[Senate Hearing 109-869]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-869
AN IRAQ UPDATE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2006
__________
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RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Lugar, Hon Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Khalilzad, Hon. Zalmay, Ambassador to Iraq, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar............ 48
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden............ 53
(iii)
AN IRAQ UPDATE
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Alexander,
Sununu, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee meets today to
review the situation in Iraq. We welcome our Ambassador, Zalmay
Khalilzad, who has been on the job in Baghdad for just over a
year. Ambassador, we are grateful to have you back today, safe
and sound. We look forward to your update. As some of my
colleagues are aware, you planned three other trips home during
the last several months and graciously offered to testify each
time before our committee. The events in Iraq, including
critical efforts to name a Prime Minister and to finalize the
Iraqi Government, required your presence in Baghdad. We are
heartened that you have finally been rewarded with a break and
that you are willing to share a part of that with us. We also
appreciate the dedication of your Embassy team, which has
worked under very, very challenging circumstances. Your efforts
have contributed to several breakthroughs in forming a
government that have opened new avenues for progress. The Iraqi
Government under Prime Minister Maliki is inclusive and broadly
representative. Significantly, it was approved by a vote of 95
percent in the Council of Representatives. Its diversity
improves the prospects that the political and sectarian
divisions that have cut violently into Iraqi society can be
overcome to institutionalize a functional government. But the
people of Iraq desperately need their government to deliver
tangible benefits. The government must begin to show progress
in solving the vexing security situation that has produced
daily violence, including ethnic killings and suicide bombings.
The government must have a strategy for dealing with militias
that are responsible for much of the ethnic violence. We are
interested in your views on the condition of the Iraqi security
forces and whether they can become a reliable force for
stability. Beyond disbanding the militias, the government must
build a Ministry of the Interior, a judiciary, and other civil
institutions that are respected and capable of protecting the
rule of law. The government also must establish effective
institutions to fight corruption and create conditions that
enable the economy to flourish. These include reliable
electricity, communications and transportation, unambiguous
commercial and investment laws, and the beginnings of a social
safety net. The vast potential of the Iraqi economy is
reflected by its growth during the past 2 years, despite the
violence. The Oil Ministry reported another ray of hope in late
June as production raised about 2.5 million barrels of oil a
day, its highest level since the war began. Notably, 300,000
barrels were being pumped from the northern city of Kirkuk to
Turkey.
Prime Minister Maliki has made progress in building ethnic
and regional relationships that may contribute to stability. I
was encouraged by his travels to Basra, where he saw firsthand
the flaring violence, his engagement of the Kurdish Regional
Government in their own territory, and his instructions to his
ministers that they must not simply sit in the Green Zone. This
week, he embarked on a trip to Saudi Arabia and other Persian
Gulf States to gather support for a reconciliation initiative
intended to bridge the gap between Shiites and Sunni Arabs. A
preparatory meeting for an international compact on financial
support for Iraq is scheduled to occur in Baghdad on July 20.
We are interested to hear from you on the prospects for such a
compact that might arise and what it might mean for stability
in Iraq.
At the heart of efforts to bring security to Iraq and end
sectarian violence is Prime Minister Maliki's 24-point National
Reconciliation Plan. This plan is aimed at creating among
Iraqis of all ethnicities a stake in being Iraqi. It
encompasses the decommissioning and the reintegration of
militias, the release of detainees who have not been charged,
an effort to bring those willing to abandon violence into the
political process, the reevaluation of security activities in
the peaceful provinces, an appeal to regional governments to
cease their support of the insurgency, and assurances to Sunnis
and all minority groups that they will have a significant role
in society. We are eager for your assessment of whether such a
reconciliation plan can be implemented. If Prime Minister
Maliki can bring enough groups on board, can a reconciliation
plan reduce violence, stabilize the economy, and solidify the
position of the government? What is the United States doing to
support this effort?
Ambassador, we welcome you back to the committee. We look
forward to our discussion with you this morning. As Senator
Biden arrives, I will recognize him as appropriate for his
opening statement, but we are most eager to hear from you. I
would say to members of the committee, we are all cognizant of
the work on the floor on behalf of the Homeland Security
appropriations bill, which the leadership has indicated will be
completed today, involving rollcall votes continuously
throughout the day and maybe even interrupting our hearing. We
ask for your indulgence, Ambassador, as we come and go, as may
be necessary, but we will try to accommodate the questions of
all Senators in due course. It will be the Chair's hope to
conclude the hearing by noon so that you have some idea of your
time requirements, as well as those of Senators. I now call
upon you for your testimony. Your full statement will be a part
of the record--wait just a moment.
The distinguished ranking member has arrived just at the
right time and he is recognized for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Mr. Ambassador, it is a pleasure to see you.
I was waiting for you in Baghdad. I was in the wrong venue.
Thank you very, very much for being here and let me begin by
saying, publicly, what an incredible job I think you are doing.
I think you are, in my experience, one of the most gifted
diplomats I have ever worked with and in the most difficult
circumstance, actually, the two most difficult circumstances,
Afghanistan and Iraq. I want to thank you and I am sure if
Senator Jack Reed were here, he would--he probably already has
extended his thanks to you and to your staff in Baghdad. We put
a heavy burden on them and they got us in and out of Basra and
Fallujah and Baghdad and I know you know better than anyone
that that is not an easy task for them and I just want to
publicly thank you and your first rate staff that is there.
I might point out, which everyone already knows, but these
are civilians who were there at some considerable risk and I
think we should recognize not only their significant
professional input in terms of the diplomacy and foreign
policy, just of personal courage and I want to acknowledge
that.
We are fortunate, as I indicated, to have you and your
staff in Baghdad and I would like to, Mr. Ambassador, talk to
you about what it seems to be, for me, parallel realities. If
you spend time as you have more than anyone, with our military
and your staff, you can't help but come out of Iraq other than
impressed with the job both the military and the State
Department personnel are doing under very difficult
circumstances. But for all the achievements, the larger reality
is this, in my impression: That Iraq and the success of our
mission there remains a prisoner of a terrible and growing
violence and a lack of a sufficient plan--coordinated plan with
the new government, as well--to stop it. I still don't see a
clear strategy for victory in Iraq. I do see a strategy for
preventing things from outright defeat but I don't--I did not
come away with a clear strategy for victory.
As you have acknowledged, sectarian violence has trumped
the insurgency and foreign terrorists as the main security
threat in Iraq, although clearly--clearly the insurgency is a
significant problem and it is spiraling in Baghdad in spite of
the much publicized operations to secure the city with more
than 50,000 forces. It seems to me that there are three
overwhelming problems that feed the violence: First, the
absence of a political settlement that gets the Sunni buy-in
and a commitment from major groups to pursue their interests
peacefully. Second, the absence of a governing capacity to
deliver basic services to the Iraqi people, and third--and by
the way, I mean as part of that, I mean the civilian agencies,
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, the
Ministry of Justice, et cetera--and third, a significant
unemployment problem that is swelling the ranks of the militia,
the insurgency, and criminal gangs.
In speaking to some of our flag officers there, several of
them pointed to the fact--one actually used the phrase,
``Senator, if you want me to be able to deal with the militias
that have actually increased in their numbers since the
election last December, get the Department of Agriculture
working.'' He said this used to be the breadbasket of the
entire Middle East. If you could get that up and moving, he
said, that would take care of the militia more than any single
other thing that could happen, this in the opinion of one
general. So, Mr. Ambassador, I know you know this better than
we do but if we don't make these challenges, I think we risk
having traded a maniacal dictator for some chaos.
Let me say a few words about each one of these things.
First, the actions of a political solution, the Sunni
insurgence, in my view, won't stand down and the Shia militia
violence won't stop and so how do we cut that Gordian knot? I
know you recognize the centrality of a political solution. Last
year, you pulled, I believe, a rabbit out of the hat. You were
kind enough to put up with me being there as well, back in
December. I remember vividly--vividly--and coming back, telling
everyone who would listen, that your--I didn't know how you did
it but in the last couple weeks before that constitution was
put out there, you essentially got an amendment to the
constitution, saying this is open for further negotiation. I
won't go through the detail that you know better than I: Four
months after the Parliament meets, that there is a committee
about so and so forth. But you--I think that is the reason why
there was such Sunni participation and I think that agreement
averted a crisis.
But now, I'm told by a number of people that we are not any
longer pushing the Iraqis to follow through with amendments,
that somehow--I'm not mentioning anyone in particular and
Senator Reed found the same experience--speaking to a number of
people on the ground in Iraq last weekend. When I'd raise the
amendment process, they said, well look, this is kind of--you
know, maybe we should put that off, down the road. We're going
to move this further down. And from my perspective and I would
like you to speak to that, I think that is a gigantic mistake.
Maybe I'm wrong but I think it is a big mistake. Whether by
amendment or some other mechanisms, the Shia-led government, it
seems to me, have to take significant steps beyond ministries
to get Sunni buy-in. In particular, I think they have to
guarantee some form or another, some share of the single
biggest resource that country has, is oil. In addition, the
government has to be willing, I think, to move against a Shia
militia with the same intensity that it moves against the
Sunni-based insurgency.
After meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, I'm not sure--and
again, you know him better than I do--he is an impressive man.
But I came away not all assured. You know--you have been with
me in those meetings. I'm very straightforward and he was very
receptive to my being straightforward but the answers I got
raised two possibilities with me. Either, one, he was so
constrained by trying to keep together his Shia constituency,
which is somewhat disparate, as we spoke to the Brits down in
Basra. They said, ``Look, there is not an insurgence here,
there is a competition among Shia who is going to be in charge
when everybody leaves.'' So I don't know whether it's that or
whether a lack of desire on his part--I think he is more
committed to dealing with demobilizing the militia than he is
to getting Sunni buy-in. Maliki has contended with, as I said,
the politics of the Shia coalition. If he gives up too much of
the Sunnis or moves too harshly against the Shia militia, I
think he risked losing support of his coalition. I would like
you to speak to that at some point.
It seems to me, Mr. Ambassador, we need to keep up pressure
to bring the Sunnis in, to keep the militia out, which will
marginalize Sunni insurgents. But we shouldn't be the only ones
doing it because our influence is a diminishing asset. That's
why I think it is so urgent to get the international community
and Iraqi's neighbors in on this deal. I don't see any plan
beyond the so-called compact, which I'm anxious to hear you
talk about because that has real promise. I know you've been
pushing it for some time, the need to expand conversation. Now,
maybe you've had full, unfettered support from all elements of
the administration but my observation--and I want you to speak
to that--but my observation is you haven't. So I'm anxious to
hear that.
The second challenge is the governing capacity and really
the part that I'm focusing on more than I have in the past. If
a government can't do basic things like turn on the lights,
provide clean water, make payroll, supply and sustain the army,
then it seems to me, we'll be leaving behind as we leave, a
failing state. It seems to me we need this massive civilian
effort to build Iraqi Government like the effort our military
is making to train and build a capacity of the security forces
in other ministries. We have that need. We need a massive
effort. With your staff at the Embassy, they indicate there is
such a plan. They indicate that there is such a plan. They
indicate that there are clear tactics, targets, and benchmarks.
I'm anxious--if you're not prepared to do it now, at some
point, you share with us those actual documents, those actual
game plans, which I'm told exist.
After his visit, the President talked about sending some of
the Cabinet Secretaries to Iraq and this is encouraging, even
if it is 3 years down the road. He would go to State and AID,
Agriculture, Commerce, HHS, and so forth and brought all the
employees together and personally made an appeal. Personally
make an appeal. As patriotic Americans, they know how difficult
this is but ask for significant volunteers from our agencies to
go into what I think are desperate agencies--one senior
official, Mr. Ambassador,--said, ``I'll never complain about
bureaucracy again.'' He said, ``I wish there was one here. I
wish there was somebody to deal with.'' So even as we start to
drawdown our military forces, we have to make a massive
civilian effort and if we don't, I see two things: Complete
chaos or the emergence of a military strongman as the training
of an Iraqi Army outpaces the civilian reconstruction and out
of frustration, the military takes things over. The third
challenge is the massive unemployment. So that we can get to
the Ambassador's statement, I will put the rest of my statement
into the record, but this issue is very, very important.
I'll just give one example so my colleagues know what I'm
talking about and I know they know as much about this as I do
and maybe more but meeting with the No. 2 military man in Iraq,
he talked about the situation in Baghdad and around and near
Sadr City and he said, ``Look, we've built this great water
treatment facility.'' He said, ``It's the largest water
fountain in the Middle East,'' meaning that folks can take
their buckets and they can go and get the water and he raised
the question about why--were we going to be able to get the
water from this facility into the homes? And he said, the
question was raised whether or not you bring in a large outfit
with backhoes and engineers and bulldozers and do it and he
said--and don't hold me to this. You'd know the number better
than I but I can't remember whether he said 3,000 or 4,000. He
said, ``Let me have 3,000 or 4,000 Iraqis I can hire to dig
ditches, to lay the pipe, to move this,'' he said, ``that will
help me more in terms of violence and insurgency in that part
of that community than if you, in fact, give me more trainers
over here.'' So there is a lot to talk about, Mr. Ambassador,
no one better to talk about it than you and--excuse me one
second.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to--I'm going to probably ruin his
career but I want to particularly compliment you on Clarke
Cooper. I don't know whether everybody knows him. He is a guy
that leaves the embassy, gets in those helicopters on these
CODELS and sits next to the guy with the nine millimeter
machine gun and goes on every one of these, at least every time
I've been there in the recent past. He is incredibly
knowledgeable, he is one of the kind of guys I like at State
and you don't often get and as you ask him a question, you get
an answer. So I'm sure my colleagues have visited and all of us
have, share my view but I see him in the audience there and I
want to publicly compliment him. He has--does a first rate job,
besides speaking the language, which is a nice thing to have a
guy along who can do that.
Anyway, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador, I'm anxious to hear from you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I'm sorry that Senator Jack Reed and I
didn't have a chance to see you in Baghdad last week. I look forward to
catching up today.
We are fortunate to have someone of your caliber in Baghdad. I
can't think of anyone better for such a consequential job. And your
civilian team and our men and women in uniform deserve our gratitude
for their courage and commitment.
Mr. Ambassador, it seems to me that there are two parallel
realities in Iraq right now. If you spend time with our military and
with your staff, you can't help but be impressed with the job they're
doing, under very difficult conditions. But for all their achievements,
the larger reality is this is my impression: Iraq--and the success of
our mission there--remains a prisoner to terrible and growing violence
and the lack of a plan to stop it. I still do not see a clear strategy
for victory in Iraq--I see a strategy to prevent outright defeat.
As you've acknowledged, sectarian violence has trumped the
insurgency and foreign terrorists as the main security threat in Iraq.
It is spiraling in Baghdad in spite of a much-publicized operation to
secure the city with more than 50,000 forces.
Three overwhelming problems feed the violence.
First, the absence of a political settlement that gets Sunni buy-in
and a commitment from the major groups to pursue their interests
peacefully.
Second, the absence of any governing capacity in the civilian
agencies to deliver basic services to the Iraqi people.
And third, mass unemployment which is swelling the ranks of the
militias, the insurgency, and criminal gangs.
If we do not meet these challenges, we risk trading a dictator for
chaos.
Let me say a few words about each one.
First, in the absence of a political solution, the Sunni insurgents
won't stand down and the Shiite militia violence won't stop. We have to
cut this Gordian knot.
I know you recognize the centrality of a political solution. Last
year, you pulled a rabbit out of a hat by engineering an agreement to
allow the Constitution to be amended. That agreement averted a crisis
and ensured Sunni participation in December's elections.
But now I'm told we are no longer pushing the Iraqis to follow
through with amendments. That's a big mistake. Whether by amendment or
some other mechanism, the Shia-led government has to take significant
steps beyond giving them ministries to bring the Sunnis in. In
particular, they must guarantee Sunnis a share of oil revenues. In
addition, the government has to be willing to move against the Shia
militia with the same intensity that it moves against the Sunni-based
insurgency.
After meeting with Prime Minister Maliki--and he's an impressive
man--I'm not sure about the government's ability or willingness to
amend the Constitution or to effectively demobilize the militias.
Maliki has to contend with the politics of the Shia coalition. If
he gives up too much to the Sunnis, or if he moves too harshly against
the Shia militia, he risks losing the support of his coalition.
We need to keep up the pressure to bring the Sunnis in and keep the
militia out, which will marginalize the Sunni insurgents. But we
shouldn't be the only ones doing it because our influence is a
diminishing asset. That's why it is so urgent we work the international
community and Iraq's neighbors into the effort. I see no plan to do
that, beyond the so-called ``compact'' which is limited to getting
others to put more money into Iraq.
The second challenge is governing capacity. If the government can't
do basic things--like turn on the lights, provide clean water, make
payrolls, or supply and sustain the army--then we'll leave behind a
failing state when our troops come home.
We need a massive civilian effort to build the Iraqi Government,
like the effort our military is making to train and build the capacity
of the security forces and ministries. Your staff at the Embassy
indicate there is such a plan--with clear tactics, targets, and
benchmarks. If so, you should share it with us.
After his visit, the President talked about sending some of his
Cabinet Secretaries to Iraq. This is encouraging, even if it's 3 years
down the road.
But I wish he had gone himself to each of our key agencies--State,
AID, Agriculture, Commerce, HHS, and so forth--and brought their
employees together and personally made an appeal to them to go to Iraq
to help Iraq's ministries get up to speed.
Even as we start to draw down our military forces, we have to make
this massive civilian effort. If we don't, we will see one of two
things: Complete chaos or the emergence of a military strongman as the
training of the Iraqi Army outpaces civilian reconstruction and, out of
frustration, the military takes over everything.
The third challenge is massive unemployment. Angry young men are
joining criminal gangs, insurgent groups, and militia at an alarming
rate for one simple reason--they get paid.
We need specific plans to generate employment and give young men an
alternative. The military has proposed solutions like investing in the
agricultural sector, which can soak up lots of the unemployed. But the
military can't do this alone.
The President's budget for civilian reconstruction is dropping
precipitously. Foreign donors are not making good on old pledges or
making new ones. Even with oil prices up, the resources aren't there to
create jobs.
Mr. Ambassador, our generals made clear that we will begin leaving
Iraq this year. But as we leave Iraq, it is very important what we
leave behind. A few months back, I offered a comprehensive plan for a
political settlement in Iraq and to overcome these fundamental
challenges.
Whether what I proposed was right or wrong isn't the issue. What is
the issue is the lack of a strategy for success in Iraq. The President
owes that to our soldiers and their families, to the Iraqis, and to the
American people.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden, and let me just say
that I, for one, appreciate this Senator's indefatigable
interest in the country. I think he has a room over there. I
admire your stamina and your courage. I will call now upon our
Ambassador. Your statement will be made part of the record in
full but please do not feel inhibited. This is your time, and
we want to hear from you. Then we will have questions from our
Senators. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Khalilzad. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and
distinguished members, I welcome this opportunity to share my
assessment of the situation in Iraq and my thoughts on the way
ahead. I have seen many of you in Baghdad and I want to thank
you for your visit and your interest in achieving a good
outcome in Iraq. Your visit also means support for the many
courageous Americans who serve in both military and civilian
posts in Iraq. I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your comments and
Senator Biden, your comments about the Americans who serve in
Iraq. I will be brief in my opening remarks and I look forward
to exchanging views with you in the remaining time.
I'll begin by giving my bottom-line assessment. Americans
should be strategically optimistic about Iraq, even as the
continuing difficulties in Iraq will require tactical patience.
The challenges of curbing sectarian violence or defeating
terrorism are difficult and will require the full commitment of
the Iraqi Government and the coalition to resolve. And it will
take time. However, the political progress that has been made
in Iraq has created opportunities and has put Iraq on the right
trajectory. The balance sheet in terms of key developments
during the past year has many positives, as well as some new
and continuing causes for concern. The positive developments,
which give the Iraqi Government and friends of Iraq real hope,
create opportunities going forward to improve the situation in
Iraq.
