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HURRICANE KATRINA: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THE RESPONSE

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2006

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, and Dayton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good morning.

Today the Committee will scrutinize the performance of the U.S. military, both National Guard and active duty forces, in the response to Hurricane Katrina. We will analyze the military's actions on the ground, review the military's work with other agencies involved in the response, and explore the relationship between the Guard and the active duty troops. In doing so, we will examine the fundamental issue of whether the U.S. military is properly structured to meet the 21st Century threats to our homeland.

There is no question that our men and women of our military shared much in common with the first responders helping the victims of Katrina. That is, they performed very well under extraordinarily difficult and, at times, dangerous conditions.

There is also no question that the military brought substantial resources to relieve the suffering of the Gulf region. From Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), vehicles, and communications equipment to the ships that became vital platforms for search and rescue operations, we have heard throughout these hearings of the military's enormous contributions to the relief effort.

There is also no question, however, that the military was not immune from the conflicts, the confusion, and the lack of coordination that occurred across all levels of government and that may have prevented the response from being as quick and effective as it should have been. Furthermore, it is apparent that these problems existed not just between the military and other Federal agencies, but also within the military itself.

The active duty military and the National Guard share many traits: Unmatched material assets, experienced and dedicated leaders, and highly trained personnel possessing courage and devotion

to duty. Yet during Katrina, the active duty military and the National Guard at times seemed to be, to paraphrase Churchill's famous quip about England and America, two forces separated by a common mission.

Katrina revealed a split between Northern Command, the combatant command focused on homeland security and created in the wake of September 11, and the National Guard, which is under the command of its State's Governor. The very institution that Americans look to as a model for a unified chain of command revealed itself to have fallen a bit short in that regard. Better coordination between the active duty forces and the National Guard must be ensured before the next disaster strikes.

I appreciate the appearance today of our first panel of very distinguished witnesses: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale; the Commander of Northern Command, Admiral Timothy Keating; and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Steven Blum. I look forward to hearing their views on these important issues.

The second panel of witnesses will describe military preparedness and response on the ground for Hurricane Katrina. I'm very pleased to have with us today General Russel Honoré, the Commander of the Joint Task Force Katrina, and General Bennett Landreneau, the Louisiana National Guard Adjutant General.

I'm interested in hearing from all of our witnesses what problems they encountered in melding two forces into one cohesive effort, the challenges they faced in trying to establish a clear and effective chain of command, and the difficulties in the relationship between DOD and FEMA. For example, FEMA officials have told the Committee that the Department of Defense subjected its Katrina mission assignments to what FEMA viewed as unnecessarily protracted and detailed reviews that delayed the requested support.

On the other hand, we know that Defense officials often saw those same requests as vague and not clearly identifying the exact support that was needed. "Send us everything you've got" is not a reasonable request to make of a military that bears enormous national security responsibilities around the world.

This conflict reveals, above all, one of the fundamental problems that the Committee's investigation has uncovered no matter what level of government we examined, and that is the lack of concerted pre-disaster planning so that the expectations and capabilities are understood in advance and so that needs can be met rapidly, effectively, and efficiently when disaster strikes.

Among the questions I hope we will answer this morning are: What did DOD do to prepare for this storm, both in terms of planning and prepositioning of assets? Why didn't the Department of Defense work through the coordination role with FEMA before the storm, and did the failure to do so contribute to the sense among some FEMA officials that the Department was slow to assist in the effort?

When were active duty troops requested, and should they have been deployed earlier? Did disputes over the chain of command affect the timing of the deployment of troops? Why was the command and control issue still being debated almost a week into the disaster, and was this a distraction or worse?

If most of the work in the response was done by the National Guard with little visibility by Northern Command, then do we need to better define Northern Command's mission going forward? Is Northern Command truly prepared to assist in natural disasters as well as in terrorist attacks? What will the Department do going forward to bridge the gaps in coordination between the active duty forces and the National Guard?

These questions raised by Katrina delve into the philosophical basis of American Government, in many ways. They bring into focus the principle of federalism and the respective roles and authorities of 50 sovereign States under one central but limited government.

From the founding of our Nation to the present day, questions of deploying the military in response to domestic crises have been of grave concern. They are addressed in our Constitution and in laws ranging from the Posse Comitatus Act to the Insurrection Act to the Stafford Act.

The key question for this panel is: How can we continue to uphold the traditional principles of federalism as we confront the challenges and threats of the 21st Century? We will explore that question in the context of Hurricane Katrina, an event that brought longstanding traditions and deeply rooted political philosophy into a collision with reality.

The U.S. military, both active duty forces and the National Guard, is unparalleled in excellence, commitment, and courage. We must find a better way to employ this valuable resource when disaster strikes our Nation while we continue to embrace the principles of federalism that lie at the heart of our governmental system.

Senator COLLINS. Senator Lieberman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Good morning to the witnesses.

As the Chairman has indicated, today's hearing is our 17th in the Committee's investigation of preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. This one offers us an opportunity to examine a very critical question about what role we want our military to have in dealing with the most catastrophic of natural disasters, whether they're natural or inflicted by terrorist enemies.

The answer to that question, of course, has both very practical and very constitutional implications. Despite its designation as a supporting agency under the National Response Plan, which we've talked a lot about in this Committee, I must say that the Defense Department's preparation and initial response to Hurricane Katrina seemed to me to be, unfortunately, about as passive as most other Federal agencies.

But when the military did engage, it engaged with full force and great effectiveness. It took on the responsibilities of many other agencies at different levels of our government. By Thursday of the week of the hurricane, FEMA essentially turned over its logistical obligations to the military, resulting in a $1 billion mission assignment, the largest in the history of FEMA mission assignments.

Members of Congress, including myself, frequently and proudly say that the United States has the best military in the history of the world because of the men and women who comprise it, but also because we invest in them and our military. I think in the days after Hurricane Katrina, we were reminded again of the wisdom of those investments.

The military's contribution to the rescue of the communities along the Gulf Coast that were hit by Katrina is yet another testament to the fact that we not only have extraordinary men and women serving in our military under extraordinary leaders, but that the Defense Department itself has the best communications equipment, logistical ability, equipment generally like helicopters and boats, medical teams, and other resources necessary to respond to a catastrophe.

The question is when and how we use those assets. Today we're going to hear from two panels of witnesses, the senior uniformed officers who led the operations on the ground in Louisiana and the top civilians and uniformed officers who set the policies and implemented the full military response.

With a few individual exceptions, the Pentagon's preparations for this cataclysmic storm in the days before landfall were slow and unsure. Situational awareness was poor, and the Pentagon was hesitant to move necessary assets unless they were requested.

Our military is superb, as those of us who are privileged to serve on the Armed Services Committee in addition to this one know, at planning for different threat situations. But it does appear that the Pentagon did not do much planning in advance of Katrina to anticipate the challenges of a so-called Incident of National Significance, as defined under the National Response Plan.

On Tuesday of Katrina's week one, the military recognized that the rescue of the Gulf Coast was uncertain and foundering under the administration of the Department of Homeland Security. In this regard, we are indebted to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, who that morning was watching, as the rest of the Nation and the world were, the suffering of people in New Orleans particularly. And he was watching on television.

He concluded that troops and equipment needed to be deployed immediately, without the normal paperwork. And we thank him for that. We also thank Lieutenant General Blum for orchestrating the deployment of thousands of National Guard troops from around America to the Gulf Coast and Admiral Keating for ordering the deployment of, ultimately, 22,000 active duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the materiel to support them.

We are of course also grateful to the men and women in the trenches. Under the most difficult of circumstances, Major General Landreneau ably led the Louisiana National Guard troops, which swelled from a force of 5,000 based in Louisiana to an eventual force of 30,000, literally from every State in the Union, mobilized, I believe, by Lieutenant General Blum.

Lieutenant General Honoré we all got to know very well during that period of time. He's from Louisiana. He had previous experience in responding to hurricanes. As Katrina approached and he was at First Army Command in Atlanta, he followed the weather forecast and acted on that day. He asked the Pentagon to identify

equipment and assets that he knew from previous experience would be needed if the storm was as bad as everybody was saying it definitely would be at that time.

I hope you understand in the next sentence that I'm not making a pun here. General Honoré filled a large and visible leadership role in New Orleans when he arrived. Mayor Nagin actually likened him to John Wayne, which may not be far from the truth. General Honoré's conduct actually was exactly in the forceful and decisive manner that was necessary to reassure all who saw him there and throughout the Nation as the city plunged deeper into the crisis.

In some sense, General Honoré's presence as the top active duty Federal Army officer there highlights the critical constitutional questions that are at stake. How much authority should the military have in domestic matters? We've heard and asked much about the Posse Comitatus law here; I'm sure we'll ask it again. And we know that this country has a tradition which contains a strong aversion to military control in civilian settings unless absolutely necessary. These are difficult questions that must be studied in a thoughtful manner and resolved in advance, not in the heat of a crisis, as appears to have happened here.

As we learned from Governors Blanco and Barbour last week, when disaster strikes a State, no governor in America is going to willingly cede authority over their National Guard to the Federal Government. But what if there is a catastrophe so great that the National Guard is overwhelmed, as the New Orleans Police and the firefighters were in the Hurricane Katrina situation?

What if, God forbid, the disaster is an unexpected terrorist attack without the warning that the weather experts gave us about Hurricane Katrina coming? Is federalization then necessary to bring all the critical resources of the military to bear? Hurricane Katrina showed us that we need to define where that line is drawn to the best of our ability and define it ahead of the crisis.

Governor Blanco testified to the pressure that she felt from the White House to federalize her National Guard. She said she thought the pressure resulted from considerations that were not purely military, but political, calling it "posturing instead of a real solution." I'd like to ask some of our witnesses to help us better understand what that was all about.

Hurricane Katrina also revealed some uncertainties and tensions between the Pentagon, NORTHCOM, and the National Guard Bureau regarding the military's role in domestic crises. Our Committee has learned through interviews and documents of some disagreements about the degree to which the Defense Department should operate on U.S. soil, and these disagreements may have limited the military's response time and effectiveness in this case because of the initial hesitation to deploy active duty troops or even to preposition assets before Hurricane Katrina made landfall and before the Department of Defense was requested to do so.

Once again, the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise made clear that local and State resources would immediately be overwhelmed by a Category 3 or higher storm, which Katrina was. The National Response Plan (NRP) had been in place to guide all Federal agencies in the event of such a catastrophe.

But instead of using the NRP to address in advance these matters related to a catastrophic event and to resolve bureaucratic differences and construct a comprehensive action plan, the Federal Government appeared to be operating without that advance implementation of the NRP and therefore too much on the fly.

And the roles of the military, National Guard and active duty, look to have been part of a response that was cobbled together as the week went on instead of in advance. It is a great tribute to our military that it and the men and women who wear the uniforms nevertheless performed so well.

I'm sure all of our witnesses would agree that's no way to manage a crisis of this magnitude, without the necessary planning and pre-training for it. It's certainly not what we envisioned when this Committee led in the creation of the Homeland Security Department. The lack of a plan led to unnecessary confusion, unnecessary bureaucratic struggles and, I'm afraid, more human suffering than should have occurred.

This hearing can and, I'm confident, will, help us resolve some of those questions so that we do better next time when, as I've said earlier, we may not have the advance notice that we had in this occasion. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, and I thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

I'm very pleased to welcome our first panel this morning. Paul McHale is the very first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Admiral Timothy Keating is the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. And Lieutenant General Steven Blum is the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

I'm going to put more extensive introductions into the record, but I know we're eager to proceed at this point. But I want to thank each of you for your long career in public service, and I want to share with my colleagues an interesting fact about General Blum. And that is that his son serves in the Maryland National Guard and was deployed during Hurricane Katrina to assist in Louisiana. So I think that's an interesting little fact for our Committee.

This is an ongoing investigation, so I'm going to ask that you stand, and I'm going to ask that the second panel stand at the same time so that I can swear you all in.

Do you swear that the testimony you will be giving to the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Secretary MCHALE. I do.

Admiral KEATING. I do.

General BLUM. I do.

General HONORÉ. I do.

General LANDRENEAU. I do.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Secretary McHale, we're going to begin with you.

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. PAUL McHALE,[1] ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary MCHALE. Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman, Senator Levin, Senator Dayton, good morning. I have submitted my formal statement for the record, and Madam Chairwoman, with your consent, I'll simply proceed to a brief and relatively informal opening statement.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Your full statement will be included in the record.

Secretary MCHALE. In order to maximize the time for questions, including what I hope will be detailed follow-up questions on the important points that were raised by Senator Lieberman, my opening remarks will be brief and to the point.

The Department of Defense response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest deployment of military forces for a civil support mission in our Nation's history. That is a fact. Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast during the early morning hours of August 29. By landfall plus 5, more than 34,000 military forces had been deployed into the affected area. That's more than five times the number of military personnel deployed within the same time frame in response to 1992's Hurricane Andrew.

By landfall plus 7, more than 53,000 military personnel had been deployed in response to Katrina, three times the comparable response to Hurricane Andrew. And by September 10, military forces reached their peak at nearly 72,000, 50,000 National Guardsmen and 22,000 active duty personnel, a total deployment for Katrina more than twice the size of the military response to Hurricane Andrew. In scope and speed, no civil support mission in the history of the United States remotely approaches the DOD response to Hurricane Katrina.

The Department of Defense received 93 mission assignments from FEMA and approved all of them, and contrary to some of the statements that have been made to you previously, both during hearings and during questioning by Members of your staff, we respectfully disagree, very forcefully disagree, with the characterization that the processing and ultimate approval of those requests for assistance took an undue amount of time.

I would hope that we would pierce the rhetoric of past criticism, look to the documented time frame for the approval of those requests for assistance (RFAs), and focus on the complexity of those RFAs, and in that context, I believe that we worked very effectively. And I invite your questioning on those points.

Many of these mission assignments were approved verbally by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England and were in fact in execution when the paperwork caught up days later. I want to assure the Members of this Committee: Our Department felt a sense of urgency before, during, and after landfall and acted upon it. And the record well documents that activity.

In addition to the 72,000 men and women in uniform, the Department of Defense coordinated the deployment of 293 medium

[1] The prepared statement of Secretary McHale appears in the Appendix on page 63.

and heavy lift helicopters, 68 airplanes, 23 U.S. Navy ships, 13 mortuary affairs teams, and two standing joint headquarters to support FEMA's planning efforts.

DOD military personnel evacuated more than 80,000 Gulf Coast residents and rescued another 15,000. Military forces provided significant medical assistance, including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and air, the delivery of medical treatment to more than 5,000 sick and injured persons, as well as support for disease prevention and control. DOD committed more than 2,000 healthcare professionals for civil support contingencies and approved six bases as FEMA staging areas.

When violence erupted in New Orleans, Lieutenant General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, coordinated over a 3-day period the deployment of 4,200 National Guard military police and security personnel into New Orleans, dramatically increasing the security presence. The President deployed 7,200 active duty military personnel for humanitarian relief. Their presence, in combination with National Guard security forces, restored civil order in the City of New Orleans.

DOD delivered critical emergency supplies: More than 30 million meals, including 24.5 million MREs and some 10,000 truckloads of ice and water. As noted by Senator Lieberman a few moments ago, in a single RFA processed within a 24-hour period of time, we took on a $1 billion civil support mission to provide full logistics support throughout a two-state area.

No RFA of that complexity had ever been considered, let alone processed and approved, within 24 hours, contrary to the express criticism stated on the record to this Committee by previous witnesses. Their timeline was factually inaccurate.

In short, we believe that DOD met its civil support mission requirement and did so because our men and women in uniform acted to minimize paperwork, cut bureaucracy, and provide much-needed capabilities with a sense of urgency. The domestic deployment of 50,000 National Guardsmen from all 50 States, three Territories, and the District of Columbia was historically unprecedented and central to the success of our total force mission.

In closing, fully consistent with the observations made by Senator Lieberman, our performance was not without defect. We did very well, but there are areas, many in the same areas tracked by Senator Lieberman in his opening comments, where we, too, believe that we must do better next time around. Many of the areas identified by the Senator were in fact first identified by our Department during internal after-action reviews. And let me touch on those very briefly.

Our performance can be improved. DOD communication with first responders was not interoperable. Early situational awareness, as noted by the Senator, was poor, a problem that should have been corrected following identical damage assessment challenges during Hurricane Andrew.

Military command and control, as noted, was workable but not unified. National Guard/Joint Staff/NORTHCOM planning, though superbly executed, was not well integrated. Our task-organized deployment reflected the total force, but our planning did not.

The roles, missions, and authorities of DOD in responding to catastrophic events need to be examined. Portions of the National Response Plan need to be reviewed and perhaps rewritten. With the disestablishment of JTF Katrina, the Department shifted from response and recovery operations to a focus on a comprehensive after-action review of our response to Hurricane Katrina. We performed well. We were not passive. We were not slow.

The execution of the missions met or exceeded any standard previously set for civil support missions in the history of the United States. We take pride in that. But with equal conviction, we are absolutely committed to better performance the next time around. We do intend to get better.

My colleagues and I would welcome your questions following the opening statements by the other two witnesses.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Admiral Keating.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL TIMOTHY J. KEATING,[1] COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

Admiral KEATING. Madam Chairman, good morning. Members of the Committee, good morning. And thanks for the opportunity to appear before your Committee this morning.

A couple of key points that I would like to make in addition to the formal opening remarks that we've submitted for the record that you've indicated would be included. From the U.S. Northern Command perspective, we were directed by the Secretary of Defense to support the National Response Plan, and we did so. We supported the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster relief efforts.

Now, as you know, the National Response Plan and Title 10 statutes define U.S. Northern Command's responsibilities and authorities for civil support. From our perspective, hurricane relief was conducted as a coordinated effort among Federal, State, and local governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations. Our experience in exercises before Hurricane Katrina and since demonstrate that we have adequate capability to meet homeland defense and civil support crises.

I'd like to point out that cooperative efforts with allies from around the world, over 100, particularly Canada and Mexico, paid dividends during and after the catastrophe. The global community rushed to offer humanitarian assistance to the U.S. We're grateful for their generosity.

As Secretary McHale mentioned, we're now engaged at Northern Command in a comprehensive after-action review of our Nation's response to Hurricane Katrina. We, the U.S. Northern Command, have sent over 50 representatives to the Gulf Coast and other areas to talk with Federal, State, and local officials. Their critical lessons learned report will improve future civil support operations. Of this I'm confident.

We're anxious to engage in discussions regarding the Defense Department's role and U.S. Northern Command's role in disaster response and the authorities required for Department of Defense ac-

[1] The prepared statement of Admiral Keating appears in the Appendix on page 73.

tion. It's important to note, I think, that throughout this operation, Katrina and Rita, we at Northern Command did not lose focus on our primary mission, homeland defense. We were ready and able to thwart any attempt by our adversaries to exploit this tragedy.

In closing, I would recommend to you that the men and women of the U.S. Northern Command are resolutely committed to our mission to deter, prevent, and defeat attacks by those who would threaten our United States. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Admiral. General Blum.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM,[1] CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB)

General BLUM. Good morning. Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the National Guard's role in the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina here today.

The National Guard, as you know, is no longer a strategic reserve. It is an operational force at home. It has always been an operational force for the past 368 years. We are your military first responders for homeland missions.

The National Guard is an essential part of the Department of Defense. As such, the National Guard soldiers and airmen continue to answer the Nation's call to duty. America's governors, through emergency management assistance compact agreements, at the request of the governors of the affected States, rapidly fielded the largest National Guard domestic response force in the history of our Nation in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

At a time when the National Guard had over 80,000 citizen soldiers and airmen deployed around the world in the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other regions, soldiers and airmen, as you said, from every State, all 50 States, the Territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, all responded to the area. Not a single National Guard failed to respond to Hurricane Katrina.

The Guard responded in record time with a record number of troops, as has been stated, over 50,000 Army and Air Guard members at its peak. The National Guard forces were in the water, on the streets, and in the air throughout the affected region rescuing people, saving lives, all within 4 hours of the hurricane winds clearing and allowing the recovery efforts to start.

The Guard had more than 11,000 citizen soldiers and airmen involved in these rescue operations on August 31. The National Guard amassed an additional 30,000 troops in the following 96 hours. There were more than 6,500 in New Orleans alone by September 2, 2005. The fact that the National Guard units were deployed in Iraq at the time of Katrina did in no way, in any way or any measure, lessen the Guard's ability to respond with trained and ready personnel and equipment.

The National Guard was the first military responder, as it should be, beginning rescue operations, as I said, within 4 hours of the storm's passage. Guardsmen provided to the disaster area by the

[1] The prepared statement of General Blum with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 78.

Nation's governors rescued more than 17,000 American citizens by helicopter alone, evacuated and relocated another greater than 70,000 American citizens to places where they could have hope and start recovering their lives.

The National Guard restored order and assisted in recovery efforts. The National Guard pilots flew thousands of sorties over long hours without a single mishap. Never before in our history has the National Guard responded so quickly and so well to such a dire need of our fellow American citizens here at home inside the United States.

As provided by the National Response Plan, the National Guard's immediate response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster was, as I said, unprecedented in military history. We did not wait. We anticipated needs. We responded immediately and, I feel, very effectively. The National Guard delivered when and where they were needed, often getting formal requests long after the delivery of the capability.

Can we do better? In a word, absolutely, we can do better. The National Guard must be better equipped for these missions here in our homeland, for homeland defense and to support homeland security missions. The interagency and intergovernmental relationships are absolutely fundamental to the success of a Federal response in any disaster, and we must continue to foster even stronger relationships between the National Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Northern Command, and the Department of Defense.

The track record of the National Guard in response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that whether overseas or here at home, America's National Guard is ready. It's reliable. It's accessible. And it's absolutely essential to the security of this Nation.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, General.

Admiral Keating and General Blum, I'd like to read to you from the National Guard's after-action report concerning Katrina. In your exhibit books, it's behind tab No. 27.[1] The part I'm going to read is also on the poster before you.

According to the report, "With few exceptions, the National Guard Joint Task Force elements had significant command and control difficulties while trying to respond to the disaster. These difficulties were compounded with the deployment of Title 10 forces"—in other words, active duty forces—"into the Joint Area of Operations, and lack of command and control coordination and poor communications between Title 10 and Title 32 forces were significant issues."

It goes on to say that the disconnect between the Guard and the active duty command and control structures resulted in some duplication of efforts. It gives as an example that the 82nd Airborne moved into a sector that was already being patrolled by two National Guard units. In addition, our investigation has indicated that there was duplication in helicopter missions, with two helicopters sent on the same rescue missions, which arguably delays the rescue of other victims.

[1] Exhibit 27 appears in the Appendix on page 236.

From your perspective, and I'm going to start first with you, General, what should be done in the future to avoid the command and control difficulties that the Guard's after-action report very candidly says were problems during Katrina?

General BLUM. I'll be honest with you, Chairman. I do not professionally or personally subscribe to what I'm reading on this chart. And I doubt that was rendered by the National Guard Bureau. It certainly was not rendered by me. It does not reflect my professional feelings of what occurred during that time.

Was there perhaps a duplication of effort? It's certainly possible. What you described, the 82nd being assigned to a sector where people were already performing missions, you could call that duplication. I could call that an expansion of capabilities because the 82nd could assume a role and a mission that they could perform very well, and that would free up the troops that were doing other things to do things, frankly, that they could do without the limitation of Posse Comitatus. So it actually may have been a very good thing.

When I was asked about the ordering of Federal troops into the area, there was never one time that General Blum or the National Guard Bureau pushed back. They were welcomed. I had my faucet turned on full volume. I was doing everything the National Guard could possibly do through EMAC and the affected—and the donor States that sent their personnel and equipment and expertise.

And having someone at the Federal level opening up a second spigot, so to speak, to allow more capability to flow in faster and expand our ability to render positive effects, reduce suffering, save people, and restore order quicker were welcomed. At no time did I see a difficulty with the command and control structures that were in place. It was all about unity of effort in my mind. Unity of command does not guarantee unity of effort. Unity of effort guarantees success, and I think we achieved that.

So I don't really know who the author of this is.

Chairman COLLINS. Let me show you the report because it is a report dated December 21, 2005, "National Guard After-Action Review, Hurricane Response, September 2005." And it has the seal, Departments of the Army, and the Air Force and the National Guard Bureau.

It's a very extensive report, which we've read thoroughly, and this is one of the key observations. In fact, it's the very first observation that is in the summary. So I'm surprised that you're not familiar with it or disagree with it.

General BLUM. I, too, am surprised. I'm not familiar with it. But I stand on my sworn statement. And what I said now, today, many months after the hurricane is exactly what I felt during the time the hurricane was occurring and the response was occurring.

I think what you're trying to get is how I really feel about it, and I just stated that.

Chairman COLLINS. It is.

Admiral Keating, what's your reaction to the command and control issues? Did you see difficulties or confusion from your perspective at Northern Command?

Admiral KEATING. From our headquarters, Madam Chairman—the last sentence on the slide, there were Title 10 forces and Title

32, previous to that, State active duty forces deployed to the area. And if that results—and there was extensive coordination between the National Guard Bureau and Generals Cross and Landreneau through Russ Honoré and Task Force Katrina up through our headquarters to the Department of Defense. We were in, at least once a day, a teleconference with the Secretary of Defense. Steve Blum and I were participants, as was Secretary McHale.

So there may have been tactical disconnects between troops on the ground in an area where communications were a challenge, and there may have been duplication of effort. Your point that if there are two helicopters going to spot X, that may mean no one goes to spot Y.

I don't think that happened. I think because of the volume of response that there were command and control challenges, but there was extensive coordination. And there's a difference in that Russ Honoré couldn't tell elements of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact assembled Guard forces what to do, nor could they tell General Honoré what to do. But I know, for a fact, that there was frequent, near-continuous communication and coordination.

So the bottom line there, I'd say, I don't disagree that there had been times when Title 10 and Title 32 forces may not have been crystal clear on what they were doing. But there was extensive coordination. And I don't know that I would say it was a duplication of effort. It was a harmony of effort, and it was a comprehensive lay-down of those capabilities that were resident in uniformed forces, whether Guard or active.

Long answer to a short question. I don't think it was a critical factor in the execution of our mission following Katrina.

Chairman COLLINS. Secretary McHale, in the four previous instances in which the National Guard and active duty forces were together, used on domestic missions, a single dual-hatted commander was designated as the commander for both the National Guard and the active duty military forces, with a dual reporting line up the chain of command and to the State's governor.

Well, let me ask you the question: Should there have been a single commander, a dual-hatted officer, in the case of Katrina to coordinate the active duty and the Guard?

Secretary MCHALE. No. We, in the military, in looking at the goal of maximum operational effectiveness, routinely try to achieve at least two things: Unity of command and unity of effort.

The Constitution of the United States was not written to support maximum effectiveness in military operations. The Constitution was written to establish a Federal system of government under that document, and that means that inevitably, at the beginning of a domestic military mission, the governors, pursuant to their authorities under the Constitution, will have command and control of their State National Guard forces. The President and the Secretary of Defense, under Article II of the Constitution, will command the Federal forces.

So we start any domestic mission with a breach in that principle of unity of command. The way in which that breach is addressed in a crisis circumstance is through the federalization of the Guard, often combined with an invocation by the President of the Insurrec-

tion Act. That is a very significant decision, particularly when exercised in the face of opposition by the affected governor.

In this case, recognizing that we started with a division in the command structure, with the governor in command of National Guard forces and the Secretary of Defense in command of Title 10 forces, though we could not immediately achieve, unless we invoked the Insurrection Act and the federalization of the Guard, unity of command, we could achieve unity of effort. And that means that instead of a command relationship over all those forces, you respect the normal Constitutional paradigm and insist upon close coordination among those forces.

And what happened was throughout the course of the execution of the mission, the Secretary of Defense was in routine daily contact with General Honoré and Admiral Keating to ask General Honoré how that coordinating relationship was working with the National Guard. And General Honoré, as he will tell you, gave repeated assurances that the relationship was working well, that he and General Landreneau had a good relationship, and although there was not technical unity of command, there was unity of effort.

If that relationship had broken down, the Secretary of Defense would have known about it immediately and an appropriate recommendation could have been made to the President. But in light of the assurances that the relationship was working, achieving unity of command, one person in charge, stripping the governor involuntarily of her command and control, was not the right course of action.

Chairman COLLINS. Are you aware that the White House proposed a dual-hatted officer to achieve unity of command to Governor Blanco?

Secretary MCHALE. Senator, I'm not only aware of it, I recommended that to the Secretary of Defense. He reviewed that recommendation, concurred in that recommendation, and took it to the President for the President's consideration.

Chairman COLLINS. Just to clarify your previous response, then, I'd asked you whether you thought there should have been a dual-hatted officer; you said no.

Secretary MCHALE. In retrospect, that's correct.

Chairman COLLINS. OK.

Secretary MCHALE. At the time that we were looking at that goal of unity of command, and in light of the fact that on four previous occasions during the previous 12 to 18 months we had in fact used that procedure, a dual-hatted command, a National Guard officer in command of both National Guard forces and active duty forces—we used that paradigm at the G8 Summit. We used it at the Democratic and Republican conventions. We used it for Operation Winter Freeze along the Canadian border. That was a reasonable concept to consider.

And it was presented to the governor for her consideration. That would not have stripped her of her command. That would have brought into the charge of a single officer unified command under both the President and the governor. Governor Blanco rejected that proposal, and we went forward with the coordinating system that I described a few minutes ago. And, in fact, that worked well.

So I believe it was prudent to consider a dual-hatted command. I frankly have reservations now whether that approach should be used in a crisis environment. And based on the positive relationship between Major General Landreneau and General Honoré, in retrospect I'm glad that we did not invoke either a dual-hatted command or the statutory authority under the Insurrection Act.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman.

Let me say to my friend Secretary McHale in response to your opening statement, which I appreciate, that, again, when the military swung into action here, National Guard and Title 10 active military, the contribution made was extraordinary and just critical.

And my concern, as I look back at this, because in a catastrophe of this type time is obviously of the essence, is that the majority of the assets didn't come in until the week after landfall. The National Guard was obviously first and mobilized by Wednesday. The active duty military didn't fully come in until the following Saturday.

So I think the question we would ask, really thinking about the next catastrophe, is: Do we want to be in a position to have both the National Guard and active duty military move more quickly with the extraordinary resources they have? It's not an easy question. It's a little easier in hindsight.

I will tell you that in a totally separate field, the Coast Guard—because this is their work, normally they saw the weather forecasts. Beginning Friday before the Monday of landfall, they began to preposition assets in the region and personnel so that when it hit on Monday morning, they were ready to be out there Monday afternoon.

And I think that's the question we've all got to ask ourselves when we see really a big disaster coming, whether we want also the Guard and/or the active duty military to be ready to swing into action.

I want to go back and ask a couple of questions about planning. Admiral Keating, as the Chairman said, you are the second Commander of Northern Command, which was established in 2002 as the combatant command responsible for military operations in the continental United States, obviously part of a reaction to September 11, 2001. As part of that, NORTHCOM was assigned—was designated as the combatant commander responsible for all defense support to civil authority, so-called DSCA missions within the continental United States.

In addition, in January 2005, the Federal Government essentially updates, broadens, deepens what was the Federal Response Plan into the National Response Plan. We've talked here about the emergency support functions. DOD is given a backup role on—as far as I can see—every ESF there.

As you look back, do you think that the Department of Defense, specifically NORTHCOM, from 2002 did enough planning to be ready to quickly implement or activate its responsibility under the defense support to civil authorities ideal?

Admiral KEATING. Senator, I do think that we were—we have on the shelf, and had on the shelf pre-Katrina, our CONPLAN 2501. That's a concept plan. It is a comprehensive approach to providing

defense support to civil authorities, as you say, across—and what areas of consequence management would we, as the DOD's local commander, be required to provide to support civil authorities. That is a plan ready to be approved by the Secretary, and it is on our shelf.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And sir, to interrupt very briefly——

Admiral KEATING. Sure.

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. That would cover both natural disasters and a terrorist attack?

Admiral KEATING. It is—yes to the natural disasters. And we have a separate plan, CONPLAN 0500, for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives. So that family of plans we think covers the span of consequences to which we would be directed to reply. So we have both plans on the shelf.

The challenge, Senator, I think, is exercising those plans.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Literally to exercise in advance of the catastrophe, you mean?

Admiral KEATING. Precisely. To duplicate the total elimination of infrastructure, as witnessed in Southern Mississippi actually more dramatically than in New Orleans——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Admiral KEATING [continuing]. We simply cannot replicate that in the field. We have done tabletop exercises. We've done computer war games at several war colleges. We work with our friends in the commercial industry as well. Coors Brewery, as a matter of fact, runs significant exercises here right in—close to us.

So we have the plans on the shelf. The challenge is exercising those plans in the field with sufficient fidelity to duplicate—to provide sufficient challenge to us to execute those plans and to consider the second, third, and fourth order consequences of a significant disaster.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So in that sense, you wish you had been able to exercise those plans more before Katrina hit?

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And Secretary McHale, I see you agreeing. Is anything being done to try to create—understanding the difficulties you've described, to create the opportunities to exercise those plans? Secretary McHale, you want to get into this?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. The observation made by the Admiral is correct. And I think everyone in the Department of Defense, both in the Pentagon and out in the operating forces, would welcome the opportunity for more frequent, more challenging, more realistic catastrophic scenarios to test our capability to respond.

And in fact, that kind of catastrophic series of scenarios forming the basis for a coordinated series of war games was underway prior to Katrina. We had developed a proposal that was then underway—frankly, Katrina caused part of it to be postponed—to deal with catastrophic events, not major disasters. We have 50 to 60 major disasters a year, presidentially declared. We're talking about a level of destruction that equaled or exceeded the kind of loss that we experienced real world in terms of the aftermath of Katrina.

And so, not only can I tell you do we believe that should take place, I can reassure you it was underway prior to Katrina. And

we're talking about things such as multiple nuclear explosions, multiple RDDs——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Worst case scenarios.

Admiral KEATING [continuing]. Category 5 storms over major American cities.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But we live in that kind of reality today.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So those are the worst case, but it's important to exercise for them.

Our own review, as we go over what the Pentagon did before landfall, does include, Admiral, NORTHCOM deploying Defense Coordinating Officers to the region. Correct? Do you remember what day that was done on?

Admiral KEATING. We had Defense Coordinating Officers in place, according to our timeline, Senator, on Friday, August 26.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That sounds right to me.

Admiral KEATING. Three days before landfall.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Here's an interesting exchange I want to ask you about. I mentioned that General Honoré, at First Army Command on Sunday, August 28, was agitated by what he was seeing, and sends the request, which is Exhibit B.[1] He sent it to NORTHCOM and to the Joint Staff asking that assets be identified that in his experience with hurricanes would be required within the first 24 or 48 hours—helicopters, boats, medical capabilities, communications equipment.

He sends the list, and he receives an e-mail response from General Rowe at the Pentagon——

Admiral KEATING. Senator, General Rowe is our——

Senator LIEBERMAN. I'm sorry.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir—was our operations officer.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. He gets a response from him that they're working on it. Then on August 29, which is the day of the landfall, he gets another response from General Rowe. I can't resist reading the first two words from Rowe to Honoré. "Sir, hooah." Right?

Admiral KEATING. That's a technical term, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. I'm familiar with it. "Joint Forces Command reviewing joint solutions from force providers," which had been provided at that time, possible—but in the meantime, the storm has already hit. And then he says, "Somewhat hamstrung by JDOMS desire to wait for RFAs." And the translation being hamstrung, I presume, because of a decision to wait for the request, the RFAs, from FEMA to act.

In fact, our indication is that FEMA finally did ask—had asked on Sunday, August 28, for some helicopters. They were approved on August 29 and did not arrive until August 30. I'm glad that they arrived on August 30, but obviously, if they had arrived on August 29 and been able to go out in the afternoon or whenever the storm had subsided, it would have been a lot better situation.

How do you respond to General Rowe's statement that he was hamstrung by this waiting, this decision to wait for FEMA to request? And I suppose in retrospect, Secretary McHale, Admiral

[1] Exhibit B appears in the Appendix on page 242.

Keating, should we next time be in a position where you don't wait, where you decide—you've got General Honoré seeing this coming. He's made a request. And in a sense, like the Coast Guard, because that's the way they operate because this is their normal business, you just get ready to go and you go?

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, we didn't wait. And the comment that you quote from JDOMS was not reflective of either how the leadership at the Pentagon viewed the issue or how we operationally responded. We were a whole lot closer to the mindset of General Honoré and General Rowe. And in fact—I don't know if this is the appropriate time—we can go back a week before landfall, and day by day, with a sense of urgency, bring to your attention in a manner that is absolutely documented the proactive preparation that we put in place in advance of landfall on August 29.

You mentioned the RFAs that had come in. The simple fact is every RFA that had come in at that point was promptly approved, vocally, I believe, and we deployed those assets—including helicopters, most especially helicopters, for search and rescue—as fast as was humanly possible under the circumstances.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, that's my question in part. Because let's say the two helicopters had been—I'm asking the question; I assume they hadn't been prepositioned close by—then they would have—if asked for by FEMA on Sunday, August 28, presumably they wouldn't have had to wait until Tuesday night, August 30, until those helicopters arrived, and they were desperately needed on Monday afternoon and Tuesday.

Secretary MCHALE. They were desperately needed. We moved as quickly as was humanly possible. And as we look at your very legitimate question, the underlying point is: What is the expectation—certainly not reflected in the current National Response Plan—in terms of the timeline of DOD's response in support of another lead Federal agency?

When you can get helicopters there within 24 to 48 hours of the event, that makes you virtually a first responder. That's the standard we met. If that isn't fast enough, if we expect to have helicopters in significant numbers there within hours after the event, that is going to require a change in the national paradigm in terms of what we expect of the Department of Defense as a secondary mission often in conflict with, in terms of resources, our primary mission to fight and win wars overseas.

So if the expectation is going to be—it wasn't on August 29——

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree with you.

Secretary MCHALE [continuing]. But if the expectation is going to be a 24-hour or less response, we're going to have to train and equip and assign missions to the Department of Defense according to a different paradigm. Based on the paradigm we had in place, our response was very fast.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I think you've raised very important points, and that's why I think we're all looking back. Do we wish that you had—that essentially the paradigm had been different, the National Response Plan had been different, and that the Pentagon had been operating under a plan that would have required you in this circumstance to preposition assets as the storm was approaching and then be ready to move quickly?

You moved very quickly when asked. Obviously, the full force of the——

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, we did preposition assets. And that, as I say to my friend and a former attorney general, I hate to challenge your reliance on a fact not in evidence. But we did preposition assets, and as early as August 23, a week before landfall, I turned to an Air Force colonel, who is seated behind me, Rich Chavez, and when I found out that there was a tropical depression 400 miles off the coast of Florida a week before landfall in Louisiana, I instructed Colonel Chavez to do a complete inventory of DOD assets that might be available to assist FEMA in this case.

And I instructed him to look to the force package we had used the year before for the four hurricanes in Florida to assure that those assets would be in place. Pursuant to that guidance, Colonel Chavez did that on August 23, a week before landfall, before Katrina even had a name. And we had that complete inventory compiled.

We were extremely proactive in anticipating well in advance of landfall the kinds of capabilities we would have to employ.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. My time is up. Still, the fact is the great bulk of the Federal forces obviously didn't move in until the Saturday afterward. But the helicopters, the two helicopters that were requested, and the fact that they arrived 30 hours after—well, they arrived actually 2 days after requested, and those were 2 critical days. We can come back to this.

Secretary MCHALE. And I would welcome that, sir, because I think that is the issue. And we ought not to draw a distinction—because we don't in the Pentagon or in our strategy for homeland defense and civil support—between our active forces and our reserve component forces. We believe in a total force.

And the force flow, both Guard and active duty, was huge during this period of time. And it wasn't by accident that the Guard forces got there in large numbers ahead of the Title 10 forces, based on the strategy we published in June that I believe was validated by Katrina. For domestic missions, it makes a great deal of sense to rely primarily on the National Guard, their capabilities and speed of response, and then to augment our Title 10 forces in support of the Guard as required.

So it wasn't delay, it was design that moved a huge number of Guard forces in initially, followed by very substantial forces from the active component.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you to each of our witnesses, not just for being here today, but for your service to this Nation. We're grateful for that.

Admiral, what was your position on whether the Guard forces that flowed into Louisiana and Mississippi were sufficient to meet the States' needs?

Admiral KEATING. Throughout the early days on Tuesday, Wednesday, into Thursday, Senator, we were confident that the numbers flowing were appropriate and adequate. And from our

headquarters, Senator and Madam Chairman, and this kind of goes to Senator Lieberman's point, it's not so important to us as to numbers. It's capabilities. And we end up with 22,000 or so—22,500 for active forces.

The number is of little consequence to us. It's the capability resident in the forces deploying. And so if it's a National Guardsman from Connecticut, that's great. If it's an active duty force out of the 82nd Airborne, that's great.

Senator LEVIN. It was your judgment at that time through Thursday that the forces were adequate, the National Guard?

Admiral KEATING. The flow was—the forces and the capabilities——

Senator LEVIN. Including their capabilities. But the National Guard forces were adequate for the job.

Admiral, there's an Exhibit C[1]—there was a message that came from General Rowe, who's your J–3——

Admiral KEATING. Correct.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. To General Honoré, James Hickey, who was with General Honoré, and that's Colonel Hickey. And here's what the message said. It said that "the governor has asked that Federal troops pick up the rest of the tasks being uncovered by the Guard." There was a desire to concentrate the Guardsmen in New Orleans for law enforcement and security tasks, but the governor specifically asked for Federal troops to pick up the rest of the tasks.

Now, that message was Wednesday, August 31. And the response that came back was as follows, from General Honoré to you, essentially, which is, "Push back. I will see the Governor today." So what General Honoré—and we'll be able to talk to him later, except I won't be able to be here, so we'll need your view on this for my purposes—General Honoré was telling you at that point to push back on that request. Is that fair?

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. It is fair.

Senator LEVIN. All right. Then, at the same time that was going on, General Honoré sent a message to General Amos at the Marines, with a copy to you, saying to the Marine commander, the Marine general, "Hello, brother. Get here as fast as you can." And a copy of that came to you.

What did you make of that, when you received that message at the same time you were—I guess literally within an hour of each other, you were getting two messages from General Honoré, one saying, push back against the governor's request for Federal troops, and then you get a copy of a message from him to General Amos at the Marines saying, "Brother, get here as fast as you can"? What did you make of that?

Admiral KEATING. I talked to Russel about it that afternoon or the next morning, Senator, and I don't remember precisely. As I recall, the issue became for the specific application of those forces. We had missions that we were looking to do in Mississippi that were completely separate and distinct from, obviously, the missions in New Orleans, writ small, and Louisiana, writ large.

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[1] Exhibit C appears in the Appendix on page 255.

My understanding at the time was the National Guard forces were principally going to New Orleans, and a good number of them, at that time 4,500 or so, were military police, separate and distinct from the forces that Russ might need throughout the rest of Louisiana and in Mississippi. So different requirements, is how I interpreted it, and as we discussed, as I recall the conversation the next morning. Different requirements.

Senator LEVIN. So that it was your understanding from General Honoré when you talked to him that this was not inconsistent with his saying to you, push back against the governor for Federal troops?

Admiral KEATING. It was not inconsistent sir.

Secretary MCHALE. Senator, what was the date on that, if I may ask, sir?

Admiral KEATING. Wednesday, I think.

Senator LEVIN. Both were Wednesday, August 31.

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. The first message from General Honoré was Thursday, September 1, at 11:46 a.m. The other message on Thursday, September 1, was at 1:46 p.m.

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, I think the explanation is that on Wednesday of that week, General Amos was in command of both aviation and ground forces in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps forces that were then headed toward the AOR were aviation assets, principally helicopters and some medical capabilities. And they were desperately needed, and they had to get to the AOR as quickly as possible.

Marine Corps ground forces weren't deployed until the following weekend. So when we think of Marine Corps assets, we should not assume that we're talking about infantry. The assets were moving on ship, and they were primarily helicopters and medical personnel, desperately needed.

Senator LEVIN. Those were not the Federal troops that the governor was asking for?

Secretary MCHALE. That's correct. and that's why it is consistent to say, we don't need light infantry, for instance, out of the 2nd Marine Division under General Amos, but we do need Marine Corps helicopters and medical capabilities out of Marine Corps aviation, also under General Amos.

Senator LEVIN. Now, when General Honoré told you, Admiral, that you should push back against the governor's request, it was also stated at that time, I believe, that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with that. Is that correct?

Admiral KEATING. As I recall, that's correct, sir.

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, on Friday, another message was sent from General Honoré to General Amos. And that was an expletive "hitting the fan. Get here as fast as you can."

Was that something which also referred to different assets than the governor wanted, as far as you can—when you got a copy of that message?

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, I want to get to this unity of command issue because I must say, Secretary, I have trouble with your explanation to the Chairman's question.

At the time that you were recommending to the governor that there be unity of command, you believe that was the better course. Is that correct? But subsequently, or at some later point, you felt that it was a mistake to make that recommendation to the President. Is that a fair summary?

Secretary MCHALE. I think that's a fair summary. During that week sir, at that very point in time, anyone who was watching TV saw that the situation of civil disorder was bad and getting worse in New Orleans. There was a concern with regard to how we might achieve unity of effort, and therefore we thought about ways in which we might achieve unity of command.

Having used the dual-hatted approach four times successfully in the previous year, year and a half, we certainly looked at that as an option. And I recommended it to the Secretary, and he brought it to the President's attention.

Senator LEVIN. Isn't that ordinarily the better course of action, to have unity of command?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. It is.

Senator LEVIN. Either in the Federal or the State officer?

Secretary MCHALE. From the standpoint of operational effectiveness, yes, sir, that's true. The challenge here is that we've got a Constitution that has been drawn in a way that it conflicts with unity of command because it gives command authority both to the governor and to the President.

Senator LEVIN. But the Constitution is consistent with unity of command where there's an agreement on it. Is that not correct?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir, and that's really where we were coming from. We sought the governor's agreement. We presented to her a concept that would have preserved her command authority but would have unified that command in the hands of a single officer who also would have been responsible to the President. She then rejected it.

Senator LEVIN. And that's ordinarily the better course of action, is that there be unity of command. And if she had agreed to that, there would have been unity of command?

Secretary MCHALE. Well, sir, that's what brought us to that recommendation. But in retrospect——

Senator LEVIN. OK. I'm running out of time.

Secretary MCHALE. In retrospect, the disagreement at the level of chief executives has led me to conclude that in a crisis environment, unlike preplanned events, in a crisis environment dual-hatting is probably not an effective approach.

Senator LEVIN. In general?

Secretary MCHALE. In general, in a crisis environment. I anticipate that in a non-crisis environment, a national special security event, it remains a very viable alternative.

Senator LEVIN. All right. I've got to disagree with you on this. It seems to me in a crisis environment, providing there's planning in advance, it may be the most essential place for unity of command. But that's just my opinion.

Secretary MCHALE. Well, that's not what I said, sir. Unity of command can be achieved, but not through dual-hatting because a dual-hatted command falls apart if you have a difference of opinion between the two executives. And in a crisis environment, I think it's almost inevitable that a President and a governor will have differences of opinion. To put an officer in the crossfire between the two of them, I think, is untenable.

Senator LEVIN. Doesn't dual-hatting give unity of command at least in one person?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. Who then is responsible to two chief executives.

Senator LEVIN. I understand. But there's one person who has that unity.

Who were the Marines, when they were deployed, commanded by?

Secretary MCHALE. Are you talking about the ground forces, sir?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Secretary MCHALE. The ground forces were deployed by Presidential order on Saturday.

Senator LEVIN. But hadn't they previously been deployed by the Marine commander without that Presidential order?

Secretary MCHALE. I'm not aware of that. It was First Battalion——

Senator LEVIN. Were you aware of that, Admiral?

Admiral KEATING. The aviation assets. Yes. There were Marine helicopters in the AOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Right. That were under whose command when they were deployed?

Admiral KEATING. Mine.

Senator LEVIN. But there was no Presidential order for that at that time?

Admiral KEATING. There was not. We were acting on verbal orders authorized by then-Acting Secretary England.

Senator LEVIN. OK. But there had been a verbal order prior to your order?

Admiral KEATING. You bet. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Got you.

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, what we had done was we had chopped the aviation assets.

Senator LEVIN. OK. Final question to General Blum. Your answer on this assessment, this National Guard assessment, to the Chairman is striking that you were not familiar with this until today because it really is a very—it gives an overview about the command and control difficulties.

I'm just curious if you could for the record——

General BLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. You won't know today because you've never seen this before—let us know who prepared this Guard Bureau report.

General BLUM. Well, certainly, sir, I could tell you what it is. It's an after-action report. It's a compilation of observations by people who viewed the situation, and probably with somebody in my Joint Operations Center, one of my watch officers or someone like that, who made a—from their point of view, that's what they saw.

They didn't have the total perspective that I did. And it's probably an accurate and valid validation that they would come and make sworn testimony that's the way they saw it.

Senator LEVIN. I got you.

General BLUM. I don't happen to subscribe to that because I saw the whole—the big picture.

The other point is, to help you a little bit, I think, with your dilemma, sir, on asking Admiral Keating and the Secretary about the Federal forces, if I could refer you to this chart over here.[1] On the day in question, we had over 10,000, growing to 20,000, soldiers that were on the ground and closing on Louisiana and Mississippi.

And I was in communications through telephone with General Honoré on a pretty frequent basis, as well as Northern Command, as well as Secretary McHale, as well as General Landreneau in Louisiana and Hack Cross in Mississippi. And they were telling me that the flow of the National Guard forces that they requested were arriving at the rate with the right capabilities to do the jobs that they wanted done and were satisfied that what we had promised Governor Blanco and Governor Barbour were in fact arriving in time to meet their requirements.

So this is in the early stages of the response. And remember, the National Guard, both Army and Air Guard, are DOD assets that we share with the people who are in charge. There is unity of command. That's called a governor. The governor is the Commander in Chief. All of this military support is to civil authorities. That civilian authority is the governor in the State.

There were five States affected, not just Louisiana. Texas saw it the same. Governor Perry saw it the same way. Governor Blanco saw it the same way. Governor Barbour saw it the same way in Mississippi. Governor Riley saw it the same way in Alabama. And Governor Bush saw it the same way in Florida.

They see it as they are the elected civilian leader, and they are in charge of the event. All of the military forces that come into that State are coming there to support them, whether they're sent by the President or they're sent by their other governors through EMAC.

When they show up into the State, if they're in the National Guard, they work for the Adjutant General of the State. All the governors agree to that. If Federal forces come into the State, they respond to a Federal chain of command, but the job they're doing is in support of those elected governors.

So there really is—now, unity of command is——

Senator LEVIN. General, my time is way overdue.

General BLUM. All right, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I think we understand that.

General BLUM. Trying to be helpful.

Senator LEVIN. The question is whether those Federal forces should have come earlier at the request of the governor or whether there should have been a push back at that time. And I think if you had to do it all over again, they would have come in earlier rather than later. I think that's the bottom line in terms of that push back comment.

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[1] National Guard Chart appears in the Appendix on page 82.

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, in all fairness, I'm not sure that, in terms of the expectations of the NRP and the very proactive planning of the Department of Defense that went well beyond waiting for requests for assistance, to move up the timeline of active duty forces much more quickly than we did will require a very fundamental review of what we expect of the Department of Defense domestically if we are to be first responders.

And in retrospect, we wish in this case someone had been a more effective first responder. But if we are to be the first responders, you have to change the character of the training and the equipment, as well as the legal authorities of the Department of Defense.

Senator LEVIN. That's clearly true. This isn't first responder. This is Wednesday. This isn't Saturday or Sunday or Monday or Tuesday. That is a Wednesday request.

Secretary MCHALE. We had forces flowing before landfall, and it takes a while to move ships.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you all again for your service.

General BLUM. Sir.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Welcome to our panels this morning.

Admiral Keating, the DOD strategy for homeland defense and civil support gives NORTHCOM responsibility for all States except my own state of Hawaii and U.S. Territories, possessions, and freely associated States in the Pacific. These areas fall under the responsibility of the U.S. Pacific Command for all homeland defense and civil support efforts.

While NORTHCOM's overall mission is designed around the homeland defense and civil support mission areas, PACCOM's primary mission is not homeland defense, in part because PACCOM has significant war fighting responsibility for over 105 million square acres of the world. As a former director of the Joint Staff, you have intimate knowledge of all the combatant command capabilities.

Will you please describe how you are working with PACCOM to ensure that the Pacific Command is capable of responding to a natural disaster in Hawaii and the Pacific Territories, should the need arise? For example, have you conducted any joint disaster recovery meetings with PACCOM? This has been a long-standing question, and there has not been a written answer. So I'm asking for your advice on this.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. And thanks for the question, Senator. We have as recently as October conducted an extensive exercise in the field, in the water and in the skies and on land around Alaska. And it involves forces that were operationally controlled by the Pacific Command and tactically controlled in the course of the exercise by Northern Command.

Admiral Fallon is a good friend of mine, as you might suspect. We work with his command on the formulation of these two plans that I discussed earlier, CONPLAN 2501 and 0500. They were a full party to the development of those plans. Their plans reflect the

work that we have done with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies.

So there is extensive cooperation and coordination. We have a Pacific Command officer full-time in our headquarters. So I'm satisfied, and I can report to you that we work closely with Pacific Command in the formulation of our plans and in the exercise of the plans as recently as October.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. And this has been a concern in Hawaii——

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir.

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. As to who do we look to for any first response help.

General Blum, did preexisting relationships between senior military officials enhance DOD's ability to achieve what we're talking about, unity of effort? Do you think that preexisting relationships did achieve that?

General BLUM. Yes, sir, I do. In fact, without those relationships, the difficult tasks that were achieved between the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Northern Command, the National Guard, Russ Honoré's task force, and the National Guard Adjutants General in the five States affected would have been impossible.

So I have to say that the previously existing relationships were a key to the successful response that DOD played for Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, that shortly came after. The answer is yes, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Would the unity of effort concept work if such relationships did not exist?

General BLUM. They would be extremely more difficult to achieve without those relationships.

Senator AKAKA. Secretary McHale, would you comment on that?

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, I agree completely with General Blum. It is vitally important that we establish those kinds of relationships. There's only so much you can do on paper. The relationships between commanders, between human beings, between departments, in face-to-face confidence built on prior relationships, that is of enormous value in a crisis environment to cut through the paperwork and achieve decisionmaking and operational deployment in an effective manner.

This is not about—the strategy you cited was written in our office. We have an expression in the military: As soon as you cross the line of departure, you can forget about the paperwork. There are operational requirements. A strategy is helpful, but those peer-to-peer relationships of trust and confidence make it happen.

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you so much for that.

Secretary McHale, a memo issued by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in March 2003 giving guidance on the implementation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense states, "To focus the use of resources in preventing and responding to crisis, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense will serve as the DOD domestic crisis manager."

Will you please explain what authority you have to deploy DOD resources during a domestic crisis?

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, I have no authority to deploy resources except the authority that is granted narrowly to me by the Sec-

retary of Defense in a given circumstance. Command and control going back to Goldwater-Nichols, 1986 in the Congress, establishes a chain of command that goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander, and the deployment of forces falls squarely within the responsibilities of that chain of command. So only someone who is vested with command authority—I do not have command authority—can deploy forces.

Now, during the course of Hurricane Katrina and on many other occasions in the last 3 years, I have had management responsibilities, not command responsibilities. And what that means is I try to gather as much information as I can, I bring it promptly to the attention of the Secretary of Defense, I offer a recommendation to the Secretary, and then he makes the decision.

The only caveat to that is during Katrina, probably a third of the way into the deployment, the Secretary of Defense, under very narrowly defined circumstances, delegated to me decisionmaking authority. And in his name, I did approve the deployment of forces under circumstances where it was difficult to get the Secretary's direct approval.

The purpose was to speed up that decisionmaking process. And whenever I made a limited number of decisions under that circumstance, I promptly advised the Secretary of Defense of the fact that I had made such decisions.

Senator AKAKA. Secretary, as the DOD domestic crisis manager, are you the point person with whom all other Federal agencies and State and local officials interface during a domestic crisis?

Secretary MCHALE. The answer to that is yes, sir. But it's a little more channeled than that. While we do interface with a multitude of Federal agencies and departments simultaneously, and we have a whole staff led by Colonel Chavez that does that, most of that communication under the National Response Plan is first channeled to the Department of Homeland Security.

The Department of Homeland Security has the lead under the National Response Plan. And while we interface with all the Federal agencies, in a crisis environment probably 90 percent of our communication is with DHS because they have the Federal lead and we are in support of their mission.

Senator AKAKA. Secretary McHale, Deputy Secretary England called Admiral Keating and instructed the Admiral that NORTHCOM should push DOD resources to the disaster site in anticipation of receiving a FEMA mission assignment. Were you involved or notified of this decision?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. I was in the meeting—that's dated August 30, I believe?

Senator AKAKA. I don't have the date.

Secretary MCHALE. My belief is that the communication between the Deputy Secretary and Admiral Keating took place on August 30. And it followed a meeting that I had attended with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and others early that morning. And the sense of urgency that is clearly implied by the content of that communication had in fact been guiding our Department for more than a week prior to that communication.

We felt a sense of urgency. We leaned forward well beyond waiting passively for RFAs. We tried to identify assets, deploy them, and move as quickly as was humanly possible to include most especially the rapid deployment of National Guard forces. So yes, sir, I was aware of that communication and had participated in the meeting that immediately preceded it.

Senator AKAKA. Madam Chairman, if I had more time, I wanted to compliment our military for what had happened in 1992 in Hawaii when we had Hurricane Iniki, and how well it moved with Admiral Chuck Larson as the CINCPAC head.

We arrived at 3 a.m. in the morning, and he called us together. To make it quick, he said, when you get in there, provide all the supplies and equipment that's needed. And as soon as you begin to do that, begin to plan to get out. And anything you do, you do by consulting the Mayor of Kauai.

And it worked out so beautifully. The people of Kauai were so happy that when the military moved out, they had banners to say, "Mahalo," which is "thank you," to them for what they did to help the people of Kauai. And we need to make sure that all Americans are afforded the same level of cooperation and coordination. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Dayton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON

Senator DAYTON. I'm impressed by your testimony, and I trust you understand we're Monday morning quarterbacking here, obviously. And I'm reminded what President Eisenhower said—I'm paraphrasing a bit—but that any 8th grade student of history can make better decisions in hindsight than a president or a general can in the midst of the battle.

But we are—and I agree with Senator Lieberman's observation. And I'm glad that it is being modeled because I think we are, in a sense, using this as a learning experience for what we need to do legislatively. I'm impressed that the Constitution is first and foremost before you and that you're following that as you understand it, and others with you. And that's refreshing to know. And it is important.

But I think, what Senator Akaka just said about interjecting also at the local level, the mayor. At what point does this plurality of command, or responsibility, I guess, the governor, a mayor, Federal agencies, FEMA—at what point does that get overwhelmed by the magnitude of the event such that there does have to be a shift? And who makes that decision?

I think that really is the crux of some very critical issues here. And certainly we need to know, is there anything in terms of legislation or in terms of what we impose as restrictions that are impeding that decisionmaking and that response?

As part of that, Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could elaborate on your relationship with FEMA. And you talk about being in support of FEMA. You said in your written testimony that on Thursday, August 25, DOD augmented its liaison officer at FEMA with three emergency preparedness liaison officers.

Where is that occurring? Is that in New Orleans? Baton Rouge? Washington?

Secretary MCHALE. That reference, sir, I believe was FEMA headquarters here in Washington, DC. I'll take both parts of your question in the order in which you presented them.

The Constitution is lots of things, but it's not a model of efficiency. It wasn't designed to be efficient. The system of checks and balances brings inevitable——

Senator DAYTON. Sorry. I've got limited time. I'm agreeing with you.

Secretary MCHALE. Well, on the question of FEMA, what we have done is we have established over a 3-year period of time a very close working relationship, particularly in a crisis environment, with DHS and with FEMA. And so we have a full-time staff that is co-located with the Homeland Security Operations Center over in the Department of Homeland Security. In a crisis environment, as indicated in the note that you cited, we send additional officers under the authority of our staff over to FEMA to be co-located at FEMA headquarters here in Washington, DC.

Admiral Keating has the authority, and he exercised the authority, to forward deploy Defense Coordinating Officers and their teams in the field in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, in this case, to be co-located with FEMA. We had two Joint Headquarters that we deployed to be co-located with FEMA.

We made it a focused-intent effort on our part to establish the closest possible working relationship with FEMA to include, you'll see in the record, on August 31, I called Mike Brown. I indicated to Mike Brown that we had two very talented officers, two colonels, that we would make available to him to augment his personal staff to ensure better connectivity and support between FEMA and DOD. He accepted that offer, and those colonels were deployed and promptly joined him in New Orleans.

Senator DAYTON. Following that, then, sir, according to your written testimony, on Thursday, September 1, FEMA made a request to DOD to accept the responsibility to provide "full logistics support" through the entire area. That's at the time where the levees have broken——

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir.

Senator DAYTON [continuing]. Forty eight hours before. The civil order, disorder, is kind of overwhelming the local law enforcement. Then your next page, I just want to be clear that full logistics support, that includes, then, as you out line here, search and rescue, security assessment, command and control infrastructure, geospatial surveillance, firefighting, health and medical support, disease prevention, quarantine planning, debris removal, and restoration of basic utilities?

Secretary MCHALE. No, sir.

Senator DAYTON. Is that full logistics support?

Secretary MCHALE. No, sir.

Senator DAYTON. What is that?

Secretary MCHALE. And this comes——

Senator DAYTON. You're also being asked for that as well.

Secretary MCHALE. Well, we were asked for that over the weekend. And the FEMA witnesses who have conferred with the Committee confused those two packages of requests for assistance. Here's the chronology.

On Thursday, we got the largest request for assistance in the history in the United States. And it wasn't anything other than, "full logistics support throughout the entire area of responsibility."

Senator DAYTON. What does that mean, then, please?

Secretary MCHALE. Well, that's what we asked. And over a period of time, in consultation with FEMA and the Homeland Security Operations Center, we got a better understanding of what they meant by "full logistics support," and we helped them in that effort.

Senator DAYTON. Over a period of time? What period are we talking? Days? Weeks?

Secretary MCHALE. Within 24 hours, we received that request for assistance. It had an estimated cost of $1 billion. It ultimately covered two States and all the disaster areas. And within 24 hours, approximately after the receipt of that request for assistance, which came in on Thursday, it was approved by the Secretary of Defense on Friday, and I communicated that approval, as did others, to senior officials at the Department of Homeland Security. So that was the first RFA, the largest——

Senator DAYTON. So what constituted, then, in this instance "full logistics support"? What were the components of that?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. We viewed it, in consultation with DHS, the provision of food, ice, fuel, restoration of transportation systems, and items of that type. We conferred with the Joint Staff, General McNabb, who is the J–4 on the Joint Staff. He assured the Secretary of Defense and me that we could execute that mission. And we promptly said yes.

Now, that was a very broad, fairly loosely defined mission requirement. But in a crisis circumstance, we felt that we should take that on, and we did.

Senator DAYTON. I'm sorry to be interrupting, but my time is limited.

Secretary MCHALE. That's all right, sir.

Senator DAYTON. Is this the first instance in which that kind of full logistics support was requested of DOD? Who provides these in lesser emergency situations?

Secretary MCHALE. A request of that type, fortunately for our country, is unprecedented.

Senator DAYTON. All right.

Secretary MCHALE. It came in on Thursday on a single 8½ by 11 sheet of paper. It said nothing more than what I have just quoted to you. We discussed it with DHS and FEMA. We refined it a little bit to make sure that we had the capacity to meet the requirement. The Secretary was convinced that we could meet it. He approved it, and we communicated that late Friday afternoon back to DHS. And I sent an e-mail to Deputy Secretary Jackson about 7 o'clock Friday night confirming the Secretary's approval.

Senator DAYTON. That's the first package, as you've described it.

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. And that was a single RFA.

Senator DAYTON. Then the second package is this search and rescue, security assessment, etc.?

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir. That was a separate package. What happened there, very briefly, was on Saturday morning I met across a table with Deputy Secretary Jackson. We talked about the

challenges that had been experienced in the very chaotic circumstances of the previous week.

I asked Deputy Secretary Jackson to discuss with me the anticipated mission tasks that we could expect DOD to provide. He and I sat down and drew up a list of about a dozen mission-essential tasks, which were the missions, the mission areas, you quoted a few moments ago.

On Sunday, while the Secretary of Defense was in New Orleans, that list was reviewed by senior officials in the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. There were seven requests for assistance in that package. They totaled about three-quarters of a billion dollars. And they were approved vocally by the Secretary of Defense on Monday.

So on Friday, we had vocal approval of a $1 billion RFA, and on Monday, we had a second series of RFAs with a cost estimate of three-quarters of a billion dollars, also vocally approved by the Secretary of Defense. There was no delay at all in that process.

Senator DAYTON. Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Secretary. But I've got to get my questions in here.

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir.

Senator DAYTON. Fast-forwarding, now, we're in a situation, as described in the *Washington Post* today, "New Orleans is a Gordian knot of complications." Everything seems to be snarled. Vast sections of the city are still without utilities.

We saw this when the Chairman and the Ranking Member—I accompanied them and others just about 3 weeks ago down to New Orleans and Mississippi. But in New Orleans, it says here an estimated 50 million cubic yards of hurricane and flood debris; of that, only about 6 million has been picked up.

So initially—and I'm not faulting you with this; I just want to understand why so little has gone from the point of obviously overwhelming impact? If you have at one point initially responsibility for debris removal, restoration of basic utilities, how long did you maintain having that responsibility? At what point and to whom did that responsibility shift?

Secretary MCHALE. We provided support to the lead Federal agency, DHS and FEMA, for about a 5 to 6-week period of time. At the end of that period, perhaps even a little less than that, we began the retrograde of our forces—Admiral Keating can address that—in close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.

And so we began to—we built up our force very quickly. And then as soon as civilian authorities were able to step into the breach in a coordinated retrograde, we began to remove our forces from the area of responsibility so that today, for instance, there are no active duty military forces committed to the mission. There are about 2,000 National Guard forces committed. But they, too, are expected to be retrograded by the end of this month.

So what you're describing as the current situation has once more, and in fact several months ago, been transferred back to civilian authorities.

Senator DAYTON. So the Federal Government is providing $80 billion now, or $62 billion that the Congress has approved, another $18 billion that the President has requested. And that goes down

to, at this point, then, the governor and the rest of this State and local civilian authorities, and they have the operational responsibility—if debris is not being removed, if basic utilities are not being restored, who's responsible for that at this point in time?

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, I can answer that, but I'm probably not qualified to do so. So I'll exercise some unusual restraint. All I can tell you is that is no longer a DOD mission. We transferred that mission back to civilian authorities approximately a month after landfall.

Senator DAYTON. In closing, I'd just say, General Blum, when we were down in Mississippi and New Orleans, they're not putting up banners down there. If they are, they're unprintable. They have bumper stickers down there related to FEMA that are printable but not appropriate for this setting.

But in both Mississippi and New Orleans, from the governors and the local officials, there was very high praise for the National Guard and their response. And I share that with all of you.

General BLUM. Thank you.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator.

General Blum, I want to go back to the National Guard after-action review. Because as you can see, this is a voluminous report. You testified earlier to me and to Senator Levin's question, in response to our questions, that you hadn't seen this report and that you disagree with the findings that I read to you.

I want to point out that this report refers to the National Guard Bureau and specifically to J–7. Now, is that one of the directorates on your staff?

General BLUM. Yes, it is, and from their point of view, what they have in there may be their life experience and absolutely truth as they see it. The problem is, the J–7 doesn't have the total picture. An after-action review, that 200-some page document that you have, is a compilation of all the lessons learned as they saw it.

Now, that gets further refined, and will ultimately come to me to say what we really do need to do. And I've already done some of that with the more critical issues. There's probably lots of goodness in that. Perhaps 90 percent of that document may be absolutely accurate and valid.

But that particular paragraph that I saw displayed on the chart does not reflect my professional or personal feelings, and I don't think it accurately presents the overall picture of what was going on with DOD, the Joint Staff, Northern Command, General Honoré's Joint Task Force in the two States. And I thought that I owed it to you to give you ground truth.

Chairman COLLINS. You do, and I appreciate that. I do want to point out to you that the NGB J–7 analyzed, in compiling this, after-action reports from the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the National Guard Bureau Joint Staff, lessons learned liaison officers deployed to the areas of operations, the NGB public affairs office, the NGB Judge Advocate General's office, as well as a structured hot wash conducted in Texas at the very end of September.

So it isn't as if this is the opinion of one narrow directorate. It's a directorate that did what appears, from the description on how this report was compiled, a very thorough assessment across the board of after-action reports. So I wanted to clarify that as well.

And I guess my final question on this report for you is: I understand that you personally disagree with the findings that I read to you, but are you saying that it's the official position of the National Guard Bureau that the findings that I read you on command and control are inaccurate?

General BLUM. The paragraph that you exposed me to today, the official findings are what I say, I am the Chief of the National Guard.

Chairman COLLINS. Right. That's why I'm——

General BLUM. Ultimately, I am the final word on what the Guard's opinion is on that. And I've shared that with you now twice, and I stand by it.

