[House Report 110-196]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 110-196
======================================================================
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACE AND NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2007
_______
June 18, 2007.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Lantos, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 885]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 885) to support the establishment of an
international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for
peaceful means and to authorize voluntary contributions to the
International Atomic Energy Agency to support the establishment
of an international nuclear fuel bank, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment.................................................... 2
Summary.......................................................... 5
Background and Purpose........................................... 6
Hearings......................................................... 8
Committee Consideration.......................................... 8
Votes of the Committee........................................... 8
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 8
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 9
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 9
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 10
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 10
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 10
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 10
Earmark Identification........................................... 10
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 10
The Amendment
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International
Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Statements of policy.
Sec. 104. Report.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1946, the United
States has believed that an increase in the number of countries
that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such
weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing
the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in
which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all
concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more
countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear
weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear
weapons.
(2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all
countries, and in the vital national security interest of the
United States, that the number of countries that possess a
nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum and
ultimately reduced.
(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used for
peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or can be
used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As
such, these facilities are inherently a proliferation risk,
allowing their possessor to be just months away from the
production of a nuclear explosive device.
(4) It is also therefore in the general security interest
of all countries that the number of countries that operate
uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also
be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for
nuclear power reactor fuel.
(5) The financing and construction of additional uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities in additional
states around the world is indefensible on economic grounds
alone, given current and future supplies of uranium and
existing providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing services to the world market.
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-
fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries,
therefore, is often based upon considerations other than
economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is
often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration
to the world that the country that possesses this technology
has arrived at a level of technological development comparable
to that of the United States and other countries with advanced
civil nuclear power programs.
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and
spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a
demonstration of the developing world's independence from
technological domination by the more developed states. Article
IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) recognizes that State Parties have an ``inalienable right
. . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination.''. However, this
is a qualified right conditioned by a State Party's acting in
conformity with the NPT's obligation for such countries not to
acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices.
(8) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of
new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for
decades recognized the need to address this problem through
multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear
fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an
international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a
country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in
international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to
develop and construct such facilities themselves.
(9) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more
than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-
market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined
with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such
technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear
weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new
urgency.
(10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable
international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for
developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also
produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear
weapons.
(11) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last
year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a
consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities
providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of
used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear
energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities.
(12) The United States also joined France, the Russian
Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on
May 31, 2006, in proposing a ``Concept for a Multilateral
Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would
facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and
recipients to provide fuel to countries with good
nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.
(13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should
meet the condition outlined by President George W. Bush on
February 11, 2004, that ``The world's leading nuclear exporters
should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable
cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states
renounce enrichment and reprocessing.''.
(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its
uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international
management and oversight, as part of a ``Global Nuclear Power
Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear fuel
cycle centers.
(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system
to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current market
prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, could
reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct
nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of
nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as such
countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing facilities and are committed to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ``Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable
Access to Nuclear Fuel'', proposed by the United States,
France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be
expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
(2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian
Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities
under international management and oversight is also a welcome
development and should be encouraged by the United States;
(3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of
$50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an
international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States
and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively
at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to
fulfill the NTI proposal; and
(4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently
engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs
(1) through (3) and other initiatives should seek to identify
additional incentives to be included in an international regime
for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at
current market prices, including participation in non-weapons-
relevant technology development and fuel leasing to further
persuade countries that participation in such a multilateral
arrangement far outweighs the temptation and expense of
developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing facilities.
SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
(a) General Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to support the establishment of an international regime for the
assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral
authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(b) Additional Statement of Policy.--It is further the policy of
the United States to--
(1) oppose the development of a capability to produce
nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or
outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'');
(2) encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the
right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes,'' as described in Article IV of
the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the
overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining
from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not
demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT
obligations, as determined by the International Atomic Energy
Agency; and
(3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines
concerning consultation by members regarding violations of
supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the
practice of a timely and coordinated response by Nuclear
Suppliers Group members to all such violations, including
termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that
discourages individual Nuclear Suppliers Group members from
continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a
consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
SEC. 104. REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate a report on the activities of the United States to
support the establishment of an international regime for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current market prices
under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The report shall include an assessment of the feasibility of
establishing an international fuel services center within the United
States.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY.