They include a tectonic shift that has taken place in the
political orientation of the Sunni Arab community. The Sunni
Arabs who boycotted the January 2005 elections have largely
participated in the political process with representation in
the National Assembly and the government proportional to their
share of the population. Shia Arabs, who have been the
principle target of sustained attacks by terrorists, have
exercised enormous restraint, even as some extremist Shia
groups have opted for sectarian retaliation. Kurdish leaders
remain committed to a future as part of Iraq and have played
constructive roles in shaping a cross-ethnic and cross-
sectarian government. Iraqi leaders succeeded in forming Iraq's
first ever government of national unity, with nonsectarian
security ministers, agreements on rules for decisionmaking on
critical issues and on the structure of institutions of the
executive branch and a broadly agreed-upon program. All
elements of the Government of National Unity have endorsed
Prime Minister Maliki's National Reconciliation and Dialogue
Project, which is designed to address the fundamental issues
dividing Iraqis and to induce elements of the armed opposition
to lay down their arms and join the political process. A divide
has opened up between the Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgency and al-
Qaeda and irreconcilable elements, as evidenced by the fact
that some insurgent groups have offered to provide intelligence
or to conduct operations against the terrorists. Key regional
countries, as well as the international community, have
reassessed their perspectives on the future if Iraq, with more
and more coming to the view that the new government will
succeed and opting to increase their nonmilitary involvement in
Iraq.
At the same time, several challenges to Iraqi's new
government persist or have become more severe and will require
adjustments and new efforts to resolve. Terrorists have adapted
by exploiting Iraq's sectarian faultlines, and sectarian
violence has now become the significant challenge to Iraq's
future. The security situation in Baghdad remains extremely
difficult as the capital has become the focal point of
terrorist and sectarian violence. A few countries, particularly
Syria and Iran, continue to engage in actions to destabilize
Iraq, providing sanctuary, training, arms, and financing to the
extremists fighting the new Iraqi Government.
In light of these developments, we are adjusting our
strategy and policies. The central focus now is to stem
sectarian violence, both by political and security measures,
even as we continue other efforts to stabilize the country and
get Iraq to stand on its own feet as soon as possible by taking
increasing responsibility for its own security.
First, we are working with Iraqi leaders to enhance unity
and to take political measures to defuse sectarian violence.
Iraqi leaders will soon begin to work on developing consensus
approaches to several key issues arising out of the new
Constitution, including consideration of amendments under a
fast-track process, enactment of legislation on the development
of Iraq's oil and gas resources and a review of the de-
Baathification Commission. In addition, Prime Minister Maliki's
National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project will seek to
capitalize on the expressions of interest among many insurgent
groups to reconcile with the new government and join in a
common fight against those who persist in terrorist actions.
Second, we are working with the Iraqi Government to improve
the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces and to adopt
security measures to curb sectarian violence. Building on the
successes in standing up Iraqi forces, the Iraqi Government and
the coalition will implement plans to accelerate the upgrading
of Iraqi combat and support capabilities. Prime Minister
Maliki, as well as Minister of Interior Boulani, has made a top
priority of reforming the Ministry of Interior, including the
purging of sectarian forces in the police. Iraqi leaders, with
coalition support, are developing a program to demobilize,
decommission, and reintegrate foreign militia and other
unauthorized military formations. The Iraqi Government and the
coalition will take advantage of the reconciliation process to
widen the division between Sunni Arab insurgents and al-Qaeda.
The Iraqi Government and the coalition are also carrying out a
series of focused stabilization operations that will target
sectarian militants and develop enduring security in major
cities, starting with Baghdad.
Third, we are supporting the Iraqi Government's new effort
to increase regional and international political and economic
support. The new contacts and cooperation between Iraq and key
regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Kuwait are encouraging. Iraq's neighbors and the
international community can do more to help the Iraqi people,
and we will work actively to ensure the success of Iraqi
efforts, in cooperation with the United Nations, to develop an
International Compact, which will commit Iraq to key reforms in
exchange for assistance needed to complete Iraq's transition to
a free-market democracy. At the same time, we will work with
the Iraqi Government to end the destabilizing policies of Iran
and Syria.
Fourth, we are implementing programs to help Iraqis improve
governance from top down and bottom up. Ministry advisory teams
have been deployed to 10 key ministries. Five provincial
reconstruction teams have been deployed and are engaged in
efforts to improve local governance and jump-start economic
development in provinces.
Fifth, as these political, security, and diplomatic actions
are pursued, we will support the new Iraqi Government's
strategy to realize the country's enormous economic potential.
Prime Minister Maliki and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh have the
right priorities, as explained yesterday in the speech to the
National Assembly by the Prime Minister. They are prepared to
move forward with the difficult actions--for example, curbing
subsidies and fighting corruption that are essential to
success. The United States and other friends of Iraq will help
Iraq's new leaders deliver results.
In closing, I want to emphasize that despite the present
difficulties, a path exists to success in Iraq. Moreover, the
success of Iraq is critical to the evolution of the Middle
East. Most of the world's security problems emanate from the
region from Morocco to Pakistan and shaping its evolution has
become the defining challenge of our time. The struggle for the
future of Iraq is vital to the future of the world. If Iraqis
work together against terrorism and sectarianism, and if we
Americans and other friends of Iraq support them, we will
succeed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Zalmay Khalilzad, Ambassador to Iraq, State
Department, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and distinguished members, I welcome
this opportunity to share my assessment of the situation in Iraq and my
thoughts on the way ahead. I have seen many of you in Baghdad, and I
want to thank you for traveling to Iraq. Your visits demonstrate your
interest in achieving a good outcome in Iraq and your support for the
many courageous Americans working in the U.S. mission. I will be brief
in my opening remarks, and I look forward to exchanging views with you
in the remaining time.
I will begin by giving my bottom-line assessment. Americans should
be strategically optimistic about Iraq, even as the continuing
difficulties in Iraq will require tactical patience. The challenges of
curbing sectarian violence or defeating terrorism are difficult and
will require the full commitment of the Iraqi Government and the
coalition to resolve. However, the political progress that has been
made in Iraq has created opportunities and put Iraq on the right
trajectory.
The balance sheet in terms of key developments during the past year
has many positives, as well some new and continuing causes for concern.
The positive developments, which give the Iraqi Government and friends
of Iraq real hope, create opportunities going forward to improve the
situation in Iraq. They include the following:
A tectonic shift has taken place in the political
orientation of the Sunni Arab community. Sunni Arabs, who
boycotted the January 2003 election, have largely participated
in the political process, with representation in the national
assembly proportional to their share of the population.
Shia Arabs, who have been the principal target of sustained
attacks by terrorists, have exercised enormous restraint, even
as some extremist Shia groups opted for sectarian retaliation.
Kurdish leaders remain committed to a future as part of Iraq
and have played constructive roles in shaping a cross-ethnic
and cross-sectarian government.
Iraqi leaders succeeded in forming Iraq's first-ever
government of national unity, with nonsectarian security
ministers, agreements on rules for decisionmaking on critical
issues and on the structure of institutions of the executive
branch, and a broadly agreed-upon program.
All elements of the government of national unity have
endorsed Prime Minister Maliki's National Reconciliation and
Dialogue Project, which is designed to address the fundamental
issues dividing Iraqis and to induce elements of the armed
opposition to lay down their arms and join the political
process.
A divide has opened up between the Iraqi Sunni-Arab
insurgency and al-Qaeda and irreconcilable elements, as
evidenced by the fact that some insurgent groups have offered
to provide intelligence or to conduct operations against the
terrorists.
Key regional countries, as well as the international
community, have reassessed their perspectives on the future of
Iraq, with more and more coming to the view that the new
government will succeed and opting to increase their
nonmilitary involvement in Iraq.
At the same time, several challenges to Iraq's new government
persist or have become more severe and will require adjustments and new
efforts to resolve:
Terrorists have adapted by exploiting Iraq's sectarian
faultlines, and sectarian violence has now become the
significant challenge to Iraq's future.
The security situation in Baghdad remains extremely
difficult, as the capital has become the focal point of
terrorist and sectarian violence.
A few countries, particularly Syria and Iran, continue to
engage in actions to destabilize Iraq, providing sanctuary,
training, arms, and financing to the extremists fighting the
new Iraqi Government.
In light of these developments, we are adjusting our strategy and
policies. The central focus is now to stem sectarian violence, both by
political and security measures, even as we continue other efforts to
stabilize the country.
First, we are working with Iraqi leaders to enhance unity and to
take political measures to defuse sectarian violence. Iraqi leaders
will soon begin to work on developing consensus approaches to several
key issues arising out of the new Constitution, including consideration
of amendments under a fast-track process, enactment of legislation on
the development of Iraq's oil and gas resources, and review of de-
Baathification. In addition, Prime Minister Maliki's National
Reconciliation and Dialogue Project will seek to capitalize on the
expressions of interest among many insurgent groups to reconcile with
the new government and join in a common fight against those who persist
in terrorist actions.
Second, we are working with the Iraqi Government to improve the
effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces and to adopt security
measures to curb sectarian violence. Building on the successes in
building up Iraqi forces, the Iraqi Government and the coalition will
implement plans to accelerate the upgrading of Iraqi combat and support
capabilities. Prime Minister Maliki, as well as Minister of Interior
Boulani, has made a top priority of reforming the Ministry of Interior,
including the purging of sectarian forces in the police. Iraqi leaders,
with coalition support, are developing a program to demobilize and
reintegrate armed militias. The Iraqi Government and the coalition will
take advantage of the reconciliation process to widen the divisions
between Sunni-Arab insurgents and al-Qaeda. The Iraqi Government and
the coalition are carrying out a series of focused stabilization
operations that will target sectarian militants and develop enduring
security in major cities, starting with Baghdad.
Third, we are supporting the Iraqi Government's new efforts to
increase regional and international political and economic support. The
new contacts and cooperation between Iraq and key regional countries,
such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are
encouraging. Iraq's neighbors and the international community can do
more to help the Iraqi people, and we will work actively to ensure the
success of Iraqi efforts, in cooperation with the United Nations, to
develop an international compact, which will commit Iraq to key reforms
in exchange for assistance needed to complete Iraq's transition to
free-market democracy. At the same time, we will work with the Iraqi
Government to end the destabilizing policies of Syria and Iran.
Fourth, we are implementing programs to help Iraqis improve
governance from the top down and the bottom up. Ministry advisory teams
have been deployed to 10 key ministries. Five provincial reconstruction
teams have been deployed and are engaged in efforts to improve local
governance and jump-start economic development in the provinces.
Fifth, as these political, security, and diplomatic actions are
pursued, we will support the new Iraqi Government's strategy to realize
the country's enormous economic potential. Prime Minister Maliki and
Deputy Prime Minister Saleh have the right priorities. They are
prepared to move forward with the difficult actions--for example,
curbing subsidies and fighting corruption that are essential to
success. The United States and other friends of Iraq will help Iraq's
new leaders deliver results.
In closing, I want to emphasize that despite the present difficult
situation, a path exists to success in Iraq. Moreover, the success of
Iraq is critical to the evolution of the Middle East. Most of the
world's security problems emanate from the region from Morocco to
Pakistan, and shaping its evolution has become the defining challenge
of our time. The struggle for the future of Iraq is vital to the future
of the world. If Iraqis work together against terrorism and
sectarianism, and if Americans and other friends of Iraq support them,
we will succeed.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. We
have good attendance today. In fact, you have brought together
a quorum of the committee, right off the bat, which is not
easily come by. Let me say that in view of that, we'll have a
7-minute question period and try to move rapidly with our
colleagues. I'll begin the questioning by making the comment
that I would like for you to respond to. As you are an
observer, obviously, of what is going on in Iraq, you also
observe what is occurring in America. There is increasing
impatience in the public for progress on the part of the Maliki
government, specifically, with regard to the priority of
disarming the militias, if that is the key to the end of the
insurgency. Likewise, there is some question as to whether the
United States priorities are being achieved. I would cite among
those the rule of law, religious freedom, human rights issues,
and the role of women. Now, this is a difficult task for the
American Ambassador. My question to you is, How much leverage
do you have, or do you feel you have, in bringing about both
support for the policies of ending the militia and, more
positively, achieving the goals of an Iraqi democracy that
embraces some of the objectives that I've mentioned?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Of course, the
objective is an Iraq that is successful, and Iraq cannot be
successful if militias and insurgents are allowed to operate,
challenging the rule of law and the government authority. A
successful country is one in which there is a monopoly and use
of significant force in the hands of the government, in the
hands of the state and in Iraq, what we have is with the
liberation of Iraq that the existing institutions of the state
were destroyed. So, new institutions are being built and we are
in a transition in that process. We have state institutions
being built: The army and the police. At the same time, power
is diffused, military equipment has fallen into the hands of
militias and insurgent groups. Because of the increased
sectarianism, Mr. Chairman, the militias have become, more and
more, forces that protect, or seem to protect, the Shia
population in the sectarian conflict and respond to terrorist
efforts to exasperate that faultline and the insurgent forces
have become more--increasingly as protecting or presenting
Sunni Arab interests. This unity government provides the
opportunity for credible state institutions to be built and at
the same time, for both these nonstate security forces that
have emerged because of the difficult transition that I had
referred to, that Iraq has been through, to build them down.
This will be difficult, getting people who carry weapons to
give up those weapons is not easy. It will require political
agreement by the leaders of the different communities to that
objective and then a plan of implementation that will require
that some people as individuals be integrated into the security
forces--provided they meet the criteria--while others will be
reintegrated into society and be trained for jobs that are in
demand in this new Iraqi economy. That will take time and the
resources--there will be a requirement of resources for that
reintegration, besides the political will of the Iraqi leaders
and part of those resources, I hope, will come though this
compact process that I mentioned in my statement and you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman.
So, this is going to be a very important issue for the
success of Iraq and we will work with the Iraqi Government. I
have to tell you, first of all, I can assure you that the
people you have in the mission there work closely together. We
see ourselves as a single team, good relations with General
Casey and others involved. And at the same time, I can assure
you that we have very good relations, good working relationship
with the Prime Minister in the new government. This is a
significant, positive development. I will have the opportunity
to engage and to affect things in ways that take our interests
into account.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, do you have a gut feeling, as
someone who is as close an observer of anyone I can think of on
the scene, that a predominant majority of Iraqis, quite apart
from this governmental group, really want to be Iraqis? Is
there a sense of being Iraqi among them that gives us some hope
that those who are attempting to disrupt that process as Sunnis
or Shiites or militias or what have you, finally will be
subordinated? And absent that, then are those who predict civil
war, or separation of the groups in the country, likely to have
the last date? What is your gut feeling as to whether there is
this sense of wanting to be Iraqi?
Mr. Khalilzad. We talked in the previous question, Mr.
Chairman, about state-building issues. Here you are raising a
fundamental issue with regard to nation-building. Iraq is a
nation but it is really a new nation, in the sense that for the
first time in the history of Iraq, perhaps, at least in the
modern history of Iraq, you have the people of Iraq, the
community leaders, engaging with each other about what does it
mean to be an Iraqi and how do they relate to each other? In
the earlier periods, external imperial powers ruled Iraq.
Whether it was the Ottomans or subsequently, the Brits or an
internal autocrat, they determined what it meant to be an
Iraqi, without full participation of all communities of Iraq.
And now, for the first time, all Iraqis are participating in
the elections. They have sat across the table with each other,
arguing about federalism, arguing about the nature of the
state, what powers should be given to what institutions, rules
and procedures for decisionmaking, programs and so on.
So, I think state institutions are being built and a new
Iraqi nation also is being born. These processes, as we know
from the history of our own country and the history of other
old lands in Europe, are not easy. I know that you stated, Mr.
Chairman, that the American people are impatient--and they are
entitled to be impatient. They want to see results. They want
to know that we are heading in the right direction, that we
know what we are doing and I certainly appreciate that. But at
the same time, I urge that we be patient because the issues
that the Iraqis are dealing with are difficult, complicated
issues that will take time to resolve and that we need to be
agile and adapt and adjust as they move forward. I believe that
they are moving in the right direction, but there are also
countervailing forces, both internal and regional, that will
like this Iraq not to succeed.
So, in a sense, the struggle for the future of the Middle
East is being fought in Iraq--we must do everything we can
prudently to make sure the outcome is good for Iraqis, good for
the region, and certainly good for the American people.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you've observed,
Mr. Ambassador, there has not been much of a disagreement, if
any at all, between me and the chairman on Iraq. I would just
like to make two very brief, sort of opening comments, I guess.
One is, I think the American people have been incredibly
patient. It has been over 3 years. I can't think of another
people who are in the world who would likely be as patient as
our people have been. They have been, as you know better than
anyone, we've expended well over 2,500 lives and thousands of
injuries, billions and hundreds of billions of dollars. So I
think their patience is--the reason I think their patience is
running thin is that they are not sure there is a plan and
staying the course. It's not political comment. That phrase
doesn't look like, doesn't sound like to them that there is
something new here that is going to happen.
And the second generic point that I would make is that back
in December, having an opportunity to talk with you after the
election, I remember us having a conversation that although the
election was democratic, was it sectarian? As you know, the
results--you know them better than I--if I'm not mistaken, I
think the conclusion, reached a month or so after, was roughly
90-plus percent of the vote was a sectarian-cast vote. So, I
must tell you, count me on the skeptic side about whether or
not there is a real dialog beyond the leadership about being
Iraqis. When I was--my most recent trip, like the last trip,
there is increasing discussion that I hear and I'm told that
takes place. I'm not speaking to that many Iraqis. As you know,
we can't get out of the vehicles and go into the restaurants;
we can't go into the shops, because of the situation relating
to security. So I don't want to exaggerate on the base of my
knowledge. But speaking to people I respect, including the
people I most respect after you guys over there, are the press.
Our press are there. I mean they are there. They are getting
shot at and killed and as you do, I know. I've watched you in
Afghanistan. The first people I go to speak to are the seasoned
press people. And my impression is that there is a growing
identification: I'm Sunni. I'm Shia, as opposed to I'm Iraqi.
So count me as a skeptic on that, which leads me to this next
point.
You state in your statement that there is a need to get the
country, essentially, facilities up and running, provide
everything from water to hope, safety, a step outside the front
door and not step into sewage in the street, et cetera. One of
the things that impressed me negatively was how the void of
capacity--not will, not will. I think the Iraqi people have
will. I think they are desirous of changing their circumstance
and, obviously, they risk and lose their lives in an attempt to
do that. But I'm not sure of the extent of the capacity because
of four or five decades of them having been given no authority,
really. I'll give you one example. I can't remember what the
bug literally is that ruins the date--that can ruin the date
trees but there is some virus equivalent to the boll weevil and
cotton and speaking to one of our senior officials who are
saying they went to the Department of Agriculture and said, you
know, you haven't sprayed these date trees in 4 years or 3
years or whatever. They have to be sprayed because this is both
a national symbol and a future economic benefit and they're
told, well no, the Iraqis have to work this out. Well, the
Iraqis didn't know how to work it out. I was told they didn't
know how to plan, they didn't know how to acquire the aircraft
or helicopters to do it and when they did it, they didn't know
how to follow onto it and finally, and maybe this particular
military guy is wrong, said finally, we went ahead and sprayed
the trees.
Underline the notion that something equivalent to what we
have done with our military. We didn't say, let the Iraqis
build their military, we brought in our single best military
trainers, the best military trainers in the world who have
risked their lives to actually go out and train their military.
So I ask your folks, what is the plan to do the equivalent of
that in training the Department of Agriculture how to get this
massive capability up and running? What is the plan to get the
Department of Justice actually functioning? For example, after
Kosovo--you know, we went into Kosovo, as you know. A matter of
fact, my son was one of the people from the Justice Department
who went over there to literally teach them how to set up a
criminal justice system with trained judges, et cetera and we
made a significant investment. A long prelude to a short
question. I ask that of your staff and they said, you know,
we've changed from the Bremer model, which is we go in and just
run the agency, the Ministry of Agriculture, and we have to let
the Iraqis do it but we have to be more deft about doing it. I
said, well what's the plan? Is there any place where you set
priorities? Say look, if I were running the Department of
Agriculture, these are the first five things you have to do to
get it up and running, et cetera. And they said that they had,
for the key ministry, clear tactics, targets, and benchmarks. I
asked them--and this is mainly to get this in the record, Mr.
Chairman, I asked them, would you provide to the committee
those actual documents that you have, which lays out the
tactics, targets and benchmarks for each of those civilian
agencies. So my question is, Would you speak generally to that
right now and would you be willing, Mr. Ambassador, to provide
to the chairman and the committee, what specifically--not
generically--specifically for each of those civilian agencies,
what the plan is? That is my question and my time is up.
Mr. Khalilzad. Mr. Biden, with regard to your overall
observation, as I said and I believe this very strongly, that
Iraq is going through a transition. In transition, by
definition, there are different elements: Elements of old;
elements of new. It is good and bad and mixed. Our role, as I
see it, is to strengthen what is good and to contain and weaken
things that are bad. Depending on what you look at, you could
come to one judgment or the other. There is certainly in the
mix, sectarianism, this is a fact and the dominant issue right
now. So if you look at that as an issue, certainly it is
growing. But at the same time, if you look at the agreement--
and I have sat through hundreds if not more meetings with Iraqi
leaders in the process of negotiating, both in regard to the
Constitution and with regard to the government formation. I
believe that there is--you see the tendency to want to build a
new Iraq with the rights of the different communities.