Chairman COLLINS. Right. I just wanted to be very clear on this because it's unusual to have a report that comes from your bureau——

General BLUM. No, it really isn't. And any time you do an after-action review of a complex operation, you will see many refracted versions of the truth. We're hearing some of it this morning. Perception is not always reality. It is my job to look at the whole picture. What they are holding are several pieces of the puzzle, several tiles in a mosaic. I happen to see the view of the entire thing from a vantage of perspective that they did not have.

Chairman COLLINS. Right. But your J–7 talked to the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the public affairs office, and the JAG office. This wasn't just a narrow section. And I just want to get that on the record.

General BLUM. I am not attacking the job they did, nor the——

Chairman COLLINS. I fully understand your personal views. Thank you.

General BLUM. OK. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Admiral Keating, I want to go back to the time frame on the deployment of active duty troops. Governor Blanco told us that she asked for the deployment of Federal troops on August 30. On August 31, two key active duty units, the 82nd Airborne Division and the First Cavalry Division, were put on heightened alert. But they were not actually deployed to the disaster area until September 3.

I'm trying to get a better understanding of why the troops were not deployed earlier. You have the request from the governor on August 30. You have the heightened alert given to these two key units on August 31. But they're not actually deployed until September 3.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, ma'am. And that timeline is accurate. Those forces in question, the 82nd Airborne, First Cavalry, and some elements of Marine units from both coasts, represent less than a third of the total active duty forces committed.

While they were somewhat prominent in that their role in New Orleans was significant, and they're readily identified by their red berets, I would hasten to point out to you and to the Members of your Committee, we had active duty forces there before the hurri-

canes hit. We were deploying—because of the authorities that Secretary England gave me—ships, airplanes, Air Force personnel who were opening up airports, literally as the hurricane was clearing the central part of our country.

So those forces in question, yes, ma'am. Identified, prepared to deploy order—is the term we give them—on Wednesday of that week. Didn't get the authority to move them until Friday night and Saturday of the week after landfall. Less than a third of the total active duty forces committed to the actual rescue operation, however.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Secretary McHale, I appreciated the candor in your earlier testimony this morning talking about the relationship between DOD and DHS and the very different perceptions on how the process works. And as you've correctly pointed out, we've had testimony, sworn testimony, before the Committee which paints a very different picture from your perception of how the process works.

So I'd like to follow up on the issue of mission assignments for a moment. The Stafford Act—which is the law that authorizes mission assignments, as you're well aware—is very clear in the authority that it gives to the President, which he has designated to the Secretary of Homeland Security. And that authority is to direct—that's the word that's used—direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities and resources in support of State and local assistance efforts.

Now, the word "direct" in my judgment does not suggest any room on the part of the agency that's asking for help to negotiate terms with the—or I should say on the part of the agency that's been asked for help to negotiate the terms of that help.

I want to get this clear in the record because we have been told repeatedly by FEMA officials that DOD is alone among Federal agencies and departments in requiring an often lengthy period of negotiations before it will accept a mission assignment. In other words, other agencies just take the mission assignment from FEMA and go forth and do it. FEMA tells us that DOD even rejects the term "mission assignment" and instead says that these are simply requests for assistance. Big difference.

The White House, in a briefing, recently told us that to enter into a mission assignment, FEMA and the Defense Department undergo this 21-step process. And the White House said, that's too long. It's got to be streamlined in some way.

Now, let me say that I think DOD got some assignments from FEMA that lacked clarity, that were vague—take over logistics, what does that mean? But I am troubled about the DOD approach that the Pentagon has the ability to treat these as requests when the law says that agencies are directed to comply. Could you comment on this issue further for us?

Secretary MCHALE. The description that has been given to you by past witnesses with regard to the chain of command is accurate. The description given to you in seeking a change in the law on that subject indicating undue delay in processing RFAs is inaccurate. So the rationale for the argument is false, although the description of the authorities as they currently exist is accurate. Let me backstep a little bit.

The Department of Defense is unique under the Constitution and under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There is a military chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Admiral Keating out to his operating forces.

We have taken the position that, under existing authorities and as a matter of policy, placing a FEMA official or a DHS official in command, placing that civilian outside the Department of Defense within the military chain of command, violates Goldwater-Nichols and is a bad idea.

You can decide whether or not it would have been a good idea for Secretary Brown to have command authority over General Honoré's forces in New Orleans. We take the position that only General Honoré should have command over his forces.

The historic term is a request for assistance. The term used more recently by FEMA is a mission assignment. We do push back on that because we do not believe that the chain of command within the military, though we want to work closely and in a supportive and efficient way to assist FEMA, giving FEMA actual command authority over military forces places a military commander in the field in a very difficult position. Does he listen to the PFO or does he listen to the Secretary of Defense in receiving his orders?

With regard to the facts that they have presented, and Senator, I would say in a very respectful way, it really isn't our perception. Those who criticized us were factually wrong. They confused two different sets of RFAs. The $1 billion RFA, it's well documented, was processed and approved within 24 hours. The seven RFAs initially generated by Deputy Secretary Jackson and me over the weekend were approved verbally by the Secretary of Defense.

I can tell you, in a crisis, there are no 21 steps for approval. It involves frequently a phone call from the Homeland Security Operations Center, from Matt Broderick to me or to another official in DOD; a review by the Joint Staff; a conference with the combatant commander; and a prompt presentation to the Secretary of Defense, who's not at all hesitant to make a firm decision very promptly.

We decided almost $2 billion worth of RFAs between Friday and Monday. I don't know that human beings can assess such complex missions and approve them more rapidly than that. And that's the documented record.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. General Blum, I'm interested in the way we talk about dual-hatting with the National Guard separately reporting to the governors and then the Department of Defense.

General Landreneau mobilized the Louisiana National Guard, but you also mobilized a considerable force from throughout the Nation, National Guardsmen to come into the damaged area. Do you have any requirement—I just want to have this for the record—to notify Northern Command, for instance, or anyone at the Department of Defense—or get any approvals at the Defense Department to do that? I mentioned Northern Command because of the responsibility for homeland defense.

General BLUM. In statute, sir, no. In practicality, obviously you have to do that. It gets to Senator Akaka's question: If you don't

have that communication and relationship, you have misunderstanding, duplication, redundancy, and confusion.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. That's what's really interesting about our American system because you have no real legal requirement to notify.

General BLUM. That's correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You've got a separate command authority to the governors. Do you remember who you did notify that this was happening at the Defense Department?

General BLUM. Well, we can start with the Secretary of Defense, who was personally knowledgeable every——

Senator LIEBERMAN. You spoke directly to him that this was happening?

General BLUM. Every day. The Deputy SECDEF.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good enough.

General BLUM. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I got it. Good enough.

General BLUM. The Assistant Secretary.

Senator LIEBERMAN. We had testimony last week from Governor Blanco. You had been asked in the pre-hearing interviews we had with you, General Blum, about some of this, and I want to give you a chance to respond.

On Thursday, September 1, you visited Louisiana, and you discussed the command and control of the rapidly escalating number of Guard forces in the State and advised the governor, according to her testimony—and I believe you confirmed this with our staff earlier; certainly her staff did—that she should not ask for federalization of the Guard. At that point, as she testified, she was just looking for the most help she could get. And I believe you indicated to her that federalization would not get her an additional soldier, which it would not.

Then she reported this series of conversations or calls from the White House that we referred to on Friday night, three of them from 11:30 p.m. to 2 a.m., in which she was asked by various people, including Chief of Staff Andrew Card, to sign that MOU which would have had a kind of federalization/dual-hatting and that she thought that contrary to what you had said earlier on the day before that you were advocating that she accept federalization.

I wanted to give you a chance to respond. There was some suggestion you may have felt under some political pressure at that moment from the White House. Just tell us what was going on then and how you saw what she was being asked to do.

General BLUM. Absolutely. And the first part of your question is absolutely accurate. I did visit New Orleans on September 1. I've also visited Mississippi, talked to the senior leadership in Mississippi, then flew into New Orleans, and then flew up to Baton Rouge where I met with General Landreneau and Governor Blanco.

Discussion did take place, and she asked my opinion on federalization. I said operationally it didn't look like it was a necessity at that time. It looked like the force flow coming in was adequate, or more than adequate, to meet her needs. She asked for—and so did General Landreneau at that time—additional forces. We made communications and got that moving. That was on September 1.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. I understand.

General BLUM. On September 2, the President of the United States visited New Orleans. The mayor was there. The governor was there. I was there. And all three of those elected officials at the Federal, State, and local parish level had a national news conference where they declared that General Landreneau had just successfully taken down the last bastion of civil unrest or concern about civil unrest in New Orleans. This was about 12:30 that afternoon.

And they were all three elected officials—the mayor, the governor, and the President—satisfied that the security situation in New Orleans was in hand. And they complimented General Landreneau and the National Guard troops who supported what was available of the New Orleans Police Department, which actually was the—we were in a military support to law enforcement role at that time, authorized by the governor. And everyone was satisfied with that.

I came back from New Orleans that evening.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thursday evening?

General BLUM. Yes, sir. Late, pretty late. About 11:30 p.m. I landed at Andrews, if I recall correctly. I was asked to present to Governor Blanco some options that would be command and control operations or federalization options.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You mean on Friday? Friday, you were asked to do that?

General BLUM. Well, let me look at the calendar.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I guess the question is: How did you end up on those calls from the White House on Friday night?

General BLUM. I was asked to make that. And that's not illogical.

Senator LIEBERMAN. No. I understand.

General BLUM. Statutorily, here's where my job is in law. I am the channel of communications between the governors and the Department of the Army and the Air Force. Since we're talking about Air National Guard, Army National Guard, and governors, it would not be illogical for me to make that offering to her.

I made the offering to her. She wanted time to consider it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. This was, again, just for the record, the memorandum of understanding, the dual hat? That's what you mean by the offering on Friday night over the phone?

General BLUM. That's correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General BLUM. That's correct. And she wanted to reflect on it, and she said, I don't see a reason to do it. She had some concerns. We addressed the concerns. She was called back again because of that. She again said, I would like to have some time to look at this and my legal people look at it, and she ultimately rejected it.

I left the White House, and if she had subsequent conversations after that with anybody in the White House, I wouldn't know about it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Do you think she made the right decision in rejecting?

General BLUM. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You do? Understood.

General BLUM. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. For the record. Then we go to Friday. And as I said earlier, time is of the essence. And a lot of this is when you get personnel in.

We're on Friday, and here's what Governor Blanco said to us last week. And I quote from her testimony: "The drama moments were settled"—I think she means handled, but—"settled by the Louisiana National Guard and the Guard members from 50 States, four Territories, and Washington, DC. And I couldn't get one Federal Government to move its troops in to assist. So you know at that point in time"—and here I think she's talking about the Friday night discussion—"this hybrid arrangement coming to me at midnight just seemed a little like posturing instead of a real solution."

Let me just add to this, in Exhibit 5,[1] which I'm going to describe to you but you can check if you want, General Rowe, NORTHCOM operations director, told us that the general view at NORTHCOM at that moment on Friday—and he suggested at DOD and certainly at the National Guard Bureau—was that Federal troops were no longer necessary. And then we have an Exhibit 6,[2] 2 a.m. Saturday—that would have been September 3—8 hours before the President gave the deployment order for Federal troops, the Joint Staff operations director says that the Federal troops are no longer necessary.

General Rowe, incidentally, says that the reason for the view at NORTHCOM that there was not a requirement for Federal troops, and I'm paraphrasing here, was undoubtedly influenced by the massive number of Guard troops that had already been deployed.

So the question is—and here I want to give you, Mr. Secretary, the opportunity to respond to what the governor said, and to some extent seems to be validated by General Rowe's interview with our staff, that by that time, as that Saturday morning approached that the President deployed Federal troops, they really weren't necessary.

Secretary MCHALE. At that time, it was clear to anyone looking at the situation they absolutely were necessary. I'd have to speak with General Rowe to get his understanding of his comments. But on Saturday, September 3, there were nearly 35,000 military forces in the AOR—29,491 National Guard, 4,631 Federal forces, with massive numbers of Federal forces on the way, ultimately building up on September 10 to 22,000. I believe this is the distinction drawn by General Rowe, but you'd have to ask him.

It was clear that massive combat service support, Federal military requirements, were needed in this area—logistics, communications, debris removal, search and rescue, and mortuary affairs. It was obvious that this was the largest natural disaster requiring a military response in American history, and massive amounts of Federal military resources, including troops.

The issue was: Did we need light infantry in order to restore civil order in the presence of National Guard MPs? Did we need to send in not logistics support, humanitarian relief, but forces to restore civil order? And at the period of time, Senator, you have cited, it

[1] Exhibit 5 appears in the Appendix on page 172.
[2] Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 190.

was very much in question as to whether or not troops, meaning Federal troops, infantry to restore civil order, would be required.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me interrupt. Just because by that time, the evacuation of the Superdome and the Convention Center had been carried out by the Guard, and there appeared to be a restoration of order. I get your point.

Secretary MCHALE. We were moving in that direction. And General Blum during that very period of time was moving 4,200 National Guard MPs and security personnel into New Orleans. So there was real doubt as to whether we needed Federal infantry going in.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And maybe that's what the governor had in mind. But you're saying beyond that function, there was a need nonetheless for the logistics——

General BLUM. Yes, sir.

Secretary MCHALE. Absolutely. Humanitarian relief.

General BLUM. Let me help in that, if I can.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please.

General BLUM. The Chairman alluded to the fact that my son, who is a military police company commander from the Maryland National Guard, was diverted from his mission in Honduras and sent with his unit to New Orleans. They accomplished their mission riding on amphibious vehicles provided by the U.S. Marine Corps because the Humvees that we have in the National Guard are not suitable for high water traffic and were necessary in the parish that he was operating in.

So if you want to see a perfect example of jointness and unity of effort, it is a Maryland National Guard military police commander diverted from a mission riding on an amphibious Marine piece of equipment that if you had not sent the Marines in, we would not have had. So he was able to do his support to civilian law enforcement work because of the enhanced capabilities brought in by the Title 10 Marines, which I think is welcome. I don't think we should—there's goodness in this.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I hear you. It's well said. And my time is more than up. I think I'd like to just leave you with two questions, which I'll frame for you and ask you to answer in writing, to all of you.

One is—and this is really particularly for General Blum—is there any circumstance under which you would think it appropriate and necessary to federalize the National Guard? I'm not asking for an answer now.

And the second question really goes more to Secretary McHale's earlier point about the paradigm changing. Do we need to change the paradigm? Do we need to invest more in the Title 10 active duty military to be ready to move in in this kind of case, and in a terrorist case, with prepositioned assets or rapid response? Or is the better alternative to give greater support, training, equipment, etc., to the Guard nationally and let—I don't think I have the time where we have to answer it now. But that's a very important question for us, and it will be something, I think, that Senator Collins and our Committee may, if we reach a consensus, want to make some recommendations on in our final report.

Secretary MCHALE. Senator, if I may, there is a third option that should be included in that package.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please.

Secretary MCHALE. We tend to view the two options that you have presented as a consolidated whole. We look to the total force, whether it's active duty or National Guard. And the rapid deployment of National Guard forces, in this case in overwhelming numbers, reflected not a necessity. It was a choice. It was a strategy. We believe that Title 10 forces should be preserved for overseas war fighting, the primary mission of the Department of Defense. And we think the Guard is ideally suited for domestic missions.

But the third part that needs to be considered is: As we improve DOD capabilities, both active and reserve, we need to think through what kinds of capabilities should exist in the civilian sector so that DOD does not become the default setting of immediate resort because those capabilities, including first responder capabilities, may not currently be trained and equipped adequately within the civilian sector.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Fair enough. I know every time I return to those two helicopters, you and I get into a debate. But part of the question is: Should the Guard have had those two helicopters, and should FEMA have been ready to ask the Guard instead of the active duty military for those helicopters, and would they have arrived—ideally they would have arrived on Monday afternoon after the hurricane subsided so they could have been put right to work.

Admiral KEATING. Senator, there were DOD helicopters there.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So I guess the question, then, is: Why didn't those two helicopters get there until Tuesday night when they were requested on Sunday afternoon?

Admiral KEATING. I don't know, sir. I'm perceiving that there's a theme that we were slow to respond and it wasn't until Friday/Saturday/Sunday that DOD Title 10 guys and girls got there. Patently inaccurate.

We were talking to forces on the U.S.S. *Bataan,* for example, before the hurricane hit, telling the captain of that ship, from my lips to her ears, get as close as you can to the center of the storm because you're certain to be needed. This is on Sunday afternoon. She, Captain Nora Tyson, had eight helicopters on board who were flying in near—well, bad weather in the wake of the hurricane.

So the two helicopters that you cite, Senator, I'm not quarreling that they were late. It's just they were two out of what ended up to be 230 helicopters. There was much more there.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Secretary MCHALE. Sir, I was just going to say you can't possibly deploy 72,000 forces by September 10 if you begin at a dead start. We were leaning into this a week before landfall, preparing forces, equipping forces, getting them ready to move, and then actually moving them in advance of landfall.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Here's the whole picture for all of us to look at. And we've seen it much more painfully in other Federal agencies. When Dr. Max Mayfield and everybody else is beginning to—with a crescendo saying, "This is the big one," what more could we have done?

This is really self-critical so we do it better next time: To get every conceivable asset in place, to evacuate more people so we wouldn't have had those terrible circumstances at the Superdome and the Convention Center for people in New Orleans, and get them there as quickly as possible because time is of the essence. And we hold ourselves, and all of you, to a very high standard.

And I appreciate what you did, and next time we want to make sure the Federal Government does a lot better. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator.

I want to thank this panel. I, too, am going to have some additional questions for the record. We do need to move on to the next panel, but I want to give you a preview of what those questions are going to be.

Secretary McHale, it seems to me what you have described today is a conflict between the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Stafford Act. If you read the two laws together, it seems to me that there is a conflict there. And my question for the record for you is going to be: Do you agree there is a conflict? And if so, what are the Department's recommendations for resolving that conflict?

It's an important issue because, in fact, the White House has said that DOD itself identified this 21-step process as being a problem with the response. Now, maybe you disagree with that assessment. But that's what we have heard. And when you look at the $1 billion—the biggest FEMA request ever made of DOD, in fact, that was cut down to half that amount. So I want to pursue those issues with you.

Admiral Keating, I did not get to explore with you some of the situational awareness issues that we talked about in our interview last Friday, including your visibility into what the Guard was doing and also when you knew that the levees broke. Because it was the collapse of the levees that made the catastrophe so much worse.

And it seems to me, from what you told me last Friday, that there was quite a delay between when the FEMA person on the ground on Monday morning knew that the levees had broken and when that information got to you. And that's a problem. That's another lesson learned as far as communications. And I see you're nodding in agreement on that.

There are so many other issues that we will be submitting questions for the record. I do appreciate your testimony today, and I am going to thank you now and go on to the next panel, unless——

Senator WARNER. Would you allow me——

Chairman COLLINS. I'm sorry. I didn't realize Senator Warner had come in.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I won't delay it. But we have the Attorney General two hearing rooms down on the question of the surveillance issue, and I'm part of that Intelligence Committee.

But I just want to say that I've observed quite a few things in my 28 years here in the Senate, and this is an extraordinary event brought on by extraordinary circumstances of nature, which I don't think any of us could have foreseen.

But Madam Chairman and all three of us here are on the Armed Services Committee. I personally, in my own independent analysis of what you've done, I think you've done an exemplary job. Yes, hindsight shows here and there we could have perhaps done things somewhat differently.

But on the whole, I think the United States, the people of this country, have the highest regard for the National Guard, working with their brother Guardsmen in Louisiana and Mississippi, and for the regular forces, Admiral Keating, which were brought in to give additional support. Many a person has said that the uniform was a quieting presence and a reassuring presence to citizens that were just in a state of total distraught.

So I may have one or two questions for the record. I still am trying to probe this Posse Comitatus doctrine. I'm not advocating it, but I just want to make sure the system looks at it very carefully. And then I'd like to express my views as to whether a change should be made to that.

Secretary MCHALE. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. You and I have talked about that, Mr. Secretary. Because when those uniforms are on the street and the active force has to step back and turn over to the Guard such support as they may be giving to local law enforcement, or in the absence of local law enforcement they have to be law enforcement, that leaves an extraordinary impression that all those in uniform, the same uniform, half have to step back and the other half have to take on that situation.

And there has been some testimony. There were instances where, had the active forces had the authority—which they don't under the law—they might have been able to curtail some of the looting, which is a very tragic aspect of these natural disasters.

I thank the Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. And I commend you and your troops.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

I'd now like to call forward our second panel of witnesses. Lieutenant General Russel Honoré is the Commanding General of the First U.S. Army, which is based in Georgia. He's been an Army officer since 1971 and has served in a variety of command and staff positions. General Honoré commanded Joint Task Force Katrina, the active duty military force that responded to the Gulf Coast region.

Major General Bennett Landreneau is the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana as well as the Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. General Landreneau has served in the Louisiana National Guard since his enlistment in 1969.

We're very pleased to welcome you both here today. We very much appreciate your service, not only to the people of the Gulf Coast but also to your country. And General Honoré, we will begin with you.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUSSEL L. HONORÉ,[1] COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST U.S. ARMY

General HONORÉ. Good afternoon. Chairman Collins, Members of the Committee, for four of the past six hurricane seasons, I've had the opportunity to support the Department of Defense planning and response to hurricanes. Hurricane Floyd in 1999, Hurricanes Lili and Isidore in 2002, Hurricane Isabel in 2003, and Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne in 2004. I also helped plan and supported the U.S. military's response to devastating floods which swept through Venezuela in 1999 and in Mozambique in 2000.

It has been 164 days since Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast of the United States. We only have 111 days until the next hurricane season. Today, 42 percent of the American people live within 20 miles of the waterways of America. With that in mind, I will abbreviate my comments here so we can get to the questions you would like to do. But I'd like to just mention a few points.

First, prior to my return from the Gulf Coast, I had meetings with Admiral Allen and General Landreneau, and informally we looked at some tasks or some quick fixes. We identified 11 of them. I'd like to share those with you:

Establish pre-event unified Command and Control (C2) organizational structure.

Pre-position unified mobile disaster assessment teams.

Designate a single DOD point of contact for the Federal Coordinating Officer to coordinate requirements.

Implement a local/state employee Disaster Clause to dual-hat/train employees to fill key disaster support manning shortfalls.

Pre-position common interoperable communications assets.

Establish external support (push packages/funding) to fill common resource shortfalls.

Pre-allocate space in the State Emergency Operation Centers to integrate Federal or other external agencies.

Develop a Continuity of Government Plan that sustains government functions at the State level.

Pre-arrange support contracts for required resources.

Acquire and integrate assured power supply—meaning generators—and make it a requirement that gas stations, pharmacies, and local Emergency Operations Centers have generator power during and after hurricanes.

Gain industry commitments to re-establish critical services.

With that, ma'am, the rest of my statement is for the record. I'll defer, with your permission, to General Landreneau or to your instructions.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. General Landreneau.

[1] The prepared statement of General Honoré with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 91.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL BENNETT C. LANDRENEAU,[1] ADJUTANT GENERAL, LOUISIANA NATIONAL GUARD; DIRECTOR, LOUISIANA OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

General LANDRENEAU. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm honored to be here with you today to discuss the military response for Hurricane Katrina.

Before I begin I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all who provided support to Louisiana in our hour of need. In the face of our Nation's greatest natural disaster, the heart and soul of this country launched the greatest response and outpouring of support ever witnessed on American soil, and we are forever grateful.

I greatly appreciate the hard work and creativity of the professional emergency managers who work with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). Their dedication is noteworthy and commendable.

I also am thankful and proud to work alongside the finest National Guard soldiers and airmen in the United States. Their courage and selfless service in the face of tremendous turmoil was inspiring.

In Louisiana, the Adjutant General of the National Guard also serves as the Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. As Commander of the Guard and Director of LOHSEP, I am responsible for the actions of these organizations, and I am responsible for ensuring these organizations implement lessons learned from this disaster.

When Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency, I recommended the activation of 2,000 National Guardsmen early on. This activation began a chain of events that initiated our emergency response plan and began the coordination with staff and units to implement preplanned support requirements for response operations.

As we gathered more information on the strengthening storm, I recommended to Governor Blanco that we increase the activation to an additional 2,000 soldiers, for a total of 4,000, unprecedented pre-storm in Louisiana.

As part of the Louisiana National Guard's response plan, we have standing agreements with parishes in the greater New Orleans area to provide personnel and equipment. In accordance with our plan, high water vehicles and soldiers were assigned to each NOPD district, the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, along with each of the 13 parishes in Southeast Louisiana, where we assigned Louisiana National Guard liaison teams to coordinate the Guard's response. Mobile communication teams and engineer assessment teams were staged along the outer path of the projected strike zone.

These teams were moved in as soon as Katrina passed and were able to provide early assessment of damage in areas surrounding New Orleans. Personnel and equipment are assigned to specific

[1] The prepared statement of General Landreneau with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 109.

Louisiana State Police Troops, and our agreement with the City of New Orleans is to provide medical and security personnel for the Louisiana Superdome, as it is designated a special needs shelter.

When the Superdome was later designated as a shelter of last resort, the Louisiana National Guard responded. Our Guardsmen, in support of NOPD, organized and implemented an entrance plan that ensured that the personnel coming in were searched and that safety was implemented.

On Monday, when we learned of the multiple failures in the Federal levees, we recognized we were coping with a catastrophic incident. Louisiana's five levels of redundancy within its communications systems were either down or had reached capacity, so our ability to receive timely and accurate information was degraded.

As soon as it was possible, National Guard soldiers and airmen launched search and rescue boats that had been prepositioned at Jackson Barracks and our aviation resources, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, soon followed as gale force winds subsided. By Tuesday, the Louisiana National Guard had every resource committed. We had no reserves. All engaged in Governor Blanco's No. 1 priority, search and rescue, saving lives.

On Tuesday morning, I received a call from General Honoré when he informed me that he was Task Force Commander for Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. During our conversation, I conveyed the governor's desire for Federal troops, in particular, an Army division headquarters to plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of New Orleans.

After my conversation with General Honoré, I spoke to General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and requested the National Guard Bureau assistance to take the lead in a national call for additional assistance from National Guard units throughout the country. Today, we know that one of the most successful outcomes of Katrina was this execution of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

On Wednesday, August 31, General Honoré arrived in Baton Rouge. I introduced him to Governor Blanco, at which time she asked General Honoré to coordinate the evacuation efforts in New Orleans so that I could concentrate on search and rescue and law and order issues. At this point, the governor expressed increasing concern with the lack of Federal resources entering the State.

On Thursday, September 1, we began to see the arrival of National Guard forces in significant numbers. We eventually processed and missioned over 30,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen. The governors from all of the States and Territories and Adjutant Generals deployed those soldiers in a very rapid fashion.

Also on Thursday, the National Guard began to receive large numbers of buses at the Louisiana Superdome. National Guard members coordinated around the clock evacuation beginning at 10 a.m. and completing Saturday. Eventually, 822 buses would be used by National Guard forces to evacuate the Superdome.

In addition to securing and evacuating the Louisiana Superdome, the Louisiana National Guard received a request from the City of New Orleans to assist in securing the Morial Convention Center. On Friday at 12 noon, nearly 1,000 National Guardsmen supported the securing of the Convention Center and assisted NOPD, and by

12:30 p.m. the area was secure, and by 3 p.m. food distribution and medical triage facilities were in place. Distribution of food, water, and medical care continued throughout the night. The evacuation began at 10 a.m. on Saturday, as discussed by General Blum, and was completed by 6 p.m. the same day, again by National Guard forces.

Madam Chairman, distinguished Members, I tell you today, as I recommended to Governor Blanco, that there was never a need to federalize the National Guard. Federalizing the National Guard would have significantly limited our capacity to conduct law enforcement missions and would add no advantage to our ability to conduct operations. Thousands of National Guard forces were pouring into the State, soldiers and airmen in a Title 32 status, most of whom were combat-tested and uniquely qualified to carry out the governor's priorities.

There has also been some discussion about a proposal received by Governor Blanco on Friday evening, September 2, outlining a dual-hatted commander, one commander to control Title 10 and Title 32 forces. I again submit to you that this procedure would have served no operational purpose.

By the time this document was received, there were over 8,500 National Guardsmen on the ground performing operations. Lines of communication, chains of command, and tasking priorities had already been accomplished. Changing this process would have only stalled current operations and delayed vital missions and not have provided any additional boots on the ground.

General Honoré and I were in constant communication. When Federal land forces began to arrive on Saturday, September 3, General Honoré consulted me and we discussed their deployment. We coordinated how those forces would be utilized. We did in fact reach unity of effort, each component working towards a common goal while maintaining unique chains of command. We had developed a multi-component command operating under the legal authorities of Title 10, 14, and 32 of the U.S. Code, all in support of the Governor of Louisiana.

There has never been a time in our Nation's history when the National Guard has been in greater demand. We need your assistance to make sure our National Guard is properly resourced to defend our Nation overseas and to defend our people at home.

I'm very proud of the soldiers and airmen of the Louisiana National Guard. There are thousands of examples of heroic actions that took place as a result of commanders empowering junior leaders to step up, to be innovative and creative, to take care of missions, and to carry out the governor's No. 1 priority of saving lives.

I thank you and look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, General, and thank you both for your testimony and your service.

General Honoré, you made a very important point at the beginning of your testimony when you reminded this Committee that hurricane season will soon be upon us once again. And it is that reality which has motivated this Committee to press to conclude its hearings and write its report and make its findings and recommendations so that we can learn the lessons of Katrina before hurricane season is underway once again. In that regard, your 10

quick fixes, or 11, as you listed in your testimony, are very helpful to the Committee.

The first recommendation that you made was to establish pre-event unified command and control organizational structure. And as you know, with the previous panel, we've had a lot of discussion about that issue. Four times recently, prior to the event, whether it was the Democratic or Republican national conventions or the international summit, and there was one other, there was pre-event planning that led to a dual-hatted commander being placed in charge. I believe in each case, General Landreneau, it was the National Guard official who was given the dual-hatted responsibility.

Is that the kind of planning that you're talking about, General?

General HONORÉ. To some degree, ma'am. Those operations take months to plan and prepare. We don't have that luxury in preparing for hurricanes or some of the other disturbances that might happen on the earth, whether it's due to weather, earthquakes, or WMD.

I was a part of the NORTHCOM staffing with the Department when we staffed the dual-hatting concept. The idea was to use that dual hat when we had a deliberate plan for a known event. We deliberately at that time never considered it as a crisis response, where in the middle of a crisis you would determine who's going to take command. And I think that the Secretary spoke to that earlier.

Chairman COLLINS. Well, what are you suggesting be done with regard to command and control?

General HONORÉ. For this hurricane season, we don't want to fight the last hurricane, but apply the lessons learned from it. Prior to this hurricane season we must bring people together.

We don't want people to meet and exchange business cards at the scene. We want to do it quicker. We want to do it better. We have an obligation to our citizens that it does not appear that they're waiting on us to come to their rescue. We owe, true to our oath, that we will support and defend them. And when that doesn't happen, it hurts us to our heart.

Going into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast of Mississippi under those circumstances is the reason we're here today determining how we might respond quicker. One of the things that can be done is to create a prearranged unified command and control organization. After talking to some of my colleagues, I believe it's in progress and will happen prior to the next hurricane season.

Chairman COLLINS. General, as far as your other 10 recommendations, do you know if any of them are being implemented?

General HONORÉ. We have shared them with our higher headquarters, Northern Command, as well as with Admiral Allen and General Landreneau.

Chairman COLLINS. General Landreneau, one of the lessons of Katrina is clearly that there has to be a better system in place, better planning, and the execution of that plan to evacuate people with special needs, nursing homes, hospitals, prior to landfall.

We heard truly tragic testimony over the last week of nursing home patients who were not evacuated because the nursing homes

failed to execute their plans, but also calls for help that went unanswered until too late.

Are you aware of any planning underway in Louisiana to improve the evacuation of the most vulnerable citizens of the area, those who cannot evacuate themselves, either because they are in nursing homes or hospitals, or they're too old or infirm or sick to do so?

General LANDRENEAU. Absolutely. Thank you, Madam Chairman. The governor has directed a thorough after-action review and identification of any corrective measures that need to be taken to ensure that during the next hurricane season, we're in the position to be able to support whatever evacuation needs there are.

But I must state to you that as you, in your preamble to the questions, spoke to the very difficult time that we had with the evacuation, the resources of the local units of government were exhausted. The resources, all the resources of the State, were focused on saving lives and taking care of people. The governor had all of the agencies and all of us focused on that. We were totally committed and overwhelmed. FEMA was overwhelmed.

I think it's very clear, Madam Chairman, that this incident, a catastrophic incident such as we had with Katrina, required the execution of the identification of a catastrophic event and the implementation of catastrophic incident annex as part of the National Response Plan. This was not done.

It was only the second day after the hurricane that the Secretary of Homeland Security identified Katrina as an Incident of National Significance. But Hurricane Katrina was never identified as a catastrophic event, as outlined in the GAO report.

That would have given more rapid opportunity for Federal forces to flow into the State to be able to assist us with the evacuation. It would have also influenced the ability to bring DOD forces in quicker.

Chairman COLLINS. I realize, General, that hindsight is always 20/20. But I'm sure that you're familiar with the testimony of the New Orleans Police Department in which we were told that there was a specific request to the National Guard to preposition five high water vehicles and boats at each of the police stations around New Orleans and that the request was denied prior to Hurricane Katrina despite the fact that it had been approved for previous hurricanes, such as Hurricane Ivan; and as a result, when the National Guard Barracks flooded, access and the use of some of those vehicles was lost.

In retrospect, should the National Guard have prepositioned high water vehicles at the police departments?

General LANDRENEAU. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for allowing me to comment on that because you're absolutely correct. That was what we should do, and that's what we did. I realize that Superintendent Riley made comments regarding this to the Committee. Superintendent Riley, with all respect to him, was not the superintendent at the time.

The National Guard had a prearranged agreement to preposition some 20 high water vehicles and over 100 soldiers with the New Orleans Police Department prior to the storm, and that was executed. I have submitted documentation to Colonel Ebbert, who is

Superintendent Riley's supervisor, and I have those documents to enter into the record,[1] where we actually did preposition that equipment and personnel with the New Orleans Police Department.

I have entered as well some statements from soldiers on how they worked with NOPD and, in one particular case, where a soldier tells of some 500 rescues that they were able to make with those high water vehicles.

And in comment, if you would allow me to comment about Jackson Barracks. And it is true that Jackson Barracks flooded. It is the headquarters for the Louisiana National Guard. However, prior to Hurricane Katrina, in our history, since the levees of the Mississippi have been constructed in the early 1900s, we have not flooded at our headquarters.

For Hurricane Betsy in the early 1960s, although St. Bernard Parish and the Ninth Ward did flood, the headquarters for the Louisiana National Guard did not flood, and we were able to immediately move out with equipment and personnel to do search and rescue.

But I have to tell you, ma'am, that even with the flooding that occurred at Jackson Barracks, the soldiers and leaders were very resourceful. They protected the boats. We had 20 boats that were preserved. We had high water vehicles that did flood. But on the second day after the hurricane, they were able to get four of those high water vehicles back online.

And as a result of that, on the second day, with those four vehicles, they were able to rescue 90 personnel from a retirement home, the Villa St. Maurice in the Ninth Ward. They rescued over 500 people during the week. That's just those high water vehicles. And a lot more with the boats.

Chairman COLLINS. General, my time has expired, so I'm going to yield to Senator Lieberman. But let me just clarify that although you are correct that Superintendent Riley was not superintendent at the time, he was the individual with the Police Department who had the conversation with the National Guard commander at Jackson Barracks in which he asked for and was denied the high water vehicles. So there is a definite conflict on the testimony. We look forward to getting the information that you've offered to provide.

General LANDRENEAU. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And we've been in contact with Colonel Ebbert in New Orleans. We have agreed to meet and go over that information as soon as I get back.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman.

Thank you both, General Honoré, General Landreneau, for being here and for your excellent testimony, but also for your extraordinary service during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. You were really heroes there, and we appreciate it greatly. You gave a lot of people a lot of confidence, which they needed at the time.

General Honoré, I thank you for the presentation of the 11 recommendations, which I gather you present on behalf of or at least in consultation with both General Landreneau and Admiral Allen. They are very helpful, and they go to some of the pre-event posi-

[1] The National Guard documents appear in the Appendix on page 142.

tioning and readiness that I think this story cries out for. So I appreciate your being very specific about it.

General Landreneau, I want to take you through a series of questions about your expectations of FEMA in this situation. We've talked a lot here about the Hurricane Pam exercise, which was the fictional hurricane exercise to try to prepare Federal, State, and local agencies for what responsibilities they'd have. In Pam, they had not performed very well.

And I want to go particularly to the question of evacuation responsibility because the site of the people at the Superdome and the Convention Center was obviously the part that most aggravated, angered, and disheartened not only the people involved but the rest of the country and, in some sense, embarrassed us in the eyes of the world.

One of the warnings delivered in the Hurricane Pam exercise was exactly that, that you've got to get ready because by their estimate, there were probably about 100,000 people who would be left in New Orleans after an evacuation incident, which was an extraordinary evacuation which I know everybody assisted in.

When our staff interviewed you, General Landreneau, you told them that it was your understanding from the Hurricane Pam exercise that FEMA had agreed that it would have responsibility for the transportation for the evacuation of New Orleans because State and local resources would be consumed after landfall. Is that roughly correct?

General LANDRENEAU. That's exactly correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And the understanding of the staff was, and mine, too, that you assumed from the Hurricane Pam exercise that FEMA would prearrange for transportation assets, also for post-landfall evacuation, so that when the State asked for them, those buses would be available immediately. Is that also right?

General LANDRENEAU. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. According to the governor's narrative on Hurricane Katrina, which appears at length in Exhibit 18 [1] in the exhibit book, on Monday, August 29, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown told Governor Blanco, I presume in response to her request, that FEMA would deliver 500 buses. Were you present for that conversation?

General LANDRENEAU. Yes, sir. I was.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And is that your recollection, that Mr. Brown assured the State on Monday that FEMA would be delivering those buses to New Orleans?

General LANDRENEAU. Yes, sir. Mr. Brown assured the governor the buses were available, they had them, and they would be on the way.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. But the buses, if I'm right, did not arrive any time during that day, Monday.

General LANDRENEAU. No, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Nor did they arrive on Tuesday morning. Is that right?

General LANDRENEAU. No, sir.

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[1] Exhibit 18 appears in the Appendix on page 203.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So when that happened, did you follow up directly with FEMA, either with Mr. Brown or the person in charge on the scene, Bill Lokey, to ask where the buses were?

General LANDRENEAU. Yes, sir, we did, numerous times throughout the night, Monday night, Tuesday morning. The schedule that was given to us on Tuesday was that they would be there, would be driving in and be available first light Wednesday morning.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was what finally happened. And as far as you know, the governor also had followed up with them on Monday night and Tuesday to ask where the buses were?

General LANDRENEAU. Yes, sir, we did. Monday night we expected them to be there quickly. We asked again throughout the night, Monday night, early Tuesday morning, throughout the day on Tuesday.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And they finally did arrive when, did you say?

General LANDRENEAU. They did not arrive until Thursday.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thursday. I don't know whether you know this, but our investigation has shown that, to me incredibly based on the fact situation that you've just described on Monday and Tuesday, FEMA did not actually ask the U.S. Department of Transportation to obtain the buses until 1:45 a.m. on Wednesday.

Did you know that?

General LANDRENEAU. I found that out, sir, and it's very disappointing to know that's when it occurred because we were actually expecting the buses much earlier than even that time.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. If the buses had arrived in New Orleans, let's say later Monday after the storm abated, or even on Tuesday, could the buses have reached the Superdome? In other words, were the roads clear enough to get there?

General LANDRENEAU. We had procedures in place. We had contingencies to be able to get the personnel to the buses because the water was rising. In every case, from Monday through Thursday, there were—we had plans in place and we had contingencies to be able to get all of the personnel onto the buses.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, you answered my question, then—that if the buses had gotten to New Orleans, you could have gotten the people to the buses to be evacuated——

General LANDRENEAU. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. From the Superdome and the Convention Center. And the bottom line, obviously, is that if the buses had arrived on Monday or Tuesday or Wednesday, as promised by FEMA, the people would not have to endure the conditions they did at the Superdome or the Convention Center.

General LANDRENEAU. Yes, sir. You're exactly right, sir. Being on the ground, I have to tell you that the people that were in the Superdome that had used it as a shelter of last resort, of course, they came in. They'd used it before that way in previous storms. They expected, when the hurricane passed, they would walk home.

They found out that they could not. And then we began, of course, rescuing people and bringing them to the Superdome, and those people were under a great deal of stress, a great deal of trauma, a great deal of depression. So there were a lot of emotions. And

to have to tell those people—we told those people the buses would be there Wednesday morning.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General LANDRENEAU. We told them that on Tuesday. And then to have to tell them on Tuesday they would not be there until Wednesday had a compounding impact on the stress and the situation those people had to deal with in the Superdome.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Let me ask a final question about this event. If you had known on Monday or Tuesday that FEMA would not have been able to deliver the buses or would not deliver the buses, in fact, until Thursday morning, would you have been able to make alternative plans to obtain buses?

General LANDRENEAU. The governor, as she testified, gave clear direction to her staff and to the agencies to work all the resources available in the State. And we were successful in getting school buses. But it was being done to really try to fill the gaps and augment the buses that we expected from FEMA. So we would have had to double up our efforts.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Thank you.

General Honoré, let me turn to a different line of questioning. First off, I admire you again for the initiative you took on that Sunday, August 28, which set a lot of events in motion that might not otherwise have been.

When you arrived in Louisiana, did you believe in your military judgment at that point that active duty ground troops were required?

General HONORÉ. No, sir. At that moment we did not need ground troops.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General HONORÉ. What we needed were helicopters and boats.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General HONORÉ. We needed naval vessels that could get into the littorals so we could use their assets for command and control, in addition to their hospital capability.

But on that morning, based on what I knew from morning updates, there were sufficient National Guard troops flowing in. What we could do is help with our joint communications, which we brought with us.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General HONORÉ. And built rapidly and coordinated with the National Guard and assisted them in the planning of the evacuation.

Senator LIEBERMAN. It's an important distinction, and I get it. I appreciate it.

Tell us, if you would, about the guidance after you arrived in Louisiana that you were receiving from your superiors at NORTHCOM and the inputs that you were providing to them regarding the necessity of Federal involvement.

General HONORÉ. I might say what you have seen is a small snippet of a vast amount of information that was not covered based on telephone conversations. Some of the e-mails may have given the perception that at times, we were not moving or not preparing. Much of that was corrected by verbal communication between myself and Admiral Keating.

To support our concept of operation we had to identify the unique joint capabilities available. We have the Navy. Get them into the fight. We had the U.S. Transportation Command. Get them into the fight. Get all the helicopters into the fight, along with available medical capability.

But again, the tasks were search and rescue and evacuation of the Superdome and the Convention Center. Long story short, those were the tasks we focused on for the first couple days, and those were the assets we were asking for.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got it. General, I know you heard the discussions about the memorandum of understanding that was proposed to Governor Blanco on Friday night, the one that would have had you serving as the dual status commander.

I wanted to ask you whether you were involved at all personally in the development of that concept, and if so, what was the first time that you had been brought into those discussions?

General HONORÉ. Some time Friday morning.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

General HONORÉ. I would say, again, things were pretty fuzzy, to determine the exact time.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Who was the discussion with?

General HONORÉ. It was with Admiral Keating and the Pentagon. My recommendation at that time was that we did not need that authority, that my relationship with General Landreneau was sufficient.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

General HONORÉ. Dual hatted command is a tool in the box, and it's one we didn't need to use.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got it. Because basically, you felt that you and General Landreneau had been working this out without the need for anything more formal.

What did they say to you was the operational purpose of the command structure that they were proposing, the dual status command structure?

General HONORÉ. I have no idea. I moved on from that, and we were doing missions. I was asked for a recommendation, which I provided. We finished the update, and we went on with missions because our focus was to complete the evacuation of the Convention Center.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood and appreciate it.

Madam Chairman, I have one more question. Should I ask it now or wait for a second round?

Chairman COLLINS. Go ahead.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. I talked to Secretary McHale about the two helicopters requested. And I want to sort of present you with what I understand of this and ask you to both respond. Because we may not have all the facts clear, but I think it may highlight a problem in the existing structure. And it's one of those things that you wish that there had been more exercises on.

So here's the way I understand it. On Sunday, August 28, FEMA did make a request of the Army for two helicopters, which would be used for rapid needs assessment.

General HONORÉ. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And those we believe would have come from Fort Polk or Fort Hood. They operated from land, obviously. Admiral Keating mentioned the movement of the U.S.S. *Bataan* into the area. I'm not sure when it got there. A lot of helicopters on it. As I understand, those were search and rescue helicopters.

But I also believe, as General Blum said, that there were plenty of National Guard helicopters by that time in the area. But here's the bureaucratic question I wanted to ask you. Those Guard helicopters were not assigned to the FEMA request. They were not part of the FEMA assignment. So, did the bureaucracy as it existed mean that this request from FEMA went to the Army for the rapid needs assessment helicopters? And it did take a couple of days; it went on Sunday and the helicopters didn't arrive until Tuesday night—am I right that FEMA didn't turn to the other side and ask the Guard if they could help with that task? And I don't know whether you had helicopters that could have fulfilled that function or the personnel who were trained in it.

Those are the facts as I understand them. And just to make sure the next time around we're organized to get assets in as quickly as possible, particularly if they're already around the area, I wanted you to give me your response to that fact scenario, which is as best I understand it.

General Honoré, did you want to start?

General HONORÉ. That's a good question, and I know you're interested in those helicopters. But that is standard operating procedure that I've seen for my 6 years dealing with storms. Before a storm makes landfall, FEMA has a standing request with DOD for helicopters to do assessments. Generally speaking, we provide those helicopters in a timely manner.

The effect of this storm—we've got to remember, this was one big, bad storm, was to create 45 mile an hour winds at a sustained level. One might say, well, why didn't we use the Coast Guard helicopters? Those helicopters are dedicated to search and rescue, saving peoples' lives. These two helicopters are for FEMA personnel to fly around the area and assess the damage.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What the needs are. Rapid needs assessment.

General HONORÉ. Right, sir. They'd fly in to see the mayor. They'd go see a parish president.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

General HONORÉ. Those helicopters did arrive, and we've got a timeline on their arrival. They got there on Tuesday, August 30——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General HONORÉ [continuing]. And were prepared for action, as well as the helicopters on the U.S.S. *Bataan* and the U.S. Air Force 920th Rescue Wing. So we had assets coming in on August 30. The storm happened on August 29. They arrived, sir, the day after. Remember that the Coast Guard helicopters came in by sea——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General HONORÉ [continuing]. And their primary focus was on search and rescue. They immediately came in from the sea and started to work, followed by the U.S.S. *Bataan* helicopters. But the

two Army helicopters that you speak of were tasked to FEMA. It's a standing operating procedure.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General HONORÉ. We always know they're going to ask for them, and we get them there as soon as we can.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. And obviously, we'd all say, I presume, that the search and rescue function and the helicopters to do it was more important and urgent——

General HONORÉ. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Than the rapid needs assessment. But that had some high level of importance, too.

And I guess the question that I'll ask you, General Landreneau, in your responses, did you have Guard helicopters present on the scene that could have fulfilled that rapid needs function earlier, on Monday?

General LANDRENEAU. No, sir. On the normal hurricane situation, it's very common for the National Guard to provide helicopters to FEMA to do this function. But in this catastrophic event, all of our aviation assets were committed to the search and rescue.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got you.

General LANDRENEAU. Every Louisiana helicopter—in fact, we had coordinated EMAC agreements prior to the hurricane, so we had helicopter units in from Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, and Texas, augmenting our resources. But all of our resources were totally committed to the search and rescue effort.

General HONORÉ. May I come back on this, sir? This clearly wasn't occurring on Monday, there was a long period of time on Monday where you could not fly helicopters.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood.

General HONORÉ. The storm had winds exceeding 45 miles per hour over 200 miles from the eye. The storm moved through New Orleans in the morning but did not clear the Gulf Coast area until Monday night, to the extent that it killed two people as it moved through Georgia.

Due to the effects of the winds, most of Monday you could not fly a helicopter from Fort Polk to New Orleans. It was impossible because of the high winds. The only reason the Coast Guard flew in early was because they came from behind the storm.

Those winds were still affecting flight operations, and I think the records will show from the National Weather Service, through most of Monday because I tried to fly from Atlanta on Monday evening to Mississippi and could not because runways were not open and you could not fly light jets into the storm. As late as midnight Monday night we could not move.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate those answers. And I guess the question I'm left with is: If you had had additional helicopter capacity that you were not using for search and rescue, would FEMA have broken through the normal chain and come to you with the helicopters there instead of waiting for them to come in from other sites?

We can come back to that. I thank you very much, both of you.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And I welcome our two distinguished professional officers here today, and I had the privilege of getting to know you, General Honoré, in the course of this really remarkable chapter in how our military, both regular, Reserve, and Guard, came to the aid of its follow citizens.

I really meant what I said to the previous panel. I think the heart of America is very grateful for their services and has a sense of pride in how our military, which we think is operating primarily beyond our shores, can here in our homeland come to the aid of our citizens. So I commend you for that.

And I accompanied the distinguished Chairman of the Committee down to Louisiana, where I first met you. But I guess I first met you, frankly, on television. And you exhibited to me that remarkable quality that some military individuals have, and that is called command presence.

Just your presence there was very reassuring to citizens and those in uniform who you, I presume jointly, instructed together with your counterpart General Landreneau. I did not get to meet you, but I again thank you for your service, too.

General LANDRENEAU. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. The question that I have has somewhat been answered, but I'd like to put it once again on the record and let each of you address it.

While the National Guard and the Federal forces clearly mounted a monumental effort, and the facts record that, and you also recognize that there could have been a higher degree and a better coordination. And there were some areas which, if you had the authority to de-conflict, you would have stepped in and done so. Some of the results were some resources arriving to perform a mission, and in some instances they really weren't needed. And in others, there was a shortage. The facts all bear this out—not by way of criticism, but those things happen.

How well you know, General Honoré, and perhaps I looked at your record. You've seen situations in actual combat. Combat is often a state of confusion, and the question of success is enabling those who are best able to de-conflict that confusion succeed.

And we can sit down and do all the preplanning and all of the orders and all the instructions. And that's important and will be done. But it really gets down to the individual officers and men who are on the scene and their ability to utilize and draw upon their professional training and their own judgment and common sense to make it work.

So can you provide us with some examples of how to improve unity of effort between the Title 32 and the Title 10 forces? We'll start with you, General Honoré.

General HONORÉ. Yes, sir. The art of command is to take the situation as you find it, sir, and un-confuse people.

Senator WARNER. That's right.

General HONORÉ. That's what General Landreneau and I did by standing outside the same tent outside the Superdome, working together in collaboration to achieve a unity of effort—not through a staff, not by long distance, but the most personal way that can happen, face to face and collaborated decisions.

Many people associate unity of effort and unity command with the two headquarters being in the same place. That's not required. This storm set back technology 80 years. The American people need to understand that this storm beat us. I've been beat before, but not this bad. This storm beat everything that we pride ourselves in—our transportation system, our airline system, our ability to communicate, our ability to take care of Americans with the proper healthcare. This storm beat us.

Senator WARNER. But not the will to survive.

General HONORÉ. Not the will to survive. But it beat us. As a result of that, it created a crisis and a disaster with the number of Americans who were trapped in the waters in and around Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes.

In the middle of that type of crisis, how can we achieve better unity of effort? I think we need to look to the future, and not just along the Gulf Coast because these storms don't just come along the Gulf Coast. The storm approached the entire Eastern shore as well as the Caribbean. We need to establish some common command and control locations in which we will put our respective response force. Our authority under the National Response Plan is to prepare and to respond and to mitigate.

The Department of Defense worked with the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA primarily in the preparation and the response. We don't necessarily do a lot of recovery work.

Looking to the future, I look forward to working with and advising those in my higher headquarters at NORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security in establishing those locations where we can practice establishing satellite communications because the normal communications systems are going to come down. If they don't come down, you're not needed.

You get a lot of hurricanes where the communications systems stay operational, water systems stay up, roads stay open, and you are not needed. So you're going to establish and use some resources in preparation that you would normally wait for the governor to ask for.

In order to truly be prepared and ensure we never have another Katrina, you have to invest resources up front. One of the things you can do, and we can do, is establish in each State and region a unified headquarters and exercise them periodically before hurricane season.

But that will only solve the hurricane issue. There are other disturbances on the earth that require us to actively engage in each State and region and practice how we would respond to them.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General Honoré. But I have to observe that you were able to do your role professionally because of your force of personality and the willingness to work with your counterparts. You overcame the absence of a unity of command, which is so essential to military operations, by the force of your own personality and your background and knowledge of the culture of the people. But the next situation may not have a General Honoré——

General HONORÉ. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. With that background and that understanding. And that's why I turn to you, General, when you——

General HONORÉ. Sir, may I come back on that for one second?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

General HONORÉ. As an observation. You gave us Goldwater-Nichols, and it was a bitter pill to swallow.

Senator WARNER. Oh, I remember it well.

General HONORÉ. You've got a joint dependent interagency, knock-'em-down Department of Defense. You don't have that in the interagency.

Senator WARNER. I realize that.

General HONORÉ. So the observation to you, our friends in the interagency don't approach the joint interdependence the same way you forced us down that road.

Senator WARNER. Right.

General HONORÉ. And we have seen the goodness of that. I think if we are going to get a unified unity of effort, it's not just a department. You tell us what to do, and we do it, the Department of Defense.

Senator WARNER. The Department of Defense.

General HONORÉ. How do we get all the other agencies in unity of effort? Because in most cases, it's their capability that's going to carry the day, not the Department. We do the search and rescue, and we're out of there. It's what happens during the preparation and the recovery that has longstanding impact on the American people.

Senator WARNER. Well, General, I don't wish to take this time. But I'm pushing that same concept as it relates to Iraq today.

General HONORÉ. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. I think our military are performing their mission extraordinarily well, but other departments and agencies of our Federal Government have not brought to bear their resources to the same degree as the Department of Defense. And I think—I said those words yesterday to the National Security Advisor, "I think it's time to look at a Goldwater-Nichols for this type of situation." And our Committee will undertake to look at that.

I'd best return to this subject, though, and give you an opportunity, General Landreneau, to talk about how you would hope to work the Title 32 and Title 10 forces together in future operations with greater efficiency.

General LANDRENEAU. Thank you, Senator Warner. To obtain unity of effort, the first component is to have very clear command guidance. We had very clear command guidance in the form of the governor. Governor Blanco gave very clear, explicit direction.

We understood what her command guidance was. It was then my responsibility to empower junior leaders—because in the fog of this—of a catastrophic event, not unlike the fog of war, it is very important when you have communication breakdown, when lines of communication are disrupted and you have the confusion that goes with dealing with a major catastrophic event, you have to empower your soldiers, empower your officers, your commanders at each level down to the squad leader level, to clearly understand the com-

mander's intent, be able to articulate it, and be able to independently carry it out.

And that's how we achieved unity of effort. And I assure you, sir, that when the Title 10 forces arrived in Louisiana and General Honoré and I discussed how we would integrate them into—and it was a reinforcement or, if you will, it was adding depth to the National Guard formations that were already in place.

We discussed the importance of embedding National Guard troops in each of those active duty formations so that you had not only the liaison connection between the National Guard and the active duty units, but you also had that additional component of being able to deal with law enforcement in the event that you needed to.

So we obtained unity of effort by good commander's guidance, good communication, and empowering junior officers.

Senator WARNER. And strength of personalities.

You mentioned the law enforcement aspect. I'm hopeful that our government carefully analyzes the doctrine of Posse Comitatus, which you understand full well. Do you have any views as to whether or not we should provide for means by which, say, the President, if necessary—it's a very important doctrine—could have the discretion to give waivers for the traditional prohibition against the utilization of active forces to participate in law enforcement?

Do you think that's something that should be studied, and do you feel that this tragic chapter of our history showed instances where, had there been such authority, we might have avoided some of the looting and other infractions of law?

General LANDRENEAU. Senator Warner, it's my personal opinion that it is not necessary to make any changes to the current Posse Comitatus provisions. I lived the situation. I saw it. But I also communicated with General Honoré about this and with other active commanders to see if they had witnessed or had any issues with it. And we saw none. We saw no problems.

There is a tremendous—when you bring in the Title 10 forces, when the Title 10 forces come in to augment and add depth to the existing National Guard formations that are in place in a catastrophic event, just as Katrina, there are just critical—just large numbers of critical missions that can be accomplished by those active duty troops. And that law enforcement piece can be handled by the National Guard troops that are in place.

Senator WARNER. All right. General Honoré, you and I have discussed this. Do you have anything further to add on your thoughts about Posse Comitatus and the need to study it?

General HONORÉ. I think we ought to always review how we're doing business. We owe that to the American people because the disturbances I spoke to earlier, that could happen, that are not natural disasters, that are tied to a pandemic, that are tied to the possibility of a contaminant moving across State lines.

I think the conditions that are in the law now are substantial enough to have us do our job and gives authority to the Executive Branch to execute that, if needed, in collaboration with the governor or on top of a governor's concern.

I think what we need to continue to work on in that regard is a common understanding of it, and decision points and triggers

that when you're dealing with a storm is a lot different. And sometimes the news reports are going to tell you things that would give the impression that you need to pull that tool out of the box. And a lot of those reports gave rise to that during this storm.

But most of them, as we've looked back at it and talked to people, were not accurate. While there were trying times inside the City of New Orleans as far as law enforcement, it in no way met the threshold of executing or using that option. But I do think we need make sure that it's not a discussion that we must have before we put ground troops on the ground.

It should not be an automatic discussion that we've got to have, particularly if the mission is to do search and rescue and save lives. That could be a problem if, every time, every lawyer in the room put that on the table because they always want to talk about it.

Senator WARNER. Well, well done to you and all those under your respective commands. And I thank the Chairman for the indulgence.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

I want to thank you both for your testimony today and your service. General Honoré, I was saying to my colleague and partner in this endeavor, Senator Lieberman, that your testimony reinforces my belief that we should create regionally based task forces that have representatives from every agency that would be involved in providing services or rescue or recovery operations in the event of a catastrophe, whether it's a manmade catastrophe such as a terrorist attack or a natural one such as Katrina.

I think one reason that you were able to be so successful was your understanding of the region to which you deployed. And I thank you. You summed it up well when you said you shouldn't be exchanging business cards in the middle of a crisis.

And if we can get people representing all the different players, at all levels of government, also, to meet, to exercise together, to train, to plan, I think it is the single greatest step we could take to improve the effectiveness of response.

General HONORÉ. And I would really give some incentive to industry to play because they can make a lot of difference in the response if we engage them up-front during the preparation phase as a part of these regional endeavors, ma'am.

Chairman COLLINS. Excellent point, Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, I agree with everything you just said. It's the take-away that I have from this hearing today. You've both been extremely helpful in your testimony and the constructive suggestions that you made on your behalf, and I include Admiral Allen. This is real lessons learned.

And we'll try to do in our work now whatever we can, either legislatively or by recommendation for administrative action to carry that out. And boy, that's the line that stuck with me, too, about not having a situation where, in the middle of a disaster, the key people are exchanging business cards.

Did you two know each other before the——

General HONORÉ. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You did? That helped?

General LANDRENEAU. Yes, sir.

General HONORÉ. We speak the same language.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I noticed. [Laughter.]

Well, I don't want to get too personal. But when Senator Breaux was here, we were members of a very small caucus of two Senators, which Senator Breaux referred to as the Cajun Kosher Caucus. [Laughter.]

So I understand the language.

General LANDRENEAU. I might add that General Honoré's son is in the Louisiana National Guard, served in Iraq, and returned during Katrina. He was able to welcome his son home.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Isn't that great? I'm not surprised to hear that, but it's a pleasure to hear it and an honor to hear. Thank you both very much for your continuing service to our country.

Chairman COLLINS. This hearing is now adjourned. The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for additional materials. Thank you for your testimony.

[Whereupon, at 1:26 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Statement by

Paul McHale

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

Before the 109th Congress

Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

February 9, 2006

Introduction

Chairwoman Collins and distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to address you today regarding the Department of Defense's role in responding to the effects of Hurricane Katrina.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most challenging natural disasters in U.S. history – in terms of persons displaced, businesses disrupted, commerce affected, and in projected aggregate economic losses. As a result, the Department of Defense's deployment of military resources in support of civil authorities after Hurricane Katrina exceeded, in speed and size, any other domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States. The ability of our military forces -- Active Duty, Reserves, and the National Guard -- to respond quickly and effectively to an event of this magnitude is a testament to their readiness, agility, and professionalism. It is also a reflection of the resources provided by Congress that enable them to organize, train, and equip to meet the full range of DoD's missions.

As President Bush described in his September 15 address to the nation:

> *The [Katrina] storm involved a massive flood, a major supply and security operation, and an evacuation order affecting more than a million people. It was not a normal hurricane -- and the normal disaster relief system was not equal to it. Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the United States military, the National Guard, and state and local governments performed skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days.*

There is no doubt that improvements can and should be made at all levels of government. We continue to assess operational data from Hurricane Katrina in order to develop lessons learned and improve DoD's ability to respond the next time we are called, whether for a natural disaster or a catastrophic terrorist attack.

DoD Planning Prior to Hurricane Katrina

The Department of Defense has a long history of assisting civil authorities in response to emergencies and disasters. For example, in 2003, DoD received 72 requests for assistance from more than 20 civil agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, and the National Interagency Fire Center. In 2004, DoD fielded 99 requests for assistance from domestic civilian agencies. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DoD had already addressed 25 requests for assistance in 2005, and acted on over 140 for the entire year. For Hurricane Katrina operations alone, we received more than 93 requests for assistance.

Well before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the Department of Defense had undertaken preparations for the 2005 hurricane season. On August 19th, the Secretary of Defense approved a standing order to prepare and organize for severe weather disaster response operations. This order authorized the pre-positioning of senior military representatives, known as Defense Coordinating Officers, to act as liaisons with other governmental organizations in the projected disaster area prior to an event. The order also allowed the use of DoD installations as logistical staging areas for FEMA.

On Tuesday, August 23rd (six days before landfall in Louisiana), as Tropical Storm Katrina approached, DoD conducted an inventory of available capabilities (e.g., meals ready-to-eat, staging bases, deployable hospitals, and health care providers), in anticipation of potential requests for assistance from other Federal, State, and local agencies. On Thursday, August 25th, DoD augmented its Liaison Officer at FEMA with three Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. From Friday, August 26th to Sunday,

August 28th, Defense Coordinating Officers and their support elements deployed to the State Emergency Operations Centers of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi to begin preliminary coordination with Federal, State, and local emergency management officials. From Wednesday, August 24th, to Sunday, August 28th, the Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi National Guard each established Joint Operations Centers in their respective States and thousands of National Guard soldiers and airmen were called to State Active Duty by their respective Governors. On August 28th, a Hurricane Katrina 24 hours-a-day/7 days-a-week crisis management cell was activated in my office. In addition, the Commander of U.S. Transportation Command put aircraft, crews, and contingency response wings on alert.

Although DoD's responsibility under the National Response Plan (NRP) is to provide assistance when requested by FEMA or directed by the President, the Department of Defense gave advance notice to designated military units and actually began deploying forces days in advance of formal FEMA requests. Through past experience in supporting civilian authorities, the Department was able to anticipate the types of assistance that might be requested by FEMA and we had appropriate units ready to move.

DoD Contribution to Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts

The Department of Defense's response to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest and most rapid military deployment within the United States since the Civil War. Over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard personnel were deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina, more than twice the number deployed in response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (over 29,000). These forces were directly employed in saving lives through extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical assistance.

U.S. Northern Command, established after September 11, 2001, to unify DoD's homeland defense and civil support operations, provided command and control of Federal military forces during its most significant operational response. While overseeing the operational response to Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Northern Command also continued to focus on its mission to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests.

By any measure, the flow of military forces and relief supplies into the Katrina-affected areas was a massive operation. At the height of the DoD response, some 72,000 men and women in uniform assisted Federal, State, and local authorities in recovery efforts. Other military capabilities employed during the response included 23 ships, 68 fixed-wing aircraft, 293 helicopters, amphibious landing craft, space-based imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway surveillance, mortuary teams, and large-scale construction support provided through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Navy Seabees. Additionally, nine DoD installations served as logistical staging areas for the delivery of supplies and as sites for Federal Medical Shelters. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was designated as the central collection point for foreign relief donations.

Federal military and National Guard forces were instrumental in saving lives, restoring order, and beginning the long, challenging process of recovery. Approximately 15,000 residents of the Gulf Coast were rescued and 80,000 others evacuated. DoD delivered critical emergency supplies – more than 30 million meals and some 10,000 truckloads of ice and water. Military forces also provided significant medical assistance, including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and air, medical treatment of more than 5,000 patients, as well as support for disease prevention and control. Further, DoD made available more than 3,000 beds in field hospitals, installations, and aboard U.S. Navy ships. At the request of FEMA, DoD also supplied 13 mortuary teams to support local authorities in the systematic search, recovery, and disposition of the deceased.

Additionally, to assist in disease prevention, DoD aircraft flew mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions covering more than two million acres.

The Department of Defense planned for and employed a balance of Active, Reserve, and National Guard capabilities in responding to Hurricane Katrina. In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992), in which National Guard forces constituted 24% of the military response, National Guard forces represented more than 70% of the military force for Hurricane Katrina. Even while 75,000 National Guard members were deployed overseas, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blum and the various state Adjutants General, the National Guard amassed over 30,000 troops in 96 hours in response to Hurricane Katrina. At the height of Katrina relief efforts, the National Guard deployed a total of 50,000 military personnel. National Guardsmen from every State, territory, and the District of Columbia were involved in Hurricane Katrina response operations. Further, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) from 14 states deployed to provide state-of-the-art communications capabilities to local authorities and assistance and advice on identifying and handling hazardous materials from damaged infrastructure.

Most National Guardsmen participating in Hurricane Katrina response operations served under authority of Title 32 , U.S. Code (U.S.C.). With these forces in Title 32 status, the States maintained command and control of their forces and the Department of Defense provided funding. National Guardsmen in Title 32 status were also able to undertake law enforcement activities as directed by the Governor. One such example can be seen in the deployment of National Guard military police into New Orleans. Immediately preceding Hurricane Katrina, there were approximately 1,600 police officers in the New Orleans Police Department. When it became clear that civil order was breaking down, over a three-day period of time, the National Guard deployed 4,200 National Guard military police and security personnel into New Orleans, dramatically increasing the security presence. These National Guard forces were able to not only

backfill, but substantially expand, the total number of security personnel available in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes.

DoD Coordination with Interagency Partners

The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security work in close coordination to ensure the safety and security of the U.S. homeland. Coordination and cooperation take place continuously at all levels of both organizations. As the Secretary of Defense's principal liaison with DHS, my office has worked diligently to foster excellent working relationships and provide relevant expertise. In that regard, the two departments signed a memorandum of agreement in 2003 that authorized the assignment of 64 DoD personnel to DHS on a detail basis to fill critical specialties, principally in the areas of communications and intelligence. Further, we established a Homeland Defense Coordination Office at DHS headquarters to provide for continuous liaison and advisory support and we maintain a 24 hours-a-day/7 days-a-week presence in the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center. As needed, DoD also provides senior personnel for the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group – a group of senior Federal department and agency officials focused on incident response. Beyond these formalized arrangements, daily contacts between DoD and DHS are the norm in the course of interagency working group meetings and our collaboration on a range of projects and initiatives.

DoD is an important partner in the overall national response effort for a complete spectrum of incident management activities, including the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from, acts of terrorism, major natural disasters, or other major emergencies. DoD resources are employed as part of a coordinated incident management approach among Federal, State, and local governments, as well as non-governmental organizations. Title 10, U.S.C., and the National Response Plan (NRP), published in December 2004, define the authorities and responsibilities of the

Department. DoD is the only Federal department with supporting responsibilities for each of the NRP's fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Additionally, DoD's U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is designated as the primary agency for Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering, operating under separate statutory and funding authority.

In responding to requests from FEMA for Hurricane Katrina operations, DoD acted quickly within the NRP framework. In all, DoD acted on more than 93 Hurricane Katrina-related requests for assistance (RFAs) from civil authorities for a broad range of military capabilities. Many of these requests were approved verbally by Secretary Rumsfeld or Acting Deputy Secretary England. The Department felt a sense of urgency and acted upon it.

An example of this sense of urgency can be seen during an extraordinary 5-day period at the beginning of the response effort. On Thursday, September 1, 2005, FEMA made a request for DoD to accept the responsibility to provide "full logistics support" throughout the entire area affected by Hurricane Katrina, at an estimated cost of $1 billion dollars. This was a substantial request, with enormous planning and resource requirements, reflecting the staggering amount of damage and immediate needs of those affected. On September 1-2, DoD reviewed this request, assessed the requirements, identified available military capabilities, and notified DHS, in writing, that the request had been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Within approximately 24 hours, DoD had processed and approved what may well have been the single most complex civil support mission in the history of the U.S. military.

