say, the administration supports--to
let the Indonesian process play out first to see how effective
and how credible it is. The notion is if Indonesia carries this
out all the way through, if you have a report that goes to the
top, that has a credible judicial process, that has
convictions, then it may not be necessary to do more on the
international side, at least in terms of a tribunal.
There may be room for cooperation on getting evidence and
sharing evidence from the different investigations. At the same
time we have made clear that if the Indonesian process isn't
credible, that if it falls short, that there will be pressure
for the international community to do more. The administration
has said that at this point it would like to give the
Indonesian government the lead with its domestic process, but
we have made it very clear that if it is not an adequate,
credible process, then we will have to consider supporting an
international process.
Why don't I stop at that point.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Secretary, you have conveyed to us an
impressive amount of information in a brief period of time, and
well-organized.
We would now like to hear from Secretary C. David Welch,
the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.
Mr. Welch?
Yes? Have you got to vote?
Senator Thomas. Can I ask a question or two? I just got
beeped and I am going to have to go vote.
Mr. Bereuter. Absolutely. If you will hold off, Mr. Welch,
we will come back to you.
Mr. Welch. That will be fine.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You covered an
awful lot in a fairly short time.
Obviously the times have changed, they have changed for the
better, but the real question, and you can attach it to several
things we have been involved in lately, is you can make this
first transition but the second one doesn't seem to happen
very--Haiti, Kosovo, all of those places. I understand that
they were set up for 1,400 civilian policemen and there is less
than half of that there. Why is that?
Mr. Roth. First, please don't assume that that is going to
be the final outcome. We are going to get many more civilian
police out there. The delay is partially because one has to get
qualified civilian police. This is a multinational effort. It
includes a lot of Third World countries. You want to make sure
they have the right training and can handle the situations,
particularly----
Senator Thomas. Those are all excuses, but the fact is that
they aren't there and I am told that they need them there.
Mr. Roth. I agree, we need to get more out there. Including
us, by the way, since we haven't done our share yet, because we
haven't funded our own U.S. civilian police.
Senator Thomas. This concerns me because, we go through
this getting away from the battle part and getting over that,
and did that very well, but then for instance the $500 million
you mentioned, how much of that has been delivered?
Mr. Roth. I don't have the exact number, but obviously very
little, considering that the pledging conference was just a few
weeks ago. But----
Senator Thomas. How do you expect them to make a living and
do it economically? They don't have any economy. What is the
major economy there?
Mr. Roth. Overwhelmingly it has been agricultural and it
has been subsidized by the Indonesians in the past. I don't
mean that to sound as positive as it sounds. I talked about the
featherbedding of the civil service, which we are not going to
repeat.
Part of Indonesia's shameful legacy there is that not one
factory was ever built in East Timor. We have to look and see
if we can get some investment once you have the appropriate
conditions. But I think there are several sources of money.
One, very promising on the coffee side, which is a major export
and something the United States has been trying to develop.
A second source is Timor Gap revenues. As you know, there
is believed to be a lot of gas and maybe oil in the gap between
Australia and East Timor. In the past there was an agreement
between Indonesia and Australia about how those revenues should
be shared. Now there is a process going on to try to
renegotiate so that East Timor gets its share of those
revenues, which could be quite a lot.
We are talking about a place of 700,000 to 800,000 people.
We are not talking about multibillion dollars worth of needs.
There is a potential for tourism. They have a granite industry.
I am not telling you that they are going to be rich, but there
is a chance that they could make it if they can get past this
reconstruction.
Senator Thomas. Just one more observation, and I am
positive about it, as you are, and I think we can do something.
But here is a country with 700,000 people and basically no
economy, basically no structure for self-government, and they
want to be independent.
Now we have kind of completed the main thing. That is
always in the public arena, and we have done that. Now I guess
the real issue is, what do we do now to make this work. You
could even ask the basic question: Is that the basis for an
independent country?
Mr. Roth. I think the answer is going to have to be the
choices that the people of East Timor and their leaders make
and how they set this country up. For example, an East Timor
that gets along with Indonesia, that gets along with ASEAN,
that has positive relations, is going to have a better chance
of making it--it shares an island, or half an island, with
Indonesia--than one which doesn't.
Senator Thomas. Absolutely.
Mr. Roth. We have seen some extraordinarily impressive
leadership from Xanana Gusmao and Ramos-Horta and some of the
others, despite the horrific violence which was inflicted on
them. They have traveled to Jakarta, met with the Indonesian
leaders, and said they are interested in reconciliation and
want to work together. Indonesia is now talking, incredibly,
about opening up a liaison office back in East Timor, and the
Timorese are talking about doing it in Jakarta.
Senator Thomas. That's good.
Mr. Roth. Don't sell them short.
Senator Thomas. Good. I guess my whole issue is that we
have gone through this. I am very pleased with what has
happened. I think we have done a good job, Australia has done a
good job, but unless there is some pretty serious planning done
now and some movements to implement that, it is hard to imagine
that this thing is going to take off.
Mr. Roth. You are absolutely right.
Senator Thomas. And you are exactly right. If they are
going to completely identify--move themselves away from
Indonesia, they are----
Mr. Roth. Agreed.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Senator Thomas. Come back if you
can.
Now we will turn to Secretary Welch. You may proceed as you
wish.
STATEMENT OF C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should just proceed to
questions. I have little to add to what my colleague Stanley
Roth has already said.
Perhaps I should point out, in answer to the Senator's
question, that the U.N. leadership is concerned with, bedeviled
by, some of the very same problems he identified. The Under
Secretary for Peacekeeping was in my office yesterday. We had a
long discussion about the pace of CIVPOL deployment. It is an
issue that they are riveted on, given what is probably a more
pressing need for policemen than for military at this point.
They are focused on it.
Second, Sergio de Mello, who I think we all agree is a very
capable administrator, identified as one of his two primary
problems, when he briefed the Security Council just a couple of
days ago, would be the flow-in of dollars to begin the process
of reconstruction and rehabilitation in a way that will get
money into the economy to sustain people there, and so that
livelihoods can be rebuilt again. The Secretary General of the
United Nations is planning a trip to East Timor imminently, and
I expect this will be on his agenda, as well.
[The joint statement of Mr. Roth and Mr. Welch appears in
the appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. I thank you, Secretary Welch. We are aware of
the fact that you had a joint statement, the two of you, and so
we will proceed to questions at this point. Since we began with
Senator Thomas so he could leave, we will go the Ranking
Member, Mr. Lantos. We will proceed under the 5-minute rule,
but I believe we will have a chance for two rounds.
So, Mr. Lantos?
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend our
witnesses and I want to commend the administration for handling
a very difficult situation very effectively. I am sorry that
our colleague is no longer here, because I think our insistence
on others paying their pledges and commitments would have a
somewhat more authoritative sound if we had not been delinquent
for so long in paying our United Nations dues, but it is
certainly the hope of all of us that these pledges will be
fully met.
I have a rather specific general suggestion. I know that
Japan has been quite forthcoming in terms of economic
contributions to all of these international endeavors, and I
commend them for this. But I find it unacceptable that two
generations after the end of the Second World War, Japan is
still hiding behind what is clearly an obsolete constitution in
terms of their military participation in peacekeeping efforts.
My understanding is that there are a handful of Japanese in
a support role, but I would like to ask both of you, if both of
you wish to deal with this, whether there is any high level--
and I mean high level, Secretary of State level--initiative
that we can anticipate, pointing out to the Japanese that if
German troops can participate in the Balkans, as they have in
large numbers and continue to do so, since they have recognized
that the new Germany has very little to do with Hitler's
Germany of the 1930's and 1940's, what do we need to wait for
in terms of Japan accepting its proper share of responsibility
in peacekeeping or even peacemaking activities in Asia and the
Pacific region?
I find this lack of burden-sharing, from the point of view
of one Member of Congress, unacceptable. I find the notion that
the Japanese are prepared to write a check but they are not
prepared to participate physically--had it not been for the
Australians, this endeavor, just as the Kosovo endeavor, would
have fallen overwhelmingly on the shoulders of the American
military.