Senator Biden. I acknowledge that, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Khalilzad. We see both.
Senator Biden. That's what I said, there are two realities.
That is one of them. But there is the other reality.
Mr. Khalilzad. We hope that the reality that I speak of
will become dominant and we can contain and reverse the other
reality that also exists.
With regard to the capacity of the ministries, it is very
important. The model that we have embraced is to help in the
short term; to help them do what needs to be done. But at the
same time, build institutional capacity for self-reliance
because if we do everything for them, there is the question of
dependence that will develop in terms of the longer term. The
American people, through you, the representatives, have been
generous. We have this year about $150 million for capacity-
building; $60 million of that will be spent in terms of short-
term measures, from technical assistance, where they need
computers and hardware and so forth, to hiring people that need
to do the job when they can't do it, advising them in terms of
planning, programming, budgeting, and the capability. We've
done an overall assessment of the key ministries to see where
the weaknesses are and how to deal with those weaknesses. But
we do that through the Ministerial Advisory Team--MATs. Besides
the immediate assistance to our MATs, and then the longer term
program, which the bulk of our effort will go into--and we
think that will take time to build institutional capacity to
train Iraqis, building their civil service commission, building
other institutions where their government officials will be
trained. Due to the methods of Saddam Hussein and then the de-
Baathification and the current problems of Iraq, capacity is
limited in the ministries. I agree with you. It varies from
ministry to ministry but we are--we do have a plan and I'll be
glad to----
Senator Biden. If you have a plan--if you will indulge me.
A plan for institution-building. If I can make a terrible
analogy. There are a lot of new candidates for public office in
the United States. They know exactly what they think. They are
very bright. They know what they want to do.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right, right.
Senator Biden. But they have to bring somebody in to say,
by the way, here's what you have to do.
Mr. Khalilzad. Exactly.
Senator Biden. You have to have a plan to go raise money.
You have to have a plan to organize within these territories--
you have to have a plan--that's the institution-building.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Biden. What is--are we laying out that plan for
them, not telling them what to do, how to build an institution?
Mr. Khalilzad. We are. As I said, this is the
responsibility of the Ministry Advisory Team to develop those
plans. But at the same time, institution-building, where Iraqi
civil servants could be preened so that they can become self-
reliant.
Senator Biden. But you'll take on board to us.
Mr. Khalilzad. I'll take on board your request to submit
our plans.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Ambassador,
welcome. Thank you for coming. I want to add my appreciation to
what has already been noted by the chairman and Senator Biden
and their recognition of our Americans who are serving in Iraq,
both uniformed and nonmilitary personnel for the kind of work
that they are doing, the effort that they are putting forward.
You noted, Mr. Ambassador, in your remarks as did Senator
Biden, that we have been in Iraq now about 3\1/2\ years and on
the scale of conflict commitment and all that is part of the
efforts that we are making and you talk about strategic vision.
That represents longer, I believe, than the Korean war. We are
a couple of months away from surpassing the length of World War
II. Now the world is more complicated today. I think we
recognize that and we do not judge threats and response to
threats and challenges based on past conflicts. I recognize
that. But as you opened your remarks this morning, Mr.
Ambassador, with referencing tactical patience, strategic
optimism, I want to go into that in some detail with the time I
have and I'm going to ask you the question but I want to ask
another question first. What do you mean by strategic optimism?
You noted that much of the future of the Middle East is
revolving around and is centered in the conflict in Iraq. I
think that is certainly a central part. But I would also say
that the northern and southern borders of Israel and what is
going on there will have something to do with the future of the
Middle East, as well as the outcome in Iran. The more bogged
down we become--we are now engaged in two land wars--the more
options that we take away from our arsenal of diplomacy and
resources. You know that. You are a professional. You are the
best we have and I really mean that. You know that. I
introduced you twice to this committee and I was very proud of
that. That isn't the question. The American public,
occasionally, I think needs to be reminded that there is a
difference, not unlike in Vietnam, when we asked our young men
to sacrifice and fight and die in Vietnam. They had nothing to
do with the policy. So we can question policy and ask about
policy and occasionally, hopefully, put forward a contribution
on policy without undermining the effort of our troops and I
think occasionally, we need to remind the American public of
that. Not only is that our constitutional responsibility here
but it is our overall responsibility in government.
Now, you talk about--and I'll quote from your statement,
``key regional countries as well as the international community
have reassessed their perspectives on the future of Iraq, with
more and more coming to the view that the new government will
succeed and opting to increase their nonmilitary involvement in
Iraq.'' And you mention it again in your statement. But isn't
it true, though, that there has been very little new
international assistance provided to Iraq in the last 6 months?
If my numbers are correct and I got these from the State
Department, that only $3.5 billion has been provided out of the
$4.6 billion that has been pledged from the international
community. As far as I know, it is still unclear whether the
Arab League will host a conference on Iraq. Unless you have
something new to talk about on that, this is a followup, as you
know, from November 2005 in Cairo. As you know and has said it,
as I have said it and we have had discussions about this, there
will be no resolution in the Middle East without a regional
understanding and a regional resolution. You have just noted
that in Iraq and I completely agree. But I'm not encouraged,
Mr. Ambassador, with the lack of participation and effort and
commitment I see from the neighbors. I also am concerned
about--I don't see any effort to bolster or increase in the
military as well. The United States continues to carry the
burden: The dying, the fighting, the financing. And that really
kind of loops me back to your point about strategic optimism.
Where is the strategic optimism when we talk about how does
that translate into Iraqi governance? We have talked about
magnificent progress and contributions that have been made and
successes: The Constitution; a freely elected government. How
does that translate into day-to-day governance, security,
supporting their own country, the corruption problem, our own
inspector general's report on this a couple of months ago, the
Iraqi inspector general. I understand where you have to be, to
a certain extent on this, but if you could answer some of those
questions, because we need a clearer understanding of the
specifics, of the measurements, Mr. Ambassador, of what you are
talking about here.
Thank you.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator Hagel. I appreciate your
statement about me. With regard to strategic optimism that I
talked about, my judgment is that the participation of the
Sunni Arabs in the political process--they've changed from
opposing this change that took place in Iraq, to embracing it
and wanting to work with it. It gives me strategic hope that
the different communities, the three principle communities of
Iraq: The Shia Arab, the Sunni Arab, and Kurds, are now working
together to deal with the problems of state- and nation-
building that I referred to earlier. That was a necessary step.
You couldn't get Iraq on the right trajectory if one of the
three principle communities, as it was the case a year ago,
opposed it. Now that has changed. It was necessary but it is
not sufficient. A lot more has to happen and that's where I was
referring to the tactical patience, working through the
problems that exist, given this fundamental requirement, which
has now been met. It required patience. Now, of course, the
question of a timeline that you talked about, Senator Hagel, I
believe that the issue, the challenge that we face in this part
of the world, which is to encourage this region which has been
dysfunctional for a long time, which is the source of many of
the security problems, is more analogous in a timeline to
dealing with the Soviet threat, in my view, although it is not
identical. We're talking about a transformation that will take
decades to achieve, not all by military means, clearly, in most
cases. In this case, we do have a significant military means as
part of it. But the challenge of the broader change that is
needed in this region, solving regional problems such as the
one that you talked about with regard to the Arab-Israel
problem, talking about the evolution of Iran. It is a great
people, a terrific civilization, right now, in a very difficult
situation given the policies of the leadership there on some
issues as well as some of the other challenges of this area. So
this will take time and the outcome in Iraq will be very
important in shaping where this region goes. God forbid, if we
were to abandon this effort, the threat that will emanate from
that possibility, from that scenario, would create, in my
judgment, bigger problems than we face now. I believe that for
good strategic reasons, as well as for moral reasons because we
have had a role in bringing about these sets of circumstances
in which Iraqis find themselves, that we can't abandon them. We
need to help them stand on their own feet because it serves our
strategic interests and we have a responsibility to see it
through. But staying the course that Senator Biden was saying,
in my view, is not doing everything exactly as you did before,
adjusting as the circumstances warrant. I am not a believer in
staying the course, do exactly what you did before although the
circumstances would have changed.
Now, with regard to the regional situation and the
international situation, your specific questions, Senator
Hagel, I believe and I travel a lot in the region. I recently
went to see the King of Saudi Arabia, the leadership of UAE
before the Prime Minister went there. The fact that the Sunni
Arabs are in, because most of the leadership of the Arab world
is Sunni Arab, the fact that the Sunni Arabs are in the
strategic issue that I talked about and the reconciliation plan
that the Prime Minister offered, reaching out to the
insurgency, had a big and positive impact in terms of how Iraq
is now perceived by the Arabs--and they are willing to help.
They are willing to help with the reconciliation because some
of the insurgent groups are Sunnis that are still outside the
political process. These countries can influence them and they
are willing to facilitate meetings and encourage these people
to participate in the political process. Also internationally,
I believe that in the discussions that we already have had on
the compact, countries that opposed this project at the
beginning are now saying they want to participate. Some of
their companies, particularly in the energy sector, are already
reengaging because Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, has huge potential
economically and the countries are beginning to sort of see how
they could benefit from that and participate. Therefore, are
looking for ways to enhance their engagement. So that is what I
would say about the strategic level as well with regard to my
regional and international assessment.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one thing? My
staff representative noted that I said $4.6 billion.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right, that was $13.5----
Senator Hagel. It is $14.6 billion that has been pledged,
but only $3.5 billion that has been given, is my understanding
and again, I received these numbers from the State Department.
Mr. Khalilzad. That is correct.
Senator Hagel. Which I don't think stands up very well in
your efforts, all of our efforts, in trying to engage
commitments and connect those to reality.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Hagel. From the international community,
specifically the region. Thank you.
Mr. Khalilzad. I accept that, Mr. Hagel, that the Arab
world has not forgiven back the level that some of the other
countries have. Some of the pledges that you are referring to
were Arab pledges that were then in Madrid, have now been
delivered on and that is where I believe a change is taking
place because the previous government was perceived by them as
being a Shia-Kurdish government in which Sunnis were not
participating. This is where I see the opportunity with this
unity government that could have--is likely to have, in my
view, given my talks with some of them--a positive effect.
Senator Hagel. Is the Arab League going to follow up with a
host meeting from the Cairo meeting last year?
Mr. Khalilzad. The Ambassador of the Arab League in Baghdad
told me that they are committed to holding a conference, that
they will have a preparatory conference in Cairo. The nature of
the mission has changed because when they started the
initiative, the Sunni Arabs were not in the political process
so they wanted to play a role in facilitating that. Since that
has happened, the question is what is going to be the focus of
this conference? My judgment is that it is going to probably be
in support of the reconciliation part in terms of what remains
of those forces that are not in. That becomes a little harder
because we are talking about some insurgents and who is who. It
has become a little more difficult because of who you have to
reach out to. So they are doing this preparatory conference but
they are committed to moving forward and we are committed, I
can assure you, to helping them. We support this initiative and
we will work with them.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
saying also how much I have personally enjoyed working with
you, Ambassador, with your staff and I congratulate all of you.
I thank them for their service and what they are putting up
with over there. That is very difficult. Also, since you are
the principal representative to the troops and everybody over
there, we all continually express our gratitude for their
sacrifice and service. You are very skilled. But I think you
are regrettably undermined by a lack of adequate central focus
within the administration on some of these choices. I mean, the
fact is that 2\1/2\, 3 years ago, a number of us on this
committee were loudly calling for this international
conference. It is finally happening, too many lives later, too
many limbs destroyed and lives destroyed later. I mean, it is a
tragedy that that kind of international effort isn't happening
more. Senator Hagel has just referred to the money not given by
those countries pledged. That really goes to some of the
fundamental challenges that you face now because many of those
countries are Sunni and there is, I think you will agree, a
reluctance playing out among them because there is only a 20-
percent Sunni population in Iran and that's what the insurgency
is about. So is it fair to say that we are engaged in probably
the most complicated and largest nation-building experiment in
the history of this country with the exception of ourselves?
Ambassador Khalilzad. First, Senator, with regard to your
broader point, I have no doubt that we have made mistakes in
how we have dealt with this issue and although I don't tend to
look back but rather to work with what I have to move forward,
but I believe that no matter what one's view was and what one
thinks about the mistakes, now that we are where we are, we
need to do what we can to make this----
Senator Kerry. I understand that, Mr. Ambassador. The
problem with the mistakes is that every time options have been
put on the table and ignored, the situation gets more
complicated. So the mistakes have to be taken into account in
measuring what are our options now.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Now, we have to know that you are
right on how we got to where we are. I agree with that.
Senator Kerry. But let me speak to that for a moment. Let
me just get the answer to that. Is this the most significant
nation-building effort we've ever engaged in, except for our
own?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that this is a very
difficult, complicated enterprise that we have taken on. It
involves state-building, it involves nation-building, it
involves fighting terrorism--because that is an element of
fighting terrorists, the global network that has also made
headway in Iraq, although I believe that part of it has
weakened in the past 12 months, but it is a very, very
important, complicated, difficult task that we have taken on.
Yes; I agree with that.
Senator Kerry. The presence of international terrorist
enterprises is one of the reasons things are more complicated
today in many ways, because the al-Qaeda presence, as you know,
was not significant in the beginning but now is. I agree with
you. I think that part of it has diminished. But let me come to
the harder issues.
The number of insurgent attacks have increased from 5 per
day in May 2003 to 90 per day in May 2006. The incidents of
sectarian violence have increased from 5 per month in May 2003
to 250 per month in 2006. The number of Iraqis kidnapped has
increased from 2 per day in May 2003 to 35 per day in May 2006.
The number of civilian deaths has increased from 250 per month
in 2003 to 1,500 per month in May 2006. So every indicator of
violence and disorder is up. Now, on March 7 of this year, you
said the potential was there for sectarian violence to become
full-blown civil war. On Tuesday, you said, violence,
sectarianism is now the main challenge to stability. Over 100
Iraqis have died in sectarian violence this week, including
more than 50 in Baghdad alone on Tuesday. Yesterday, Haider al-
Ibadi, a prominent Shiite legislator, said, ``certainly what is
happening is the start of the civil war.'' Saleh al-Mutlak, a
leading Sunni legislator, described the recent violence, ``as
the start of the civil war.'' Do they know something that we
don't know and that we are not willing to admit?
Ambassador Khalilzad. With regard to your overall point
about the levels of violence and the ratio between different
elements within that violence, the date varies depending on
what baseline one chooses. I think at times, subsequent to your
baseline of 2003, there have been higher----
Senator Kerry. Sure, but come to the heart of the question.
The heart of the question is, Do these leaders, these members
of the government who are defining a civil war, do they see
something that we are unwilling to admit?
Ambassador Khalilzad. With regard to the point that I was
making, is that I believe that the attacks on the United States
and the coalition part as a proportion of the level of
violence, is down--has been down--and the sectarian violence
has gone up, which gets us to the point of what you just said
as to the bottom line. I believe that whether this is the
beginning of a civil war or it is something that can be
contained and reversed, only retrospectively we can judge.
Senator Kerry. But we are not judging it retrospectively
because General Casey announced in the papers today that he is
considering bringing troops in, in order to deal with this, put
them into Baghdad because there is increasing violence.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. No, I'm just----
Senator Kerry. What are our troops going to do to stop
sectarian violence, when our generals have already declared
that this cannot be resolved militarily, it has to be resolved
politically?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Let me say that whether we can judge
that what is happening right now is the beginning of a full
blown civil war, which was your question.
Senator Kerry. Let's not fight about full-blown, small-
blown. It is a low-grade civil war.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I just think that whether it is going
to become a civil war or whatever the term, full-blown or not,
will be something that we judge later on with regard to what
happens subsequently. It will be, I think, a mistake to judge
it, that this is the beginning of an overall civil war.
Senator Kerry. Let's not quibble over the descriptive term.
Ambassador Khalilzad. OK, all right.
Senator Kerry. Let's agree that the violence is up, that
there is increased sectarian violence.
Ambassador Khalilzad. It is; I agree.
Senator Kerry. What are our troops--the heart of the
question is, If you would agree it can't be resolved
militarily?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I agree. I say the following,
Senator Kerry, which is that in order to deal with this
problem, you need both political steps and security steps.
Senator Kerry. I agree.
Ambassador Khalilzad. You can't count on political
measures----
Senator Kerry. The policy of the administration has been
that as the Iraqi troops are trained, we will stand down. As
they stand up, we stand down.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Kerry. We are told by our general that they will be
fully trained by the end of this year.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Kerry. But we're not standing down. There has been
no standdown. There has been an increase in the violence.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe the policy has to be, and I
believe it is, that we want Iraq to succeed and for Iraq to
stand on its own feet, to take care of its own security. But
that will be--that depends on building Iraqi capacity but also
on conditions. I believe that is why we have talked always
about a condition-based framework and there are places that
there could be adjustments downward inside Iraq, in terms of
the presence. There are places, because of conditions and the
help that the Iraqis need, that we may have to increase the
level of our forces. But that will be calibrated and we will do
constant recalibration, depending on the circumstances. But the
target, the objective is an Iraq that can stand on its own feet
as soon as possible.
Senator Kerry. Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman. I know
my time is up. It's hard to do this in 7 minutes and get
through the kind of series of questions that are important to
really understanding a point. So let me, if I could just
summarize quickly.
You used the word abandonment earlier and you used the word
adjustment now for success. None of us who have articulated
alternative policies have suggested it as an abandonment or
believe it is. In fact, in the policy that the three of us
sitting here proposed as an alternative in the Senate, we
specifically allowed the President the discretion to leave a
certain number of troops to deal with training, to fight al-
Qaeda, to protect American facilities, to have an over-the-
horizon capacity in order to encourage success. But there is a
strong belief based on a lot of the statements of Sunni and
Shia politicians themselves about how our presence attracts
insurgency and increases violence. I think there are plans
right now within the military to actually garrison troops,
begin to move them out, to take a very different posture, which
is, in effect, the policy we've prescribed. So I think using
the word abandonment is the wrong way to frame what the real
choice is. The question here is how do we get success? There
are many people who believe that it is only by pushing the
Iraqis with the same kind of deadline that required the
elections, the transfer of authority, the Constitution, all of
which they met--with your pressure, I may add--that's the only
way to really affect the kind of transition necessary.
Ambassador Khalilzad. While I am in complete agreement with
you, Senator Kerry, that we need to keep the pressure on the
Iraqis to take on more responsibility, to deliver, to do the
right thing. I appreciate the sentiment behind some of the
efforts and I don't dismiss the utility of those efforts. So to
the extent to which efforts to encourage self-reliance is the
motive that is welcome. But the extent to which signals
abandonment, undermine confidence, I think that will be
counterproductive to our goal.
Senator Kerry. So you don't believe that General Casey in
making a recommendation for a timetable for withdrawal has
undermined the effort, do you?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I don't believe that General Casey
has recommended a timetable for withdrawal.
Senator Kerry. He made a presentation to the Pentagon with
respect to plans.
Ambassador Khalilzad. You know the Pentagon and I have
worked--you know, I used to head the planning and policy shop
there. We have a lot of plans and then adjustments are made as
the plans are reviewed. There has been no discussion yet with
the Iraqi Government, on the way forward. When I get back, we
will form a joint committee.
Senator Kerry. But that is specifically to talk about
withdrawal of troops.
Ambassador Khalilzad. But the conditions today----
Senator Kerry. I understand.
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. Today, for example, a
whole province was turned over to the Iraqis, the province of
al-Muthanna. They are taking the lead in terms of security for
that province. So there will not be as much requirements as
there was before. But in Baghdad, I believe now, we have a
requirement for additional capability to bring down the level
of violence. So there will be adjustments and we have to remain
flexible with the goal, with the intent to bring the level of
U.S. forces down and to get Iraqis to take on more and more
responsibility.
Senator Kerry. But I am confident you would agree that when
the Iraqi National Security Advisor, Mr. al-Rubaie wrote in the
Washington Post a few weeks ago, that there already is an
unofficial roadmap for foreign troop reduction that will
eventually lead to a total withdrawal of U.S. troops, he was
not undermining his own government, was he?
Ambassador Khalilzad. No. I believe that all Iraqis, or
most Iraqis, let me say, would like the foreign troops to go
out. We would like the troops to come out but if you ask
Iraqis, do you want them out now or in 6 months, I think you
will get--the overwhelming answer will be no.