After the approval of the "full logistics support" request, on Saturday, September 3rd, I met with DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and, during that time, we drafted a list of current or emerging FEMA requirements that were likely to generate additional

DoD requests for assistance: search and rescue; security assessment; command and control infrastructure; geo-spatial surveillance; firefighting; health and medical support; disease prevention; quarantine planning; debris removal; and restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes. On Sunday, September 4th, these draft requests for assistance were reviewed and further refined by senior DHS and DoD officials, who were working with a shared sense of urgency. On Monday, September 5th, these requests, many of them already in active execution, were approved by the Secretary of Defense.

The joint DoD-DHS effort produced seven comprehensive RFAs on Monday, at an estimated cost of $805 million dollars, in addition to the "full logistics support" RFA approved the previous Friday. The total estimated cost of these RFAs, including the "full logistics support" RFA, was more than $1.8 billion dollars. Considering the magnitude of physical resources and the complexity of planning necessary to execute these requests for assistance, as well as the sheer number of DoD personnel involved, our Department acted with urgency to provide a rapid and positive response.

Observations on the Federal Response

As with all Department of Defense operations, we have made it a priority to capture lessons learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina. We have been doing so ever since the hurricane made landfall. The Department has organized to support the White House Hurricane Katrina lessons-learned process directed by the President and to oversee implementation of lessons learned within DoD. Although review and analysis are still ongoing, let me highlight some preliminary areas for corrective action to improve both the overall Federal government and specific DoD response.

We must –

- improve our ability to obtain timely and accurate assessments of damaged areas immediately after an event;
- achieve unity of effort when multiple Federal agencies converge on an affected area;

- assure our ability to effectively communicate with first responders and emergency management personnel;
- integrate both Active Duty and Reserve Components capabilities into pre-event and on-scene operational planning for catastrophic events; and
- re-examine the foreseeable roles and necessary resources of DoD in responding to a catastrophic event.

These preliminary observations, and others under review, form the framework for an in-depth analysis of our response to Hurricane Katrina and will enable DoD to better plan for the next catastrophic event.

Conclusion

In terms of its magnitude, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history, and proved to the deadliest storm to strike since 1928. U.S. military forces executed the largest, fastest, most comprehensive, and most responsive civil support mission ever. In a domestic disaster relief operation unprecedented in scale, over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard forces flowed into the Gulf Coast region over a twelve-day period to assist fellow Americans in distress.

The ability of our military forces - Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard – to respond quickly and effectively to an event on the scale of Hurricane Katrina and to simultaneously sustain the ongoing Global War on Terrorism is a testament to their readiness, agility, and professionalism. It is also a reflection of the resources provided by Congress that enable them to organize, train, and equip to meet the full range of DoD's missions.

Madam Chairwoman, I commend you and the members of this Committee for your leadership, interest in, and support of, the Department's homeland defense and civil support missions, with a particular focus today on the DoD response to Hurricane Katrina. I look forward to any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ON

HURRICANE KATRINA: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THE RESPONSE

9 FEBRUARY 2006

UNCLASSIFIED
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role of our active duty forces in disaster response. My comments today will first focus on the actions U.S. Northern Command took to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. I will also discuss proposals for improving the Command's disaster response capabilities.

USNORTHCOM Operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events with specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation. All DoD support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan.

As directed by the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command supported the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster relief efforts. Hurricane relief was conducted as a team effort among Federal, state and local governments, as well as non-governmental organizations. USNORTHCOM was fully engaged in supporting the massive operation to save lives, reduce suffering and protect the infrastructure of our homeland.

USNORTHCOM began tracking the tropical depression that became Hurricane Katrina on 23 August. Before Hurricane Katrina's landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi, USNORTHCOM established staging bases and deployed Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Element teams to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to manage DoD response efforts in coordination with State and Federal officials. These teams are normally not activated until a Presidential Disaster Declaration is made; however, as authorized by the Secretary of Defense, we deployed them early due to the magnitude of Katrina.

In addition, we alerted forces to be prepared to move as soon as the situation on the ground stabilized and the Department of Homeland Security,

through FEMA, determined what assets were needed. We coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide heavy lift aircraft. We also worked with Joint Forces Command to identify available Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units to perform missions such as imagery support and damage assessment, inter-coastal waterway search and rescue, aviation medical evacuation, and construction/bridge/utility engineering to restore key infrastructure. This enabled us to identify appropriate units to perform requested assistance quickly and provide transportation to the scene as soon as possible.

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, we were given authority by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to deploy the forces we deemed necessary to preserve life and reduce suffering. We had not yet been asked by Federal agencies for these capabilities, but we wanted to ensure we could respond when needed. As the levees in New Orleans gave way and the magnitude of the disaster grew, we continued to lean forward by preparing and moving additional capabilities, including emergency medical teams and communications experts.

In anticipation of the significant role the Department of Defense could play in the rescue and recovery efforts, USNORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina). Led by Lieutenant General Russ Honoré (Commander, First Army), JTF-Katrina provided command and control of Title 10 assets deployed to save lives, mitigate suffering, and restore critical services. JTF-Katrina grew to include 22,500 active duty forces, over 200 fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and 20 ships at its peak. General Honoré and his staff provided pivotal leadership on the ground and did a superb job providing Department of Defense assistance in coordination with state National Guard Forces and other Federal, State, local, and non-governmental partners.

USNORTHCOM met every request for support received from FEMA. In support of the relief effort, Department of Defense forces conducted search and rescue operations, assisted with evacuations, organized a complex logistical system to deliver food, water, and other essential supplies, provided medical care, provided imagery support, conducted fire fighting and mosquito abatement missions, cleared debris, safely managed crowded airspace and assisted with mortuary affairs.

Throughout the operation, we worked with our interagency partners through on-site liaison officers who provided a daily assessment of anticipated requests for military support. In addition, we shared information through teleconferences with Joint Task Forces Katrina, Defense Coordinating Officers, FEMA and other interagency organizations, and the Secretary of Defense.

Relationships and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina relief operations were extremely valuable in facilitating our response to Hurricane Rita. USNORTHCOM worked with FEMA to define requirements early and responded by ensuring Title 10 forces, imagery support, and search and rescue assets were in place ahead of the storm, helping to mitigate additional suffering.

Lessons Learned. We are actively involved in efforts to compile lessons learned and incorporate them into future operations. One very important lesson we learned pertains to unity of effort.

We all witnessed the employment of 50,000 National Guardsmen in Title 32 status along with 22,500 active duty (Title 10) troops. But due to various factors, we lacked complete visibility into the National Guard's efforts throughout disaster relief operations.

Commanding, directing and coordinating the efforts of over 70,000 troops present many challenges under any circumstances. While we embrace the fact that the National Guard will play a pivotal role in all disasters, the nation should have the capability to properly leverage active duty forces that have

the inherent structure and capacity to achieve unity of effort when assembling and directing a large-scale, multi-state response to a catastrophic event.

If a tragedy occurs on a local level, the local and/or state leadership should retain command and control. They know the terrain, they have the personal relationships with responders, and they are familiar with the most likely challenges. However, DoD capabilities can prove extremely helpful in mitigating a disaster when local and state responders are overwhelmed, consequences are grave, and the scope of the suffering and the casualties is extensive. We are prepared to respond as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Another lesson learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina relates to communications. We need immediate, reliable communications that are survivable and flexible. These communications must be mobile, secure and both voice and data capable.

The National Response Plan remains a solid framework for responses to crises on a certain scale, but there is room for improvement.

Conclusion. Our experience demonstrated we have adequate capability to meet emerging homeland defense and civil support crises. Even as we act to support civil authorities in responding to natural disasters, we never lose focus on our primary mission of homeland defense. One fact remains constant- our enemies should make no mistake about our resolve or our capabilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

BEFORE THE

SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

ON
HURRICANE KATRINA

FEBRUARY 9, 2006

STATEMENT BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, members of the committee; thank you for the opportunity to discuss the actions of the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Today, the National Guard finds itself more than ever linked to the vital interests of our nation, both here at home and around the world. Even while we had more than 80,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen deployed in support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dozens of other nations, the men and women of the National Guard responded magnificently to the catastrophic events of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma here at home. Over 50,000 National Guard personnel hailing from every state and territory responded to calls for support during this difficult period. That is more troops than the United States employed during Grenada or Panama operations.

As the Nation begins the necessary process of assessing the effects of the hurricanes and the governmental response to those events, the picture is one of laudable successes as well as areas requiring improvement.

I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the National Guard's efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people within four hours of Katrina's passing. More than 9,700 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen

were in New Orleans by the thirtieth of August. The National Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the passing of the storm. At the peak of the operation, the Governors nationwide dispatched more than 42,000 National Guard troops to assist Mississippi and Louisiana. In short, the National Guard response to the catastrophic events of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma was both timely and extensive.

While we have been successful in meeting the needs of the warfight overseas, we must continue to significantly upgrade our ability to respond to domestic mission requirements. In order to ensure that our deploying units are fully equipped and ready to support operations anywhere in the world, we have transferred over 101,000 items of equipment in support of these missions. This situation has presented the National Guard with challenges in keeping our inventories here at home fully supplied with critical items such as trucks, radios, and heavy engineering equipment. With the help of Congress and the President, we have made an excellent start in addressing these challenges, and the President's Budget will allow the National Guard to continue on the road to recovery. Over the FY06-FY-11 timeframe, the Administration plans to invest $19.2 billion and $4.4 billion in the Army and Air National Guard, respectively, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to providing the resources necessary to protect our homeland. By fully funding this budget and the commitment it makes to the National Guard, Congress would help us greatly in meeting this challenge.

Interagency relationships are fundamental to the success of the federal response to any disaster, and we must continue to foster strong relationships with the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command. Indeed, coordination efforts to date point to the need for better planning, procurement of more equipment and interoperable communications, and joint training of the National Guard, active duty forces, and our federal partners.

One tool that was available but not used in the military response to Hurricane Katrina was the dual-hatted state/federal military command authority. In 2004 domestic operations supporting the G-8 summit as well as the Republican and Democratic national conventions, a National Guard general officer appointed under this authority was highly successful in simultaneously commanding both active duty troops and National Guard troops in state status. This helped to achieve unity of effort between state and federal forces. That sort of unified effort is particularly important in a multi-state emergency such as Hurricane Katrina. We need to look for ways to make good use of the dual-hat authority in these types of events in the future.

As a full member of the national security team, the National Guard had met its mission requirements at home and abroad. However, a continued commitment to increased resources and better inter-governmental coordination are needed in order for the National Guard to be more effectively postured to meet the needs of the future. By working closely with the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Congress, the National Guard will continue to be Always Ready, Always There.

Thank you.

NATIONAL GUARD TITLE 32 HURRICANE RESPONSE



NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE TO KATRINA



BRIEF DTG: 080800RSEP05

National Guard Response to National Commitments
SEPT 07 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 13,457
ANG: 307
TOTAL: 13,764
SEPT 07 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 76,104
ANG: 1,899
TOTAL: 78,003
SEPT 07 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 42,249
ANG: 4,347
EXT JOA: 3,520
TOTAL: 50,116
SEPT 07 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 13,841
ANG: 1,259
TOTAL: 15,100 in place
TX
LA
MS
AL
FL

National Response Plan
Emergency Support Functions

ESF-1	Transportation
ESF 2	Communications
ESF-3	Public Works and Engineering
ESF-4	Firefighting
ESF-5	Emergency Management
ESF-6	Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
ESF-7	Resource Support
ESF-8	Public Health and Medical Services
ESF-9	Urban Search and Rescue
ESF-10	Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF-11	Agriculture & Natural Resources (Animal and Plant Disease and Pest Response)
ESF-12	Energy
ESF-13	Public Safety and Security
ESF-14	Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
ESF-15	External Affairs

Spectrum of Operations



Full Spectrum Force



GAO Report 05-954 Reserve Forces

Figure 2. Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting Minimum Criteria to Deploy



Source: Army National Guard data.

Note: Units must have at least 80 percent of their mission-essential equipment to meet minimum deployment criteria. Because data were not available for all months between October 2002 and July 2004, some chart points in this period were estimated based on trends.

Source: GAO Report 05-954 Reserve Forces

DOD/DHS INTERFACE
TAG ROLES



STATE COMPACTS



EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact)

EMAC Pending Approval by State

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUSSEL L. HONORÉ
COMMANDER, FIRST U.S. ARMY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ON DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

9 FEBRUARY 2006

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUSSEL L. HONORÉ

COMMANDER, FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY

COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE – KATRINA

Introduction

Chairman Collins, distinguished members of the committee: I am here to address you today regarding the role of the Department of Defense in responding to Hurricane Katrina and in supporting the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management.

Hurricane Katrina not only tested the nation's ability to respond to a major disaster, but also the resolve of the American people. The initial response to the aftermath of Katrina was characterized by selfless acts of courage and compassion. The unselfish actions of first responders, private citizens, military personnel and volunteers from all corners of the nation who confronted this disaster represent the hallmark of this great nation. Many key and essential personnel along the Mississippi and Louisiana Coast, who could have departed the area, did not. Instead, they remained to perform critical services at hospitals or first responder functions. Heroes – like the businessmen of Elberta, AL, who provided over 150,000 meals in 17 days; the Director of Emergency Services for the City of New Orleans who supervised the medical triage efforts at the Convention Center evacuating over 19,000 patients in a single day; and

the extraordinary response by our service men and women who immediately reacted to save lives and property – all rose to the occasion in unison. Many of these people had their own families and property directly impacted by the storm, but they continued to serve. Therefore, I would like to begin by recognizing the unheralded efforts of these selfless Americans and offer my greatest appreciation and gratitude for their sacrifices.

Enormity of the Task

The most destructive natural disaster in the history of the United States, Hurricane Katrina struck with successive blows between the 25th and 29th of August 2005. Initially striking southern Florida as a Category 1 hurricane causing 14 deaths and millions of dollars in property damage, the storm stalled and then grew in intensity in the Gulf of Mexico before finally veering slightly to the east of New Orleans as a Category 3 storm, resulting in one of the country's worst natural disasters. At times, Katrina appeared to fill the entire Gulf as it reached a peak of Category 5 strength. The worst occurred as Katrina made landfall in the vulnerable New Orleans area – a densely populated city already eight feet below sea level. The East Louisiana and Mississippi Gulf Coast received the full wrath of Katrina's 140-MPH sustaining winds and a tidal surge that was over 30 feet high, leaving a trail of destruction and debris for miles inland. The New Orleans levee system, overwhelmed and severely damaged in several locations, failed resulting in millions of gallons of water quickly engulfing and flooding the homes of hundreds of thousands wreaking havoc and death. Thousands of residents, who stayed in their homes rather than evacuate, had only minutes to escape before becoming

trapped in their attics or on rooftops. Access to information about the affected area was severely hindered post-landfall by disabled communication systems, downed power lines and cell phone towers, and inaccessible roads and railroads due to downed trees, flooding and damaged overpasses. The flooding and damage across Louisiana and Mississippi affected hundreds of thousands of residents, creating a crisis of national proportions. Demands for assistance extended to the regional and national level as the number of displaced Americans paralyzed the states' ability to provide food, water, fuel, traffic management across LA, MS and adjoining states. The storm did not distinguish between the wealthy and the poor, civilians or members of the Armed Forces; over 118,000 service members and their dependents living in the four-state area were displaced or significantly impacted by Katrina. Destruction existed as far as the eye could see.

The affects of Hurricane Katrina extended well beyond the Gulf Coast and the City of New Orleans. The effects of Katrina also impacted the nation's economy. Infrastructure, critical oil and natural gas refineries that provide a major source of the nation's energy, were either damaged or rendered inoperable due to damage or the loss of the available work force. Hydrogen resources, used in the production of steel, were temporarily halted. Roads, bridges and rail systems sustained extensive damage, preventing interstate commerce. Port operations in New Orleans, as well as up and down the Mississippi, were halted as sunken and damaged vessels blocked piers and waterways.

Magnitude of the Response

The timeliness of the DoD response hinged on the capability to assess the situation. Pre-positioning Defense Coordinating Officers into the projected affected area and the deployment of the Forward Headquarters from the United States First Army provided human eyes on the ground to determine as quickly as possible the extent of the damage and support required. Fifth Army deployed an Operational Command Post (OCP), 24 Soldiers, to the LA Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to augment the LA Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element (DCO/DCE) to provide planning support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and enhance communications and coordination capability for JTF-Katrina. JTF-Katrina was established the evening of 30 August 05. JTF-Forward Headquarters was fully supported by the JTF-Main (250 personnel in Atlanta, Georgia) and USNORTHCOM (1200 personnel in Colorado Springs, Colorado) via "Reach Back" capability in order to synchronize effects and to prevent adding victims to the affected area.

The ability to SEE FIRST and UNDERSTAND FIRST allowed us to ACT FIRST in shaping a timely, robust and coherent response plan. Environmental problems reached crisis stage as the effects of oil spills, benzene spills, and bacteria from spoiled food, human and animal waste, and human and animal remains began to affect the populace still in the area and the relief operation. The inner city poor and the elderly, who lacked transportation, were stranded and needed assistance. Large numbers of citizens were gathering in and around the Superdome and Convention Center with their numbers growing due to the lack of life-sustaining food, water and sanitation services throughout the affected Parishes, ultimately requiring the evacuation of 69,000 personnel.

Over the next week, critical units and capabilities from all branches of the military flowed into the Joint Area of Operations (JOA) to form the Joint Task Force. These included the Joint Force Maritime Component Command, led by Rear Adm. Kilkenny; the Joint Force Air Component Command, led by Maj. Gen. Mayes; the Marine Forces Command, led by Maj. Gen. O'Dell; the Army Forces Command, led by Maj. Gen. Caldwell; and the Joint Logistics Command, led by Brig. Gen. Terry. Numerous National Guard forces cooperated and collaborated with the JTF, and the resulting synergy proved critical to the success of the overall relief effort. There were two major force headquarters for the National Guard: (1) the 35th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Mason, worked for The Adjutant General (TAG) for Louisiana, Maj. Gen. Landreneau, and (2) the 38th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Vadnais, worked for the Mississippi TAG, Maj. Gen. Cross. Ultimately, National Guard service members from all 50 states, 3 territories and the District of Columbia participated with the JTF.

From the start on 29 Aug 05, Transportation Command assets were placed on alert. The USNS Comfort, a Navy Hospital ship, was ordered to prepare for deployment, as was the USS Bataan, then operating in the Gulf of Mexico. All National Guard aircraft positioned in FL, AL, TX, LA and MS were made available to support operations across the affected areas by pre-existing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC). These aircraft commenced operations four hours after the hurricane passed, moving medical patients, evacuating personnel,

performing cargo transport missions, and conducting search and rescue missions in the first several hours.

On 30 Aug 05, the federal response expanded as the USS Truman, the USS Iwo Jima, the USS Shreveport and the USS Tortuga were deployed to provide humanitarian assistance. The Air Mobility Command's C-5, C-17 and C-130 aircraft were used to deliver logistics stocks and evacuate displaced personnel. Meals-Ready-to-Eat were pre-staged at Fort Polk, LA. Fort Polk and the Naval Air Station New Orleans were activated as shelters for displaced persons, and medical assets were activated for 24/7 operations at Camp Beauregard, LA; Jackson, MS; and Maxwell AFB, AL.

Quick Fixes

Prior to my return from the Gulf Coast, VADM Allen, US Coast Guard, and MG Landreneau, Adjutant General (TAG) from Louisiana, and I informally discussed areas for improvement that should be considered:

1. Establish pre-event unified Command and Control (C2) organizational structure.
2. Pre-position unified mobile disaster assessment cell.
3. Designate a single DOD point of contact for the Federal Coordinating Officer to coordinate requirements.
4. Implement a local/state employee Disaster Clause to dual-hat/train employees to fill key disaster support manning shortfalls.
5. Pre-position common interoperable communications assets.

6. Establish external support (push packages/funding) to fill common resource shortfalls.
7. Pre-allocate space in State Emergency Operation Centers to integrate federal or other external agencies.
8. Develop a Continuity of Government Plan that sustains government functions 24/7.
9. Pre-arrange support contracts for required resources.
10. Acquire and integrate assured power supply capabilities (gas stations, pharmacies and local EOCs).
11. Gain industry commitments to re-establish critical services.

Conclusion

At its peak, JTF-Katrina was supported by over 22,000 Title 10 uniformed personnel from all services. In executing this mission, JTF-Katrina executed the priorities established by local, state and federal authorities to save lives, provide basic human sustainment, and restore basic services. Through extensive coordination and collaboration, JTF-Katrina assisted local, state and federal agencies in providing immediate response and disaster relief operations which included: conducting air and sea rescues; searching house to house for survivors; providing emergency medical care; evacuating displaced citizens; providing emergency resupply of food, ice and water; collecting human remains; developing and reporting damage assessments; restoring basic infrastructure; repairing levee breaches for the de-watering of New Orleans; opening ports and waterways; and providing life sustainment subsistence to stranded livestock and pets.

The ability of our Armed Forces to react to such a devastating hurricane speaks volumes to the readiness, professionalism and training of our Active Duty, Reserve and National Guard forces. They performed efficiently and effectively, in coordination and collaboration with local, state and federal agencies under the most austere conditions.

Improvements can and should be made to ensure our responses to future natural or man-made disasters meet the challenge. We stand ready to assist in this endeavor. As we look forward from today there are 111 days until the next hurricane season.



Figure 1

Source: 2003 US Census Data



DP 1	24 1200R Aug 05 (Wednesday)	• Issued 1A Exercise Katrina WARNORD • Began monitoring TS Katrina	DP 5	27 1200R Aug 05 (Saturday)	• Issued 1A FRAGO 1 • Deployed DCO/DCE & SEPLO for AL & MS
DP 2	25 0800R Aug 05 (Thursday)	• Alerted REPLO, TM IV, DCO/DCE, SRAAG, SEPLO & Strike Teams for FL	DP 6	28 1200R Aug 05 (Sunday)	• Activated 1A CAT Tied • Submitted RFC to NORTHCOM
DP 3	25 1800R Aug 05 (Thursday)	• Issued 1A Exercise Katrina PLANORD • Pre-deployed REPLO, TM IV, DCO/DCE & SEPLO for FL	DP 7	29 0900R Aug 05 (Tuesday)	• Katrina makes landfall in LA & MS • Alerted 1A TF-CM (E)(FWD) for deployment • Alerted REPLO TM V, DCO/DCE, SRAAG & SEPLO for TN, KY & OH
DP 4	26 1200R Aug 05 (Friday)	• Alerted DCO/DCE, SRAAG & SEPLO for GA, AL & MS • Katrina makes landfall in FL	DP 8	30 0900R Aug 05 (Wednesday)	• Established JTF Katrina Main • Deployed JTF Katrina FWD to Camp Shelby, MS • Alerted REPLO Teams II & III, DCO/DCE, SRAAG & SEPLO for PA & NY

Figure 2


- Mission Analysis
- Mission Planning
- Pre-position DCO's
- Mission Analysis
- Mission Planning
- Pre-position DCE's
- Mission Analysis
- Mission Planning
-Est Battle Rhythm
- Integration with DCO, & State EOC
- MissionPplanning
- Establish JTF
- Search & Rescue
- Search & Rescue
- Air Evac Sick & Elderly
- Evac planning
- Establish Comms
0930: JTF CDR ARRIVES AT SUPERDOME
0837: CG DIRECTS HQS TO CAT RED
1000: NEW ORLEANS MAYOR ORDERS MANDATORY EVAC
0610: KATRINA MAKES LANDFALL
0724: CG DIRECTS MOVE TO CAMP SHELBY
INDUSTRIAL & 17TH ST CANAL LEVEES BREACHED
1100: JTF CDR CAMP SHELBY, MS
1400: RECON JOA DESTRUCTION
2200: JTF-KATRINA ESTABLISHED
1800: MTG WITH GOV/TAG B.R. EOC
1800: GOV/TAG MOBILIZE SCHOOL BUSES
1950: LOCAL LDRS CONFIRM EVAC PLAN N.O. CITY HALL
27 Aug SAT
28 Aug SUN
29 Aug MON
30 Aug TUE
31 Aug WED
LA DCO Baton Rouge (2 pax) 27 AUG 1845
MS DCO Jackson, MS 27 Aug 2150
AL DCO CLANTON, AL 27 Aug
LA DCE at Houston, TX (9 pax)
USCG SAR (5 x HH-65), New Orleans, LA
JT Medical Planner EOC Baton Rouge
Army & Navy EPLO's Baton Rouge, LA
JTF-Katrina Fwd Est Camp Shelby (75 pax)
USAF 920 Rescue Wing
USNS POLLUX
USS BATAAN (2 x MH-60, 4 x MH-53, 3 x LCAC)
1 CAV (2 x UH-60) 30 AUG 1100
LA DCE moved to Baton Rouge (9 pax)
USMC 2 X AAV'S FROM GULFPORT MS
USAF 8 X Swift Water Rescue Tms LAFAYETTE LA
USAF 620th EAS and 55th RQS
USAF 305th MED Group
USAF 4th & 375th CES and 304th & 306th Rescue
USAF Emerg Response Grp (9 x HH-60, 1 x C-130)
USS ARCTIC (Supplies)
5A BG Graham at EOC Baton Rouge (25 pax)
Ft. Polk MEDEVAC (2 x UH-1, 2 x UH-60)
18 ABC Avn Assets at Baton Rouge (6 x HH-60)
93rd SIG BDE (-) (Sig Spt Pkg)
1 CAV AV TF (4 x UH-60, 4 x CH-47) & 615 ASB 31 AUG 1530
USMC MAG 42 in N.O. (2 x UH-1N)
ARMY AIR FORCE
NAVY MARINES
JOINT COAST GUARD
ALL TIMES ARE CDT

Figure 3


- Search & Rescue
- Air Evac Sick & Elderly
- Ground & Air Evac Super dome
- Position Food & Water
- Enhance Comms
- CH 47 & Nets to Hancock Cty
1327: JTF CDR MTG WITH FEMA B.R. EOC
1430: TELECON WITH SEC DEF & NC CDR
1532: JTF CDR MTG LA GOV & MR. BROWN B.R. EOC
1545: PRESS CONF B.R. EOC
SUPERDOME EVACUATION
- Search & Rescue
- Air Evac Sick & Elderly
- Deliver Food & water at Conv center
0600: JTF CDR VTC WITH POTUS
0822: MTG with TAG MS
SUPERDOME EVAC COMPLETE
1200: FOOD / WATER TO CONV CTR
- Search & Rescue
- Food & Water
- Ground evac of Conv Center
-Vip visit to troops
- Stage MREs at Gulfport MS
0750: MTG with TAG MS
0830: CONV CTR EVAC COMPLETE
1648: 82ND ABN ARRIVES
- Search & Rescue
- Evac coordination
- Logistical support
0806: MTG WITH SECDEF & NC CDR FOR TOUR OF OPS IN BATON ROUGE & N.O.
0830: SECDEF N.O.
1637: BRIEF TO SEC CHERTOFF & MR BROWN AT STATE EOC IN B.R.
1941: CG VISITS MED OPS AT CONV CENTER
Search & Rescue
Evac coordination
Logistical support
Max USN Hospital Beds
Arming Posture - Self Def
Hasty Ground Search begins
1616: JOINT PRESS CONF WITH SEC CHERTOFF
1732: MTG WITH CDR JFMCC
POTUS VISIT TO JOA
01 Sep THU
02 Sep FRI
03 Sep SAT
04 Sep SUN
05 Sep MON
JCSE Communications Suite at Super Dome
USAF Modular Aerial Fire Fighting Sys(C-130s)
USAF EMS (25 Beds) & Crisis Response Grp New Orleans
Navy P3s at New Orleans
4th ID AVN Tm Baton Rouge (3 x CH-47, 12 x UH-60)
5A BG Graham at EOC Baton Rouge (66 pax)
USMC 24th MEU Assessment Tm at New Orleans NAS (7 Pax)
HSV SWIFT Humanitarian Aid
18 ABC PAD at Camp Shelby, MS
USAF 4th Air Exped Grp
USNS ALTAIR (Supplies)
82nd ABN Div TAC CP at New Orleans Airport (344 pax)
Elements of 2/1 CAV at Hammond Field, LA
ATSCOM, 2 x Air Traffic Svcs Co at Hammond Field, LA
USMC 24th MEU CE at NAS Belle Chase
USS TRUMAN (3,200 Pax & Air Helo Wing)
USS IWO JIMA (1,100 pax, 3 x LCACS, Helo SAR)
USS TORTUGA
82nd ABN Div at New Orleans Airport (950 pax)
USMC 24th MEU (235 pax)
USS GRAPPLE (SALVAGE)
USS SHREVEPORT (AMPHIBIOUS SHIP)
USS WHIDBY ISLAND at Biloxi, MS (MEU & Navy Const Bn)
49th QM Grp (-) at Ocean Springs, MS (6 x POL Tankers)
4/10 MTN Div(-) New Orleans(65 Trucks & 147 Pax)
ALL TIMES ARE CDT
ARMY
AIR FORCE
NAVY
MARINES
JOINT
COAST GUARD

Figure 4


JTF-KATRINA Road Map
Priorities:
JTF Planning
Air Search & Rescue
Grd Evac Superdome/Conv Ctr
Water/MRE to Superdome/Conv Ctr
Title X
MS to LA
1A Designated
JTF-Katrina
(2200)
1A Forward
Arv Shelby
(1200)
USS
BATAAN
Katrina
Landfall
TF AA
ADVON
USS
IWO
JIMA
Ground Search & Rescue / Evac Coord
Door to Door Searches
Dates (Month/Day)
Evacuations
Title X Troop Strength
Water Levels
Searches
Hasty
Primary
100%
75%
50%
25%
Figure 5


31 Aug 05
Depth (ft.)
0 - 1
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - 5
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 8
8 - 9
9 - 10
10 - 15
15 - 20
> 20
USACE Flood Status Zones
Zone 0
Hurricane Katrina Flooding
Estimated Depth and Extent
31 August 2005

Figure 6


UNCLASSIFIED
27 Sept 05
8 Sept 05
Depth (ft.)
0 - 1
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - 5
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 8
8 - 9
9 - 10
10 - 15
15 - 20
> 20
USACE Flood Status Zones
Zone 10
Hurricane Katrina Flooding
Estimated Depth and Extent
08 September 2005

Figure 7

Capacity to Confront Disasters

Capability ✓ / Authority ★	Local	State	Federal	DOD	Private Industry
Land	✓ ★	✓ ★	✓ ★	✓	✓
Air		✓ ★	✓ ★	✓	✓
Sea/Water			✓ ★	✓	✓
Communications			✓ ★	✓	✓
Information Management			✓ ★	✓ ★	✓ ★

500,000 to 1,000,000 Citizens

Figure 8

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
4705 N WHEELER DRIVE
FOREST PARK GA 30297-5000
February 21, 2006

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC 20515

Madam Chairman:

As a follow up to my testimony before your committee on February 9th, I request the following letter be entered into the record to correct the inaccurate account of my involvement in the cancellation of an aerial evacuation of the Superdome, as portrayed by Mr. Phil Parr in his testimony on December 8, 2005. As your staff has already concluded based on the document trail, at no time did I cancel nor delay any plan for the aerial evacuation of the Superdome.

Mr. Parr's testimony is factually incorrect. At no time before or after my arrival was there ever a plan presented to me to evacuate the Superdome using air assets, nor did I suspend any planning efforts to evacuate the Superdome by air. On the morning of August 31, 2005, local, state and federal officials reviewed with me a collaborative plan to conduct a ground evacuation of the Superdome using FEMA supplied buses. During that meeting, local and state leaders did discuss the use of air assets, but they quickly discarded that option as not feasible. That day, I met with Governor Blanco and the Louisiana Adjutant General, Major General Landreneau, and requested that the Governor mobilize local and state school bus assets to assist in the evacuation which the Governor did. Additionally, I directed Brigadier General Graham to assist the Louisiana National Guard and State Staff in planning the evacuation of New Orleans. Brigadier General Graham and his staff assisted in refining the ground evacuation plan for the Superdome (police security requirements, assembly points, routes, and way-points to support follow-on displacement sites) in support and coordination with local, state and National Guard leadership.

The priority of effort on August 31, as established by Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco, was Search and Rescue; air evacuation of the sick and elderly; evacuation planning; and establishing communications. In accordance with that priority of work, aerial rescue and evacuation of stranded, sick and ambulatory citizens continued throughout the city, including the Superdome.

I hope this letter helps to clarify events in those hectic early days. I look forward to your committee's final report and if I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Russel L. Honoré
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL BENNETT C. LANDRENEAU
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA

BEFORE THE

SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

ON

Hurricane Katrina
The Defense Department's Role in the Response

FEBRUARY 9, 2006

STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL BENNETT C. LANDRENEAU
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA

Good Morning

Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be with you this afternoon to discuss the military response for Hurricane Katrina.

Before I begin, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all who provided support to Louisiana in our hour of need. It is true; Hurricane Katrina was the most devastating natural disaster in our nation's history, a catastrophic event of biblical proportions. However, in the face of our nations greatest natural disaster, the heart and soul of this country launched the greatest response and outpouring of support ever witnessed on American soil. Personnel, supplies and equipment from every state and territory came to the aid of Louisiana and her citizens and we are forever grateful.

I greatly appreciate the hard work and creativity of the professional emergency managers who work with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. Their dedication and service is noteworthy and commendable.

I am also thankful and proud to work alongside the finest National Guard Soldiers and Airmen in the United States. There courage and selfless service in the face of tremendous turmoil was inspiring. The efforts of these Soldiers and Airmen reflect great credit on the citizens of Louisiana and we will never forget their sacrifices.

In Louisiana the Adjutant General of the National Guard also serves as the Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. As Commander of the Guard and Director of LOHSEP, I am responsible for the actions of these organizations,

and I am responsible for ensuring these organizations implement lessons learned from this disaster.

As Katrina made her way into the Gulf of Mexico and her projected path was Florida, Louisiana began to make preparations beginning on Thursday, 25 Aug. and we continued to monitor Katrina throughout the night and into Friday, 26 Aug. Preparations continued throughout the day and at 4pm it became clear Katrina had shifted far enough West and was a definite threat to Louisiana and Greater New Orleans.

When Governor Blanco declared a state of Emergency, I recommended the activation of 2000 National Guardsmen. This activation began the chain of events that initiated our emergency response plan and began the coordination with staff and units to implement preplanned support requirements for response operations. Although 2000 Guardsmen were activated, thousands more were alerted to possible activation.

On 27 Aug at 7am, all three Louisiana National Guard Joint Operation Centers were staffed at maximum levels and all units were staffed for 24 hour operations. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) coordination began for early aviation support. Throughout the day, Louisiana National Guard forces continued to execute their missions in accordance with our existing support plans to include providing 160 soldiers to support Louisiana State Police Contra flow evacuation.

I moved to the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness in Baton Rouge to continue coordination efforts. As we gathered more information on the strengthing storm, I recommended to Governor Blanco we activate an additional 2000 National Guardsmen. Never before in Louisiana's history had so many National Guardsmen been called up before a hurricane.

On Sunday, 28 Aug, we continued to preposition specific resources in accordance with our plan. As part of this response plan I would like to point out that we have standing agreements with parishes in the greater New Orleans area to provide personnel

and equipment. High water vehicles and soldiers are assigned to each NOPD district, Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, St. Bernard and Plaquemine Parish. Also, each of the 13 parishes in Southeast Louisiana was assigned a National Guard Liaison team to coordinate the Guard response with each parish emergency manager. Mobile communication teams were linked up with Engineer Assessment Teams and staged along the outer path of the projected strike zone. These teams moved in as soon as Katrina passed and were able to provide early assessments of damage in areas surrounding New Orleans. Personnel and equipment are assigned to specific Louisiana State Police Troops, and our agreement with the city of New Orleans is to provide medical and security personnel for the Louisiana Superdome, Which is identified as a special needs shelter in the state emergency response plan. When the Superdome was later designated as a shelter of last resort, the Louisiana National Guard was prepared. Our guardsmen, in support of NOPD organized and implemented an entrance plan that searched every person entering the Superdome. Over 10,000 personnel were searched for contraband. Seeing an immediate need for food and water, the guard delivered Meals ready to eat and water on Sunday, 28 Aug.

By landfall on Monday, 29 Aug the Louisiana National Guard had personnel and equipment in place with additional personnel being alerted. As the day progressed, and Katrina moved inland, we knew we had a significant problem in Southeast Louisiana. When we learned of the multi failures in the Federal levees, we then recognized we were coping with a catastrophic incident. Louisiana's 5 levels of redundancy within its Communication systems were either down or had reached capacity, so our ability to receive timely and accurate information was degraded.

As soon as it was possible, National Guard soldiers and airmen launched search and rescue boats that had been pre positioned at Jackson Barracks and our aviation resources along with the US Coast Guard soon followed as gale force winds subsided. This search and rescue continued throughout the night and into Tuesday.

By Tuesday, the Louisiana National Guard had every resource committed as well as EMAC aviation forces that arrived before the storm. All engaged in Governor Blanco's number one priority, search and rescue and saving lives.

On Tuesday morning I received a call from LTG Honoree where he informed me he was named Task Force Commander for Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana . During our conversation I conveyed the Governor's desire for Federal Troops, in particular an Army Division Headquarters to plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of New Orleans. After my conversation with LTG Honoree, I placed a call to LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and requested the National Guard Bureau take the lead in a national call for additional assistance from National Guard units throughout the country. Today, we know one of the most successful outcomes of Katrina was the execution of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. This process opened the door and without hesitation, every state and territory began to flow resources into Louisiana.

On Wednesday, 31 Aug, LTG Honoree arrived in Baton Rouge, I introduced him to Governor Blanco at which time she asked LTG Honoree to coordinate the evacuation efforts in New Orleans, so that I could concentrate on search and rescue and law and order issues. At this point the governor expressed increasing concern with the lack of federal resources entering the state. Governor Blanco assumed LTG Honoree's arrival was the beginning of the federal military response. When she learned that he in fact did not have a sizable military force with him, she again expressed concern. On Wednesday, BG Graham arrived in Baton Rouge with 25 personnel and was directed by LTG Honore to assist in coordinating the evacuation of New Orleans.

On Thursday, 1 September we begin to see the arrival of National Guard forces in significant numbers. When we recognized the pace and quantity of arriving forces, I directed members of my staff to establish a receiving location for incoming forces. Within hours of my instructions, the Joint Reserve Base located in Belle Chasse Louisiana was established as the Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration [RSOI] base. The purpose of this base was to receive personnel, assign an area of

operation, brief on the mission to be preformed, supplement any supplies and transport them to their AOR.

Realizing communication with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness and local governments was severely degraded; we decided to use our separate task forces to expedite the assistance to local governments. Upon arriving within their AOR, the commander of each task force established communication with the parish officials and became the one stop shop for military support within each parish. In some instances, this process happened in less than 2 hours.

It is important to note Hurricane Katrina not only impacted the city of New Orleans, but 12 other Southeast Louisiana Parishes. In responding to each parish we created a separate task force to conduct operations in each of the 13 effected parishes. Each parish had a commander working with local officials to meet immediate needs. If resources could not be provided locally, commanders would channel the request up to the Task Force Pelican Commander who could resource the request.

The RSOI mission went on for several weeks and we eventually processed and missioned over 30,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen and equipment to 13 parishes.

Also, on Thursday the National Guard began to receive large numbers of busses at the Louisiana Superdome. National Guard members coordinated around the clock evacuation beginning at 10 am and completing Saturday. Eventually 822 busses would be used by National Guard forces to evacuate the Superdome.

In addition to securing and evacuating the Louisiana Superdome, The Louisiana National Guard received a request from the city of New Orleans to assist in securing the Morial Convention Center. On Friday at 12 noon, nearly 1000 National Guardsmen supported the securing of the Convention Center. By 1230 the area was secure and by 3pm, food distribution and medical triage facilities were established. Distribution of food, water and medical care continue throughout the night. The Evacuation began at 10 am Saturday and was completed by 6pm the same day, again by National Guard forces.

Madam Chairman, and distinguished members, your committee and others have discussed the issue of Federalization. I tell you today, as I recommended to Governor Blanco, there was never a need to federalize the National Guard. Federalizing the National Guard would have significantly limited our capacity to conduct law enforcement missions and would add no advantage to our ability to conduct operations. Thousands of National Guard forces were pouring into the state, soldiers and airmen in a Title 32 status, most of whom were combat tested, and uniquely qualified to carry out the Governors priorities.

There has also been discussion about a proposal received by Governor Blanco on Friday evening outlining a dual "hated" commander." One commander to control both Title 10 and 32 Forces. I again submit to you this procedure would have served no operational purpose. By the time this document was received, there were over 8500 National Guardsmen on the ground performing operations. Lines of communication, chains of command and tasking priorities had already been established. Changing this process would have only stalled current operations and delayed vital missions and not have provided any additional "boots on the ground."

LTG Honoree and I were in constant communication. When federal land forces began to arrive on Saturday 3 September, LTG Honoree consulted me and we discussed their deployment. Seeing as the major evacuation of New Orleans was complete, we discussed where the most effective utilization would be, and at LTG Honoree's request, when MG Caldwell of the 82nd Airborne arrived, I briefed him on his sector and mission. We embedded National Guard personnel in every Active Duty formation that arrived. These National Guard soldiers and airmen served as effective liaisons and also added a law enforcement capability in case the need arose.

We did in fact reach unity of effort, each component working towards a common goal, while maintaining unique chains of command. We had developed a multi-

component command operating under the legal authorities of Title 10, 14, and 32 of the United States Code all in support of the governor of Louisiana.

There has never been a time in our nation's history when the National Guard has been in greater demand. We need your assistance to make sure our National Guard is properly resourced to defend our nation overseas and defend our people at home. The National Guard is forward deployed in every state and territory in America. They will be the first military responders, and in most cases will be able to fulfill the needs and requirements for a disaster, just as we have done in Louisiana for decades. However, as in Katrina, when a catastrophic event occurs, DOD assets will be needed to add capabilities and resources to the relief effort.

When the National Guard performs it's military support to civil authorities mission, a key component is the delivery of the capacity to communicate. If civilian first responders cannot communicate, they cannot coordinate. Katrina's wind and flood waters destroyed the preexisting communication infrastructure. In the future, the Guard needs to have the capacity to deliver a communication infrastructure that is able to meet the new surging demand. The Louisiana National Guard also needs 2 mobile command suites to serve as forward command posts.

We must develop better electronic solutions to request, locate and track resources. We must standardize our procedures to receive and stage personnel and equipment as they arrive in state. Then integrate those resources into the deployed formations.

I am pleased to see the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has initiated action to create DHS Emergency Reconnaissance Teams. This should enhance the Secretaries capacity to determine when conditions warrant the declaration of an incident of National Significance or a Catastrophic Incident which authorizes a proactive Federal response.

LOHSEP, LANG and the federal government, with your help are learning those lessons and factoring them into our future plans. The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic

Planning Project commonly know as Hurricane Pam demonstrated the quality work that we can produce with a joint federal, state and local team. I ask you to help us reinforce that teamwork. I can assure you that lessons learned will help us be better prepared for the 2006 Hurricane season.

I am honored to be on this panel with LTG Honoree, who represents the finest in America.

I look forward to answering your questions.

Event Synopsis

In the following event synopsis, Hurricane Katrina is followed throughout its course from 25 AUG 2005 – 29 AUG 2005. The synopsis summarizes the then existing situational awareness of the hurricanes position, wind speeds, direction, forward speed and forecast from initial entry into the Gulf through landfall and transition to the recovery phase. Key decisions are noted as actions taken each day of the event process.

Tropical Depression Twelve
Tuesday, 23 AUG 05 16:00 CDT

• 5:00 PM EDT: National Hurricane Center announces formation of Tropical Depression Twelve over the southeastern Bahamas. (Appendix A).

Tropical Storm Katrina
Wednesday, 24 AUG 05 10:00 CDT

• 11:00 AM EDT: National Hurricane Center announces formation of tropical storm Katrina." (Appendix B).

Hurricane Katrina
Thursday, 25 AUG 05 16:00 CDT

• 14:00 CAT Activated

• 14:20 1st Alert issued

•16:00 The National Hurricane Center upgrades tropical storm Katrina to "Hurricane Katrina"(Appendix C).

•19:00 Katrina makes landfall in Florida.



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Friday, 26 AUG 05 05:00 CDT

- **08:26 Alert issued**
- **Checking Comm with Parishes**
- **Conference Call set up For SETF**
- **Mouth of the Mississippi is on the outer edge of the cone of error**
- **10:00 AM CDT: NHC Advisory: "Majority of the NHC Models take Katrina inland over the Northeast Gulf Coast." (Appendix D).**
- **10:30 AM CDT: Katrina is upgraded to a Category 2 hurricane (Appendix E).**
- **10:30 AM CDT: NHC Advisory shows probability of landfall in New Orleans is 11%. Pensacola is 16%. (Appendix F).**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Friday, 26 AUG 05 16:00 CDT

•16:00 The National Hurricane Center issues an advisory forecasting that Katrina would soon be a Category 3 hurricane (Appendix G). First indication that models have "shifted significantly westward" (Appendix H). Pensacola still listed as more likely landfall site. (Appendix I.)



• 17:00 SETF Conf Call #1

• 18:00 Governor Blanco declares a state of emergency for Louisiana (Appendix J).

• Alert issued

• LSP & DOTD join CAT

• Announcement of EOC Level 3 activation for 07:30 27 AUG 05

Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Friday, 26 AUG 05 22:00 CDT

•22:00 NHC Advisory: "Guidance Spread has decreased and most of the reliable numerical model tracks are now clustered between the eastern coast of Louisiana and the coast of Mississippi." (Appendix K.) NHC landfall probability for New Orleans now equal to that of Pensacola(17%). (Appendix L.)



• 23:00 LSP/DOTD ready for Phase 1 Evacuation

Hurricane Katrina
Saturday, 27 AUG 05 04:00 CDT

• 06:06 Alert issued Katrina at CAT 2

• 07:00 EMAC-A team requested

• 7 Parishes have declared precautionary evacuations for low lying areas

Mandatory: St Charles

• 07:30 EOC at Level 3 SETF Call #2 Evacuations start in accordance with State Plans



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Saturday, 27 AUG 05 10:00 CDT

- **09:00 SWTF Call #1**
- **10:30 SETF Call #3**
- **11:00 Katrina a CAT 3**
- **Governor requests that The President declare a Federal State of Emergency**
- **FEMA Region VI concurs with Governor's request**
- **FEMA liaison at EOC**
- **Transportation Control Center (TCC) staffed**
- **12:00 Phase 2 of SELA Evacuation commences, City of New Orleans opens Superdome as a Special Needs Shelter**
- **14:00 EOC at Level 1, SWTF Call # 2**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Saturday, 27 AUG 05 16:00 CDT

- **Katrina CAT 3**

- **14:00 State Special Needs Shelters open in Monroe and Alexandria, Louisiana.**

- **15:00 - 9 additional Parishes Declare; Pre-positioning of SAR assets; Commo & Security support required for EOC; Mandatory Evacuation Plaquemines Parish**

- **15:30 SETF Call #4**

- **16:00 Phase 3 Evacuation for SELA and Contra-flow**

- **1800 State Special Needs Shelter opens in Baton Rouge, LA**

- **19:00 Hurricane Watch issued for SELA incl. N.O.**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Saturday, 27 AUG 05 22:00 CDT

- **20:00 Conference Calls continue**
- **22:00 Hurricane warning issued for N. Central Gulf, CAT 4 projected by Sunday**
- **FEMA ERT-A & ERT-N Arrive at EOC**



Hurricane Katrina
Sunday, 28 AUG 05 01:00 CDT

- **03:00 Katrina a CAT 4**
- **Shelters opening across North Central LA**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Sunday, 28 AUG 05 04:00 CDT

- **05:00 Hurricane warning from Morgan City to the AL/FL line, includes N.O. and Lake Ponchartrain**



Hurricane Katrina
Sunday, 28 AUG 05 07:00 CDT

- **07:00 Conference Calls continue**
- **Katrina a CAT 5**
- **08:00 Hurricane warning from Morgan City to the AL/FL line, includes N.O. and Lake Ponchartrain**
- **0900 Mayor Nagin calls for mandatory evacuation of New Orleans**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Sunday, 28 AUG 05 10:00 CDT

- **10:00 Conference calls continue**
- **11:00 Katrina 225 miles S/SE of mouth of the river**
- **Additional SAR assets pre-positioned**
- **Commodities pre-positioned at Camp B**
- **Evacuations continue**
- **13:00 CAT 5 180 miles S/SE of mouth of the river**



Hurricane Katrina
Sunday, 28 AUG 05 16:00 CDT

- **Conf calls continue**
- **N.O. Airport closed**
- **Superdome last resort shelter**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Sunday, 28 AUG 05 22:00 CDT

- **22:00 Katrina CAT 5**
- **LDWF Preparing for SAR**
- **LANG supporting NOPD**



Hurricane Katrina
Monday, 29 AUG 05 04:00 CDT

- **04:00 Katrina CAT 4, near landfall**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Monday, 29 AUG 05 10:00 CDT

- **07:30 SETF Call #10**
- **08:00 Damage reports, Some levee breaches 9th Ward and St Bernard**
- **Lost contact w/some Parishes**
- **10:00 Eye moves ashore near LA/MS border at CAT 3**
- **Almost 300,000 households without Power**



Event Synopsis

Hurricane Katrina
Monday, 29 AUG 05 16:00 CDT

- **13:00 Levee breach reported at 17th St Canal**
- **First looting reported to LSP**
- **Wind still 70-80 mph in Kenner, LA as per LSP, roads still closed**
- **14:00 Continuing damage reports from Parishes**
- **16:00 400,000+ without Power**



- **Communications disrupted throughout affected area due to power outages and equipment failures**
- **Louisiana National Guard begins Search and Rescue missions with Superdome as primary SAR evacuation shelter**
- **Superdome damaged by storm, shelter occupants moved to upper levels within Superdome and outer walkways.**
- **21:00 Additional Watercraft requested from USCG for SAR**

Hurricane Katrina – Post Landfall
30 AUG - 20 September 2005

- **Ongoing Operations: Search and Rescue, Temporary Medical, Security Missions, Sheltering, Commodities Support, Generator Support, Fuel Support.**
- **Superdome evacuation begins 1 September, completes 3 September**



Louisiana National Guard Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina



TASK FORCE PELICAN

7 DEC 05

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

25 Aug 05

- **1400** COL Keeling coordinated 3ea 6000 gal fuel tankers from LA Air National Guard to be positioned at Hammond Airport.

26 Aug 05 (D-3)

- COL Keeling initiated Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests for four CH-47s, two UH-60s with hoists and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) assets.
- COL Keeling ordered initial aircraft and crew selection for evacuation and response staging.
- **1200** COL Keeling ordered personnel to JFHQ JOC and establishes TF Eagle
- **1500** COL Keeling published FRAGO for Katrina to Aviation OPORD STORM SURGE and provided initial logistics forecast to J4.
- **1558** COL Dabadie sent email to key personnel to set up a preparatory meeting that afternoon:

-----Original Message-----
From: Dabadie, Stephen COL
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 3:58 PM
To: Sheridan, Joanne; Baillie, Kenneth T.; Aycock, David N.; Santos, Pat; Soileau, John COL; Marze, Jay COL; Kincanon, Lance; Fink, Robert A.; Arbour, Paul; Lacoste, Lloyd COL; May, Louis COL; Pugh, John COL; Schneider, Pete (LTC); Erickson, Dirk; Mooney, Gary (CPT); Wood, Michael COL; Oliver, Clifford COL; Stuckey, Ronnie D.(COL); Schmidt, Lester R. COL; Landreneau, Chad; Wellmeyer, Henry P.; Ball, Jonathan (LTC); Mouton, Douglas J.; Keeling, Barry; Aldridge, William; Salcido, Mary LtCol; Kling, John; Nomey, Roy I. COL; Deville, Mike; Ducote, Randy L.; Bordelon, Daniel P.
Cc: Downer, Hunt (BG); Morrow, John R.; Curtis, Glenn (COL); Landreneau, Bennett MG
Subject: HURRICANE KATRINA

ALL,
Hurricane Katrina continues move in a W/SW direction. She is getting stronger and larger. The NHC predicts landfall o/a Mon AM at Cat IV.
The projection continues to move more westward. The projection cone now includes portions of S/E LA. With the current projected path tropical storm winds or worse could affect portions of S/E LA to include the NO Metro area.
This storm has become a much more serious threat to LA in the last few hours than expected. Some models show the hurricane projection further west. It is therefore essential that we begin planning should we have to respond.
The J3 will notify you of an initial huddle / conference call this afternoon in order to set the conditions for a response.

Scd

- **1600** Katrina track shifts west. It became evident that Louisiana and the Greater New Orleans area were in danger of impact by Hurricane Katrina. COL Dabadie called a meeting with COL Curtis, COL Aycock and COL Santos to initiate the emergency response plan.
- JOC published FRAGO 07 to LANG Emergency Ops Plan which initiated the pre-positioning of personnel and equipment previously identified in the plan.
- **1700** COL Keeling unable to coordinate hangar space for aircraft at either Baton Rouge Airport or Hammond Airport. Coordination was made for hangar space at airports at Beaumont and Houston.
- **1800** COL Dabadie conducted meeting/conference call with all staff and MACOMs to review status of storm, review support requirements and activate the LANG for response operations.
- COL Keeling ordered OH-58s for direct support of Contraflow.
- MACOMs and Staffs initiated call up procedures for leaders and key personnel

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

27 Aug 05

- **0700** LANG activated all three JOCs (Primary at JB, Alternate at Gillis Long Center, Rear at Cp Beauregard) at Level 3 staffing
- **0800** All MACOMs initiated troop call up and 24-hour operations.
- COL Keeling began EMAC coordination with FL and TX for AVN support. COL Aycock began coordination with those states for ground force support.
- **1100** LANG deployed LNOs to 13 parishes and LOHSEP
- **1100** MAJ Baldwin and members of SRT conducted leaders recon of Superdome
- In accordance with plan, TF Eagle deployed remaining required troops and aviation assigned to support LSP Contraflow
- **1200** TF Eagle repositioned HEMMT Tankers from Esler to Hammond. Aircraft configuration and PCIs complete. OH-58s begin Contraflow mission.
- **1300** TF Eagle executed pre-storm aircraft missions
- JOC published FRAGO 08 which adjusted the pre-staged equipment and personnel
- JOC published FRAGO 09 which further adjusted the pre-staged equipment and personnel
- JOC published FRAGO 10 which organized Superdome security TFs
- State EOC requested LANG Commo and Security support
- COL Keeling reorganized army aviation assets into Task Force (TF) Eagle consisting of personnel and equipment from the State Aviation Office (SAO) staff, 204th Air Traffic Services Group, 1-244th Avn Regt, 812th Medical Company(-)(AA), Detachment (DET) 2 106th AVIM, Reconnaissance and Interdiction Detachment (RAID), and Operational Airlift Support (OSA) DET 38. The TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was established at Jackson Barracks in support of the State's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and "jumped" a Tactical Command Post (TAC) to Esler Field in Pineville, LA. Initiated plan for a roving helicopter cell consisting of four UH-60s and two UH-1s along with Command and Control (C2); this cell would re-position so they could move in immediately behind the storm and begin flying rescue missions in New Orleans as soon as the winds allowed.
- 159th Fighter Wing evacuated F-15s to Ft. Worth. ANG re-located C-130 to Little Rock, AR
- **1500 (approximate)** TF Castle initiated deployment of troops to support LSP Contraflow plan and shelters IAW standing plans. TAC relocated to Jackson Barracks for forward command and control.
- SRT main element deployed to Jackson Barracks
- LANG Troop Buildup - 3085

28 Aug 05

- Continued deployment of forces in support of existing plans
- **0700** SRT arrived at Superdome. It should be noted that this was the sixth time for the SRT to deploy to the Superdome in support of civil authorities in the past four years.
    - The first SRT deployment to the Superdome was in support of the US Secret Service for a National Security Special Event (NSSE). This was Superbowl XXXVI (2002 – Command and Control of 500 Guardsmen).
    - The second SRT deployment to the Superdome was in support of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) for the NCAA Final Four Championship tournament (2003 – 50 SRT personnel).
    - The third SRT deployment to the Superdome was in support of the FBI and NOPD for the NCAA National Championship Sugarbowl (2004 – Command and Control of 175 Guardsmen as they conducted pat-down searches, metal detector searches, and package inspections for the 75,000 citizens in attendance.
    - The fourth SRT deployment to the Superdome was in support of the NOPD for Hurricane Ivan in its use as a Special Needs Shelter (2004 – Command and Control of 100 Guardsmen).
    - The fifth SRT deployment to the Superdome was in support of NOPD for Hurricane Dennis in its use as a Special Needs Shelter (2005 – Command and Control of 50 Guardsmen)

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

- **0800** LANG MEDCOM personnel arrived at Superdome in accordance with the State of Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Plan. The MEDCOM (which is a component of the Louisiana Army National Guard) deployed 38 unit personnel to the Louisiana Superdome on 28 Aug 05, including 3 physicians, 5 nurses and 30 other medical personnel. Company A/111 Medical Company also deployed 18 soldiers the to Superdome in support of the LA MED COM. Co A/111 component included 1 physician, 1 nurse, 2 physician assistants, and 14 medics. Additionally, 15 medical personnel and physicians from the LA Air National Guard deployed and worked in conjunction with the MEDCOM to provide medical support at the Superdome. The LANG medical compliment at the Superdome totaled 71 medical personnel.
- TF Eagle TOC relocated from Bldg 37 to the JOC in Bldg 35 at Jackson Barracks.
- JOC published FRAGO 11 which dictated endstate LANG troop numbers
- JOC published FRAGO 12 which outlined staging plan for Commo/Engr assessment teams
- JOC published FRAGO 13 which established JTF Pelican HQ, Log, En, SAR TF
- **1000** City of New Orleans opened Superdome as Special Needs Shelter. Approximately 300 initial critical care evacuees arrived at Superdome. MEDCOM team accepted approximately 500 special needs patients by the end of the day.
- The 225th Engr Gp mobilized and deployed approximately 1485 soldiers in accordance with the LANG Emergency Procedures OPLAN. The 225th moved approximately 220 soldiers to the Superdome to assist with security operations. The 225th deployed approximately 120 troops to NOPD and approximately 64 soldiers to Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Department to assist with evacuations and security missions. The 225th deployed approximately 300 soldiers to conduct security missions in support of shelters throughout the state and to the Louisiana State Police to support contra-flow. The remaining 225th engineer forces staged outside Katrina's path (South Central and North Louisiana) ready to move in after landfall.
- **1100** 527th deployed an advance party to the Superdome to link up with the SRT. Lights, running water, toilets, and air conditioning were available.
- **1200** City of New Orleans opened Superdome as Shelter of Last Resort. Lights, running water, toilets and air-conditioning were available. First evacuees arrived with their own food and water.
- **1300** TF Eagle completes evacuation of Lakefront Airport (AASF#1). COL Keeling coordinated with NGB for EMAC aviation support for Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Company, 2 UH-60s w/hoist, 4 CH-47 aircraft, and discusses the possible need for additional support. EMAC request initiated through LOHSEP.
- **1500** TF Eagle relocates roving aircraft to Houston.
- TF Castle soldiers assigned to NOPD linked up with their counterparts and moved to Hilton to ride out storm.
- **1600** TF Eagle completes all refueling and ground support equipment placement. Completes augmentation of LSA and TAC CP for Army aviation assets.
- 159th Fighter Wing deployed 100 personnel for security operations at the Superdome.
- Additional 159th deployments were East Jefferson Hospital, bus drivers to Plaquemines Parish, High-water vehicles and airmen to St. Bernard, LOHSEP support, fuel and flat bed trucks to Hammond, and ASOS teams throughout South Louisiana.
- **1700** TF Castle forward operations (approximately 6 personnel) arrived at the Superdome with mission of command and control of security. There were approximately 2,500 evacuees there at that time.
- LANG delivers 9,792 MREs and 13,440 (1) liter bottles of water out of its contingency stock to the Louisiana Superdome in support of shelter operations. Additionally, aviation and transportation units in the New Orleans area possessed 5,560 (1)-liter bottles of water and 400 MREs.
- LANG Troop Buildup – 3396

29 Aug 05

- **0400** City of New Orleans lost power. LANG JOC continued to operate on backup generator
- **0600** Katrina made landfall
- At the Superdome, there were an estimated 10,000-12,000 evacuees with a LA National Guard Special Reaction Team (SRT) in place to provide security and order.

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

- During the storm, rain began to fall inside the Superdome and several holes appeared in the roof. After consulting with Superdome officials, a decision was made to move the shelter population from stadium seating out of fear that the Superdome's roof might collapse. Consequently, the shelter population was moved to the Plaza level walkway and various elevated walkways inside the Superdome.
- First EMAC support arrived (helicopters from OK)
- **1300** LANG directed 62nd CST to relocate their Unified Command Suite to the Superdome to provide communications support to the JTF.
- **1400** Disruption of natural gas triggered the decision point for the LANG to relocate the JOC from Jackson Barracks to the Superdome. The following is a personal account from a LANG member, COL(R) Santos: "After we lost power in the JOC we transferred command and control to the Alternate JOC located at the Gillis W. Long Center in Carville, LA. This transfer went very smoothly as it was practiced just a few weeks prior during Hurricane Dennis. After relocating to the Superdome I assembled my team to reassume command and control from the Alternate JOC. This transfer of control from the Alternate JOC to the relocated Primary JOC was smoothly accomplished. These transfers of strategic control during the middle of a catastrophic event were executed exactly as we had trained and exercised."
- **1500** LANG began SAR missions with Superdome as primary SAR evac shelter. A prime example of the early SAR efforts is contained in this narrative by BG Brod Veillon: "Monday morning the water rose to 10 feet. I reached the location (Jackson Barracks Area B parking lot) where the LANG and LDWF had pre-positioned boats. The boats were floating with their trailers attached. I send out a small boat with guardsman to use bolt cutters to cut the boats loose from their trailers. A guardsman went into the water and cut each boat loose. We then brought them to Jackson Barracks HQ Building to use for SAR. Mid afternoon on Monday as the wind subsided and the rain ended we set out with 6 boats to search for people who might need help. I found hundreds of people on rooftops calling for help. As I filled my boat at one house, a lady told us that her neighbor was in her attic next door and needed help. We docked at the house and looked into the attic vent. She was there and needed help. We cut a hole in her roof and pulled her to safety. We then proceeded to the St. Bernard court house where we unloaded and found many, many people who had made their way there. I left 4 boats for the parish government to use and returned to Jackson Barracks." This is a single account of the hundreds of events that took place by the LANG immediately following the storm.
- **1500** CST arrived at Superdome to establish Unified Command Suite and mobile command post at Superdome providing SATCOMs, radio comms, and connectivity to JTF Pelican and FEMA.
- **1630** Launched aircraft from Baton Rouge to New Orleans to initiate reconnaissance and rescue
- **1800** LANG JOC jumped to Superdome as the center of gravity shifts. COL Beron flew from Jackson Barracks to the Superdome as the lead element of JTF Pelican. Upon arrival, SRT reported approximately 10,000-12,000 evacuees were on site. JTF Pelican, TF SAR, TF LOG, and TF Engineer operate out of Superdome. Remainder of JTF Pelican and TF Eagle relocated from Jackson Barracks to Superdome bringing the National Guard force to approximately 700. The "Eagle's Nest" as it became known was initiated to coordinate aviation missions. Search and rescue operations continued. There were over 150 National Guard and Army helicopters plus Coast Guard, Navy, USMC, Air Force and civilian aircraft operating. In the first 48 hours the Louisiana Army National Guard flew 323 hours, rescued 2,662 citizens, transported an additional 2,273 personnel from evacuation points after initial rescue, moved 127 tons of cargo, and 70 tons of Class I.
- 159th Fighter Wing began unloading aircraft in preparation for the largest peacetime air operation in the history of the US.
- LANG co-located a Forward Operating Base with FEMA Regional Staging Area at Zephyr Field. ANG directed the operations on that FOB.
- Late evening hours CST completed set up of Unified Command Suite and mobile command post at Superdome. Provided SATCOMs, radio comms, and connectivity to JTF Pelican and FEMA.
- **2200** TF EAGLE completed establishment of the Joint Air Operations Center and EAGLE Base at Superdome Heliport with the assistance of the airport manager, Norm Umholtz.
- NG Troop Buildup – 4549

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

30 Aug 05

- **0630** Launched aircraft from Hammond for Search and Rescue.
- **0800** COL Beron assumed command of TF Security.
- LANG completed move to Superdome
- **1000** TF EAGLE converted Superdome parking lot into heliport by removing light poles and the cars that were parked on the upper level of the parking structure. Launched remaining aircraft from Baton Rouge for Search and Rescue.
- More EMAC forces arrived
- Requested additional EMAC assistance through NGB
- Initial coordination of federal DoD response between MG Landreneau and LTG Honore
- SAR operations continued.
- "Eagle's Nest" was in full operation. This fixed base operation provided operational commercial telephones and limited internet capabilities. These communications provided a capability which kept aviation operations effective. Aviation assets were able to provide Class I needed of evacuees at the Superdome and fly in additional security forces to maintain control of the crowds. When the USN and USCG personnel joined the "Eagle's Nest" team the TOC became a Joint Operations Center (JOC). The loss of generator power was of major concern because of rising water due to breaches in the levee system. TF Eagle became heavily engaged in plugging the breach in the 17th Street Canal which was over 100' long and 25' deep. The first EMAC aircraft arrived, UH-60s from the Oklahoma National Guard and UH-60s and CH-47s from Texas. The Louisiana Army National Guard flew 128.0 Flight Hours, 512 Sorties, Class 1 66 Tons, Cargo 99 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 366, 2nd Contact Rescue 303, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 669.
    - Sample Action: Baptist hospital called for evacuation of neonatal patients in incubators. TF EAGLE crews evacuated 11 patients and incubators to Baton Rouge Hospital.
    - Sample Action: Rooftop evacuation 4 juveniles and 2 adults one adult was a paraplegic.
    - Sample Action: 11 ventilator patients were air evacuated from VA Hospital. The patients were loaded onto air mattresses and loaded onto a linen truck while being hand bagged ventilated and then loaded onto the waiting aircraft at the Superdome.
- About half of the external walkway surrounding the Superdome on the Plaza level was made available to the shelter population.
- Emergency power was by generators only. Lights were at a minimum. Running water and plumbing had failed. 29,960 MREs and 48,490 bottles of water were issued. Approximately 24,000 evacuees were present. The La National Guard provided roving patrols, guards at check points, security of the food and water distribution points and sections of plaza were restricted.
    - An example of one of the many heroic acts by National Guardsmen that day involves Corporal Howland. As a result of the storm, the Superdome lost power and the rising waters threatened the safety of the only generator operating the safety lighting to the building. This limited lighting was vital to the security of the Dome and it was feared a power loss would send the evacuees into anarchy. The JOC immediately had water pumps and sandbags airlifted to the Superdome to protect the generator from the floodwaters; however, the pump hose was not long enough to reach the outer wall. Corporal Howland immediately planned and executed a mission acquiring the fire hoses from within the Superdome to support the pumps, thus allowing continued operation to protect the generator. Corporal Howland sacrificed his own personal safety in extreme conditions of waist deep water around the clock to ensure the generator was fully functional. Due to Corporal Howland's ability to act quickly and without direction, the Superdome never lost power.
- LANG used Chaplains, Judge Advocates, and Public Affairs, and members of the crowd to talk to people, share factual information, dispel rumors, and distribute food and water to the non-ambulatory.
- Med Com realized that all the special needs patients had to be moved from the Dome as the conditions were deteriorating (no sanitation, no lights, plumbing overflowing, floors wet from plumbing and from rain coming through holes in the ceilings). The Med Com personnel began

transporting all the special needs patients (500 plus, many in wheelchairs and on stretchers) to the arena. .