This is an absurd situation, and I have raised this issue
with previous administrations, and I will continue to raise it
with this one and future ones. I would be grateful, Secretary
Roth, if you would address it as fully as you are willing to
do, because this facade of a clearly obsolete constitution is
no longer an acceptable answer.
Japan's role in trying to build a Greater East Asia co-
prosperity sphere three generations ago is not an answer as to
why the Japanese are not participating at least to the same
extent that the Australians are participating. They have the
resources. They have the manpower. They have certainly the
economic capability. Our timidity in approaching this issue in
bilateral dealings with the Japanese is extremely
disconcerting.
Mr. Roth. I am sorry that you raised the issue in the
context of constitutional reform rather than in the context of
Japanese policy, because I don't think they need to reform
their constitution in order to address this issue. As you know,
Japan has had some participation in international
peacekeeping--I am thinking about Cambodia--and it is not
impossible for them to do it.
The issue is not their constitution, and I would argue in
fact that there would be huge reactions in Asia if Japan were
to amend its constitution; that you might see a surprising
amount of negative feedback. There was a lot of hostility, you
may recall, when Japan sent the peacekeepers to Cambodia, even
though we hugely applauded it.
But I don't want to beg the issue, which is more Japanese
participation in these peacekeeping exercises, and I have not
only heard your comments but agreed with a lot of it. On my
last trip to Japan, which was about 3 weeks ago, I had many
conversations with them. My emphasis was more on the police
than on the peacekeepers in this case, and the reason for that
is, the real need in East Timor is for the police rather than
the peacekeepers.
Mr. Lantos. No, but my question is a generic question.
There will be future crises in Asia, and unless we have the
United States or Australia again carrying the main burden,
there will be no mechanism by which to implement policy, when
the Japanese are fully capable of participating.
Mr. Roth. I agree with that, and I think there is a further
point which has been made to them, that if Japan wants a
permanent seat on the Security Council, it is going to be
expected that it will play a larger role in the decisionmaking
process and in the international activities that are approved.
So this is an issue where Japan is going to have to do better.
I must tell you, though, I met with a number of
parliamentarians on the same trip that I just described, and
the reaction I got was, ``You know, if they had one fatality in
Timor, it could set back Japanese participation in peacekeeping
for 10 years.'' There is this mentality that Cambodia was a
close call and almost got them permanently out of the
peacekeeping business.
So there is a tremendous timidity, but I think in terms of
the trends for the future, you are right, there is not one
standard for Japan and one standard for all other countries
that do peacekeeping, and they are going to have to do better.
Mr. Lantos. Now, this degree of sensitivity, which I agree
with you is present, will have to be overcome. I mean, the
notion that no Japanese can potentially be hurt anyplace on the
face of this planet is an idiotic and naive notion. This is
still a dangerous world. Large numbers of other people get
hurt. To have Japan exclude itself from carrying any of the
physical burdens of activities such as this, sticks in the
throat of many of us, and we hope that the administration will
raise the issue with the seriousness that it merits.
Mr. Bereuter. Maybe the gentleman and I would want to talk
about a hearing on that subject.
Mr. Lantos. A good idea.
Mr. Bereuter. The Chair will recognize himself now under
the 5-minute order.
We all recognize the role of the Portuguese, and certainly
it is self-evident that there has not been enough focus on
training for self-government in East Timor. I am reminded also
that when the Portuguese left their colonies, East Timor was
absolutely in the worst condition of all their colonies, with
not a single college-educated person in East Timor, as I have
noted in various books.
I would like to focus a little bit on our effort to see
progress toward independent governance in East Timor. I don't
think it makes sense that they are going to be an independent
country in an economic sense, but I am glad, since autonomy is
now acceptable, we are going to proceed in that direction, and
we have to think of them, I guess in a benevolent sense, as an
international welfare case for a while.
How long is it expected for the U.N. to set up the
necessary functioning institutions for self-government? Maybe
we will start with you, Mr. Welch. What are your predictions in
that respect?
Mr. Welch. I think first we ought to speak to their
intentions, that is, the U.N.'s. It is inherent in the title of
the organization. It is a transitional administration.
The way I understand it from talking to de Mello and other
senior leadership at the United Nations, they want to work
themselves out of business, and as far as they are concerned,
the sooner they do that, the better. Now, they realize of
course that they can't--it isn't going to be that simple
because they have a variety of targets, and you mentioned some,
which pose some serious challenges, and I think the question is
at what pace and what phase they would do those things.
When this was addressed in a session of the Security
Council at the beginning of this week, de Mello put his
emphasis first on starting the--doing a more effective job in
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and resetting the economy on
somewhat of a footing, but on a firmer footing, with some
reluctance to pursue immediately into some of the political
issues for fear of politicizing the environment there.
He had listed two principle challenges in his briefing to
the Council. First was to establish some rapport and
cooperation with the East Timorese. That I think he has made a
credible and good start on. Second was this economic area that
I mentioned earlier, where there have been more difficulties.
So, to the extent I understand their phasing, it would be that.
Mr. Bereuter. Let me, in order to draw you out further on
this, what can be done, not only by us but internationally, to
expedite the self-governance process? What conditions have to
be met before elections are possible? With respect to democracy
building, what specifically will our country do to help build
democratic institutions and institutions of self-governance?
Can you take on that three, that combined three questions
there? Mr. Roth?
Mr. Roth. Sure. First it is useful to know what the
Timorese themselves are thinking. I have talked about this
precise question to Xanana Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, and their
thinking has been quite pragmatic. Prior to the violence in
September, their hope had been--they had always assumed they
would win the referendum--that they would have independence in
6 to 9 months. Following the violence and the reports of what
had gone on, they were talking more in terms of 3 to 5 years.
Now that they are back on the island, not outside, living
there and seeing the international efforts, we are hearing
about shorter time periods. We have heard as little as 18
months. We have heard 2 to 3 years at the outer limit. So, it
is coming down to a manageable bite. They have defined the
first year as reconstruction, and the second year as both
development and institution-building.
Xanana Gusmao and Ramos-Horta talk about the need for a
constitution, the need to have an electoral process. Right now
there are no elected leaders. Xanana, by virtue of his role as
a guerilla leader, has been prominent. Ramos-Horta, by virtue
of his role the past 20 years in exile and his receipt of the
Nobel Prize has been another leader. But they don't have
elected officials. So they need to work out procedures for
local elections, figure out what it is that they want, a
process by which they have a national election, and have the
campaign and do it.
So there is a fair amount of work that needs to be done
just in building the basic building blocks of politics. There
are no government institutions. But I think the intent is to
move quickly on it. Again, if you take the 18 months to 3 years
I think is the expected outcome, nobody is saying that they
have to be fully independent economically before they can move
toward political institutions, elections and independence. The
feeling is that they are going to get aid after they are
independent, as well.
Mr. Bereuter. My time has expired. I will come back on a
second round for more specifics on the aid and the current
budget.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Hastings, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Chairman Bereuter.
Gentlemen, thank you for your presentations. In your joint
offering under the heading ``U.S. Policy-Meeting the
Challenges,'' you say the following: ``These then are the
challenges that we face: building a new East Timor, resolving
the fate of remaining refugees in West Timor, and ensuring
accountability for past atrocities.'' And that is where I wish
to place my focus.
As an observer of international tribunals where bringing
people to the bar of justice for their actions in other areas
of the world, the process has been glacial to say the least,
and the results have not in all instances approached what some
of us might think would be a reasonable conclusion.
I am curious, in this area, what is the United States
position on the development of an international tribunal with
reference to East Timor? What has been the Indonesian
government's response to calls--for example, Carlos Belo called
for an international tribunal--and what about the military? Has
there been a response from them in this area?
Mr. Roth. I thought I had laid out what the
Administration's policy is. We are giving priority first to
seeing how the Indonesian domestic process rather than the
international process proceeds. As you know, it is not the norm
that there is necessarily an international tribunal for every
egregious human rights situation that happens everyplace in the
world. It is more when you don't have a prospect for justice
that you have to look at an international mechanism.