Senator Kerry. But our plans wouldn't do that. I just want
it clear, our plan didn't do that.
Ambassador Khalilzad. No; I'm not saying that.
Senator Kerry. So we should take the word abandonment off
the table. We should leave the word success on the table.
Different words.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry. Let
me just note for the record that the Chair has allowed
questioning that has gone beyond 7 minutes on both sides, and
in two cases by doubling the 7 minutes, but it has been a good
dialog. At the same time, in fairness to all Senators, to the
extent that Senators can keep their remarks within the time,
that would be very helpful. I'll call now upon Senator Chafee,
and in fact, will turn over the chair to Senator Chafee because
a vote has been declared. Some of us may vote and come back.
The next Democratic Senator would then be the candidate for
questions after you, sir.
Senator Chafee [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador. I think we all agree, as you
have said, that we've embarked on a complex and difficult
mission here and, in fact, that complex and difficult mission
has cost over 2,500 American lives, many thousands of Iraqi
lives, hundreds of billions of dollars, American dollars, and a
whole new generation of veterans with very serious needs and of
course, all the horrors that come with war, whether it is Abu
Ghraib or Adetha. Where is this all taking us? In your last
paragraph of your prepared statement, you say the success of
Iraq is critical to the evolution of the Middle East and then
you say with very proactive words that ``shaping its
evolution'' is the defining challenge of our time. So what is
the evolution of the Middle East and how do you reconcile it
with the facts, the vision with the facts and the facts being
warfare in Gaza, warfare now in southern Lebanon, the threat of
nuclear weapons in Iran and a very, very difficult and complex
situation in Iraq, what is the evolution?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Sir, the very reasons that you
mentioned, the nuclear issue in Iran, what Senator Hagel
mentioned with regard to the Israel-Palestine issues, with
regard to the rise of extremism that produces terror, the lack
of adequate progress in terms of building stable, democratic
societies, are the reasons for why I call and I think many
others have called this, the future of this region at the
present time, the principle challenge for our strategy, for our
national interests, for the future of the world. As was the
European balance of power in the earlier centuries, whether you
go to the 19th century, 20th century, how the Europeans related
to each other and there were, obviously, complexities at that
time, that the balance of power for a while, kept the peace and
it didn't work and we had to come in twice, with huge
sacrifices on the part of the American people, to restore order
in the world, to put the world on the right trajectory. And now
Europe is heading in the right direction and the same thing
happened in Asia, of course. But now, for reasons that you
talked about and the reason of the September 11 attack, this
region is the issue that we confront although there are other
issues and I don't want to diminish their importance. This
requires a very patient, long-term strategy that not only deals
with immediate crises, and the kind that we are seeing in Gaza
or the kind we are seeing with the nuclear issue with Iran, but
deals with the longer term, the underlying challenges with
regard to education, with regard to building a civil society,
with regard to building the infrastructure of modern states and
societies. It is going to take time. For a while, we ignored
these issues because we had other priorities.
Senator Chafee. Mr. Ambassador, can you be a little more
specific on what the evolution, what the vision is for the
Middle East?
Ambassador Khalilzad. The vision? Well, the vision is what
people everywhere want. What we are talking about in the Middle
East is not that something different for them. People
everywhere want to live in security. People everywhere want to
have the ability to feed their kids, to----
Senator Chafee. We're not doing very well. Mr. Ambassador,
we're not doing very well, if that is----
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. But if we weren't doing
very well, then we wouldn't have the----
Senator Chafee. Security?
Ambassador Khalilzad. If we were doing very well, then
there wouldn't be a challenge any more. So this will be a
success and a celebration. The reason we are talking the way we
are is precisely because the region is not doing very well.
What are the options, therefore? Is the option----
Senator Chaffee. One option, in your words, was that this
was similar to the Soviet threat. You said that this morning.
Ambassador Khalilzad. In terms of defining an issue. Well,
of course, it is a unique----
Senator Chafee. What were the lessons of dealing with the
Soviet threat? It was the cold war. It was containment, it was
avoiding of conflict at every possible opportunity and wait out
and allow new generations to come along.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Sure, right.
Senator Chafee. We threw that model out the window and
we're suffering the consequences. If this is your vision, this
is your initiative, defend it.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I would say that when I referred to
the European balance of power as the defining issue of an
earlier era, the Soviet challenge being the defining challenge
of much of the 20th century, that this is the most--I meant it
in the sense of the most significant challenge that we face.
Clearly, both in terms of what the challenge is and how you
deal with it is different. I mean, we didn't apply the Soviet
model of containment when we were dealing with the balance of
power problems of Europe. The instruments were different, the
means were different, the threat posed was different and here,
the means will differ. Military was the instrument in
Afghanistan because of the 9/11 attack, so we had to go get rid
of the regime in Afghanistan. But in other places, the military
isn't going to be the instrument. It will rely more on
encouraging reform, political participation, buildup of civil
society, reform of education systems and so on. So we need a
grand strategy that has the different elements in it. I am not
the person at this point with the responsibility to elaborate
and detail, for each country of the region and the specific mix
of things ought to be because I am, as you know, rather
preoccupied with one country, Iraq, and that is quite
sufficient to keep me preoccupied but I believe that when we
think about Iraq, we need to know that there is this bigger
context in which Iraq is playing out.
Senator Chafee. Would you say that what is happening--I
know this is, you're, as you just said, preoccupied with Iraq,
but what is happening in Gaza and now in southern Lebanon, is
that going according to plan?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I do not believe that if you are
talking about our plans, that what is going on there and Gaza
and in southern Lebanon, would have been according to our plan;
no. But we're not the only players. Others are also players.
They have their plans. And the question is, Do we acquiesce to
their plans or do we keep working on our plan for a positive
vision for a positive future for the region? This is a
multiplayer, complicated process, the struggle for the future
of this region and nation, a region with lots of faultlines. It
will not be easy, but yet, given the nature of the world that
we are in, the trust that we faithfully cannot, but in my
judgment, my recommendation for your consideration is to do
what we can to increase the prospect for it to go in the right
direction.
Senator Chafee. In this vision, back to as you said,
shaping the evolution of the Middle East--these are your
words--do you honestly foresee a permanent presence, a military
presence in the Middle East, an American military presence in
the Middle East?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Those are decisions that, of course,
are way above my pay grade but certainly, I think the military
is an element of our strategies. It has got to be, to deal with
the problems. How we configure our military posture to deal
with the problems of the region as an element in an overall
strategy, I'll leave it to the Pentagon planners and to the
Secretary of Defense.
Senator Chafee. Seeing as I am holding the microphone, I'll
continue until another Senator comes back and then go vote
myself. I believe Tuesday you gave a speech to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Is that right?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes; I did.
Senator Chafee. And in that speech, I think you've made
some similar comments this morning, also, about Syria and Iran.
In that speech to the CSIS, you said that if Iran persists in
its unhelpful actions, the Iraqi Government, as well as the
United States and other friends of Iraq, will need to consider
necessary measures to deny Tehran the ability to undertake
destabilizing policies. So back to the reshaping of the Middle
East, what do you have in mind there? With that sentence?
Ambassador Khalilzad. This is about reshaping Iran and
policies in Iraq. I had a very specific issue in mind and that
is, Senator, that Iran is pursing a two-track approach to Iraq.
On the one hand, it has good state-to-state relations with the
new Government of Iraq. But in addition, it is using its Quds
forces, which is part of its Revolutionary Guards, as well as
its intelligence and some surrogates in Iraq, to attack
coalition forces to support militias. We discussed earlier the
problem of militias for the success of Iraq. And what I was
saying is that unless Iran abandons this second prong of its
policy that is unhelpful to Iraq and to the coalition, and the
Iraqi Government recognizes this, together with the Iraqi
Government, we have to take steps to deal with that challenge.
That was my intent, that we are cognizant of the second element
and we are thinking, together with the Iraqi Government, what
to do about it. We are considering options if Iran persists.
Senator Chafee. You led off that answer by saying there are
some positive elements of the relationship between Iran and the
Government of Iraq.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I agree with that. As I said, it is a
two-track approach and I was referring to the second track.
Senator Chafee. Are we working to--on the first track--to
make that stronger?
Ambassador Khalilzad. As you know, we did make an offer
earlier on, to talk to the Iranians about the situation in Iraq
and to have the opportunity to express our concerns with regard
to the second track and to also express to them that we do not
seek a hostile relationship between Iran and Iraq. They are
neighbors. We want a good relationship between neighboring
states in that region. Our goal has been an Iraq that set peace
internally and in terms of the region, unlike Saddam, who went
to war against Iran at a huge cost to both countries and Kuwait
was a source of huge insecurity for the region. That is not the
goal. Our goal is an Iraq that is both internally secure and
has peaceful relations with its neighbors. For various reasons
in terms of timing, those discussions did not take place. Now
the focus is clearly in terms of a dialog with Iran on the
nuclear issue and we'll see how things evolve from here
forward. But I would not rule out that--and there are
appropriate circumstances that we will go back to an engagement
on the Iraqi situation.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for all your
service.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Chafee.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Thank
you for your service. As I said when I supported you when you
came before this committee, I also thanked your family at that
time and I continue to do that. My trip to Iraq was a harrowing
experience and fortunately, there was no particular incident.
So you are facing this uncertainty every minute when you are
there and I just want to say thank you for your service.
During your confirmation hearing, you expressed confidence
that Irag's sectarian divisions could be overcome and you still
exhibit that confidence. At your confirmation hearing, you
said, ``there is a lot to build on to foster a focus on a
united Iraq, an Iraq that brings the Iraqi people together
rather than splits them apart based on ethnicity and
sectarianism.'' Now, since you made that statement, incidents
of sectarian violence have risen from 5 per month to 250 per
month and you questioned the database. I'll put it in the
record, Mr. Chairman, this is the Brookings Institution so this
is solid data.
The Chairman. It is placed in the record.
[The Brookings Institution information submitted by Senator
Boxer follows:]
THE STATE OF IRAQ: AN UPDATE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Categories May 2003 May 2004 May 2005 May 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq civilian deaths.................................... 250 1,000 1,000 1,500
Multifatality bombings.................................. 0 9 36 56
Iraqis kidnapped per day................................ 2 10 25 35
Iraqis optimistic about future (percent)................ 75 51 60 30
Iraqi police officers and soldiers in top two readiness 0 0 20,000 60,000
tiers (out of four)....................................
U.S. troop fatalities................................... 37 80 77 68
Other foreign troop fatalities.......................... 4 4 8 10
Iraqi Army and police fatalities........................ 10 65 259 149
U.S./other coalition troops (in thousands).............. 150/23 138/24 138/23 132/20
Estimated number of insurgents.......................... 3,000 15,000 16,000 20,000
Estimated number of foreign fighters.................... 100 500 1,000 1,500
Daily attacks by insurgents............................. 5 53 70 90
Monthly incidents of sectarian violence................. 5 10 20 250
Monthly attacks on oil and gas assets................... 5 7 10 3
Oil production (millions of barrels per day; prewar: 0.3 1.9 2.1 2.1
2.5)...................................................
Household fuel supplies (as percentage of estimated 10 73 93 83
need; gasoline, kerosine, etc.)........................
Average electric power from official grid (in megawatts; 500 3,900 3,700 3,800
prewar: 4,000).........................................
Telephone subscribers (in millions; prewar: 0.8)........ 0.8 1.2 3.5 7.5
Real GDP per capita (in dollars; prewar: 900)........... 550 1,000 1,075 1,100
Eligible Iraqis voting freely in last election (percent) 0 0 58 77
Actionable intelligence tips from Iraqi civilians....... 100 300 1,700 4,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Boxer. Just yesterday, a gunman abducted two dozen
Shiites from a bus station northeast of Baghdad, took them to a
nearby village and killed most of them. According to the French
press, they were blindfolded and shot with their hands tied
behind them. This latest tragedy comes just days after masked
Shiite militiamen stormed through Baghdad, killing more than 40
Sunnis.
Now last month, a cable was sent from your Embassy in
Baghdad--it had your name on it, doesn't mean you wrote it--it
had your name on it and it was printed in the American press.
It is titled, ``Snapshots From the Office, Public Affairs Staff
Show Strains of Social Discord.'' This cable describes how life
has deteriorated for Iraqi nationals who work for you at the
Embassy. I want to read just a few passages. ``An Arab
newspaper editor told us he is preparing an extensive survey of
ethnic cleansing, which he said is taking place in almost every
Iraqi province, as political parties and their militias are
seemingly engaged in tit-for-tat reprisals all over Iraq.''
Continuing to quote this cable, ``two of our three female
employees report stepped-up harassment beginning in mid-May.
Some groups are pushing women to cover even their face, a step
not taken in Iran, even at its most conservative.'' Continuing
the cable, ``personal safety depends on good relations with the
neighborhood governments who barricade streets and ward off
outsiders. The central government is not relevant. Even local
Leuchars have been displaced or coopted by militias. People no
longer trust most neighbors.''
So this is a very sickening report from the people who work
for you. But even as the situation in Iraq worsens, the
administration continually refuses to acknowledge the reality
and let me give you an example, Mr. Ambassador, and I want to
thank Senator Feingold for allowing me to precede him. I want
to just show this very interesting juxtaposition of stories in
yesterday's Post. Page A-10 contained the following
descriptions of the views you expressed in a speech at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, just 2 days
ago. You said, Sunnis generally--and you've said this today--
have undergone a tectonic shift in their views about the new
government and are increasingly turning away from the
insurgency. Many are now considering the pursuit of their goals
by means other than violence. But three columns away, in a
separate article on Iraq, you are directly refuted by a Sunni
legislator. I mean, you're saying the Sunnis have this great
shift. This is what the Sunni legislator says and I'm reading
from the story: Saleh al-Mutlak, a leading Sunni legislator,
said the sectarian rivalries are tearing apart the 7-week-old
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. ``This is a
hopeless government. It has not done one good thing since it
started and things are getting worse, not better,'' he said.
``The Parliament cannot reach practical solutions because their
minds are concerned only with their sect and not the interests
of the nation. It looks like this government is going to
collapse very soon.'' A Shiite legislator in the same article
say, ``Certainly what is happening is the start of a civil
war.''
And so how do you square your far rosier view with these
Iraqis? I want to say, who should the American people believe?
Let me tell you what my constituents believe, for the most
part. Not all, but a strong majority. They think we ought to
have a timetable to get out. We won the war. Our soldiers won
the war. Everything they were asked to do they did, and now it
is up to the Iraqi people. That's what they think. I don't
know, you come here with a rosy view and by the way, you're the
best of them. You're the most direct of them. But you come here
with a far rosier view than the Iraqis, than the legislators,
who Senator Kerry quoted, and I'm quoting, and then let's look
at what the Iraqi people think. Again, the Brookings
Institution, only 30 percent of them are now optimistic, where
a couple of years ago, 70 percent of them were optimistic.
So how do you square your view and who should the people in
America believe? They're smart. Should they believe this
administration that went into this war without a plan and is
struggling every day to figure out another mission or should
they believe the Iraqi people? By the way, a vast majority say
that things will get better if there is a timetable for
America's withdrawal.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Senator, I have tried to level with
the American people and with the Congress. I call it as I see
it. Sometimes it gets me in trouble with people I work for. But
the situation is as I described. There could be, obviously,
honorable differences of view, an honest difference of view in
terms of the assessment. I don't rule that out. My judgment is,
as I've said in CSIS speeches, I said today, that sectarianism
has become the dominant problem. But at the same time, the fact
of the unity government, the fact that Sunnis were not in the
political process a year ago, did not vote in that election,
now, they've voted in the last election, as proportional to
their numbers or negotiated with the government, a program to
which they agree, a key part of which was a reconciliation,
which the government has taken. I believe to these successes
that terrorists have adapted, Senator Boxer, by focusing more
on sectarian conflict. Sectarian conflict is a faultline that
is being exploited.
Senator Boxer. Let me just stop you here, if I can.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Let me say, let me say something on
Mr. Mutlak. Mr. Mutlak is an opposition politician and we know
about politics when you are in the opposition. He is not part
of the government so I am not surprised by an opposition
politician judging the government the way he did.
Senator Boxer. OK, are you surprised by the fact that 87
percent of the Iraqi people want to see us have a timeline? Are
you surprised about that?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that the vast majority of
the Iraqi people would like the American coalition forces to
leave. But the vast majority of the Iraqi people also do not
want the United States to leave immediately.
Senator Boxer. OK, well, we're not talking about--we're
talking about a timetable, which is a big issue around this
place and 87 percent say things will get better if there is a
timetable put out. Let me, because my time is up and I've
talked to the chairman. I promised him. I will just ask one
more quick question here because I've written two letters to
Secretary Rumsfeld, asking for a plan in the event of a full
scale civil war. Now, the Pentagon has not provided that plan
and instead refers me to the so-called National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq. On Tuesday, the GAO called the Bush
administration's Iraq strategy inadequate and poorly planned.
Now we've seen your cable, which I am sure you didn't write but
had your name on it.
Ambassador Khalilzad. No, no, I stand behind that cable.
Senator Boxer. That's fine. The cable in which----
Ambassador Khalilzad. I salute the courage of the Iraqis
who work with us in the difficult circumstances. They come
every day to the Embassy and work.
Senator Boxer. I agree. They are very weary.
Ambassador Khalilzad. That cable was a factual cable that I
stand behind.
Senator Boxer. Well, I so appreciate that because that
cable tells a story that the American people aren't hearing
about what it is really like. But in that cable, a few of your
Iraqi staff members asked what provisions would be made for
them if you had to evacuate. So your Iraqi staff clearly
believes a full scale civil war is a real possibility. So what
I want to ask you is this: Since you have said we are not going
to stay where we're not wanted--you've said that--since 87
percent of the people in Iraqi want to see a plan for
withdrawal, I'll tell you--and since your own people are
saying, what are we going to do if there is full-scale civil
war? Since you said there is a tectonic shift in the views in
sight of the Sunnis and the leading Sunni legislator says it is
a hopeless situation, will you please, for me, send me
something that explains what are our contingencies if there is
a full-blown civil war, because Rumsfeld won't get it to me.
They send me on a journey through some plan that the GAO says
is inadequate. Will you let me know? You don't have to answer
it now. What are our plans for a contingency if there is a
full-blown civil war or however you want to phrase it, call it?
Ambassador Khalilzad. We are doing everything we can with
the Iraqi Government, Senator Boxer, to prevent a civil war, to
bring sectarian violence down. I have talked about that.
Senator Boxer. I'm not asking you that. I believe that so
much. My question is, Will you send me what your contingency
plans are? Your own staff is saying, what are the contingency
plans and while we're at it, will you also give me your
assurance that our military will not be handed over to the
Iraqi Government to face any type of trial, because these are
people who have already said they are going to give--they are
considering amnesty for those who cut off the heads of our
soldiers. I'm not turning a soldier over to them. I assume you
agree with that.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Sustained ethno-sectarian violence is
the greatest threat to security and stability in Iraq. The
violence in Iraq is terrible and regrettable, but it is not a
civil war. The United States is doing all it can to support the
Iraqi Government's initiatives to reduce the violence. This
support is wide-ranging, from military support such as for the
Iraqi-led and Coalition Forces-supported Baghdad Security Plan,
to assistance for reconstruction and to improve essential
services, to political encouragement of PM Maliki's national
reconciliation efforts and the deepening of democracy and the
rule of law.
All Department of State overseas facilities maintain a
post-specific emergency action plan detailing the planned
responses to a wide range of emergency situations. An
evacuation plan is a standard chapter within these emergency
action plans. U.S. Embassy Baghdad maintains such an emergency
action plan. Those aspects of the emergency action plan that
deal with our contingency plans under various levels of
violence are classified. As such, I am not in a position to
discuss this in an open session. I can assure you, however that
we are working hard to avoid a situation in which we would need
to implement such a plan.
Senator Boxer. I would like a more detailed answer. That's
not a good enough answer for me. Could you give me an answer in
writing on this, how you feel about turning our soldiers over--
--
Ambassador Khalilzad. Under the existing framework, U.S.
forces are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, consistent with longstanding U.S. policy of maximizing
U.S. jurisdiction over our forces abroad. As issues have
arisen, we have worked with the Prime Minister to address his
concerns and we will continue to do so. I know that General
Casey is absolutely committed to his forces acting
appropriately. Any allegations of unethical or criminal
behavior will be investigated and any servicemembers found to
have committed violations will be held accountable. If the
Prime Minister wants to know about particular cases, we are
certainly open to discussions on that.
We're not going to turn our soldiers over to the Iraqis. I
would like to give that answer very clearly.