- 300,000 MREs, 397,000 liter bottles water
- NG Troop Buildup – 5207

31 Aug 05

- **0630** TF Castle dispatched approximately 135 soldiers to the Alario Center in Jefferson Parish. They immediately received a mission to repair a breach in the west side of the 17th Street Levee. A few hours later, approximately 60 soldiers and 20 high-water vehicles were dispatched to the Superdome to assist in the evacuation of Special Needs patients.
- 225th Engineer Group HQ (Rear) dispatched from Camp Beauregard to LaPlace, LA to facilitate and coordinate evacuation efforts from the Greater New Orleans area. This assistance was provided to FEMA contracted bus representatives on site, the LA Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (for fuel), the Louisiana State Police, and, later, to the US 5th Army. A truck stop in LaPlace was used as a staging area for FEMA contracted buses. Fuel, MREs, and water were eventually temporarily staged to support evacuees' needs.
- TF EAGLE: Rescue operations were coordinated with CAPT Jones, USCG, and sectors were assigned using major roads and waterways as boundaries. 16 additional EMAC aircraft arrived from TX, GA, and FL putting the total National Guard Aircraft at 35 rotary-wing and 2 fixed-wing aircraft. The LA and OK aircraft flew 137 hours, 548 Sorties, moved 680 patients, 2791 rescued citizens, 89 tons of cargo and sand bags, 170 tons of Class I, and hoisted 128 personnel. 1st Contact Rescue 2304, 2nd Contact Rescue 1991, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 4295.
    - Sample Action: Rooftop rescue of Chalmette Hospital patients and the hospital administrator. Chalmette Hospital Administrator was flown to Superdome to coordinate follow-on evacuation missions.
    - Sample Action: A woman in labor who was hemorrhaging and facing certain death but for her evacuation to the Pete Maravich Assembly Center by National Guard UH-60.
- LANG received reports from evacuees of rumors circulating through the crowd (evacuees would start riots and/or fires if the buses did not come)
- The LANG completed moving the patients from the Superdome to the Arena.
- **2100** Approximately six busloads of special needs patients were evacuated from the Superdome. Patients were transported from the staging area on high-water vehicles to the bus station and transferred to FEMA buses for evacuation. LANG support to this operation continued in the following days until the majority of evacuees were moved from the Greater New Orleans area.
- Late evening: Small smoldering fire in Superdome. Fire Department extinguished the fire.
- 278,000 MREs, 252,000 liter bottles water
- NG Troop Buildup – 5321

1 Sep 05

- LANG estimates approximately 30,000 evacuees on site in Superdome requiring evacuation.
- **1000** Superdome evacuation began (24/7 operations both by ground and air assets).
- Late evening: Received request from City of New Orleans to secure and evacuate Morial Convention Center in conjunction with NOPD to start on 2 Sep 05.
- Large concentrations of people seeking evacuation were gathering in dry areas. NG aviation executed 219 hours, 876 Sorties, moved 1,197 medical transfers, 5,341 passengers, 248 tons of cargo and sand bags, 217 tons of Class I, Cargo 248 Tons, hoisted 206 rescued citizens to safety. 1st Contact Rescue 2915, 2nd Contact Rescue 3529, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 6444. A first contact rescue occurred when the aircrew was the first responder to rescue citizens or evacuate medical patients. A second contact rescue occurred when the aircrew transports citizen to an evacuation point after initial rescue.
    - Sample Action: Evacuated patients from St. Bernard Parish Jail, 20 of which were in critical condition.
    - Sample Action: Memorial Baptist Hospital had no electricity and placed an urgent request to immediately evacuate 60 patients.

  - Sample Action: 1-244th crew in conjunction with Los Angeles County firemen hovered close to rooftop to allow a fireman to jump onto the roof and chop through roof with an axe to rescue 4 people. At the next house the fireman repeated his "axe" rescue and saved an additional 10 people.
- 741,000 MREs, 738,000 liter bottles water
- NG Troop Buildup – 6692

2 Sep 05

- **0800** BG Jones (JTF Commander) briefed LTC Thibodeaux (TF Commander) on Convention Center rescue mission.
- **1100** National Guard forces staged troops at intersection of Poydras and Loyola.
- **1100** LTC Thibodeaux met with NOPD Chief Compass and Deputy Chief Riley.
- **1200** 1000 NG forces (LA, TX, OK, NV, and AR) move toward Convention Center.
- **1230** Convention Center secured with no incidents.
- **1500** Relief operations began (food and water distribution as well as medical evacuation by air).
- The Superdome was at capacity, so all evacuees were being dropped at the "Cloverleaf" (the intersection of I-10 and Causeway Blvd). The primary focus was on the mission of saving lives. Civilian air ambulance operations were at a peak evacuating seriously ill people. Food and water was delivered wherever the need existed. Crews targeted people gathered in large numbers and dropped off MREs and water. Flooded areas were targeted to include New Orleans East, St. Bernard Parish, and the 7-9th Wards in New Orleans. National Guard aircraft flew 309 hours, 1236 Sorties, moved 1234 medical transfers, 6989 passengers, 167 tons of cargo, 112 tons of Class I, 169 hoist operations, 1st Contact Rescue 3439, 2nd Contact Rescue 4753, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 8192.
  - Sample Action: Conducted hoist operations where medics on hoist had to go through window of home and rescued a family of four.
  - Sample Action: While using night vision goggles crew noticed lights coming from a rooftop. The rooftop had 35 children with ages ranging 2 weeks old to 10 years old. All children were evacuated in one sortie.
- Colonel Beron assigned the task of clearing the Superdome to 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry, Ohio National Guard — a unit assigned to Task Force Security. Colonel Beron instructed its commander, LTC Ellis, to bring a clearing force to the highest point in the Superdome and begin clearing down to the ground floor as soon as evacuation of the Superdome was completed.
- 397,000 MREs, 1,013,000 liter bottles water
- NG Troop Buildup – 7835

3 Sep 05

- **1000** Convention Center evacuation began.
- **1300** Superdome evacuation completed
- **1500** LTC Ellis assigned approximately 300 of his soldiers to clear the Superdome. The clearing process lasted approximately four hours. Following the clearing process, the exterior doors were secured.
- **1800** Convention Center evacuation completed: Total 19,000 (2,000 via ferry, 14,000 via bus, 3,000 critical care medical patients via helicopter).
- **1830** This is a personal account by a LANG member, LTC Thibodeaux, of the tremendous success of the Convention Center mission: "At 1830 I reported in to the JOC that the Convention Center was cleared and mission complete. It was at this point I was able to reflect on the thousands of acts of heroism by National Guard members from all over the country. I felt a great pride in the fact that the National Guard had saved the lives of 70,000 people through search and rescue, relief, and evacuation. The National Guard has a mission of supporting civil authorities during times of crisis. We were prepared to conduct this mission and did so in a dynamic manner. It is my belief that this unified effort was the reason for this tremendous success."
- **2200** Convention Center turned over to Civil Authorities.

- TF EAGLE 255.0 Flight Hours, 1020 Sorties Flown, Class 1 105 Tons, Cargo 144 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 4734, 2nd Contact Rescue 4258, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 8992.
    - Sample Action: Citizens with special needs were air lifted from Morial Convention Center.
- 253,000 MREs, 302,000 liter bottles water
- NG Troop Buildup – 8820

4 Sep 05

- **1200** FEMA DMORT teams collected six deceased evacuees from Superdome.
- COL Beron assigned LTC Ellis to escort the FEMA official through the Superdome. They agreed to meet at the Superdome's loading dock in order to hand over the six bodies stored there. After a search of approximately 45 minutes, the group met at the Superdome's loading dock. The FEMA official confirmed that the Superdome was clear.
- TF EAGLE 338.0 Flight Hours, 1352 Sorties Flown, Class 1 147 Tons, Cargo 84 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 2810, 2nd Contact Rescue 2823, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 5633.
    - Sample Action: Initial transition to C2 and Congressional Support.
    - Sample Action: Conducted Recon of Entergy Bldg for dropping generators on building. Sling loaded generators to top of building for 911 repeater antenna power.
- By afternoon, TF Castle consolidated command and control operations at the Alario Center. From that point forward, they conducted route clearance and debris removal missions in surrounding parishes.
- 312,000 MREs, 401,000 liter bottles water
- NG Troop Buildup – 10,803

5 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published OPORD 01-0805 (Katrina) which established Parish TFs
- The Air Guard medical team departed the Superdome.
- TF EAGLE began preparation to move operations to Belle Chase NAS. TF EAGLE 254.0 Flight Hours, 1016 Sorties Flown, Class 1 140 Tons, Cargo 104 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 3134, 2nd Contact Rescue 3519, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 6653.
- NG Troop Buildup – 19,399

6 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 01 (Katrina) which readjusted Task Organization
- JTF Pelican moved to Gillis W. Long Center, Carville, LA
- **1000** Superdome turned over to 82nd Airborne and Civil Authorities
- MEDCOM ultimately provided emergency care for 500 special needs patients and 1,200-1,500 general population patients.
- TF EAGLE 276.0 Flight Hours, 1104 Sorties Flown, Class 1 339 Tons, Cargo 195 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 2685, 2nd Contact Rescue 3097, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 5782.
- NG Troop Buildup – 21,079

7 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 02 (Katrina) which pushed LNOs from TF Santa Fe to parishes
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 03 (Katrina) which provided security assets to Red Cross shelters
- TF EAGLE 294.0 Flight Hours, 1176 Sorties Flown, Class 1 166 Tons, Cargo 181 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 4028, 2nd Contact Rescue 4263, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 8291.
- NG Troop Buildup – 24,773

8 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 04 (Katrina) which established security locations in parishes
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 05 (Katrina) directed commodities distribution support

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 06 (Katrina) directed handover of Red Cross mission support from Santa Fe to Defender
- TF EAGLE Transfer of Eagles Nest from Superdome to Belle Chase NAS.
- TF EAGLE 207.0 Flight Hours, 828 Sorties Flown, Class 1 7 Tons, Cargo 72 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 13, 2nd Contact Rescue 13, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 26.
- NG Troop Buildup – 25,412

9 Sep 05

- TF EAGLE 73.0 Flight Hours, 292 Sorties Flown, Class 1 3 Tons, Cargo 14 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 61, 2nd Contact Rescue 128, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 189.
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 07 (Katrina) changed BUB and AVN priorities
- NG Troop Buildup – 25,914

10 Sep 05

- TF EAGLE by this date TF EAGLE consisted of organic Louisiana aircraft and aircraft from 11 other States
- Rescue Coordination Center stood up TF EAGLE supports with MEDEVAC 1st up/2nd up.
- TF EAGLE 45.0 Flight Hours, 180 Sorties Flown, Class 1 0 Tons, Cargo 1 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 26, 2nd Contact Rescue 59, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 85.
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 08 to (Katrina) established coordination relationship between JTF Pelican and AC Forces
- NG Troop Buildup – 26,044

11 Sep 05

- TF EAGLE 56.0 Flight Hours, 224 Sorties Flown, Class 1 0 Tons, Cargo 3 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 36, 2nd Contact Rescue 74, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 110.
- NG Troop Buildup – 26,168

12 Sep 05

- TF EAGLE 97.0 Flight Hours, 388 Sorties Flown, Class 1 1 Ton, Cargo 25 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 27, 2nd Contact Rescue 60, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 87.
- NG Troop Buildup – 26,201

13 Sep 05

- TF EAGLE 62.0 Flight Hours, 248 Sorties Flown, Class 1 1 Tons, Cargo 19 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 23, 2nd Contact Rescue 45, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 68.
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 09 (Katrina) released LANG assets from TF Santa Fe control
- NG Troop Buildup – 26,268

14 Sep 05

- TF EAGLE 59.0 Flight Hours, 236 Sorties Flown, Class 1 0 Tons, Cargo 65 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 17, 2nd Contact Rescue 35, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 52.
- NG Troop Buildup – 26,320

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

15 Sep 05
- TF EAGLE 62.0 Flight Hours, 248 Sorties Flown, Class 1 0 Tons, Cargo 0 Tons, 1st Contact Rescue 16, 2nd Contact Rescue 36, 1st and 2nd Contact Total 52.
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 10 (Katrina) released additional LANG assets from TF Santa Fe control
- NG Troop Buildup – 26620

17 Sep 05
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 11 (Katrina) established redeployment requirements for non-LANG units

19 Sep 05
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 12 (Katrina) established redeployment requirements for non-LANG units
- JTF Pelican published MOD 01 to FRAGO 12 (Katrina) established redeployment requirements for non-LANG units

20 Sep 05
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 13 (Katrina) directed pre-positioning of equipment and personnel for Hurricane Rita
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 14 (Katrina) directed pre-staging equipment and personnel

22 Sep 05
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 15 (Katrina) established TF Rita
- This is a personal account of a LANG member, MAJ Dancer: "As we began to prepare for another major hurricane I looked back on the number of missions that the National Guard had conducted to date. Based on my expertise as the LANG JOC Operations Officer for the past five years, a "typical" hurricane response by the National Guard might entail anywhere from 200 to 300 missions. During this response the National Guard had been tasked with over 1,000 missions from the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. This number does not include the thousands of missions conducted by Guardsmen working directly for local government that were not tracked at the JTF level. The magnitude of this storm had tested the National Guard and demonstrated that we were able to respond in an effective and timely manner. This was a testament to the strength and flexibility of the soldiers, airmen, and leadership of the National Guard."
- Members of 256th Infantry Brigade return from Iraq and begin to integrate into the Joint Operations Center

23 Sep 05
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 16 (Katrina) repositioned JTF Pelican assets

24 Sep 05
- Hurricane Rita makes landfall in Southwest Louisiana
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 17 (Katrina) directed reconnaissance of Hurricane Rita affected areas

25 Sep 05
- BG Basilica assumes command of JTF Pelican from BG Jones
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 18 (Katrina) directed SAR in support of Rita
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 19 (Katrina) established TF Claims Officers)

26 Sep 05
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 20 (Katrina) directed re-alignment of commo assets (ASOS)

LANG Timeline of Significant Events Hurricane Katrina

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 21 (Katrina) integrated Air Force recon teams into damage assessment efforts
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 22 (Katrina) established command relationships

27 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 23 (Katrina) directed logistical support to hurricane affected area

28 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 24 (Katrina) contaminated water advisory alert
- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 25 (Katrina) directed re-alignment of JTF Pelican into four geographic regions

29 Sep 05

- JTF Pelican published FRAGO 26 (Katrina) established new reporting format

LANDRENEAU
EXHIBIT 1

RE: HIGH-WATER VEHICLES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
LOUISIANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
769TH ENGINEER BATTALION (C)(H)
8686 GENERAL CHENNAULT DRIVE
BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA 70807

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

LANG-END-Z (385) 07 February 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Joint Force Headquarters Louisiana, Attn: LANG-JCS, 304 F Street Camp Beauregard Pineville, LA 71360

SUBJECT: High-water vehicle dispatch 28 August 2005.

1. The following paragraphs detail, to the best of my recollection, the dispatching of High-Water Vehicles (HWV) from Jackson Barracks, New Orleans on 28 August 2005.

2. The 769th EN BN provided 120 soldiers and 20 high water vehicles to the New Orleans Police Department IAW prescribed LANG Emergency Operations Procedures.

3. The vehicles (LMTV/M35A3) and personnel arrived at Jackson Barracks on or about 1000 hours on 28 Aug 05 and were further missioned (OPCON) to NOPD from Jackson Barracks at the request of NOPD; with approval of the EOC direct coordination was made by NOPD representatives at Jackson Barracks.

4. Deputy Chief Lawless of NOPD requested that the trucks be dispatched from a central location at Jackson Barracks with his NOPD representative Lieutenant Fredrick Morton, the NOPD representative at Jackson Barracks, coordinating the dispatch/allocation of vehicles to the NOPD police districts with the assistance of Captain Curole of the NOPD.

5. The disbursement of high-water vehicles to the police districts was based on NOPD's (Lieutenant Morton/CPT Curole's) on-ground resourcing to the districts as the separate district representatives arrived at Jackson Barracks.

6. The NOPD made the following allocations of the 20 vehicles to the Police Districts:

a. Police Dist 1 - 3 ea HWV
b. Police Dist 2 - 3 ea HWV
c. Police Dist 3 - 3 ea HWV
d. Police Dist 4 - 3 ea HWV
e. Police Dist 5 - 3 ea HWV
f. Police Dist 6 - 2 ea HWV
g. Police Dist 7 - 3 ea HWV

7. POC is the undersigned at (337) 239-0420 or damian.waddell@us.army.mil

DAMIAN K. WADDELL
MAJ, EN, LAARNG
Commanding

769 EN BN Command and Control Element

Jackson Barracks Building 35

	LAST	FIRST	RANK		UNIT	BLDG 35
1	ERICKSON	ERIK	CPT		769 CDC	BLDG 35
2	LYNCH	CHAD	1SG		769 NCOIC	BLDG 35
3	DORSA	ANTHONY	2LT		C 769	BLDG 35
4	NEWTON	DAVID	1SG		HSC 769	BLDG 35
5	KELLY	ANTHONY	2LT		A 769	BLDG 35
6	LANOUX	WILLIAM	SPC	HMMV DRIVER	C 769	BLDG 35
7	FARRELL	MATTHEW	SGT	CO C SUPPLY	C 769	BLDG 35
8	WILLIAMS	JOE	MSG	MECHANIC	769	BLDG 35
9	HELOUX	ROGER	SGT	C 769 Contact Truck	C 769	BLDG 35
10	ESKIND	BARTON	SGT	C 769 MECHANIC	C 769	BLDG 35
11	BRIDGES	ROBERT	SSG	HSC MECHANIC	HSC 769	BLDG 35
12	WELLBORN	TIMOTHY	1LT	S-3	S-3	BLDG 35
13	DYKES	DAVID	SFC	S-3	S-3	BLDG 35
14	YOUNG	DALLAS	SGT	S-3	S-3	BLDG 35
15	KING	JENIFER	1LT	HSC 769 XO	HSC 769 XO	BLDG 35
16	WALKEN		SGT	Medic	HSC 769	BLDG 35
17	HIDALGO	MOK		HSC comact truck	HSC	BLDG 35
18	MORRIS	BEN	SSG	MECHANIC	HSC	BLDG 35
19	FENNELL	JOSH		Cook	HSC	BLDG 35
20	KELLY	KEVIN	SSG	COOK	HSC	BLDG 35
21	HOLMES	ROBERT	SPC	HSC ARMORER	HSC	BLDG 35
22	MORALES	CHRIS	SPC	HSC CONTACT TRUC	HSC	BLDG 35
23	KNIGHT	ED	SPC	COOK	HSC	BLDG 35
					TOTAL TROOPS AT BLDG 35	23
					769 TOTAL	423

New Orleans Police Department District Telephone Numbers

District No:

1	504 [illegible]
2	504 [illegible]
3	504 [illegible]
4	504 304-4000
5	504 [illegible]
6	504 [illegible]
7	504 244-4500
8	504 [illegible]

NOPD POC for High Water Teams:
CPT Don Dyrda 504-416-1917

O.E.P. TOC - 504-[illegible]
O.E.P. NOPD Officer - 504-[illegible]

Vehicles at Bldg 35

C-43	Ryder	
IBR	NISSAN	HIGH WATER
HSC30	UMTV	MESS VEHICLE
C7	HMMV	1SG LYNCH
HSC25	CONTACT	
C36	CONTACT	
HSC17	PICKUP W/COVER	
HSC24A	MEDEVAC	
HSC23	HMMV	MSG WILLIAMS
HSC7	HMMV	1SG NEWTON
HSC 124	WATER BUFFALO	
3KW GENERATOR		1 EACH
CHAIN SAW		3 EACH
120 MIO		
5040 RDUNDS		

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Gonzales, LA. 70737	20060208	1700	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
Lynch, Chad Michael	433-61-0304	E-9 / CSM

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, ~~Chad M. Lynch~~, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The following details describe to the best of my recollection, the dispatching of High water vehicles from Jackson Barracks the night before Hurricane Katrina hit. While at Jackson Barracks on the night before the storm, I was ordered to meet an NOPD Officer in the Parking lot at the entrance to Jackson Barracks. The mission was to dispatch as many High water vehicles as possible with NOPD officers. I was told that the soldiers would be split up amongst various N.O. Police districts to ride out the storm and perform high water rescue missions after the storm.

I met an NOPD officer there at the prescribed time. Our vehicles were lined up and ready to go. The NOPD Officer told me how many vehicles to send to each district, one district at a time. The NOPD Officer pointed out the NOPD vehicle and officer that the soldiers would follow and told me the District number. I told my soldiers where they were going, introduced them to their NOPD guide and they then followed the guide to their destinations.

I have attached scanned documents used during the above Pre-katrina dispatch operations. Pages 1 through 4 were the documents I held in hand while the vehicles were dispatched to police districts...before the storm. The hand written circled number to the right side is the District that the NOPD officer told me to send each truck to. The check mark next to each soldiers name indicates that I personally saw the soldier on the vehicle just before the truck pulled out. I did this to ensure accountability before the storm.

I recall writing my NOPD contact person's name on the documents I had in hand. There are a few names hand written on the attached documents. I believe that one of them was the NOPD officer that was on the site with me. In looking at the documents today (8 Feb. 2006), I suspect that possibly Daniel Lawless (see lower left corner of page 1) was the officer on site. Page 3 is the notes I took on the back of sheet 2 just after dispatching the trucks. I had asked the officer on the ground for contact numbers at each district so that I could check on my soldiers....and these are the numbers he gave me.

Documents 5,6 and 7 are the typed revisions I made just after the last trucks left the parking lot. I did this to update the troop dispositions. This accountability document was handed out to other key leaders involved with the mission.
Nothing Follows

Chad M. Lynch
CSM, LAARNG
769 EN BN

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	CML	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF Chad M. Lynch TAKEN AT Gonzales, LA DATED 8 Feb. 2006

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing Follows

END OF Statement

AFFIDAVIT

I, Chad M. Lynch, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Chad M Lynch
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Chad J. Anderson
MSGT, LANG
HQ 76th EASB FSL
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 8th day of Feb 2006 at Gonzales LA

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

JASON P. MATHEWS
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

CPT, EN
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT CML

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998


Porsa
1 - 7th
2 - 3rd
2 - 8th
769 EN BN
HIGH Water Vehicles
C-10
WILSON KEVIN SFC
OBELL TODD SPC
MIRCS CHARLES SPC
NORWOOD JONNATHAN PFC
RABY KRIG PFC
C16-A DRIVER C 769
C19 CLS-BAG C 769
C 769
C 769
Driver
C-12
NOLEN JARED SFC
PERSON CASEY SSG
GAUTREAU MATTHEW SGT
JOHNSON AHMAD SPC
LOPEZVITO EMMANUELLE SPC
Driver
C12 DRIVER C 769
C12-A DRIVER C 769
C 769
C 769
CLS-BAG C 769
Ready
C-16
MARTIN DAVID SFC
SPAND ROLAND SSG
DARREAU JOHN CPL
JOHNSON AARON SPC
SIBLEY DARYL SGT
Driver
C16-A DRIVER C 769
C16 C 769
C16 CLS C 769
C16 CLS-BAG C 769
C 769
C11 M35A3
BOYETTE JOHNNY SPC
CALDWELL JAMES SSG
WOHLFARTH MICHAEL PVT
HALL JEREMIAH CPL
GAUTREAU DUSTIN SGT
C 769
C 769
C 769
C 769
C 769
C17
PORTERA BRANDON SPC
BURKS DARRELL SSG
CREDIT DARIUS SGT
VICKNAIR DANIEL PV2
TRACK DONOVAN SGT
LEBLANC LEOPOLD SGT
C17 DRIVER C 769
C 769
C 769
C 769
C 769
C 769
Murray
DUNN JOSEPH PFC
PERCY MEGAN SGT
BOURGEOIS CARY PFC
CROCHET CHANCE PFC
Driver
MECHANIC C 769
MECHANIC C 769
C 769
C 769
on 8
C13
Wagespack
ADAIR CHARLES SPC
BROWN CHARLES SGT
NGUYEN ANTHONY SGT
ADAMS DAVID SGT
Driver
HSC
C 769
C 769
C 769
C 769
HSC-36
GEORGE SGT
ROBINSON
Roy, Robert Sgt
HSC-36 DRIVER HSC
HSC
HSC
Add
Longmire T
Longmire A
(Kelley Mobs Ops)
TETZEL SSG
FONTENOT SGT
GLOVER SGT
GREEN SPC
GIBSON SGT
LANDRY PFC
HSC-32 A DRIVER HSC
HSC
HSC
HSC
HSC
HSC
HSC 32
Wagespack - Fuel
Fennell Fuel
HSC-31
Sanquer CPL
TOLLIVER SPC
DOMINIQUE PV2
BARLOW PFC
Gomez, Julio SSG
HSC
HSC
HSC
HSC
HSC
Hidalgo - Contact
Morales - Contact
Daniel Lawless
504-416-0328
B57


Kelly
11
B51
Davis, Brad
WILLIAMS
SGT
Deavell
12
HSC33
Fuller
Kirby, Robert
Clark, Larry
Prestige, William
Edmond, Jessica
13
403
Supplies on this truck
Driver
Stelb, Joseph
Prince, Jeremy
SSG
CUTRER
SPC
JOHNSON
SGT
14
HSC42
on 9
SIEFFORD
WALKER
Gilmore
Robinson
COLLINS
SGT
15
H12
Sava, David
Tarleton, William
Sheelon
CUMMINGS
16
A58
Knight, Edward
SFC
Driver
Hazard, Erica
SGT
STROUD, Howard
SGT
JAMES, Christopher
SGT
CAS
PVT
17
A30
Irwin, Demington
Driver
Kelly, Anthony
Wynn, Kenneth
Shaffer
Hines, Donald
18
HSC34
Martin, Josh
SGT
Driver
Doss, Gregory
Williams, Tatiana
SGT
Bourgeois, Byron
Campbell, B.
19
B35
Ducote, Steven
Phillips, Dwight
Carmouch, Jeff
Pontheux, Chance
Gauthier, Daniel
Borel, Michael
20
B25
Fastback,
Core, Shane
Sayer, Cara
Hunt, Terrance
Maddix, Jamie
Juneau, David
HSC
A 769
B 769
B 709
B 789
B 788

1. 504 658-6010

2 658-6020

3 658-6030

4 ~~658-6040~~ 504-364-4000

5 6050

6 6060

7 ~~6070~~ 504-244-4600

8 ~~6080~~ 504 565-7530

Don
CPT Curole 504-416-1917

OEP - 658-8700 TOC

OEP - 658-8716 - NOPD Officer

LAST	FIRST	RANK	PHONE	BUMPER #	REMARKS
DORSA	ANTHONY	1LT		C7-A DRIVER	
LYNCH	CHAD	1SG		C7-A DRIVER	
LANOUX	WILLIAM	SPC		C7 DRIVER	
FARRELL	MATTHEW	SGT		SUPPLY	
Stirk, Clyde				Supply	
Williams, Joe				Maintenance	
MILOUX	ROGER	SGT		Mechanic	C3H DRIVER
ESKIND	BARTON	SGT		Mechanic	C36-A DRIVER
Morris				Mechanic	
[redacted] Robert		SSG		Mechanic	
WELLBORN	TIMOTHY	1LT		S-3	
DYKES	DAVID	SFC		S-3	
YOUNG	ALLEN	SGT		S-3	
King, Jennifer				HSC 769 XO	
Walker		SGT		Medic	
Newton, David				First Sergeant	

769 EN BN
HIGH Water Vehicles

Line No. of 20	Vehicle No.	Name		Rank	Notes:	Unit	LOCATED AT NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT NO:	TROOPS
1	C-09						1	
	LMTV	WILSON	KEVIN	SPC		C 769	1	
		LOBELL	TODD	SPC	CLS-BAG	C 769	1	
		MIRES	CHARLES	SPC	DRIVER	C 769	1	
		NORWOOD	JOHNATHAN	PFC		C 769	1	
		RABY	AIRIC	PFC		C 769	1	
								6
2	C-12						1	
	LMTV	NOLEN	JARED	SPC	DRIVER	C 769	1	
		PENSON	CASEY	SSG		C 769	1	
		GAUTREAU	MATTHEW	SGT		C 769	1	
		JOHNSON	AHMAD	SPC		C 769	1	
		LOPEZVITO	EMMANUELLE	SPC	CLS-BAG	C 769	1	
								5
3	C-10						1	
	LMTV	MARTIN	DAVID	SPC		C 769	1	
		SPANO	ROLAND	SSG	DRIVER	C 769	1	
		JARREAU	JOHN	CPL	CLS	C 769	1	
		JOHNSON	AARON	SPC	CLS-BAG	C 769	1	
		SIBLEY	DARYL	SGT		C 769	1	
								5
4	C11						2	
	M36A3	BOYETTE	JOHNNY	SPC	DRIVER	C 769	2	
		CALDWELL	JAMES	SSG		C 769	2	
		WOHLFARTH	MICHAEL	PVT		C 769	2	
		HALL	JEREMIAH	CPL		C 769	2	
		GAUTREAU	DUSTIN	SGT		C 769	2	
								5
5	C-17						2	
		PORTERA	BRANDON	SPC	DRIVER	C 769	2	
		BURKS	DARRELL	SSG		C 769	2	
		CREGIT	DARIUS	SGT		C 769	2	
		VICKNAIR	DANIEL	PV2		C 769	2	
		BRACK	DONOVAN	SGT		C 769	2	
		LEBLANC	LEOPOLD	SGT		C 769	2	
								6
6	HSC29						2	
		MURRAY		SGT		C 769	2	
		DUNN	JOSEPH	PFC	DRIVER	C 769	2	
		PERCY	MEGAN	SGT		C 769	2	
		BOURGEOIS	CARY	PFC		C 769	2	
		CROCHET	CHANCE	PFC		C 769	2	
								5
7	C13						3	
		WAGLESPACK			DRIVER	HSC	3	
		ADAIR	CHARLES	SPC		C 769	3	
		BROWN	CHARLES	SGT		C 769	3	
		NGUYEN	ANTHONY	SGT		C 769	3	
		ADAMS	DAVID	SGT		C 769	3	
								5
8	HSC-36						4	
		LONGMIRE	T			HSC	4	
		LONGMIRE	A			HSC	4	
		GEORGE		SGT		HSC	4	
		ROBINSON			DRIVER	HSC	4	
		FIFE, TYLER				HSC	4	
		ROY, ROBERT		SGT		HSC	4	
								6
9	HSC 32						5	
		TETZEL		SSG	DRIVER	HSC	5	
		FONTENOT		SGT		HSC	5	
		GLOVER		SGT		HSC	5	
		GREEN		SPC		HSC	5	
		GIBSON	PATRICK	SGT		HSC	5	
		LANDRY		PFC		HSC	5	
								0
10	HSC 31						4	
		Banquet		CPL	DRIVER	HSC	4	
		TOLLIVER		SPC		HSC	4	
		DOMINQUE		PV2		HSC	4	
		BARLOW		PFC		HSC	4	
		Gomez, Jake		SSG		HSC	4	
								5

Hilton

11	B61						7	
		DAVIS	BRAD		DRIVER	HSC	7	
		WILLIAMS		SGT		HSC	7	
		OLIVILL	DAVID			HSC	7	
								3
12	HSC33						7	
		Kirby, Robert			DRIVER	HSC	7	
		Clark, Larry				HSC	7	
		Prestige, William				HSC	7	
		Edmond, Jessica				HSC	7	
								4
13	HSC30						4	
		Forehand, Richard			DRIVER	HSC	4	
		Sledz, Joseph				HSC	4	
		Prince, Jeremy		SSG		HSC	4	
		CUTRER		SFC		HSC	4	
		JOHNSON		SGT		HSC	4	
								5
14	HSC42						7	
		GILMORE				HSC	7	
		MEFFORD			DRIVER	HSC	7	
		WALKER				HSC	7	
		COLLINS		SGT		HSC	7	
		ROBINSON				HSC	7	
								6
15	H12						5	
		Sykes, David				HSC	5	
		Tarleton, William				HSC	5	
		Thrasher			DRIVER	HSC	5	
		CUMMINGS				HSC	5	
								4
16	A58						5	
		Knight, Edward		SFC	DRIVER	HSC	5	
		Hubbard, Erick		SGT		HSC	6	
		STROUD, Howard		SGT		HSC	6	
		JAMES, Christopher		SGT		HSC	5	
		SHARP, CAS		PVT		HSC	6	
								5
17	A36						6	
		Ivey, Darrington			DRIVER	A 709	6	
		Wynn, Kenneth				A 709	6	
		Shaffer, Jason				A 709	6	
		Hines, Donald				A 709	6	
								4
18	HSC34						6	
		Martin, Josh		SGT	DRIVER	HSC	6	
		Davis, Gregory				A 709	6	
		Williams, Tyrone		SGT		A 709	6	
		Thompson, Byron				A 709	6	
		Carmichael, Brian				A 709	6	
								5
19	B35						3	
		Ducote, Steven			DRIVER	B 709	3	
		Phillips, Dwight				B 709	3	
		Carmouche, Jeff				B 709	3	
		Pontreau, Clarence				B 709	3	
		Gauthier, Daniel				B 709	3	
		Borel, Michael				B 709	3	
								6
20	B25						3	
		Fezback,			DRIVER	B 709	3	
		Gore, Shane				B 709	3	
		Seyer, Cara				B 709	3	
		Hurt, Terrance				B 709	3	
		Maddie, Jamie				B 709	3	
		Lirette, David				B 709	3	
								6
						TOTAL TROOPS OUT		100

Feb 08 2006 5:52PM LA NATIONAL GUARD

LANDRENEAU
EXHIBIT 2

RE: HIGH-WATER
VEHICLES

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE
JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS-LOUISIANA
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
CAMP BEAUREGARD
PINEVILLE, LA 71360

LANG-RRC

08 February 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Request for "High Water" Trucks

1. The following paragraphs provide my best recount of the request to provide "high water" trucks to the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. When I reported to the New Orleans Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at approximately 0800 on 28 August 2005, one of the first taskings I received was a request for vehicle support to the New Orleans Police Department. I believe this request had already been "working", but I immediately became involved per MG Landreneau's directive to "Get down to City Hall's EOC and work with the LNO team already in place. Cut through the bureaucracy and get New Orleans anything they need to support them during this hurricane".

2. I linked up with the NOPD representative to the EOC, Chief Danny Lawless. He asked for 24 trucks (3 per police district) to be assigned to the NOPD. I coordinated with the LAARNG EOC and spoke with COL(R) Pat Santos to get the trucks to the NOPD.

3. In coordinating the plan for link up, it was agreed to have the trucks ready to roll from Jackson Barracks at approximately 1000. I asked Chief Lawless if he could have one representative from each district report to Jackson Barracks. I explained that many of the soldiers were not familiar with the New Orleans area and it would be easier if they (NOPD) could have an officer come and escort their assigned trucks back to their police district. Chief Lawless said this was a good plan and he would coordinate getting the police officers to Jackson Barracks.

4. The trucks and soldiers would be directly assigned to the NOPD. I explained to Chief Lawless that this meant they (NOPD) would have direct control of the trucks and soldiers and that these soldiers would support them in any way they (NOPD) needed. This included providing transportation for NOPD officers, conducting Search and Rescue missions, support missions, etc. Whatever NOPD needed these soldiers and vehicles to do, they would do it. I further explained the soldiers would need designated places to sleep and although they would be bringing some rations (food) and water with them, NOPD would be required to provide food and water for the LAARNG soldiers if this turned out to be a protracted mission. I also told him they could assign the trucks anyway they needed based upon where they felt the greatest need would be. Chief Lawless agreed to this and was very appreciative of our support.

5. COL(R) Santos called me and reported the trucks were ready for pick up, but we only had 22 available due to maintenance problems with two of the trucks. To the best of my recollection, this was around 0900 or 0930. I don't remember which district(s) we reduced the number of

trucks from, but I did work this with Chief Lawless who agreed to the change in vehicle number assignments.

6. I didn't track the pick up/arrival of each set of trucks, but did confirm with Chief Lawless that the vehicles and soldiers were picked up by NOPD officers. There may have been some changes to the assignment of trucks per district, but I confirmed with Chief Lawless they had "possession" of our trucks. I did ask Chief Lawless if he needed any additional trucks or personnel at that particular time and he said no.

7. This vehicle assignment is similar to what we had done in past hurricanes and had worked well (Hurricane Andrew).

8. Questions or comments can be addressed to me at (318) 641-5403.

JONATHAN T. BALL
COL, FA, LAARNG
Commanding

Feb 08 2006 10:03PM LA NATIONAL GUARD

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BATON ROUGE, LA	20060208	1800	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	7. GRADE/STATUS
THREETON, ROBERT JOHN	E-6/ARNG

6. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HSC 769TH ENGR BN, BATON ROUGE, LA

9.
I, ROBERT JOHN THREETON, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 26 AUG 05, at approximately 2000, I received a phone call from my Company Commander, CPT Dirk D. Erickson stating that I needed to be at my unit, HSC 769th Engineer Battalion at 0630 on 27 AUG 05 to activate the Alert Roster in preparation of Hurricane Katrina. On 27 AUG 05 at 0630, I arrived at HSC 769th Engineer Battalion, and started calling our Platoon Sergeants. I then began preparing our vehicles in order to haul our assets to Jackson Barracks, New Orleans, Louisiana. At approximately 1500, we pushed out our first wave of vehicles to Jackson Barracks. I was in the last convoy that left at 1600. These troops in these waves of vehicles were designated as the High Water Team.

We staged at Jackson Barracks Bldg. 35 in the drill hall to receive further orders. By the time we went to sleep for the night, our entire High Water Team was in place as per the OPORD. All equipment and personnel were accounted for at this time. On 28 AUG 05 at approximately 1700 we proceeded to link up with the NOPD at the front gate of Area B at Jackson Barracks. SFC David Silva, SPC William Tarleton, and SPC LeQuincy Cummings were loaded into a 2 1/2 ton truck, bumper number H12, and then followed an unmarked police vehicle to the 5th district police station near Bywater Hospital. We made a few rounds around the 9th ward of New Orleans until 2300 that night. At that point, we were relocated to the Hilton Hotel at the Riverfront to spend the night and ride out the storm because that was the highest point of New Orleans, and proved to be the best area to stage the high water equipment.

We spent the night on the third floor ballroom area, and at 0330 on 29 AUG 05, we were woke up by the sounds of alarms from the Hotel staff for all occupants to leave their rooms, and relocate on the third floor. We immediately began evacuating rooms on the 26th floor of the hotel due to fact that power was out, and the elevators were inoperable. Our teams decided to provide additional security to the hotel to keep everyone in a safe area.

----------Continued on Page 2----------

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	RJT	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

Feb 08 2006 10:03PM LA NATIONAL GUARD

STATEMENT OF ROBERT JOHN THREETON TAKEN AT BATON ROUGE, LA DATED 2006 0208

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Our team couldn't leave the hotel until the storm winds were below 50 MPH, the winds subsided to the designated safe speed at approximately 1500. At that point, my team, and our vehicles proceeded to the St. Claude bridge in the 9th ward on New Orleans with SGT Frick of the NOPD as our designated officer escort. We were able to rescue over 500 stranded evacuees from flooding waters on that day alone. My team stayed until all of the boats were out of the water, and took the last load of evacuees to the Superdome at 0630 on 30 AUG 05. In the afternoon of 30 AUG 05, my team were dispatched to assist District 7 in New Orleans East where we continued high water missions until 08 NOV 05 in that area.

----------End of statement. Nothing follows.----------

RJT

RJT RJT RJT RJT

AFFIDAVIT

I, . HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 8TH day of FEBRUARY 2006 at BATON ROUGE, LA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT RJT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V01.01

Feb 09 2006 8:20AM LA NATIONAL GUARD

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
199TH LDR REG 1ST NCOA BN	20060208		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	7. GRADE/STATUS
SILVA, DAVID S.	E-7 / SFC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

NSC 769TH ENGR BN 8986 GENCHENNAULT DR BATON ROUGE LA 70807

9.

I, DAVID S. SILVA, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

THE DAY BEFORE THE HURRICANE (MORNING) I DROVE DOWN TO NO. WITH TWO OTHER TRUCKS ONE THAT SFC KNIGHT WAS DRIVING and the other SGT Haulland was driving, All three 2½ Ton Cargo Trucks. I know that Charlie Co sent some, Alfa Co. sent some, and Braud Co. There was a total of About 15 2½ mixed with the New 2½ ton LMTV Cargo Troop carriers. We all met up with each other at Jackson Barracks. Here we all recieved an A driver and 3 other Troops to assist. The drivers I remember were SSG WYNN, SSG TETZEL, SSG Carmouche, SSG Gomez, Spc TARRITON, SFC KNIGHT, SGT Haullard, SPC Donald, Spc McCabe, and SGT IRWIN. There was 62 men and women soldiers All together for Any Mission That came up. We were then split up To go with different Districts in N.O.. SFC KNIGHT, SGT Haulland, SSG THREATON, AND MYSELF," 4 2½ TON Cargo Troop carriers went with (CID) NOPD to the 5th District. Here About 16 of us waited. We then moved to the Hilton Hotel where we met up with All but 3 Trucks that were Left in the 1st District We rode the Hurricane (KATRINA) out in the Convention side of the Hotel Till Morning, About 1100-1200 we were trying to get out but the winds were still to strong, About 70-80mph sustained, About 1230 we finally got out when the winds permitted us to get going. The winds were sustained 50 mph I was told by chain of command that it was safe To go out for the safety of the Troops. 4 Trucks Loaded up Zodiac boats with NOPD and Fire Fighters to go Help the

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	DSS	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.01D

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SILVA TAKEN AT DATED 20060208

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

People who were stranded. our three trucks headed directly to st Claude st down to the steel Bridge where there were two boats picking people up out of the flooded Areas. We Brought people to the superdome from there as well as picking people up from Bywater Hospital. We worked until 0200 in the morning on the first day got back to the hotel and at 0700 wich was daylight we started picking people up until 2200 the next night. for the next 7-8 days we proceeded to Rescue people from all over N.O. Lt Eric Morton of (CID) NOPD was incharge of the officers that were ridding with us. the NOPD officer that Rode with me was Sgt Frick and also we had other various officers that Rode with us. We Worked Hard and Brought People to the convention Center and I-10-Causeway for Evacuation on About the 7th day our group ended up moving to the Arenid Center where we met up with the Complete 225 Group All the Battalions. After the people were finally Evacuated we started to clean the streets of Debri all over the city. (Up Town, 9th ward, 3rd dist, East side, Downtown, and then started Security missions,

NO MORE Comment

AFFIDAVIT

I, , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SFC

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this day of ,

at

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT DSS

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 USAPA V1.01D

Sworn Statement

I, Edward M. Knight, want to make the following statement under oath: I arrived in New Orleans at Jackson Barracks on 28 August 2005 at approximately 1200hrs. I was put in charge of a vehicle and a team of four soldiers. My team was tasked with directly supporting New Orleans Police Department's 5th District (NOPD). Approximately 1500 hrs 28 August 2005 a representative of the 5th District came to Jackson Barracks and escorted my team and another team to the District Office located at 3900 N. Claiborne Ave. in the 9th Ward. After a few hours at the District Office NOPD relocated us to the Hilton on Poydras St. to ride the storm out. When we arrived at the Hilton there were other teams already there from all four company's of the 769th Eng. Bn. The morning of the storm, 29 August, we waited for the wind speeds to subside and once it was safe for operations each vehicle was assigned two NOPD officers. At the direction of my assigned NOPD officer my vehicle moved out to the St. Claude Bridge at the Intercoastal Waterway and started assisting the offloading of survivors to the Superdome and the evacuation of vent patients on respirators at Bywater Hospital on St. Claude Ave. The number of people assitsted on the bridge is estimated to be 450 and Bywater Hospital had 25 patients. The next day we continued to support the bridge and began moving people from a school where people were gathering. All missions were directed by and coordinated through NOPD officers and there Captains. After the first two days we began moving survivors from locations in other Districts as well. The first two days we stayed with the NOPD at the Hilton, one night at the BoubleTree Hotel, one night in our truck somewhere in the West bank, then the next four nights at the Naval Support Activity Center until we were retasked back to our respective units. Each day NOPD officers would coordinated with there chain of command and one or two would get in each truck to carry out the missions of the day. The number of officers that showed up changed daily but, NOPD Lt Eric Morton (504) 915-9578 was the senior point of contact for our group, Sgt Frick and Sgt Gay were also consistently with our group of teams.

To: Pete Schneider
Fax 703/920-5947

February 8, 2006

To: Col. Glenn Curtis

From: SSG Jeffrey Carmouche
B. Co. 769th Engr. Bn.
Marksville, LA

I, SSG Jeffrey Carmouche, make the following statement:

I, along with 8 (eight) other soldiers from B. Co. 769th Engr. Bn., was deployed to Hurricane Katrina Operations in New Orleans. We arrived at Jackson Barracks on the 27th of August and moved to the Hilton on Canal St. on the 28th of August 2005. We stayed in the Hilton on Canal St. during the storm and were assigned to NOPD Swat for the first week after the storm.

The two (2) NOPD Officers that we assisted with our high water vehicles were LT. Eric Martin and SGT Gray. We conducted high water rescue operations in the 9th Ward as well as downtown.

SSG Jeffrey Carmouche

HOLD FOR PICK UP
AT THE FRONT DESK!

February 9, 2006
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Senator Susan Collins
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #1

Question: Please describe what efforts the Department of Defense made before the landfall of Hurricane Katrina to identify assets that might be needed as part of the response, alert assets that might be needed for the response, and pre-position assets (personnel and material) for possible use in the response.

Answer: DoD undertook several actions to enhance its posture prior to Hurricane Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005:

- On August 19, 2005, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) issued an execute order for DoD support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which delegated authority to Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), to use military installations and to deploy Defense Coordinating Officers/Defense Coordinating Elements (DCOs/DCEs) to coordinate directly with FEMA as severe weather approached.

- On August 23, 2005, I directed a review of DoD assets that were required for the hurricane response in Florida in 2004 and Hurricane Dennis in 2005 to determine their availability, including, specifically, meals ready-to-eat (MREs), installations used as FEMA Mobilization Centers, communication packages, and health/medical care resources and mobile hospitals. In addition, personnel from my office, who are permanently assigned in the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Operations Center, were alerted to prepare for hurricane landfall and DoD-DHS relief effort coordination.

- On August 24, 2005:
    - USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and FEMA conducted their first teleconference, during which conferees discussed DoD support to Federal authorities, including staging at military installations and military assistance availability;

    - Commander, USNORTHCOM, issued a warning order (WARNORD) to DoD units to prepare to support requests for DoD assistance;

    - Commander, USNORTHCOM, directed DCOs to deploy to Alabama and Florida. The DCO for Alabama deployed that same day, while the DCO for Florida deployed the next day, August 25, 2005;

- Commander, 1st Army, issued a WARNORD for Tropical Storm Katrina and approved an Action Plan with decision points to prepare for Tropical Storm Katrina;

- The 1st Army Liaison Officer arrived on-site at the FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Atlanta, Georgia;

- Commander, 1st Army, alerted the DCOs/DCEs, Senior Army Advisors to the Adjutant General (SRAAGs), and State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs), for Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi;

- The Defense Logistics Agency began its assessment of anticipated disaster relief support. Items assessed included MREs, fuel, cots, tents, reverse osmosis water purification unit spares and chemicals, medical materiel, and mosquito netting and repellent; and

- The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service identified and secured assets used to support disaster relief.

- On August 25, 2005:
  - DoD augmented the DoD Liaison Officer at FEMA with three Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs);

  - Commander, USNORTHCOM, issued a planning order (PLANORD) to deploy a Regional EPLO, a DCO, and a SEPLO to Florida;

  - Commander, 1st Army, issued a PLANORD deploying a Florida DCO/DCE and Regional EPLO Team IV, and issuing a Be-Prepared-To (BPT) deploy mission to Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi DCO/DCEs, SRAAGs, and EPLOs;

  - The Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (REPLO) from REPLO Team IV in Atlanta, Georgia, provided coordination and support at FEMA Region IV per a request from FEMA for a DoD representative at the RRCC; and

  - The 1st Army pre-designated DCO arrived on-site at the Long-Term Recovery Center in Orlando, Florida.

- On August 26, 2005:
  - The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) activated the Memphis District Emergency Operations Center;

  - Commander, USNORTHCOM, activated the DCO for Georgia; and

- The 347th Rescue Wing at Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia, unilaterally placed three HH-60s and one HC-130 aircraft on alert for possible tasking.

- On August 27, 2005:
  - My Principal Deputy and Joint Staff representatives participated in a noon teleconference with FEMA;
  - Commander, USNORTHCOM, directed DCOs to deploy to Louisiana and Mississippi. The DCOs deployed that same day – the DCO for Mississippi arrived that same day;
  - NGB, as a proactive measure, coordinated Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) modifications for Texas, Oklahoma, and Florida; and
  - Colonel Cochrane, the Mississippi SRAAG, submitted a request to use Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, for relief operations.

- On August 28, 2005:
  - Activated, within my office, a Hurricane Operations Cell for 24/7 operations in advance of and during the storm's landfall and aftermath;
  - Commander, 1st Army, directed the First Army Operations Center to go to Category Red, with full staffing for 24-hours-a-day/7-days-a-week operations;
  - Commander, USNORTHCOM, deployed an advance joint task force - forward to Camp Shelby, Mississippi; deployed DCOs to Louisiana and Mississippi; and designated Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, Homestead AFB, Florida, and Duke Field, Florida, as FEMA operational staging areas; and
  - The Joint Staff requested U.S. Joint Forces Command to report the availability of the Command's rotary wing aircraft to transport FEMA/State/Local government personnel for damage assessments;
  - Commander, USTRANSCOM, placed aircraft (three C-5s, two C-17s, and two C-130s), crews, and Contingency Response Wings on alert;
  - Commander, Forces Command, authorized direct liaison between the 1st Army and the 93rd Signal Brigade. The 93rd Signal Brigade, which provides the deployable communications package for the 1st Army Headquarters deploying forward, prepared for possible deployment;
  - The Alabama DCO submitted a request from FEMA to the Region IV RRCC for use of Maxwell AFB, Alabama, as a FEMA operational staging base effective August 29, 2005;

- USS BATAAN departed Naval Station Ingleside, Texas, and headed towards New Orleans, Louisiana, with verbal orders to prepare to render assistance as required. Two Navy H-60s and three MH-53 aircraft on USS BATAAN in the Gulf of Mexico were prepared to conduct search and rescue operations;

- USNS COMFORT hospital ship began preparations to deploy from Baltimore, Maryland;

- Naval Support Activity New Orleans finished plans to evacuate non-essential personnel and lay the groundwork to support relief operations. This support eventually included direct support of two Naval ships as well as elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, National Guard, and the U.S. Coast Guard. In addition, units from the New Orleans Police Force and the U.S. Marshals Service located there during the disaster;

- HAMMER ACE (U.S. Air Force Emergency Communications Team) arrived at Keesler AFB, Mississippi; and

- 920th Rescue Wing (Air Force Reserve) at Patrick AFB, Florida, unilaterally placed three HH-60s and one HC-130 on alert for possible tasking.

Senator Susan Collins
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #2

Question: Please identify what factor or factors influenced the decision to deploy Title 10 ground troops into the Joint Operating Area on September 3, 2005, including specifically, what role if any questions about the command and control structure of Title 10 and Title 32 troops played in the timing of their deployment.

Answer: On August 30, 2005, within 24 hours after Hurricane Katrina's landfall, 1,000 Title 10 personnel were operating in the disaster area in support of the Federal response effort. By September 3, 2005, the number of Title 10 personnel deployed to the disaster area rose to 4,631. Within two weeks of Hurricane Katrina's landfall, the number of Title 10 personnel deployed to the disaster area rose to its highest level at more than 22,000.

The decision announced on September 3, 2005, to deploy 7,200 additional Title 10 personnel (3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, and 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division) into the disaster area was based principally on repeated reports of civil disturbance in New Orleans, Louisiana. Questions about the command and control structure of title 10 and Title 32 personnel played no role in the timing of this deployment.

February 9, 2006

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Senator Joseph Lieberman
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #1

Question: You stated in your testimony that DoD pre-positioned assets prior to landfall. We understand that the following assets were pre-positioned prior to landfall:

a) USNORTHCOM pre-positioned Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Elements, and designated military bases as Operational Staging Areas, as authorized by the August 19, 2005, Severe Weather Execute Order;

b) Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers were deployed to FEMA Regional and National Headquarters; and

c) USS BATAAN was ordered to sea on August 28, 2005, in order to steam toward the affected region behind the storm, and additional ships were sortied from port for force protection purposes.

Were additional Title 10 assets pre-positioned in advance of Katrina's landfall on August 29?

Answer: On August 24, 2005, the 1st Army Liaison Officer arrived on-site at the FEMA RRCC in Atlanta, Georgia.

On August 25, 2005, the 1st Army pre-designated DCO arrived on-site at the Long-Term Recovery Center in Orlando, Florida.

On August 26, 2005, The 347th Rescue Wing at Moody AFB, Georgia, unilaterally placed three HH-60s and one HC-130 aircraft on alert for possible tasking.

On August 28, 2005:

- Commander, USNORTHCOM, deployed an advance joint task force - forward to Camp Shelby, Mississippi;
- Commander, USTRANSCOM, placed aircraft (three C-5s, two C-17s, and two C-130s), crews, and Contingency Response Wings on alert;
- HAMMER ACE (U.S. Air Force Emergency Communications Team) arrived at Keesler AFB, Mississippi; and
- 920th Rescue Wing (Air Force Reserve) at Patrick AFB, Florida, unilaterally placed three HH-60s and one HC-130 on alert for possible tasking.

February 9, 2006
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Senator Joseph Lieberman
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #2

Question: You stated in your testimony that on August 23, 2005, you "instructed Colonel Chavez to do a complete inventory of DoD assets that might be available to assist FEMA." We understand that Col Chavez conducted an inventory of a) MREs, b) bases which could be employed as FEMA Mobility Centers, and c) medical facilities (EMEDs), and that the availability of these assets was reported to the Secretary of Defense on August 28, 2005.

Were other assets inventoried by either OASD(HD) or JDOMS?

We have been told that the list of assets to be inventoried prior to a hurricane's landfall may be expanded this year, to include shallow-draft boats. We have also been told that the Severe Weather EXORD may be expanded to include helicopters, trucks, and communications equipment. Do you believe that the pre-landfall inventory at the Department level was sufficient in order to assess the availability of likely-required assets, or should the inventory be expanded in preparation for future catastrophic storms?

Answer: No other assets were inventoried. In DoD's view, the pre-landfall inventory conducted was sufficient. This inventory examined DoD assets that have traditionally been requested in response to hurricanes in the past and were either (1) consumed rapidly and require a long lead time to replenish, or (2) are high-demand/low-density assets that must be monitored to ensure that their use in response to a disaster does not negatively affect DoD's military readiness. However, DoD is considering chopping forces pre-incident to USNORTHCOM and granting the Commander, USNORTHCOM, the authority to issue anticipatory "Prepare-to-Deploy" orders to military forces.

February 9, 2006
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Senator Joseph Lieberman
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #3

Question: The timeline we received from OASD (HD), labeled "Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline," and dated October 26, 2005, states that on Aug 28, "USNORTHCOM deploys an advance headquarters, Joint Task Force Katrina Forward, to Camp Shelby, MS." We understand that Joint Task Force Katrina was not established until August 30, and LTG Honoré told us that the advance headquarters moved to Camp Shelby on August 30.

Please clarify this discrepancy. If assets were moved to Camp Shelby on August 28, please explain what those assets were, and in what capacity they deployed.

Answer: On August 28, 2005, Commander, USNORTHCOM, deployed a joint task force - forward to Camp Shelby, Mississippi. A joint task force - forward is an advance element of a joint task force and is charged with preparing the forward operating base for a potential deployment of a full joint task force. On August 28, 2005, the Commanding General, 1st Army, directed the establishment, at full staffing, of Joint Task Force - Katrina (JTF-Katrina). On August 29, 2005, Commander, USNORTHCOM, issued a "be-prepared-to-establish JTF-Katrina" order. In response, Commander, 1st Army, initiated planning for forward deploying JTF-Katrina with the expectation that it would assume command over Federal military operations in the disaster area on August 31, 2005. On August 30, 2005, Commander, USNORTHCOM, directed the establishment of JTF-Katrina. In response, Lieutenant General Honoré and his advance staff deployed that morning to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and JTF-Katrina was fully established by that evening.

February 9, 2006
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Senator Mark Dayton
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #1

Question: You stated that on Thursday, September 1st, FEMA made a request for the Defense Department to accept the responsibility to provide "full logistic support" throughout the entire area affected by Hurricane Katrina. On Tuesday, August 30th, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown toured New Orleans by helicopter. Did the Defense Department provide logistic support for this fly over?

Answer: DoD has no record of providing helicopter support to Under Secretary Brown for an overview of New Orleans. Of note, on August 30, 2005, a total of 74 military helicopters (14 Active Duty and 60 National Guard in State Active Duty status) were flying missions in the disaster area.

Senator Mark Dayton
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hon. Paul McHale
Question #2

Question: According to Michael Brown, the request for active duty military support was made on Tuesday, August 30th. Can you explain the discrepancy between the request being made by FEMA on the 30th and not being received by DOD until the 1st, two days later?

Answer: We are working directly with Senator Dayton's office to clarify and answer his question.

Hearing Date: February 9, 2006
Committee: Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Member: Senator Collins
Witness: Admiral Keating
Question # 1

ACTIVE DUTY TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Question: Please clarify your position on when federal active duty ground troops should have been deployed to Louisiana. Prior to the President's deployment order on Saturday, September 3, did you believe that active duty federal ground troops should be deployed to Louisiana? Why or why not?

Answer: Prior to 3 September, U.S. Northern Command had approximately 4,000 active duty forces in the Joint Operating Area in Louisiana and Mississippi including Naval vessels, helicopters from all services, and the Joint Task Force Katrina headquarters. The focus of this active duty commitment was conducting search and rescue and evacuating flooded areas in and around New Orleans. Prior to the President's decision on 3 September to deploy large active duty ground forces from the Army and Marines, U.S. Northern Command had worked with Joint Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command to prepare Army and Marine forces for deployment. Due to the extensive use of warning orders and prior planning, active duty Army and Marine ground forces were able to quickly deploy to New Orleans to augment on-going National Guard search and rescue operations and distribution of relief supplies. Key to the deployment was the seamless integration between active and National Guard forces in terms of task and purpose, focused on saving and sustaining lives.

Question # 2

COMMAND STRUCTURE

Question: Please clarify your position on whether you believed it was necessary to change the command structure for active duty and National Guard forces in Louisiana.

a) What are your views on how well General Landreneau and General Honore were coordinating their activities?
b) Did you believe that coordination had broken down to such an extent that it was necessary to propose to put General Honore in charge of the National Guard troops in Louisiana under a dual-hat structure? At what point did you arrive at such a conclusion and why?

Answer: LTG Honoré and MG Landreneau coordinated their activities effectively due to a long-standing personal and professional relationship. Due to his extensive experience working with the National Guard in his Title 10 role as the Commanding General, 1st US Army, LTG Honoré was able to coordinate with National Guard forces to achieve unity of effort within the joint operations area.

The consideration to place LTG Honoré in dual-status Title 10 and Title 32 was discussed. While dual status would have ensured unity of effort, LTG Honoré and the Adjutants General of Louisiana and Mississippi maintained unity of military effort due to close and constant coordination and liaison.

The dual-status relationship works well when there is time for adequate planning and agreement. Absent such an agreement and in a crisis, retaining separate Title 10 and Title 32 commanders may be more effective because it avoids placing commanders in the difficult position of complying with conflicting direction from two chains of command.

Hearing Date: February 9, 2006
Committee: Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Member: Senator Collins
Witness: Admiral Keating
Question # 3

COMMAND STRUCTURE

Question: Do you believe that a dual command structure such as the one proposed to Governor Blanco is workable in an "ultra-catastrophe?" If so, how do you propose to obtain a Governor's agreement to relinquish control over the National Guard forces in his or her state?

Answer: A dual-status command and control option is workable in an "ultra-catastrophe;" however, such an arrangement is not required to obtain unity of effort between active duty and National Guard forces.

There are four formal methods available to achieve unity of effort between National Guard and active duty forces during military operations:

Dual Status of a National Guard Officer. A National Guard officer was placed in command of both Title 10 and Title 32/State Active Duty (SAD) forces for three National Special Security Events (G8 Summit, and the Republican and Democratic National Conventions) and one operational mission (Operation WINTER FREEZE along the Vermont, New Hampshire, New York-Canada border), where the commanders and their staffs had adequate planning and rehearsal time to ensure proper command and control structures and processes. This option requires the consent/approval of the respective governor and the President.

Dual Status of an Active Duty Officer. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the President proposed placing LTG Honoré in dual-status command of Title 10 and Title 32/SAD forces. This option also requires the consent of the respective governors (in that case Mississippi and Louisiana) because they must commission the active duty officer (in that case LTG Honoré) in their respective militias. This option was declined by the Governors of Mississippi and Louisiana.

NOTE: The use of a dual status commander, whether a National Guard or active duty officer, does not remove National Guard forces from the command and control of a governor. The governor does not "relinquish control" because he or she remains the "commander" of all National Guard forces through the dual status commander.

Federalization of the National Guard. Another available option is to use federal law to involuntarily activate or federalize the National Guard thereby placing them in a Title 10 status under the command and control of the President or his designee, in this case Commander, USNORTHCOM. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the federal government declined to exercise this option.

Coordinating Authority. The last method for achieving unity of effort is the use of the doctrine of "Coordinating Authority" which is defined in joint publications. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. Although it is not command and control (e.g., OPCON or TACON), it provides authority to "coordinate" specific functions and activities of forces that belong to different chains of command. Essentially one commander directs his forces to cooperate with another commander. Doctrine also permits this relationship to be granted and modified through a memorandum of agreement to allow unity of effort for operations involving National Guard, Reserve Component, and Active Component forces engaged in interagency activities.

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Member: Senator Collins
Witness: Admiral Keating
Question # 3

Coordinating authority has been used extensively between the Air Force and Air National Guard during wildfire fighting and at least ten western states have signed Memoranda of Understanding to that effect with the Secretary of the Air Force.

While all four of these methods are viable, the decisions made in the wake of Hurricane Katrina did not hinder execution of search and recovery operations, distribution of relief supplies, or assistance to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in recovering and restoring civil infrastructure.

Question # 4

NATIONAL GUARD COORDINATION

Question: It appears that although NORTHCOM was aware of the overall numbers of National Guard forces deploying through the EMAC process, NORTHCOM did not have much awareness of the specific capabilities and missions that those National Guard forces would be performing.

a) How do you propose to improve the co-ordination between the National Guard and NORTHCOM so that in a future catastrophe there can be a coordinated unified military response?
b) Shouldn't a unified command between the National Guard and the Title X forces be established at the outset - prior to deployments - rather than several days after troops have been deployed? Are there any obstacles to making this happen next time?

Answer: U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) are working together on a range of initiatives to improve routine communication and mutual situational awareness. In the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Operations Center, the National Guard has established a full-time watch position. This watch position has connectivity to the NGB Joint Operations Center to ensure routine coordination of operational missions conducted in State Active Duty or Title 32 status. The NGB also participates in the twice weekly USNORTHCOM Commander's Situational Awareness Meetings and provides daily deployment and mission data to the Command. USNORTHCOM conducts routine telephonic staff coordination with the National Guard Joint Force Headquarters in all of the states and territories in the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Finally, over 250 National Guard and Reserve personnel are assigned to USNORTHCOM, to include five general officers.

Unified Command is a term used in the National Response Plan to ensure unity of effort through the Incident Command System, which places federal assets in direct support of the local or state incident command. Unity of command, a military term of reference, is normally achieved through one commander having command of all forces operating in a specific area.

Although the option of placing a commander in dual status, giving him/her command authority over both federal (Title 10) and state (State Active Duty or Title 32) has been used for certain National Special Security Events with significant available planning time, it is less suitable for short-notice or no-notice large-scale catastrophic events such as Hurricane Katrina unless pre-approved agreements between the federal and state governments exist that are triggered by the occurrence of particular events.

The option of federalizing the National Guard forces and placing them under the command and control of the Joint Task Force Katrina Commander was not exercised by the President. Federalization/activation provides increased synchronization of active duty and National Guard forces under a single commander.

Hearing Date: February 9, 2006
Committee: Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Member: Senator Collins
Witness: Admiral Keating
Question # 5
Page 1 of 1

PLAN 2501

Question: In your testimony before the Committee, you described "plan 2501" as one NORTHCOM used to respond to Hurricane Katrina. Please describe what actions NORTHCOM took pursuant to that plan in the Katrina response, the extent to which the contents of that plan had been coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security, and whether, prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina, that plan or any other NORTHCOM plan in force specifically addressed NORTHCOM's role in responding to a natural disaster such as a hurricane. Does NORTHCOM have any other plans that are relevant for responding to a hurricane? Were any relevant NORTHCOM plans coordinated with the National Guard Bureau? Do any NORTHCOM plans take into account the augmentation of active duty forces by National Guard forces?

Answer: The "plan 2501" in effect during Hurricane Katrina operations was a U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) plan transferred to USNORTHCOM when the Command assumed the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission for the United States. "DSCA" is a new term from the National Response Plan; however, the military mission to support civil authorities in the United States in times of disaster is decades old. While USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501 (DSCA), was under review at the time of Hurricane Katrina, the USACOM plan on the shelf provided for timely, comprehensive, and effective military assistance to save lives and relieve suffering. Like the USNORTHCOM plan, military support is tailored to the magnitude of the situation, with the appropriate command and control to meet any response requirements that exceed the capacity of civil authorities.

USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501 (DSCA) is an all-hazards plan to support civil authorities under any circumstances, including hurricanes. This plan is coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security, and other federal departments, through the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate, and with the National Guard Bureau through the NORAD-USNORTHCOM National Guard Advisor. The National Guard was closely involved in all aspects of CONPLAN 2501 development, participating in four rounds of written coordination and attending various plan working groups. CONPLAN 2501 does account for National Guard response operations in parallel with response operations commanded by USNORTHCOM.

In addition to CONPLAN 2501, USNORTHCOM created a Concept of Operations and Civil Support Concept of Employment covering all aspects of our support of civil authorities. Prior to Hurricane Katrina landfall, USNORTHCOM operated from a Joint Staff Severe Weather Execute Order that specifically addressed support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in conducting disaster response operations. The Joint Staff Severe Weather Execute Order serves as the model for the USNORTHCOM Severe Weather Operations Order, which is updated every year.

Hearing Date: February 9, 2006
Committee: Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Member: Senator Akaka
Witness: Admiral Keating
Question # 1

PLAN FOR DOMESTIC RELIEF EFFORTS

Question: As a result of the after-action assessments of US Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) response to Hurricane Katrina, what changes, if any, do you anticipate making to NORTHCOM's planning for domestic relief efforts?

Answer: Because USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, already incorporates the best practices from USNORTHCOM's Hurricane Katrina response, we do not anticipate making changes at this time. However, our planners continuously reassess the plan in light of real-world operations and disaster response exercises. Refinements will be included immediately in the appropriate operational execution orders, as well as the plan's revision in approximately two years.

Question # 2

COORDINATION WITH NATIONAL GUARD

Question: Are you coordinating these changes with the National Guard Bureau?

Answer: All USNORTHCOM plans are coordinated with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) via the NORAD-USNORTHCOM National Guard Advisor. The NGB has been involved in all phases of CONPLAN 2501 plan development. NGB participated in four rounds of written plan coordination, and also sent representatives to working group meetings held at USNORTHCOM.

Question # 3

COORDINATION WITH PACIFIC COMMAND

Question: How do you plan to coordinate these assessments with US Pacific Command so that they may incorporate any relevant changes?

Answer: CONPLAN 2501, DSCA, is currently in Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) review, which includes coordination with United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Prior to JPEC review, in late 2005, CONPLAN 2501 was sent informally to USPACOM action officers for comment.

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
EXHIBIT #5

UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

In the Matter of:

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

OF THE KATRINA RESPONSE

The interview of MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD ROWE, called for examination by counsel for the United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, was held on Friday, January 20, 2006, at United States Northern Command, Building 2, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and commenced at 12:45 p.m., before Priscilla Naff Medina, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of Colorado.

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was -- I got that on that Monday, and -- and did so.
Q (Nodded head.)
A But, now, in this case what I was summarizing is how General Honore, if he was asked to be a regional Joint Task Force Commander, would accommodate integrating this Title 10 and 32.
General Honore, on his day-to-day basis in his job, is the supervisor of the senior Army advisors to the Guard in each state -- Title 10 officers, colonels -- and what he was saying is the SRAAG would be his designee to be the deputy for that designated one star to provide a -- a Title 10/32, and, then, we'd -- and, then, all the teams would have to put people to this to be a -- to become a staff, 'cause it will have ad hoc nature to this. You have a designated person, and on the state level there would be people coming to make a staff up -- ops and logistics and communications -- and that would be based upon the skill of Title 10 assets that would be committed. You have a demand for skill assets to also be a part of that; and, in addition, you would need some operators, some communication skill to build the thing.
But right off the bat he was saying, "If I had to do this tonight" -- and General Honore's a master of current operations -- "I have a -- a colonel in place in Louisiana, a colonel in place in Mississippi, who worked -- works for

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me" -- although the one in Louisiana actually worked for General Clark at that time -- but we have a -- we have a serving colonel who could immediately be sent -- be the designee to be the deputy, and it had -- if you made -- you had -- in other words, we had a on-the-fly frag order ability to have a command and control thing that I -- I think would work.
Q (Nodded head.)
EXAMINATION
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q But just to be clear, the three sentences state, "My initial thought is that a 'dual hat state JTF' would be placed subordinate to our JTF East or West as the Regional Task Force", then the 1st Army commander you just described would consider adding Title 10 deputies to that state JTF command --
A Right.
Q -- so -- so what is being thrown out as a possibility was still Honore as a -- as the -- the commander in charge of the Joint Operating Area --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- with subordinate state JTF dual hats?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
A And working with that -- working with that

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commander, as he built his staff he would have a set of people coming both from the state as well as what would be appropriate to their FI to move him from the Title 10 side.
Q When you were -- when you were proposing that, did you have any thought the states might be -- might have a problem with a proposal that made their states dual hat subordinate to a Title 10 officer like General Honore? Were you thinking this could potentially turn into a -- you know, a political battle of some kind? Did those thoughts enter your head?
A My experience factor from Winter Freeze -- when the Joint Task Force Commander of Winter Freeze worked for the Joint Task Force Commander North -- worked for NORTHCOM, was that the designated Joint Task Force Commander -- I apologize, I can't remember his name -- did not like working -- he wanted to work straight for NORTHCOM.
So I think there is out there those who would like to see this as a clean -- a state joint commander reporting straight to NORTHCOM, and, then, with a line of communication probably on the Guard side back through the National Guard Bureau.
But as I would offer from my -- my experience and my nature of operations and all, I think this regional piece, and the fact that much of the Title 10 response wasn't dedicated to one state or another, was of the scale

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that says you have a -- a Joint Task Force Commander with a -- a Joint Operational Area that's larger than a single state.
The -- that -- that -- that always comes into a challenge given the architecture of our nation and the Constitution of the United States, and many of us should find here -- often go back and read our founding father's biographies -- and I've read the Federalist's Papers since I've been here -- to appreciate the power of what we have.
But the -- I think there is a -- a state federal piece there, so the -- the idea of a multi-state part, I'm not sure -- I'm not sure everyone, with that -- to me, from a professional military point of view, I think that's the right answer, and I think that's clear, I had to look at a course of action if the scale of your response got to a certain size -- which this was a fairly large response, not measured just in numbers of people, but the numbers of ships and airplanes and efforts that had to be harmonized -- required a -- a regional command construct.
Q In retrospect today --
A I think so. In retrospect, one of the other things I scratch my head is when the situation defined itself to where you ought to go to a Joint Operational Area that was less than a state that was even less appreciated than multi-state, because there's a certain point, as you go

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into September here, that you go -- your -- your focus is the -- the nine parrishes around New Orleans, ought that to be your Joint Operational Area, and I found, as I went in this dialogue, that not only is there resistance to a -- a Joint Operational Area at the multi-state, there's resistance to designating something that's within a state that's less.