What we are looking at now is a process in Indonesia that
could potentially be a historic break from the past, where
there has not been accountability for a wide range of human
rights abuses. By contrast, there has been an investigation of
East Timor. It was quite thorough. It named a number of
individuals. It was unusual in Indonesian terms by naming
specific people, including high level generals up to General
Wiranto, the Governor of the province, militia leaders. If you
had sat down with experts on East Timor and asked them to draw
up a list of people that they thought needed to be
investigated, and compared it with what the Indonesian
investigation concluded, you would be quite satisfied.
So now the question is, what is next? It is one thing to do
a report. It is another thing to indict them and it is another
thing to prosecute them and still another thing to convict
them. We are going to have to see how this process plays out
before we can give you any kind of answer as to whether there
has been justice and accountability in East Timor.
The point we have made to the Indonesians is a basic one.
The Indonesian government is strenuously opposed to an
international tribunal. That is not just the military, that is
the government itself. They have said this is a different
Indonesia, it believes in the rule of law, it believes in
justice, and it is going to do this.
We have said and many other countries have said, fine, we
are certainly prepared to give you the chance, but you have to
do it, and if you don't do it, then the international community
is not going to give you a blank check. We are withholding the
right to support an international mechanism if we don't feel
that the job domestically is adequate.
So that is the stage we are at, but I have to emphasize
that the Indonesian process has gotten off to a very strong
start.
Mr. Hastings. Let me shift emphasis, then, to USAID. It is
reasonable, I believe, to assert that food aid is going to be
required for quite some time. With the rainy season ensuing
there and many roads being impassable, my curiosity is piqued
to ask the question whether or not there is any direction
toward projects that would, for example, build roads that would
help the delivery process or for an infrastructure.
Is there anything being considered along those lines? Or
otherwise you are just--there are a lot of places we go in the
world, you know that if you can't drive a truck or you can't
get something there, even the food aid that we propose to give
sometimes becomes difficult, and not just the United States but
donors otherwise. That will be my final question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Roth. First, let me commit to get you a more detailed
answer for the record, since this is not an area of expertise
on my part. But let me give you some general impressions,
having traveled to Timor twice last year and flown over it
several times.
My impression is, food is not the major problem. You had a
food problem at the time of September because you had displaced
people. More than half the population of East Timor was either
internally displaced within East Timor or was across the border
in West Timor. The farms were not being attended to, crops were
being pillaged, and so of course you had a food problem. Even
when you had food growing, you didn't have the people living
there to tend to it.
But that is not the biggest problem, and Timor is such a
tiny place that it is not really the question of getting the
food to market that is the biggest problem. We are not talking
about vast distances. Sure, the roads can be improved, but let
me tell you it is vastly different from when I went to East
Timor for the first time in 1981, when there weren't roads. It
is not like that now.
So I suspect that that is not necessarily going to be the
biggest focus. It is going to be a health delivery system, it
is going to be creation of some kind of investment for
industry, creation of some jobs program that they are going to
need very badly. It is government. They have no police force.
They have no courts. They have no medical processes. There are
no doctors. There are no nurses. There are no civil servants. I
mean, it is an incredible absence of personnel in these areas
that the U.N. is just beginning to address now.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, I had said that that was my
final question. I don't have another question. I just, not
meaning to argue with you, Mr. Secretary, but while CRS may not
be an eminent authority, at least they make offerings. In their
November 5th report that I have in hand, they say because of
destruction of homes, crops and farmland, the World Food
Program estimates that 740,000 of a total East Timor population
of 890,000 will need food aid over the next 6 months, and this
is a November 5, 1999, report. I am not suggesting that it is
inaccurate, but I am glad to hear what you said, and somebody
needs to tell CRS that food ain't the issue.
Mr. Roth. No, I think we are talking about two different
things. What I am trying to suggest is, of course there was a
staggering need, as a result of what happened, in what we call
humanitarian aid. That is housing, medical, as well as food.
That is clear, and there has been a major international
response to that.
But that is a very short-term piece. It has been the
question--I took your question to be on the development side
rather than on the immediate emergency humanitarian and
disaster relief side. There once we get past this initial hump,
once you have the next crop, I don't think food is going to be
the overwhelming problem of East Timor. Jobs, will be a huge
problem for East Timor.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.
The gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega, is
recognized.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to
commend you and Chairman Smith for calling this joint hearing.
I think it is not only timely but it is important that we also
get the latest information from the administration, and I
certainly would like to offer my personal welcome to Secretary
Roth and Secretary Welch for their presence here in the
Committee.
So that I won't be redundant in expressing my personal
sense of frustration and advocacy, because I have always said
in the past several hearings, Mr. Chairman, and I am just going
to say it very briefly, when we talk about East Timor, we have
to talk about West Papua, New Guinea. But I will not talk about
West Papua, New Guinea today, Mr. Chairman. It will be
definitely my intention to offer legislation concerning this
very serious matter affecting West Papua, New Guinea, but let
us just touch the issue of East Timor.
I think that I would be remiss, Mr. Chairman, if I did not
say something for the record, to offer my personal
commendations to the government of Australia for taking the
initiative and the resources and the efforts that they have
made, not only in the geographical sense but certainly taking
the leadership of what they had to do to bring peace and to
restore peace in that region of the world, especially when it
directly affects its own security and well-being.
I recently, and I am sure both of you Secretaries have
noticed the latest development out of Indonesia, where the
Prime Minister has asked the former general of the army or
whatever the armed forces, Mr. Wiranto, to step down, and he
has refused to do so. What are the implications, do you think,
in the future for this as far as Indonesia's own stability will
be for the future? I say this because I think it will also have
real serious implications on the stability with East Timor. I
would just like to ask you gentlemen for your reactions to
that.
Mr. Roth. Let me first say that this is a work in progress,
the story is not over, and that, as you know, President Wahid
is due back on Sunday. It is expected at that point that there
will be some resolution of this issue. Most people are betting
that General Wiranto will step down.
I will have more to say on this subject when we have the
second hearing next week, but just to answer your question
head-on, it is very clear what the position of the United
States is. We believe strongly in the importance of civilian
supremacy. This was a point which Secretary Cohen made on his
trip to the previous government, pointing out that the military
had to abide by the results of elections and not attempt to
take matters into its own hands.
Here you have the president of the country, exercising his
right to determine who is going to be in his cabinet. So for us
this is a question of civilian supremacy. The exact mechanism
for working it out is something that I leave to the
Indonesians, but the U.S. position is clear.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I appreciate your response to that, but I
thought we had a similar problem also with Cambodia where there
was a coup taken, and Mr. Hun Sen is still around. What will be
our policy toward a military coup, if Wiranto does decide--I
know I am being hypothetical, but will our position be just to
say, ``Well, you shouldn't do that,'' or will there be any
strong position taken by our government, if there will be a
military coup on the part of Wiranto, on this issue?
Mr. Roth. Let me first say that we are not seeing
indications to suggest a coup will take place, in terms of the
unit that would have to participate. Futher more key generals
in Indonesia have made statements expressing their support for
the government, including the head of their military forces on
the uniformed side. I don't want to perpetuate the story that
the United States has any information suggesting a coup is
imminent. We don't.
Nevertheless, if you ask me the question, what would be the
policy if there is a coup, Ambassador Holbrooke has already
spoken authoritatively for the U.S. Government on this several
weeks ago. You have undoubtedly seen his statement where he
indicated it would have very dramatic and severe consequences;
that the United States supports the democratic government, and
there would be many consequences if that was overthrown by
military force.
I think, and I hope, that the Indonesian military has
learned a lesson. They were warned there would be consequences
if they did not abide by the outcome in East Timor. They
didn't. There were major consequences for them, including a
suspension of the military relationship with the United States
and other aspects of international opprobrium. There would be
similar consequences, even stronger ones, in the event of a
coup.
But again, the main message I want to say is we do not have
information suggesting that any kind of coup situation is
imminent.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I notice in your statement also, Mr.
Secretary, that we plan to provide about $300 million in aid
for a 3-year period. What kind of assistance is Portugal
planning to give to East Timor for its reconstruction?