Senator Boxer. That is a good, clear answer and you're
going to send me something about----
Ambassador Khalilzad. I will talk about the amnesty issue
but turning over--certainly we will not turn over American
soldiers. We have an agreement with Iraq on this issue, under
the U.N. resolution, under the rules put in place by CPA.
Senator Boxer. But the Prime Minister wants to take another
look at that agreement.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Oh, we will. We are perfectly willing
to discuss with the Prime Minister his concerns about the
issue. If he believes that the American soldiers who violated
the law, the Law of War, policy and rules of the United States,
that they will go Scot free, he is wrong. They are prosecuted.
The law is applied. If he wants to know what rule Iraqis can
plan for in terms of getting informed about the different
stages of particular cases, we certainly are open to a dialog
and suggestions with him on that. But with regard to the
turning over of the American soldiers to the Iraqis; no.
Senator Boxer. OK.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador, for coming to testify in front of the committee. I
know you are really busy and I hope that you know that all of
us appreciate the incredibly hard work that you and the men and
women who work with you are doing in Iraq. My colleagues have
already discussed a range of important issues and I won't take
a lot of time but I do want to talk about what has obviously
become one of the largest questions we are facing in Iraq
today: How long U.S. forces will remain there. Unfortunately,
we can't get this administration to clarify for the American
people about when our troops will come home and as Senator
Boxer just alluded to, a new GAO study released this week
points out that the President's National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq, and I quote, ``neither fully addresses how U.S. goals
and objectives will be integrated with those of the Iraqi
Government and the international community, nor does it detail
the Iraqi Government's anticipated contribution to its future
security and reconstruction needs.''
I think the American people have every reason to feel
misled and angry and worried about the fact that we've lost
over 2,500 brave service men and women and hundreds of billions
of dollars and we don't have any real clarity about when we'll
bring our troops home. Instead, we have a seemingly unlimited
troop presence in Iraq without any real benchmarks or timeline
for ending the military mission. Now, I think that hurts our
national security and apparently, it isn't really contributing
to stability in Iraq.
So I want to focus on two specific issues today, the role
of the United States military in Iraq now and in the future and
our strategy for helping Iraq complete all of the tough
political, economic, and security-related issues that it is
currently undertaking. But again, I do want you to know that I
appreciate and value the very hard work and the very difficult
job you have.
Reiterating what Senator Kerry was talking about, giving
your best estimate, Mr. Ambassador, can you tell us when you
believe, as our lead diplomat and Chief of Mission Iraq that a
majority of U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq?
Ambassador Khalilzad. As I said before, Senator, when I get
back, there will be a joint group formed between us and the
Iraqis to discuss a way forward in terms of drawdown of U.S.
forces that are dependent on conditions. We have an elected
Iraqi Government that is a unity government. We want Iraq to
succeed, to stand on its own feet. We do not want the country
to disintegrate into a sectarian civil war that will bring
other countries in. So, we want Iraq to stand on its feet as
soon as possible, as I've said. So I don't think it is
appropriate, before we have started discussions with the
Iraqis, for me here, to talk about a timeline that you are
asking for. Besides, the President has said that he looks to
General Casey to develop those plans, based on discussions that
myself and General Casey will have with the Iraqis and to
present it to him. I think it would be premature for me at this
point, to----
Senator Feingold. Although General Casey is already
developing such plans, as you admitted.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I said there are different plans and
these plans have not been discussed with the Iraqi Government.
Senator Feingold. But he has developed and presented such
plans, whether or not----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Not to the Iraqi Government.
Senator Feingold. But to the administration.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Not to the--I think to some, perhaps,
people in the Pentagon, but not to the----
Senator Feingold. That is--the Assembly is part of the
administration.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I would describe what he did was a
working document.
Senator Feingold. Fair enough. But there are plans being
discussed and developed, at least in some parts of our
government.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Feingold. Let me shift to General Dempsey's, who is
the head of training Iraqi forces, recent comments. The New
York Times quoted the general a few weeks ago as saying that
the Iraqi Army would be, by the end of the year, ``fully
capable of recruiting, vetting, inducting, training, forming
the units, putting them in barracks, sending them out to the
gate to perform their missions.'' You two have talked about the
fact that by the end of this summer, the Iraqi Army battalions
and brigades will be leading counterinsurgency operations with
the coalition playing only mentoring and supporting roles. You
also said that by the end of this year, they will be in the
lead. Given this confidence in the Iraqi security forces and
the President's standup and standdown strategy, what will the
remaining United States forces in Iraq be doing there? And how
long will it be before the administration articulates a clear
vision for when our troops will come home from those functions,
which presumably are going to be different from the functions
they have now?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that with the completion of
the numbers of the Iraqi Army, there will still be the
challenge of helping Iraqis develop their own sustained manned
and logistic capabilities, their own fire power, because
currently, when they are in the lead, they still need U.S.
support. So, I have said repeatedly that the current size, the
current mission, the current composition of the forces are not
ends in themselves for us. It is for the Iraqis to be able to
do the job by themselves with minimal United States support.
That is the goal.
Senator Feingold. Well, I understand that but given the
fact that these statements here, yours, as well as General
Dempsey's, do suggest a----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes; but if I could finish that
answer because I was going to answer your question, which is
with regard to the police, that is well behind compared to the
army, in terms of doing the job. It will require adjustments in
terms of vetting, in terms of reform of the ministry for the
police to rise to the level in terms of effectiveness as the
army. That will take time. And, of course, what happens with
security also depends on the circumstances, what the other side
is doing. Therefore, we will pull all of this together----
Senator Feingold. Well, sure----
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. Senator, if I could
finish.
Senator Feingold. Well, my time is running out and I want
to be able to say something else.
Ambassador Khalilzad. We will pull all of this together in
discussions with the Iraqi Government and come up with a way
forward that will be presented to the President.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, I can understand that
argument that when one of the major tasks is largely completed,
which this seems to talk about, the Iraqi security forces,
there are still issues with regard to the police. Nonetheless,
the notion that there isn't a substantial opportunity to
drawdown troops between now and the end of the year, if, in
fact, this is true, doesn't make sense to me. To justify what
130,000 troops still being there, just for that function, to
me, doesn't quite add up with regard to the present standup and
standdown strategy. If that major task is largely completed, we
should be able to bring home a whole lot of the troops.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I do not rule out the possibility
that the circumstances could develop that would allow for some
diminution, but it would be a mistake to talk about specific
numbers at this time without, as I said, taking the conditions
into account and discussions with the Iraqi Government into
account.
Senator Feingold. OK. You've suggested this week that you,
``do believe that if one stays too long, we also add to the
difficulties.'' Could you say a little bit about what you mean
by that?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you for that, Senator. I think
I mentioned before that there is an agreement in Iraq that the
ultimate withdrawal of United States and coalition troops is
desirable. But at the same time, there is a concern that if we
leave too soon, that this could add to the problems of Iraq.
Therefore, the challenge that we face is the right calibration
of when is it too long, when is it too soon?
Senator Feingold. I understand, but what is the problem if
we stay too long? I want you to talk about--what are the
downsides of staying too long?
Ambassador Khalilzad. The downside of staying too long
would be that we increase opposition to us that will give
people a sense that we are seeking to occupy the country, and
that we will run into difficulties. More difficulties not only
politically in terms of our dealing with the government, but
also with the people. There are clearly downsides to staying
too long. But I want to urge you, the other Senators and the
American people, that to leave too soon will be a strategic
mistake and morally wrong.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, my time is up but I've had
good conversation with the Ambassador here and in Afghanistan
and in Iraq, of all of these issues. I just want to
respectfully submit--I think we've already reached the point
where we have been there too long, that the difficulties that
are associated with being there too long have outweighed the
benefits in terms of the military, so I understand you need to
calibrate it. I'm suggesting the calibration can be done now
and that the weight is on the side of the difficulties and the
downside. But I respect you and I look forward to working with
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador,
thank you for your service. Continuing the discussion, my
questions will begin by being--how does an American citizen
measure what you call tactical patience? Following Senator
Feingold's comments, how do we measure tactical patience in
Iraq, both in terms of what we might call nation-building and
in terms of constitutional development?
Earnest May, who is a professor at the Harvard School of
Government, once wrote a book. I think it is called, ``Thinking
in Time,'' where he urged those of us in policy positions to
think, to look at history and see what lessons we learn from
there.
Senator Hagel mentioned earlier the length of World War II.
He mentioned the length of the Korean war. But if we are
accurately thinking in time about nation-building, would that
be the correct measure? I mean, wouldn't we--we're past the
idea of the war in Iraq. We're at a point where a nation is
being built. You're calling it a new nation. The United States
of America was once called the First New Nation. So what
lessons do we have there?
Some of the ones I think of in terms of nation-building, we
may be approaching the time of World War II but we're not close
to the time of our involvement after World War II in Japan. I
mean, we've had U.S. troops there since 1945. The occupation of
Japan ended 7 years after the war. We've had troops in Germany
since 1945. West Germany wasn't set up until 4 years after the
war, fully sovereign in 1955. In Kosovo, United States troops
have been there now for 7 years. So that's one way to measure
tactical patience for nation-building. In terms of
constitutional development, Iraq, you say, is a new nation. If
America was the first new nation, our Constitution came 11
years after our Declaration of Independence. Giving women the
right to vote came 120 years after our Constitution. We still--
we're denying equal opportunity to African-Americans 180 years
after our Constitution. So as we Senators and we citizens sit
here in the United States looking at Iraq in a period of
nation-building, what is the measure of tactical patience?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator Alexander. I
believe that the issues that we face are state-building,
nation-building, and fighting terror. Those are the three
things that we are doing in Iraq. With regard to nation-
building, the key issue, in my judgment, is constitutional
agreement; we still have a set of issues left that have to be
addressed. Second, there has to be the issue of what happens
with the de-Baathification, because in the aftermath of the
liberation of Iraq, the party was outlawed and a commission was
established to look at people who were candidates for jobs or
were in the government that could not hold positions. It has
become a controversial issue that needs some closure on that.
There are issues also, which gets into state- and nation-
building, which covers both--that is building new institutions
of the state: The police who are truly credible and respected
and we know from our own experience how difficult and
complicated that can be, and the institution of the army. But
the war of terror, of course, element is a separate track,
related because they are seeking to undermine our state- and
nation-building efforts. There, in my judgment, the process
overall will take time to do, as you say. You can't do these
important things in 2, 3 years. But it doesn't have to be--the
mix of instruments that we apply to it will not be the same. I
think, assuming if things move in the direction that we're
working for, it will allow for a significant diminution in the
role of the military, not a complete elimination of the role of
the military, but allow for an increase relatively and other
instruments of our policy, to cope with the situation, to
encourage a successful state- and nation-building program and
defeating terror in Iraq. So you're right that the war model,
in terms of a timeline, is not the right model for what we are
doing: A state/nation-building and a war of terror model needs
to be applied in this case.
Senator Alexander. My other question is, it's been
suggested that maybe a solution is a federation, three states,
Kurdistan, a Shia state, a Sunni state. If that were to happen,
what would the consequences be?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, the Constitution allows for
Iraqis to organize themselves the way they see fit, but I think
it would be a mistake for us, for the United States, to say and
impose that on them. I think the process for imposing such an
outcome on Iraq will cause huge difficulties, intensifing
sectarian violence. But if democratically and voluntarily, they
want to federalize the rest of Iraq in that way, that is
available to them constitutionally. But that's not what they
want at the present time, the Sunni Arabs. Generally, they want
a stronger central government at this point, thinking the
problem is not too strong a central government but too weak a
central government. The assumption using the same argument
saying: Well, since the center is preoccupied with issues of
security, let's allow the providences and the regions to do
more things for themselves. These are perfectly legitimate big
issues that the Iraqis need to come to an agreement on, and
they have agreed, thank goodness, for a path to deal with this,
for resolving this issue in the agreement at the end of the
drafting of the constitution. I think we ought to be supporting
a constitutional process, rather than kind of suggesting that
we divide the country along sectarian lines.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Alexander.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador,
it's good to see you. What message do you want to send to
Tehran about their involvement in Iraq?
Ambassador Khalilzad. The message has two parts. Part one
is that we favor good relations between Iraq and all its
neighbors. The United States is not seeking to impose its
differences with Iran on the Iraqis in terms of dealing with
Iran. The second part of the message, however, is that Iranian
efforts to undermine this new Iraq by sending arms, training
militias and extremists, by sending money to them, to keep Iraq
weak so that Iraq will not be able to play the traditional
balancing role vis-a-vis Iran as a significant power in its own
right, is unacceptable to the Iraqi Government and to us. We
are looking for, and the Iraqi Government also is, for an
adjustment in Iranian policy. And if that adjustment doesn't
come as a--to Iraqis and those of us who are supporting Iraq
will look at measures to be able to deal with that challenge,
by the second element of the Iranian policy.
Senator Nelson. Earlier today in this hearing, you
suggested that some of this Iranian influence was with the
direct approval of the Government of Iran. To what extent are
Iranian groups, independent of the Iranian Government,
operating in Iraq?
Ambassador Khalilzad. There are things I can speak about
with confidence, that I believe the Iranian Government does
directly bear a responsibility for when its particular forces,
such as the Quds Force, does things. There are things where, of
course, information is contradictory and this is not an
appropriate forum to get into that, but I think there are
things that I am pretty confident that has direct Iranian
Government involvement, that are disturbing.
Senator Nelson. Because of that you consistently lobbied
for limited talks between the United States and Tehran
concerning Iraq and in March were granted the authority to
undertake those talks. How did that come about, and what were
the results?
Ambassador Khalilzad. You know, Senator, prior to my
assignment in Baghdad, I was the U.S. Ambassador to Kabul, to
Afghanistan. I had been involved in the process in Bonn, to set
up the Afghanistan Government. At that time, I had been given
the authority to engage the Iranians on the issue of
Afghanistan. When I moved to Baghdad, I asked for similar
authority in Iraq and the President granted me that authority.
Based on that, we talked about the possibility of some meetings
with them. Because of various reasons, those meetings have not
taken place yet and now the focus is clearly on the nuclear
issue. I think at an appropriate time, if it is warranted, we
would be, of course, willing to engage them on our concerns on
the issues related to Iraq.
Senator Nelson. To what extent do you think that Iran may
now be exacting revenge on Iraq for the Iran-Iraq war?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that there is a desire on
the part of the Iranians that is motivated by two things. One
is the war that you talked about, to make sure Iraq doesn't
become a power that can pose that sort of a challenge to Iran.
But at the same time, I think what Iran is doing is motivated
by ambition, which Iran is seeking and it believes that it is
its natural right to be the preeminent power in that region. It
sees itself as a power on the rise and, therefore, wants Iraq
not to reemerge as a balancer, as a strong country in its own
right and it also fears the rise of a kind of an independent
Shia center of gravity, if you like, in Iraq--and Iraq is an
older Shia community than Iran. So, yes; I think there is a
history of the war that forms their views, their policies but
also ambition is as well.
Senator Nelson. I want to keep the name of Captain Scott
Speicher in the front and center of your mind as we continue to
look for some evidence that will help that family bring long
overdue closure to this tragedy. Finally, as you know, the
United States Senate approved, with approximately 70 votes, a
resolution stating that there should be no amnesty granted to
Iraqis who have killed Americans. As the Iraqi Government is
considering a plan for reconciliation, I would like you to
remember that, and I would appreciate any comments that you
have regarding this.
Ambassador Khalilzad. First of all, Senator, thank you for
your concern with regard to Captain Speicher. I got your letter
a while back and I have been cognizant of his case since I was
in a panic during the gulf war. General Casey and his people
are doing everything they can with regard to Captain Speicher.
I have communicated your concern to him. Second, with regard to
the amnesty issue, I think the vote, if I'm not mistaken, a
reaction to some ideas or comments expressed by some Iraqi
leaders that if someone has killed an American, he could
receive amnesty but if has killed an Iraqi, he will not or he
would not. While I believe that to end the war in Iraq, as all
other wars, amnesty is a part of the package of things that
need to be done. But I can assure that there will not be a
discrimination against those who have sacrificed their lives to
liberate Iraq and give Iraqis the opportunity that they have. I
also recognize, however, that the biggest homage that could be
paid to the brave American soldiers who sacrificed in Iraq
would be for the cause that they fought for to be embraced by
those who fought that cause. You can rest assured that will be
firm and that there will be no discrimination against the
American men and women who gave their lives and sacrificed for
Iraq.
Senator Nelson. These forums allow us to remind the
executive branch of the sense of the Senate.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, it
is good to see you again. I know that you've already been
bombarded with questions and I apologize, I wasn't here for the
whole hearing, so some of my questions may be repetitive.
I really want to focus on the political situation and its
connection to security, because I think the basic premise of
the administration's strategy for the last several years and
certainly when I spoke to you in Baghdad, was the central part
of your strategy. Was that as the political situation clarifies
and stabilizes, the insurgents will become more isolated? There
will be trust built between the various religious sects and
ethnic groups within Iraq and based on that political victory,
the military needs will lessen.
Now, I am one who has held off a--despite having the
feeling that it was a mistake for us to go in and that the
American people would not have signed up for the ambitious
project that you've just outlined at this hearing, I've been
wanting to say, now that we're in, let's see if we can make it
work. So I was heartened when we had Prime Minister Maliki and
the appointment of the Interior Minister and the Defense
Minister. What I am concerned about is that it seems as if the
steps that you had outlined, politically, have taken place and
there has not been a corresponding lessoning of violence. In
fact, there has been a continuing escalation of violence. I
think anybody who heard the news a couple of days ago where
militia members were randomly pulling people off the streets,
checking their IDs and executing them, would not say that the
security situation has improved. You've got Prime Minister
Maliki declaring a state of emergency in Baghdad. Sectarian
violence gets worse. You've got the Prime Minister visiting
Basra, saying we're going to initiate a government crackdown.
No improvement.
I guess my question is two-fold. One, at what point do we
actually see improvements on the security situation as a
consequence of the political steps that have been taken or have
we reached a point now where there is such a disconnect
between--and such a lack of confidence in the central
government, that no matter what the Prime Minister is doing or
the Defense Minister is doing or Interior Minister is doing,
that the violence has taken a life on its own. If that's the
case, then what plan--I don't know what plan we're on now--Plan
F or G. You know, what's the next plan?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Senator, thank you for a very
thoughtful question. I believe that the steps we have taken
politically were necessary steps to deal with the violence
issue. You couldn't deal with the violence issues successfully,
couldn't place yourself strategically to deal with the violence
without having the political progress that had to take place--
with the Sunni Arab community accepting to play its role in the
political process. The question is, there is no doubt that--
well, let's just say it hasn't been sufficient, as you say
correctly and others have adapted to this, particularly the
terrorists, by focusing, extenuating the sectarian faultline
that was there, to exploiting it. Since they have adjusted to
our strategy, which was to bring people together, they are
trying to push a button, work on an issue that can keep us from
succeeding. I believe that I outlined in my statement, steps
that need to be taken politically and securitywise, to deal
with the sectarian violence issue to bring it under control.
And I believe those are issues having to do with militias, with
the insurgency and bringing those two elements that are
principally responsible, besides terrorists, to this violence
increasing end of control. The reform of the Ministry of
Interior, which we talked about when you were there, I think we
now have a Minister that we can work with to reform the
Ministry. There are instances in which the militia gets support
from elements in the Interior of Ministry when they are
involved in sectarian violence, so we have to deal with those.
Those are difficult issues of state- and nation-building that
we've talked about earlier. But I believe that this government,
has 6 months or so, to bring the sectarian violence under
control and if it doesn't, then I think we would have a serious
situation because now, politically, you have the forces, all
the key forces in the government. So if the people come to view
that this government cannot deal with it, then there will be a
serious issue.
Senator Obama. Can I focus on that point? I've always found
you to be very open and thoughtful and all of us feel that
you've made an enormous contribution with your presence there,
so I hate to get you in trouble. But I'm going to try to pin
you down on what you said. If this government has not
significantly reduced sectarian violence in about 6 months,
then we've got real problems. Right? If I'm hearing this
correctly, what I'm hearing you say is that at that point, the
Iraqi people will have the confidence and the central
government will have eroded to the point where its not clear
what we do now. I guess the question then becomes, what do we
do then? Because you may be back here in 6 months and I'm going
to feel bad when I read back this transcript and say, 6 months
is up and the sectarian violence continues. So at that point,
how do you respond to Senators Kerry or Feingold when they say,
OK, look, at some point, we have to cut out losses here. This
thing is not working and something entirely different is going
to have to be tried that does not involve this sort of--I was a
little worried when Senator Alexander mentioned us being in
Japan for 45 years and Germany--as far as I know, we weren't
spending $100 billion a year during that 50-year period. Why
don't you respond to what I think was a fairly open-ended
question? Take it where you will.