And I think that -- and I think both of those are very fair opinions on the table.

My takeaway is I think my regional construct for the scale is -- is more valid than trying to go within a state and divide it up would be. There was -- in hindsight I can't figure out too many advantages of being less than the size of the state because of the need to be coordinated with the governor and the TAG and all that; and insights on that come when Rita happens, and I don't know how far out they went, but we also went through some tremendous deliberations on how to organize for -- for Rita.

Q Yet my question was simply there developed a lot of resistance, as you indicated, to the notion of the Joint Operating Area with the Title 10 commander in charge on that Sunday when you were mulling these possible courses of action. Were you aware of that?

A No.

Q Okay.

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A And -- and I'm intuitively aware after. I have no conversations, there's no e-mails that come in that would tell you that, 'cause, I mean, I'm -- I -- I think we've given you what -- all but the family e-mails, saying, "Hey, Dad, are you still coming home for supper?", and stuff like that.

There -- there was nothing to me, so I -- I would tell you that my -- my -- what I'm giving to you in that case is based upon the -- the -- what I can see from this desk and the computer and phone calls, you know, 'cause what -- like I said, literally from the 29th, at noontime, I don't think I have another mention in my e-mail of the state dual hat commanders; no one calls me, no one e-mails me to discuss those. The names, I don't believe, are ever forwarded through the -- through the political channel from the Governor to the -- to the President. It kind of falls off.

And I -- and I think it's -- I think it's either late on the -- it's probably the 30th that I'm told General Fleming is coming in from Florida; he's the expert at this, and he's going to be -- he's going to be in charge of the Guard response in Louisiana.

So I kind of put it in my back -- back of my head and just paid attention to what was coming in to me.

MR. ELDRIDGE: (Indicating.)

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EXAMINATION

BY MR. BERKOVITZ:

Q Let me -- I think, then, maybe this might capture -- the -- the last e-mail, I think, that we -- one of the last e-mails on that Monday morning, the -- the 29th, when you referred to my not seeing e-mails after -- after noon -- but I'll introduce Exhibit 3 (indicating).

Is that Xerox copy good enough for you to read? Is that one smudged on the side?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARNEY: Yeah.

MR. BERKOVITZ: Okay, I've got a better copy (indicating).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARNEY: That looks good

MR. BERKOVITZ: Okay.

(Exhibit Number 3 was marked for identification.)

THE WITNESS: (Reviewed document.)

This is from Captain Reininger.

Q (By Mr. Berkovitz) Right.

These indicate further discussions along some of these command and control issues, whether you need a Joint Task Force and -- and what the command and control would be for a Joint Task Force.

A And -- and this is -- fairly lays out the kind of work that Reininger was engaged with on that Monday (indicating).

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But I do not believe that we approved an EXORDER or request for 1st Army to be a JTF commander till the next day. I think this was all the staff work being done by my Chief of Future Ops, and in his case he was playing catch-up because he didn't engage on Sunday, his deputy did, Colonel Ferrell.

Q Now, the original e-mail, on the second page of this one --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- is from General Honore to yourself --

A Right.

Q -- General Inge, with a cc to Admiral Keating --

A Right.

Q -- and General Clark --

A Sunday.

Q -- saying you might want to think about a JOA for Louisiana, Mississippi in case you needed a two or three star

A Right.

Respond Regional Task Force.

Q Right.

A And that's at 8:07 a.m. on the 28th, Sunday.

And my response was -- you know, you're never sure how these work, what time it comes in, because I'm in Mountain time --

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MR. ANDERSEN: Eric Exhibit 1.
(Exhibit Number 4 was marked for identification.)
EXAMINATION
BY MR. ANDERSEN:
Q This is a -- this is a pair of messages -- I can let you have it (indicating) --
A Yep.
Q -- this is a pair of messages, the first is a 1st Army request to NORTHCOM on the 28th, and the -- the second message, on the second page, is pretty much the identical text, but following shortly thereafter, on the 28th, a request from FORSCOM to Joint Forces Command, both requesting -- saying that Hurricane Katrina's -- is on the horizon, it's headed towards the -- towards the Gulf Coast --
A Right.
Q -- and it's asking for -- that, "NORTHCOM identify the available units and unit locations with capabilities as listed below", and it requests capabilities within the first 24 hours, including satellite phones, utility aviation, maritime capability for search and rescue, and, then, 48 hours after landfall medium lift aviation, medical evacuation, et cetera.
And -- and it's requesting by a certain time,

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several hours thereafter I believe later, on -- on the 28th, a response as to the availability of these assets.
A Right.
Q Do you -- do you recall this message, sir (indicating)?
A Yes.
Let me give you a little background. When we went through the Florida campaign we found, before the second hurricane, that beginning to build an estimate of what the required capabilities would be was very good; and, so, we received from 1st Army -- 'cause these were all in that -- in that area -- something very close to what this looks like has been produced for almost every hurricane from Hurricane Charlie -- Francis, in 2004 --
Q (Nodded head.)
A -- and turned, at this headquarters, into a message -- and I think our message was released Mountain time, about 18:00 local -- that's Sunday night -- to the Joint Staff, with cc's to all the same family, saying, "There is a hurricane coming, we think that we may need to be able to have these kinds of capabilities, that would be useful."
I developed this business of trying to go to immediate, 24 hours, 48 hours. When 1st Army first started this it had been, "I don't want it all right now, I want

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it -- you know, want it all in hand and, then, I'll use it and give it back to you" (indicating).
Quite frankly, other than the messages being flowing, and Army Forces Command, within their capabilities, doing some alerting, Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff did not do anything.
The first time they ever take one of these and do anything is Ophelia.
And they did a hell of a lot for Rita.
Now, that was received, the anecdotal action officer comment from the Joint Staff was "Don't send this to me" on that Sunday night, to my colonel, but we sent it; and I made sure that General Scherling was aware -- and General Conway -- that we were sending it, and these are the kinds of things you ought to be thinking about.
Because I do not have troops assigned, as a Combatant Commander, to respond to this part of my mission, so I've got to be able -- and, so, we've used this device to raise situational awareness; but I don't believe that you'll be able to uncover any evidence, outside of U.S. Army FORSCOM did -- did -- I did -- I do believe directed some increased readiness, the signal people that moved out with General Honore on that Monday -- Tuesday, the 30th.
But the Joint Force Provider, it was received, and at the Joint Staff level it was less than that.

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Q (Nodded head.)
A And I -- I -- I am unaware of any evidence that would say anything but that that had been true.
But that had been true all summer, 'cause you'll find similar messages for -- Dennis, I think, was the larger hurricane earlier in the summer, and you'll go back to Jean and Ivan -- or Ivan and Jean from the year before.
It's been extraordinarily challenging to operationalize this.
And the good news is this sustained effort interest I think has now been codified.
And I just saw the severe weather order for 2006, and I will tell you the Department of Defense and their work is -- is putting into that EXORDER these exact kind of things on these kind of timelines, which are -- if you -- if you kind of table top this and thought it out you would say this is kind of -- this is really very good, very prudent work.
But it is good intellectual tissue, but it did not get the 105th Supply Company and the 66th Rotary Wing Aviation and all.
Now, what it did do is as this week goes on and you turn and you start saying, "We're going to need rotary wing and stuff: The -- the rapidity of the response was in many ways aided and abetted by this tissue that had gone to

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it gives me a -- it gives me a little bit of control.
But we're -- I think our evidence -- we're very sharing in information, and part of the reason I'm so aggressive in information is because of the importance of being able to share it with others. We -- and we can improve my information exchange.
MR. BERKOVITZ: Okay.
(Exhibit Number 7 was marked for identification.)
EXAMINATION
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Okay, this is an exhibit that includes an e-mail trail which begins on Wednesday, August 31st, regarding proposal to bring in Title 10 troops, and there's some back and forth that you're involved in, and I guess I would like to use this exhibit as a springboard to just talk about and -- and just -- you could tell us the story if you want, when you learned of the requests from a particular state for any Title 10 troops and what those requests were, both in terms of size, capability, and how -- how those requests from the states evolved over the week, and how NORTHCOM's view of the need for Title 10 troops evolved over the week as well. If you could take us through that, that would be very helpful.
A (Reviewed document.)
I think we're -- when you say "Title 10" are you

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specifically focused on ground --
Q Thank you.
A -- troops?
Q Yes.
As opposed to --
A In New Orleans.
'Cause I don't believe there's a lot of debate about hospitals and airport openings and C17s and --
Q Well, I would say, though, this first e-mail suggests an initial thought on Wednesday that, in fact, the federal troops go elsewhere in Louisiana to allow the Guard to go to New Orleans. So it could be beyond New Orleans, but we're talking about ground troops I think.
A Right.
(Reviewed document.)
What I don't remember exactly is -- is -- and I think there may be an e-mail somewhere through there earlier that says where this thought came from, but this thought didn't come from me, this idea of concentration in one place versus another came either through a phone call or whatever, and, so, I didn't invent this (indicating).
Q Do you recall whether it was from one of your conversations with General Honore or --
A No, it was not with General Honore, I can -- but it may have been with General Scherling or someone from ASD

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Homeland Defense; it may have come out of downstairs, that they picked up on it, one of my guys.
Somewhere it came, in all of the coordination and staff talking, that New -- New Orleans is -- is in extremist -- of course, the CNN effect and all, who knows what we're doing.
We've clearly articulated the evacuation of the Superdome, this is job one, or a little later that night I got the in -- information from General Honore that actually it's the Superdome plus there's about 60,000 people in pockets in the city, it's much bigger than, I think, what I really had recognized at that time in terms of the -- the stress (indicating).
So you have this notion that the guardsmen will flow into New Orleans, and I think one of the arguments people would advance for that is the ability to do law enforcement on -- with the possecomitatus thing, and that there is requirements elsewhere that federal troops should flow to, and that -- but they're not -- they weren't specifically, "What are these other tasks that we do distribution points", or something like that.
So the question --
Q Was this the first time that you got word that the Governor was asking for federal troops? We're you aware, for example, of a conversation between General

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Landrieu and General Honore, on Tuesday, in which there was discussion of troops? Did -- did anything from Tuesday come to your attention?
A I don't have anything that says the Governor -- for this hurricane, no.
Q Okay.
So --
MR. BERKOVITZ: General Honore did not communicate to you that she -- at any time that she wanted active duty Title 10 ground troops?
THE WITNESS: Later this night, on the 31st, about 23:10 I think is the e-mail, is the exact summary of what General Honore told me over the phone after he'd had that evening meeting with the Governor and the TAG and the mayor in the vicinity of the -- the Superdome (indicating).
MR. ELDRIDGE: (Nodded head.)
THE WITNESS: So what I had was this; and, then, the question -- the question I had as an operator is, "Okay, if -- if we decided to do this what would be the specific tasks? Where's -- what are the five Ws, if you will, of where you need some of the thing?"
It goes to one of the challenges we had there of -- of understanding the task and purpose of the various National Guard capabilities that were flowing into the state By Friday it was 9900, and 1400 -- 14,000 I think on

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the 3rd. I mean, the incredible numbers -- in terms of individuals -- national guardsmen moving where -- where, and what would be the task of purpose where we need to do the -- and part of this is -- and subsequently, in re -- I said not for this hurricane did I see a Governor -- subsequently, for Hurricane Rita, I saw her memo that she sent, saying she wanted 30,000 or 15,000 active duty forces, and, you know, this -- this number, and, then, the challenge we have is we are what we are. We want to turn that into, "What is the capability you need? What's the task and purpose that you need done, and, then, we'll figure out" -- it's something different than numbers -- different ways of articulating the challenge we have is numbers of people don't translate directly to a task, they translate to a number of people.

"What is -- what is it you need done?"

"Do you need people to provide bandages, people to feed meals, people to help hand out meals?"

MR. ELDRIDGE: I am just going to have this one marked as well (indicating).

THE COURT REPORTER: This will be "8".

(Exhibit Number 8 was marked for identification.)

THE WITNESS: (Reviewed document.)

Q (By Mr. Eldridge) This is an e-mail from the 31st of August on which you were cc'd, it's earlier in the morning, so it's 9 in the morning of that same day --

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A Uh-huh.

Q -- and it discusses a conversation between General Honore and the TAG and Governor of Mississippi, and a request from them for 5,000 federal soldiers; and it's similar in nature, I would suggest, to what is contained in this later e-mail that you sent, which was about 6 -- 6 p.m.

A (The witness nodded head.)

Q I don't know if that helps to jog your memory at all on where these things originated from or when you learned when federal troops might be requested by the Governor or TAG of Mississippi.

A Right, this is Mississippi.

Q Right.

A And this never was follow -- this -- Mississippi never, you know -- it didn't validate with Damon. They did not want this.

The part of this that became very valid during the next -- that period of time, that night and the next day till we close out, was trying to get the Bataan in a place to help with command and control.

But in the -- in Mississippi . . .

(Reviewed document.)

Q And you're referring to Exhibit --

A The one that you just handed me (indicating). This is Mississippi

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THE COURT REPORTER: It's "8".

THE WITNESS: "8".

It -- it -- it didn't check out and turn into a requirement at all. The -- in fact, the -- if -- as you go through my work you'll see my distribution point issue in both states was to facilitate through the National Guard Bureau to both states to get help to distribution points for the Red Cross; and in the state of Mississippi they did an awesome job.

This follow-up traffic, the -- there was hardly any delay. They got guys there anecdotally, after I've debriefed my military police officer that I sent to the Joint Task Force to be part of that effort, and he just sings the praises of the two Mississippi Guard MP battalions and the kind of work they did -- and many of -- many of those soldiers were victims -- and the kind of work they did in that area.

I had -- it was a little different getting guardsmen to the Red Cross sites in Louisiana, there's a bit of -- bit of delay. You'll see on the 31st, 1st, and 2nd in my e-mail it's a little frustration in trying to --

Q (By Mr. Edlridge) I did see that.

A -- trying to get that -- to handle.

But this -- this piece which was Mississippi didn't -- didn't add up to a request subsequently -- and I

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don't know how General Honore -- I don't know if you asked General Honore about this at all or -- 'cause he had spent almost all day on the 30th in Mississippi, and I know he met and talked with General Cross some number of times, so I -- I -- I would believe that this at that time may very much have been put on the table.

But it --

Q Ultimately the problem was solved without --

A It doesn't -- one of the key things -- one of the really helpful things you have on Mississippi is that quality of Damon's daily -- I think you've been provided his -- that daily summary, and it -- it's inconsistent -- real times there in that week when Mississippi's on the ropes, they're extremists; then on the 2nd you get the report that says they now are able to communicate with everyone, but they have distribution problems -- supply problems, he says he doesn't have distribution.

Then you have the little stray voltage about there's going to be a huge leap in the numbers dead, but --

Q And there's a concern that that will be attributed to supply issues?

A Yeah.

And the next -- but the next week you -- you get -- then you get -- and I don't know if it's in my e-mail -- but you get that General Cross has said he wants

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all the Title 10 troops out of Mississippi and he's telling all the guardsmen to go home, which he wanted the Marines to move; but they still love those Seabees, they would still have those Seabees working if they could.

But Mississippi is -- when you take it, you know, and you kind of look and hit with a -- with a catastrophic storm and all kind of works, this -- so I would -- I think --

Q That's Mississippi I understand --

A -- my recollection --

Q -- okay, Louisiana, when is the first report that you get that there is a desire by the Governor and the TAG for federal troops? Is it on that Wednesday in regard to the --

A Yeah, I would say that's the -- the business of this idea, "Could you send" -- you know, "Could you send federal troops? We'll put them in the outlying areas, we'll move the -- the guardsmen in."

Also on that 31st I think there's an e-mail that talks about trying to get -- give Louisiana the two brigades that are mobilization trading at Shelby, there's a -- which that never went anywhere either. There wasn't any interest in the Army of diverting them off their current mission, there was -- a readiness to provide other -- other troops has happened.

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Q Explain -- explain to us what you mean by that. In other words, was that offered to the state?

A The National Guard Bureau looked around as they were trying to mass troops and said, "There's two National Guard Brigades at Shelby, we want them sent over to Louisiana."

Of course, they no longer -- they're not in National Guard Title at that point, they're -- they're Title 10, they're a mobilization duty getting ready, they've deployed now.

So there was no -- I have -- there's nothing in my sight that said anyone on the -- the Title 10 force was interested in sending the -- the unit from Shelby, or the 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain that was similarly preparing for mobilization out of Ft. Polk.

Q And what do you mean by there was no desire on the -- their part? I mean, I'm -- I'm confused.

The National Guard Bureau was -- was looking at its -- its troops that were in Title 10 status and saying, "To Whom, why don't you send those", or --

A There is an e-mail I think I got from Elward, with a follow-up -- who was the Deputy J through the National Guard Bureau -- saying, "We won't advance the idea of taking these units out of Shelby and move-ing them over 'cause they're a Title 10 status, Guard patches", but they

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were -- they're the same category as -- as me on that day', they did not have possecomitatus authority, they were limited by possecomitatus. So that was -- I -- I never saw that go anywhere.

It's just one of those threads that came in, you know, I don't think that notion was ever entertained by U.S Army FORSCOM as a force provider, 'cause they looked and said, "We have plenty of available -- forces that are available to move to the problem if you ask us to", and they -- Ft. Bragg and Ft. Hood, and, subsequently, with Rita, they had forces identified as Ft. Drum and Ft. Sill.

Q So, again, this was a -- this was a FORSCOM decision you think?

A If they made a decision. I don't -- I do not know if a decision was made.

Q Okay.

A I just know it's one of those int -- another one of those as you sat and played -- and the day after the 31st I began a daily 10 o'clock morning all the threes talking to each other teleconference, and that was very helpful in these kinds of stray voltage almost here's an idea popping through the ether.

They -- they -- they stopped because we began to all share with each other what we were thinking, and -- and had a common set of priorities from that point on

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(indicating). So beginning on the 1st.

Q Were you aware of what the National Guard Bureau, under the direction of General Blum, was -- was helping to martial in terms of the -- the -- the forces and the projected flow?

A Telephonically that they were working very hard EMAC, the scale of the width and breadth of it I don't think I knew. Later in the week, when they -- I was sent a copy of the -- they call it an "order", but I think it was actually a request, 'cause I don't think the National Guard Bureau could order -- order this -- but there was a -- it was shared with me -- I think on Friday the 2nd is where the -- the reference is.

But up to that point -- I knew there was a lot of EMAC con, but exactly what was moving from where, with what task and purpose, I did not know.

Neither did the National Guard, based upon conversations, because what they were doing at that point was assembling, reporting numbers, and units were not given their task of purpose till they arrived.

And one of the reasons these two division headquarters came was because there needed to be a reception station, onward movement, and integration process in the states, and that wasn't in place. So I -- I think we were not the only ones who had a challenge with a hundred -- a

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hundred folks from Task Force Harney have come, which parrish or county in Mississippi did they go to, and -- and what will they be doing.
Q You go -- you go through the e-mail chain now -- on the same exhibit, Exhibit 7 -- on Thursday, General Honore to you, saying, "Push back. I will see Gove today" --
A Yes.
Q -- "will show her flow of NG troops. NG has the ground fight in hand."
A General Honore was not -- I don't -- not believe that he would have -- that he favored -- based on our conversations -- favored or identified a need for a -- a Title 10 formation as a commander looking at the ground.
Now, on the 3rd, when he was handed one, he immediately frag ordered what he wanted Bill Caldwell and -- and General O'Dell to do, and set that up and he worked them in -- in engagement with the Oklahoma Brigade, which was in New Orleans, then the Oregon and the Alabama.
Q Let me ask you, though, specifically with regard to your e-mail to him on the 1st, where you say, "Guidance is Guard in NO and Guard to fullest extent possible for tasks in LA and MS. NGB supports. EMAC working. OSD and CJCS agree with this."
A That was -- that was the consistent view of the

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Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, and Northern Command.
Q And how was that communicated to you?
A It was communicated to me -- (reviewed documents) -- through conversation with General Scherling primarily.
Q (Nodded head.)
And did you have conversations with Admiral Keating about that during this time?
A Yes --
Q And --
A -- I updated him.
Q -- and did Admiral Keating have a view himself on that issue, if he expressed it to you?
A I think he was comfortable with that situational awareness.
Q And that was, again, that -- that the National Guard would be used to the fullest extent possible for tasks in Louisiana and Mississippi?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. BERKOVITZ:
Q Is that -- in that -- in that statement is there any implication that -- I mean, you could still use the

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Guard to the fullest extent possible and, yet, Title 10 would -- forces on the ground would be necessary in addition, or does that imply that we don't need Title 10 ground forces in addition (indicating)?
A Well, Title 10 was needed, and we had specific tasks and purpose going, primarily Air Force, the medical capabilities, projection from the -- the maritime assets that were arriving onto the shore to assist, Corps of Engineer works; but in terms of ground maneuver force placed on the ground in the city of New Orleans, it was an option but it was not the -- the priority was, I think, as this articulates, to the fullest extent possible to leverage the National Guard capabilities that were moving.
Q And that really was consistent with the envisioned response under the National Response Plan and -- that you would use the Guard to the fullest extent possible, you wouldn't bring in Title 10 unless it couldn't be handled with the Guard?
A The scale of EMAC probably goes beyond what anyone visualized, 'cause EMAC is generally your adjacent state capability for all. So the business of going out for a 54-entity call -- I'm not sure that everyone was aware that that was -- that was being done, but I believe that General Blum was articulating to the -- to the Department of Defense, his fellow members in Department of Defense,

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that -- that he was working very hard to provide this scale, and it would -- and assess a degree of adequacy to it.
Q Given General Blum's advocacy that what he was -- could bring in through the -- through the EMAC process would be sufficient -- and I think it's fair to characterize as faster than a given time than the Title 10 --
A Yeah.
Q -- and General Honore's decision -- or -- or perspective that he didn't need Title 10 active ground forces, were there contrary views within NORTHCOM or --
A I don't think there was a faster way. I know General Blum articulates the word "faster", and I've seen it on the press, and have sat on a panel that testified to the House --
Q You would take issue with that?
A Oh, I would take extraordinary issue with that.
Q (Nodded head.)
A The -- it's -- and it is -- it is illogical. We are standing here right now, you telephone the state of Wisconsin and ask for a brigade, I telephone Ft. Bragg and ask for a brigade, which is going to be faster?
Q (Nodded head.)
How quickly can the brigade from Ft. Bragg get there?
A It's a question when did you start bringing them

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into the armory to move them?
When Bill Caldwell got told to move it was by telephone during the President's speech on the 3rd, six hours later he stepped off an airplane in New Orleans. No other capability deployed with that speed in this catastrophe.
Q Let me -- let me -- just so we have a big factual background for some of the special network we're entering into here I would like to show you one of the briefing packages we got from 1st Army, from General Honore, and I'll mark this as Exhibit 9?
THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
Q (By Mr. Berkovitz) This is -- this is not the complete briefing package, I -- complete briefing package, it would have been too heavy to carry on the plane without extra charges.
(Mr. Andersen exited the room.)
Q (By Mr. Berkovitz) And this is --
MR. ELDRIDGE: What number is this?
THE COURT REPORTER: "9".
MR. BERKOVITZ: This is Exhibit 9.
Q (By Mr. Berkovitz) And this is Asses -- this is the "JTF - Katrina Commander's Assessment" as of the 3rd of September, and the first pages in this are "Assets Deployed", the first four pages of it --

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A Uh-huh.
Q -- and, then, the last two pages, the ones that I would like to focus on here, are "Assets Alerted", which I think help -- goes to the issue of how fast assets could have been deployed as of an order on September 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, because it appears that a number of assets were alerted beginning -- at least according to this -- on the 31st of August.
A Uh-huh.
Q So they were alerted.
If you could describe what it means when an asset is alerted in terms of its readiness to deploy and how that affects the deployment time. So when, for example, you get an order to deploy, after it's alerted, what that does to the time to deploy.
First I should ask, before we get to that question, whether this is consistent with what --
A This is consistent with the estimate document we talked about earlier, and the request for forces that NORTHCOM issued.
Q Okay.
A I do not believe that at this point, because of the MACDIS work we had done the day before, the Ft. Bragg Brigade and the Ft. Hood Brigades had been told, "Think about you might deploy" -- there was not a decision to

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deploy them until somewhere around 8 o'clock Mountain time 3 September.
And they're both on here as alerted.
2nd Brigade, 1st Cav division is the -- if you go down to your fourth line on -- it would be the next to last page, alerted forces, 1 of 2.
Q Right.
A You'll see 1st Brigade Task Force -- that's 1st Brigade -- 2nd -- 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry division -- they had been given a warning order to be ready to deploy -- General Inge's son is a platoon leader in this unit --
Q Okay.
A -- so they had their duffel bags, they were ready to go, they did not have an order to move.
(Mr. Andersen entered the room.)
THE WITNESS: They were given the order to move on the 3rd, they moved the next morning of the 4th, 'cause they moved by ground convoy, and they arrived in New Orleans.
They -- they could of, if the order had been a -- given -- and we've gone through this discussion of ground forces -- the decision to put ground forces in the city of New Orleans was made by the President of the United States, and those forces move very, very quickly.
Q (By Mr. Berkovitz) So getting back to the-- the

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question which -- which you pose, which we're very much interested in --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- in the answer, if -- on a -- on day one if an order to deploy is given for a unit that is on alert --
A Yeah.
Q -- how many -- approximately how many soldiers can you have, and within how many hours? What is the -- if it's not classified.
A The -- the brigade of the 82nd is on various levels of alert all the time, 'cause it's the defense-ready brigade available for homeland purposes, or outside the United States. It normally is under a alert plus time, about 48 hours or so, to be ready to move.
Alert here shortened that timeline to be, "When told to move, move."
It also caused the United States Transportation Command to position C17s in the vicinity of Ft. Bragg, Pope Air Force Base, so when the decision was made the 82nd troops -- the lead troops got on the airplanes and flew.
'Cause the timeline that I described for Bill Caldwell, the 82nd Commander, to move, includes flying time
Q (Nodded head.)
A The -- now, if you walked this back into the National Guard capability, they did very well There's a

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infantry battalion in Virginia that went, they did not bring all their troops. They made a decision -- the battalion commander made a decision, based on the state guidance, that college students and high school students would not deploy.

So when this Virginia battalion commander deployed his infantry it deployed about 50 percent strength. They anticipated the call, gathered at the armory, and the space of time it took them to move was about 48 to 72 hours. They did not deploy with all their equipment or their vehicles, they flew in air National Guard C130s, popped down in the box. Did a great job.

Q So give -- given the ability to rapidly deploy forces on alert at that point mid-week --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and the question is should Title 10 be deployed, and General Blum -- whether his bases or his belief were accurate or not regarding the speed of deployment -- nonetheless, his position was, "No, don't send Title 10 and I've got it covered" -- or "we've got it covered", and General Honore's saying, "Don't send Title 10 ground in" -- which is what we're talking about here -- my question is was there other -- were there other views that we should send Title 10 in, and maybe, even though from a military perspective it might not have been absolutely necessary, as it turned out, from a visibility perspective,

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and just the -- or perception or actual, perhaps, need maybe relieve -- relieve the Guard, they're getting tired or they will be tired -- were there other people urging other courses of action that we, indeed, should send Title 10 in?

A No, I think the way we have described this is that you had a -- a flow of forces that -- of -- of units going into armories being moved by Air National Guard, some by ground con -- convoy -- 'cause I know out of the state of Missouri they sent some high water trucks down, and some HK helicopters that self-deployed -- that that stream was going on, that it was advocated it would be adequate for the ground presence based upon the dialogue of the Joint Staff that went on.

During the week we postulated what an alternate course of action would be if you wanted a -- a active duty formation, which became captured as the approximately 7200-person ground force that could be put on the ground -- theoretically could be put on the ground, which included a brigade from Ft. Bragg, brigade from Ft. Hood, and elements of Marine formations from both coasts as an option.

And in the national decision process the President of the United States directed the Secretary of Defense for us to execute that.

Q (Reviewed documents.)

One of -- one of the issues in the -- the actual

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deployment, and in -- in the position -- one of the things that we find confusing in the e-mails is the issue of how the Marines fit into this, the 2nd MEU. Because we have e-mails -- a number of e-mails from General Honore encouraging, apparently, General Amos --

A Yes.

Q -- to send the 2 MEU in.

A I -- I sometimes -- that's -- that's one part of the help that I will have to give you that we did not ask for.

However, I am aware that General Amos and General Honore corresponded. General Honore shared that with me, that General Honore at that point said the help will be appreciated, and the United States Marine Corps provided a special Marine air/ground task force command and control capability with Major General O'Dell, which deployed in on -- C130 self-deployed into Bell Chase, that provided a two-star command and control capability, and some -- some aviation became very useful.

And General O'Dell, then, became -- when the decision was made to send the package of 7200 he became the Marine commander for the infantry Marines that deployed in -- initially into Mississippi and, then, moved into part of New Orleans and eastern Louisiana (indicating).

Q Is there a reason why that -- why was that broken

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out separately from -- why was that kind of a separate track from every -- everything else (indicating)? Why was General Honore doing a Marine deployment separately from everything else that was being coordinated?

A I don't know what the relationship is in the past from General Honore and General Amos, or if it was just two fellow three stars and an offer -- they probably have been stationed near each other, have gone to class -- I have never asked the question how do they know each other --

Q Right.

A -- but I know that General Honore, when offered the help, said he thought this would be useful and please come -- you see that in the e-mail -- so they came.

I do not have orders or records that show a set of directions or requests that said "Please give me a -- a Marine air/ground task force" at any point here, but the capabilities were -- were indeed useful.

MR. LEPORE: Would it be unusual -- not to take anything away from the good work they did -- would it be unusual for an active duty unit like that to deploy into -- into an operating area owned -- owned -- if I could say it -- with a combatant area without the Combatant Commander asking for it? I mean, is it unusual?

THE WITNESS: Outside of the homeland it would be extraordinarily unusual

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Mr. Brown had moved down to Baton Rouge, two Army colonels were deployed to join him to be -- help him as a staff -- he didn't have much of a staff -- the defense coordinating officers were working very hard to keep us informed, and our -- our efforts and what we were doing was the -- to make and -- enable FEMA to be successful to the best of our ability, with awareness, that we might be asked to take greater -- a greater unity of command, if you will; but, at the same time, the unity effort, unity of purpose that we were trying to achieve we were working our way towards slowly but surely making improvements on that (indicating).

Q At some -- in the late -- very late Friday there was FAXed to the Governor -- General Blum presented the proposal to the Governor, with assistance or direction of the White House, to have the -- General Honore be the dual hat, and, so, we're trying to understand the pro -- the considerations underlying why that option eventually was -- was pursued, and -- 'cause there was a significant change from -- at that point in time from the way the command and control had been, it would have shifted to General Honore, and, so, we're trying to understand the pros and the cons, and -- and how that option evolved.

A Yeah.

Q Looking back on it, in terms of -- now that

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you've been through it once and you're aware of the issues that states have with pursuing that track, and, at the same time, the difficulties assuming command and control of the -- at the Title 10 level and the responsibilities, what -- what would you take away from that in terms of a future event where the same -- similar issues may come into play, where you have a large Guard component and you have a large Title 10 component? Should we continue to pursue this dual hat chain, are we going to continue -- we going to run into the same issues and just have -- by -- by many accounts General Honore and General Landrieu -- I think you just mentioned -- worked it out, they made it happen on the ground, so all the -- the tactical level -- a lot of this got ironed out; maybe it could have been more efficient with a single commander, yet the job got done.

Given the political difficulties and the institutional difficulties of all of a sudden putting one person in command of two very different --

A Yeah.

Q -- structures, the National Guard plus the Title 10, are we going to be able to solve that for the next crisis, or do we just say, "Okay, we have -- we have really qualified people, if you have top-notch commanders at the state level and federal level, like General Honore and his counterpart, they'll work it out?"

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What do you -- where do you sort of come down on that at this point?

A I think there's a couple of pieces. I -- I'm in favor of unity of command; however, in the homeland we're never going to have pure unity of command as I would understand it as a military leader, which is a piece of -- piece of ground, and that which is friendly belongs to me, because we're going to have an interagency construct and we're going to have the various levels of government.

Even a dual hat commander is an indicator that you don't have unity of command, 'cause he is reporting to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commander, and to the Governor. He has two bosses (indicating).

Now, is there a -- in a deliberate planning thing we know that we can make that work.

I will tell you for the dual hats that have been used in both conventions, they were active duty two- and three-star Joint Task Force commanders on alert in the event a crisis had happened. Joint Task CS was on alert -- Civil Support was on alert for the Democratic convention and the Republican convention to be responding in case of a weapon of massive destruction event, and Joint Task Force East -- General Honore's headquarters -- was on alert in case we had a scale problem that required a three-star commander.

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It was not envisioned that the dual hat commander would handle a crisis, he would handle the military support by the state and local level for the -- for the deliberate events requiring military support to a domestic event.

So there are those who say we did dual hat here in these deliberate events, it's good for crisis, and I go -- what I can read of plans, and I executed two of these as the operations officer -- the plan was not to execute the crisis with that dual hat commander, it was to execute it with the Joint Task Forces that stand ready (indicating).

Q (Nodded head.)

A So you don't hear that from those who come forward.

Now, the challenge you have is in this event EMAC was used to raise an Army for the Governor, it raised an Army that was unclear for task of purpose who arrived to the state; go through the menu of things, there are -- each have capabilities, and you go kind of cohesive, you look at what we do in the military, it's a darn solution.

And when we went to a certain scale I think that masked the crisis at hand, it became, "Don't come, we can raise people from Wisconsin."

I think we have to ask ourselves, "Is that how we want to do business in the homeland?"

If it is, we'll -- we will move to support that

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It's the choice.
But I do not believe that was ever envisioned under the EMAC agreements -- which are governor to governor, state to state -- that we would orchestrate a 54-political entity raising an Army.
And I think it put delay into the response, measured not in weeks, measured maybe in hours or days, but it delayed us at times.
I believe when you look at the scale of that response there was not an adequate command and control solution provided within the state for the response forces that came, so I think that has to be worked forward.
If you decide to do this with National Guard, make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau an orchestrator of how we respond, you're going to have to ask yourself -- and he would advocate standing up state joint headquarters capabilities, and that is a course of action that should be looked at.
Q (Nodded head.)
A It's a -- you know, when I work my way through these, whatever the -- any of the options that through the week we could of -- we could make work, I'm not sure if I was in a deliberate plan I would deliberately advocate this state Army solution (indicating).
I think the intent of the militia act and all --

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and all of the state people from that state responding to the needs is good, I think the EMAC piece locally is good, but when you begin to get to this kind of scale I think we had problems with underlying unity of effort and unity of purpose.
So unity of command's a good argument, but the challenge that really failed during the week was really getting all the assets moving to be helpful.
Q I think it helps if I circle back to something we were talking about at the beginning of the outset, when you appointed the -- "you" being NORTHCOM -- appointed General Honore as the JTF Commander, a three-star general -- if you could articulate for us, or explain to us if making that determination of a three star -- what are you -- what statement does that make about the level of complexity and the level of response and the level of experience needed to manage that, and that -- you've obviously made some determination of a senior military --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- officer is needed to manage that, that's judgment of capability plus seniority plus experience plus training that you may or may not be able to get in a week-long course for --
A Yeah.
Scale of operation You get to a point where

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your commanding joint capabilities on the scale have a numerics here, 20, 25,000 joint personnel; your commanding capabilities on the sea, in the air, and on the land; you're operating at a -- a complex interagency environment, I think it begs for a joint interagency task force command solution.
The scale of that problem as you look at it can go from a colonel level to a multi-star level, and in this case two dozen plus ships, 70,000 or so displaced people in -- in a challenging environment in New Orleans, the damage to southern Mississippi, nature of working between two governors, multiple federal agencies in support, working directly on report for a four-star Combatant Commander in this environment, this -- this environment of collaboration, I think that the answer of a JTF commander at the two- or three-star flag officer level is appropriate.
Q (Nodded head.)
MR. ELDRIDGE: Could I ask a follow-up?
EXAMINATION
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Maybe it would not surprise you, but in conversations with people on the National Guard Bureau they come to some different conclusions than you've just expressed --
A Yes.
Q -- about what the take-aways were from this

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experience.
A Yeah
Q And I guess that raises a concern that if they come away with a set of conclusions that's different from the set of conclusions by --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- the senior General in charge of operations at NORTHCOM, what does that say about if one of these catastrophes were to happen next, whether we would be engaging in some of these same types of debates that -- that occurred over that first week?
A Uh-huh.
Q In particular, I think their conclusion would be that the flowing in of these forces creating a private Army for the Governor, as described --
A Not "private", a Army -- raising an Army.
Q Raising a Army.
A I wouldn't call it "a private Army". She is an elected state official.
Q I didn't mean --
A And I know you didn't, but -- but what I want to make very certain is we have, within our Constitution, certain authorities reserved -- I think they're appropriate -- but under this EMAC arrangement, which is a later arrangement which does not necessarily have federal

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direction, it's a governor and governor relationship.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, who is a federal appointed officer, used that device in order to provide incredible amounts of manpower into a state, and you can -- and I think we need to have a debate did that help or not. And they would say it does, I would say yes. But there was some tremendous pain in being aware of what we were doing.
And, oh, by the way, these were not cohesive, equipped, ready units that were deployed, these were individuals with a ad hoc chain of command.
And, so, you have incredible reception stationing all the movement, integration of units deployed without task and purpose until they arrive at the state. It's a heck of a way to do military business, and in a case where you're coming and you're going to go out as 25 people groups to run distribution points and stuff, the works -- Florida has done this very well at a scale much less than this, with help.
I'm not against EMAC, I just think we need to be careful of the scale
And what happened here with the scale is, I believe, we preempted decisions that belong to the Secretary of Defense, we preempted roles that are assigned under the Unified Command Plan to the Joint Force Commander, JFCOM, to be a force provider, and I think we stepped on the toes of

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what we've assigned by the Unified Command Plan to the NORTHCOM Commander as a Combatant Commander for the area
TRANSCOM was severely hindered by the deployment of the Air National Guard capabilities of Air National Guard here as where planes were to be in order to optimize them to bring things out
And the way we resolved that was TRANSCOM put in discipline to say, "You cannot land without permission."
And later the Air National Guard did a great job inputting their -- their missions into the global system so that we had visibility on it, but initially we did not
So we have an architecture which the scale of this -- the -- the National Guard Bureau is not an operational headquarters; if we want it to be, then we're going to need to -- to legislate in that direction, and we're going to then look at how -- what the other unified commanders do in support, and that becomes an argument within the -- the defense department I think we should have
Q And, again, I'm not -- they might disagree with what you just described as some of the challenges, but I think, again, the take-aways from it might be different in that they might say, "Well, the solution as we see it is to strengthen and develop a -- a better regional command structure" --
A Uh-huh

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Q -- "that has buy-in from governors, and to develop a cadre of skilled commanders, you know, two-star generals level, who have the skills and qualifications who could occupy a regional command structure that has that kind of buy-in from -- from the governors, and could exercise better oversight over the flow of those forces", as you described it.
I don't know if you see that as something that -- that would work, would improve the situation, or whether you think they're heading the wrong direction with that, but that's the sense we got of what -- what they conclude would improve the situation next time.
A I -- I think there's work to be done on what that architecture could be. We got a heck of a lot of two- and three-star headquarters already in the homeland; of all the J3s there's no one -- no other geographic commander who has -- in his area has as many command and control headquarters as we have. So I don't see this as a problem of having available command control headquarters.
It's a good argument to say at what level should you have staffings and -- and people focused, and should be focused regionally within a state, building more layers of command is -- is a solution, then you have to do your military utility and affordability things, "Do I need specialized commanders to do -- to do this?"

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If -- if we had been given, as an available solution, the division command element out of Indiana -- I can't remember if it's the 35th or 38th -- and been able to have a regime with that combat formation to be ready to be joined and able -- which is part of what the Army is trying to do with these headquarters, is to have two- and three-star headquarters and joint-enabled -- you could argue that that unit trained for combat and ready for combat would have utility to do this -- do you need another two- or three-star commander stationed somewhere to be responsible with this?
I've seen that plan.
We did for pandemic -- we've been doing a lot of work for pandemic, we've looked at what would happen if you needed to come to the regional construct, and we found an almost bottomless supply of two- and three-star headquarters that exist now in the Guard, the Reserve, and the active forces, that could be missioned and go through the training readiness to be able to do this.
So I --
Q I understand what you're saying.
A -- I think the problem that's being articulated is -- is, one, the solution, which is very narrowly they go this way versus that bears more than powerpointed drawing and -- and analytical analysis, and, then, it's a matter

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of -- of tradeoffs, because how much -- how much do we wish to buy if this is a specialized capability that's only for the homeland, how often have you and the homeland needed a -- a military Joint Task Force in the past 10 years.

Q I guess from --

MR. BERKOVITZ: I guess go back to the War of 1812, or something.

THE WITNESS: Well, we used a number of senior leaders in our own Civil War, and we have used Task Force Andrew, there have been capabilities

So it -- it -- it bears study. And I -- I'm very open to all courses of action.

Q (By Mr. Eldridge) Well, as a committee doing this investigation and, to some extent, looking at oversight of -- of Homeland Security aspects of it, I guess the question is what -- what is NORTHCOM doing to talk to the National Guard Bureau about these issues --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- to see if they can be worked out to everybody's satisfaction in terms of what -- what's best for the country?

A There's a lot of efforts. I understand Joint Force Headquarters has been working very hard at the effort to socialize and train plans and all for the state joint headquarters; we're working downstairs with the National

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Guard Bureau in order to tie the Joint Operations Centers together and decide on the details of the agreed information exchanges.

I've imbedded in this Operations Center a watch desk.

The Chief of Staff is bringing in the most likely hurricane state leaders here in about two weeks, and we're going to have a full day -- very little of which is NORTHCOM -- to discuss what -- what we should do for the way ahead.

We think that there are models that we and the states have used that have been very successful, that have provided capabilities and a lot of situational awareness successfully.

I think the state of Florida, for -- for example, can be very proud of their efforts in Wilma this year, and in last year's campaign season

And Rowe is never in charge, and I never would be 'cause I'm a J3, but the Combatant Command NORTHCOM was provided as being supportive through the Defense Coordinating Officer.

And we're actually going to use a Hurricane Wilma, Florida, estimate brief to help do that conversation with the -- the adjutant generals.

But it -- it's -- there's a lot to be done

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Our body of plans, as they're completed and undated the J5's been charted -- and I think the Secretary's told the Combatant Commander the job this year is to update the body of plans within the Department of Defense. We have a lot of work to be done there, it's important to get to what you're saying.

MR. ELDRIDGE: You have a follow-up on that?

MR. BERKOVITZ: No.

Q (By Mr. Eldridge) I know we have very little time now, but immediate response authority, do you feel it was enhanced? It was exercised by individual commanders in the case of Katrina, did you observe that?

A I think so. I think so. I think it -- lots of evidence of that in southern Mississippi.

Q Were you satisfied with the -- the way in which the Air Force got engaged in the response?

A For the most part. Air Force being -- there's a number of Air Force capabilities deployed under STRATCOM authorities and TRANSCOM authorities.

Much like other services I have anecdotes and things that happened that didn't have situational awareness; or there was one Air Force command element that wasn't that far away from the JTF, but waited two days for an airplane to come and pick him up and fly him there instead of just getting in their vehicles and driving.

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There's an urgency e-mail.

But I think much to the credit of the -- the services and the -- the Air Force, across all of their components, I think did a -- did an admirable job of helping orchestrate the inclusion of Air Force Reserve capabilities and Air National Guard capabilities productively.

Q Did --

MR. ELDRIDGE: Go ahead, follow up.

MR. ANDERSEN: Can I follow up on the question of immediate response?

MR. ELDRIDGE: Sure.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. ANDERSEN:

Q There is an e-mail from you that says, "For SA, For OPG, who is working the expanding authority question related to" --

A Right.

Q -- "installation response?"

What would be --

A Immediate re -- well, immediate response, I'm here at Peterson Air Force Base and my fire department can operate off the base in Colorado Springs, you know, that's within --

Q Right.

A What we were talking about the expanded immediate

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response is getting the helicopters out of Ft. Polk down to New Orleans -- that's about a four-hour drive, a couple hours' -- that is well beyond what the garrison base commanders understand their immediate response authority to be, and on a scale that's different.

So I think that that's -- or that's on the -- probably on the 30th?

Q This was on the 31st.

A 31st.

Q And there was another e-mail on the 1st regarding it.

But was -- was there any -- was there any resolution to that question?

A No, 'cause I think the other greater capabilities coming from across our nation and provided by EMAC began to pick up the piece.

But as you -- you know, as you -- you realize, on the 30th, 31st, 1st operationalizing the evacuation out of New Orleans was a tremendous challenge, and understanding who was doing what to contribute to that, who was in charge.

You know, we talk a lot of times about unity of command up here, command up here, I also approach it from the point of view you had an operation to be done, you had 20,000 people plus -- 'cause the Superdome was refillable for awhile -- you had the convention center, and, then, you

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had folks along the -- the interstate causeways, the dry spots, you had an operation, how did that evacuation get executed (indicating)? Who was in charge?

Q (Nodded head.)

MR. ELDRIDGE: General Graham.

THE WITNESS: General Graham's your answer.

MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, no, I mean, he was -- he did the planning and coordination.

THE WITNESS: General Vermilion will tell you he was in charge.

MR. ELDRIDGE: Exactly.

MR. ANDERSEN: Right. Right.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. ELDRIDGE:

Q From your perspective -- from the NORTHCOM perspective, General Graham.

A FEMA was in charge of deciding where -- where things were going to.

Q (Nodded head.)

A The -- the value added of General Honore and General Graham on the ground down there was to suggest military discipline, logic, and tracking.

I think General Graham's advice and assistance in making sure water and pot -- port-a-potties, General Honore's physically the one who led those folks on how you

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would walk from the Superdome over to where you get on the bus.

This is not rocket science and does not require a three-star general.

Q Not surprisingly other people will say they're the ones that figured that out, too.

A And Mr. Parr believes that he was going to orchestrate this using somewhere around the 2500 sorties of air -- helicopters, and think about the catastrophic failure there from that one- or two-pad thing when you operationalize this.

There were a lot of people who were parents and contributed to that; I think General Graham, as an executive officer, essentially for General Honore in helping him think through this, and I think the active guys in terms of saying, "Hey, we need to get this on", 'cause every difficulty was coming up.

But I don't think the active duty guys moved the buses anywhere.

And I know Guard units facilitated the security environment and -- and all, had a little bit of coaching on where to go.

So I think there's a lot -- how did that happen? Certainly didn't have unity of command.

Q (Nodded head.)

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EXAMINATION

BY MR. BERKOVITZ:

Q One of -- one of -- I mean, I think two of the -- we interviewed General Graham a week or two ago --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and walked through all the details of his involvement -- and -- and it's a pretty -- very compelling story, always one has to keep it in the context of in support of -- that he was not in charge, he was in support of, and he didn't state otherwise -- but the perception is when you see a general with a star, two star, three stars, saying, "I think we should do this", even civilians, "That man's in charge."

A Yes.

Q And, so, although in support of is really what it is, that gets dropped in --

A Yeah.

Q -- talking about it and in perception.

The other -- the other really important mission that we've learned about was -- when we were here last time we talked to Colonel Woods -- the whole logistics mission.

But both General Graham's mission and -- and Colonel Woods mission was done not with thousands of ground troops and soldiers with weapons and tanks and --

A Uh-huh

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Q -- brigades and what we see in Iraq, it's done with -- with plan -- logistics planning and management and leadership capabilities that the military has developed; but should not -- we should have -- we should have civilian agencies that are up to the task of doing that in -- in a crisis rather than coming up to the default option which is -- which is DOD?

A Uh-huh.

But those -- those two officers and others from the National Guard, other components, made enormous difference in doing what we were describing earlier.

What our work was during most of this period we have been discussing was in accordance with the National Response Plan to support the lead federal agency and to make them successful in supporting the people of the two -- of the two states and of the local communities.

And I think when you -- you back off and look at what they did, it was interesting.

I would extend stars having an influence down to colonels, and I think if you looked across the range of colonels that came into the box from all the components there is -- what you hit on, there's a -- a -- a thing about where the colonel or the general walks, and what they do in their ability that people from other agencies, responders, local government officials, value and respect and will

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listen to. Make a tremendous difference.

And I think you -- you're capturing something proper in there.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. ELDRIDGE:

Q One of the things that has been mentioned by some FEMA people was that in the National Response Plan DOD is different, DOD is the only entity with which we need to negotiate when we want them to do something, and there has been a suggestion this caused delays in getting a response. What do you have to say about that?

A Well, I think the National Response Plan and the architecture built with that builds -- that we're a last resort.

Q But the negotiation element of it, they might submit a request for assistance -- they call it a "mission assignment", you call it a "request for assistance" --

A (The witness nodded head.)

Q -- and, then, it leads to negotiation, and their -- their view is -- some people have expressed it in interviews -- that that caused delay in getting needed commodities or services to -- to people. Did you observe that at all?

A I -- not in this operation, 'cause the earliest in which we got this verbal order, I'm not -- I'm not sure

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how any part of the uniformed services could be faster. You know, it takes time for a ship to move, the -- but from exercises and lessons learned this is a -- a place within the National Response Plan that these requests, whatever you call them, or mission assignments, are graded, determined, parched over --

Q In specific, the big logistics mission assignment for a billion dollars that came in on Friday the 2nd, that Colonel Woods was involved with -- which we did interview her extensively about -- do you know, was she and her group taking action with regard to that as early as that Friday, or sooner than that?

A I think well before that. All week we were trying to figure out what -- what the laydown was so we could support it.

Q (Nodded head.)

A We're the notes.

Q And, then, the last question I have is under what circumstances do you see, under the National Response Plan or any kind of catastrophic annex, the Department of Defense becoming the first responder?

A I think the -- the measure for that -- that decision point is a loss of effective ability to save lives, preserve life, do immediate aid capabilities within a local -- within a -- within an area.

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Q (Nodded head.)

A The greater challenge will be to have multiple levels of government agree that we've had a catastrophic event.

Q And is that what HSPD5 directs that the Department of Defense, including other agencies, plan for, do you know?

A I think that's where we're headed.

Q (Nodded head.)

A I think the -- the Critical Inci -- Catastrophic Incident Management Annex, and all, is aimed at trying to determine that.

But the first -- first challenge is to agree that this is the trigger, and to who makes that decision that designates. As we've already discussed, uniformed people are very willing to step in and take charge.

Q (Nodded head.)

But you need to decide under what circumstances that's appropriate for them to do, and have an agreement at -- as you said -- all levels of our government? The appropriate levels of government.

A Yeah.

MR. BERKOVITZ: I just want to complete in -- in the record, we had Exhibit 7 regarding the question of whether there was sufficient Guard forces or Title 10

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needed, and the -- the e-mail in Exhibit 7 was General Honore saying he was going to push back on the governor.
This will be Exhibit 13 (indicating).
This will be "14", then (indicating).
(Exhibit Numbers 13 and 14 were marked for identification.)
(A discussion was held off the record.)
EXAMINATION
BY MR. BERKOVITZ:
Q Exhibit 7, General Honore said he was going to push back on the governor in terms of need for troops, and that was on Thursday, the 1st, at 11:46 a.m.; and this is an e-mail you are forwarding to -- you are sending to Mr. Hickey, and cc General Honore, Roger e-mail from Colonel Hickey to you Wednesday afternoon, where Colonel Hickey, on behalf of General Honore, saying, "We are analyzing, but think there are enough Army National Guard Soldiers and volunteers to perform all these missions. Commanding General" -- that would be General Honore --
A (Nodded head.)
Q -- "thinks Louisiana Army National Guard was reluctant to move into New Orleans. Working with Tony Daskalvech. CG is going to Baton Rouge to attempt to try to get ground truth."
So he was try -- going to Baton Rouge to get the

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ground truth to analyze and see if they needed more ground troops and exactly the situation, and that was the response to you prior to his later response, which said he thinks there are enough and is going to push back on the governor --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- is that correct with your recollection?
A Yeah, this -- there's not a lot of follow-up.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Do you know what he was getting at by his saying that he had the impression Louisiana National Guard didn't want to go into New Orleans?
A I know from follow-up discussions that we were very unclear as to what capabilities were committed by the Louisiana National Guard into the city of New Orleans.
My estimate is that if the Guard forces had comprehensively been employed in the city of New Orleans in the manner that we saw starting on the 3rd and 4th of active and Guard forces we would not have a debate about Title 10 forces having put in, I don't think there would have been a need.
I think the need was for uniformed squads and platoons providing a presence, a willingness to help someone with their suitcase, to ask them if they needed to get to

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some place they could be evacuated, to drop them off a bottle of water, and I don't believe we were seeing that on the -- the national media, it was focused on New Orleans. It may have been happening somewhere within my scope.
But beginning on the 4th of September it was clear that there were -- there were infantry and other soldiers moving in squads, often with a first responder -- a policeman or a -- a Guard people -- in boats and -- up and down helping people.
Q We know there were people from many states that had begun to come in by that point, I guess my question to you is have you done an analysis of the Louisiana National Guard of what -- they moved troops in, or how many they had in on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday? Is that something you had gotten aware of necessary of, or visibility of?
A We have awareness of numbers, such as what you have; we do not have awareness of the exact locations, and the task and purpose being executed by these formations.
As Guard formations deployed -- I tracked very closely the Oregon Brigade, the 41st, it actually deployed after that weekend that the 82nd and all -- General Fred Reese, the TAG of Oregon, I believe they deployed about 1400 Oregon soldiers from the 41st Brigade. They deployed 6, 7, 8, 9 September, moved in that week into the city of New Orleans; shortly before Rita happened they moved out of New

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Orleans, prepared to redeploy, assisted in the southwest parrishes and, then, redeployed to Oregon.
They did not receive where they were going to, their task or purpose, until they arrived in New Orleans, they stayed for a space total commitment of about 21 days to include deployment.
Their commander was Brigadier General Witt, I believe, who was actually on General Honore's conference calls.
And while they were there I think they did a tremendous job.
Q I guess I'm still a little confused. Are you saying that -- that it's your view that if the Louisiana National Guard had deployed more soldiers into New Orleans earlier after the landfall that we would not have had the debate over Title 10 forces?
I thought that's what I heard you say.
A I think that the presence and hu -- humanitarian support mission could have been executed.
Q Could have been executed better than it was?
A With the numbers. I think the numbers were there, I don't know if they had the organizational capability.
Q I see what you're saying. Even if they were there, perhaps they were unorganized to effect the --

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A I don't know, do not -- do not have the situational awareness.
I -- what I do know is I -- I -- is that they weren't at these locations doing these things.
Q Okay.
A When the active force arrived they began to pair with, cooperated with those units, and supported this very well.
General Caldwell, the 82nd Commander, shows the Oklahoma Brigade in his -- his map as part of his formation, they were not -- they were Title 32, he's Title 10, but, I mean, the cooperation on the ground was tremendous.
Q Do you know how the airport was secured?
A When?
Q Well --
A New Orleans International Airport?
Q Yes.
We've seen reports of unrest, Brigadier General Graham landed there Friday morning about 2 in the morning; I've seen e-mails from General Honore saying, "Send MPs there", and we know that ultimately, I guess, some of the 82nd element went there.
A Yeah.
Q So between Thursday --
A We had a great deal of difficulty being able to

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identify a Red Cross feeding site, or a New Orleans International Airport, and suggest a need for a capability to be there to help provide an environment of some security.
You'll find in my e-mail allusions to that of Secretary McHale, as well as conversations he's relating from Secretary Jackson.
Q We have seen those.
A I have communicated that with the National Guard Bureau.
I am unaware that the National Guard ever succeeded in putting an element there to help sort that through
Transportation Command ended up sending security police, and, then, when the 82nd came in they gave, I believe, the Divarty(phon) Commander the responsibility of helping in that environment.
And the key thing they did to secure it and make that environment safe is they got out the trash bags and picked up the trash, and they just changed the environment to, "We're going to act like human beings, we're going to work together", and -- and these were -- these were not bad people that were in these places, but there wasn't a -- the organization and the safety environment for them I don't think had been supported to the extent it could have been.
MR. ELDRIDGE Thank you

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MR. BERKOVITZ: I have one exhibit I would just like to put in the record, we've been talking about it. This is Exhibit --
THE COURT REPORTER: "15".
MR. BERKOVITZ: -- "15".
EXAMINATION
BY MR. BERKOVITZ:
Q This is an e-mail from Colonel Timothy Kadavy, the National Guard Bureau, Friday, September 2nd, at 12:25 p.m.
"NORTHCOM JOC. Attached is the initial deployment message and MOD that NGB sent to the 54 states and territories" --
A Yeah.
Q -- "Major General Young asked that this be forwarded for your SA."
A Uh-huh.
Q So on Friday the 2nd they're sending you the -- what they put out on Wednesday the 31st regarding the deployment --
A I alluded to that earlier.
Q Yes.
A I did not know about that, and extent; and the intent of that was to cause us to be very calm, "That there will be enough soldiers and troops there" --

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Q (Nodded head.)
A -- "you don't need to come."
Q But that wasn't sent to you until two days after the -- that order.
A Then this is -- the National Guard was orchestrating operations.
Q (Nodded head.)
A I don't think that's in their national charter or what they're asked to do, but I think they would -- I think they were in what Northern Command does.
And I think that before they send out a 54-entity EMAC thing they ought to at least ask what the NORTHCOM Commander's thoughts are on that, and the Joint Force Commander, and the other service providers.
Q (Nodded head.)
A I also think there's a social contract for these soldiers who are part of the militia of these states; and I think myself, I'm now Sergeant Rowe in the state of Wisconsin, and -- I have taken two oaths when I enlisted -- and I'm the -- and now I'm in Louisiana as a Title 32 guy.
Q (Nodded head.)
A I don't know if that -- maybe -- at the TAG level that's the right way to do things, but I think at the social contract for that individual citizen soldier I think we need to think that out

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
EXHIBIT #6

UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

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In the Matter Of: :
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SPECIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE :
HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE :
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Washington, D.C.

Monday, January 23, 2006

The interview of MICHAEL D. BROWN, called for examination by the United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, in Room SD-338, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., convened at 8:41 a.m., before Donald J. Jacobsen, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the parties:

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Majority:

JONATHAN T. NASS, ESQ.
MICHAEL BOPP, ESQ.
ASHA A. MATHEW, ESQ.
TOM ELDRIDGE, ESQ.
Counsel
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
340 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

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Q Were any of the DHS entities outside of FEMA mission assigned prior to landfall?
A Well, I don't know the answer to that question, because--I mean, it's a fascinating question, because, see, a mission assignment is where we tell another Department or agency go do this and don't worry about it, because I'm going to pay you. I'm not certain at the tactical level that we necessarily--I mean, we may follow up with the mission assignment paperwork--this we're getting way into the weeds--we may follow up with paperwork later on, but if we need something from the Coast Guard or CBP or ICE, we just call them and tell them to go do it, because we're all part of the same Department. So that technicality has got me hung up, mission assign.
Q Okay; moving aside from the technical jargon of mission assignments--
A Right.
Q --did you tell Coast Guard or ICE or Customs and Border Patrol or the National Communications System prior to landfall that you needed stuff from them?
A The only one I specifically recall talking to is Admiral Collins about the Coast Guard, that whatever they had moved out of the area, I wanted moved back into the area as quickly as possible to do search and rescue, to do the lifesaving that we knew was going to be important

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Q Post-landfall, did you talk to any of the other DHS entities with responsibilities under the National Response Plan to try to get assets from them?
A No, not from me directly. Not from me.
Q Do you know if other FEMA people did?
A As a matter of fact, no, I don't. I can only assume that as part of the ESF function and the operations in a disaster that since they're representing those ESFs, they were tasked to do certain things.
Q During the course of the days after landfall, was there a time when you felt law and order and security were becoming an issue in New Orleans or anywhere else in the Gulf Coast, for that matter?
A There was a point where clearly, I needed more information about truth on the ground about what was happening. I received a phone call from one individual about mayhem in the Superdome, and the Governor and I continuously tried to get, you know, real time information about what was going on.
I spoke to Governor Barbour on one occasion, actually in person, I think, about his concerns about looting and civil disturbance, but he had it under control. So we didn't do anything further with that. I don't think with Riley, I had any conversations with him about it.
Q In Louisiana, did you ever seek additional help in dealing with concerns about public safety?

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A The Governor made a request for additional National Guard troops, and we pushed that request through to get additional National Guard troops, yes.
Q Did you seek additional help at any point from DHS entities on public safety and security from ICE or--
A Yes.
Q --when I say you, I'm sorry--
A Right.
Q --FEMA.
A Yes, FEMA may have; I did not. FEMA may have. I just--
Q Do you know of any requests--
A I don't know; yes, I don't know.
Q You said earlier when we were talking about the Convention Center that one of the things that the DOD guys who were with you were doing was helping get situational awareness. When you originally came down to Louisiana prior to landfall, did you bring with you anyone to perform that function, to try to get situational awareness for you?
A No, I had already sent those: Bahamonde, Phil Parr, and it seems like there was somebody else that went--I thought I had sent somebody else with the DMAT team that was going into the Superdome. For some reason, I thought there were three people going with that team into the Superdome.

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Other than them, no.
Q Were their responsibilities to provide you with situational awareness?
A That was part of their responsibility, yes.
Q Was there anybody who that was their primary responsibility?
A Well, let me back up. That probably was--I mean, Phil Parr's primary responsibility is to act as kind of a deputy FCO in that localized situation for Lokey. Part of his other primary responsibility is to feed Lokey real time information about what's really going on and what do you really need. So I guess I have to say that, yes, that was part of his primary responsibility.
Q Did there come a time later in that week where there were additional people sent to support you as PFO that were sent from DHS?
A Yes.
Q And how many people were sent?
A I just remember Thad came in to go into New Orleans and just do New Orleans, and I don't think that they sent anyone at that time to Mississippi. I think they just sent Thad and his contingency with Thad into New Orleans
Q Was there a time when people were sent to support you for situational awareness purposes or for others for personal support functions?