Mr. Roth. Considerable. One of the hard things in
explaining or even evaluating these aid programs is, a lot of
the contributions are in kind rather than in dollars, and so it
becomes more difficult if you are providing a hospital ship to
service individuals or if you are sending a unit to help
administer something. It is more difficult than just cash
transfer. If you would like, I would be happy to give you more
detail than this for the record on what Portugal----
Mr. Faleomavaega. If you would, please.
Mr. Roth. Yes, certainly.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, may I have one more
question, or am I----
Mr. Bereuter. We can come back to you, but if it is a brief
one we can go ahead and take it now.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I just wanted to follow, Mr. Secretary,
and Mr. Welch also, the question and the concerns expressed by
my good friend from California, Mr. Lantos. Japan is the
largest investor in all of Southeast Asia. No other country
makes more money out of these Southeast Asian countries than
Japan. I do want to express that similar concern.
If they want to be top of the heap, be a permanent Member
of the Security Council like Germany, there should be added
responsibility given to them, especially when it comes to--it
is very easy to give money. I mean, anybody can make money. But
when your sons and daughters come back in body bags, that is a
very difficult situation, what our country has had to go
through.
Do you think that, in adding to what Congressman Lantos has
said earlier, is Japan offering assistance to East Timor for
reconstruction?
Mr. Roth. Japan is offering very substantial assistance to
East Timor for reconstruction.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How much?
Mr. Roth. I could fish out the numbers but I----
Mr. Faleomavaega. That is all right. You can just provide
it for the record.
Mr. Roth. They are probably the largest or the second
largest donor. It is a very large, significant program.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you.
The Chair will exercise discretion and grant the gentleman
from California, Mr. Bilbray, an opportunity to engage in
questions here. It is, after all, his Committee hearing room,
and half his relatives are Australian so he has taken a great
interest in the East Timor issue. The gentleman from
California, Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the chance to
participate. For those of us in California, we have always been
frustrated with the tradition in the United States of--America
has a bad habit of looking East in foreign policy all too
often. I guess it is a tradition that goes all the way back to
our Founding Fathers. But obviously there was a lot of us that
had major concerns of what was going on in this part of the
world as we were looking at Eastern Europe and were so obsessed
with Eastern Europe, and there was a concern about what was
happening in East Timor.
In fact, my relatives in East Timor and the Ambassador and
the Prime Minister of Australia kept hitting me up as a Member
of Congress about, ``Where are you? Where are you coming from?
Why isn't there anything being talked about this?'' And I am
sure that my colleague from Samoa would say you get the same
thing. It is like, hey, guys, you know there is something going
on out here, and I guess as much the media should be blamed for
the lack of focus on this as anything.
My question gets around, and really I want to reinforce my
colleague from California's comment about the fact of trying to
get across the message to the economic powerhouses of the
world, that with the economic opportunities and prosperity
comes the responsibilities, and with those rights the
responsibilities need to be borne. I think Japan is one that
quite clearly needs to understand that part of this brave new
world that exists out there, if I may use that term--it is not
very politically correct, but it is--is that if you want to be
a world leader and participate economically, then you have a
political and cultural and social responsibility to participate
in a lot of fields.
The $500 million that you were talking about over 3 years,
that is compared to what kind of contribution have we seen
from--Japan has matched that pretty close, or how close have
they come to it?
Mr. Roth. The $500 million was the total contribution of
all the countries and international organizations that attended
the pledging conference. It is an exceedingly complex figure to
unravel because a lot of countries included what they were
already giving to East Timor, please future contributions, plus
in-kind contributions, plus contributions to two international
trust funds, one for the expenses of the U.N. operation, the
UNTAET trust fund, the other for the World Bank trust fund,
which is the coordinating mechanism for development.
So trying to sort it out in a very simple fashion for you
is not that easy. The $500 million figure includes everyone.
That includes Japan, Australia, Portugal, U.S., and all the
other donors. By the way, that is roughly in line with what we
think the needs are.
Mr. Bilbray. Yes, and I would just like to remind all of
us, I guess we forget about that, is that in the South Pacific,
United States, Australia and New Zealand have placed massive
amounts of resources into their protectorates, taken on a
responsibility that the rest of the world community has not
taken on in a lot of ways. I think that too often when we see
this, we forget that Australia and New Zealand are very much,
for such small countries, very much committed into cooperating
with the small island communities. They are trying to protect,
trying to participate and get involved with it. Our involvement
with our released protectorates, our newly created independent
island nations out there, we still have participation out
there.
My constituency is just saying, are we paying our fair
share? I will just say this, and I have said it before, and I
have said it on the House floor: If it wasn't for Australia and
the pan-Asian countries stepping forward, we probably would
have been in this Catch-22 of going in and doing it for them
again. I think that we need to encourage everyone, including
the Japanese, to bear their fair share.
I would say this to my colleagues who are looking at
Europe: I would only ask NATO, look at what Australia has done
and say, how could a little country like this make such an
effort, and you guys constantly be looking at us to do it? I
guess the answer is, is we will do it. We will get in there and
do it for them.
Is it really beneficial for us in the long run, and for
places like East Timor, to have the United States always be the
one who goes in and be the lead group? I guess that is a
rhetorical question, because I think it is great having
subregional participation like we are seeing in East Timor.
Would you like to comment on this as being a prototype for
the future? Not just in Asia and Europe. I am talking sub-
Saharan Africa and South America, too.
Mr. Welch. I think as a general matter, wherever we can
find capable, determined regional leadership, that helps in any
multilateral effort.
Now that at least three Members of the Subcommittee have
raised this question of Japan, I would note that Ambassador
Holbrooke will be testifying on another peacekeeping issue to
the Committee next week. He is intending to visit Japan in the
not too distant future. I hope you will communicate the same
message to him, and I will do so myself, about your concern in
this area, because it is where both the responsibility to pay
and the capacity to pay meet up, is in their interest in
playing a global role such as by permanency on the Security
Council.
Mr. Bilbray. See, my concern is that we need to be
proactive, Mr. Chairman, and I will close with this statement.
We need to be proactive and send a signal around the world that
we are willing to participate and be a supportive nation
anywhere in the world, but that we no longer should be looked
at as being the primary source of relief everywhere in the
world.
I think that that message needs to be sent, like sub-
Saharan Africa, we need to be proactive and communicate in sub-
Saharan Africa that they need to get their act together. We
will help them, we will participate with them, but the days of
doing it for them, need to come to an end. We have to teach
them how to fish rather than keep giving them fish, and I think
that East Timor has been an example we should use as a
prototype.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.
We have been joined by Chairman Ben Gilman and Senator
Feingold. Welcome, gentlemen. I will recognize you under the 5-
minute rule in that order. Chairman Gilman?
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief. I
want to thank our distinguished Chairman of the Asia and
Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Bereuter, for holding what I consider
a very timely hearing today, and for his diligent attention to
the problems in Indonesia and East Timor. I also want to
welcome to the House our former colleague, Senator Craig
Thomas, and his colleague, Senator Feingold from the East Asian
and Pacific Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. We welcome them as well.
Although the situation in East Timor is stabilizing, it is
obvious that much is left to be done. First, the refugee
repatriation process must be completed expeditiously and
safely. There are still a substantive number of refugees who
still remain in West Timor and want to return home.
I am pleased that our former staff Member, Stanley Roth,
has now gone up to higher levels and is keeping an eye on all
of this, and we welcome him along with Mr. Welch.
Second, the remaining militia elements must be controlled
and ultimately disbanded, and Indonesia is going to have to
dissolve these militia groups which are crossing the border
from West Timor into East Timor, and I hope we can find a way
to do that.
Third, all those responsible for the violence in East Timor
must be held accountable for their actions and eventually
brought to justice. We are all anxious to see the report of the
Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights, and we call
upon the government of Indonesia to take action on the findings
and make that report public as soon as practicable.
In that regard, former armed forces chief General Wiranto
should step down from his government post and account for his
actions in the aftermath of the referendum on independence in
East Timor last year. His resignation as well would send an
important signal to others that the military must extricate
itself from Indonesian political life and return to the
barracks and provide civilian control.