Ambassador Khalilzad. What I would like to say, Senator, is
that we have to work with the Iraqi Government in the course of
the next 6 months to bring the sectarian violence under
control, to encourage them to do the steps that are necessary,
both on the political and on the security track, and we will
need to help them on the security track to bring it under
control. I do not believe that one can table in but I think to
reverse the trajectory----
Senator Obama. I'm saying there is measurable improvement
that people can see.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Exactly. I think this is a challenge
for the government and I have explained it to the Prime
Minister and I'm sure when he comes here, you and other leaders
of our country will have an opportunity also to speak with him.
But this is very important, in my view, that progress is made
on this issue, and I think given there is a new government,
that the permanent impression that it will make is very
important to all the people. I think they are moving in the
right direction. I'm encouraged by the steps that he has taken
but more needs to be done and concretely, and we need to help
them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama. Let the
Chair mention that we're going to have a vote, as I understand
it, at noon. The Ambassador needs to leave at about noon. We
have two Senators still to be heard. So I'm going to call upon
Senator Coleman, and if he could be helpful and give Senator
Dodd a moment or two, that would be helpful.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, permit me to inquire, is it
appropriate for us to be able to--I'd like to ask unanimous
consent that we can submit some questions we're not going to
get to the Ambassador.
The Chairman. That's an excellent suggestion. The Senators
should do that and hopefully the Ambassador can respond
properly.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Ambassador, first, like every one of
my colleagues, thank you for what you are doing. You are an
extraordinary leader in extraordinarily difficult circumstances
and your efforts and talents are greatly appreciated. So it is
just very important to articulate that again. Talk a little bit
about corruption. The stories about corruption regarding oil
supplies at a massive, massive level and perhaps tying some of
that in to fueling the insurgency. I was going to ask you the
overall question about what is funding the insurgency. You can
kind of have that in the back of your mind, but where are we at
in terms of getting a handle on corruption? Is there a sense of
the rule of law in Iraq? If we don't settle those things, then
in the end, we're going to be faced with huge problems in
addition to all the security issues.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Corruption is a big problem. In part,
it is because of the subsidy system that exists, which
motivates and provides opportunities for people to make money
exploiting the different market prices and what subsidized
prices are. The government is moving to reduce subsidies with
regard to fuel. I think they have taken some courageous
decisions in that regard. I am very encouraged by that, moving
toward a free market, market prices that will help. But also,
it is important that the institutions monitoring and responding
to corruption and government is strengthened. They have those
institutions. They need to be strengthened. I mean, courage by
the Prime Ministers, their stand on this is very strong, very
firm, and I am encouraged by the Minister of Oil's stand with
regard to this issue. Yesterday, the Prime Minister went to the
assembly and described that he could report to the assembly
names of people who were under investigation for charges of
corruption. As to the financing of the insurgency, I think I
can say that it is multiple sources. Some money comes from
outside, in my view. I can't go into too much detail in this
forum, but also from smuggling and from some of the hostage
taking. Those are also sources of money for the insurgents.
Senator Coleman. I was just told that we have a full and
firm commitment that if you can cut off the economic support,
that you have somewhat of a chance of slowing down the veracity
of the effort. Since there is limited time, Mr. Chairman, I
will yield the rest of my time back for my colleague from
Connecticut.
The Chairman. I appreciate the thoughtfulness, Senator.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, I, too, appreciate the thoughtfulness.
Thank you, Senator. I apologize to you, Mr. Chairman, and to
you, Mr. Ambassador. The timing was not perfect this morning. I
had an amendment they asked me to offer on the floor of the
U.S. Senate dealing with homeland security issues so I
apologize not being here at the outset to hear your remarks.
And I apologize to the chairman and Senator Biden as well, for
not being here earlier. Thank you for your presence and again,
thank you for your dedication and your work. I want you to
understand here, I think all of us probably feel that whatever
criticisms we have are not focused on you, specifically. There
is a huge task you have and I have great respect for the
efforts you make.
I'm going to focus on two quick questions, if I can.
Picking up on some of the things I'm told that you raised
earlier, one has to do with the issue of your suggestion. I
think it was made in a speech. You may have made it as part of
the response to a question here today, of increasing the U.S.
force strength around Baghdad, from 40,000 to 55,000 troops.
Let me make two points here if I can. One is about a year ago,
Senator Reid of Rhode Island and myself were in Baghdad meeting
with U.S. military commanders and one of the points that was
made about a year ago was that there was a very good likelihood
that the city of Baghdad could be policed effectively by Iraqi
forces. We are now told--I think the numbers--my colleagues
will correct me here or you will--are some 265,000 Iraqis are
in uniform and trained to one degree or another.
Let me pose the question to you by referring to a cable
that was reported in the Washington Post, that you sent to the
Secretary of State, which you point out here that we--
describing the difficulties of our employees at the U.S.
Embassy. We cannot call employees in on weekends or holidays
without blowing their cover. Likewise, they have been
unavailable during multiple security closures imposed by the
government since February. A Sunni Arab female employee tells
us that her family pressures, the inability to share details of
her employment, is very tough. Mounting criticism of the United
States at home among her family members also makes her life
difficult. She told us that in mid-June, that most of her
family believed the United States, which is widely perceived as
fully controlling the country, is punishing populations as
Saddam did but with Sunnis and very poor Shiites now at the
bottom of the list. My point and the question to you is, if, in
fact, you are making, you are reporting this kind of a problem
that exists, why in the world would we be suggesting at this
juncture to increase the presence of U.S. soldiers there when
our own military people a year ago felt that the Iraqi forces
would be able to handle Baghdad and wouldn't it be wiser for
them to take over that responsibility, rather than increasing
the U.S. presence, if, in fact, this woman is correct in her
perception?
Ambassador Khalilzad. First answer, thank you for what you
said about me. With regard to the increasing forces in Baghdad,
I think it is very important that Baghdad, which is now the
scene of the sectarian violence, the focal point of the
struggle--sectarian struggle that terrorists are encouraging
and exploiting. Together with Iraqis, the plan that was
developed has not produced the results that we were
anticipating. That plan is being adjusted. As to what specific
measures should be taken in terms of additional U.S. forces
there, I have not made any public statement or recommendations
on that account. This is something that General Casey has a
responsibility for, if there are adjustments to be made with
regard to our force presence there.
Senator Dodd. What is your view? You're correct. I
misspoke. I said you and it is General Casey.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Dodd. But do you disagree with General Casey about
that?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I defer to General Casey, of
course, on military matters because that is his area of
responsibility.
Senator Dodd. But this is a political question, too,
because your cable indicates, ``we're having trouble with our
own employees because of the perception of the U.S. controlling
the country.''
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Dodd. What is your advice on that point?
Ambassador Khalilzad. With regard to the cable, Senator, I
stand behind that cable. It just shows that dedicated Iraqis
take the risks that were described to come and work with us to
build this new Iraq and we very much appreciate their service.
I feel a responsibility toward them as I do toward the other
employees from third countries or from the United States who
work there for us and with us. But I believe with regard to the
attitude toward the United States, people want security. They
want to be able to send their kids out to school and come home,
be able to go out on the street. There is this view in that
region, in Iraq in particular, that if the United States wanted
to end sectarian conflict, it could happen immediately.
Therefore, they believe how could it be that we are there, in
control, as you say, and this happens. They would like the
sectarian violence to end and they have a misperception about
that ability to control everything, an exaggerated view of our
capacity. I think that clearly, as a matter of principle,
politically, we prefer Iraqis to secure Iraq. That is the
principle, the right thing to do and I support that. But if
under some set of circumstances, in order to contain a
situation or deal with a situation, they need our help. It is
important for us and I defer to General Casey as to the
specifics of what that help could be and that we provide that
help.
Senator Dodd. Let me jump in quickly, if I can, with a
second question. I'd spend more time on that point with you but
I hear your answer. That is, I gather in response to a question
earlier about Iran and the earlier authorization you had to
engage, if it was appropriate in some contact conversation with
Iran, and I gather your answer was that it is timing, things
have changed, the matters have moved to the nuclear weapons
issue and the like and that you also said earlier that there
was sort of a good news/bad news, that there was a very good
relationship between the Iranian Government and the Government
of Iraq but obviously there was continuing support for Shia
militias that are coming out of Iran as well. I'm somewhat
concerned. I want you to respond to this if you will. Why
wouldn't it be possible, given the importance of the nuclear
question and the ongoing relationship, have you been denied
authorization--I mean, it seems to be opening up these doors
that would open up conversations not limited to merely Iraq-
Iranian relationships but also this issue, which is paramount
in our view, why wouldn't we allow you to pursue a dual track,
if that would produce some results?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Senator, at this point, of course as
I said, the focus is on the nuclear issue but I would not rule
out the possibility of engaging them with regard to the Iraq
situation, under the right circumstances, if we judge that it
would be productive in terms of what we seek in Iraq. But I
think tactically, at this point, the focus of dealing with Iran
is very much on the nuclear issue.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. I
announced a while back the Ambassador would have to leave at
noon. Senator Sarbanes has arrived. Can you accommodate the
Senator for--all right. We have a 7-minute limit and hopefully
we can observe that, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Ambassador, I join my colleagues in welcoming you before the
committee. When did you move from being Ambassador to
Afghanistan to being our Ambassador to Iraq?
Ambassador Khalilzad. June of last year, Senator. But I
didn't assume my role until July.
Senator Sarbanes. June 2005?
Ambassador Khalilzad. June 2005; yes, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, I'm sure you continue to follow the
situation in Afghanistan, having spent so much time there and
done some very skillful work. The situation there seems to be
deteriorating on us. Would you agree with that?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I am very concerned about the
situation in Afghanistan, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. I'm tempted to attribute it to your
departure but I don't want to overdo that point. So what do you
attribute it to, this deteriorating situation in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I think clearly that there is a game.
You'll have to forgive me, I've got my hat full in Iraq so the
details are not on top of in great detail.
Senator Sarbanes. Sometimes you get a better perspective
when you are some distance removed.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. But there is clearly increased
attacks from the Taliban and it is very--whether that is as a
result of new finances, new equipment, new people joining them,
how the situation in terms of worsening, perhaps, between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. I've seen from the media some
increased contentiousness between those two countries--and
certainly it is evident that there is an upsurge, an increase
in Taliban activities against the government.
Senator Sarbanes. Would you say that United States focus
and attention and the commitment of resources to Afghanistan
has been diverted away, beginning with our entry into Iraq and
continuing over this time period? If you were the all-knowing
decisionmaker, would you want to commit more focus and
resources into Afghanistan?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Success in Afghanistan is very
important, Senator, in my view--9/11 was planned there and it
is specifically important because of that. The Afghans, when I
was there and I believe it continues to be the case, want to
work with the United States, generally. I mean, of course,
there are Taliban who have a different agenda, but generally,
and President Karzai is a good partner. He is a good leader.
Senator Sarbanes. Would you say that he has a greater
legitimacy as the leader of his country, given the process by
which he was chosen, than perhaps exists in Iraq, with respect
to their leadership?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, at present, Karzai clearly is
the elected leader of Afghanistan, a democratic election, he
campaigned across the country on an agenda. He had opponents
and he won. The Government of Iraq is a legitimate government,
a unity government. Everyone has been elected. I don't want to
make comparisons but there is no question that President Karzai
is elected. On your point about diversion to Iraq, I was in
Afghanistan when--after Iraq and I have to tell you, I
respectfully disagree with that because during the period I was
there, while Iraq was going, our focus and assistance for
Afghanistan also increased. I do know what has happened since I
left but certainly, when I was there, when we managed to,
thanks to your leadership----
Senator Sarbanes. You were a very strong champion, actually
for that position and I recall you coming here on a number of
occasions to press that issue.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. And you were kind enough, both
the Senate and the House, to provide for additional resources
for Afghanistan.
Senator Sarbanes. I know those who were here at the dais
with me took a major lead in----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Absolutely.
Senator Sarbanes. Senator Biden and Lugar and Hagel and
Senator Dodd, I know, constantly pressed that issue. Let me go
on because the time is limited.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. I know you have to depart. I understand
that the United States is now calling on the United Nations to
help put together an international compact of donors, is that
correct?
Ambassador Khalilzad. The Iraqi Government is, along with
the United Nations, cochairing an international conference on
Iraq, in which Iraqis will commit themselves to certain goals
and timelines in exchange for political and economic support
from the international community.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, I understand earlier----
Ambassador Khalilzad. And we support that.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Yes. I apologize--I wasn't
able to be here at the outset so if some of these questions are
redundant, I apologize for that. But earlier in this hearing in
response to Senator Hagel, you said that of the $14 billion
that had originally been pledged for Iraq, only $4 billion of
it has been received. Is that correct?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I think that is largely correct; yes,
Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Why do you think we've had so much
trouble getting those contributions to come through?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Part of it that I am aware of, that I
deal with in the neighborhood of Iraq has been the reluctance
of some of the Arab countries who pledged to deliver on, and
they have been slow because of their concern about the
government there. The Sunni Arabs and most of the Arab
countries are Sunni Arabs--have taken a negative view of the
previous government, which did not have elected Sunni members.
Now that there is a unity government with Sunnis fully
participating, in my judgment, there is a transition to a more
positive attitude.
Senator Sarbanes. Could I interject right there?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. Is it your judgment that we are fully
over the hump of having a unity government, that that has now
been worked out in a lasting way or does it still remain a very
shaky situation with respect to a unity government?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, there is a unity government but
it faces the challenge of sectarianism on the street. This is
the best government, in a sense, to deal with it but at the
same time, of course, I can understand that continuing
sectarian violence can strain relations inside that government.
So I suppose, an opportunity and a challenge, but there is the
issue of integrating some of those other elements that are not
in yet, insurgency, which was first necessary to bring the
political leadership of the Sunnis and now the Prime Minister
reaching out as part of the reconciliation, to the insurgency
to be brought in and we support that. The Arab governments in
the neighborhood can help and that is why they went to Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE to seek their help and they have
offered to assist them.
Senator Sarbanes. Speaking of the neighborhood--and I'll
close with this--could you very quickly run through for us the
roles that are being played by the neighboring countries with
respect to the situation in Iraq? I understand earlier you
spoke at considerable length on Iran so I'll leave that aside
on the assumption that it has been covered. But you could go
through the other countries and give us some sense of the roles
they are playing?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe Syria is also playing a
mixed role with a lot of negative in it. Turkey, Jordan,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia--some of them have been playing a positive
role. Others are beginning to engage positively, such as the
Saudis, with a visit of the Prime Minister. I think they can do
more and I would like to see them do more. I have urged them
that on their concern about Iranian influence in Iraq, that the
best way to deal with that is for them to engage this new Iraq,
to engage, among others, the Shia population of Iraq, which
during the time of Saddam, because they were in the opposition,
they were based in Iran and Iran gained some influence over
some of the groups. But now that Iraq has become independent,
with the engagement from the Arab States, there can be a lesser
need for them to rely exclusively on Iran and if they isolate
this new Iraq, they will push it toward reliance on Iran and
that would not be in their interests. I think there is an
adjustment that is taking place there, in a positive direction
and I regard that to be an opportunity for the new government.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you expect these countries to be part
of this effort at the United Nations, the compact to provide
reconstruction assistance?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Absolutely.
Senator Sarbanes. How about Egypt? Would they be also a
part?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Certainly Egypt is an important Arab
country that can help in many ways, although how much it can
help financially will be--I think we are looking more to the
Gulf States to do the heavy lifting on the financial front.
Iraq is indebted to them substantially because during the Iran-
Iraq war, they assumed a lot of debt. That needs to be
forgiven. The Arabs have done less than Western powers in terms
of debt forgiveness. They have shown a willingness to do that
and there is also the issue of assisting with reconstruction
efforts and this compact is the opportunity and we anticipate
that they will play a leading role.
Senator Sarbanes. So what is the timetable on that compact?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, as I said, this is an Iraqi
project with the United Nations as a cochair. We think the
first meeting will be of the preparatory committee on the 20th
of July in Baghdad. Then there is the idea of a ministerial
second step during the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New
York and then a final conference before the end of the year.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Ambassador, we thank you very much.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I take 60 seconds to make
a closing comment? Thanks for being here, Mr. Ambassador. I
come away from my recent trip and discussions with you as well,
today, is that I believe there is an inevidentability we're
drawing down American forces, regardless of what happens on the
ground. I think it is going to start as early as September. I
think that because of all the reasons you've stated about the
Iraqis as well as us. I think the only question left is, what
are we going to leave in the wake here and I hope I get a
chance to talk to you more about Sunni buy-in in a larger way
because it seems to me, that is one of the giant keys to this.
But we're drawing down, we're drawing down no matter what
happens.
The Chairman. Do you think we'll leave the Ambassador in
the wake?
Senator Biden. Well, they may want him to be President or
Prime Minister.
The Chairman. Let me ask. Senator Hagel, do you have a
final comment?
Senator Hagel. Not anything other than to thank Ambassador
Khalilzad and to also extend that thanks to all of the people
you represent. We know, as you have heard here, how difficult
this is. So thank you very much.
Senator Dodd. That is an important point. I would hope,
despite the issues raised in a table like this, there is no
limit to the amount of respect we have for the people who serve
in our embassies, the people in uniform in that country put
their lives on the line every single day and one should never
confuse questions being raised about policy and our deep
commitment and respect for those who are out there trying to
make things happen in a positive way. It is very important you
bring that message back, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator Dodd, for that. I
appreciate that and Senator Hagel, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Ambassador, let me just conclude by saying we
admire your personal wisdom and courage and we wish you well.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an
honor to have been with you.
The Chairman. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to Questions Submitted by
Senator Richard Lugar
Question. As part of his 24-point National Reconciliation Plan, PM
Maliki has prioritized disarming the militias. They were also outlawed
by the Constitution and opposed by U.S. policy prior to that. What will
the key be to making this a reality this time? Will the United States
have a role?
Do you continue to have sufficient leverage in ensuring U.S.
priorities are achieved and we don't allow the Iraqis to lose sight of
rule of law, religious freedom, and human rights issues?
What if the reconciliation plan falls through? What and who is
doing the planning for the worst case outcomes?
Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to working closely with
the Government of Iraq (GOI) in developing a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program as the vehicle to bring
militias back into civil society. International/regional neighbor
action is also critical in stemming material support for militias. The
mechanics of the DDR plan require the GOI establish a plan that
reintegrates these former armed group members under the Iraqi National
Reconciliation and Dialogue project.
A viable reintegration plan will require political, economic, and
educational reforms designed to help members of these groups transition
back into society. This plan will address jobs, integration into Iraqi
military and police forces, and influencing those both inside and
outside of Iraq who are supporting the militias.
The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) works closely
with the Ministry of the Interior to eliminate human rights abuses. To
date, the Ministry has taken a number of steps to curb corruption and
human rights violations. The MOI relieved 3 brigade commanders whose
units were receiving frequent abuse reports, allocated $4 million to
renovate current MOI detention facilities to U.N.-international
standards, conducts human rights training during police training, and
directed the formation of an MOI Center for Ethic, Integrity and
Leadership.
The United States remains engaged with Iraqi political, religious,
and civil society leaders to assist in the transition from government
formation to governing. While there are still many challenges that lie
ahead to address the pressing needs of the Iraqi people, PM Maliki
remains focused on a long-term strategy to ensure success of the Iraqi
Government.
Question. What are the objectives of the International Compact that
the administration hopes to put into place? What will it encompass?
Will the compact involve a wider involvement than the Council of
Ministers? What are we doing to ensure its legitimacy?
Answer. The International Compact with Iraq is an Iraqi initiative
supported by the United Nations and the World Bank. The objectives of
the compact are for Iraq to commit to reforming its political economy
so that will become self-sustaining over the next 5 years. In return,
Iraq's international partners (countries and international
organizations) will commit to providing the assistance needed until
Iraq is capable of meeting its goals with its own resources. While the
content of the compact will be mainly economic, dealing with such vital
sectors as oil, electricity, and agriculture, and such important topics
as subsidy reform, social safety nets, and fighting corruption, the
document will also point to the importance of Iraq continuing to make
gains with security and its political institutions.
The Government of Iraq, the United Nations, and the World Bank are
organizing the work effort for the compact so as to directly engage key
Iraqi ministries into the process. Iraq's provincial governments will
also be involved in the process of formulating the compact. We expect
that the resulting document will receive the endorsement of Iraq's
Council of Ministers.