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Mitre interview notes of your interview.
A Of my interview?
Q Yes. Please take a look at it and let me know if you reach the same conclusion.
A It must be mine, because it sounds like me.
Q That's what I thought.
A What does that mean?
Q Nothing; I just thought it sounded like you. For example, if you can just go to page 8 for a moment, two thirds down the page, the paragraph starts we're getting taxed to death.
A That doesn't sound like me, now, does it?
Q Mitre should do a case study of Secretary structure; we can at least get into a holding pattern. Sounds like what you were just talking to us about earlier, correct?
A Yes.
Q I will represent to you that these are documents that Mitre produced to us under compulsion. They've redacted names, but in your case, do you believe that these are your interview notes?
A I honestly don't know if these are my interview notes or not, but it certainly sounds like exactly what I would have said to Mitre to these questions.
Q If you can go to page 9, on the bottom right, it

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says 9; halfway down, there's a line that says M, question mark, we may ask you to talk with Jackson, what kind of role will he play? Do you see that? And it says when White House talked to me, I said DHS must have a deputy who could do strategy. Secretary's time is taken on the Hill. Jackson was chosen specifically for those reasons and to fix certain things

Ken Burris is a great example. I needed someone to kick ass and get people to do what they need to do. He'll fire people. Patrick is purely political. He thinks White House. See all that?
A Yes.
Q Now, again, it is not our goal here to get into character assassination. However, you did name Patrick Rhode as your acting deputy director, and, you know, I do understand your comment earlier about he worked together with Ken Burris. But if you agreed that he was purely political and didn't have an operational background, why did you name him your acting deputy.
A Because I thought he would work with Burris and get done what needs to be done. I thought it made a good management team.
Q Why didn't you just make Burris your deputy?
A For exactly the reasons I spell out here about why I like Ken He'll kick ass and get people to do what they

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need to do, and I need to balance that.
Q Yes, by the way you, I mean, you had some emergency management experience, and you had more experience as general counsel of FEMA as well, I mean, and had been through many different disasters before you became the Director of FEMA, correct?
A Correct.
Q Patrick Rhode had none of that.
A That is correct.
Q And, I mean, in retrospect, do you think it was a wise move to make him the acting head of the place when you were down in Louisiana?
A Well, I mean, I can second guess it all day long, but I thought I had a good team. I mean, you know, I respect the heck out of Ken Burris and Ed Buikema and Mike Lowder and Dan Craig and Patrick and Altschuler. I thought those guys as a team--and that's how we operated was as a team. So for me to sit here and throw Rhode under the bus for being, you know, a political guy, I'm just not going to--I'm not going to buy into that. I had a team concept there.
MR. BOPP: Okay; can we go off for a quick second?
[Discussion off the record.]
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Mr. Brown, my name is Tom Eldridge, and I'm on the

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majority staff, senior counsel here on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and I'd like to ask you just a few questions about the relationship between your role and that of the Department of Defense in the Katrina response. First, could you tell us when did you first have a conversation with General Honore?
A What day, I don't recall. He was on his way to Baton Rouge. He had not arrived yet. He was having a hard time getting there, and it was a phone conversation. And to the best of my recollection, it was in the early evening, late afternoon, by telephone.
Q Would that have been Wednesday the 31st?
A That seems right
Q Was that the day, do you recall, that you had just described earlier where you were at the Superdome with the Senators, the Governor, and possibly General Landreneau?
A It may have been, but that's not clicking.
Q Let me ask whether--you say he was on his way to Baton Rouge. Did you in fact meet with him later that same day when he arrived in Baton Rouge?
A I met with him as soon as he arrived, but for some reason, I don't think it was the same day, but it may have been.
Q Well, let's assume it's not the same day.
A Right

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Q Can you just tell us about the nature of the conversation you had with him?
A The phone conversation?
Q Yes, please.
A I mean, the nature of the phone conversation was this. He, he being General Honore, he had a list of 20 things that he was going to do. And I pushed back and said those indeed may be the 20 things that you need to do, but before you do them, you need to have a conversation with me and with the Governor or whoever she designates to make sure indeed that those are the 20 things we want you to do.
Q Was there anything--
A It was a pretty tough conversation to have with somebody like General Honore.
Q And what was his response to your push back?
A It was absolutely, yes, sir, I understand completely, and you have my whole support.
Q Can you tell us, if you recall, what the 20 things were that he wanted?
A I don't remember. I was more concerned about making sure that he understood that he was going to have to mold into this civilian operation, and before he ran off and did stuff that it was what the Governor wanted done and that I'd signed off on it
Q Do you remember when you first learned that

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General Honore had gone to the Superdome, which we believe happened Wednesday morning?
A I think either--I think I either talked to him--he either tracked me down by phone or the two liaisons I had in the operations center told me about the visit.
Q And does that at all help to jog your memory about when you were having this conversation with him? In other words, was it before or after--
A It was before he got to the Superdome.
Q Okay; so, the conversation you had with him where he said these are the 20 things that I think we need to do was before he even got to the Superdome.
A Right, right.
Q Did it relate to Mississippi, to Louisiana? Do you recall?
A The whole picture.
Q The whole picture.
A Yes, what he was going to do everywhere.
Q And you can't recall as you sit here any of the details of that?
A I really don't, because it was a tough call for me to have, because I really respect this guy, and my whole objective on the phone call was just to make sure that he understood that I want him to do all these things, but don't run off and hot dog it without the Governor and I know what you're doing.
Q Let's talk about the first time that you met him in person. Was that in Baton Rouge--
A Yes.
Q --on that Wednesday?
A Yes.
Q And was that sometime in the evening?
A It seems like it was.
Q 6:00, 6:30, does that seem about right or--
A Well it was getting dark. That was because the storms and what. It was getting dark, so it may have been later than that.
Q All right; and tell us the circumstances of your meeting with him.
A We just met, I think, out in the parking lot somewhere and marched down to a room and sat down and had a great visit and fell in love with the guy.
Q Can you tell us who was present in that meeting?
A No, he sucks up all the oxygen, so all I remember is Russel Honore.
Q Do you remember whether any people from FEMA were there with you?
A Probably some--I mean, I'm sure, because there was always someone with me; you know, Lokey may have been there, may not. You know, I think in that meeting, we went into

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the Governor's conference room off the EOC, and so, I think Landreneau was there; Scott Wells may have been there. Beyond that, I'm just--I won't speculate.
Q Was the Governor there for that meeting?
A I don't think so.
Q Was General Graham there? Do you recall General Graham?
A I remember General Graham. May have been; I just don't recall.
Q All right; can you tell us what you discussed with General Honore at that in-person meeting?
A What we needed done. We needed security and visibility at the Superdome and the Convention Center, and I needed logistics. I needed supplies moving.
Q Can you tell us in what context within the National Response Plan you were having this discussion with him? In other words, is this FEMA turning to DOD and making a formal request for assistance or giving him a mission assignment?
A Yes; I mean, it is essence that, because prior to his arrival, we had executed a formal blanket mission assignment for DOD total logistics support, and so that's the basis upon which we were having--at least in my mind, we were having a discussion.
Q Now, it's our understanding that that assignment

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was signed on Friday the 2nd, and I guess--
A Maybe it was signed, but I had reached back to headquarters and had discussions about I wanted all logistics turned over to DOD, and I'm pretty sure--that was Wednesday--that was Wednesday or Thursday. That would have been the 1st or 2nd of September? I need a calendar.
Q Thursday would be the 1st.
A Okay; so it would have been the 31st or the 1st.
Q I guess I'd like to go back if we could to that Wednesday and that first meeting that you had with General Honore in person and, I guess, ask--General Landreneau has told us that he was present during that initial meeting between you and General Honore and that there was a similar discussion to the one described earlier over the telephone about the roles and responsibilities of the General.
A Right, right.
Q Does that ring any bells?
A That sounds more like the telephone conference with him than it does the meeting. I mean, to me, as I recall the meeting, it was more I want you to do logistics. I want you just to take over logistics completely.
Q And was that with regard to evacuation, with regard to movement of commodities? What was that with regard to?
A Anything logistical, anything logistical. If we

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need FEMA people transported to St. Bernard Parish, I want you guys to do that for us. If the Red Cross or Salvation Army comes to us, and they can't get something moved, and they come and ask us to help them, I want you guys to do it. I wanted them to do everything logistical.
Q So specifically with regard to movement of people and the evacuation, was that a topic of discussion at this meeting with General Honore on we're going to say Wednesday?
A Yes, because we discussed how they were going to--I'm pretty sure that was Wednesday--about how they were going to do the evacuation from the Superdome, because it was a fairly in depth conversation about moving them to the New Orleans Airport and how they were going to run the buses and transport from the Superdome; some discussion about was there a route to get around some of the flood waters. They were going to airlift; they couldn't airlift because of the landing pad there. So yes, that was all part of the discussion there.
Q And what was General Honore's response to your various requests for assistance?
A Like it was on everything: yes, sir, we'll go figure out how to do it.*
Q And to your knowledge, when you were having these conversations, what was your anticipation for the paperwork that would be involved or that would follow these various

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conversations? In other words, was someone there being a scribe of all the things that you were asking him to do and following up, or how was that working?
A No, it was at some point, we were going to have Chertoff call Rumsfeld and just say basically, we want to do a blanket mission assignment, you know, go and do whatever they ask you to do down there, and we'll pay you for it.
Q And it's your belief that the discussion with regard to the blanket mission assignment may have started as Wednesday the 31st at your first meeting with General Honore?
A Yes, yes.
Q Can you tell us, turning now to Governor Blanco and General Landreneau, what requests, if any, they made to you specifically for Federal active duty troops and when they made those requests?
A Oh, the only request that I--and I don't remember the date; I'll go back and see if I can dig up notes or something that show the date--was she wanted more National Guard troops. And for some reason, the figure, she either wanted 40,000, or she wanted to get to 40,000 troops.
Q Do you remember the first time you learned of a request for significant numbers of troops, National Guard or Federal active duty?
A You know, counsel, I don't. I remember us having

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a discussion in her office, her little waiting room, but I don't remember what it was
Q Did you ever interpret that as a request for active duty troops that you needed to pass on to General Honore or someone else within DOD?
A No, no.
Q Were you aware of the flow of National Guard forces that was being orchestrated by the National Guard Bureau and General Blum?
A Yes.
Q And how were you made aware of that?
A The liaisons in my office.
Q Were you aware of the videoteleconference
A No.
Q So you became aware of that from a liaison to you? How did that happen?
A No, I became aware of that whatever DOD needed to do to get the additional troops was being handled, because the liaisons, the DOD liaisons in my office told me that.
Q Oh, Colonel Jordan?
A Yes, Colonel Jordan and--
Q Young?
A No, it wasn't Young.
MR. BOPP: Jones?
THE WITNESS. Yes, Jones

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BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Jones?
A Yes, those two.
Q Did you ever in any conversation with the Governor get the impression that she believed that the National Guard troops that were being brought in were insufficient for the job that she believed needed to be done?
A That's a tough question, because she was very distraught. So I don't really know that--I mean, she was always asking, you know, more troops, more troops, you know, 40,000; I remember there was at one point, she had a conversation with--I don't remember if it's somebody I can't talk about or whether it was somebody else, but she had a conversation with somebody where somebody said that, well, we're getting X number of troops in, and it was less than the 40,000, whatever she wanted, and she was okay with that, and then, sometime later, she wasn't okay with it, so she kind of vacillated back and forth a little bit.
Q So during that first week, the Governor was at times satisfied and at times dissatisfied--
A Yes.
Q --and it kind of went back and forth?
A Yes, it would be that, you know, she had this target of 40,000, and somebody would say, well, we've got 15,000 coming today and, you know, 8,000 coming the day

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after or whatever, and she seemed fairly satisfied with that. And then, you know, 15 minutes later, she would be upset because we didn't have the 40,000.
Q Did she ever express to you what capabilities she was requesting versus just a blanket number?
A No, it was always just a blanket number.
Q Did you ever hear anyone seek greater clarification as to those capabilities?
A No, I let Blum and all them handle that.
Q Did you ever develop the impression that you needed to take action to get more DOD involvement in terms of bringing in more troops based on hearing what the Governor was saying?
A I made some inquiries. I mean, I remember asking the liaisons and others a few times are we getting the troops we need? And it was always, I mean, in hindsight now, it was always my impression that there was a time line, and there was this incremental improvement every day in terms of the number of troops coming.
Q And so, you were being briefed on that, and were you satisfied with what you were hearing about the flow in of National Guard troops?
A Yes, I thought it was fine.
Q Do you recall any discussion or request coming from the State that active duty troops should be brought in

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to backfill National Guard troops in Louisiana so they could go into New Orleans and do security? Do you recall any discussion about--
A The way you phrased it, I don't remember that. But I remember some discussion about we don't want to send active duty military in to do security, because they'll actually shoot and kill people, and that's not a law enforcement; they're not going to do law enforcement. I remember having that discussion several times with Honore and Landreneau and just others that were, you know, in the mix.
Q Did the Governor, though, ever express to you a desire to bring in active duty troops--
A Yes.
Q --for any purpose?
A Yes; for what purpose?
Q For any purpose.
A Yes; I mean, I think that was when--when there were some of the security issues, I think it was the Governor who brought up the idea of active duty forces for security purposes, which then led to those subsequent discussions about we really don't want the Fifth Army in here doing security; we want the National Guard doing that
Q Can you tell us as best you can recall when the Governor brought that up?

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A It's all a blur. I mean, you'd have to feed me something to give me some sort of time frame.
Q I've seen emails suggesting that the Governor raised this issue on Wednesday the 31st, but it's really your recollection that's going to control, because I don't have any emails from you saying--
A Right.
Q --the Governor's raised it with you.
A Yes, yes, I just know she did.
Q All right.
A And that we had discussions about--I mean, I really was concerned about active duty troops going in, because, you know, some kid fires even a BB gun at them, they're going to take them out. And I also believe very deeply that we shouldn't have the military doing law enforcement. That needs to be National Guard or State and local.
Q So you were aware the Governor raised this, and you had reservations about bringing in active duty troops for the reasons you just described; is that fair to say?
A For those purposes. I had no reservations about bringing in active duty troops to do other things; you know, help evacuate or whatever, but to do law enforcement, I had a strong reservation about that.
Q So were you involved in any discussions, then,

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about using active duty troops for other purposes to avoid the law enforcement and security issues?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us about that?
A No, I can't.
Q As in you don't recall you can't, or for some reason, you can't--
A I can't tell you that because it occurred on a certain airplane with certain people.
Q Can you tell us what day that was?
A It occurred over--
Q Well, the President visited on Friday the 2nd.
A Yes, well, also, there were--
[Witness confers with DHS counsel.]
THE WITNESS: Can't talk about it, counsel.
BY MR. BOPP:
Q Well, in the past, DHS counsel and the White House have allowed witnesses to at least identify when conversations occurred and with whom. If this is a retrenchment from that, I'd like to know.
MR. TRISSELL: My direction is if it's a conversation with the President or Vice President, if those occurred, we're not supposed to acknowledge--we would ask the witness not to acknowledge the existence of those conversations.

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MR. BOPP: Okay; so no acknowledgement of conversations with the President and Vice President?
MR. TRISSELL: That is correct.
MR. BOPP: How about others in the EOP?
MR. TRISSELL: Those are the two I've been asked. And I think that's the White House position. And then, the others we've talked about before as far as the substance of conversations.
MS. SCHULTZ: And so, now, to clarify, to make sure I understand, you're instructing him not to discuss whether or not there was a conversation, not even the substance but whether or not a conversation occurred with the President and Vice President. Is that the instruction?
MR. TRISSELL: I don't believe I instructed him to--responded to Mike's question. We can read it back.
MR. BOPP: I think he said that there will be no acknowledgement of conversations with the President and the Vice President; is that correct?
MR. TRISSELL: I believe that's what I said.
MS. SCHULTZ: And what's your basis for that?
MR. TRISSELL: I've stated that before. Executive level communications.
MS. SCHULTZ: I'm not asking about the communications. The question is whether or not there was a conversation

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MR. TRISSELL: I can't give you any more answer than I've given.
MS. SCHULTZ: So it's still executive communications.
MR. TRISSELL: It's been that since day one. It's been that a year ago.
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Prior to the visit of the President, did you have discussions with anybody other than the President and Vice President about the use of Federal active duty troops?
A Yes.
[Witness confers with DHS counsel.]
Q And who did you have those discussions with?
A There was a videoconference in which Card, Rove, Hagin, and I think Hadley participated in, and I think it was about that Wednesday or Thursday.
Q And at that videoteleconference, the issue of whether to bring in active duty Title 10 troops was discussed?
A Yes.
Q And did you express your view on whether or not that should occur?
A I'm pretty sure I did.
Q And what was your view?
A My view was, you know, bring everything in I

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mean, bring more National Guard in; bring active duty; bring whatever it takes to get stuff moving and make things happen. We just needed to be careful about what we actually used the active duty forces for.
Q So you expressed no reservation to use active duty, and we're talking about ground troops now.
A Right, that is correct.
Q Was there any reservation expressed by the people on that videoteleconference to the use of active duty troops?
A I probably shouldn't be telling you about what the responses were.
Q Let me ask you whether the subject--
MS. SCHULTZ: Can we just clarify why not? I'm sorry.
THE WITNESS: Pardon?
MS. SCHULTZ: Why you shouldn't be talking about what the responses were?
THE WITNESS: Well, because it probably involves people that I shouldn't be talking about today.
MS. SCHULTZ: On the instructions of your counsel?
THE WITNESS: DHS counsel.
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q I'm going to step back from that just a moment and ask whether you remember having a conversation with Mr

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Lokey about Federalizing the response, including use of DOD troops.
A Counsel, I'll answer it this way. I recall having lots of conversations about Federalizing the response. I don't recall a specific one with Bill, but I have no reason to believe I didn't have one with Bill.
Q He's testified to us that late Tuesday or early Wednesday morning, you and he had a conversation to the effect that he was overwhelmed and that you should bring in DOD. Does that--
A That would be accurate. That would be absolutely accurate.
Q And do you remember what your response was to that?
A I had other conversations.
Q So you then raised it to a higher level.
A Absolutely.
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay.
MS. SCHULTZ: And will you discuss those conversations? I just want to clarify it for the record.
THE WITNESS: No, because it's apparently about people I shouldn't talk about.
MS. SCHULTZ: And again, upon the instruction of Mr. Trissell.
THE WITNESS: Yes.

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BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Do you recall, just with regard to that one conversation--
A The Lokey conversation?
Q Yes, there later being a reaction from the Governor with regard to this issue of Federalizing the response?
A The initial response from Governor Blanco was--it was ambiguous is the best way I can describe it.
Q Did you raise it with her directly?
A I raised it with her directly.
Q And when was that?
A I think it was the Wednesday. It was when I had the conversation with Honore, because I was cautiously optimistic that she was going to do it.
Q And what was it that you were proposing to her would be done?
A That we just Federalize this entire response, that we let the Army take it over.
Q And what would that mean for the National Guard troops?
A That they would come under the control of General Honore and the Federal Government. We invoke the Insurrection Act and get to work.
Q And you proposed that directly to the Governor?

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A We had that discussion about--I don't think I used the term Insurrection Act, because, I mean, I didn't know how much she knew about it, so I talked about Federalizing the response, just turning it over to DOD, trying to kind of ease into the conversation.
Q And prior to that, had General Honore in any way suggested to you that that's what he thought should occur?
A You know, counsel, I don't remember.
Q So it's fair to say you don't recall?
A I just don't recall. I don't recall. I mean, his attitude was whatever, I'm going to do whatever you tell me to do and whatever I think needs to be done; I mean, he was there to help.
Q Is it fair to say that you probably would recall it if General Honore was advocating Federalizing the response or not?
A Yes, because, I mean, if General Honore came to me and said hey, Brown, we want to Federalize this, you know, yes, I think it would have stuck in my mind, so I just don't remember.
Q So the idea of Federalizing and the genesis of this conversation with the Governor came from conversations you had with Mr. Lokey and others about the way the response was going?
A Yes, because it goes back to my House testimony,

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that with all due respect to the State, I could not establish a unified command. It just wasn't happening. Lokey was overwhelmed. I had all of the DHS baloney going on, and we needed to Federalize that thing.
Q And so, now, talking about the Governor, you had a meeting with the Governor, and what was her response?
A Again, I think I used the word ambivalent, ambiguous about how she reacted to it, because there was enough ambiguity that I thought we might actually be able to pull it off, that she might actually agree to this. And she did say, you know, she needed more time; she needed to talk to her staff about it, which I fully understood and respected, but I really thought I had kind of made some inroads there.
Q And that was, you think, around--
A I think that was Wednesday or Thursday. I think that was after Honore had been there, and I had the comment--I think Lokey and I--I'm not sure about Tuesday, the conversation with Lokey. I think that's incorrect. I think that occurred on Wednesday or Thursday, and it was on Wednesday or Thursday, I started approaching Governor Blanco about doing it.
Q Can you tell us just how that played out with the Governor? Maybe that will help us understand better the time line of it

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A I tried to keep--I mean, she became--it was a double-edged sword for me. The more that National Guard troops continued to show up, the more she was able to shove off that decision, because the troops were coming, I mean, the National Guard troops were coming. And so, it just kind of kept--the decision kept getting pushed back and back and back and finally came to a head when the President visited.
Q And were you aware of the nature of the offer that was made to the Governor by the President on late Friday night, early into Saturday morning?
A Yes.
Q Had you actually seen a copy of the draft MOU that was presented to the Governor prior to it being presented to her?
A I believe I had.
Q And had you had any conversations with her that Friday the 2nd on the issue of command and control of troops?
A Yes; there was some point to me where she came to me and just said I cannot do this, and she was adamant about it, and that was it.
Q Now, again, the this was with regard to an actual offer that was on the table? It was our understanding that the document may have been faxed to her late in the evening, 11:00-something on Friday night?

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A Correct.
Q So the conversation you described, her coming to you and saying I can't do it--
A That was the next day. I mean, she had--
Q On the Saturday?
A We had been on the plane that Friday, and when we all got back, I think I had run into her a few times in the EOC, and I'm thinking about it, and it wasn't until Saturday she said no, she wasn't going to do it. You're right.
Q Now, you said you were on the plane. Not including any conversations that you overheard between the President, the Vice President, and the Governor, did anyone on that Friday suggest to the Governor that the arrival of Federal troops could be speeded up if the Governor agreed to the command and control structure that was a dual hat structure as was contained in that memo?
A Yes.
Q During the day?
A Yes.
Q So it was suggested to her that Federal troops could get there quicker if she agreed to this arrangement?
A Yes.
Q Was that by Mr. Card?
A No, he was not on the plane.
Q Who was it who suggested that to her?

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[Witness confers with DHS counsel.]
A It's a result of conversations on the plane with people that I can't on the advice of DHS counsel talk to you about.
MS. SCHULTZ: For the reasons that have been stated previously?
THE WITNESS: Yes, yes.
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q I guess I'm confused. Just so it's clear, did somebody say that to the Governor in your presence?
A Yes.
Q And that's one of the people that there is a prohibition on our learning what the conversation was? Is that what I'm to understand?
A Can I even answer that question? Mr. Lester? Somebody? Yes.
Q Okay; and again, that list of people includes the President, the Vice President? Is there anybody else that--I thought that was it.
MR. TRISSELL: I think we're going through a process of elimination where you identify a couple of people.
MR ELDRIDGE: No, there's something I heard with regard to Mr. Card, but I wasn't sure what the rules were with regard to Mr. Card and whether--

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MR. TRISSELL: The rules are as they've been before, which was Mr. Card--witnesses are not supposed to discuss the substantive conversations they had with Mr. Card, Mr. Hagin, Mr. Rove, others--
THE WITNESS: What about Hadley?
MR. TRISSELL: Mr. Hadley.
MS. GROSSMAN: Hadley is in which group?
MR. ELDRIDGE: Can't relate the substance of it?
MR. TRISSELL: Correct.
MR. BOPP: Okay. Tom, we're going to have to wrap it up.
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay.
BY MR. ELDRIDGE:
Q Were you satisfied with the pace of DOD's response and of their bringing troops to bear on the response?
A Generally, yes. They were wonderful, yes. I'm trying to think of any problems I had. I just--I didn't.
Q Did you feel that DOD's process was too time consuming for approving the various requests that were being sent over to them and that that caused any delay in the response?
A Let me give you an inarticulate answer. It could have been. But I didn't see it. I saw that in last--or in 2004, which I fixed just by picking up the phone and calling certain people at DOD I didn't have to do that here But

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I was so swamped with stuff going on in Baton Rouge that if it occurred in Katrina, I just didn't see it this time.
Q Did Secretary Chertoff ever express to you a view about the issue of Federalizing or command and control of the troops?
A I don't remember.
Q Were you satisfied with the way that DOD responded to the request to take over logistics?
A Yes.
Q To your observation, what did they do, in fact?
A What did they do impact?
Q In fact.
A Oh, in fact; well, they found MREs for us. They went to suppliers that we didn't have access to and got food, and they were able to use equipment to get that food distributed to places we couldn't get it distributed to.
Q Was this any kind of capability that was unique to the Department of Defense, that they brought to bear on this?
A Yes, they've got--they've got suppliers that they don't have, and they've got toys that we don't have.
Q And were you familiar with the work of General Graham? Did you observe his work?
A Yes.
Q And can you just tell us what you observed was his

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work with regard to evacuations of the various facilities?
A He was wonderful. I mean, he pulled it off.
Q What did he pull off in your estimation?
A He brought order to chaos and got it done in a systematic, timely manner.
Q And specifically, we're talking about what?
A Superdome, the Convention Center, helping get people off where people had been rescued and put on other places, helping supplement the urban search and rescue, Louisiana Department of Wildlife or whoever had the flat bottom boats, he helped facilitate all of that. The guys were great.
Q Referring to the DOD people.
A Yes.
MR. ELDRIDGE: That's all I have.
BY MS. SCHULTZ:
Q You had previously talked about talking with Marty Bahamonde on Monday evening regarding his flyover of the City of New Orleans, and he told you, he talked to you after that flight; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And he told you that the city was flooding and that the levees had broken; is that correct?
A He told me that the levees had broken; that there was some floodwaters beginning to occur around the area of

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the Superdome, and he expressed to me his concern for his safety and told me that he was going to evacuate himself and the medical teams
Q And this was Monday evening the day of landfall?
A Yes, this--yes, that is correct.
Q Who did you discuss that information with following that phone call?
A Lokey.
Q What did you tell Lokey?
A Just what Marty had told me, and then, the next day, when Marty actually evacuated and left the Superdome and came back to Baton Rouge, I immediately took him in and sat him down with Lokey and had him debrief Lokey about what was going on down there.
Q And who debriefed Lokey, then, the next day?
A Marty.
Q Did you pass that information that Marty gave you to anyone else at that time?
A No one specifically that I recall, but again, in the context of that overall picture, it's what's being discussed the entire time there in the Governor's conference room at the EOC.
Q Marty Bahamonde has testified that you said to him thank you, I'm now going to call the White House after you spoke with him that evening, and he gave you the information

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about the levees breaking. Did you call the White House?
A I either called them, or I'm sure they called me, because I know we had conversations that evening.
Q So you did have conversations with the White House then, Monday evening after talking with Marty Bahamonde about his flyover.
A I actually think I had conversations with them just practically every day.
Q Do you remember having a conversation with anyone in the White House on Monday evening regarding Marty's flight as a result of what you saw there?
A Yes.
Q Who did you speak with?
A One of the people I can't tell you I talked to.
Q And as I understand it, that list is only the President and the Vice President, because the other people, you acknowledge that you had been in a conversation--
A Right.
[Witness confers with DHS counsel.]
THE WITNESS: I talked to either Secretary Card or Joe Hagin on probably every afternoon or evening that I was down there, so yes, on Monday evening, I'm pretty sure it was probably Joe Hagin that I spoke to. I don't think I spoke to Andy that night.
Q Did you speak with anyone else at the White House

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impression that they were already doing that sort of stuff for us.
Q And why do you have that impression?
A Because when I would ask about how are we--one of the questions I ask every single morning, how are we doing on supplies, you know? Do we have enough food? Do we have enough water? Do we have enough ice? And I had the impression that there was a backup coming in for some reason from the military that was going into Fort Worth and going into Barksdale and going into some of those places. And I thought it was the military that was bringing it in.
Q Did you see any hard evidence that that was happening?
A I mean, right now, I can't recall any, but that was the impression I had, Michael.
Q But you also said that you had talked to DHS headquarters, and you thought it was on September 1, the Thursday, about getting DOD to take over the logistical functions down in New Orleans; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Who did you talk to at headquarters?
A Well, at FEMA headquarters, I talked to, like I say, it was either Bunkema, Lowder, maybe Rhode or Burns, and at DHS headquarters, I'm pretty sure I talked to Chertoff about this one.

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Q What can you recall about that conversation with Secretary Chertoff?
A Just that, you know, he needed to call Rumsfeld, and let's turn it over.
Q So you asked the Secretary of Homeland Security to call Secretary Rumsfeld to get this mission assignment process moving?
A Right, because there's a historical rule, process, whatever that when we're going to turn over something that big, it's Secretary to Secretary, and I just wanted Chertoff to call Rumsfeld and make sure it was done.
Q And you think that happened on Thursday?
A That sticks in my mind, but I don't know why it sticks in my mind.
Q And the actual process of creating the mission assignment, this $1 billion mission assignment, I assume you were busy with other things, right?
A Yes, I never deal with--
Q You didn't have a role in that?
A Right.
Q Was that taken over by DHS headquarters, do you know?
A Lord, I hope not, but I don't know.
Q Were you aware of another mission assignment in addition to this $1 billion mission assignment which

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included a number of other functions for DOD to take over including mortuary and geospatial imaging?
A Yes.
Q In the amount of $750 million?
A Yes.
Q And how did you become aware of that?
A Well, I knew you were going to ask the question. I think I became aware of that one after the fact; after leaving FEMA and everything, I became aware of that one
Q You weren't involved in putting that one together?
A No, I don't recall that one. I think I learned about that one after the fact.
Q Your general impression, though, I think you told Tom was that DOD really did lean forward and helped out in this matter, right?
A Yes, yes.
Q But as far as--you know, we've been taking pains, and it's been very difficult, frankly, to figure out what DOD actually was doing and when. People talk about what they were doing or were not doing. We don't have any evidence. Where should we look?
A Do you have all the sit reps? It should be reflected in all the sit reps.
Q Well, I'm wondering if FEMA keeps track of the execution of mission assignments.

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A That's one of our problems is that we don't. And let me, before everyone has a heart attack over that, that doesn't mean we just give a mission assignment out and then just pay it and go on. It means that we follow-up later on, but that may be long after the storm is gone, and the activity has been done or not done.
Q Now, you had mentioned, and I'm just going to jump to one other topic really quickly, but you had mentioned that you were aware of this draft MOU that was sent to Governor Blanco about dual hatting.
A Yes.
Q Who prepared that? Do you know?
A Truthfully, I don't know who actually prepared it.
Q Do you know who was involved in preparing it?
A All those people I talked about earlier: Hadley and Hagin, and I assume that Card was involved. I assume Rove was involved. See, the thing is I don't know for a fact. I just know that I had conversations with a lot of those people about that issue.
Q How about at the Department of Homeland Security? Who was taking the lead on it? Do you know?
A I don't know.
Q Someone in the Secretary's office? Is there someone in the Secretary's office that you know was involved?

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A No, because the meeting on the plane was where General Blum, myself, Hadley, Rove was in and out, Hagin was there, I think. That's where we all put together the initial kind of draft points that Steve Hadley originally put together, so I assume it was Steve or someone in Steve's office who really charge of that.
Q Was there anyone from DHS headquarters that was part of that conversation you just mentioned?
A No, because that conversation was on the plane. Nobody on the phone. Oh, maybe there was somebody on the phone, but it wasn't DHS. It may have been White House Counsel's office or something; I don't know.
Q Nobody from DHS was on the plane with you?
A Well, Chertoff was on the plane, but he wasn't in that discussion. He was in and out of that meeting. He came in some, he went back out but--
Q Did it seem like Hadley's brain child?
A Yes.
Q And then, finally, you had mentioned--according to press reports, you had mentioned in a speech that recently, supposedly at a gathering of broadcast and National Weather Service meteorologists--
A You didn't watch it on C-SPAN this weekend?
Q You had mentioned that--you were quoted as saying I should have demanded the military sooner. I think that's

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consistent with what you just told us. In retrospect, if you went back, you would have demanded the military to come in a lot sooner, right?
A That is correct.
Q In fact, pre-storm, you said you would have asked for the military, right?
A Right.
Q By the way, is it your understanding that there's nothing preventing the military from taking a proactive, more proactive role even without FEMA asking for it, correct?
A Sure; I mean, I guess, you know, it's the military. They can come do whatever they can do statutorily, within the bounds of the Constitution and the statutes. But in real terms, they're not going to do that, because they want to come in under the Stafford Act, so, one, they can get paid for doing that; and two, I think they want to be careful, which I think is a legitimate concern about putting active duty troops and boots on the ground in the middle of a disaster where you may have security issues and other things. So I'm one of those guys who's probably on Rumsfeld's side about let's be very cautious about what we have the military come in and do.
Q And also, when you had that conversation with General Honore, at which point he listed 20 things he wanted

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to do, and you said slow down a minute, in retrospect, do you wish you'd just told him go ahead and do them?
A No, because I know what he did, because we've talked about that. All I wanted him to do was make sure that he was doing whatever he felt he needed to do, but when it came to anything that--I mean, militarily, do whatever you need to do, but if you're going to start an evacuation process or whatever, make sure we know what that plan is and what you're doing before you actually execute it. I'm not going to argue with--in fact, I told him, I probably won't argue with anything you do; I just need to know about it before you do it. We've got to keep that chain of command. And he respected that, and he went full bore ahead.
Q And don't you think somebody could come back at you now and say, well, you delayed Honore possibly evacuating the Superdome by a day? Would that be a fair characterization?
A No.
Q Why not?
A Because they don't know me or Honore, and if they think I'm going to stop Honore, they're nuts. But see, it's not like that. It was just, okay, Russel, you've just got to make sure that I know what you're doing. Didn't delay him in the least.
Q Not even overnight?

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A No, no.
Q But to the best of your knowledge, he did not act on the list of 20 items until the two of you had a meeting the next day, right?
A But you know what he did is exactly what I would do, too: position, get ready, get everything you need to do, tell, pull the plug, and it happens, so there's never any delay in the actual execution of the action that needs to be taken. I know he did that. We've laughed about it.
BY MS. SCHULTZ:
Q What did you observe to be others' perception of Honore's role? Did others perceive him being in charge, or, I mean, do you have a perception of what others--how others were viewing him?
A Well, sure, well, yes; generally, because he wore a uniform, all the National Guard, of course, naturally defers to the uniform, and I think the Governor, bless her heart, deferred to him because he was taking charge.
Q Do you have an understanding as to what Chertoff believed regarding whether Honore was in charge? Do you have any knowledge of--
A No, I have no clue what Chertoff was thinking.
Q Did you tell Governor Blanco on Sunday before landfall that FEMA had 500 buses on standby ready to be deployed?

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A No, and I've heard that quoted, and I don't recall that conversation. I think I alluded to that earlier that they asked for some assets, and I think that she asked for buses. She asked for something to help in the evacuation, and I think that's what we were trying to do, but I'm not sure it was ever done, and I think that's the Landstar contract I was talking about.

Q So it's your understanding that prior to landfall, the Governor did ask for buses?

A She asked for something, but I don't recall specifically, Mary Beth, whether it was buses or that I've linked those two in my head.

Q And did she have that conversation with you about what she needed, and you're just not quite remembering exactly what she asked for or--

A No, she and I, before I went down there, had very short telephone conversations. It was primarily about whether the evacuation was going to be mandatory or not. You know, General Landreneau or somebody else may have been having specific conversations about buses. I just don't recall it.

MR. LESTER: Guys, it's 15 minutes past my drop dead time. Are we close?

MS. SCHULTZ: Yes.

BY MS. SCHULTZ

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Q What did you do to try to establish the unified command?

A I tried to maintain a presence in the conference room and encouraged her to some extent to get people out of the room. She was getting too much advice from too many people. She was, with all due respect to the Senators, they shouldn't have been a part of her decision making process. They may have certainly been a part of some of the long-term things going on, but in the middle of that response, she needs to rely upon General Landreneau and Lokey as the experts, and we should all be sitting right there in that command center together, sitting down without distractions about what do we need? Who's going to do what?

And it was chaos the entire time. There was just hordes of people in and out all the time, and you couldn't get her to sit down and really focus on that stuff. I'm not faulting her. She just didn't have a good decision making process established that allowed her to do her executive functions.

Q And while you were at the EOC, were you in the Red October outside?

A Yes.

MS. SCHULTZ: I know I've said this before, and I've said this on other interviews, but I just want to make clear on the record that we do object to the instructions

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from the White House regarding the refusal to answer questions. I just want to make sure the record is clear. We've gone through it before, but we just need to get that resolved. It's impeding the investigation.

THE WITNESS: Well, you guys resolve it and let me know.

MR. ELDRIDGE: Can I ask one follow-up question?

BY MR. ELDRIDGE:

Q On the plane you mentioned the various people present. Was there anybody present from DOD on the plane when you were going through the various points that were going to go into that--

A General Blum.

Q General Blum.

A Yes.

Q From the National Guard Bureau.

A Right.

Q Okay; anyone else?

A I don't think so.

Q Was General Blum expressing his opinion on any of this?

A Yes.

Q And what was he saying?

A You know, I don't remember, because he was kind of hot dogging it, and I honestly don't remember; you know, of

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course, he wanted to come in and take over the world. And the rest of us were trying to finesse it in such a manner that it might be acceptable.

Q So you're suggesting General Blum wanted Federalization?

A Yes; that's my takeaway from that meeting, because he recognized that we needed to get moving on stuff.

BY MS. GROSSMAN:

Q One quick question. At the EOC in Baton Rouge, was there anyone there to your knowledge from DHS who was not part of FEMA?

A Eventually.

Q On the day of landfall was there--

A No.

Q --anyone there?

A No.

Q Do you know David Oswind from ODP?

A No.

Q Do you know David Hunter?

A No.

Q Do you know someone named Louis Dabadube?

A No

Q So you don't know if any of those three were there on the day of landfall.

A No.

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RESPONSE TO U. S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNNMENTAL AFFAIRS DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION REQUEST DATED OCTOBER 7, 2005 AND TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

SUBMITTED DECEMBER 2, 2005:

OVERVIEW OF GOVERNOR KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO'S ACTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

As a supplement to the tens of thousands of pages of documents provided by the Governor's office and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the following overview details key actions taken by Governor Blanco in the days immediately proceeding and following Hurricane Katrina. This overview is in no way intended as a complete documentation of all actions, but is intended to be responsive to questions 8 and 10 specifically, and to capture the key events as they developed to the best of our knowledge.

A Brewing Storm

Hurricane Katrina first receives Governor Blanco's attention when it appears as a newly formed tropical depression, days before August 26th and prior to the storm receiving an official name. For the past decade, Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel to the Governor, has been entrusted with the responsibility for keeping his eye on the tropics, advising Governor Blanco and her predecessor of potential hurricanes. Governor Blanco instructs Ryder to alert her the moment he learns of a tropical depression. Once a tropical depression develops into a tropical storm, it receives an official name from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) and Ryder begins providing regular updates while tracking the storm on software provided by the Center. He also serves as the point person who communicates with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to obtain needed information and to orchestrate the operational process.

As Ryder and the Governor begin discussing Katrina, all indications suggest that Louisiana will fall well outside of Katrina's cone. Since models initially project Katrina will target the Florida panhandle, Governor Blanco tentatively continues her longstanding plans to

attend the Southern Governor's Association Conference in Atlanta, where she is to be installed as Chair. Her Executive Assistant, Paine Gowen, and her Legislative Director, Rochelle Michaud Dugas, travel ahead to Atlanta preparing for the Governor's participation. Up until the storm shifts and Louisiana moves into the cone late on Friday, based on NHC tracking charts and staff discussions, Hurricane Katrina appears no more threatening than many of the storms that the Governor and Ryder track during hurricane season.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005

A Sudden Shift

Early predictions deteriorate on Friday as NHC steering factors evolve, and the Governor sounds the alert. Periodic updates have been filtering in all day long. By mid-afternoon, the National Weather Service reports that Katrina has shifted westward, with landfall now projected to fall near Mobile along the Alabama/Mississippi line instead of the anticipated Florida panhandle. Upon learning of the storm's dramatic and unprecedented shift, Governor Blanco signs and immediately issues Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005, Declaring a State of Emergency, and places the Louisiana National Guard and all State agencies on full alert. She warns that "Hurricane Katrina poses an imminent threat to the state of Louisiana, carrying severe storms, high winds, and torrential rain that may cause flooding and damage to private property and public facilities, and threaten the safety and security of the citizens of Louisiana."

As Louisiana falls within the hurricane's cone, Governor Blanco cancels her trip to Georgia for the Southern Governor's Association Conference, and begins working with emergency preparedness officials to address the rapidly changing situation. The situation grows dire at around 10PM that evening as the storm again shifts westward, for the first time bearing down on Louisiana.

The Governor immediately begins arrangements for a massive evacuation, conferring with her staff to strategize implementation of her recently restructured contra-flow evacuation plan for coastal Southeast Louisiana and the New Orleans region. She participates in an evening conference call with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) regarding Hurricane Katrina, and is assured that all parishes and State agencies are on high alert and ready to activate the agreed-upon evacuation plans.

Friday evening, Governor Blanco focuses on the evacuation and contra-flow plan, knowing firsthand the urgency of moving people to safety. She confers with State Police Superintendent Colonel Henry Whitehorn regarding her intent to activate the contra-flow plan to facilitate the evacuation, and receives his assurance that the Louisiana State Police and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development will begin staging the equipment and manpower needed to move the masses. The Governor places a similar late-night call to Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour to alert him, per their prior agreement, that she is urging an evacuation of the New Orleans metropolitan area and requests that he be prepared to activate contra-flow of I-59 through Mississippi on Saturday.

Early Evacuation Planning Saves Lives

The successfully retooled evacuation plan was well executed, and can be lauded for avoiding additional loss of life during Hurricane Katrina. Governor Blanco's evacuation plan using contra-flow rapidly moves an unprecedented 1 million *plus* people out of harm's way relying on a system of phased evacuations. Governor Blanco had ordered the evacuation plan overhauled as a result of the lessons learned earlier in her term from Hurricane Ivan, when it became apparent to her that the evacuation of a large metro area with low-lying parishes under the State's existing plan could be more efficient. Because of frustrations caused by evacuations during previous storm threats, Governor Blanco recognizes that evacuations must flow smoothly. Otherwise, the risk is great that people will become so discouraged by gridlock that they opt to weather the storm at home.

Katrina confirms the value of this early planning, and demonstrates the importance of a well-planned evacuation to save lives. Evacuations also depend on the cooperation of the general public and local government agencies. The State's new evacuation plan has been designed in cooperation with local parish leaders who signed agreements and are asked to follow the plan. There are invariably those who will not or perhaps cannot leave an area, which is why Mayor Nagin set up the Superdome as the shelter of last resort. It is therefore recognized that some will always be in need of rescue. The goal is to minimize the numbers. Hurricane Katrina resulted in a devastating loss of life and property for Louisiana, but the tragedy would have been far worse if the initial evacuation had not been so efficient and safe.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005

Leave While You Can

With the National Weather Service now predicting that Hurricane Katrina could slam into Southeast Louisiana, Governor Blanco begins the day early on Saturday at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge at LOHSEP to participate in the morning conference call led by Colonel Jeff Smith. She prioritizes this call because she wants to hear again that with evacuations set to begin at 9AM that morning, all parish presidents remain committed to following the phased plan as discussed and agreed upon the previous evening. Throughout the morning, the Governor personally calls parish presidents to verify their plans and to encourage evacuation efforts in compliance with the State's plan.

From Saturday, August 27, through Katrina and until the aftermath of Hurricane Rita, Governor Blanco sets up her primary headquarters in the Emergency Operations Center as it allows her to personally oversee the rapidly developing situation that often requires spur of the moment decisions. Working side by side with the National Guard, the State Police and other State agencies is essential, especially considering the local communications degradation that would occur later.

The Governor follows Friday's State of Emergency declaration with the first of many Hurricane Katrina-related letters issued to President Bush and other federal officials, urging him to declare a federal State of Emergency for the State of Louisiana under the Stafford Act, which

he does. She expects early on that Katrina could be a catastrophic event that would overwhelm State resources, and wants to ensure that Louisiana would receive every form of assistance the federal government could provide.

Governor Blanco engages in a considerable number of public appearances over the weekend, urging citizens to take this storm seriously and evacuate Southeast Louisiana and the New Orleans metropolitan area. As someone who has grown up with hurricanes, she worries that many people would play a familiar game of "hurricane roulette" – tempting fate and staying home in a gamble that this storm would be no worse than the last one that they weathered in their home. Believing this could be the "big one" talked about for years, she was adamant in urging people to avoid complacency and to leave, as evident in the news footage from Saturday and Sunday.

At around 1:00PM on Saturday afternoon, Governor Blanco stands first with Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard and parish officials, and then with New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and city officials for press conferences emphasizing the importance of an immediate evacuation. In a state where hurricanes are a way of life, it is almost unprecedented for a Governor to participate with local officials in news conferences urging evacuations. Governor Blanco encourages local citizens to go door to door and plead with their neighbors to leave their homes and evacuate the region.

With the evacuations well underway as scheduled and traffic growing heavy, contra-flow officially begins at 4PM on Saturday. Both lanes of interstate highways will be utilized for travel in the same direction going away from the urban center. Louisiana National Guard members join State police and Department of Transportation officials in moving well over a million people to safety. At 5:30PM, the Governor is back on the phone on a conference call with statewide elected officials and the 65 legislators in the affected areas, warning them of the seriousness of the storm and the importance of leaving, as well as encouraging others to do so.

"Pray and Pack"

Late Saturday afternoon, Governor Blanco acts on a report from State Representative Cedric Richmond of New Orleans. Representative Richmond visited a local ballpark that evening where approximately 700 people were present, and learned that some people had not paid attention to the weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans. He worries that many may have thought that the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle, as reported by the National Hurricane Center up until late Friday afternoon. Governor Blanco calls her Assistant Chief of Staff, Johnny Anderson, and asks him to contact the African American ministers in the affected areas. The Governor suggests that they call their members urging immediate evacuations, and then advise those attending Sunday morning services to "Pray and Pack" without delay. Anderson stays up through the night making the calls to ministers and other leaders.

National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield calls Governor Blanco on Saturday evening to share his professional opinion of the severity of Katrina. The Governor calls Mayor Nagin and urges him to call Mayfield and speak with him directly to hear the dire warning for

himself. Nagin calls the Governor back after his conversation with Mayfield, and tells her that he would order a mandatory evacuation first thing in the morning. Governor Blanco offers to join him to add her authority and support to this announcement.

Weekend: Pre-Positioning and Statewide Preparations Underway

On Saturday and Sunday, Governor Blanco oversees the State agencies as they move forward in a coordinated effort under the State of Emergency Operations Plan to pre-position and prepare for the storm. For example, as soon as the hurricane is in the Gulf of Mexico, Governor Blanco authorizes the Adjutant General of Louisiana, Major General Bennett Landreneau, to mobilize 2000 Louisiana National Guard soldiers and airmen, with the numbers increasing to 4,000 and continuing to grow as the storm continues to shift west. The Louisiana State Police and the Department of Transportation and Development deploy personnel across the state to assist evacuating motorists and to help direct evacuees to appropriate shelters. As this occurs, the Public Service Commission stages utility repair vehicles and personnel in advance of the storm.

The Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS), local parishes and the Red Cross identify shelters to accept pre-storm evacuees in Baton Rouge, Alexandria, Monroe, and other areas, with certain shelters designated for the special needs population. The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals works closely with DSS during this critical time to stage medical personnel to offer medical assistance to evacuees. The Louisiana Shelter Task Force diligently works to man shelter checkpoints and supply personnel to open the shelters. Further, Dr. Fred Cerise, Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals, assembles a team of officials staged to travel to New Orleans to oversee medical care for evacuees.

Aware that some areas will always experience flooding, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries stages some 400 watercraft at regional locations so they are poised to engage in search and rescue efforts. In addition to conducting needed rescues, these Wildlife and Fisheries agents would be able to provide early insight when little information is available from the affected areas immediately after the storm. The actions detailed above provide only a limited overview of the extensive planning process underway under the State Emergency Operations Plan, as the full resources of the State come together as planned in preparation for Hurricane Katrina.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005

Governor Continues Urging Residents to Leave

Governor Blanco rises at 4AM on Sunday to appear on Good Morning America and four other news programs, continuing to urge the people of Southeast Louisiana to immediately evacuate. The Governor follows her request for a federal emergency declaration by requesting that President Bush issue an Expedited Major Disaster Declaration beginning on Sunday, thereby freeing up additional federal relief for the State.

General Landreneau keeps the Governor apprised as additional Louisiana National Guardsmen are activated, alerting her that 4,000 will be on duty by Monday. In addition, the General begins Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) coordination with individual states asking them to send their National Guard troops. Louisiana has a long history of sending National Guard members to help neighboring states recover from natural disasters, and now appreciates the reciprocation of Louisiana's neighbors.

Per their agreement on Saturday, Governor Blanco joins Mayor Nagin in New Orleans on Sunday as he calls for a mandatory evacuation of Orleans Parish. Governor Blanco receives a call from President Bush just before she walks into the news conference, telling him that she is with the Mayor and he will order a mandatory evacuation in just a few minutes. She tells the President that the evacuation of the affected areas started early yesterday morning and proceeded all through the night, and she thanks the President for signing the disaster declaration.

At the news conference, the Governor again urges people to heed the mandatory evacuation order. She advises people who have not done so to pick up evacuation maps at easy to reach locations around town and plan their routes and destinations. The Governor also advises families to pack as though they are going on a camping trip with food, water, toys, clothing, etc. for at least three days. She urges drivers to proceed with caution to avoid auto accidents.

On Sunday night, Governor Blanco holds a press conference to announce the end of contra-flow (which needs to end before the high winds begin so that DOTD and State Police employees and their equipment can be moved to safety) and to urge continued evacuations. The Governor chose to continue contra-flow until the last possible moment, sending a state police helicopter to fly over contra-flow loading points to make sure that there were no traffic backups remaining, and keeping it activated two hours after it was scheduled to conclude. She thanks the "citizens of the Greater New Orleans area for the heroic, serious and courteous manner in which they have conducted themselves in the past several days," and expresses "grave concern" about reports that some people are not evacuating. Even though contra-flow has ended, Governor Blanco stresses that people should still leave and get out of town now, as evacuation routes are still open.

The Governor participates in yet another conference call with legislators, statewide elected officials, and members of the Congressional delegation, updating them on all recent actions.

MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005

Landfall

Governor Blanco awakes at 4:45AM to participate on the morning television shows, continuing to provide reports as Katrina makes landfall. She remains throughout the day at the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), participating in Emergency Operations Conference Calls at 7:30AM and again at 5:30PM, and monitoring reports of storm damage throughout the day. Major General Landreneau assures the Governor that the Louisiana National Guard has now alerted all available 5700 (eventually this number

would grow to 6100) Louisiana members of the Guard who are not serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Throughout the day reports pour in from the affected areas, and the Governor learns that approximately 10,000 evacuees are riding out the storm in the Superdome. Agencies have their assets prepositioned and ready to roll as soon as it is safe to venture into the winds. The Governor's Chief of Staff, Andy Kopplin, sends out an alert to all staff telling everyone to be prepared to be proactive in providing information, coordination and assistance.

"We Need Everything You've Got"

Governor Blanco again speaks with President Bush, informing him that she would need every resource possible from the federal government. She recalls telling him, "We need your help. We need everything you've got." Based on their conversation, she believes he understands the urgency of the situation, and has every intention to send all of the resources and assistance within the power of the federal government. From the beginning, she believed and continues to believe President Bush desired to be as helpful as he could be in the face of such an unprecedented catastrophe.

Governor Blanco meets with Mike Brown, the Director of FEMA, who reviews what FEMA will do for disaster assistance and assures the Governor not to worry about costs, that all the State's needs will be provided. He mentions supplies, money for those with destroyed homes ($26,200) and that FEMA has 500 buses on standby, ready to be deployed. He cautions that drivers can only drive for 12-hour shifts and must rest. The Governor recommends that they double team and alternate drivers, and Brown replies that some do but others do not.

Worst Case Scenario

On Monday, it becomes clear that New Orleans has not dodged the bullet as some commentators initially suggested, and that was obvious throughout the day at the Emergency Operations Center as reports of a breach in the roof of the Superdome, major flooding in Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes and the Lower Ninth Ward are reported. The catastrophic damage of Katrina – the double punch of first the hurricane winds and then the surging floodwaters – becomes increasingly apparent.

The Governor orders Secretary Dwight Landreneau of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries to deploy rescue boats as soon as winds die down to gale force at 40 mph, so they can begin to rescue stranded people. Sam Jones, the Governor's Deputy Director of Community Programs, speaks with her by phone Monday night, and she orders him to begin recruiting private boats and volunteers to aid in the rescue effort. The LDWF directs a growing battalion of first responders and other spontaneous volunteers arriving with boats and equipment to assigned staging areas for rescue missions.

National Guard members rescue people from the Lower Ninth Ward waters, where Jackson Barracks, the National Guard headquarters, is located and has also flooded. In and around Jackson Barracks and St. Bernard Parish, the storm surge causes the waters to rise as

much as twelve feet in a span of 30 to 40 minutes. Louisiana-based members of the Coast Guard are also running rescue missions. The heroism and selfless acts of bravery exhibited by these early rescuers and the thousands of volunteers who joined them cannot be overstated.

Scattered reports begin filtering in to the Governor from the affected areas. Representative Nita Hutter reports being stranded with the Parish President and a large number of people on the second floor of a building in St. Bernard Parish with water filling the first floor and with high water as far as the eye can see. Mayor Nagin alerts the Governor that the catastrophic damage of the storm may escalate, as they believe the 17th Street Canal wall is failing. The Governor reports this to Major General Landreneau. As early reports come in, the extent of the breach is not clear, but the 17th Street breach results in the flooding of vast residential areas as well as downtown New Orleans. The first signs of serious problems with the communications systems also become apparent on Monday as it becomes more and more difficult to reach the affected areas by phone.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005

Assessing the Damage

FEMA Director Mike Brown and Senators Landrieu and Vitter join Governor Blanco for a Blackhawk flight to survey Katrina's damage on Tuesday morning. Their group meets with Mayor Nagin and receives an overview of the situation before returning to Baton Rouge. The Governor returns from the trip extremely concerned by the extent of the devastation and the limits of the State's resources.

The floodwaters continue to deepen and encompass most parts of the city and area parishes also flooded from other effects of the storm. On Tuesday, floodwaters are still surging across New Orleans and surrounding neighborhoods from levee breaks. It is now becoming harrowingly clear that the dreaded "big one" has arrived, and the city that lies below sea level is in dire trouble.

As the extent of the flood damage becomes apparent, Governor Blanco meets with Leonard Kleinpeter and other members of her staff, ordering them to locate buses to evacuate people who remained in New Orleans. It was still unclear at this point how many bus evacuations would need to occur, but Kleinpeter begins lining up buses from local school districts and churches.

The Governor's Office staff, under the direction of Kim Hunter Reed, sets up a call center and a staffing system to field the massive volume of incoming emergency rescue calls. The Governor orders that incoming calls are to be answered on an around the clock basis, as these incoming calls are primarily rescue requests and/or people seeking assistance in locating family members. Initially the calls are fielded directly from the Governor's office. Later in the week, the Governor's staff arranges for a higher volume 800-number to be issued, and relocates the operation to a call center at the Department of Public Safety's Office of Motor Vehicles.

As floodwaters spread, the crowd surges beyond the initial evacuees at the Superdome. Initially many drive from their homes and arrive by car, with more arriving on foot and pushing family members on rafts as the water rises. Governor Blanco travels for a second time to the Superdome on Tuesday, to see for herself the developing situation as the communications systems are severely degraded. She wants to learn additional information and speak with the people who are gathering there. She sees that people are worried about being separated from their families in the rescue efforts, as so many are being forced to board separate boats. They say that the food and water lines are long, but the Governor is assured that at least there is food, water and medical care. With limited communications ability, it is difficult to calm nerves and communicate information to a crowd that large. The Governor leaves for Baton Rouge extremely concerned by the difficult situations these families face, and determined that the Superdome must be evacuated as soon as possible.

Governor Blanco calls General Landreneau after her return from the Superdome and expresses her escalating concern about the lack of significant federal resources to supplement the State's efforts. She instructs the General to ask for all available assistance from the National Guard and the United States Government, specifically federal military assistance. The Governor wants to know the status of the troops and if he has any information about the pending arrival of the FEMA buses, as she plans to use them to evacuate the Superdome on Wednesday.

Major General Landreneau reports to the Governor that he receives a call from United States Army Lieutenant General Russ Honore and relayed to Honore their request for significant federal troops and resources. General Landreneau reports that he also asks National Guard Bureau Chief Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum to assist with generating additional assistance from the National Guard units from across the country to help with the effort, and the Governor is assured that General Blum begins to do so immediately.

Late on Tuesday night, Governor Blanco calls Ann Williamson, Secretary of the Department of Social Services, and instructs her to find a shelter by 6AM for at least 25,000 people.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005

Governor Declares August 31st an Official Day of Prayer for the Victims, their Families, and the Rescuers

Need for Federal Resources Escalates

When the expected and promised federal resources still have not arrived on Wednesday, Governor Blanco places an urgent morning call to the White House in an effort to reach President Bush and express the need for significant resources. She is unable to reach President Bush or his Chief of Staff, Andrew Card. A later phone call reaches Maggie Grant in the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. The Governor receives a call from Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend. Andrew Card later returns her call too, and she requests his help in getting the promised FEMA buses into the New Orleans area. She suggests that 500

will not be enough, and that she might need as many as 5,000 buses. He affirms that he believes he can help with this.

Later Wednesday afternoon, the Governor places a second call to President Bush. She stresses to him that the situation is extremely grave and asks for additional resources. Governor Blanco also specifically stresses that she wants to continue to be his partner in a unity of effort as is called for under the National Response Plan. To relay the urgency and the magnitude of the need at that point in time, the Governor tells the President she estimates 40,000 troops would be needed, and again reiterates her frustration about the FEMA buses.

In the meantime, the Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of Transportation, and the National Guard attempt to fill the breach in the canal wall. Major General Landreneau dispatches engineers and helicopters from the National Guard to airlift 3,000 pound sandbags to drop into the ruptured 17th Street Canal wall. The General later reports that the hole is far too deep and too large and there is no significant relief from the floodwaters in spite of early efforts to fill the breach. Reports are received that large crowds are beginning to gather at the Convention Center. The city has not pre-planned this building as an evacuation site. The Governor grows more concerned recognizing this situation makes the need for FEMA buses even more acute.

Governor Pushes Forward with Evacuation

Governor Blanco is determined to move ahead on evacuating the Superdome with or without the federal resources. With designated shelters, hotels and most households in Louisiana bursting at the seams from evacuees who left during contra-flow, she knows she has to secure additional locations where she can transport those who are still in New Orleans.

Wednesday morning, Governor Blanco calls Governor Rick Perry of Texas to coordinate the arrival of evacuees from New Orleans to Texas. It was agreed that the Astrodome would be opened to accept evacuees. In addition to Governor Perry, she also calls to secure the support of Houston Mayor Bill White and Harris County Judge Robert Echols of Texas to pave the way for temporarily housing evacuees in the Astrodome.

General Landreneau presents Lieutenant General Russ Honore to Governor Blanco when he arrives on Wednesday at the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Everyone welcomes the appearance of Louisiana native General Honore, as the assumption is that his arrival indicates the federal troops are here or on their way with the equipment needed to help get the job done in response to the Governor's requests. The Governor asks him to coordinate the evacuation efforts in New Orleans, so that General Landreneau can concentrate on saving lives, search and rescue, and law and order issues. Governor Blanco later asks Honore if he brought a large number of soldiers, and learns that he arrived with only a small support staff. The evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has not arrived.

Brigade of Buses

With no sign of the promised FEMA buses in sight on Wednesday, General Honore requests more school buses and Governor Blanco issues Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31 later in the day, allowing her to officially commandeer or utilize any private property she finds necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency. Governor Blanco's office continues to direct each school superintendent to provide an inventory of school buses and bus drivers in their districts.

An estimated 1500 school buses were commandeered. Although all of the buses were not ultimately used, initial estimates indicate that at least 800 school bus trips were made shuttling evacuees to safety. The Governor's staff arranges a staging and implementation plan that keeps the buses flowing in convoys once the order is issued. It is important to note that as reports of violence escalate on the news, many potential bus drivers become understandably concerned about the safety of driving into the city on rescue missions. All available first responders from the Baton Rouge area and surrounding parishes are involved in the rescue efforts, so are not able to ride the individual buses on their missions. Police escorts accompany convoys in groups of ten buses. Those who respond to the call for bus drivers are saluted for their bravery.

With the FEMA buses rumored to be on the way and helicopter rescue operations increasing, at some point, it is suggested that the school bus convoys are not needed. Governor Blanco refuses to halt the school bus convoys, and instructs her staff to proceed with securing every bus – school, church or tour bus – they can acquire. She pushes to move the bus convoy full speed ahead as it is uncertain whether or not the rumored FEMA buses would ever materialize, and she is not willing to rely solely on helicopter operations to move people to safety. As of 10:30PM on Wednesday night, there was still no word about the status of significant numbers of FEMA buses.

Governor Blanco flies over the Cloverleaf area and sees the crowds gathering on raised highways and levees. She instructs her staff to send available school bus convoys to those areas too. As horrible and uncomfortable as conditions are in the Superdome, there is at least food, water and shelter from the sun. People brought to the raised surfaces as they transitioned to safety had no shelter from the sun, and many of these children, elderly and other adults had been subjected to the elements. As people were bused out from the highways, others took their place in a constant flow of evacuees deposited by the boat and helicopter rescuers.

Just before midnight on Wednesday, the Governor learns that a number of the promised FEMA buses are finally crossing into North Louisiana, some 7 or 8 hours away from New Orleans.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005

With all shelters and communities bursting at the seams, on Thursday Governor Blanco issues Executive Order KBB 2005-24 allowing all evacuees occupying hotel rooms to continue occupying the room under the normal terms, conditions and rates. The Governor takes this precaution because she does not want evacuees competing for rooms with non-evacuees. In an

effort to address the housing shortfall, Governor Blanco also writes to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson and urges him to consider both immediate and long-term housing solutions for evacuees.

A Growing Contingent of National Guard Troops

In response to widespread reports of looting and violence, a large number of security forces including Military Police that the Governor had ordered earlier in the week from the National Guard arrive on the streets of New Orleans. Governor Blanco announces that they are just back from Iraq, armed with M-16s that are "locked and loaded," that they are trained to shoot to kill and would accommodate anyone threatening the *lives* of evacuees or rescuers. They never fire their weapons, but law and order is restored.

On Thursday evening, General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, arrives in Baton Rouge. His arrival is in response to General Landreneau's appeal for Blum's assistance in continuing efforts to recruit larger contingents of National Guard troops needed from across the country and the territories. General Blum meets with the Governor and General Landreneau to report on his progress and to inform the Governor that he has a large number of National Guard troops that have arrived with more on the way. The discussion turns to the role of the National Guard, and the Governor's desire for federal troops to assist the State.

General Blum provides his candid assessment that the Governor should not federalize the troops, recommending the dual command structure. He confirms the Governor's position that a joint command is appropriate, with Lieutenant General Honore commanding federal forces and Major General Landreneau commanding State forces, and that federalization would not be necessary to receive more federal assets. Additionally, any such move to place Guard troops on Title 10 status would have significantly limited our capacity to conduct law enforcement missions. We all know that the Posse Comitatus Act significantly limits the situations when the army and air force can conduct law enforcement missions. The reality is that thousands of Guard troops are pouring into the State, yet very few federal troops are on the ground to meet the Governor's request.

On Thursday evening, Governor Blanco decides to hire an experienced expert to serve as the State's liaison with FEMA and to cut through the red tape as the disaster recovery efforts continue. Governor Blanco hires former FEMA Director James Lee Witt to assist in the recovery. Witt is well respected within FEMA, and with more than 25 years of disaster management experience, is one of the country's foremost experts on responding to natural disasters. Executive Counsel Terry Ryder called Friday morning from the Governor's office to extend the offer to James Lee Witt, and he agrees to start immediately, arriving ready to work on Friday night.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005

Bring the 256th Home

With all available Louisiana National Guard troops activated and thousands of National Guard forces pouring in from across the country to meet the tremendous needs of the State, Governor Blanco delivers another official request to President Bush urging him to allow for the expeditious return of the soldiers of the 256th Brigade Combat Team as they have completed their mission in the Iraqi theatre of operations and they are urgently needed here at home to assist in the recovery efforts. Her letter also requests federal assistance with aerial and ground firefighting support; a fleet of military vehicles that would remain in the affected areas; at least 175 generators; medical supplies including personnel, equipment, drugs and vaccines; assistance with mortuary affairs; and assistance in dealing with injured animals and animal remains. She prioritizes the need for federal help in rebuilding Louisiana's communications grid.

In an effort to utilize the services of doctors who were answering Louisiana's much needed calls for medical assistance, Governor Blanco issues Executive Order No. KBB 2005-26, declaring a state of public health emergency and facilitating the acceptance of additional medical professional assistance. This order temporarily suspends Louisiana's licensure laws, rules and regulations for medical professionals and personnel who possess medical licenses in good standing in their respective states, thereby helping out-of-state medical professionals and personnel treat those in need of urgent care.

Louisiana's Fund for Louisiana's People

On Friday, Governor Blanco creates and announces the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, a non-profit foundation developed to accept donations pouring in to the State to meet the needs of Louisiana's people. In an overwhelming show of generosity and support, people from across the United States and the globe reach out to Louisiana in her time of need, sending their contributions and their prayers.

The Tide Begins to Turn

General Landreneau assures the Governor that some 30,000 occupants of the Superdome have now been evacuated, but alerts her that thousands more continue to come. He also notifies the Governor that improvement is underway at the Convention Center, with large shares of rations and security in place brought in by the National Guard. He reports on the continued escalation of EMAC forces. On day four after Katrina hits Louisiana, Governor Blanco sees the tide beginning to turn in search and rescue missions, evacuations and peacekeeping efforts. The first responders, National Guard, State officials, in and out of State volunteers, and citizens of Louisiana stepped up and pulled together to get through the crisis moments created by the largest natural disaster ever to strike this country. It was not pleasant to experience or watch, but tens of thousands of lives were saved.

Governor Meets with President

President Bush arrives in New Orleans on Friday for his first visit since Katrina, and schedules a meeting with Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and other members of the Louisiana Congressional delegation aboard Air Force One. Each local leader briefs the President on the situation, and gives him an overview of his or her concerns. As the official meeting concludes, President Bush invites Governor Blanco to join him in a private office with a member of the White House Staff.

The Governor has a private conversation with President Bush about the command structure of the operations, and reiterates her need for a significant number of federal troops. The President asks Governor Blanco to put her troops, the Louisiana National Guard and EMAC National Guard, under control of a Department of Defense appointed General. By the time of Friday's conversation, the situation has evolved and the immediate needs on the ground are far different than the needs when federal troops were first requested earlier in the week. By Friday, the State has received a massive National Guard presence including troops from other States under the command of Louisiana's Adjutant General (TAG), General Bennett Landreneau. Over 8,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen and women are on the ground, working in Louisiana as part of Task Force Pelican. Three thousand of these troops are from other states, with an additional 15,000 reinforcements expected by Monday. They are making giant strides stabilizing the situation and evacuating the Superdome and the Convention Center using the commercial buses that have finally arrived, but there are no significant numbers of federal troops in Louisiana.

In spite of the significant progress that has been made in the last two days, the Governor insists on securing more federal troops and assets that she realizes will be required to accomplish the work that lies ahead. Governor Blanco reiterates that she is satisfied with General Landreneau heading up the massive effort underway by the National Guard. When federal troops did not arrive, the National Guard increased their troops through EMACs, and moved mountains to turn the corner. This was the largest and quickest EMAC activation in American history, including the participation of forty-eight states and four territories. The Governor suggests that President Bush assign Lieutenant General Honore to command the federal troops that would be deployed to Louisiana, as there is still so much work that needs to be done. Even though Lieutenant General Honore arrived without his army, he is performing a valuable service helping to coordinate the evacuation of the city, and working side by side to complement the National Guard effort.

By Friday, unity of effort is already achieved. The supporting governors have already placed their National Guard forces under Governor Blanco's operational control. The President has directed Lieutenant General Honore to conduct the military assistance to civil authorities mission. Governor Blanco has communicated her intent and purpose to Lieutenant General Honore. He and Major General Landreneau are both executing that intent and purpose.

Out of respect for the President, Governor Blanco agrees that she would talk to General Landreneau and her Executive Counsel and review the President's reorganization proposal. She remains clear and steadfast, however, that the present command structure is appropriate and fully

capable to command both federal and Guard troops. Historically, the joint command structure worked well in other federal emergency responses such as Hurricane Andrew in Florida. The federal government could send troops under this organization that would remain under the command of Lieutenant General Honore, which is exactly what was done.

Much has been said and written about the Governor's private meeting with the President, and erroneous reports have been circulated that she denied federal troops or delayed help for 24-hours. The facts are clear and evidence confirms that the Governor requests early and often the need for additional military presence, including a federal military presence and assets. At no time does anyone from the federal government tell her that federal troops are withheld because the existing structure was inadequate. In fact, the new proposal is first presented to her aboard Air Force One on Friday, four days after the storm struck on Monday, and the President never suggests that federal troops were reliant on this new structure nor did he convey that the joint command structure is insufficient. She believes that the President is sincere in his pledge to help Louisiana. She is clear about needing that help, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the storm.

In agreeing to discuss the reorganization with General Landreneau and her Executive Counsel, the Governor is concerned that restructuring could confuse the steadily improving situation on the ground. The National Guard troops have risen to the occasion, and making an abrupt change in command for no apparent reason may disrupt ongoing operations. Sending the federal troops under the command of General Honore, as the Governor suggests, is indeed what the President decides to do on Saturday, five days after the storm, using the existing command structure.

Close to midnight on Friday, Governor Blanco receives phone calls from General Steve Blum, just after his return to DC, and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card who want to discuss with her their proposed organizational restructuring. She hears them out, but continues to believe, given the stabilization now underway and the massive National Guard buildup on the ground, that bringing in the federal forces and putting them under the command of General Honore to coordinate with General Landreneau who leads the Guard forces is the most effective solution.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2005

Federal Troops on Their Way

Just before the President delivers his Radio Address on Saturday morning, Governor Blanco speaks to Andrew Card who tells her that she will be pleased with the President's announcement. The Governor listens intently as the President speaks, and is thankful that he has authorized federal troops to work with the National Guard.

At noon, Governor Blanco reports to the press on her meeting with the President where she again asks for federal assistance. The State has now received his assurance that 7,000 additional troops are on the way. The troops are coming from the 82nd Airborne, the 1st Calvary, and the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Forces, and they would operate under the direct

command of Louisiana native Lieutenant General Russ Honore, who commands Joint Task Force Katrina.

In the days that follow, the Governor and her staff are deeply involved in getting help to local communities, identifying housing, fighting to make sure Louisiana's people are employed in the recovery, reuniting families, visiting people in shelters both in state and out of state, meeting with visiting members of Congress, Secretary Chertoff, Admiral Allen, the Vice President, the President and his staff, and leading many follow-up visits to the affected areas. The magnitude of the devastation demands the full time and attention of the Governor. She and her staff work 14 to 18 hours, seven days a week, for weeks afterward.

Just last year, FEMA ran a federal, state, and local doomsday scenario called Hurricane Pam with emergency preparedness people from the State and the New Orleans area. While the analysis is still pending, nearly everything negative predicted in this fictional disaster comes true during the very real Katrina. There is one glaring exception. Pam predicts some 61,000 deaths would occur. Instead, at the time of submission, the Governor and Louisiana mourn the deaths of 1,067, a tragedy for the State but thankfully a far cry from predictions. Because of a well-organized initiative, well over one million people pre-evacuated the New Orleans region. Thousands who stayed were pulled from attics and rooftops; with some 78,000 bused or flown to safety in the aftermath of Katrina. We must never forget the heroes of Katrina.

State officials did not rest from the moment Katrina turned her firepower toward Louisiana. All the resources the State had to bear were brought to aid in the evacuation, rescue, recovery and rebuilding efforts. In a demonstration of the resolve and commitment to move forward, the State turned from **Hurricane Katrina** to successfully prepare for and respond to the additional devastation unleashed by **Hurricane Rita** and the floods that followed that storm. Today, Governor Blanco leads a massive rebuilding effort. Our people stand unified together as we rebuild Louisiana safer, stronger and better than before Katrina and Rita.

And, now, in response to the specific questions posed by the document request dated October 7, 2005, please accept the following responses:

1. **Organization charts of the Governor's office and of each component of state government involved in the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina. Identify the individual(s) who hold or held each key position from August 23, 2005, to September 6, 2005.**

A copy of the organization chart of the Governor's Office is attached.

The Governor's executive staff between August 23 to September 6, 2005, was comprised of the following individuals:

Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff
Leonard Kleinpeter, Special Assistant
Terry Ryder , Executive Counsel
Kim Hunter Reed , Policy Director

Johnny Anderson, Assistant Chief of Staff
Bob Mann, Communications Director
Rochelle Michaud Dugas, Legislative Director
Denise Bottcher, Press Secretary
Paine Gowen, Executive Assistant to the Governor
Erin Mosely, Director of Scheduling (on maternity leave during the period at issue).
Jerry Luke LeBlanc, Commissioner of Administration

Each of these individuals reports directly to the Governor.

Additional individuals holding key positions during the response effort are the following:

Sam Jones, Deputy Director and Liaison to Parochial and Municipal Governments
Ty Brommel, Executive Director of the Office or Rural Development

2. A detailed description of the Governor's roles, responsibilities, and authorities in preparing for and responding to a major disaster. Moreover, with respect to each specific role, responsibility or authority described, please:

a. list the statutory, regulatory or other source for that role, responsibility or authority; and
b. identify the key personnel within the Louisiana Office of the Governor and the Louisiana state government involved in acting pursuant to that authority or discharging that role or responsibility.

(a) The Governor's duties, responsibilities, and authority in preparing for and responding to a major disaster is contained in the following:

Art. 4, Sec. 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974

La. R.S. 29:7

La. R.S. 30:2109

La. R.S. 29:766

La. R.S. 14:329.6

La. R.S. 29:724

The State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan

Executive Orders

Emergency Management Assistance Compact

Stafford Act

National Response Plan

(b) Key Personnel:

See Governor's executive staff set forth in response to No. 1.