Fourth, the United States and the international community
should recognize the challenging transition that is now
underway in East Timor and extend a helping hand to assist that
important transformation. Our Nation has a key role to play in
the democratization and reconstruction of this new island
nation.
Last, I want to thank the forces of INTERFET, but
especially the Australians, who played a key role in its
deployment and the cessation of violence in East Timor. I also
want to commend our brave American forces who, half a world
away from home, supported this historic transition to an
interim U.S. stewardship.
We look forward to free and fair elections at an
appropriate time in the future in East Timor, and wish the U.N.
Transitional Administration for East Timor and the East
Timorese people the best as they undertake this unprecedented
journey.
Mr. Chairman, if I have a moment, I would like to ask a
question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When Bishop Carlos Belo, a 1996 Noble Peace Laureate, has
called for an international tribunal to bring to justice those
who perpetrated violence in East Timor. I would like to ask our
witnesses, what is our position on such a proposal, and what
has been the Indonesian government's response to calls for such
an international tribunal? The international community's
experience with such tribunals is, to be kind, uneven. Are
there more appropriate methods to bring to justice those who
planned the violence in East Timor? Mr. Roth?
Mr. Roth. First, let me say that I think in terms of your
opening statement I could basically say I agree. I made many of
the same points in my testimony, only not as well, but I think
I see no conceptual differences or nuance differences in
anything you have said and the Administration's positions.
In terms of your specific question, the position of the
administration is that at this point we would like to give the
Indonesian domestic process on the commission of inquiry a
chance to play out. I have detailed previously that this
Indonesian press has had a very credible start; that there was
a significant investigation; that a number of high level
individuals, including prominent generals, were named, also the
governor of the province and the heads of key militia groups.
It was a very credible report.
But I also stressed that this was the beginning of a
process, not the end of the process, and that we in the
administration do not consider the box checked simply by the
report. It now goes to the attorney general, who has 90 days to
make recommendations for indictment and prosecution. Then they
have to have trials, and then they have to have convictions.
We would like to see a situation where Indonesia is capable
of getting justice and accountability in its own right. That is
the position of the Indonesian government. ``Let us do it
ourselves. This is something we need to do to show that
Indonesia has changed.'' But we have made it very clear that
until the process has played out, until we see the end result,
we are not prepared to say that we are opposed to any
international effort or that there won't be an international
effort. We are rather saying, ``Do the job right, and if you do
the job right, then there won't have to be an international
effort.''
Mr. Gilman. Just a quick followup. At a recent seminar in
Washington hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace, Indonesian
Attorney General Marzuki and other senior officials discussed
truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa and in
Latin America. Would we be supportive of the establishment of
such a commission in Indonesia?
Mr. Roth. This is an Indonesian government decision. If
they decide to establish such a commission, we will be
supportive of it.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you
pursuing those questions.
Now we recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Senator
Feingold, for questions that he might have.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
being late, but in the 10 minutes that I have been here, I have
already heard more that I agree with than I sometimes hear in
the Senate in a whole day, and that certainly does not apply to
Chairman Thomas.
But let me just say, first of all, thanks to Chairman
Bereuter and Chairman Thomas for scheduling the hearing. I
certainly agree with Chairman Gilman's comment about his idea
for General Wiranto's career future. I think that is an
excellent suggestion. I also want to say that I agree with much
of what Congressman Bilbray was saying.
One of the reasons I voted against the Kosovo operation and
the Bosnia operation, as much as I wanted to support it and the
administration policies, I did not feel that the European
nations were doing as much as they might have to take the lead
in that situation. What I thought was impressive and exciting
about the East Timor situation was the Australian commitment,
and I want to take this opportunity to publicly commend the
people of Australia, the government of Australia, the military
of Australia, for what they did in that situation.
Let me just say, as you go forward with the hearing, if I
heard correctly, I believe Ambassador Holbrooke will be before
the Committee. When he speaks to you about the Congo operation,
I want folks to notice, if they could, that that fits in with
what Congressman Bilbray was saying.
It is an African-led initiative, where specifically no
American troops are being requested. This in the model of
people in the region saying they want to take the lead, and I
very much concur with those remarks that I think can be the
basis for some bipartisan agreement about the kind of
commitments that we make as a country in the future.
But I am especially pleased that the Senate and House
Committees with jurisdiction over U.S. policy in East Asia have
again taken the opportunity to convene a joint hearing on the
important issue of the future of East Timor. As the people of
East Timor start down the road toward independence, we should
focus our attention on two important issues: accountability for
the past and action for the future.
The international community should join the people of East
Timor in embracing their transition to independence, and I
really do welcome the day when East Timor is truly independent
and our policy toward that new country is not considered only
in the context of our policy toward Indonesia. Of course the
two will always be interrelated, but this is an important step
forward. East Timor, as Ambassador Holbrooke likes to say, is
the first new nation of the new millennium. It should be
treated in that way, and our conversations and our efforts with
regard to it should not always be simply with regard to its
position vis-a-vis Indonesia.
I know many of the things that I was interested in, Mr.
Chairman, have already been asked, so I just have two brief
questions. One is for both Mr. Roth and Mr. Welch. One of the
recommendations made in the report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor focuses on establishing
procedures for assisting survivors, and I will just quote:
``A clear-cut policy should be established for official
custody of remains, their return to families, and the support
families can expect during this process. Those involved in
interviewing survivors should be trained in supportive and
sensitive techniques for doing so.''
As we all know, almost every East Timorese citizen has been
touched by the violence that has scarred that territory over
the past year, and I commend the Timorese for their courage in
this horrible situation. I would ask, what is the United States
doing to ensure that there is adequate counseling and other
appropriate care for the East Timorese people as they seek to
rebuild their lives and their country? Start with Secretary
Roth.
Mr. Roth. I don't know. This is not something I have
focused on. I would rather get you an answer for the record
than make it up.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Welch?
Mr. Welch. Get you an answer for the record.
Senator Feingold. Both of you? OK. I look forward to that.
I know that the administration is seeking $18 million to
support ongoing bilateral and multilateral efforts in East
Timor, but I notice that the ESF request for East Timor is $15
million less than the 2000 estimate of $25 million. Would you
speak to the priorities that our assistance will focus on East
Timor? Then, given the vast needs of the territory, where
rampaging militias wiped out virtually all of the
infrastructure, would you please explain why would this
reduction be appropriate, given the needs?
Mr. Roth. I am puzzled by the numbers. I am not aware of
any reduction in aid to East Timor, only increases. There is
the $25 million that the Congress earmarked, as you know, to
ESF. You had a lot to do with that. On top of that, there is
money that is going to be made available, $8.5 million, I
mentioned in my statement, for paying the salaries of civilian
police, and then there will be some additional sums that will
be provided for police functions and the like.
I indicated before you arrived that we are still in the
last phases of consultation on spending of the $25 million, and
so I can't announce it today. I hope I can announce by next
week exactly how we are going to break it down, but I did say
that the overwhelming majority of the money is going to be for
AID and it is going to go on the development side, and be for
precisely the types of things you have talked about.
Rather than going in many different directions, the focus
is to try to get as much money as possible for poverty
alleviation and development in East Timor. I will be able, as
soon as we finish the consultation process, to give you an
exact answer. There is no reason to withhold that from you.
Senator Feingold. I thank you very much, and I thank the
Chairs.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank you, Senator.
Senator Thomas, do you have any concluding remarks for this
panel?
Senator Thomas. No, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you.
I would just say I heard numerous commendatory comments
about Australia here, and I think in general that is shared by
Members of Congress and the American people. In fact, I don't
remember so many positive comments about another country since
the Canadians helped us rescue hostages, and it is well
deserved.
Finally, let me say that in today's paper I noticed an
indication that a ``notorious East Timorese military leader''
suspected of being involved in massacres, leading attacks on
Australian peacekeeping soldiers, has been arrested, and the
Indonesian government arrested him. Do we expect any additional
arrests soon? How is it that the U.N. can call for this
military leader to be extradited to East Timor? There is no
judicial system in East Timor.