Legitimacy will also derive from the endorsements the compact
receives from the international community, in particular Iraq's Gulf
Arab neighbors and their official financial institutions.
We are encouraging the Iraqis to view the compact as a framework
for focusing their efforts for engaging international actors and
organizations--to begin on economic matters.
Question. Beyond the compact, are you involved in increasing the
contributions of international actors and organizations, or are you
encouraging the Iraqi ministers to lead this effort?
Answer. In every appropriate venue, we continue to urge
international support for Iraq politically, economically, and in the
security area by upgrading diplomatic relations, supporting capacity-
building programs, concluding bilateral debt forgiveness agreements,
disbursing existing pledges, seeking new donor support and seeking
support for security and stability.
In coordination with the Iraqi Government, our international
engagement strategy includes consultations by U.S. Government
principals with regional and other countries, and outreach to
international organizations, NGOs, and international financial
institutions. I personally engage Iraq's neighbors such as with my
recent visits to UAE and Saudi Arabia. Foreign ministerial and
bilateral meetings, international summits, official visits, and many
congressional delegations are also reinforcing our objective of
increased international support for the new Iraqi Government. Most
recently, the G-8 summit provided such a venue for engagement.
Question. You have spoken about Syria and Iran. With fingers being
pointed at Damascus and Tehran for destabilizing activities with
respect to Iraq, and also for backing the intransigence of Hamas and
Hezbollah with respect to Israel, what is the sense of Iraqis of their
ability to deal effectively with these neighbors?
Answer. Despite public statements signaling their interest in
dialog and cooperation with Iraq, it is the position of the United
States Government that Syria and Iran continue to support destabilizing
activities with respect to Iraq. Syria continues to turn a blind eye
toward insurgents' entry into Iraq and has claimed difficulty with
controlling transit. Iran continues to undertake destructive activities
in Iraq, and adversely affect the new national unity government's
efforts to promote national reconciliation.
The Iraqis understand that solutions will require coordinated and
simultaneous actions across the political, economic, and security
tracks. The Government of Iraq understands that it must lead these
efforts, including carrying out an initiative focused on national
reconciliation. For instance, the Iraqis are coordinating closely with
the Arab League, calling for Iraqi parties and Arab States to support
Iraq and respect the political will of the Iraqi people, bolstering any
outside interference or influence.
Senior Iraqi officials have made their views about Syrian and
Iranian actions in Iraq known to the officials of those governments.
While the details of those conversations are confidential, there is no
doubt that Syrian and Iranian officials know the kinds of conduct that
Iraqi Government officials deem objectionable.
Question. Being aware of this committee's involvement in improving
our government's ability to handle reconstruction and stabilization
missions--especially from the civilian component--can you evaluate the
operations of the few PRTs that have been established to date? Describe
the challenges you are facing in staffing the civilian side robustly
enough to be effective and the challenges they are facing? Can they
move and operate effectively in the current security environment?
Answer. Five PRTs are currently operational in Tamim (Kirkuk),
Ninewa (Mosul), Babil (Hillah), Baghdad, and in Al Anbar (Ramadi). PRTs
have always been a part of our strategic plan to coordinate
reconstruction and capacity-building efforts. We initially fielded
three U.S.-led ``proof of concept'' PRTs in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Hillah.
Based on that experience, we have refined the PRT concept to shape
logistics, security, and staffing to match specific needs in each
province.
PRT deployment is conditions-based. For U.S.-led PRTs, we use
existing logistical and security resources at current U.S. Regional
Embassy Offices (REOs) and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). The security
environment in each province is key factor in the timing of the PRT
rollouts and the mix and composition of security resources for each
PRT. In some cases, this may mean State and Multi-National Forces-Iraq
(MNF-I) share security. In others, one or the other is in the lead.
Joint analysis between the Embassy and MNF-I continues as we
collaborate on PRT deployments.
To date the Department of State has filled State-designated
positions in Iraq, including the PRTs, with volunteers. In the summer
2006 assignment cycle, State thus far has filled 99 percent of the open
positions for Baghdad and more than 85 percent of the PRT positions. In
recognition of our need for additional expertise in the field,
Secretary Rice approved, in June, the augmentation of PRT staffing by
an additional 45 positions, drawn from several civilian USG agencies.
We have reached out to the Department of Agriculture and USAID to fill
6 Agricultural Specialist and 11 Economic Reform and Private Sector
Development positions, respectively. At the same time, State is
identifying expertise from within State, the USG interagency community,
and from qualified private citizens hired by the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO), to fill the remaining 28 augmentee positions
with political/foreign affairs, public affairs, and rule of law
professionals. USAID and the Department of Justice already are
providing development and rule of law expertise at currently
operational PRTs.
The PRTs are working closely with provincial governments to
establish effective linkages with the central government, and to help
local officials plan and prioritize provincial government direction and
activities. This work includes assisting Iraqis in preparing budgets,
identifying funding and staffing needs, and developing fiscal
responsibility. Additionally, PRTs continue to provide assistance in
coordinating civil construction, including advising provincial
authorities on communication with their constituents and enhancing
delivery of provincial and municipal services.
Question. Assess the abilities of the Iraqi ministries to perform
basic functions of government? Do we have sufficient civilian expertise
to provide the advice and assistance they need to stand up ably,
through ministerial assistance teams or what have you? The Iraqi
economy has managed to grow despite all of the violence, yet corruption
in the oil sector and elsewhere has been described as systemic. Is the
Maliki government taking steps to step up enforcement and increase
penalties for those who are caught?
Answer. Increasing the capacity of Iraq's national-level ministries
and local government bodies is a critical part of our strategy to
support Iraq's transition to democracy and self-sufficiency. Tens of
thousands of Iraqi officials, at great personal risk and sacrifice, are
working to keep the Iraqi Government functioning and deliver essential
services. Embassy Baghdad's National Capacity Development (NCD) program
will assist the new government by addressing urgent needs (short-term
track), and employing a longer term approach to foster indigenous
capacity development (medium-term track).
Embassy is finalizing a baseline assessment of capacity across the
key ministries. Efforts are underway to attend to the highest priority
identified needs, including programs to address cross-ministerial
deficiencies as well as those targeted to specific ministry needs.
Ministry Advisory Teams (MATs) are the implementation vehicle for the
short-term approach and consist of Iraqis, U.S. Senior Consultants,
USAID, donors, and other partners. The MATs will facilitate Iraqi
ownership of ministry priorities as well as provide a vehicle for donor
participation and coordination. To provide an example, the Electricity
MAT is led by the Ministry's Head of Training and is soliciting
proposals to address infrastructure management, legal and regulatory
reforms, tariff reforms, and technical training. Embassy also plans to
place a Bicultural-Bilingual Advisor (BBA) on each MAT, as well as
provide BBAs to strengthen the overall operations of the Prime
Minister's Office.
The medium-term NCD approach is complementary to the short-term
approach. Immediate support will be given to the Iraqi National
Training Center to build government-level capacity in key ministries,
followed by international assistance to strengthen the curriculum and
capability of the national as well as regional training centers. This
approach also employs civil service reform and Iraqi-led training
programs to foster indigenous capacity development. Embassy is
currently developing metrics to measure the progress of ministerial
capacity development during our NCD effort. Full partnership and
cooperation from the GOI will yield faster returns and facilitate Iraqi
ownership.
Coordination pivots on our senior consultant to each ministry to
ensure that all of our operational and capacity development and
training efforts are complementary and in many cases synergistic. NCD
program efforts are also being coordinated with the work of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) at the provincial and regional levels, and
will also go hand in hand with anticorruption initiatives. The new
government will provide a longer term, more stable political
environment for capacity development and several of our international
partners have expressed interest in assisting specific Iraqi
ministries.
While corruption remains a major obstacle to the reconstruction and
stabilization of Iraq Prime Minister Maliki has made repeated
statements reaffirming his commitment to fighting corruption in Iraq,
most notably in his June 12, 2006, address to the Iraqi Parliament. The
Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, the Iraqi inspectors general, and
the Central Criminal Court of Iraq continue to work together to combat
corruption in the Iraqi ministries and Embassy Baghdad, through the
IRRF and FY06 supplemental funds continue to assist in the efforts of
these Iraqi anticorruption institutions.
Question. U.S. reconstruction appropriated funding is waning, and
little more has been requested. Describe what this is doing to our
reconstruction priorities and goals.
Answer. We have already disbursed $15 billion of the $20.9 billion
in IRRF I and II, and expect to conclude most of our major
infrastructure projects by the end of 2006. These programs were
intended to jump-start the Iraqi economy, and facilitate Iraq's
transition to self-sufficiency. These programs are already having an
impact, for example, providing roughly one-third of Iraq's electricity
generation capacity, stabilizing oil production, and improving delivery
of water and access to sewage. As we wrap up these infrastructure
programs, we are increasingly focusing on programs to build Iraqi
capacity to manage their own affairs. Under the 2006 supplemental, we
are beginning a program to increase the capacity of 10 key Iraqi
ministries to carry out core functions, such as budgeting and personnel
management. We also are implementing programs to improve Iraq's ability
to operate and maintain USG-funded projects, protect critical energy
infrastructure, and develop local government capacity. We have
requested $771 million in FY 2007 to continue programs to build Iraqi
self-sufficiency, as well as to support economic policy reforms and
democracy programs.
Question. In addition to the constitutional review process, the
Constitution itself requires enacting legislation for dozens of
provisions, many of them related to human rights and freedom
guarantees. Is the Iraqi Parliament showing progress on these fronts,
and are they being provided capable advisors as needed? What agency/
contractor/grantee has the lead for this?
Answer. The Iraqi Parliament, also known as the Council of
Representatives (CoR), has made no significant progress during its
first month in drafting legislation related to human rights guarantees
in accordance with articles in the Constitution. The CoR is currently
out of session, but will resume work in September. The constitutional
review process will likely begin in earnest in the fall.
U.S. Embassy Baghdad--drawing on State Department, USAID, and other
agency expertise--is providing legislative drafting assistance to the
CoR. Embassy Baghdad also has been working closely with the United
Nations and the United Kingdom, for instance on the Human Rights
Commission legislation. The United States will remain engaged to assist
the Iraqi Government in guaranteeing human rights and freedom for all
Iraqi citizens.
Question. Under the previous government, the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) received very poor marks. Accusations continue to be levied at
the active police force suggesting that loyalties are misplaced, the
force is infiltrated or worse. Is Minister Boulani capable of turning
the Ministry around so that it can gain the confidence of all Iraqi
communities? Do you have any oversight purview of the MOI, or is that
all handled by the Defense Department?
Most Americans cannot fathom the level of violence that is being
described daily in Iraq, much less what motivates people to perpetrate
such acts? Can you explain what you see? Are average Iraqis frustrated
because they do not have access to justice? Do they think the system or
institutions will fail them? How has this changed since you have been
there?
Answer. Minister Jawad Al-Bolani faces the monumental task of
overcoming corruption, human rights abuse, and sectarian influence to
establish a transparent and accountable ministry capable of planning,
organizing, managing, and sustaining Iraq's civil security forces and
helping to establish the rule of law in Iraq. We believe that he can
and must rise to the challenge. The U.S. Government is committed to
helping him succeed.
As the Chief of Mission, I coordinate with the Multinational Force-
Iraq (MNF-I) Commander to provide policy guidance and general direction
to our efforts to build the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior.
The Department of Defense, through CENTCOM and MNF-I, provides tactical
guidance to ministerial advisors.
Effective rule of law in Iraq requires four institutions: Effective
laws, police to enforce them, courts to administer justice, and prisons
to incarcerate offenders. The United States, its coalition partners,
and international agencies are helping Iraq strengthen the rule of law
by building a legal system that instills confidence in the Iraqi
Government and ensures security for its citizens. Despite these
efforts, progress in developing and implementing both the institutions
and processes to foster the rule of law in Iraq have been limited.
Although there have been some positive developments, delay in the GOI
formation resulted in a loss of momentum and rule of law initiatives
slowed.
The MOI has made significant progress during the last 2 months. A
major crime unit was disbanded for extensive involvement in corruption
and terrorist activities. Recent investigations have identified a list
of MOI personnel whom the De-Baathification Committee identified as
being senior Baath Party members. The end result will likely be the
firing of a large number of personnel based on Iraqi law that prohibits
Baath Party members holding specific government positions. High profile
prosecutions in connection with human rights abuses in MOI detention
facilities will be a significant step toward increasing the credibility
of the MOI as a national institution.
Question. The Embassy has had problems filling positions with
adequately qualified individuals willing to serve in such dangerous
environment for periods long enough to be truly effective. As we are in
another turnover period, 2 years after the Embassy opened, describe
what you are doing to improve this situation.
Answer. The Department of State has 137 authorized Foreign Service
positions in Iraq of which 135 personnel have been identified for the
summer 2006 cycle (99 percent fill rate); 41 of the above positions
located in the Regional Embassy Offices/Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(REOs/PRTs) or temporarily attached to military units as political
advisors. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) currently
has 173 personnel in Iraq, including ministerial advisors (80 percent
fill rate) and 32 candidates in the pipeline. To date, the Department's
package of recruiting incentives has enabled us to staff nearly all our
positions. Certain positions are filled by individuals who have the
requisite professional skills but who are not at the requested grade or
level; we continue to reach out personally to employees who meet all
requisite qualifications to encourage them to serve in Iraq. The
standard tour of duty in Iraq is for 1 year because of the extreme
danger and hardship that our personnel endure. We are pleased that our
employees have been so responsive to the challenges of serving in Iraq,
we are proud to have an all-volunteer cadre there, and we continue to
look at all options that will allow us to provide the best staff
possible for Embassy Baghdad and constituent operations.
In addition to the Department of State positions, we are pleased to
report that of the 48 additional positions we requested of the
interagency in March, 40 have been filled. Moreover, 8 agencies
combined have offered up the names of 24 volunteers willing to serve 3-
month rotations in Iraq as part of our public affairs Global Outreach
(GO) teams. The first GO team is on the ground and assisting U.S. and
international journalists to facilitate coverage of reconstruction
stories.
The Department of State continues to host interagency meetings to
encourage the continued staffing of these positions, to discuss
recognizing and compensating all USG civilians adequately for their
service in Iraq, and to review the legislative and regulatory
impediments that complicate service of USG civilians in war zones such
as Iraq. Thanks to the support of Senators Lugar, Warner, Biden, and
others, many of those legislative impediments have been removed with
the amendments offered with the passage of the FY 2006 Iraq
supplemental, which President Bush signed into law on June 15.
______
Responses of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to Questions Submitted by
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. Please provide the committee with an updated assessment
of the governing capacity of the key Iraqi ministries. Please also
provide the committee with the detailed plans on the strategies and
benchmarks for building the capacity of each of these ministries. Which
ministries have the best leadership and potential, and which ones do
you worry about? What are the biggest obstacles you face in standing
them up? How are international reconstruction efforts being coordinated
to ensure that they assist in building Iraq's governing capacity?
Answer. Embassy Baghdad's National Capacity Development (NCD)
program is an integral component of transitioning U.S. support from
reconstruction to building Iraq's capacity to govern effectively and
deliver essential services. With the new Government of Iraq (GOI) in
place, Embassy is finalizing a baseline assessment of ministerial
capacity across the key ministries. The NCD program will address urgent
needs during the first year of the new government (short-term track) as
well as medium-term initiatives. Ministers were briefed on the NCD
program shortly after new government formation, and Embassy has also
obtained the support of the Prime Minister's Office and the Council of
Ministers Secretariat to strengthen interministerial and provincial
relations.
Ministry Advisory Teams (MATs) are the implementation vehicle for
the short-term NCD approach and consist of Iraqis, U.S. Senior
Consultants, USAID, donors, and other partners. The MATs will
facilitate Iraqi ownership of ministry priorities as well as provide a
vehicle for donor participation and coordination. Efforts are underway
to address the highest priority needs, including programs that address
cross-ministerial deficiencies as well as efforts that are targeted to
specific ministry needs.
The medium-term approach is complementary to the short-term
approach and immediate support will be given to the Iraqi National
Training Center to build governate-level capacity in key ministries,
followed by international assistance to strengthen the curriculum and
capability of the national as well as regional training centers. This
approach also employs civil service reform and Iraqi-led training
programs to foster indigenous capacity development. Embassy is
currently developing metrics to measure the progress of ministerial
capacity development during our NCD effort. Full partnership and
cooperation from the GOI will yield faster returns and facilitate Iraq
ownership.
Coordination pivots on our senior consultant to each ministry to
ensure that all of our operational and capacity development and
training efforts are complementary and in many cases synergistic. NCD
program efforts are also being coordinated with the work of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) at the provincial and regional levels, and
will also go hand in hand with anticorruption initiatives.
Having the new government in place for 4 years will facilitate the
transition from U.S.-led training and mentoring to Iraqi-led capacity
building with international donor and NGO assistance. The World Bank
has also been working to expand Iraqi ministry capacity over the last 2
years through two targeted programs. Other donors have also expressed
interest in working with the Iraqi Government to address specific
needs.
Question. Please submit a progress report on the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). How many teams are deployed? What is the
schedule for deployment? What are the staffing levels? Why can't they
be established faster? Do they have enough resources? What have been
their key accomplishments? What lessons have been learned?
Answer. Five PRTs are currently operational in Tamim (Kirkuk),
Ninewa (Mosul), Babil (Hillah), Baghdad, and in Al Anbar (Ramadi). An
additional two, Salah ad Din and Diyala, are completing staffing and
will be inaugurated by the end of August. Also, one coalition PRT has
been established, in Basrah, led by the United Kingdom. PRTs have
always been a part of our strategic plan to coordinate reconstruction
and capacity-building efforts. We initially fielded three U.S.-led
``proof of concept'' PRTs in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Hillah. Based on that
experience, we have refined the PRT concept to shape logistics,
security, and staffing to match specific needs in other provinces.
PRT deployment is conditions based. For U.S.-led PRTs, we use
existing logistical and security resources at current U.S. Regional
Embassy Offices (RE0s) and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). The security
environment in each province is a key factor in the timing of the PRT
rollouts and the mix and composition of security resources for each
PRT. In some cases, State will secure the movement of PRT members,
while in other cases, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) will provide
site security. Joint analysis between the Embassy and MNF-I continues
as we collaborate on PRT deployments.
Recruiting civilian staff has been a challenge; to date, the
Department of State has filled State-designated positions in Iraq,
including for the PRTs, with volunteers. Once accepted, the State
``quick hire'' process requires 60-70 days to bring a candidate on.
Thus far in the summer 2006 assignment cycle, State has filled more
then 98 percent of the open positions for Baghdad and more than 85
percent of the PRT positions. In recognition of our need for additional
expertise in the field, Secretary Rice recently approved the
augmentation of PRT staffing by an additional 45 positions. We have
reached out to the Department of Agriculture to fill 6 Agricultural
Specialist postions and to USAID to fill 11 Economic Reform and Private
Sector Development positions. State is taking the lead in identifying
expertise from within State, the USG interagency community, and from
qualified private citizens hired by the Iraq Reconstruction Management
Office (IRMO), to fill the remaining 28 augmentee positions with
political/foreign affairs, public affairs and rule of law
professionals. USAID and the Department of Justice are already
providing development and rule of law expertise at currently
operational PRTs.
Resource support for PRTs varies somewhat depending on
circumstances. Some PRTs were built within REOs and inherited REO
assets, while other PRTs were built on the infrastructure of FOBs and
need to be provided for separately. This is to be expected. However,
overall, the PRTs are working effectively with provincial governments,
establishing linkages between the central government and the provincial
governments and helping local officials plan and prioritize provincial
government direction and activities. This work includes assisting
Iraqis in preparing budgets, identifying funding and staffing needs,
and developing fiscal responsibility. Specifically, in Ninewa, PRT
support helped in the formation of a provincial charter, crucial to
defining the provincial government baseline. Additionally, PRTs
continue to provide assistance in coordinating civil construction,
including advising provincial authorities on communication with their
constituents and enhancing delivery of provincial and municipal
services. In Tamim, PRT support helped to develop the first two phases
of a master plan for Kirkuk City, and in Babil, PRT support helped to
develop and implement an action plan to address the approximately 6,000
IDPs that have sought refuge from sectarian violence.
While there are many PRT accomplishments, carrying out diplomatic
functions and building provincial capacity in the middle of a war has
proved a challenge, and many lessons have been learned in the process.
Our original timeline for the program was optimistic and has been
adjusted to reflect experience.