3. **Identify and provide copies of all authorities, regulations, procedures, policies and operating guidance related to the Office of the Governor's ability to act or task, assign missions to, or seek assistance from other entities or organizations, including, but not limited to, any other State of Federal agency, in responding to an emergency or major disaster. Provide all documents that refer or relate to any such acts, tasks, requests, or mission assignments by the Office of the Governor in connection with Hurricane Katrina.**

Please see response to No. 2. See also the documents produced by LOHSEP, the Executive Orders and Governor's correspondence on the Attorney General's document management system and the other documents provided with this response.

4. **All documents from the past five years that evaluate, assess, or describe, in any way, the risks posed to the State of Louisiana by a hurricane or flood, including, but not limited to, documents that relate to the knowledge of such risks held by the Federal, State or local officials, including, but not limited, to the East Jefferson, Orleans, West Jefferson, Lake Borgne Basin, and Plaquemine Levee District Boards, prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. This also includes, but is not limited to, all documents from the past five years that refer or relate to the vulnerability of the levee system, or particular levees, in or around the City of New Orleans, to damage, breach or overflow, including, but not limited to, documents that refer or relate to the knowledge of Federal, State, or local officials of such vulnerability.**

The Governor was well aware of Ivor van Heerden's well publicized warnings and predictions that storm surge from a Cat 4 or Cat 5 hurricane would cause overtopping of the levees, which would result in massive flooding in the City of New Orleans. No one expected, or predicted, that the levees would fail in the manner which occurred after Hurricane Katrina.

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No. 4 would be the same as are found in the Attorney General's document management system, particularly the Hurricane Ivan After Action Report found at Bates No. LOH-0019, and Hurricane Pam Exercise found at Bates No. LOH-0034.

As reflected in the chart entitled, "Louisiana Congressional Budget Requests" and the documents contained in the folder labeled, "DOTD Requests for Federal Funding of Levees and Hurricane Studies," which are provided herein, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development has repeatedly made requests to the United States Congress for funding of hurricane studies, as well as requests for full funding of the state's portion of the cost of levee construction. To date, these efforts have had marginal success, at best, as reflected by the request in FYI 2004 for $16,000,000 in construction costs, with only $7,000,000 being

appropriated. The budget requests submitted by the Army Corps of Engineers to Congress for levee construction around the City of New Orleans area have been met with a similar response.

5. **All documents that refer or relate to any planning or exercises conducted to respond to a hurricane scenario in Louisiana, including, but not limited to, all documents that refer or relate to the hurricane planning exercise known as "Hurricane Pam," including but not limited to, all plans, reports, after-action reviews and other analyses, whether they be in final or draft form, that refer or relate to Hurricane Pam.**

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No. 5 would be the same as are found in the Attorney General's document management system, particularly the Hurricane Ivan After Action Review found at Bates No. LOH-0019 and the Hurricane Pam Exercise found at Bates No. LOH-0034.

6. **Identify any individual(s) appointed as State Coordinating Officer (SCO) and Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) for the emergencies and major disasters declared for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. For each individual, state when he or she was first notified of potential deployment, state when the individual was actually deployed, and state when the individual was appointed as SCO or GAR. For each such individual, identify all prior emergencies and disasters for which he or she had served as SCO or GAR, describe any other relevant experience, and explain why the individual was selected to serve as SCO or GAR. Provide all documents that refer or relate to these individual(s) from August 23, 2005, through September 6, 2005.**

Governor Blanco appointed Arthur G. Jones as SCO and Jeff Smith as GAR in her letter to President Bush dated August 27, 2005. Subsequently, Jeff Smith was appointed both SCO and GAR for the combined Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita disaster declaration. See folder attached to LOHSEP response labeled "LOHSEP Responses Nos. 14 and 15" and on CD No. 6.

Art Jones

Art Jones is the LOHSEP Division Chief of the Disaster Recovery Division. He joined LOHSEP in April 1991, just prior to two Presidential Declarations (FEMA 902/904) and has since administered twelve Presidential Disaster Declarations. His background includes extensive public service experience in State Government in both Louisiana and Alabama, corporate experience as a subcontractor for the Federal Aviation Administration during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and military as a US Air Force Combat Fighter Pilot in Southeast Asia.

In his current position, Mr. Jones provides overall management for the Public Assistance Program and the Individual Assistance Program for the State of Louisiana. He also serves in the

State Emergency Operations Center during periods of disaster alerts and exercises and provides Disaster Recovery Operations Training, Debris Management Operations and Damage Assessment Courses to Emergency Management Officials throughout the state and around the country.

As an Active Duty Officer in the US Air Force, Mr. Jones served as an Aircraft Commander and Instructor Pilot flying the F-4 C/D and E Phantom, and T-38 Talon. In addition to accumulating more than 2,500 hours of Jet Fighter time, including nearly 1,000 hours of instructor time, he logged nearly 500 hours of combat time in Southeast Asia and received numerous awards and declarations including The Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, and The Air Medal with twelve oak leaf clusters.

Mr. Jones works closely with FEMA Region VI Officials in order to coordinate Individual Assistance and Public Assistance programs. He is a member of the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association (LEPA) and has completed many Emergency Management Institute Training Courses in addition to instructing EMI courses in Disaster Recovery Operations, Public Assistance Managers Training, Public Assistance Inspectors Training, and Debris Management as an Adjunct Instructor. Mr. Jones has served as the State Individual Assistance Officer for FEMA 956, FEMA 978, and FEMA 1049; the State Public Assistance Officer for FEMA 956, FEMA 1012, FEMA 1049, and FEMA 1169; and the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) for FEMA 1169, FEMA 1246, FEMA 1264, FEMA 1269, FEMA 1314, FEMA 1357, FEMA 1380, FEMA 1435, FEMA 1437, 3172 EM, FEMA 1521 and FEMA 1548. He earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Secondary Education from Northwestern State University and is a qualified Commercial Airplane and Helicopter pilot.

Colonel Jeff Smith

Col. Jeff Smith is an individual with a vast array of experience in multiple disciplines. He is a certified public accountant with an extensive background in financial management, auditing, and financial consulting. His thirty three (33) years service in the military gives him a depth of operational experience and understanding matched by few. He also has a wealth of managerial experience in the private sector. In addition, he has worked in a consulting and employee capacity to local government and understands how they operate. He served as chief administrative officer for the fastest growing parish in the State, overseeing a workforce of over three hundred (300) with a budget of $64 million. His experience in the financial arena includes over 5 years with a national accounting firm, primarily serving as an auditor for publicly traded companies and operating his on accounting and consulting firm for almost twenty (20) years. His experience in business and industry includes serving as the manager of administrative services for a publicly traded company where he oversaw personnel, accounting and contracting. Col Smith has a long tack record of public service to include the Rotary Club, Chamber of Commerce, and the Ascension Fund for Public Education, River Parish Community College Foundation board of directors, and was a founding director for United Community Bank. His military career began at age 18, serving with the 769th Engineer Battalion as a heavy equipment mechanic. After serving as an enlisted soldier for 3 years, he attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in the Engineering Branch. He is a graduate of the US Army Engineers Basic and Advanced courses as well as the Army Command and General Staff College. Col

Smith served in all levels of command to include company, battalion, and major command. Most of his experience was in the 769th Engineer Battalion, which under his command won the award for the best National Guard Battalion in the 5th Army area all three years he commanded and the best National Guard Battalion in the United States for one of those years.

During his many years of service in the National Guard, Colonel Smith was called upon to respond to hurricanes, floods, other natural disasters and civil disturbances. Then Major Smith led the first wave of dump truck and heavy equipment into the Abbeville, Louisiana, area during Hurricane Andrew, and assisted in directing the response operation in one of the most heavily affected regions in the state. Later in his career he was selected to be the Commander of the 62nd (CST) WMD, a newly created unit to respond to terrorism activities. During his tenure, he selected and trained a team that would later become among the first to receive certification as mission ready. His last major command was the 61st Troop Command whereby he commanded over 2000 soldiers and oversaw the massive undertaking of moving all of the Louisiana Brigade's equipment to the national training center at Fort Irwin, California. This was a large movement of equipment and supplies from Louisiana to California which required extensive planning and operational execution of an extremely large operation.

Colonel Smith has unique qualifications for his current position, as Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness at LOHSEP, in that he has extensive background with emergency operations through the National Guard, a financial management background, an engineering background, and extensive operational experience in the military. In addition, he has worked very closely for years with local governments thereby giving him firsthand knowledge as to how best to communicate with local officials.

When the Adjutant General who serves as the director of LOHSEP needed assistance with the hazard mitigation program, with an eye toward a new assistant director, Colonel Smith was heavily recruited due to his unique experiences and capabilities. He was the right person, in the right place, at the right time to lead Louisiana's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Copies of the resumes of Art Jones and Jeff Smith are attached.

7. Within the universe of documents created between the dates of August 23, 2005, and September 6, 2005, and that refer or relate to Hurricane Katrina, please produce:

a. All documents that refer or relate to emergency or major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act or applicable Louisiana law for Hurricane Katrina, including, but not limited to, gubernatorial declarations or requests for declarations, any internal Office of the Governor consideration, analyses and recommendations regarding declarations or Declaration requests, and agreements with FEMA executed pursuant to a declaration; as well as any amendments to such agreements;

b. **All communications between the Office of the Governor of the State of Louisiana and (1) the Federal government, including, but not limited to, FEMA, or (2) any other Louisiana State, parish, and/or local emergency agency or department, including but not limited to, any request by the Office of the Governor for Federal assistance in preparation for, or in response to, Hurricane Katrina; and**

c. **All notes, recordings, videotapes and any other documents from meetings, teleconferences, or videoconferences.**

The documents in the Office of the Governor which are responsive to No. 7 for the period specified are the following:

In the Attorney General's document management system:

Governor's Correspondence beginning at Bates No. GOV-0004;
Governor's Executive Orders beginning at Bates No. GOV-0007.

Hard copies provided with this response:

Governor's Notes
Executive Staff e-mails
Terry Ryder Notes File
Terry Ryder Documents File
Terry Ryder Miscellaneous File
Terry Ryder Weather Maps
Bob Mann Notes File
Documentation Bob Mann
CDs of Press Conferences
Call Logs
MOU File
Homeland Security and Emergency Operations Plan
Handwritten Notes Rochelle Dugas
Notes Denise Bottcher
Report to the Governor's office media coverage Orleans Levee Board

FEMA-State Agreements and Declarations found in folder labeled "LOHSEP Responses No. 14 and No. 15" provided with LOHSEP response.

Finally, please refer to documents provided with LOHSEP Response regarding conference call summaries, sit reps, limited Maestri Recordings, E-Team CD and ARFs.

In addition, I have obtained from many of the State departments and agencies a time line or chronology of their response to Hurricane Katrina. These are works in progress, but will assist you in understanding the magnitude of Katrina, the overwhelming response that it required, and

the heroic and unwavering efforts of the men and women of the State of Louisiana to respond to this storm.

8. **Please provide a detailed description of how and when the Office of the Governor was first informed that it would have to take action to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Please be specific as to dates, times, and personnel involved.**

Please refer to OVERVIEW above.

9. **Please provide all evacuation plans and a detailed chronology and description of any evacuations carried out or coordinated by the State of Louisiana, the Office of the Governor, or any collaborative efforts between the State of Louisiana, the Office of the Governor, and any other Louisiana State, parish, and/or local agency or department, relating to Hurricane Katrina, including who ordered the evacuations, when the evacuations started, where evacuees were evacuated from and to, and under what authority such evacuations were ordered and carried out. Please provide all documents referring or relating to any such evacuations.**

The definition of the word "evacuation," contained in the instructions accompanying the document request, while accurate for purposes of the National Response Plan, precludes a discussion of the true nature of the evacuations accomplished by the State of Louisiana: well over one million people were evacuated from the State within two days prior to the storm pursuant to phased evacuations as set forth in the Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide, a copy of which is provided with this response. Citizens from the lower parishes were evacuated first, followed by residents of the City of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. Contraflow was in effect for 25 hours from 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27 through 5 p.m. Sunday, August 28. There were no deaths caused by vehicular accidents during contraflow. Fuel was available along the route. The success of the phased evacuation cannot be overstated. It is directly due to the efforts of Governor Blanco's order to re-tool the contraflow plan after Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and the by-in for the plan among all of the parish presidents and the Mayor of New Orleans. Evacuation routes were improved and bottlenecks experienced during Ivan at the I-10/I-12 merge in Baton Rouge were eliminated. Focus groups targeted the best manner and means to get the message to the people of Louisiana. In addition to public service announcements and the internet, prior to the 2005 hurricane season, the State of Louisiana printed and distributed over one million copies of the Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide, of which contraflow is only one part.

Pre-landfall Evacuations

LOHSEP recommended during the 7 a.m. conference call on Saturday, August 27, 2005, that the Parishes implement the State Evacuation Plan for the Southeast Hurricane Task Force. The Parishes followed the recommendation and as noted in the sit reps, at 9 a.m. Saturday morning,

the Parish Presidents ordered various levels of evacuation (ie, voluntary to mandatory), beginning with Plaquemines and lower St. Bernard and Jefferson Parishes.

In accordance with state law, pre-storm evacuations were ordered by the local authorities.

Governor Blanco traveled to New Orleans and Jefferson Parish on Saturday, August 27, and again on Sunday, August 28, 2005, where she joined press conferences with local officials to add urgency to the evacuation. *The Times Picayune* published extensive coverage of the dangers posed by Hurricane Katrina in both the Saturday, August 27, 2005 and the Sunday, August 28, 2005 editions. Copies of the news articles are attached. New Orleans based WWL radio and many other local radio and television stations provided round the clock pre-storm coverage, urging citizens to heed hurricane warnings and evacuate the area.

It should be noted that the first phase of the evacuation which started at 9 a.m. on Saturday, August 27, 2005, did not include contraflow. Contraflow is not triggered until Phase Three of the evacuation plan. Contraflow operated from 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27, 2005 until 5 p.m. on Sunday, August 28, 2005. Evacuations continued after contraflow ended. It is believed that people continued to evacuate until about midnight.

Post storm Evacuations

At the request of LOHSEP on August 31, 2005, through an Action Request Form (ARF), DOD assets set up a movement control center at the EOC to coordinate the flow of FEMA buses as well as air evacuations at Moissant International Airport. Post storm evacuations of the special needs patients from the Arena were performed by the Louisiana National Guard, using LANG vehicles, National Guard Chinook helicopters, and private ambulances. Other special needs patients were taken to the Cloverleaf where they were evacuated on school buses procured through Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31 (and KBB 2005-25). See "Bus Documents" submitted with this response. The number of special needs patients was over one thousand, and may have been as high as fifteen hundred. The school buses procured through Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31 (and KBB 2005-25) also assisted with the evacuation of the Superdome. Thereafter, FEMA buses were used to evacuate the remaining population at the Superdome, the people who migrated to the Convention Center and those who were deposited by search and rescue at the Cloverleaf, as well as those who migrated to the Cloverleaf.

FEMA maintains records of the whereabouts of the evacuees, whether pre-storm or post-storm. The State has requested a copy of these records from FEMA, to no avail. The Governor's Office is aware that the individuals who were evacuated from the City of New Orleans and other areas after landfall were taken to reception stations where they were transferred to the care of volunteer organizations, which worked with the Department of Social Services.

A chronology of significant events which represents the best effort to date to catalog the massive quantity of information and data generated by the response to Hurricane Katrina has been provided with the LOHSEP response. This is an on-going project. In order to provide the most complete response, the chronology must be read in conjunction with the Louisiana Citizen

Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide (which includes the contraflow map) provided with this response, and the sit reps and conference call summaries provided with the LOHSEP response.

Additional documents responsive to this Request No. 9 are the following:

A copy of the powerpoint presentation entitled "Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan (LEEP)" has been provided with the LOHSEP response.

The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures, which includes a Shelter Plan Information, found in the Attorney General's document management system at Bates No. LOH-0018.

CD Nos. A and B, labeled "Press Conferences"

***Times Picayune* newspaper articles from the August 27 and August 28, 2005 editions**

Situation Reports:

SOURCE	BATES NO(s).
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0001
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0057 – LOH-0058
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0096 – LOH-0109
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0111 – LOH-0152
LOHSEP	LOH-0289 – LOH-0340
LOHSEP – FEMA Region VI	LOH-0047 – LOH-0056

Conference Call Summaries:

SOURCE	BATES NO(s).
LOHSEP (Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force)	LOH-0008 – LOH-0117

Limited Maestri Recordings:

DATE/TIME	BATES NO(s).
August 27, 2005 at 10:30 AM	JEF-0006
August 27, 2005 at 3:30 PM	JEF-0007
August 27, 2005 at 9:30 PM	JEF-0008
August 28, 2005 at 7:00 AM	JEF-0005
August 28, 2005 at 12:00 PM	JEF-0002
August 28, 2005 at 4:30 PM	JEF-0003
August 28, 2005 at 9:30 PM	JEF-0004
August 29, 2005 at 7:30 AM	JEF-0001

No Date/Time	JEF-0009
No Date/Time	JEF-0010
No Date/Time	JEF-0011
September 9, 2005, no time	JEF-0012

Please see also the timeline/chronology provided by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and the Department of Social Services.

10. To the extent not already provided in the responses to previous questions and requests, please identify and provide a detailed description of all actions taken by the Office of the Governor in preparation for and in response to Hurricane Katrina, between the dates of August 23, 2005, and September 6, 2005. Please provide all documents referring or relating to any such actions.

Please refer to OVERVIEW above.

11. All documents, from August 23, 2005, to September 6, 2005, constituting, referring or relating to communications between the Office of the Governor and Federal, State, parish, or local officials or first responders, or with others in the private or non-profit sectors, regarding assistance or offers of assistance relating to Hurricane Katrina.

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No. 11 would be the same as referenced in response to No. 7, with particular reference to the press release regarding formation of a foundation to accept Katrina donations as found on the **CD Nos. A and B, labeled "Press Conferences" and the MOU's with other states which supplied National Guardsmen which are found in the Governor's Correspondence** at Bates No. GOV-0004 on **the Attorney General's document management system.**

12. All documents and communications between the dates of August 23, 2005, and September 5, 2005, that are related to or associated with Hurricane Katrina that were not produced in response to previous items in this request.

To the best of its ability, under extremely trying circumstances, the Office of the Governor has made its very best effort to provide all relevant documents.

13. All documents from August 23 to September 6, 2005, referring or relating to emergency communications in the areas affected by, or expected to be affected by, Hurricane Katrina, including, but not limited to, requests for assistance with communications and plans to address communication failures.

Among the many documents relevant to the issue of post-landfall communication problems are the many references found in e-mails provided with this response; the Call Log; the Governor's notes, staff e-mails, as well as the documents submitted by LOHSEP in its response.

See also the narrative response to No. 20 in LOHSEP's Response for a succinct testimony of the extensive efforts made by LOHSEP, Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana National Guard and the Louisiana Attorney General's Office to address the degradation of communications caused by extensive damage to infrastructure inflicted by Hurricane Katrina.

14. Please identify all key State of Louisiana personnel with responsibility for emergency and interoperable communication in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Executive Counsel Terry Ryder is the individual on the Governor's executive staff with primary responsibility for liaison between the Governor and General Bennett Landreneau, Executive Director, and Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness at LOHSEP, and other entities involved with emergency communications. The Louisiana State Police has the lead role in interoperable communications. LOHSEP provides and assists with interoperable communications with the parishes as reflected the response to No. 20 above. Matt Farlow, the Division Chief of IT, which includes communications, has the primary role at LOHSEP with oversight provided by the deputy directors, Jeff Smith and Jay Mayeaux. Col. Joseph Booth and Rex McDonald, are the lead for Louisiana State Police.

15. All documents constituting, referring or relating to communications from August 23, 2005 to September 6, 2005, between the State of Louisiana and/or the Office of the Governor and Federal, State, or local officials or first responders, or with others in the private nonprofit sectors, regarding the failure or inadequacy of emergency communications.

Please see response to No. 13 above.

16. Describe the state command staff responsible for the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina, including how this command staff complied, or failed to comply, with the principles set forth in the National Incident Management System. Was the command a unified command? If not, what was it? Identify all individuals within the command. Please explain in detail how the command exercised control over each aspect of the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina.

The state unified command staff responsible for the response to Katrina is made up of the Governor, her executive Counsel, the Director of LOHSEP, the Acting Deputy Director of LOHSEP for Emergency Preparedness, and the secretaries, or their designees, of the following

state departments: Agriculture, Corrections, Louisiana National Guard, Transportation and Development, Environmental Quality, Fire Marshall, Justice, LSU Health Sciences, Health and Human Service, Public Service Commission, Social Services, Louisiana State Police, Natural Resources, Wildlife and Fisheries and Division of Administration, and the Federal Coordinating Officer and the State Coordinating Officer. American Red Cross, by virtue of its agreement with FEMA, was also part of the command staff as it is the designated agency for shelters. In addition, as circumstances required, the command staff included the secretary or their designees for Economic Development; Dept. Culture Recreation and Tourism; Dept of Education; Governor's Office of Elderly Affairs; Office of Financial Institutions; Office of Indian Affairs; Governor's Oil Spill Coordinator Office; Dept. of Labor; Board of Regents; Dept. of Revenue; Secretary of State; Dept. of Treasury and various volunteer organizations. This group provided the multi-agency coordination system as outlined as one of the major components of NIMS. In addition this group also provided coordination for multi-agency jurisdictional operations such as the search and rescue effort. Furthermore, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) maintained an operations section, logistical section, and an administrative section made up from State agencies, federal representation from FEMA Emergency Response Team-A (ERT-A and ERT-N) and those federal agencies with pre-presidential disaster declaration statutory obligations such as the US Coast Guard, US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Weather Service. Also present in the EOC were the Defense Coordinating Officer and liaison officers from Texas and Mississippi to facilitate mutual aid from other States through EMAC. Planning was occurring through each agency on an ongoing basis within their Emergency Support Functions. Due to the magnitude of the event, and resources and personnel being quickly overwhelmed, planning was decentralized to each functional area.

Command exercised control over each aspect of the response as follows:

1. ESF 1. Transportation. Prior to the storm, the ESF coordinated and executed the evacuation plan as outlined in the Louisiana Citizens Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guide., which included, at the direction of the Governor, the implementation of contraflow by DOTD, Louisiana State Police, and LANG. After the storm, DOTD inspected bridges and highways, and cleared roadways of debris. LSP, among many other missions, coordinated traffic into and out of the storm affected areas. LANG provided security and cleared debris form roadways after the storm.
2. ESF 2. Communications. Please see No. 20 above.
3. ESF 3. Public Works. DOTD reacted to levee breach at the 17th Street Canal by developing a plan to provide access for construction equipment needed to drive sheet piling to close the breach and finding a contractor to do the work.
4. ESF 4. Firefighters. Intrastate firefighters were deployed in the affected area under the direction of the State Fire Marshall. The additional assistance of out of state firefighters was procured through EMAC.
5. ESF 5. Emergency Management. LOHSEP, as part of the unified command, exercised the emergency management of the situation.

6. ESF 6. Shelters were coordinated by the Department of Social Services, in conjunction with the American Red Cross and the Department of Health and Hospitals, across the State of Louisiana as well as out of state. Additional out of state shelters were also coordinated through FEMA.
7. ESF 7. Resource Support. Resources were pushed from the parishes through E-Team requests and other means to the Emergency Operations Center, as well as being processed through the Joint Operations Center being operated by LANG. These requests were filled by a combo of local, state, out of state and federal resources. With the magnitude of the catastrophe, direct requests made to and fulfilled by LANG cut red tape and enabled a quicker response.
8. ESF 8. Public Health and Medical. DHH headed up the unified task force for Emergency Medical support throughout the entire area of operations.
9. ESF 9. Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue was coordinated from the Joint Operations Center at the Superdome, with the Emergency Operations Center acting in support, by providing coordination and resources. Ground operations were coordinated by Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries and Louisiana National Guard under the direction of General Broad Veillon. Air rescue was coordinated by LANG Col. Barry Keeling.
10. ESF 10. Oil Spill. DEQ, in conjunction with LSP, coordinated oil spill and haz mat from the EOC.
11. ESF 11. Agriculture. The Louisiana Department of Agriculture provided fuel for all emergency and evacuation vehicles, as well as generators and other fuel operated equipment.
12. ESF 12. Energy. DNR and the Public Service Commission cataloged reports of outages and coordinated the restoration of power.
13. ESF 13. Public Safety and Security. As contemplated by the State Emergency Operations Plan, local law enforcement, augmented by LSP, LANG, and the AG's investigators, maintained and restored law enforcement. In addition, Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr., and Secretary Richard Stalder of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, and their staffs are directly responsible for the successful evacuation of 8,000 prisoners from the Orleans Parish Prison, and the establishment of a temporary booking center at Camp Amtrak, which was the initial step in the restoration of the criminal justice system in the City of New Orleans.
14. ESF 14. Community Recovery, Mitigation and Economic Stabilization. This is not part of the response to Hurricane Katrina. It is part of the recovery.
15. ESF 15. Emergency Public Information. From Friday evening, August 26 and throughout Sunday, the catastrophic potential of Hurricane Katrina was well publicized via newspapers, radio and television. The Governor, Mayor of New Orleans and each of the parish presidents of Jefferson, St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes held numerous news conferences throughout this period. The success of these efforts can be measured by the number of people who evacuated prior to landfall and the number of people who sought shelter in the Superdome prior to landfall. Post landfall, unconfirmed and erroneous media reports of widespread lawlessness, violence and anarchy hampered rescue

efforts.[1] Bus drivers and FEMA contractors refused to enter the City of New Orleans without a police escort. FEMA's D-MAT hospital team and ambulance drivers left the Superdome on Wednesday, August 30, 2005. The shear magnitude of the response required to address the devastation caused by Katrina impaired LOHSEP's ability to devote resources to pursue "an aggressive rumor control effort."

The unified command staff responsible for the response to Katrina is made up of the Governor, her executive Counsel, the Director of the LOHSEP, the Acting Deputy Director of LOHSEP for Emergency Preparedness, and the secretaries, or their designees, of the following state departments: Agriculture, Corrections, Louisiana National Guard, Transportation and Development, Environmental Quality, Fire Marshall, Justice, LSU Health Sciences, Health and Human Service, Public Service Commission, Social Services, La. State Police, Natural Resources, Wildlife and Fisheries and Division of Administration, and the Federal Coordinating Officer and the State Coordinating Officer. American Red Cross, by virtue of its agreement with FEMA, was also part of the command staff as it is the designated agency for shelters. In addition, as circumstances required, the command staff included the secretary or their designees for Economic Development; Dept. Culture Recreation and Tourism; Dept of Education; Governor's Office of Elderly Affairs; Office of Financial Institutions; Office of Indian Affairs; Governor's Oil Spill Coordinator Office; Dept. of Labor; Board of Regents; Dept. of Revenue; Secretary of State; Dept. of Treasury and various volunteer organizations. This group provided the multi-agency coordination system as outlined as one of the major components of NIMS. In addition this group also provided coordination for multi-agency jurisdictional operations such as the search and rescue effort. Furthermore, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) maintained an operations section, logistical section, and an administrative section made up from State agencies, federal representation from FEMA Emergency Response Team-A (ERT-A and ERT-N) and those federal agencies with pre-presidential disaster declaration statutory obligations such as the US Coast Guard, US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Weather Service. Also present in the EOC were the Defense Coordinating Officer and liaison officers from Texas and Mississippi to facilitate mutual aid from other States through EMAC. Planning was occurring through each agency on an ongoing basis within their Emergency Support Functions. Due to the magnitude of the event, and resources and personnel being quickly overwhelmed, planning was decentralized to each functional area.

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2. ESF 2. Communications. Please see No. 20 above.

[1] There were some confirmed reports of gun fire, but not to the extent perpetrated and perpetuated by the media.

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13. ESF 13. Public Safety and Security. As contemplated by the State Emergency Operations Plan, local law enforcement, augmented by LSP, LANG, and the AG's investigators, maintained and restored law enforcement. In addition, Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr., and Secretary Richard Stalder of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, and their staffs are directly responsible for the successful evacuation of 8,000 prisoners from the Orleans Parish Prison, and the establishment of a temporary booking center at Camp Amtrak, which was the initial step in the restoration of the criminal justice system in the City of New Orleans.
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17. All records relating to communications to and from the state Emergency Operations Command.

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco was a very active participant in the response to Hurricane Katrina. She arrived at the Emergency Operations Center very early Saturday, August 27, 2005, and she rarely left until very, very late at night. As reflected in the Governor's Notes provided with this response, she was present at the EOC at 6:11 a.m. on Monday morning, August 29, 2005, when CBS broadcast hurricane coverage. Similarly, the Governor's executive staff stayed close by in the EOC. As a consequence, most of the Governor's communications were made verbally, directly with her staff, her cabinet members, statewide elected officials, department heads, and as events transpired, the members of the Louisiana Congressional delegation and federal officials present at the EOC. The scope of documents or records of communications to and from the State Emergency Operations Command by the Governor and her staff are reflective of these circumstances. The documents which are responsive to this request are provided with this response, and found in the e-mails; call logs; and Governor's correspondence; Bates No. GOV-0004 and Executive Orders, Bates No. GOV-0007 found on the Attorney General's document management system.

18. All documents concerning funding by the Federal government for the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; the West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; and the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project.

Any information responsive to No. 18 in regard to the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; the West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; and the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project would be in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, which provided the documents contained in the folder labeled,

[2] There were some confirmed reports of gun fire, but not to the extent perpetrated and perpetuated by the media.

"DOTD Requests for Federal Funding of Levees and Hurricane Studies" provided with the LOHSEP response. As reflected in the chart entitled, "Louisiana Congressional Budget Requests" attached to the LOHSEP response, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development has repeatedly made requests to the United States Congress for funding of hurricane studies, as well as requests for full funding of the State's portion of the cost of levee construction. To date, these efforts have had marginal success, at best, as reflected by the request in FYI 2004 for $16,000,000 in construction costs, with only $7,000,000 being appropriated. The budget requests submitted by the Army Corps of Engineers to Congress for levee construction around the City of New Orleans area have been met with a similar response. From the State budget perspective, appropriations of State funds for levee projects are made by the Louisiana legislature and the funds are handled by the Division of Administration.

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NATIONAL GUARD
After Action Review

Hurricane Response
September 2005

NGB J7
21 December 2005

Hurricane Katrina
NATIONAL GUARD AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
Lines of command, control and communications lacked clear definition and coordination among the Title 10 (T10) and Title 32 (T32) forces. The lack of effective coordination between T10 and T32 command and control structures resulted in duplicate effort and less than optimal use of critical resources. Liaison Officers proved invaluable under these circumstances. They provided situational awareness for the decision makers but much needs to be done to improve C2 within and between T10 and T32 forces.

COMMUNICATIONS
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted commercial and civilian communications networks in the disaster areas. Lack of situational awareness was caused largely by the loss of communications. The lack of communications and difficulties with interoperability of equipment between T10 and T32 forces as well as between the military and civilian leadership also hampered the rapid generation of EMAC requests. Poor communications also resulted in a lack of visibility of available assets in nearby states.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS/COMMON OPERATING PICTURE
Initial AAR comments noted that NGB lacked a common operating picture (COP) within its own headquarters. Lack of doctrinally correct reports, graphics, and communications procedures caused duplication of effort, confusion and multiple requests for clarification of information.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACTS (EMACs)
While initial Adjutant General – to – Adjutant General (TAG-to-TAG) coordination allowed for rapid deployment of NG forces, the large-scale and sustained operations required for this disaster requires a more systematic approach. Forces were deployed "piece meal" into and out of the JOA. NGB conducted Request for Forces (RFF) conference calls at the same time that the EMAC RFF process was being conducted by the National Coordinating Committee. In many cases NGB RFFs duplicated state EMAC RFFs causing confusion and duplicated efforts.

Hurricane Katrina
NATIONAL GUARD AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS

DUTY STATUS OF NG PERSONNEL
The multiple types of duty status of NG forces during a natural disaster presented some legal challenges in proper employment of forces. State JAGs interpreted laws, regulations and policies pertaining to various statuses and units of assignment (AGR, Military Technicians, State Active Duty, Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), Civil Support Teams (CSTs), Counter Drug (CD), Title 32 and Title 10 differently. Early authorization to utilize T32 funding (in accordance with 32 USC 502(f)) allowed for robust and sustained NG employment.

USE OF OTHER TITLE 32 ASSETS
Of particular interest is the legal aspect of using Civil Support Teams (CSTs) and Counter Drug (CD) personnel for natural disasters. When it came time for the RC-26B aircraft to launch and/or for CST or CD personnel to deploy, there were issues regarding proper funding and questions about whether the mission was justified under various regulations. NGB leveraged these assets to their maximum capability to provide greater support to MS and LA. Clarification of the legal status, funding, and justification for use is necessary for these assets to be fully utilized.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
State NG Public Affairs offices did not coordinate their resources or develop a unified National Guard message. State NG PAOs were unable to match the resources available to the active component. Procedurally, in order to provide accurate and consistent messages to the media and public, it is essential that JFHQ and NGB operation centers build their data from the same source(s) and mirror each other at all times.

Hurricane Katrina
NATIONAL GUARD AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS

The following summary includes critical items contained in reports from various entities contributing to the NGB After Action Review process. They are arranged under the categories Command and Control, Communications, Situational Awareness/Common Operating Picture, Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC), Duty Status of NG Personnel, Use of Title 32 Assets, and Public Affairs.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
With few exceptions, National Guard Joint Task Force (NGJTF) elements had significant command and control difficulties while trying to respond to the disaster. These difficulties were compounded with the deployment of Title 10 forces into the Joint Area of Operations (JOA) and lack of command and control coordination and poor communications between Title 10 and Title 32 forces were significant issues.

The disconnect between T10 and T32 command and control structures resulted in duplication of effort. For example, the 82nd Airborne moved into a sector already being patrolled by the 45th Bde and 41st Bde with no coordination.

The lack of T10 Reception Staging Onward Integration (RSOI) in the JOA without proper coordination with on-the-ground NG forces caused a burden on NG forces. Poor coordination of T10 RSOI with T32 forces already on the ground caused NG units to stop their mission to support and transport T10 forces to their area of operation (AO).

Liaison Officers (LNOs) proved invaluable. They assisted coordination efforts by providing situational awareness for the decision makers. LNO use of SATCOM phones during the early stages of response in LA was essential to making and filling resource requests and to providing timely SITREPS to higher headquarters entities.

Numerous organizational charts reflected multiple and often redundant layers, such as NORTHCOM, National Guard Bureau (NGB), Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ-State), Joint Task Forces, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state (Governor) and local (Mayoral) authorities. Each organization had preconceived ideas of who was "in charge" and how the relationships among them should be aligned. Unity of command was a problem.

The command and control model (separate state and federal Joint Task Forces) used during the Katrina response was appropriate. Improved coordination between T10 and T32 forces will result in more efficient and timely execution of support. In the future, protocols associated with sharing essential information, movement of personnel and equipment and the exchange of liaison officers are vital to an effective and comprehensive response.

Hurricane Katrina
NATIONAL GUARD AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC)
While initial state-to-state (TAG-to-TAG) coordination allowed for rapid deployment of National Guard forces, large-scale and sustained operations require a more systematic approach. Forces were deployed "piecemeal" into the Area of Operations (AO). The sheer numbers of forces arriving made it difficult to coordinate the flow.

NGB conducted Request for Forces (RFF) conference calls to coordinate military support well in advance of hurricane landfall. This initiative paralleled the EMAC RFF process conducted by the National Coordinating Committee. Although the NGB's military-to-military coordination allowed specific capabilities to be matched to RFFs very quickly, and in many cases anticipated similar EMAC RFFs, this parallel process caused confusion and duplicated efforts. EMAC RFFs were sometimes sent to "all states", essentially bypassing the NGB's previous coordination, and created a duplicate RFF.

To address these issues, the NGB JOC initiated an RFF and EMAC process flow for large events (see chart below).

Request for Forces and EMAC Process Flow
For Large Events



Hurricane Katrina
NATIONAL GUARD AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS

DUTY STATUS OF NG PERSONNEL

There was confusion regarding legal utilization of the National Guard during a natural disaster depending on various statuses and units of assignment (AGR, Military Technicians, State Active Duty, Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), Civil Support Teams (CSTs), Counter Drug (CD), Title 32 and Title 10. State JAGs interpreted current laws, regulations and policies differently. Soldiers being in different statuses also exacerbated standard policy for reporting and tracking of personnel. Title 32 funding (32 USC 502(f)) status allows for robust and sustained NG employment, but authorization was not received until D+9. The approval for T32 was not approved early enough in the process and had to be back-dated to align with Hurricane Katrina landfall (29 Aug 05).

USE OF TITLE 32 ASSETS

There was significant confusion regarding the legal aspects of CST deployment which, in some cases, precluded their use for Hurricane Katrina. When it came time for the RC-26B aircraft to launch and/or personnel to deploy, however, there were issues regarding who was going to fund the operation and questions about whether the mission was justified under NGR 500-2 / ANGI 10-80.

The CST/CD communication elements were used by some states, but not others and some capabilities were never used, such as command and control elements for site operations and the survey teams for initial assessments. The Counter Drug units provided Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) and their aviation assets also.

Both CST and CD are non-standard organizations that are not designed as a normal responding unit to a natural disaster. NGB leveraged these assets to their maximum capability to provide greater support to MS and LA.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public Affairs (PA) news releases about the National Guard (NG) were not readily evident on national news throughout the Hurricane Response timeframe. The national spotlight was on the US Coast Guard and active duty units. On several occasions active component officers were interviewed about activities being accomplished by members of the National Guard or with National Guard members prominently present in the background. Air National Guard assets in particular, were repeatedly described as elements of the US Air Force. The stand up of an active component Joint Task Force (JTF) by NORTHCOM contributed significantly to the perception that the active component was in the spotlight. State NG Public Affairs offices did not coordinate their resources or develop a unified National Guard message. In some cases, PA Officers

Gritzmacher, Thomas, CTR, OSD-POLICY

From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 5:56 PM
To. Scherling, Terry L, Brig Gen, JCS J3
Subject: RE: Katrina--1A Call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

could be--I may stop watching tv for the fear of the storm!

-----Original Message-----
From: Scherling, Terry L, Brig Gen, JCS J3 [mailto:terry.scherling@[redacted]]
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 3:41 PM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Subject: RE: Katrina--1A Call

Good plan, Sir. This sounds VERY catastrophic. v/r, Terry

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 5:31 PM
To: NC JOC - Director - OMB
Cc: Scherling, Terry L, Brig Gen, JCS J3
Subject: Katrina--1A Call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

1A has forwarded request for capabilities. We need to gather that in and turn into a warning request to the JS, JFCOM and force providers for the capabilities required. We need to get JS and JFCOM thinking about types of support that may be needed--joint solutions.

Need to message JS that we need to be looking << File: Richard J. Rowe Jr (E-mail).vcf >> t communications solutions (sat comms) and potentially sea to shore logistics support if significant road ways are washed out (for example bridge over Lake Ponchtrain).

vr
rjr

Gritzmacher, Thomas, CTR, OSD-POLICY

From:	Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Sent:	Sunday, August 28, 2005 7:22 PM
To:	Felderman Robert J COL USA USNORTHCOM J3
Cc:	Johanson Brad E CAPT USN USNORTHCOM J33; Muir Thomas M COL USA USNORTHCOM J33; NC JOC - Director - OMB; Scherling, Terry L, Brig Gen, JCS J3
Subject:	RE: Joint Staff Capabiliies and Units message for your approval

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

approved.

make sure that we are talking to JFCOM about thinking through capabilities and answers.
vr rjr

-----Original Message-----
From: Felderman Robert J COL USA USNORTHCOM J3
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 4:38 PM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Cc: Johanson Brad E CAPT USN USNORTHCOM J33; Muir Thomas M COL USA USNORTHCOM J33; Felderman Robert J COL USA USNORTHCOM J3; NC JOC - Director -- OMB
Subject: Joint Staff Capabiliies and Units message for your approval

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir,

Below is the GENADMIN message to Joint Staff regarding request for them to identify units and capabilities if and when a formalized request is submitted from NC.

Waiting for your review and approval to send message.

v/r RJF

Colonel Bob Felderman, USA
USNORTHCOM, J33
Joint Operations Center, Director

UNCLASSIFIED//
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
FM HQ USNORTHCOM//J3//
TO CJCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//
CDRUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-J4/TCJ3-OD// CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J1/J2/J3/J4/J5/J6/J7/J8/J9// HQ USNORTHCOM//J1/J2/J3/J4/J5/J6/J7/J8/JA// HQ NORAD COMMAND CTR CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN AFS CO//J3/J5// CDRNORAD PETERSON AFB CO// CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-OC/HS// HQ USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J33/J34/J35/J4/J5/J8/ CDRUSAONE FT GILLEM GA// CDR 5 ARMY EOC FT SAM HOUSTON TX//AFKB-OP/HSOP-SP// NGB WASHINGTON DC//CF/XP/DO/ARZ/ARO//HD/HD/XO// BT UNCLASSIFIED OPER/DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA/CJCS/192300ZAUG2005// MSGID/GENADMIN/USNORTHCOM J-3// SUBJ/DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA IN CONDUCTING DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA.//
REF/A/MSGID: GENADMIN/FIRST U.S.ARMY/281656ZAUG05/-/NOTAL// AMPN/REF A IS FIRST U.S. ARMY REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA.
SUBJ/REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA// POC/USNORTHCOM JOC CHIEF/NC J-33/LOC: PETERSON AFB/TEL: 692-2361/E-MAIL:
NC.JOC.CHIEF.OMB@NORTHCOM.MIL// AKNLDG/YES// GENTEXT/REMARKS/ 1. (U) GENERAL.
1.A.(U)HURRICANE KATRINA IS CURRENTLY 150 MILES SE OF THE MOUTH OF MISSISSIPPI AND MOVING WNW AT 12 MPH. IT IS PREDICTED TO MAKE LANDFALL EARLY MONDAY, 29 AUG 05. THE STATES OF LA,

B-2

MS, AND FL ARE POTENTIAL IMPACT AREAS. MISSION ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES THAT NEED TO BE LOCATED AND ALERTED FOR POSSIBLE DOD SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AFFECTED
STATE(S) AND THE PRIMARY AGENCY (PA).
1 B. (U) REQUEST JDOMS IDENTIFY AVAILABLE UNITS AND UNIT LOCATIONS WITH CAPABILITIES AS LISTED BELOW AND PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO CDRUSNORTHCOM NO LATER THAN 291600ZAUG05.
2. (U) KEY CAPABILITIES THAT MAY BE REQUIRED:
2.A. LANDFALL PLUS 24 HOURS:
2.A.1. (U) SATELLITE PHONES.
2.A.2. (U) UTILITY AVIATION (OH-58, UH1H OR UH60) FOR AERIAL RECON, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND C2.
2.A.3. (U) MARITIME CAPABILITY FOR INTER-COASTAL WATERWAY SEARCH AND RESCUE OPS AND TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.
2.B. LANDFALL PLUS 48 HOURS:
2.B.1. (U) MEDIUM LIFT AVIATION FOR MOVEMENT OF CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL.
2.B.2. (U) MEDICAL EVACUATION AVIATION UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT EVACUATION, SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) MISSIONS.
2.B.3. (U) ENGINEER/TRANSPORTATION UNITS WITH WATERCRAFT ASSETS FOR THE GULF COAST AREA.
2.B.4. (U) ENGINEER PORTABLE POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT (MINIMUM 30KW CAPABILITY) AND OPERATORS.
2.B 5. (U) MEDICAL DETACHMENTS (SANITATION/VETERINARY) WITH CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MASS TEMPORARY HOUSING.
2.B.6. (U) CONSTRUCTION/BRIDGE/UTILITY TYPE ENGINEER UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO RESTORE LOC (REMOVE AND HAUL DEBRIS, REPAIR ROADS, PROVIDE EMERGENCY BRIDGING, EMERGENCY RESTORATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE TO INCLUDE REPAIR/RESTORE POWER/GAS/WATER LINES).
2.B.7. (U) MP OR SECURITY UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FORCE PROTECTION AND SAFEGUARD DOD ASSETS AS REQUIRED.
2.B.8. (U) TRANSPORTATION UNITS (MEDIUM TRUCK COMPANIES) WITH CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE HAUL/TRANSPORT IN HIGH WATER.// GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/USNORTHCOM OFFICIAL: J3/MG ROWE//

B-3

[illegible] Admin NCC, EPLC [illegible] Deputy Chief Army EPLC

Subject: FIRST ARMY REQUEST [illegible] NORTHCOM FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA

Importance: High

ALL [illegible] MESSAGE to NORTHCOM requesting support for Hurricane Katrina

Fletcher B. Thornton
JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER (JOC)
HQ, First U.S. Army
COMM: 404-469-3285 DSN [illegible]-3285, FAX: 404-469-3406
fletcher.thornton@first.army.mil

Originator: DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(UC), 1A G3 EOC OFF(UC)
DTG: 281656Z Aug 05 **Precedence:** Routine **DAC:** General
Subject: FIRST ARMY: REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA

UNCLASSIFIED//
EXERCISE KATRINA
MSGID/GENADMIN/FIRST U.S.ARMY G-3/AFKA-OPP/05-149//
SUBJECT/REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA
GENTEXT/REMARKS/MSGID/GENADMIN/FIRST U.S.ARMY G-3
REF/A/DRAFT DISASTER RELIEF CONOP/FIRST ARMY/311000RMAY05
REF/B/PLANORD FOR 2005 SEVERE WEATHER SUPPORT/FORSCOM/271822ZMAY05
REF/C/JTF-CM SOP CM EAST SOP/MAR 04
AMPH/REF A IS THE DRAFT FIRST ARMY CONOP DIRECTING SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS TO CONDUCT DISASTER RELIEF CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF B IS THE FORSCOM ORDER THAT DIRECTS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR SEVERE WEATHER RESPONSE. REF C IS THE 1A TF-CM EAST SOP FOR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
GENTEXT/GENERAL
1. (U) GENERAL.
1.A.(U)HURRICANE KATRINA IS CURRENTLY 250 MILES SE OF THE MOUTH OF MISSISSIPPI AND MOVING WNW AT 12 MPH. IT IS PREDICTED TO MAKE LANDFALL EARLY MONDAY, 29 AUG 05. THE STATES OF MS, AL, AND FL ARE POTENTIAL IMPACT AREAS. MISSION ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES THAT NEED TO BE LOCATED AND ALERTED FOR POSSIBLE DOD SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AFFECTED STATE(S) AND THE PRIMARY AGENCY (PA).
1.B. (U) REQUEST USNORTHCOM IDENTIFY AVAILABLE UNITS AND UNIT LOCATIONS WITH CAPABILITIES AS LISTED BELOW AND PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO FIRST U.S.ARMY NO LATER THAN 282300ZAUG05.
2. (U) KEY CAPABILITIES THAT MAY BE REQUIRED:
2.A. LANDFALL PLUS 24 HOURS:
2.A.1. (U) SATELLITE PHONES.
2.A.2. (U) UTILITY AVIATION (OH-58, UH1H OR UH60) FOR AERIAL RECON, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND C2./
2.A.3. (U) MARITIME CAPABILITY FOR INTER-COASTAL WATERWAY SEARCH AND RESCUE OPS AND TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT./
2.B. LANDFALL PLUS 48 HOURS:
2.B.1. (U) MEDIUM LIFT AVIATION FOR MOVEMENT OF CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL./
2.B.2. (U) MEDICAL EVACUATION AVIATION UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT EVACUATION, SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) MISSIONS.

B-4

2.B.3. (U) ENGINEER TRANSPORTATION UNITS WITH WATER CRAFT ASSETS FOR THE GULF COAST AREA
2.B.4. (U) ENGINEER PORTABLE POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT (MINIMUM 30KW CAPABILITY) AND OPERATORS
2.B.5. (U) MEDICAL DETACHMENTS (SANITATION/VETERINARY) WITH CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MASS TEMPORARY HOUSING./
2.B.6. (U) CONSTRUCTION BRIDGE/UTILITY TYPE ENGINEER UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO RESTORE LOC (REMOVE AND HAUL DEBRIS, REPAIR ROADS, PROVIDE EMERGENCY BRIDGING, EMERGENCY RESTORATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE TO INCLUDE REPAIR/RESTORE POWER/GAS/WATER LINES)./
2.B.7. (U) MP UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FORCE PROTECTION AND SAFEGUARD DOD ASSETS AS REQUIRED./
2.B.8. (U) TRANSPORTATION UNITS (MEDIUM TRUCK COMPANIES) WITH CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE HAUL/TRANSPORT IN HIGH WATER.//
3. (U) POC FOR THIS REQUEST IS MAJ FEIGENBAUM, MILITARY SUPPORT DIVISION (MSD), G-3, FIRST ARMY AT DSN 797-4311 OR COMM 404-469-4311. ALTERNATE POC IS ON-DUTY MSD DESK OFFICER IN FIRST ARMY JOC AT COMM 404-469-4485, DSN 797-4485.//
AKNLDG/YES/INST: PHONE FIRST U.S.ARMY JOC UPON RECEIPT AT DSN 797-3280 OR COMMERICAL (404) 469-3280 OR (800) 496-6286 OR EMAIL AT JOCBATTLE[redacted]//
GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/HONORE/LTG/
OFFICIAL:/
de GRAFF/
COL/
DCS,G-3//

DISTRIBUTION.

FM: FIRST U.S ARMY G3//
TO: USNORTHCOM J3//
INFO:
HQDA G-3 OPS
JOINT STAFF J-3
JFCOM J-3
FORSCOM G3//
FORSCOM CHIEF OF OPS//
CDR 78TH DIV EDISON NJ//
CDR 85TH DIV ARLINGTON HEIGHTS IL//
CDR 87TH DIV BIRMINGHAM AL//
CDR 2/78 BDE FT DRUM NY//
CDR 4/78 BDE FT BRAGG NC//
CDR 5/78 BDE FT MEADE MD//
CDR 2/85 BDE FT MCCOY WI//
CDR 3/85 BDE FT HARRISON IN//
CDR 4/85 BDE FT KNOX KY//
CDR 2/87 BDE PATRICK AFB//
CDR 3/87 BDE CP SHELBY MS//
CDR 4/87 BDE FT STEWART GA//
CDR 5/87 BDE FT JACKSON NC//
REPLO TM III & IV//
SEPLO NC, VA, AND MD//
SRAAG NC, VA, AND MD//

TOP OF MESSAGE
Details

TO Addressees

(OR1) HEKP1, 78DIVOPNSUC

(DN1) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, USARC 78 DIV TSD, 78 DIV OPNS(UC)

B-5

[redacted]

From: Thornton, Fletcher B CIV DCS G-3 on behalf of 1A JOC Watch Team

Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 7:46 PM

To: 1A JOC DSCA Taskpoc, Colgrazie, Dan M [redacted] CMD GRP, Distribution ADCS, Distribution DCG, Hickey, James R , COL, CMDGRP; Hill, Floyd E , CSM CMDGRP, Honore, Russel L , LTG CG, Yingling, John A , MG CMDGRP, Bozgoz, Margaret S LTC, MSD, Cook, Charles W MAJ MSD, Feigenbaum, Shawn P , MAJ, MSD, Griffin, Charlene C , CIV MSD, Johnson, Neil C , LTC, MSD; Mills, Ronald J LTC, DCS, G-3, Loving, Jerome CIV, MSD, Reed, Donald J CIV, DCS, G-3, Seawright, Perry J , MAJ, MSD, Bergeson, Lawrence E , Contractor, DCS, G-3, Bostick, Kevin, Contractor DCS, G-3, Daras, Kirby M , Contractor , DCS, G-5, Frame, John E., Contractor, DCS, G-5, Kanley, Kevin R , Contractor, DCS, G-3, Nolan, Joseph, Contractor, DCS, G-5, Weaver, Brent N , Contractor, DCS, G-3, Reynolds, George, COL, DCS, G-5

Subject: FORSCOM REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA DTG 282329Z AUG 05

ALL, below is the FORSCOM MESSAGE TO JFCOM requesting title X forces based on the 1A message sent to them earlier today

Fletcher B Thornton
JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER (JOC)
HQ, First U S Army
COMM. 404-469-3285 DSN. 797-3285, FAX 404-469-3406
fletcher.thornton[redacted]

Originator: DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM OPERATIONS CENTER, G3 CURRENT OPS(UC)
DTG: 282329Z Aug 05 **Precedence:** Routine **DAC:** General
Subject: REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA

UNCLASSIFIED//
UNCLASSIFIED//
MSGID/GENADMIN/FORSCOM G-3//
SUBJECT/REQUEST FOR FORCE CAPABILITIES (TITLE X) ISO POSSIBLE DSCA
OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA//
REF/A/DRAFT DISASTER RELIEF CONOP/FIRST ARMY/311000RMAY2005//
REF/B/PLANORD/FORSCOM/271822ZMAY2005//
REF/C/JTF-CM SOP CM EAST SOP/MAR 04//
REF A IS THE DRAFT FIRST ARMY CONOP DIRECTING SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS
TO CONDUCT DISASTER RELIEF CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF B IS THE FORSCOM
ORDER THAT DIRECTS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR SEVERE WEATHER RESPONSE.
REF C IS THE 1A TF-CM EAST SOP FOR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT//
GENTEXT/REMARKS.
1. (U) GENERAL.
1.A.(U)HURRICANE KATRINA IS CURRENTLY 250 MILES SE OF THE MOUTH OF
MISSISSIPPI AND MOVING WNW AT 12 MPH. IT IS PREDICTED TO MAKE
LANDFALL EARLY MONDAY, 29 AUG 05. THE STATES OF MS, AL, AND FL ARE
POTENTIAL IMPACT AREAS. MISSION ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING
SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES THAT NEED TO BE LOCATED AND ALERTED FOR
POSSIBLE DOD SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) OPERATIONS IN
SUPPORT OF AFFECTED STATE(S) AND THE PRIMARY AGENCY (PA).
1.B. (U) REQUEST USNORTHCOM IDENTIFY AVAILABLE UNITS AND UNIT
LOCATIONS WITH CAPABILITIES AS LISTED BELOW AND PROVIDE THIS

(B-6)

[illegible] FIRST U.S. ARMY HQ DATE TIME 196002AUG2005
[illegible] AVAILABLE TIES THAT MAY BE REQUIRED
2.A. LANDFALL PLUS 24 HOURS
2.A.1. (U) SATELLITE PHONES
2.A.2. (U) UTILITY AVIATION (CH-47, UH-60, OR UH-60, FOR AERIAL RECON, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND CC
2.A.3. (U) MARITIME CAPABILITY FOR INTER-COASTAL WATERWAY SEARCH AND RESCUE OPS AND TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.
2.B. LANDFALL PLUS 48 HOURS
2.B.1. (U) MEDIUM LIFT AVIATION FOR MOVEMENT OF CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL.
2.B.2. (U) MEDICAL EVACUATION AVIATION UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT EVACUATION, SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) MISSIONS.
2.B.3. (U) ENGINEER/TRANSPORTATION UNITS WITH WATERCRAFT ASSETS FOR THE GULF COAST AREA.
2.B.4. (U) ENGINEER PORTABLE POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT (MINIMUM 30KW CAPABILITY) AND OPERATORS.
2.B.5. (U) MEDICAL DETACHMENTS (SANITATION/VETERINARY) WITH CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MASS TEMPORARY HOUSING.
2.B.6. (U) CONSTRUCTION/BRIDGE/UTILTY TYPE ENGINEER UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO RESTORE LOC (REMOVE AND HAUL DERIS, REPAIR ROADS, PROVIDE EMERGENCY BRIDGING, EMERGENCY RESTORATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE TO INCLUDE REPAIR/RESTORE POWER/GAS/WATER LINES).
2.B.7. (U) MP UNITS WITH CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FORCE PROTECTION AND SAFEGUARD DOD ASSETS AS REQUIRED.
2.B.8. (U) TRANSPORTATION UNITS (MEDIUM TRUCK COMPANIES) WITH CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE HAUL/TRANSPORT IN HIGH WATER.
3. (U) POC FOR THIS REQUEST IS MAJ WALTERS, FORSCOM BATTLE CAPTAIN, G-3, AT DSN 367-5069 OR COMM 404-464-5069.//
AKNLDG/YES/INST: CONTACT FORSCOM BATTLE CAPTAIN UPON RECEIPT DSN 367-5069 OR COMM (404) 464-5069 OR EMAIL FORSCOM_G3_BCPT@FORSCOM.ARMY.MIL.//

TOP OF MESSAGE

Details

TO Addressees

(OR1) NRTH1, CPXNRTH1, V3HQNORTHCOMJ3
(DN1) DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(UC), J3(UC)

CC/Info Addressees

(OR1) VEJX25, USTRANSCOMJ3
(DN1) DOD, TRANSCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, USTRANSCOM J3 OPERATIONS(UC)
(OR2) QCEY4, HQMC
(DN2) DOD, SOUTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ USSOUTHCOM(MC)
(OR3) TAYZ50, AYTAYZ02, AOCCATOPSWATCHG3DAMOAOCMC
(DN3) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER, AOC CAT OPSWATCH G3 DAMO AOC(MC)
(OR4) SBDJ2, JFCOM J3(MC)
(DN4) DOD, JFCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ USJFCOM NORFOLK VA(MC), JFCOM J3(MC)
(OR5) HHQL1, 1A G3 CURRENT OPS
(DN5) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(UC), 1A G3 CURRENT OPS(UC)
(OR6) HHQL7, 1A G3, 1A G3 EOC OFF
(DN6) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(UC), 1A G3 EOC OFF(UC)

B-7

[redacted]

From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 [Rich.Rowe@[redacted]
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 6 46 PM
To: "Honoré, Russel L , LTG, CG", Inge Joseph R LTG USA USNORTHCOM DC
Subject: RE JTF MS and JTF LA identified Cdrs (state JTF only)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir hooah JFCOM reviewing 'Joint Solutions' from force providers. Somewhat hamstrung by JDOMS desire to wait for RFAs. I've been in touch with J3 JFCOM (Mike Fernter) twice today and his staff is on board (differently than past experiences). Still an area for improvement. vr Rich

---

From: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" [mailto:russel.honore@[redacted]
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 4:26 PM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3; "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG"; Inge Joseph R LTG USA USNORTHCOM DC
Subject: RE: JTF MS and JTF LA identified Cdrs (state JTF only)

THANKS RICH IAM MOVING TO SHELBY EARLY TOMORROW MORNING , WITH MY RTF HQ WILL BRING ABOUT 100 PHONE LINES, SAT BASE SYSTEM, NIPER AND SIPER, TAG MISS IS CURRENTLY MOVING TO SHELBY, WE WILL SET UP LET THEM USE COMMS , UNTIL INSTRUCTIONS FROM YALL V/R HONORE

Russel L. Honoré
Lieutenant General, USA
Commander, First U.S. Army
Comm: (404) 469-7281
Cell: (404) 805-1653

From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 [mailto:Rich.Rowe@[redacted]il]
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 6:09 PM
To: russel.honore@[redacted], Inge Joseph R LTG USA USNORTHCOM DC
Subject: JTF MS and JTF LA identified Cdrs (state JTF only)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sirs, for SA--BG Pylant is Asst AG Mississippi identified as JTF - MS Commander; BG Jones is Deputy Cdr State JHQ identified as JTF - LA Commander. Per my understanding will be State JTFs only--thus 'coordinating relationship' with any Title 10 folks as appropriate. Vr Rich

<<FW: BG Pylant's Bio>> <<FW: BG Jones' Bio>>

(B-8)

[redacted]

From: Altshuler, Brooks [Brooks.Altshuler@dhs.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 10:57 PM
To: 'Michael.Lowder@dhs.gov'; 'Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov'; 'Patrick.Rhode@dhs.gov'; 'Michael.Heath1@dhs.gov'; 'brooks.altshuler@dhs.gov'; 'William.Carwile@dhs.gov'
Subject: Re: Northcom Response to Katrina

Great news as far as I am concerned. Tomorrow will be a big day in order to get linked up with the beast. All I have to say is, this country kicks ass.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder@dhs.gov>
To: 'Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov' <Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>; 'patrick.rhode@dhs.gov' <Patrick.Rhode@dhs.gov>; Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath1@dhs.gov>; 'brooks.altshuler@dhs.gov' <Brooks.Altshuler@dhs.gov>; Carwile, William <William.Carwile@dhs.gov>
Sent: Tue Aug 30 22:52:44 2005
Subject: Fw: Northcom Response to Katrina

FYI.....

-----Original Message-----
From: Blong Clair K GS-15 DHS/FEMA NORAD USNORTHCOM IC <Clair.Blong@northcom.mil>
To: Fema-NRCC <Fema-NRCC@dhs.gov>; FEMA, HSOC <HSOC.Fema@dhs.gov>; Lokey, William <William.Lokey@dhs.gov>; Bulkema, Edward <Edward.Bulkema@dhs.gov>; Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder@dhs.gov>; Pawlowski, Michel <Michel.Pawlowski@dhs.gov>
Sent: Tue Aug 30 22:51:40 2005
Subject: Northcom Response to Katrina

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

During the NC Commander's Executive Board meeting this afternoon, Deputy Secretary of Defense England called Admiral Keating and informed him that NC should lean forward on its Katrina response efforts by

--moving out on any good ideas,
--have a blank check to move out,
--move whatever ships, planes and resources that are useful and just keep the Pentagon informed,
--NC is leading the DoD response activities,
--the President and Sec Def are returning to Washington and have called this the US "tsunami".

NC Commander has ordered the Command's battle cells to operate 24/7 for the duration and recall and augment staff appropriately. The NC has also adjusted its battle rhythm to support the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and other Washington agencies. NC is also leaning forward on anticipating mission assignments and tightening reporting requirements from its components in the field.

Admiral Keating has also taken several decisions today to move ships and planes to the LA, MS and AL area and placed a number of military units on high alert for movement on short notice.

B-9

August 30, 2005

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Hurricane Relief

Don,

Attached is the latest update (Page 1) to my earlier fax to you regarding DoD's support of the relief efforts. For reference, the earlier fax is also attached (pages 2 and 3).

Bottom line is that we are leaning forward on all fronts. I have authorized all local commanders to provide their assistance and have authorized NORTHCOM and the Chairman to take all appropriate measures to push forward available DoD assets that could be useful to FEMA. All efforts are being fully coordinated with FEMA, but we are pre-staging food, water, medical, etc., as we want to have those items available as needed. So far, we have received only modest requests but know these requests will rapidly accelerate, so we are being as proactive as possible.

A SVTC is scheduled for 0930 tomorrow with NORTHCOM so you will get a firsthand update from ADM Tim Keating.

Gordon
1945

Enc.

Page 1
8/30/05
1945 EDT

Update of DoD Support for Hurricane Katrina Relief

1. A joint task force headquarters has been formed, led by LtGen Honore (USA) located at Camp Shelby, MS. LtGen Honore will be Admiral Keating's "man on the scene" to coordinate and direct active duty and reserve forces.

2. Three additional ships being prepared to depart and will likely depart yet this evening. They are the USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport and USS Tortuga. Iwo is a "small deck carrier", Shreveport has two helo spots, Tortuga has one, and they all have medical capability.

3. The Comfort hospital ship is making preparation to deploy from Baltimore and will likely leave in 2-3 days and on station in 7-9 days. Medical personnel will be flown to the ship en route to reduce preparation time.

4. FEMA has requested 500-bed hospital with 50 intensive care beds. FEMA would like this to be dispersible in about 100-bed lots. Current thinking is to deploy an Expeditionary Medical System that provides care for 3,000-5,000 people in anticipation of greater need.

5. Transportation Command is deploying eight civilian swift water rescue teams to New Orleans Air Station from California. Each team consists of 14 personnel with six suburban size vehicles with small trailers and boats.

6. 19,200 cases of MREs were pre-staged, and another 583,000 cases have been requested by FEMA. We are responding without impact to war stocks.

7. TRANSCOM has C-5s, C-17s and C-130s on alert to be available as needed.

8. There are a lot of individual actions underway and it's changing hourly.

1. **DoD Integration with FEMA**

- Defense Coordinating Officers, who are trained for disaster relief and with experience, including their 10- to 18-person staffs, have been assigned to Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana to work with the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officers. These Defense Coordinating Officers have been in place for several days in advance of the hurricane to be fully on board and ready for action.
- Emergency Preparedness Officers (Reserve Colonels) located at FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center IV in Atlanta, GA and VI in Denton, TX.
- Northern Command Operations Planner and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Planner are en route to FEMA National to liaise and assist in planning as required.

2. **DoD Actions in Response to FEMA Requests**

- Activated Naval Air Station Meridian, MS; Barksdale AFB LA; and Maxwell AFB AL as Operational Staging Areas in support of FEMA.
- Deployed helicopters to LA (two for rapid needs assessment) and MS (five with two for night search and rescue and three for day time assessment).
- TRANSCOM is positioned to provide strategic lift support (5 C-5's and 2 C-17's) from California to Mississippi for Swift Water Search and Rescue assets … people and boats.
- Put Maxwell AFB in "Be Prepared To"status as Airport of Embarkation/Debarkation and coordinated Tactical Airlift Control Element planning for potential augmentation.
- National Guard forces committed in state status (LA—3800+; MS—1900 rising to 3000; AL—1000; FL--700).

3. **DoD Proactive (Leaning Forward in Anticipation of Future Needs)**

- Established Joint Task Force Katrina with LTG Russ Honore (Commander of 1st Army) at Camp Shelby MS
- FEMA has preliminarily indicated that they may need as many as 2,000 hospital beds and may request a 500-bed deployable hospital from DoD. DoD is in the process of provisioning and making available in anticipation of a firm request.
- USS Bataan, an amphibious Navy ship, is en route and within 100 miles of Gulfport. Bataan has six helicopters aboard, one landing craft, extensive

logistics supply and trauma medical capability. Normally Bataan is used in combat with embarked Marines and, therefore, has a 44-bed hospital (surge to 500) plus 1200-bed berthing capability. On station tonight. Navy also has the USNS Artic underway on the east coast of Florida with replenishment supplies appropriate for disaster relief. On station Thursday morning. Also, the Naval vessel, USS Swift, a high speed catamaran, is loading supplies in Ingleside, TX and will be dispatched to the area when loaded.

- Activation of Ft. Polk and NAS New Orleans as home of displaced persons and airfields in New Orleans.
- Activation of Aviation JTF for 24/7 medical evacuation and medium lift support based out of Camp Beauregard, LA, Jackson, MS and Maxwell AFB, AL.
- 9 million pounds of ice, 195,000 cases of water and 600,000 MREs available.

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
EXHIBIT C

MMTF 00415-05

McHale-Mauldin, TF, OSD-POLICY

From: Blum, Steven - NGB-ZA
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 10 01 AM
To: NGJP TAGs and NGB GOs
Cc: Vaughn, Clyde A LTG NGB-ARNG, Ickes II, Charles V Brig Gen NGB/CF
Subject: Hurricane Relief VTC 1200 EST Today
Importance: High

All Adjutants General are requested to participate in a 1200 EST VTC today to discuss providing additional troops and equipment for hurricane relief in Louisiana and Mississippi. We need to start flowing troops immediately to the Gulf states, and may need as many as 10,000 within the next 48 hours

The National Guard is actively involved in the rescue phase of this operation. Lives are at stake and time is of the essence.

I need you or your designated decision-maker to join the effort. The situation is critical. Your involvement is essential.

HSB

ALL States need to have their VTC personnel coordinate directly with the Video Operations Center at NGB:

Contact number: COMM [redacted]

DSM: [redacted]

Email: video-ops@[redacted]

VTC Name: Hurricane Katrina

Times: Startup: 1130 hrs EST

Sitdown: 1200 hrs EST

Durration: 1 hour

Thank you,

SFC Paul Bearden

NGB Joint Operations

[redacted]

Blum MMTF C-1

[redacted]

From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 [Rich.Rowe@[redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 9:06 PM
To: James Hickey@[redacted]
Cc: russel honore@[redacted]
Subject: RE. LA Security mission

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

roger. rjr

From: Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP [mailto:James.Hickey@[redacted] **On Behalf Of** Honore, Russel L., LTG, CG
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 4:23 PM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Subject: RE: LA Security mission

Sir - we are analyzing, but think there are enough ARNG Soldiers and volunteers to perform all these missions. CG thinks LAARNG was reluctant to move into New Orleans. Working w/ Tony Daskaivech, CG is going to Baton Rouge to attempt to get some ground truth. Expect BG Mark Graham arrival there soon. v/r Jim

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 [mailto:Rich.Rowe@[redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 6:05 PM
To: James.Hickey@[redacted]
Cc: russel.honore@[redacted] NC JOC - Director - OMB; Ferrell Terry R COL USA USNORTHCOM J35
Subject: LA Security mission

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Jim,

There should be calls coming your way.

There is a desire to concentrate National Guardsman into NO for LE / security tasks. Governor has asked that federal troops pick up rest of the tasks being uncovered by Guard in state.

Thoughts? What does this mean in terms of scale? Type capabilities?