Mr. Roth. I asked the same question this morning when I saw
the press story. Presumably it means that the U.N. would have
to do something in terms of dealing with the person from a
judicial perspective, but I am waiting for a real legal answer
rather than a common sense answer like that.
Mr. Bereuter. Share it with us.
Mr. Roth. First of all, though, let me say that with all
the well-deserved praise of Australia today, I hope we won't
forget the many other countries that also participated. Don't
forget that we had a deputy Thai commander, which was an
extraordinary step, as well as a Thai detachment. We had a
large Filipino detachment. We have had a Korean detachment.
So there is a lot of Asian participation and a number of
other countries outside the region, and now we have a Filipino
taking over from the Australian as commander. So I completely
agree with everything wonderful that has been said about
Australia, but I would just like to add some praise for some of
the other countries.
Mr. Bereuter. So noted, and I think that is appropriate you
call that again to our attention.
Mr. Roth. Second, on the specific incident, what is
significant about this arrest is, one of the only negative
developments on the security side recently has been the fact
that in the enclave, Oecusi-Ambeno, that there have been
several recent incidents, violations of that border and threats
to the security.
The militia leader arrested was specifically linked to that
violence, and it was a response to the United Nations saying to
the Indonesians, ``This is unacceptable,'' that the security of
the enclave is just as inviolate as the security of the rest of
the border between East Timor and West Timor. So they took a
step by arresting this individual, who was found, apparently,
according to the press, with some arms.
I have no specific information about whether there are
plans to arrest other militia leaders, but I did note before
that the Indonesian report on accountability did mention
several of the militia leaders, so I think there is going to be
an effort to have some accountability for that.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. I noted Senator Feingold's
comments about budgetary questions. I have no doubt that the
informal caucus here on East Timor will take care, if the
administration doesn't, of the funds.
But I also noted that there are not the funds--the funds
are short in the administration's budget with respect to what
the assessment team said about Indonesia itself. I would just
ask the State Department to focus a little more attention on
Asia. When it comes to budgetary questions, Asia shouldn't be
neglected.
I would now expect we would thank you gentlemen for. Mr.
Welch?
Mr. Welch. If I may interject, of course Mr. Roth will take
back your concern about focus on assistance, but if I might say
something about another form of funding that is still pending,
and that is with respect to our peacekeeping assessments in
support of the United Nations effort in East Timor.
Mr. Chairman, we have a reprogramming request that has been
submitted to the Congress for a significant sum of moneys in
this regard. We have now received a bill from the United
Nations for East Timor which we cannot pay. We can't pay it
because we haven't had action on the reprogramming request.
That is not a problem in the House; it is a problem on the
Senate side. Ambassador Holbrooke has raised this with the
appropriate people on the Senate side. I hope that will be
clarified and allowed to move through.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much. We are going to have the
second panel now, and Chairman Thomas, Senator Thomas, will
conduct the hearing for that portion.
Senator Thomas. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. We
appreciate it very much.
The next panel, as has already been introduced, is Charles
Costello, Director for Democracy Programs, the Carter Center;
and Dr. Andrew MacIntyre, associate dean, Graduate School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of
California. Welcome, gentlemen. Glad to have you here. Yours
appears at the top of the list, Mr. Costello, if you would care
to begin.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. COSTELLO, DIRECTOR FOR DEMOCRACY
PROGRAMS, CARTER CENTER
Mr. Costello. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about East Timor's future. I have
submitted a longer written statement which I will summarize
briefly. I also have a short document describing the Carter
Center's actual observation of the public consultation process,
the referendum balloting, and our findings, and I ask your
permission to include that in the record as well.
Senator Thomas. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Costello. I led the Carter Center's observation mission
to East Timor in August 1999, a mission which had generous
support from the U.S. Agency for International Development and
the State Department, with help, personal help, from Assistant
Secretary Roth, and we received some support from Portugal for
that mission as well.
I personally witnessed the incredible determination of the
East Timorese people to express their will peacefully at the
ballot box in the face of serious intimidation and violence
from the Indonesian government and military, mainly through
their surrogates, the militias. The people literally came
streaming out of the mountains on foot at dawn on August 30th,
and most voting was over by noontime. More than 98 percent of
registered voters turned out, with 78.5 percent favoring
independence.
The rest of the story is well known. It is ultimately a
happy story, thanks especially to Australia and the United
Nations, and East Timor by no means should be thought of as a
disaster in spite of the suffering the East Timorese people
have had to endure to achieve nationhood. But independence will
be a hollow victory indeed if the transition over the next 2 to
3 years does not lead to a democratic political system in East
Timor. Fortunately, prominent East Timorese leaders such as
Alexander Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta, and Bishop Belo all
proclaim their commitment to democratic values.
If there is one thing we have learned in the last 20 years
about political transitions, as part of the so-called
democratic wave in the ex-communist world and elsewhere, it is
that these countries need help in building their new governance
structures and civic institutions just as much as they need
help with their economies and physical infrastructure. Truly
democratic societies, ``free countries'' we might call them,
are only built up over time, and sustainable democratic
political systems depend on a foundation of democratic values
embedded in a nation's culture.
Neither public administration training for new civil
servants nor a single free election alone will deliver
democracy to East Timor. Long-term programs of democratic
development assistance are needed as badly as any for economic
recovery or infrastructure rehabilitation. Democracy, like most
anything else, is learned by doing it, and unfortunately the
East Timorese under Portuguese or Indonesian occupation have
had precious little practice.
It is our view that support to civil society, primarily
nongovernmental organizations, for the strengthening of civic
institutions that will work alongside the U.N. Transitional
Authority for East Timor and later the elected East Timorese
government, deserves the highest priority. Be it assistance to
fledgling political parties, the independent media, or to NGO's
that participate actively in the public policy arena, this is
the area where U.S. bilateral assistance can play a vital role.
This is also where the U.S. has a comparative advantage,
based on the experience gained by American organizations
working with strong bipartisan support from the Congress for
democratic development around the world over the last 20 years.
A vibrant civil society is the basic underpinning and guarantor
of a democratic society and strong political institutions, as
de Toqueville brilliantly observed about our own country more
than 200 years ago.
Civil education in the broadest sense, through
participation in public life by private groups acting freely
and peacefully, will be essential to building a successful
democratic future for East Timor. Good governance doesn't just
happen; you have to work at it. It is as dependent upon civil
society actors and organizations as it is upon elected public
leaders. Freedom rests with self-government, and self-
government rests first and foremost with the people. I urge you
to give East Timor that kind of support. They have earned it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello appears in the
appendix.]
Senator Thomas. Mr. MacIntyre?
STATEMENT OF ANDREW MacINTYRE, ASSOCIATE DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PACIFIC STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Dr. MacIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I can bring
some fresh thoughts on this discussion here, coming from well
outside the beltway. I don't want to go over the points and
themes that have come up in the earlier discussion, so let me
just try and hit a few main points and then we can open things
up to questioning.
We all have a very clear sense of just how horrible the
situation has been in East Timor in the not too distant past,
but I guess the first point that I would like to underscore is
just how extraordinarily well things have gone in the past 4
months. I think they have gone way better than anyone would
dare to have expected back in September or October last year.
I mean, if you just think what has gone on, we have already
heard how security has been now assured in the territory,
thanks to the INTERFET forces. We have got a U.N. Transitional
Administration now in place. The ADB, the Asian Development
Bank, and the World Bank are now gearing up to get moving. We
have got the National Council for Timorese Resistance which is
functioning as an umbrella political organization in Timor,
moving to play a very constructive role in getting Timor's
political elite thinking and talking about issues. We have got
the National Consultative Council, which is a joint body set up
by the U.N. including Timorese leaders, which is actually
getting moving now on some serious decisions.
This is all pretty significant progress, and I don't think
many people would have thought it at all likely in such a short
timetable. So if point one is, things are actually going better
than we might have hoped, given how bad they had been, point
two is, not surprisingly, there is still an enormous task
ahead, a truly enormous task ahead.