Question. On June 1, the Regional Embassy Office (REO) in Mosul
closed. Why was REO Mosul closed? How many staff worked at REO Mosul
and what became of them? How many staff are assigned to PRT Ninewa and
how will the closure of REO Mosul impact it? Which of the REO Mosul's
functions will be covered by PRT Ninewa and which will not? It is my
understanding the REO Mosul was responsible for a larger geographical
area than PRT Nenewa. How will this larger geographical area be served
after the closure of REO Mosul?
Answer. Forward Operating Base (FOB) Courage, on which the REO in
Mosul was located, was closed after the Department of Defense
reorganization and security assessment in Iraq determined that it would
close by June 2006. Thus, maintaining the REO in Mosul without the
security provided by the military would have been too expensive.
After its establishment at REO Mosul in November 2005, PRT Ninewa
took over the majority of REO Mosul's functions. These functions and
personnel transferred with the PRT in the move from FOB Courage to FOB
Marez. The support staff, however, did not. While this left the PRT fit
to operate, the loss of functions that were provided by these personnel
has impaired the capability of the PRT. For instance, the PRT no longer
has a dedicated IT staff member to maintain communications and the IT
systems, and unfortunately, the support provided by FOB Marez has been
limited at best. The REO staff not connected with PRT operations will
either depart Iraq at the end of their assignments this summer, since
their REO positions will be closed upon their departure, or moved to
other locations in Iraq, including Baghdad or another REO.
Currently there are 8 Department of State (DOS) personnel, 20
Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and 5 DOD contractors assigned to
PRT Ninewa. PRT Ninewa staffing and activities have not been changed by
the closure of REO Mosul. Under the terms of the joint DOS/DOD PRT
initiative established in the fall of 2005, DOD is to fund all
infrastructure, life support, and operating costs for PRTs located on
DOD installations and DOS is to fund all infrastructure, life support,
and operating costs for those located on DOS installations. With the
closure of REO Mosul and move to FOB Marez all DOS operational support
has been reallocated within Iraq. The provincial outreach and political
reporting functions of the REO are replicated in the PRT.
REO Mosul had responsibility for Ninewa and Dohuk provinces. The
PRT is chartered to cover only Ninewa but has retained some connection
to Dohuk by housing the IPAO formerly responsible for Dohuk reporting.
Once the PRT in Erbil is established, it will assume responsibility for
Dohuk.
Question. During the negotiations that led to the formation of the
new government two extra constitutional mechanisms were set up to try
to win consensus on critical issues--a 19-member national security
council and a ministerial security council. How effective have these
organs been? How much consensus is there within Prime Minister Maliki's
Cabinet? What are the areas of disagreement?
Answer. During Iraq's Govermnent formation negotiations in early
2006, only one additional body was created to build political consensus
on critical issues--the National Policy Council (NPC). The 18-member
NPC had its first meeting on June 27, in which members discussed its
structure, rules, and regulations. The next meeting, scheduled for July
15, will take up votes on the rules of procedure and the General
Secretary. The effectiveness of the NPC has yet to be determined as it
has had only one meeting: However, progress in setting up the NPC
indicates the dedication of all parties to creating a cross-sectarian
forum for building consensus on critical issues.
The Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) was
established earlier in 2005 as a forum for discussion on security
issues between the Government of Iraq (Prime Minister and security
ministers), the United States Embassy, the British Embassy, and the
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). As a result of its effectiveness in
enhancing Iraqi-United States-United Kingdom-MNF-I coordination on
security issues, the MCNS continues to meet on a regular basis (weekly,
or more often, as needed).
Consensus within the Prime Minister's Cabinet on critical issues is
evident in the broad support for the Prime Minister's government
program. Ministers agree that several key issues are top priorities,
including progress on security, particularly in Baghdad; the delivery
of essential services such as electricity; and a plan for
reconciliation through national dialog. While there is broad
ministerial support for the government program, areas of disagreement
exist on how best to solve the myriad challenges facing the Iraqi
Government, such as how best to ``solve the problem of militias . . .
politically, economically, and in terms of security'' as called for in
the National Reconciliation and Dialogue program. Nonetheless, the NPC
and MCNS are forums for increased dialog, providing significant
opportunities for the Iraqi Government and other key players to come
together and reach a consensus on critical issues.
Question. On July 9, the Los Angeles Times reported on a recent
assessment by State Department police training contractors. The report,
entitled ``Year of the Police In-stride Assessment, October 2005 to May
2006,'' says that ``despite great progress and genuine commitment on
the part of many Ministry [of Interior] officials, the current climate
of corruption, human rights violations, and sectarian violence found in
Iraq's security forces undermines public confidence'' in the
government. Please provide the committee with a copy of the State
Department assessment described in the Los Angeles Times. What is your
own assessment of the Iraqi police force? What changes are needed--in
our own strategy and within the Iraqi Government--to professionalize
the Iraqi police?
Answer. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD 36)
conferred primary responsibility for developing the capacity of the
Iraq civilian police upon the DOD Central Command (CENTCOM), which has
in turn assigned the mission to the Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)'s Civilian Police Advisory Training Team
(CPATT). The Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is providing police personnel to
serve under MNSTC-I/CPATT's operational command. The report referenced
in your question was prepared by CPATT, and we are happy to provide a
copy of it to the committee along with this submission.
The international community has learned through hard experience in
the Balkans, Afghanistan, Haiti, and elsewhere that building effective
and professional police forces that operate within democratic and human
rights norms is challenging and takes time. Iraq is not unique in that
respect.
Despite the challenges, progress in developing the capacity of the
Iraqi police has been made on many fronts, MNSTC-I is on track to reach
its goal of training and equipping 135,000 civilian police by December
2006. Its police development program includes 8 weeks of basic training
for new recruits within Iraq and at the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC); 3-week transition training for existing Iraqi
police; and various specialized and advanced training courses.
International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) supplied by INL provide
advisory services, guidance mentoring, and technical advice.
Iraq police instructors now conduct the vast majority of the
instruction for the 8-week basic police skills courses taught to new
recruits. The JIPTC has far exceeded its goal of training 32,000 Iraqi
police, graduating 36,000 recruits to date.
We have increased the number of International Police Liaison
Officers (IPLOs) supplied by INL from 500 to 690 officers. This
increase has allowed for greater access and support to Iraqi police at
the provincial headquarters, district, and stations levels. As a
result, the Iraq police have increased their patrols and are actively
conducting investigations. Although still a target, the Iraq police
have stood their ground and defended their police stations from
insurgent attacks.
A new police force is not built overnight. The climate is
challenging, but there is progress.
Question. According to a National Public Radio news report last
month, Iraqi army recruits in some areas must pay bribes of up to $600
to join. Please describe the vetting program for the army and police.
How would you assess the corruption levels within the Ministries of
Defense and Interior?
Answer. The Government of Iraq (GOI) is increasingly taking the
lead in the recruitment and vetting of current and prospective members
of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Although the vetting procedures for
applicants are largely in place, some of the policies necessary to
enforce compliance remain under development at the ministerial level.
The payment of a recruitment bribe is not a common practice as the
ministries have taken a number of steps to curb corruption, including
recruitment bribes, and mentor all personnel on professional ethics and
responsibilities as members of Iraq's Security Forces.
The vetting process is administered by MoI and MoD separately for
the police and military respectively. Vetting procedures for both
ministries include criminal background checks, security screen
interviews, and de-Baathification compliance. MoD applicants are
immediately disqualified if they have prior level-4 Baath Party
affiliations or a known history of human rights violations.
The role of MNF-I is to assist Iraq in this recruitment and
facilitate data collection and analysis, the results of which are
passed directly to the MoI and MoD. MNF-I and the GOI continue to work
together to further develop and refine recruitment and vetting
processes for Iraqi Security Forces.
Question. In your testimony you noted that sectarian violence has
surpassed terrorism and the insurgency as the primary cause of
instability in Iraq. What is the plan to deal with the militias? What
is the extent of militia infiltration in the police, the Facilities
Protections Services, the army? How will the militias be purged from
the security forces?
Answer. It is important to state upfront that militia units are not
absorbed into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Individuals are
recruited and vetted in accordance with Government of Iraq (GOI)
policies and distributed throughout the ISF to create more ethnically
and religiously diverse forces. The Iraqi military has developed an
oath in which all recruits sear allegiance to the country of Iraq and
loyalty to the principles of the Constitution.
The U.S. Government is committed to working closely with
international partners and the GOI to build a nation whose unity is not
threatened by violence from armed militias. A continued commitment of
resources and political support to assist the new GOI with the
implementation of a solution to this problem is imperative.
International/regional neighbor action is also critical in stemming
material support for militias.
Solutions will require coordinated and simultaneous actions across
the political, economic, and security tracks. The Government of Iraq
must lead this effort, in the context of a national reconciliation.
Multi-National Forces-Iraq and the Embassy are developing a suggested
plan to assist Iraqi leaders with the militia problem, which would
include establishing a comprehensive civil-led political-security
hierarchy. Any solution will need to address militias at the local,
provincial, and national levels simultaneously. Standing up and
building local respect for ISF in areas currently under militia control
is another critical element of a successful plan.
A viable reintegration plan will require political, economic, and
educational reforms designed to help members of these groups transition
back into society. Our suggested plan will address jobs, integration
into Iraqi military and police forces, and influencing those both
inside and outside of Iraq who are supporting the militias. Dismantling
of armed militias will be a substantial challenge; each has a unique
power base and ties to political and religious leaders. Solutions
require a conditions-based approach and may be incremental.
Question. In your speech at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies on July 11, you said, ``We are implementing plans
to accelerate the evolution of the Iraqi Army from a light force that
is dependent on the coalition for logistics and combat support into a
heavier force that not only can take on well-armed enemy units more
effectively but also can operate with less reliance on the coalition.''
How do we ensure that in arming the Iraqi Army we are not providing
arms that will eventually work their way to insurgent or militia
groups? How dependent are Iraqi Army units upon American support? How
long will it be before the Ministry of Defense is capable of exerting
control over significant numbers of forces? What is the Iraqi role in
planning operations?
Answer. Coalition Military Transition Teams are embedded with every
Iraqi battalion, brigade, and division, and provide daily guidance and
mentorship. In addition Iraqi units are partnered with coalition units.
These partnerships, combined with the expertise and leadership taught
through the institutional base, are critical for development of both
unit proficiency and leadership essential to increased operation
effectiveness. Through the embedded transition teams and coalition
partnerships the USG is assured of Iraqi weapons accountability.
Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) continues to provide logistic
support to the Iraqi Armed Forces on a regular basis. Some self-
reliance is achieved with Iraqi Army units using their own process;
however there is still sufficient work to be accomplished.
Multinational Forces-Iraq continues to work with MNC-I and
Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to help the
Iraqi Government develop a defense logistic system. MNSTC-I has
recently formed a transition working group tasked with ensuring that
MoD properly supports all ISF life support requirements. Of the nine
planned Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTR) that provide mobility
and sustainment support for the Iraqi forces, four are fully
operationally capable. The MTUs will not be fully fielded until
December 2006.
As of July 24 the Iraqi Army has 4 division headquarters, 21
brigades, and 75 battalions in the lead. Iraqi Army Forces have
demonstrated an increased capability to plan and execute
counterinsurgency operations. The number of counterinsurgency
operations conducted independently by Iraqi forces as a percentage of
total combat operations continues to increase steadily.
Question. For some time the administration has said that its plans
to withdraw its forces from Iraq will be based on conditions on the
ground. Since the December elections, American troop levels have
declined by approximately 30,000. Yet, during this time violence rates
have to be increasing, particularly in the capital city. What specific
criteria will be used to make the determination on American troop
levels?
Answer. In the immediate term, our overall goal, as the President
has said, is to stand down our forces as the Iraqi forces stand up. As
Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, international forces
will increasingly move to supporting roles in most areas. In many
cases, this may allow for personnel reductions or delays in previously
scheduled deployments.
A determination of specific Iraq units rated as ``Iraqi Lead with
Coalition Support'' marks the point at which a unit can control its own
area of responsibility and, therefore, allow coalition units to focus
elsewhere. As of May 15, 2006, there were 2 Iraqi divisions, 16
brigades, and 63 Army and National Police battalions with security lead
in their areas of responsibility.
While one of the conditions for transfer of security responsibility
at the provincial level to Iraq is an assessment of threat levels,
there are other conditions which bear on that decision: Capability of
the Iraqi Security Forces (such as the Iraqi Lead with Coalition
Support category above), capability of Iraqis to govern, and readiness
of MNF-I forces to support the ISF.
It is the combination of all of these factors, not just the level
of violence, that leads to a decision of whether or not to transfer a
province to Iraqi control and remission MNF-I to a another role.
Additionally, as the Iraqi Security Forces become increasingly
capable of planning and conducting security operations independent of
the Multi-National Forces, we pledge our continued support to them and
the Government of Iraq as they seek to provide peace and prosperity for
all Iraqis.
Question. One provision of the National Reconciliation program is a
review of the de-Baathification program. How will the new program be
structured? Will there be an appeals process? How will the program's
fairness be assured? Given that Prime Minister Maliki was involved in
implementing the earlier, stricter de-Baathification policies, how
committed is he to the review? How much goodwill do you expect the
program to win from disaffected Sunni Arabs? How much resistance is
there to the review within the United Iraqi Alliance?
Answer. One of the key provisions of Iraq's National Reconciliation
and Dialogue initiative, launched by Prime Minister Maliki on June 25,
is a reconsideration of de-Baathification. Announcement of the
Reconciliation Initiative was only the first step in the development of
a detailed plan. De-Baathification program structure and operating
principles will be developed in the course of the national dialog on
reconciliation. The U.S. Government will remain engaged with the Iraqi
Government and other Iraqi leaders to encourage rapid implementation of
the de-Baathification review, as well as a fair de-Baathification
process.
Iraqis from across the political spectrum, including Sunni groups
such as the National Dialogue Council, have made public statements in
support of the Reconciliation Initiative. Prime Minister Maliki
personally vetted the elements of the initiative before he announced
the program to the Council of Representatives, and, given his
overarching goal of reconciling Iraqis, we have every reason to believe
that he is committed to de-Baathification reform. Sunni leaders have
been lobbying for de-Baathification reform for months, and positive
Sunni statements about the reconciliation initiative (and increased
Sunni panicipation in the process) flow at least in part from the GOI's
evident willingness to reconsider de-Baathification. Some Shia hard-
liners are wary of de-Baathification reform, but Shia leaders have been
publicly supportive of the initiative, indicating a willingness to
compromise in order to help bring Iraq's various communities together
and stem Iraq's sectarian violence.
The Iraqi Government and the United States will remain engaged to
ensure that reconciliation is a success.
Question. According to a recent United Nations report, there are
roughly 1.3 million internally displaced people in Iraq, at least
150,000 of whom have been displaced in sectarian violence since the
Samarra Mosque bombing in February. What is the status of these
internally displaced people? How is humanitarian assistance being
delivered to them? What is being done to facilitate their return home?
For those unable to return home, what is being done to find permanent
housing? What is being done to tamp down the level of sectarian
violence?
Answer. According to the Ministry of Displacement and Migration
(MoDM) the primary reasons for displacement since the bombing of the Al
Askariyya Mosque in Samarra in February are direct or indirect threats
or attacks on families based on sectarian ties. To date, most of the
internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been accommodated by host
families and the support network of mosques. The humanitarian aid
community has established a number of camps, however the number of IDPs
in these camps, while fluid, remain relatively low. Most Iraqi IDPs as
well as the humanitarian assistance community view the camps as a last
resort and seek host family solutions.
At this time, U.S. Government assistance to IDPs falls primarily
under the purview of USAID and its implementing partners. Since April
2003, USAID has provided $183,000,000 in assistance, including the
recent contribution of $7.1 million for an IDP rapid response
capability. These funds are expected to last through December 2006.
Since the Al Askariyya Mosque bombing in February, USAID has provided
humanitarian assistance through its four implementing partners to more
than 100,000 IDPs displaced by sectarian violence. In FY 2006, the
State Department provided UNHCR with $7.9 million and ICRC with $5.6
million, which indirectly benefits IDPs and is considering a $1.3
million contribution to a USAID implementing partner to continue
building the capacity of MoDM.
The MoDM is the primary mechanism for Government of Iraq (GOI) to
respond to IDP emergencies. The MoDM coordinates the Iraq Government
response by assessing needs, collecting data, monitoring IDP movements,
and coordinating IDP assistance activities. Local charitable
organizations, particularly in the south, are engaged in providing
humanitarian assistance to IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Iraq.
The United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) also provide IDP
assistance, although they are not budgeted for protracted IDP
assistance inside Iraq. The U.S. military also has the capacity to
support IDPs for short periods of time under special circumstances,
however, most IDPs are wary of utilizing this assistance out of fear
that they risk being targeted as collaborators.
It is unclear at this time how many IDPs would return to their
homes if they could. While some IDPs are trying to sell or rent their
homes, indicating a reluctance to return, the majority have not made
any decision to return or seek permanent resettlement. Permanent
resettlement of IDPs has not yet been explored.
The increase in sectarian violence is a major concern to us and is
one of the prime issues raised at every level with Iraqi governmental
and political leaders. The violence in Iraq only underscores the
importance of our mission there. Helping the Iraqi Security Forces
develop their capacity to secure their own country while carrying out a
campaign to defeat terrorists and neutralize the insurgency is and
continues to be our objective.
Question. On July 8, the Financial Times reported that the United
States is seeking to establish a high financial threshold for other
countries to participate in the so-called ``international compact'' for
Iraq. The article says: ``The United States had reportedly suggested a
threshold of $450 million in assistance pledges for countries to take
part. But it was lowered to $200 million, so that Kuwait, UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Japan, South Korea, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, United
States, and Canada will be invited, as well as France and Germany--due
to the amount of debt they have forgiven Iran will be a member but not,
at this stage--Russia or China. There are questions over Egypt, amid
concern that it could prove unhelpful if left outside the tent.'' Why
have we proposed a threshold to participate in the compact? Is this the
best way to ensure other countries join in the search for a solution in
Iraq? Why have close allies such as Great Britain opposed this
approach? Why aren't political and security issues being included as
central items in the compact?
Answer. The Iraq Compact is an agreement between the Government of
Iraq on one side and the international community, represented by the
United Nations, on the other. The Financial Times article misses some
important ways the international community will participate in the
compact. First, the Government of Iraq and the United Nations discussed
thresholds only in regard to a Preparatory Group that will advise on
formulating the compact document. The compact itself is open to the
participation of the entire international community, and the United
States and all of Iraq's allies will help the Iraqi Government and the
United Nations attract the broadest possible participation in building
this new framework.
Twenty countries and international and regional official financial
institutions have already been invited to be members of the
``Preparatory Group'' for the compact. The Preparatory Group is
assisting the United Nations and Government of Iraq in formulating the
compact, and helping enlist broader participation and support. The
drafting of the compact is being done by an executive committee
involving the World Bank, United Nations, and the relevant Iraqi
ministries and provinces.
Important to the success of the compact will be outreach by Iraq
and the United Nations to enlist the participation and support of the
Gulf Arab countries and financial institutions in that region. We are
encouraging Iraq and the United Nations in these efforts.
Simultaneous progress on political, economic, and security issues
has long been an acknowledged reality for success in Iraq. The Iraq
compact focuses primarily on reforming Iraq's political economy, and
will help bring hope through greater economic prosperity. This kind of
progress is essential to build better political cooperation and enhance
security. The Iraqis and the United Nations recognize that economic
success is likewise contingent upon Iraq making progress with its
political and security issues as well. The compact will encourage the
forward-looking aspirations that Prime Minister Maliki has announced,
and in some areas is already implementing, in major initiatives on
security and reconciliation.
Question. An oil committee has been established to report back on
questions such as the sharing of revenues and central government
control over oil revenues. How much progress has the committee made?
When do you expect its work to be done? How much independence does the
committee have? What are the most contentious issues the committee is
facing? What mechanism can be used to give the Sunni Arabs and other
minorities a fixed share of the oil revenues?
Answer. The Government of Iraq has reformed the National Energy
(NEC) under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs, Barham Salih. The NEC membership includes the Iraqi Ministry
of Oil, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, and the Kurdish Ministry of
Natural Resources. The NEC will look to the respective ministries to
provide guidance on the drafting of regulations for the creation of a
national oil company and the sharing of oil revenues. The U.S.
Government is willing to provide legal advice to the Iraqi committees
if asked.
The most contentious issue will be how to distribute revenues. Many
issues have been discussed, and the Iraqis continue to look at
different models to find what serves their country best.