Rich Rowe
MG Richard J. Rowe, Jr.
Director Operations, J3 USNORTHCOM

<<Richard J. Rowe Jr (E-mail).vcf>>

(C-2)

[redacted]

From: Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 2:04 PM
To: 'Rich.Rowe[redacted]; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP
Cc: 'nc.joc.dir.omb[redacted]'; 'Terry.Ferrell[redacted]; 'TIMOTHY.KEATING@NORTHCOM.MIL'; 'Joseph.Inge[redacted]; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP
Subject: Re: LA Security mission

GOT IT
LTG Russel L. Honore
First U.S. Army
Commanding General
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 <Rich.Rowe[redacted]l>
To: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" <russel.honore[redacted]l>; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP <James.Hickey[redacted]l>
CC: NC JOC - Director - OMB <nc.joc.dir.omb[redacted]l>; Ferrell Terry R COL USA USNORTHCOM J35 <Terry.Ferrell[redacted]>; Keating Timothy J ADM USN NORAD USNORTHCOM CC <Timothy.Keating[redacted]l>; Inge Joseph R LTG USA USNORTHCOM DC <Joseph.Inge[redacted]l>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 13:50:41 2005
Subject: RE: LA Security mission

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Guidance is 'guard' in NO and 'guard' to fullest extent possible for tasks in LA and MS. NGB supports. EMAC working. OSD and CJCS agree with this.

Vr
Rich

-----Original Message-----
From: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" [mailto:russel.honore[redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 11:46 AM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP
Cc: NC JOC - Director - OMB; Ferrell Terry R COL USA USNORTHCOM J35; Keating Timothy J ADM USN NORAD USNORTHCOM CC; Inge Joseph R LTG USA USNORTHCOM DC
Subject: Re: LA Security mission

PUSH BACK I WILL SEE GOVE TODAY , WILL SHOW HER FLOW OF NG TROOPS ,NG HAS THE GROUND FIGHT IN HAND WITH 24 K IN NEXT R6 HRS LTG Russel L. Honore First U.S. Army Commanding General
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 <Rich.Rowe[redacted]l>
To: James.Hickey[redacted]l <James.Hickey[redacted]l>
CC: russel.honore[redacted]l <russel.honore[redacted]>; NC JOC - Director - OMB <nc.joc.dir.omb[redacted]l>; Ferrell Terry R COL USA USNORTHCOM J35 <Terry.Ferrell[redacted]l>
Sent: Wed Aug 31 18:05:22 2005
Subject: LA Security mission

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Jim,

There should be calls coming your way.

There is a desire to concentrate National Guardsman into NO for LE / security tasks. Governor has asked that federal troops pick up rest of the tasks being uncovered by Guard

(C-3)

in state.

Thoughts? What does this mean in terms of scale? Type capabilities?

Rich Rowe
MG Richard J. Rowe, Jr.
Director Operations, J3 USNORTHCOM

<<Richard J. Rowe Jr (E-mail).vcf>>

(C-4)

MMTF 00416-05

Grubbs, Robert, CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: Miller, Thomas G MG - DCS G3/5/7 [thomas miller [redacted]
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 2 29 PM
To: Honore, Russel L LTG (russel honore [redacted]
Cc: 'Yingling, John A MG'
Subject: DRB

Sir--We have the DRB ready to roll followed by a BCT from the 1 CAV Just need to know from your staff where you want us to deploy them to We have the 82 Div DTAC available as well to assist if you need them DRF can lauch 2 hrs after notice.. Vr tm

14
MMTF 416-05 (C-5)

MMTF 00416-05

Reed, Richard C., SFC, DCS, G-3

From: FORSCOM_G3_BCPT
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 10:33 PM
To: '18ABC-OC-G3 BCPT'; '18ABC-OC-G3 BNCO'; 1A JOC Watch Team; 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain; 'NC CSC - Forscom LNO - OMB'; '3cg3ops'; 3cg3curopsoic; 3cg3curops; 'Fifth Army Operations Center (H)'
Cc: FORSCOM_G3_BCPT; Garner, Aubrey L. LTC - G3 Chief, Current OPS, 'CDO'; 'CAT02 DEP. CHIEF'; Knippel, Michael J. LTC - G3; Leary William J. LTC G3
Subject: Release of C-17 A/C at Pope AFB

ALCON,

Please be advised of the release of C-17 aircraft at Pope AFB ISO mission to TF Katrina AO.

Information is included in the message below.

V/R,

WILLIAM GORDON

MAJ, QM

FORSCOM BCPT

Comm: (404) 464-5032/5069

DSN: 367-5032/5069

SIPR: forscom_g3_bcpt[redacted]

NIPR: forscom_g3_bcp[redacted]

From: Post, Paul LTC - G3, Operations
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 2:10 AM
To: FORSCOM_G3_BCPT
Cc: Garner, Aubrey L. LTC - G3 Chief, Current OPS
Subject:

FORSCOM G-3 has agreed to release the C-17 aircraft at Pope AFB to support the on order mission of 3/82 to the TF Katrina AO.

NMCC advises that the J-3 believes that the ARNG Soldiers on the ground have the mission in hand and the need to deploy Title 10 forces will not be necessary for security.

The alert posture of the units remains unchanged.

MMTF 00 416-05 (C-6.

NEW

From: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain [jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil]
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:17 AM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Cc: 1A JOC Watch Chief; 1A JOC Watch Team; 1A JOC Briefings; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP; Thompson, Thomas, CIV, DCS, G-3/5/7; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3; Hawrylak, Michael, Contractor, DCS, G-3; Kranepuhl, Randolph, COL, DCS, G-3
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Sir,

JTF-Katrina Main is located at BLDG 101 Ft. Gillem, GA 30297. DSN 797-3280/7911

Very Respectfully,

Alan L. Wilson
Battle Captain (Contractor)
HQ First Army
Fort Gillem, Georgia
NIPR: jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil
SIPR: jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.smil.mil
(404) 469-3285 (non-secure)
(404) 469-7459 (secure)
DSN: 797-3285

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 [mailto:Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil]
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:02 AM
To: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

JTF Main is where?

-----Original Message-----
From: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain [mailto:jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil]
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 8:36 AM
To: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG"; 'james.amosADDRESS REDACTED'
Cc: 'jeffrey.a.whiteADDRESS REDACTED'; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3; Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3; Mason, William, COL, DCS, G-4; de Graff, Christian, COL, DCS, G-3/5/7; 'robert.blackmanADDRESS REDACTED'; 'jack.bergmanADDRESS REDACTED'; 'douglas.odellADDRESS REDACTED'; Trahan, Scott G., CPT, CMDGRP; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3; Rogers, John G., MAJ, DCS, G-3; Kranepuhl, Randolph, COL, DCS, G-3
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Sir,

From the 1A Marine EPLO,

C-7

MGEN O'Dell ETA JTF-Main SAT NLT 030900RSEP05. Will stay at JTF-Main as long needed. Then go forward. Issues: (1)JOA apportionment? (2) CFLCC designated? (3) Functional apportionment?
The General's new cell number is NUMBER REDACTED.

NO visit expected from LtGen Amos at this time.
-

Very Respectfully,

Alan L. Wilson
Battle Captain (Contractor)
HQ First Army
Fort Gillem, Georgia
NIPR: jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil
SIPR: jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.smil.mil
(404) 469-3285 (non-secure)
(404) 469-7459 (secure)
DSN: 797-3285

-----Original Message-----
From: Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 10:08 AM
To: 'james.amosADDRESS REDACTED'
Cc: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain; 'jeffrey.a.whiteADDRESS REDACTED'; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3; 'Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil'; Mason, William, COL, DCS, G-4; de Graff, Christian, COL, DCS, G-3/5/7; 'robert.blackmanADDRESS REDACTED'; 'jack.bergmanADDRESS REDACTED'; 'douglas.odellADDRESS REDACTED'
Subject: Re: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Shit hitting fan get here fast as you can honore LTG Russel L. Honore First U.S. Army Commanding General
(404) 469-7281

-----Original Message-----
From: Amos LTGEN James F <james.amosADDRESS REDACTED>
To: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" <russel.honoreADDRESS REDACTEDmil>
CC: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain <jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; White COL Jeffrey A <jeffrey.a.whiteADDRESS REDACTED>; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP <john.yinglingADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP <James.HickeyADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3 <ronald.roseADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil <Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil>; Mason, William, COL, DCS, G-4 <William.MasonADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; de Graff, Christian, COL, DCS, G-3/5/7 <christian.degraffADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; Blackman LtGen Robert R <robert.blackmanADDRESS REDACTED>; Bergman LtGen Jack W <jack.bergmanADDRESS REDACTED>; O'Dell MajGen Douglas V <douglas.odellADDRESS REDACTED>
Sent: Fri Sep 02 06:14:20 2005
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Roger that Russ!!! Let me know what you need from us. Got a bunch of my heavy lift helos in PCola yesterday and they will begin flying for you this morning. Bringing in a SPMAGTF HQs into Belle Chase today along with a C2 suite so we can have comms there. Have loaded 2 ships with engineering "stuff" that are headed your way. What can I do for you?

(C-8)

semper fidelis

tamer

-----Original Message-----
From: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" [mailto:russel.honoreADDRESS REDACTEDmil]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 19:48
To: Amos LTGEN James F; 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain
Cc: White COL Jeffrey A; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3; 'Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil'; Mason, William, COL, DCS, G-4; de Graff, Christian, COL, DCS, G-3/5/7
Subject: Re: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

HOOAH WARRIOR BROTHER LOOK FORWARD TO YOU GETTING HERE LTG Russel L. Honore
First U.S. Army Commanding General
(404) 469-7281

-----Original Message-----
From: Amos LTGEN James F <james.amosADDRESS REDACTED>
To: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" <russel.honoreADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain <jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>
CC: White COL Jeffrey A <jeffrey.a.whiteADDRESS REDACTED>; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP <john.yinglingADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP <James.HickeyADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3 <ronald.roseADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil <Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil>; Mason, William, COL, DCS, G-4 <William.MasonADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; de Graff, Christian, COL, DCS, G-3/5/7 <christian.degraffADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 18:41:24 2005
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Russ...you are a great American...look good on CNN by the way. We will stay plugged in. Would appreciate a good poc list on your JTF when you get it stood up...not to worry as I know you are plenty busy. Am here to please...not to tease!!!

semper fidelis

tamer

-----Original Message-----
From: "Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG" [mailto:russel.honoreADDRESS REDACTEDmil]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 13:46
To: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain; Amos LTGEN James F
Cc: White COL Jeffrey A; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3; 'Rich.RoweADDRESS REDACTED.mil'; Mason, William, COL, DCS, G-4; de Graff, Christian, COL, DCS, G-3/5/7
Subject: Re: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

HELLO BROTHER GET HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN V/R HONORE, JAY CALL LTG AMOS ASAP GIET ALL COMPONETS ON DAILY ASSASSMENT ASAP LTG Russel L. Honore First U.S. Army Commanding General
(404) 469-7281

(C-9)

-----Original Message-----
From: 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain <jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>
To: 'Amos LTGEN James F' <james.amosADDRESS REDACTED>; Honoré, Russel L., LTG, CG <russel.honoreADDRESS REDACTEDmil>
CC: White COL Jeffrey A <jeffrey.a.whiteADDRESS REDACTED>; Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP <john.yinglingADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; Hickey, James R., COL, CMDGRP <James.HickeyADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>; Rose, Ronald, J., LTC , DCS, G-3 <ronald.roseADDRESS REDACTEDmil>; 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain <jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 08:54:50 2005
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Sir,

Please see LtGen Amos's message below.

Very Respectfully,

Alan L. Wilson

Battle Captain (Contractor)
HQ First Army
Fort Gillem, Georgia
NIPR: jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil
SIPR: jocbattleADDRESS REDACTEDmy.smil.mil
(404) 469-3285 (non-secure)
(404) 469-7459 (secure)
DSN: 797-3285

From: Amos LTGEN James F [mailto:james.amosADDRESS REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 8:25 AM
To: JOCBATTLEADDRESS REDACTEDMY.MIL
Cc: White COL Jeffrey A
Subject: FW: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)
Importance: High

Battle Captain....LtGen Amos here from II MEF at Camp Lejeune. Do me a favor please and pass this along to Gen Honore for me.

Russ...know you are busy my friend. I am sending heavy lift helos down this morning to PCola and then on to the Bataan. Loading other ships with engineering gear as well. What can I do for you? Call me at 910 451-8950/51 or DSN is 751XXXX.

semper fidelis

jim
-----Original Message-----
From: Moore MajGen Thomas L

C-10

Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 7:43
To: Marshall Col Jeffery L
Cc: Peeler Col David H; Van Camp Col Eric J ; Owens Col Christopher S; Cyr Col Mark R; Amos LTGEN James F; Jeffrey White (E-mail)
Subject: RE: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)
Importance: High

Hombre,
Let's see if we can get up with Air Operations and get a list of common frequencies that they are using and a play list of call signs of the other players to pass to the squadron. Get with 461 and confirm their call signs and pass to Air Ops and see if the JTF is going to let them use theirs or designate a specific for this operation. This may already have been accomplished by JD as the ACE. You likely have this in work, if so just brief me at the morning meeting. Thanks. Welcome aboard...
Semper fi, CG

-----Original Message-----
From: Marshall Col Jeffery L
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 18:40
To: Moore MajGen Thomas L
Cc: Peeler Col David H; Van Camp Col Eric J ; Owens Col Christopher S; Cyr Col Mark R
Subject: FW: AVIATION C2 (Airspace/Tasking - TACON)

Sir, Here's the Aviation C2 side of the puzzle as prescribed by the JTF Commander/1st Army. BATAAN has TACON of all DOD assets and the airspace in the JOA. Additionally specified is that all DOD Aviation assets are directed to coordinate DIRECTLY with BATAAN. Highlighted are relevent portions. More to follow as develops. I will collect the reference messages -- only MARFORNORTH is an addressee for the Marine Corps side -- we got it via the MEF Air Shop from the MEPLO/LtCol Zuppan who is enroute.

V/Jeff

-----Original Message-----
From: 1A JOC EPLO Marine [mailto:jocmarineADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 15:26
To: Kugel Maj Joseph P
Subject: Aviation message

Originator: DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(UC), 1A G3 EOC OFF(UC)

DTG: 311634Z Aug 05

Precedence: Priority

DAC: General

(C-11

Subject: JTF-KATRINA FRAGO 2 TO HURRICANE KATRINA EXORD DIRECTING JOINT FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
OPER/ HURRICANE KATRINA//
MSGID/FRAGO-2/JTF-KATRINA/05-160//
SUBJECT: THIS IS JTF-KATRINA FRAGO 2 TO HURRICANE KATRINA EXORD DIRECTING JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFMCC) TO DEPLOY USS BATAAN TO ASSUME TACON OF ALL DOD AVIATION ASSETS ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT JTF-KATRINA AND ASSUME CONTROL OF JOINT AIRSPACE IN THE JOA.//
REF/A/NORTHCOM EXORD KATRINA/261930ZAUG05//
REF/B/NORTHCOM MOD 4 TO EXORD KATRINA/300200ZAUG05//
REF/C/FORSCOM EXORD KATRINA/27063ZAUG05//
REF/D/FORSCOM FRAGO 5 TO EXORD KATRINA/310330ZAUG05//
REF/E/NORTHCOM MOD 5 TO EXORD KATRINA/302100ZAUG05//
REF/F/NORTHCOM MOD 6 TO EXORD KATRINA/310330ZAUG05//
ORDTYPE/FRAGO/JTF-KATRINA/TIMEZONE/R//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (U) SITUATION. IAW REF F, USS BATAAN IS TACON TO JTF-KATRINA FOR SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE KATRINA AND WILL OPERATE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO VIC NEW ORLEANS, LA. JTF-KATRINA IS ASSIGNED THE MISSION TO CONTROL JOINT AIRSPACE IN THE JOA. AVIATION ASSETS FROM VARIOUS MILITARY SERVICES AND UNITS ARE BEING TASKED THRU APPROPRIATE SERVICE CHANNELS TO SUPPORT JTF-KATRINA AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. USS BATAAN HAS THE NECESSARY ORGANIC RESOURCES TO EXERCISE TACON OF DOD AVIATION ASSETS OPERATING WITHIN THE JOA IN SUPPORT OF THIS MISSION AND TO EXERCISE CONTROL OF THE JOINT AIRSPACE WITHIN THE JOA.//

2. (U) MISSION. NO CHANGE.//
3. (U) EXECUTION. NO CHANGE.//
3.A. (U) COMMANDERS INTENT. NO CHANGE. //
3.B. (U) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. NO CHANGE.//
3.C. (U) TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS.
3.C.1. (U) USS BATAAN WILL ASSUME TACON OF ALL DOD AVIATION ASSETS ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT JTF-KATRINA AND ASSUME CONTROL OF JOINT AIRSPACE WITHIN THE JOA EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
3.C.2. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
3.C.2.A. (U) DOD AVIATION MISSIONS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF JTF-KATRINA WITHIN THE JOA WILL BE SYNCHORIZED AND DECONFLICTED WITH APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE SAFETY OF ALL AIRCRAFT AND MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF DOD AVIATION ASSETS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.
3.C.2.B. (U) ALL DOD AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT JTF-KATRINA WILL COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH USS BATAAN COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER PRIOR TO CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE JOA.
4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. NO CHANGE.//
5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
5.A. (U) ALL DOD AVIATION ASSETS ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT JTF-KATRINA WILL BE TACON TO USS BATAAN.
5.B. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT (POC).

5.B.1. (U) JTF-KATRINA (MAIN) JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER (JOC) BATTLE CAPTAIN AT 1-800-496-6286 OR (404) 469-3280 OR DSN 797-3280 OR E-MAIL JOCBATTLEADDRESS REDACTEDMY.MIL.
5.B.2. (U) JTF-KATRINA (FORWARD) LTC ROSE, J-3, DSN 286-4134/4120.
5.B.3. (U) JTF-KATRINA (MAIN) J-3 AVIATION, DSN 286-4482.
5.B.4. (U) USS BATAAN COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER, COMM 757-443-7237.//

GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/HONORE LTG
OFFICIAL:
de GRAFF
COL
DCS, J-3/5/7

DISTRIBUTION (VIA DMS):
TO: CDR, JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT
TO: CO, USS BATAAN
TO: IIICORPS FT HOOD OPS
TO: XVIIICORPS FT BRAGG G3
TO: DCO, LOUISIANA
TO: DCO, MISSISSIPPI
INFO: FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON CAT
INFO: HQ USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB J3
INFO: USAFIVE FT SAM HOUSTON -OPS
INFO: SEPLO TEAM LA
INFO: SEPLO TEAM MS
INFO: REPLO TEAM VI
INFO: REPLO TEAM IV
INFO: SRAAG, LOUISIANA
INFO: 78TH DIV EDISON NJ
INFO: 85TH DIV ARLINGTON HEIGHTS IL
INFO: 87TH DIV BIRMINGHAM AL
INFO: IIICORPS FT HOOD -OPS
INFO: XVIIICORPS FT BRAGG NC -G3
INFO: JTF-CS -G3
INFO: JTF-NCR -G3
INFO: JFCOM J3/5
INFO: JDOMS J3/5
INFO: MOB STATIONS (ALL)//
DISTRIBUTION (VIA E-MAIL):
INFO: 2/78 BDE FT DRUM NY
INFO: 4/78 BDE FT BRAGG NC
INFO: 5/78 BDE FT MEADE MD
INFO: 2/85 BDE FT MCCOY WI
INFO: 3/85 BDE FT HARRISON IN
INFO: 4/85 BDE FT KNOX KY
INFO: 2/87 BDE PATRICK AFB FL
INFO: 3/87 BDE CP SHELBY MS
INFO: 4/87 BDE FT STEWART GA
INFO: 5/87 BDE FT JACKSON SC
INFO: SRAAGS (ALL)
INFO: STATE TAGS (ALL)
INFO: DA(G3 OPNS)
INFO: COMNAVRESFOR -OPS
INFO: AFNSEP -OPS
INFO: MARFORNORTH -OPS
DISTRIBUTION (VIA DMS):

(C-13)

ANNEXES/-/NA//
AKNLDG/YES/INST:JOCWATCH 404 469-3285 DSN 797-3285//

TOP OF MESSAGE
Details

TO Addressees

(OR1) NRTH1, CPXNRTH1, V3HQNORTHCOMJ3

(DN1) DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(UC), J3(UC)

(OR2) NRTH1, CPXNRTH1, HQNORTHCOMJ3J32

(DN2) DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(UC), J3(UC), J32(UC)

(OR3) SBDJ2, CMSA LANT NORFOLK VA(MC)

(DN3) DOD, JFCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, CMSA LANT NORFOLK VA(MC)

(OR4) LSFY3, COMNAVRESFOR NEW ORLEANS LA(UC)

(DN4) DOD, NAVY, ORGANIZATIONS(UC), COMNAVRESFOR NEW ORLEANS LA(UC)

(OR5) HHQL7, G3 CURRENT OPS

(DN5) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM OPERATIONS CENTER, G3 CURRENT OPS(UC)

(OR6) SBDJ2, HQ USJFCOM NORFOLK VA(MC)

(DN6) DOD, JFCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ USJFCOM NORFOLK VA(MC)

(OR7) LSFY3, COMNAVRESFORCOM NEW ORLEANS (UC)

(DN7) DOD, NAVY, ORGANIZATIONS(UC), COMNAVRESFORCOM NEW ORLEANS LA(UC)

(OR8) NRTH1, CPXNRTH1, V3HQNORTHCOMJ3J34

(DN8) DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(UC), J3(UC), J34(UC)

(OR9) NRTH1, CPXNRTH1, HQNORTHCOMJ3J38

(DN9) DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(UC), J3(UC), J38(UC)

CC/Info Addressees

(OR1) SBDJ2, JFMO LANT NORFOLK VA(MC)

(DN1) DOD, JFCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, JFMO LANT NORFOLK VA(MC)

(OR2) NRTH1, CPXNRTH1, JFHQ-NCRMESSAGECENTER

(DN2) DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, JFHQ-NCR MESSAGE CENTER(UC)

(OR3) HHQL7, 1A JTF-CME

(C-14)

(DN3) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, JTF-CME(UC)

(OR4) SBDJ2, JFCOM J3(MC)

(DN4) DOD, JFCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ USJFCOM NORFOLK VA(MC), JFCOM J3(MC)

(OR5) TAYZ21, CPXTAYZ01, JSJ3JOINTOPSDIV

(DN5) DOD, JCS, ORGANIZATIONS, JOINT STAFF(UC), JOINT STAFF J3(UC), JOINT STAFF J3 JOINT OPS DIV(UC)

(OR6) HHQL7, G3 WATCH OFFICER

(DN6) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM OPERATIONS CENTER, G3 WATCH OFFICER(UC)

(OR7) TAYZ50, AYTAYZ02, DOMESTICSTRATEGYSUPORTG3DAMODSMC

(DN7) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER, DOMESTIC STRATEGY SUPPORT G3 DAMO DS(MC)

(OR8) HHQL7, 1A G3, 1A G3 EXERCISE

(DN8) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(UC), 1A G3 EXERCISE(UC)

(OR9) ANRW1, LAAGUC

(DN9) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, ARNG LA, LA AG(UC)

(OR10) HFTZ1, IIICORPSG3DMS

(DN10) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, III CORPS, III CORPS G3(UC)

(OR11) HCTL1, XVIIIABCG3OPNSNCO6UC

(DN11) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, XVIII ABC, XVIII ABC ACOFS G3, XVIII ABC G3 OPNS NCO6(UC)

Originator-OR - HHQL7, 1A G3, 1A G3 EOC OFF

Originator-DN - DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(UC), 1A G3 EOC OFF(UC)

ContentType - 2.16.840.1.101.2.1.2.3

SecurityPolicyID-ACP120 - 2.16.840.1.101.2.1.3.14

SpifID-ACP120 - [47A985F0751E64C5]-[02][10][348][01][65][02][01][03][0E]

ClassificationMark-ACP120 - UNCLASSIFIED//

PrivacyMark-ACP120 - PRIVACY MARK UNDEFINED

CategoryMark-ACP120 - GENSER Categories//GENSER Informational Categories//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(C-15)

PrecedenceCopy - ROUTINE

MessageType - OTHER-ORGANIZATIONAL

MTS-ID - /C=US/ADMD=DMS LOCAL=AYHHQL01.020:31.08.05.17.43.16

Recipient-OR - HHQL7, G3 CURRENT OPS

Recipient-DN - DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM OPERATIONS CENTER, G3 CURRENT OPS(UC)

Signers-DN - DoD, ARMY, Organizations, HQ FIRST ARMY, 1A G3(uc), 1A G3 EOC OFF(uc)

ThisMMUser - /C=US/ADMD=DMS/O=GA2/OU=HHQL7/OU=1A G3/OU=1A G3 EOC OFF

ThisMMUserID - 001904 3108051743162

Attachments - 1A JMD TF KATRINA.xls

AttachmentsPath - D:\Telos\Data\XMLInput\attachment/A002021783.001

John Zuppan

LtCol USMCR

MEPLO 1st Army

DSN 797-4276

Comm 404-469-4276

Cell NUMBER REDACTED

jocmarineADDRESS REDACTEDmy.mil

(C-16)

Gritzmacher, Thomas, CTR, OSD-POLICY

From: Huddleston, Andrew F., CIV, JCS J3
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:09 AM
To: Bernado, Paul R, CDR, JCS J3; Gentry, Robin, LtCol, JCS J3
Cc: Scherling, Terry L, Brig Gen, JCS J3; Butler, Brian A, LTC, JCS J3
Subject: FW: NOT SURE YOU HAVE SEEN THIS; USMC ADVON TEAM INSIDE JOA MOVING TO NAS NEW ORLEANS RESERVE; 5 USMC C130 INBOUND TODAY

Importance: High

Attachments: Whidbey 2 Sept 05.ppt

Whidbey 2 Sept 05.ppt (185 KB)...

Pls ensure DD has info for passing to DJ3, regarding this USMC-directed movement into JOA. Thanks ah

-----Original Message-----
From: Gray Jr, Eugene, CAPT, JCS J3
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:03 AM
To: Huddleston, Andrew F., CIV, JCS J3; Gentry, Robin, LtCol, JCS J3; J-3 DDAT/HD JDOMS News Group
Cc: Angeli, Eric J, LTC, JCS J3; Bernado, Paul R, CDR, JCS J3; Eggert, Matthew E, Lt Col, JCS J3; Warner, Carden, LCDR, JCS J3; Yost, John W, CTR, JCS J3
Subject: FW: NOT SURE YOU HAVE SEEN THIS; USMC ADVON TEAM INSIDE JOA MOVING TO NAS NEW ORLEANS RESERVE; 5 USMC C130 INBOUND TODAY
Importance: High

Marine forces in NOLA not attached to JTF-K. Interesting. Also attached is load out info on USS Whidbey Island.

v.r.

fyi.

CAPT Gene Gray
Air, Land & Maritime Branch Chief
CGLO to Joint Staff
J-3 DDAT/HD HD
703-697-8170

-----Original Message-----
From: Reininger Robert E CAPT USCG USNORTHCOM J35
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 10:10 AM
To: Gray Jr, Eugene, CAPT, JCS J3
Subject: FW: NOT SURE YOU HAVE SEEN THIS; USMC ADVON TEAM INSIDE JOA MOVING TO NAS NEW ORLEANS RESERVE; 5 USMC C130 INBOUND TODAY
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

---Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 6:40 AM
To: Thomas G. MG - DCS G-3/5/7 Miller (Thomas.Miller@us.army.mil); Volcheff Mark A Maj Gen

(C-17)

USAF USNORTHCOM J5; 'Yingling, John A., MG, CMDGRP'
Cc: Robert Dail (robert.dail@[redacted]); Reininger Robert E CAPT USCG USNORTHCOM J35
Subject: FW: NOT SURE YOU HAVE SEEN THIS; USMC ADVON TEAM INSIDE JOA MOVING TO NAS NEW ORLEANS RESERVE; 5 USMC C130 INBOUND TODAY
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

For situational awareness...

-----Original Message-----
From: Reininger Robert E CAPT USCG USNORTHCOM J35
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 6:35 AM
To: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3; Brooks Gene RDML USCG USNORTHCOM J3
Cc: Dastur Keith R Lt Col USAF USNORTHCOM J3E; Johanson Brad E CAPT USN USNORTHCOM J33; Muir Thomas M COL USA USNORTHCOM J33
Subject: NOT SURE YOU HAVE SEEN THIS; USMC ADVON TEAM INSIDE JOA MOVING TO NAS NEW ORLEANS RESERVE; 5 USMC C130 INBOUND TODAY
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir, email traffic to give us a heads up that the USMC flew one of their C130s into Belle Chase last night w/ an ADVON team (guess of 12 persons). Their equipment (comms suite: 5 vehicles, 5 trailers--DSN capability, SIPRN, NIPR--pull into a pipe size T1 and pushed out SATCOM/SHF) and an additional 25 persons. This is being flown in today--5 C130s--wheels up at 1000 EST today. Then they are moving fwd to NAS New Orleans Reserve base...they do not have orders to move out yet but they are inside our JOA w/out JTF K or NC vis. An RFI was pushed to the JTF CDR how they would like to use this capability. "official" purpose is to recon for the USMC MEU team that is embarked on the USS WHIDBEY that is getting u/w today.

Source is MEU S6 located in Camp Lejuene. Our USMC LNO has vox comms w/ source. Bottom line... USMC Comdt directed.

v/r

-----Original Message-----
From: Ferrell Terry R COL USA USNORTHCOM J35
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 6:16 AM
To: Reininger Robert E CAPT USCG USNORTHCOM J35
Subject: FW: Marine Forces Contacts and information

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----
From: Hill William V III LTC USA USNORTCOM J35
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 1:18 AM
To: Ferrell Terry R COL USA USNORTHCOM J35; Reininger Robert E CAPT USCG USNORTHCOM J35; Farrell Richard E CDR USN USNORTHCOM J33
Cc: Clark Vincent T LCDR USN USNORTHCOM J35; Andersen Reik MAJ USA USNORTHCOM J35; Nasatka Carl J Contractor USNORTHCOM J35; Schnaubelt Christopher M Contractor USNORTHCOM J35
Subject: FW: Marine Forces Contacts and information

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

As discussed previously, MC is moving out for JOA in two elements

1 - 24 MUE (slide attached)
2 - MAGTF: Expecting DEPORD on 2 Sep

Issues: Political / C2 / Mission Needs?

LTC Hill

-----Original Message-----

C-18

From: NC JOC - Land West - OMB
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 11:57 PM
To: Hill William V III LTC USA USNORTCOM J35
Subject: FW: Marine Forces Contacts and information

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

LTC Hill,

Below are contacts for the MAGTF out of Camp Lejeune and attached are the assets that were embarked. Most of the forces are still at Lejeune, pending a Dep Order.

I have coordinated the 1st Army G-3 with the II MEF G-3 and also MEU OPSO (info below).

If questions arise, just ask.

Ted

V/R
Ted C. Thompson/GS-13
>USNORTHCOM/JOC Land-West
>DSN: 692.2359 (STE)
>CML: 719.554.2359
>DRSN: 250.2459
>SIPR: nc.joclandwest.omb@[redacted]
>NIPR: nc.joclandwest.omb@[redacted]
>

-----Original Message-----
From: NC JOC - Land West - OMB
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 9:46 PM
To: 'margaret.bozgoz@[redacted]
Subject: FW: Marine Forces Contacts and information

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

V/R
Ted C. Thompson/GS-13
>USNORTHCOM/JOC Land-West
>DSN: 692.2359 (STE)
>CML: 719.554.2359
>DRSN: 250.2459
>SIPR: nc.joclandwest.omb@[redacted]
>NIPR: nc.joclandwest.omb@[redacted]
>

-----Original Message-----
From: NC JOC - Land West - OMB
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 9:38 PM
To: 'margaret.bozgoz@[redacted]'
Cc: 'SalehM@[redacted]; Lucas LtCol William S
Subject: Marine Forces Contacts and information

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Madame,

Per our phoncon, below and attached are the Marine Forces that were embarked aboard the Whidbey Island earlier today.

The SP MAGTF (Special Purpose, Marine Air Ground Task Force) POCs are as follows:

II MEF G-3 Plans: LtCol Bill Lucas DSN 751-8955

C-19

24th MEU Operations Officer: LtCol Michael Saleh DSN 751-0619/Commercial 910 451-0619.

NORTHCOM's intent is to coordinate assets between yourself and the MAGTF. With properly structured forces flowing into the Katrina AO, the ability of JTF Katrina to utilize them effectively will be greatly enhanced.

They currently have an ADVON team on the deck at Belle Chase. There is an advance communications detachment also flying in on the 2nd of September. If there is not already one, can you facilitate a POC on the deck and further guidance for these forces as needed.

Please coordinate directly with the II MEF or MEU Operations Officer.

Thanks,

Ted sends...

V/R
Ted C. Thompson/GS-13
>USNORTHCOM/JOC Land-West
>DSN: 692.2359 (STE)
>CML: 719.554.2359
>DRSN: 250.2459
>SIPR: nc.joclandwest.omb@[redacted]
>NIPR: nc.joclandwest.omb@[redacted]
>

-----Original Message-----
From: Saleh LtCol Michael [mailto:SalehM@[redacted]]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 8:26 PM
To: NC JOC - Land West - OMB
Subject: FW: Update

FYI
Will this suffice for what we have currently and projected force laydown.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Saleh LtCol Michael
> Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 10:13 PM
> To: Shook Col John E; Johnson Col Ronald J
> Cc: Kelly LtCol Daniel P; Lucas LtCol William S; Lucas LTCOL WIlliam S
> Subject: Update
>
> Gentlemen
> Update provided:
>
> -The Shreveport went underway at 1822L containing the following MSSG
> 24
> assets:
>
> -37 PAX (1 MO; 34 ME; 2 NE)
> -OIC is CWO2 (Engineer)
> -A-drivers are equipment techs, mechs, utilities, engrs, supply
> -Includes 1 HST Team
> -7 MTVRs, 2 MTVR Dump Trucks, 1 MMV Forklift, 1 Ambulance, 1
> MRC-138, 1 MRC-145
> -3 ROWPUs w/Generators, 2 Fuel SIXCONS, 4 Water SIXCONS, 2
> M149s, 2 M105s -1
> Floodlight set, 3 Quadcons, Some CLASS I, IIII, IV, V, VIII, and IX
>
>
>
> -Forward Command Element deployed via C-130 to Belle Chase, LA wheels
> up MCAS New River ~1540; wheels down at 2131 local.
> 9 pax, 3 DOS Water/Chow, 1 HMMWV, 1 Tent, 5 rifles, 4 pistols,
> security ambition, iridium and cellular telephones
>
> I told Major Cunningham to take an aerial view of the area to include

(C-20)

> Hammand and Kessler Air Force Bases. He is going to do so tomorrow.
>
> More updates in the morning.
>
> Tomorrow's Plan
>
> -The JTFE and 20 packs will fly down on 5 C-130s.
>
> -The Whidbey Island will have: SEE ATTACHED
>
> <<Whidbey 2 Sept 05.ppt>>
>
> Saturday:
> -Remainder of CE with sustainment. Details to follow.
>
> respectfully
>
> LtCol Mike Saleh
> 24th MEU Operations Officer
> mailto:salehm@[redacted]
> DSN: 751-0619
> COM:(910) 451-0619
>

(C-21)

KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO
GOVERNOR

State of Louisiana
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
Baton Rouge
70804-9004

POST OFFICE BOX 94004
(225) 342-7015

September 2, 2005

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Let me first thank you for your leadership during this unprecedented natural disaster. Your pledge of assistance for the initial and long-term recovery efforts is reflective of the tremendous outpouring of support by the citizens of our great country. Although we have been dealt a devastating blow, I can assure you Louisiana will recover, rebuild, and restore our communities.

Based on our initial assessment, I have previously requested significant federal support to include: an additional 40,000 troops; trailers of water, ice and food; commercial buses; base camps; staging areas; amphibious personnel carriers; deployable morgues; urban search and rescue teams; airlift; temporary housing; and communications systems. Even if these initial requests had been fully honored, these assets would not be sufficient to address our critical, immediate needs. Additional assistance requirements for the federal government are outlined below. As we continue to assess our needs, I will ensure you receive our updated requirements.

I request the expeditious return of the Headquarters of the 256th Brigade Combat Team as they have completed their mission in the Iraqi theatre of operations and they are urgently needed here at home. I request that you remission this unit to Louisiana where they will become part of the recovery efforts in their home state. As the remainder of the Brigade returns, I request that they be missioned by the Department of Defense to assist civil authorities in Hurricane Katrina recovery operations in Louisiana.

To increase the responsiveness of our humanitarian relief operations, FEMA should establish a second Operational Staging Base (OSB) in Baton Rouge. Currently we have only one OSB in Pineville. Establishment of a second OSB will cut in half the response time to our most affected parishes. This will raise our local distribution points from 21 to 35, significantly increasing our support to the neediest citizens. Our current requirement for water, ice and MREs is 100 trucks of each per day; our requirement will increase to 200 trucks of each per day when we increase local distribution points.

(C-22)

Our communications grid was devastated and we need significant assistance in restoring governmental communications. The reestablishment of cell phone coverage and public safety networks is necessary to establish communications among governmental officials at all levels and among response agencies. The radio system that is currently operational in the greater New Orleans area was designed to support 800 users; there are currently 2500 users. To address the radio communications requirements, we need additional frequencies: 25 800-MHz trunking repeaters, tower crews, 1000 portable radios, three hundred-foot tower trailers, and additional BellSouth and Motorola staff. I also require additional staffed mobile command centers that provide satellite uplink to support additional voice and data needs at public safety and governmental sites.

I want aerial and ground firefighting support to address the growing danger of fire. This support should include both equipment and trained personnel.

A critical element of our military response is equipment, particularly vehicles. As military units are flown in to assist us in our recovery efforts, I request a fleet of military vehicles that will remain in the affected areas. Therefore, I am requesting access to military trucks, HMMWVs and other vehicles. Fort Polk, Louisiana, has a prepositioned fleet of military vehicles that could be accessed very quickly; however, there may be other sources that may be available quicker.

I request 175 generators to enable the parishes to provide electricity for critical local operations and state offices to better support affected citizens. As I review this requirement with our parishes, this number will undoubtedly increase. I need additional diesel fuel supplies.

Preventative health is a priority to prevent the spread of disease. Our state medical team is currently assessing these requirements; I need considerable personnel, equipment, drugs, vaccines and other medical supplies.

We have experienced a significant loss of life and as we transition from our initial emphasis on search and rescue, we require assistance with mortuary affairs. It is my pledge to the citizens of Louisiana that we will conduct this task with as much dignity as possible; to accomplish this I need federal assets to work closely with state and local officials.

Livestock and other animals were also victims of this tragic storm. I need assistance to deal with injured animals and also with animal remains.

Page three
The President
September 2, 2005

Mr. President, only your personal involvement will ensure the immediate delivery of federal assets needed to save lives that are in jeopardy hour by hour. I know you will take the actions necessary to make this happen. As the recovery efforts continue, I will provide you a reassessment of needs. Again, thank you for your support of the citizens of Louisiana.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor
State of Louisiana

(C-24)

Reed, Richard C., SFC, DCS, G-3

From: DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(SC), J3(SC) [amhsdba@info.amhscentral.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 10:20 PM
To: 1A JOC Watch Team
Subject: USNORTHCOM ELEVENTH REQUEST FOR FORCES

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Precedence: O
DTG: 9/4/2005 1:30:00 AM

From: DOD, NORTHCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, HQ NORTHCOM(SC), J3(SC)
Subject: USNORTHCOM ELEVENTH REQUEST FOR FORCES

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UNCLASSIFIED FOUO//
OP040130Z SEP 05
FM HQ USNORTHCOM//J3//
TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J4/DDATHD/JDOMS// INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
ASD(HD) WASHINGTON DC
ASD(PA) WASHINGTON DC
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC//G/3/5/7//
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N3/N5//
CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP&O//
CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO//
CMC WASHINGTON DC//POC/POS/RAM/PP&O//
CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J1/J2/J3/J4/J5/J6/J7/J8/J9// CDRUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//J3-J4/J3-OD// CDRUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//J1/J2/J3/J4/J5/J6/J7/J8// HQ USNORTHCOM//J1/J2/J3/J4/J5/J6/J7/J8/IC/JA/PA//
HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J3/J5//
HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//AFOC/XOH/ILX//
DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODS//
NGB WASHINGTON DC//J3/J4//
CDRARNORTH FT MCPHERSON GA
CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//G3/AFOP-OC/HS// CDRNORTHAF LANGLEY AFB VA ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC/DO// CDRNAVNORTH NORFOLK VA CFFC NORFOLK VA COMSECONDFLT NORFOLK VA COMTHIRDFLT SAN DIEGO CA COMMARFORNORTH NEW ORLEANS LA//G3/G4/G5/G7// COMMARFORRES NEW ORLEANS LA//G3/G4/G5/G7// JFHQ-NCR WASHINGTON DC CJTF-CS FT MONROE VA CMOC CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN AS CO//CC/J3// COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA//A/ACS/AO/AM// CMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF// WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC CSAF WASHINGTON DC FIRST ARMY FT GILLEM GA FIFTH ARMY FT SAM HOUSTON TX CDR PACOM CAMP SMITH HI// OPER/DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE KATRINA// MSGID/GENADMIN/CDRUSNORTHCOM// SUBJ/REQUEST FOR FORCES//
REF/A/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/301745ZAUG05/-/-/-//
REF/B/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/310200ZAUG05/-/-/-//
REF/C/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/310803AUG05/-/-/-//
REF/D/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/311345ZAUG05/-/-/-//
REF/E/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/311845ZAUG05/-/-/-//
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REF/G/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/011100ZSEP05/-/-/-//
REF/H/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/020530ZSEP05/-/-/-//
REF/I/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/030015ZSEP05/-/-/-//
REF/J/GENTEXT/USNORTHCOM/040100ZSEP05/-/-/-//
NARR/
REF A IS USNORTHCOM REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF B IS USNORTHCOM SECOND REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF C IS USNORTHCOM THIRD REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF D IS USNORTHCOM FOURTH REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF E IS USNORTHCOM FIFTH REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF F IS USNORTHCOM SIXTH REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.

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REF G IS USNORTHCOM SEVENTH REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF H IS USNORTHCOM EIGHT REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
REF I IS USNORTHCOM NINTH REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS REF J IS TENTH REQUEST FOR FORCES FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS //
POC/QUEEN/MR./J35/USNORTHCOM/DSN 692-1420/ JACK.QUEEN<AT SIGN>NORTHCOM.MIL AND NC.OPG.LANDMACA.OMB<AT SIGN>NORTHCOM.SMI.MIL//
NARR/THIS IS THE ELEVENTH HQ USNORTHCOM REQUEST FOR FORCES (RFF) TO AUGMENT JOINT TASK FORCE KATRINA IN SUPPORT OF USNORTHCOM'S MISSION TO SUPPORT DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING DEVASTATION BY HURRICANE KATRINA.// GENTEXT/SITUATION// 1. (U) SITUATION// 1.A. (U) DOD IS PROVIDING SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING HURRICANE KATRINAS DEVASTATION ALONG THE GULF COAST.
1.B. (U) THE REQUESTED FORCES REFLECTED FOLLOW-ON USNORTHCOM MISSION ANALYSIS.// GENTEXT/MISSION// 2. (FOUO) MISSION.
2.A. (FOUO) USNORTHCOM MISSION. PROVIDE SUPPORT TO FEMA IN THE CONDUCT OF DISASTER AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS IN AFFECTED AREAS TO AUGMENT LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL DISASTER RESPONSE CAPABILITY AS THE RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA.
2.B. (FOUO) CONOPS. CDRUSNORTHCOM HAS ESTABLISHED A JOINT OPERATIONS AREA IN THE AFFECTED STATES OF LA, MS, AL, FL, GA, TN, AND KY. CDR FIRST ARMY, LTG HONORE, HAS ESTABLISHED JOINT TASK FORCE KATRINA (JTF-KATRINA) AT CAMP SHELBY MS TO PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DOD FORCES SUPPORTING HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
GENTEXT/FORCE REQUIREMENT//
3. (FOUO) FORCE REQUIREMENT. CDRUSNORTHCOM REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING FORCES/CAPABILITIES OPCON TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO FEMA:
3.A (U) GROUND FORCES:
3.A.1 (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. REQUEST 25 LMTV VEHICLES WITH DRIVERS FROM FT POLK INSTALLATION IN SUPPORT OF THE HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER IN LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI. UNIT WILL BE OPCON TO JTF-KATRINA. FORCE TRACKING NUMBER (FTN):30511001.
3.A.1.A (FOUO) DESTINATIONS: NEW ORLEANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 3.A.1.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: REQUIRED DATE IS NLT 3 SEP 05.
3.A.1.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
3.A.1.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT TO JTF KATRINA IN THE JOA.
3.A.2. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. REQUEST CSS ELEMENTS TO PLAN, EXECUTE, AND C2 FUNCTIONS OF DISTRIBUTION OF CRITICAL SUPPLIES (FOOD, WATER, ICE, MEDICAL), TRANSPORTATION IN SUPPORT OF THE HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER IN LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI. UNIT WILL BE OPCON TO JTF-KATRINA. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING
CAPABILITIES: (FORCE TRACKING NUMBER (FTN):30511002.
3.A.2.A. 1 X O-6 LEVEL TAILORED LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS (RECOMMEND CSG TYPE) CAPABLE OF PLANNING OPERATIONS FOR BOTH STATES, INTEGRATING FEDERAL AGENCIES AND NATIONAL GUARD ASSETS ALREADY ON SITE. HEADQUARTERS SIZE LIMITED TO 35 PERSONNEL.
3.A.2.B. 2 X O-5 LEVEL LOGISTICS C2 HQS (RECOMMEND CSB/FSB TYPE):
ONE TO OPERATE IN EACH STATE ORCHESTRATING THE SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION PLANS WITH IN EACH STATE. HEADQUARTERS SIZE FOR EACH LIMITED TO 40 PERSONNEL.
3.A.2.B.1. 2 X SUPPLY COMPANY ALLOCATED 1 PER STATE TO EXECUTE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS FROM OPERATIONAL STAGING AREAS FOR PUSH FORWARD TO DISTRIBUTION POINTS.
3.A.2.B.2. 3 X CARGO TRANSPORT COMPANIES (DESIRE IS AT LEAST ONE OF THESE IS A PLS COMPANY, CAPABLE OF DROPPING FLATRACKS AT DISTRIBUTION POINTS FORWARD TO SUSTAIN FLOW. 1 TRANSPORT COMPANY TO LOUISIANA, 2 TO MISSISSIPPI TO DELIVER SUPPLIES. ALL WILL DELIVER CRITICAL SUPPLIES FROM OPERATIONAL STAGING AREAS TO FORWARD DISTRIBUTION POINTS.
3.A.2.C. 1 X AVIATION SUPPORT BATTALION TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR APPROXIMATELY 120 LIFT HELICOPTERS BEING EMPLOYED IN RECOVERY AND DISTRIBUTION SUPPORT.
6.A.2.G (FOUO) DESTINATIONS: LOCATIONS IN THE STATES OF LA AND MS AS DETERMINED BY CDR JTF-KATRINA.
6.A.2.H. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: REQUIRED DATE IS NLT 4 SEP 05.
6.A.2.I. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
6.A.2.J. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: PROVIDE JTF KATRINA CRITICAL LOGISTICS/SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION IN THE JOA.
3.A.3 (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. SOLDIERS (APPROXIMATELY 5200) FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, SEARCH AND RESCUE, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, AND DISTRIBUTION. RECOMMENDED FORCE IS 3RD BRIGADE, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION AND 2ND BRIGADE, 1ST CALVARY DIVISION. FORCE TRACKING NUMBER (FTN): 30511003.
3.A.3.A. (FOUO) DESTINATIONS: IVO NEW ORLEANS AIRPORT 3.A.3.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: INITIATE MOVEMENT 3 SEP 05.
3.A.3.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.

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3.A.3.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: PROVIDE NECESSARY HUMANITARIAN IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
3.A.4 (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. MARINES (APPROXIMATELY 2000) FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, SEARCH AND RESCUE, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, AND DISTRIBUTION. RECOMMENDED FORCE IS INFANTRY BATTALION FROM I MEF AND INFANTRY BATTALION FROM II MEF. FORCE TRACKING NUMBER (FTN): 30511004.
3.A.4.A (FOUO) DESTINATIONS: IVO BILOXI MS.
3.A.4.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: INITIATE MOVEMENT 3 SEP 05.
3.A.4.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
3.A.4.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: PROVIDE NECESSARY HUMANITARIAN IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
6.A.1 (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. REQUEST 10 HIGH-WATER VEHICLES FOR TRANSPORTING POLICE/SOLDIERS AND 10 AMPHIBIOUS ARMOR PERSONNEL CARRIERS WITH OPERATORS, LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE CREW FOR 24-HOUR OPERATION ALONG WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL AND WITH CREW. UNIT WILL BE OPCON TO JTF-KATRINA. FTN: 30511005 6.A.1.A (FOUO) DESTINATIONS: NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS)NEW ORLEANS 6.A.1.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: REQUIRED DATE IS NLT 4 SEP 05.
6.A.1.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
6.A.1.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: PROVIDE POLICE/SOLDIERS WITH TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT TO JTF KATRINA IN THE JOA.
3.B. (U/FOUO) MARITIME FORCES:
3.B. (U/FOUO) MARITIME FORCES:
3.B.1. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. SURFACE SHIPS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING SONAR SURVEYS FOR UNDERWATER OBSTRUCTIONS AND OBJECTS.
JFMCC KATRINA RECOMMENDED FORCE IS FOUR (4) MINECOUNTERMEASURES
(MCM) VESSELS FM INGLESIDE TX. FTN: 30511006 3.B.1.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION. IN VICINITY OF (IVO) JOINT OPERATING AREA (JOA) NR NEW ORLEANS LA.
3.B.1.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE. 06 SEP 05.
3.B.1.C. (FOUO) DURATION. ON ARRIVAL (O/A) UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDR JTF.
3.B.1.D (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION. JFMCC KATRINA REQUESTED FOUR (4) MCM VESSELS TO PROVIDE HIGH-RESOLUTION SONAR SURVEY AND OBJECT/OBSTRUCTION CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MARITIME OPERATIONS IVO JOA (SHIPS OPERATE IN PAIRS). CAPABILITY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SAFETY OF NAVIGATION FOR DOD AND INTERAGENCY VESSELS IVO JOA AND TO SUPPORT COMBINED EFFORT OF USCG AND USN SUPSALV (SUPERVISOR OF
SALVAGE) TO IDENTIFY AND CLEAR CHANNEL OBSTRUCTIONS THAT ARE PREVENTING UTILIZATION OF PORTS FOR HA/DR OPERATIONS.
3.B.2. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT (UNREP) OILER. JFMCC KATRINA RECOMMENDED SOURCE USNS PATUXENT. FTN:
30511007
3.B.2.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION. IVO CARRIER OPERATING AREAS (CVOA) IN THE JOA AS DESIGNATED BY JFMCC KATRINA.
3.B.2.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE. 12 SEP 05.
3.B.3.C. (FOUO) DURATION. O/A UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR JTF.
3.B.4.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION. PROVIDE UNREP CAPABILITY FOR VESSELS OPERATION WITHIN THE JOA TO SUSTAIN HA/DR OPERATIONS.
3.C. (U) JOINT FORCES:
3.C.1. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. TWENTY-FIVE (25) PAX PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) PERSONNEL WITH EXPERIENCE IN MEDIA OPERATIONS ARE REQUIRED FROM USA, USN, USMC AND USAF TO AUGMENT EXISTING PA PERSONNEL. FTN: 30511008. RECOMMEND THESE PAX BE PROVIDED FROM THE SERVICES AS FOLLOWS: USA 5 PA PERSONNEL, USN 8 PA PERSONNEL, USMC 5 PA PERSONNEL; AND USAF 7 PERSONNEL.
3.C.1.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION: MAXWELL AFB, AL.
3.C.1.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: REQUIRED DATE IS NLT 05 SEP 05.
3.C.1.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM 05 SEP 05 UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
3.C.1.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: TO PROVIDE PA SUPPORT TO JTF- KATRINA IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS.
FACILITATE MEDIA COVERAGE OF SAR/RECOVERY OPERATIONS, DOD HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS, AND DOCUMENT AND ASSIST IN PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS.
3.C.2. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. MEDICAL HOSPITAL CAPABILITY TO TAKE CARE OF HURRICANE KATRINA VICTIMS. FTN: 30511009.
RECOMMENDED FORCE IS A COMBAT SUPPORT HOSPITAL, 84 BED.
3.C.2.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION: BELL CHASE NAS LA 3.C.2.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: REQUIRED DATE IS NLT 05 SEP 05.
3.C.2.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA

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3.C.2.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: TO PROVIDE MEDICAL HOSPITAL SUPPORT FOR HURRICANE KATRINA VICTIMS.
3.C.3. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. MEDICAL LOGISTICS CAPABILITY TO DISTRIBUTE PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. FTN: 30511010 3.C.3.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION: JOA AS DETERMINED BY CDR JTF- KATRINA.
3.C.3.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: NLT 5 SEP 05.
3.C.3.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
3.C.3.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION. PERSONNEL AND ASSETS ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF TIME-CRITICAL PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.
3.D. (U) AIR FORCES:
3.D.1. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. SENSOR EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT TO GATHER AND PROVIDE HIGH DEFINITION FILM, ELECTRO OPTICAL, AND INFRARED IMAGING OF CRITICAL LOCATIONS IN THE AFFECTED AREAS.
NEED PHOTO PROCESSING AND IMAGE INTERPRETATION IN SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY EFFORTS AND SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAMS. FTN:
30511011. RECOMMENDED FORCES ARE OC-135, U-2, C-130 SCATHE VIEW, AND CD C-26B AIRCRAFT AND AIRCREW CAPABLE OF PROVIDING WET FILM, ELECTRO OPTICAL AND INFRARED OBSERVATION SUPPORT; ROVER SUPPORT FOR DATA DOWNLINK CAPABILITY, AND FILM PROCESSING AND PHOTO INTERPRETATION/IMAGING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. REQUEST ONE ROVER SYSTEM BE COLLOCATED WITH JTF-KATRINA AND ADDITIONAL ROVER SYSTEMS, AS AVAILABLE, TO BE DEPLOYED IVO JTF-KATRINA AS DETERMINED BY CDR JTF-KATRINA.
3.D.1.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION: JOA. POTENTIAL FORWARD BASING FOR C- 130 SCATHE VIEW AT MAXWELL AFB AL. ROVER SUPPORT TO BE COLLOCATED WITH JTF-KATRINA.
3.D.1.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: NLT 4 SEP 05 3.D.1.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA. UNIT MUST BE PREPARED TO MAN SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR UP TO 14 DAYS.
3.D.1.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: REQUIRED TO HELP ASSESS DEVASTATION AND DETERMINE EXTENT OF DAMAGE, LOCATION AND SIZE OF VICTIM CLUSTERS AFFECTED.
3.D.2. (FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. SENSOR EQUIPPED VEHICLE TO GATHER AND PROVIDE ELECTRO OPTICAL AND INFRARED IMAGING OF CRITICAL LOCATIONS IN THE AFFECTED AREAS. PROVIDE ANALYSIS AND EXPLOITATION OF DAMAGE CONTAINED WITHIN THE DESIGNATE SEARCH ARES (DSA). INTERPRETATION IN SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY EFFORTS AND SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAMS. FTN: 30511012. RECOMMENDED FORCES ARE RQ-1 PREDATOR AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED CONTROL TEAMS CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING ELECTRO OPTICAL AND INFRARED OBSERVATION SUPPORT OF THE KATRINA DISASTER AREA. PROVIDE ASSOCIATED GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR LOCAL AREA CONTROL FOR LAUNCH AND RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT IF FORWARD DEPLOYED.
3.D.2.A. (FOUO) DESTINATION: WITHIN THE JOA AS DETERMINED BY CDR JTF-KATRINA.
3.D.2.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: NLT 4 SEP 05 3.D.2.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA. UNIT MUST BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS FOR UP TO 30 DAYS.
3.D.2.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: REQUIRED TO HELP ASSESS DEVASTATION AND DETERMINE EXTENT
6.D.3(FOUO) FORCE/CAPABILITY. REQUEST TWO (2) CONTRACTING OFFICERS (LEVEL II NCO) AND PAYING AGENT SUPPORT TO CONDUCT AREA SUPPORT CONTRACT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER IN LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI. UNIT WILL BE OPCON TO JTF-KATRINA/J4. REQUEST CONTRACTING OFFICERS CONTACT J4 POC LTC MERCHANT (DSN 286 4142/4200) PRIOR TO ARRIVAL. FTN: 30511013.
6.D.3.A (FOUO) DESTINATIONS: CAMP SHELBY MISSISSIPPI 6.D.3.B. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE: REQUIRED DATE IS NLT 4 SEP 05.
6.D.3.C. (FOUO) DURATION: FROM ARRIVAL UNTIL RELEASED BY CDR USNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA.
6.E.3.D. (FOUO) JUSTIFICATION: PROVIDE CRITICAL CONTRACT SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR SOLDIER SUSTAINMENT IN SUPPORT OF MULTIPLE LOCATIONS ACROSS THE JOA.
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//
4. (FOUO) DESTINATION. JOA.
5. (FOUO) REQUIRED DATE IS O/A 3 SEP 05.
6. (FOUO) DURATION. FROM ARRIVAL O/A 3 SEP 05 UNTIL RELIEVED BY CDRUSNORTHCOM OR CDR JTF-KATRINA, OR AS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED ABOVE.
7. (U) FUNDING. USNORTHCOM WILL NOT PROVIDE FUNDING. COSTS WILL BE CAPTURED.
8. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. DIRECTING THAT ALL NAVAL ASSETS UTILIZE THE DESIGNATED JOPES ADP TPFDD FOR ASSET VISIBILITY AND FORCE TRACKING REGARDLESS OF MODE AND SOURCE OF TRANSPORTATION.
9. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT. MR. JACK QUEEN, NC J35, DSN 692-1420, JACK.QUEEN<AT SIGN> NORTHCOM.SMIL.MIL AND NC.OPG.LANDMACA.OMB<AT
SIGN>NORTHCOM.SMIL.MIL
GENTEX/AUTHENTICATION/MG ROWE/J3/

OFFICIAL: MR. QUEEN, USNORTHCOM J35//
AKNLDG/NO//

Details

TO Addressees
(OR1)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=DMS+GOV+SIPR/O=VA7/OU=TAYZ17/OU=TAYZ20/OU=CPXTAYZ05/OU=JOINTSTAFF
(DN1) /C=US/O=U.S.GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=JCS/OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=WASHINGTON DC/OU=JOINTSTAFF(SC)

CC/Info Addressees
(OR1)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=DMS+GOV+SIPR/O=VA7/OU=TAYZ17/OU=TAYZ20/OU=CPXTAYZ05/OU=CJCSSC
(DN1) /C=US/O=U.S.GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=JCS/OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=WASHINGTON DC/OU=OFFICE OF THECHAIRMAN(SC)/OU=CJCS (SC)
(OR2)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=GOV+DMS+DS/O=SBDQ151/OU=SBDQ1MFI3/ACP-PLAD=CJFMCCNORTH
(DN2) /C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=AUTODIN PLAS/OU=CE-CS/OU=CJFMCCNORTH
(OR3)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=GOV+DMS+DS/O=SBDQ151/OU=SBDQ1MFI3/ACP-PLAD=COMDTCOGARD WASHINGTON DC
(DN3) /C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=AUTODIN PLAS/OU=CE-CS/OU=COMDT COGARD WASHINGTONDC
(OR4)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=GOV+DMS+DS/O=SBDQ151/OU=SBDQ1MFI3/ACP-PLAD=COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
(DN4) /C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=AUTODIN PLAS/OU=CE-CS/OU=COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
(OR5)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=GOV+DMS+DS/O=SBDQ151/OU=SBDQ1MFI3/ACP-PLAD=COMLANTFLTNORFOLK VA
(DN5) /C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=AUTODIN PLAS/OU=CE-CS/OU=COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
(OR6)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=DMS+GOV+SIPR/O=LA4/OU=RQMA3/OU=NOLASDMS/OU=COMMARFORNORTH
(DN6) /C=US/O=U.S.GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=USMC/OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=MARFORNORTH/OU=COMMARFORNORTH(SC)
(OR7)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=GOV+DMS+DS/O=SBDQ151/OU=SBDQ1MFI3/ACP-PLAD=COMSECONDFLT
(DN7) /C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=AUTODIN PLAS/OU=CE-CS/OU=COMSECONDFLT
(OR8)
/C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=DMS+GOV+SIPR/O=CO9/OU=NRTH76/OU=CPXNRTH76/OU=V3HQNORTHCOMTSS
(DN8) /C=US/O=U.S.GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=NORTHCOM/OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=PETERSON AFB CO/OU=HQNORTHCOM(SC)
(OR9) /C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=DMS+GOV+SIPR/O=VA7/OU=TAYZ50/OU=PTSC/OU=SECDEF
(DN9) /C=US/O=U.S.GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=OSD/OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=WASHINGTON DC/OU=SECDEF(SC)
(OR10) /C=US/ADMD=DMS/PRMD=DMS+GOV+SIPR/O=DTH2/OU=HEFL21/ACP-PLAD=CDRUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
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C-29

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MOUNTAIN AFS CO/OU=CMOC(SC)
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  (OR14)
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ERNORAD
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OFFICE(SC)/OU=CSA(SC)
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WASHINGTON DC
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WASHINGTON DC
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FORSCOM/OU=LCC MCPHERSON(SC)
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AFB VA/OU=HQ ACC(SC)
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  (DN23) /C=US/O=U.S.
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COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA
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   (OR31)
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S
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HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
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ROOM WASHINGTON DC
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AFB VA/OU=BDP(SC)

Originator-OR:
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COMJ3

Originator-DN: /C=US/O=U.S.
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(C-31)

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CategoryMark-ACP120: GENSER Categories//GENSER Informational Categories//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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JTF-KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

JTF-KATRINA

03 SEP 05

COL Kranepuhl – Chief, Operations
404-469-3280
DSN 797-xxxx

MMTF 00327-05

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(C-33)

JTF KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Assets Deployed (1 of 4)

UNIT	ASSETS	TASK	LOCATION	DATE ARRIVED	MISSION COMPLETION DATE	ORDER
I CAV	2 x UH-60s	Transport RNA Teams	Baton Rouge, LA	301200R AUG 05	TBD	FC FRAGO 3 NC MOD 4
I CAV	AV TF 4 x UH-60 4 x CH-47 w/crews & Maint support	Casualty evac, recon. log support	Baton Rouge, LA	NLT 312030Z AUG 05	TBD	FORSCOM FRAGO 4
1A	JTF-Katrina	Disaster Relief Operations	Camp Shelby, MS	31 AUG 05	TBD	FORSCOM FRAGO 5
Fort Polk	2 x UH-1s 2 x UH-60s	MEDEVAC	LANG MED EVAC CMD CTR, Baton Rouge Airport	31 AUG 05	TBD	FORSCOM FRAGO 6
93rd Signal Bde – Tactical Sig. Spt Package	AN/TSC-85C w/data package & REDCOM/ IGX	Provide multiple comms and data networks	Camp Shelby, MS	31 AUG 05	TBD	
III Corps 4th ID	2 x CH-47 12 x UH60	CAS EVAC LOGPAC	Baton Rouge, LA	ETA 1 SEP 05	TBD	FORSCOM FRAGO 7

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MMTF 00327-05

POC: Mr. Wilson & Mr. DuRant x7911

030630RSEP05

C-3H

JTF KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Assets Deployed (2 of 4)

UNIT	ASSETS	TASK	LOCATION	DATE ARRIVED	MISSION COMPLETION DATE	ORDER
4/85 TSB	DCO / DCE	Support FEMA/ DSCA Ops	Jackson, MS	28 Aug 05	TBD	FC FRAGO 2 1A FRAGO 2 NC MOD 3
III CORPS	BDE C2 Element	C2 Army Aviation	Hammond Field, LA	ETA 1 SEP 05	TBD	FORSCOM FRAGO 8
SEPLO	SEPLO-MS	Support DCO	Jackson, MS	27 Aug 05	TBD	1A FRAGO 1
REPLO	REPLO	Support FEMA	Atlanta, GA	27 Aug 05	TBD	1A FRAGO 1
Swift Water Rescue TM	TM – 14 PAXs 6 Veh w/Boats		Lafayette Reg Airport	1 Sep 05	TBD	NC MOD 5
SJTFHQ-N (-)	Planners	Augment Planning	Fort Gillem	31 Aug 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
XVIII ABC 498th MED	1 x Air Ambu- lance CO (-) 6 x HH-60	Casualty evac	Baton Rouge, LA	1 SEP 05	TBD	FC FRAGO 4 & 7
III CORPS	BDE C2 Element	C2 Army Aviation	Hammond Field, LA	1 SEP 05	TBD	FORSCOM FRAGO 8
PAD	Public Affairs	PAO Support	Camp Shelby	31 Aug 05	TBD	MMTF 00327-05

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POC: Mr. Wilson & Mr. DuRant x7911

030630RSEP05

JTF KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Assets Deployed (3 of 4)

UNIT	ASSETS	TASK	LOCATION	DATE ARRIVED	MISSION COMPLETION DATE	ORDER
JFMCC	USS Bataan	Avn & Med	IVO NO/GP	30 Aug 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	USNS Arctic	DSCA/HA		1 Sep 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	HSV Swift	Re-supply		1 Sep 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	Exp Strike Force (IWO Jima; Tortuga; Shreveport	DSCA/HA		4 Sep 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	USN SUPSALV Ship	Salvage & Emer Response		6 Sep 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	USN Fleet Survey Teams	Safety of Navigation		4 Sep 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	USNS Comfort	Medical Support		6 SEP 05	TBD	NC MOD 6
	JFMCC Liaisons Off	Maritime Expertise		1 SEP 05	TBD	NC MOD 6

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MMTF 00327-05

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POC: Mr. Wilson & Mr. DuRant x7911

030630RSEP05

JTF KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Assets Deployed (4 of 4)

UNIT	ASSETS	TASK	LOCATION	DATE ARRIVED	MISSION COMPLETION DATE	ORDER
NSWG-1	LCAC	Ferrying Supplies	IVO NO/GP	Upon Arrival	TBD	NC MOD

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POC: Mr. Wilson & Mr. DuRant x7911

MMTF 00327-05

030630RSEP05

JTF KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Assets Alerted (1 of 2)

UNIT	ASSETS	TASK	LOCATION	DATE ALERTED	ORDER
49th QM	Mort. Affairs	Relief Ops		31 AUG 05	FC FRAGO 6
XVIII ABC	MKTS	Relief Ops		31 AUG 05	FC FRAGO 6
III CORPS	MKTS	Relief Ops		31 AUG 05	FC FRAGO 6
III CORPS	1 X BDE TF	Security / DSCA	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 8
XVIII CORPS	1 X BDE TF, AVN TF (1 X AASLT), CMD AVN CO, 1 X CAV SQDRN (-)	Security / DSCA	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 8
III CORPS, XVIII CORPS, 5A	CCMRF	DSCA	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 9
Air Traffic Control Service	2 X ATS CO	A2C2	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 9
III CORPS	2 x TRK CO (MED)	DSCA	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 9

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POC: Mr. Wilson & Mr. DuRant x7911

JTF KATRINA COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Assets Alerted (1 of 2)

UNIT	ASSETS	TASK	LOCATION	DATE ALERTED	ORDER
9TH NETCOM	1 X HHC, 2 X SIG BN, 1 X SIG CO	DSCA	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 9
XVIII CORPS	1 X EN BN (-), 1 X EN CO	DSCA	TBD	1 SEP 05	FC FRAGO 9

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POC: Mr. Wilson & Mr. DuRant x7911

MMTF 00327-05

030630RSEP05

McHale-Mauldin, TF, OSD-POLICY

From:	Perini Michael B GS-15 NORAD USNORTHCOM PA
Sent:	Saturday, September 10, 2005 12 33 PM
To	Keating Timothy J ADM USN NORAD USNORTHCOM CC, Inge Joseph R LTG USA USNORTHCOM DC, Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3, Johnson Kurt A CAPT USN NORAD USNORTHCOM JA
Subject	NEWSWEEK Follow-up Q

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir, Mike Hirsh called. He had 2 more questions.He said he should have asked it yesterday His questions relate to what was going on in the operation for the first military response I ran these draft answers by LTG Inge, MG Rowe and Kurt. You may want to edit based on your reflections

1. Did you think about deploying the 82nd Airborne? They have some special skills or units that might have been useful to responding early, he believes

WE DID LEAN FORWARD WITH THE 82ND, MIKE. WE ADJUSTED THEIR RESPONSE LEVEL -- PUT THEM ON A SHORTER RESPONSE TIME -- FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE REASONS TO REDUCE POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES TO THE GULF COAST AS A RESULT OF THE HURRICANE. BEING ON A SHORTER STRING ALSO MADE THEM MORE QUICKLY AVAILABLE IF A REQUIREMENT ARROSE AND WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAWS OF THE LAND.

2. Were there any reasons or obstacles that stopped you from deploying them?

"No, we had prepositioned C-17s at Pope AFB and as soon as we received direction to move them to the hurricane area deployment began shortly thereafter."

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