I think the most immediate priorities are fairly clear, and
we have heard this from other speakers. There is just urgent
need now to get the economy moving, particularly in the rural
sector. That is where a lot of the employment activities are
going to becoming. Urgent needs to get stable administration
and governance reestablished through the territory.
But it the challenges that come a little further out that
are actually the more interesting ones, and in some ways
contain potentially more complex matters. I think it is very
important that people start to think now about getting the
United Nations out, and that seems an extraordinary thing to
say since all the attention has been on getting the United
Nations in. It is clear that East Timor could not have come
into existence without the United Nations. The United Nations
is critical to the birth of East Timor.
But it seems to me that we need to be very careful to avoid
a situation of a protracted presence of this big, large
international bureaucracy sitting on a place that has never had
self-government. Think of metaphors of big ocean liners being
slow to turn around. I think we need to be giving thought now
to what the exit strategy is for the United Nations.
The projections I have seen are for them to leave sometime
toward the end of 2003. Timorese leaders Xanana Gusmao and
Ramos-Horta are talking much more in terms of the end of 2002,
and I think they are right to. I think that the critical issue
here is, when we look at getting this new democracy up on its
feet, is for us to be thinking sooner rather than later about
permitting these people to have self-governance.
So that is one point that I would like to put up for your
consideration, because it is not getting much air play in all
the discussion. I think more broadly about priorities for a
newly democratic East Timor, perhaps the single most pressing
international priority is their relationship with Indonesia,
and one of the big achievements you folks are achieving here in
setting up two separate discussion sessions is to detach these
two discussions, and I think that is very constructive.
But we also need to remember that East Timor's relationship
with Indonesia will have more bearing on its future than just
about anything else that happens. It would be very easy for
Indonesia to create enormous difficulties for East Timor. Now,
there is no sign that that is what we are looking at. We are
seeing the military elite, the civilian elite in Jakarta, all
looking in another direction. We are seeing the militia, what
remains of them in West Timor, being quite weak. But the fact
remains that East Timor has to have very careful regard for its
relationship with Indonesia.
This is where, I guess, the difficulties start to come, and
it focuses on the issue of accountability. I think there is
widespread agreement on the need for accountability on the part
of the Indonesian armed forces for what has happened in East
Timor. There is no debate on that. The issue really is how this
proceeds, and I was very heartened by Secretary Roth's comments
that the administration's position is to have this proceed
through Indonesian channels to begin with. I think that is the
way for us to proceed.
I think it is important that Timorese leaders themselves,
Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, are both taking the approach of let's
put emphasis on truth-telling rather than retribution. But
there could be difficulties here, and I do think we need to be
careful that any efforts to bring Indonesian military officers
to account do not destabilize democracy in Indonesia. Because
let's not forget the single worst thing that could happen for
East Timor, the single worst thing that could happen would be a
collapse of democracy in Indonesia. That would be the most
worrying scenario. So we are going to have a very delicate
balancing act in front of us all as we on the one hand want to
see serious movements toward accountability, but at the same
time ensuring that this does not fundamentally destabilize the
situation in Indonesia.
I had some other points in my written remarks that I won't
go into here, but which were more to do with the importance for
East Timor of building links more broadly in the region, so
that they are not dependent just on the United States,
Australia, Portugal, for assistance. I think it is going to be
very important for them to build links to the rest of Southeast
Asia, to the Association of South East Asian Nations, and in
particular to the Philippines as the other Catholic democracy
in the region.
So let me simply close by hitting I guess two main points
here. We know how bad this situation has been, and we know that
the challenges ahead are truly daunting. But let's not lose
sight of the fact that there has been surprising progress,
surprising progress in the last 4 months, and let's not lose
sight of the really quite difficult balancing act that is going
to be needed in the next several months, in the short-term
future, as we all seek to see continued progress with nation-
building in Timor and at the same time pursuit of
accountability and justice for the Indonesian military. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. MacIntyre appears in the
appendix.]
Senator Thomas. Thank you very much, both of you. Very
insightful.
Let me go, Dr. MacIntyre, to your last comment. It is going
to be very difficult to steer the next period of time, however
long that is, toward accomplishing both the governmental
establishment as well as the economy. Who do you see taking the
leadership in that?
Dr. MacIntyre. I think to begin with the ball is in the
Indonesian court. Let me make sure I understand your question.
Taking the leadership, are you referring there to the question
of accountability or----
Senator Thomas. No. Let's assume that if everybody walked
away from East Timor, they would not do very well.
Dr. MacIntyre. Right.
Senator Thomas. So who is going to manage this idea of
putting together a democracy? Is it going to be the U.N.? I
don't think it is going to be Indonesia is going to break their
neck, when they are in as much trouble as they are, to be
working on somebody else's success, do you?
Dr. MacIntyre. Absolutely not. No, I think the key players
to begin with will indeed be the U.N. Transitional
Administration that is there, together with the other main
developmental agencies, the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank. But I suppose the point that I would really
like to emphasize is, a lot of the discussion so far today has
all been about what is everyone else in the world going to do,
what can the United States do?
That is all fine and important, but I think what we are
overlooking here is the importance of empowering East Timorese
themselves, East Timorese themselves, to take control of
decisions. I think that is critical to things moving ahead.
Senator Thomas. Mr. Costello, do you see any--you were
there for the election and you indicate it went well,
apparently so--do you see any indication of the establishment
of the elements of democracy? Do you see a constitution? Do you
see a rule of law? Do you see a structure for some final
elections to take place?
Mr. Costello. All of that remains to be done. The transfer
of authority from the United Nations to an elected East
Timorese government should occur after free elections have been
held, with the likelihood of having a constitution in place
prior to elections, although it could be the other way around,
with the newly elected Timorese government dealing with its
constitutional issues.
But we are of the view that elections too early in that
process will be counterproductive. That has been learned, a
lesson learned, I think, in a number of places around the
world, that a bit of a cooling off period, a concentration on
some of the other issues, and adequate time to prepare the
Timorese for their national elections. I mean elections should
be held off until year 2 or year 3, at about the time that the
U.N. is ready to hand over administration, although I am
referring to national elections. I think that early
establishment of local councils, elected local councils to deal
with governmental matters at the district level would be indeed
quite helpful.
One of the issues with elections at the earliest possible
date is that it is clear that right now the only organized
political force is really the CNRT, and in terms of fostering
pluralism and a multiparty system, early elections would lead,
as a foregone conclusion, to just them assuming full control of
the government.
Senator Thomas. Do either of you know of an example or a
pattern that has been done by the United Nations, to take a
country that has never governed themselves into governance in a
democracy?
Dr. MacIntyre. No. I don't disagree with anything my
colleague here has said. I guess the spirit of my remark is, I
have great fear for the possibility of the U.N. staying three,
four, 5 years and stifling development. I need to be cautious
that the burden of my remarks don't sound like I am suggesting
a mad rush to elections. I completely agree with the spirit of
the previous comments. I just fear ocean liners that don't turn
round.
Senator Thomas. I agree with you. However, there needs to
be some help. I am not an expert, but I was in Jakarta some
time ago, a few years ago, and they were seeking to do some
things but they didn't have a rule of law, for example. They
had a human rights Committee but they had no way to enforce it.
So these folks are not very familiar with what it takes to
cause a democracy to work, and somehow someone has to be
helpful in that regard.
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Bereuter. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. Gentlemen,
sincere thanks to you for your contribution here today. I
appreciate the administration witnesses that we had before us,
but their answers tend to be more predictable and guarded, and
so I always look forward more to the second and third panels
that we have at our hearings.
Dr. MacIntyre, I want to express my appreciation to you for
bringing your Australian knowledge and experience and knowledge
of Southeast Asian island countries to our country. Mr.
Costello, thank you for the work that you did in early
difficult days in East Timor.
I remember when, in fact one of the most unforgettable
experiences of my life is working as an election observer with
the Carter Center team and former President Carter in
Nicaragua, and so I am interested to know what the Carter
Center's continued role will be in East Timor. Has it been
decided?
Mr. Costello. As Director of the Democracy Program, I know
that I would like to continue work of the sort that I described
in my statement, concentrating on strengthening of civil
society. There are a number of organizations, NGO's, in Timor
that were tolerated during the Indonesian period, others that
worked in semiclandestine fashion, but now a great number of
new NGO's that have sprung up but have very little experience
and training.
So, along the lines of what I said in my oral statement, I
think it would be important for us, I would certainly like to
see us carry forward a program. We have indeed internally
presented an initial proposal for review, so I hope that we
will be able to do work like that. So that the constitution-
making process, for example, should be one which includes
hearings, which includes participation of civic groups, and
that whole preparation for elections is not simply about the
machinery of elections but about media, about organization and
training of political parties, all of the elements that fit
around your formal government institutions that really sustain
a democracy.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Costello and Dr. MacIntyre, I ask both of
you this question, just some assessment of how deep the
divisions are between those that supported independence and
those that did not in East Timor, and that implies their
ability to work together, your commentary on that.
Dr. MacIntyre. The answer to that is not clear. It depends
on who we have got in mind. I think there is a portion of the
population that at least nominally was in favor of integration
with Indonesia, but did so perhaps out of fear or perhaps
because they were themselves employed in state bureaucracy or
in some ways locked into the system. I think a fair portion of
those people would be quite able to switch sides now, but that
is clearly not true of everyone.
There are clearly--we heard about this in the refugee
camps--it is also true of some Members of the elite that have
left East Timor and are not in Jakarta or elsewhere in
Indonesia, who feel they can't go back. So I think it very much
depends on who we are talking about.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Costello?
Mr. Costello. Let me add to that, that I don't see that as
a major problem now, a major obstacle. Obviously the voting
demonstrated that nearly 8 out of 10 in Timor favor
independence. Some people who left the country, the majority in
fact, were driven out as part of this depopulation strategy of
the Indonesian military.
But there is a goodly number, and as Secretary Roth said,
they are not sure but would estimate perhaps half of those who
are outside of East Timor won't go back. They have in fact
voted with their feet. They were civil servants who don't want
to go back. Some of them had links to the militias or to pro-
integration groups. They don't feel comfortable in the new
Timor.
So I think that the more dangerous issue in terms of
democratic development will be something that you saw that
dates all the way back to 1975, the Timor uprising against
Portugal, is factionalism on the part of the pro-independence
groups. There is a certain element of small town politics in
East Timor, a lot of personal rivalries and old grudges, and if
those groups start feuding they could really damage the kind of
basic consensus around their new democratic system that is so
badly needed.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. Dr. MacIntyre, I would like to end
with two economic questions for you. First, what is there in
East Timor that you would expect to be the most likely areas
for economic activity in the future, economic development?
Second, there is often discussion about the hope for major
oil and gas findings in the Timor Gap. Do you think it is
likely that Australia and Indonesia would renegotiate their
agreement in that area so that East Timor could in fact have an
opportunity to benefit from any oil and gas that might be
discovered in that area?
Dr. MacIntyre. With regard to the first question, if we
look in broad terms, what is going to be the main economic
activity, it is very clear it will be agriculture. Most people
in East Timor will be engaged in agriculture. That will be the
basis of the economy.
Mr. Bereuter. Is coffee one of their crops?
Dr. MacIntyre. If we look to what is going to give them
export dollars, that is where coffee comes in, that is where
oil might come in, and conceivably, given some time and some
good luck, tourism, et cetera, et cetera. But if we look at the
basis of the overall economy for the next so long it is going
to be agriculture, and that is why getting the agricultural
economy moving again, fertilizer, credits, all those sorts of
things that are necessary, is so important.
Your second question, my understanding of the situation is
that that is indeed what is anticipated, that there will indeed
be a restructuring of previous agreements to take account of
what are basically changes in the map now, and that the
Australians are fully expecting to play ball on that. It is not
clear to me how Indonesia could resist it. Maybe they could
drag the chain, but I don't see that as a major issue.
Mr. Bereuter. I enjoyed visiting the campus where you did
your study last August.
I would like now to turn to our colleague from the Commerce
Committee, representing a part of the San Diego metropolitan
area, to make inquiries of one of the gentlemen who is from the
San Diego metropolitan area. You are recognized.
Mr. Bilbray. Yes. Dr. MacIntyre, I would just like to say
we have more in common than we would like to admit sometimes,
right?
I would just like to compliment both our witnesses. I
really have to reflect on my colleague from San Diego's comment
about we should celebrate how well it has gone. Anybody who is
a betting person probably would have laid money that between
the time of the election to this day, we would have expected so
much more social upheaval, so much more problem and so much
more difficulty for the peacekeeping forces, and we have been
lucky that way.
You may disagree with me strongly, but I would say this and
I will ask you this question. I think that those of us in the
States may grossly underestimate how much not having the Yanks
on the ground helped in the process. I think that too often we
forget as Americans that we really are, an easy target for
extremists to point fingers at and try to justify actions based
on the fact that it is the imperialistic Yanks and they are
moving in, or whatever.
I think part of the formula we need to learn from East
Timor is having the Aussies go in and be the higher profile
took away the extremists, at least to some degree, not that
they can't hate the Aussies as much as they do Yanks, but it
takes away some of the tools that extremists use traditionally
as a way to cause turmoil, to cause violence and whatever, by
saying, ``Once the Americans move in, you'll never get them
out, the imperialists.''
I am just wondering from your comment, is that really that
much off base? Could that be part of the secret, that we were
able to have a group of peacemakers who weren't so
overwhelmingly intimidating and didn't play into the extremist
lines? Could that be part of the formula that gave us the
success?
Dr. MacIntyre. Mr. Bilbray, thanks for the comments. Let me
come to the first part of your remarks first. I need to be
careful in underscoring or focusing on the progress that has
been made in the past 4 months. I don't in any sense want to
diminish from the horrors of what went previously or the scale
of the challenge that lies ahead. But I guess I want to
discourage people from being despairing of the scale of the
task at hand, because much more that is good has happened than
I think we would have expected.
To the second part of your question, I strongly agree with
you. I think this is a model we should be looking at for U.S.
foreign policy more broadly. I mean, this is real burden-
sharing in action. This is the thing we want to see.
It seems to me that the U.S. in fact played a more
important role in all of this than the burden of the discussion
has suggested. I think it was important for Australia to know
where the United States stood on this issue. I think that
mattered to them in their decision to go in. But in broad terms
I very much agree with you. This is the model for burden-
sharing that it would be good to see more of.
Mr. Bilbray. It is funny you say that about where America
stood on this issue, because like I said before, I was just
astonished that every time I went back to visit family and
every time I met with a diplomat, every time I met with a
Member of parliament, they kept coming up, ``Will you be there
if we need you in East Timor? Are you willing to go in there
with ANZAC? What about the repercussions of some kind of claim
of Europeans moving into an Asian country?''
There was just an absolute concern that political
correctness or some kind of race-baiting would scare us away
from being supportive, and I was glad to see that didn't
materialize, and it was just interesting for me hearing this,
and I never heard anything here in D.C. from Americans even
reciprocating on it. So I was concerned there.
But getting back to this issue that I want to keep pinging
on, is the fact that I guess the fact that the Americans were
not the high profile up front, I guess I would say to those of
us who are Americans, we forget that we are today what the
British were in 1774. There is a bit of status at taking a shot
at an American soldier, just the fact that you are taking a
shot at an American soldier. I think when you go back and read
our history, there was a bit of status to the fact that we were
willing to stand on a village green and actually face off with
the world' premier military power, and that added status even
though we fired and ran like hell.
I leave it with that, but I just think that we need to
think about the fact that those of us in the States really do
live insulated from some of the pressures and some of the
perceptions the rest of the world have of us. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Bilbray. Mr.
Bilbray, you are welcome anytime you would like to join us on
an Asia Pacific Subcommittee.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony here
today. We appreciate your contributions, and your entire
statements will be made a part of our record. Thank you. This
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the Subcommittees adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
Febuary 10, 1999
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