(a) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--The President is
authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the ``IAEA'') for the purpose of supporting the
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a
reserve of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible
countries in the case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by
normal market mechanisms.
(b) Requirements.--Voluntary contributions under subsection (a) may
be provided only if the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that--
(1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not
less than $100,000,000 and is in receipt of not less than
$75,000,000 of such pledges for the purpose of supporting the
establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred
to in subsection (a);
(2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a
non-nuclear weapon state, and will be under the oversight of
the IAEA, only if--
(A) the non-nuclear weapon state, among other
things--
(i) has a full scope safeguards agreement
with the IAEA and an additional protocol for
safeguards in force;
(ii) has never been determined by the IAEA
Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with
its IAEA full scope safeguards agreement and
its additional protocol for safeguards; and
(iii) has effective enforceable export
controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear
technology and other sensitive materials
comparable to those maintained by the United
States; and
(B) the Secretary of State has never determined,
for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act, or any other provision of law, that the
government of the non-nuclear weapon state has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism;
(3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country
only if, at the time of the request for nuclear reactor fuel--
(A) the country is in full compliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for
safeguards in force;
(B) in the case of a country that at any time prior
to the request for nuclear reactor fuel has been
determined to be in noncompliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors
determines that the country has taken all necessary
actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA Director
General regarding the activities that led to the prior
determination of noncompliance;
(C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor
fuel in accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement;
(D) the country has effective and enforceable
export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear
technology and other sensitive materials comparable to
those maintained by the United States;
(E) the country does not possess uranium enrichment
or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale; and
(F) the government of the country is not a state
sponsor of terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the
Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law;
(4) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will not contain uranium enrichment or spent-
fuel reprocessing facilities; and
(5) the nuclear reactor fuel referred to in paragraph (3)
will be provided to a country referred to in such paragraph
only at current market prices.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement of
subparagraph (F) of subsection (b)(3) if the President--
(1) determines that it is important to the national
security interests of the United States to do so; and
(2) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate a report that contains the basis of the
determination under paragraph (1).
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize voluntary contributions under subsection (a) to
support subsidization of the price of nuclear reactor fuel whose supply
would be assured by the United States, the IAEA, or any other state or
international entity covered by this section.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--To carry out section 201, there is authorized to
be appropriated to the President $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008.
(b) Availability of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are
authorized to remain available until September 30, 2010.
Summary
The Lantos ``International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and
Nonproliferation Act of 2007'' seeks to close a major gap in
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by supporting the
establishment of an independent international nuclear fuel
bank. The bank would guarantee reactor fuel to countries that
forgo their own enrichment plants and are in good standing with
existing international nuclear safeguards commitments, should
there be a disruption in the world's supply of nuclear fuel.
The bill authorizes $50 million to support the
establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
international nuclear fuel bank. Prerequisites include pledges
to the IAEA of an additional $100 million from other sources,
of which at least $75 million must have been received. The
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has a standing pledge of $50
million. The U.S. funds would be authorized only through FY 08.
These could be used only for the creation of a fuel bank that
would supply fuel as a last resort to countries that are in
full compliance with their international nuclear safeguards
agreements and do not possess uranium enrichment or spent-fuel
reprocessing facilities.
By ensuring that nuclear fuel is available to cover all
contingencies of an interruption of supply, a fuel bank would
undermine the national security argument employed by other
countries that an independent capacity to produce nuclear fuel
is needed as insurance against a potential cutoff by external
suppliers. By removing this pretext, Iran's assertion that it
requires a capacity for this reason would be greatly weakened,
if not eliminated altogether.
An additional contribution to the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime from a fuel bank derives from the
condition that recipients cannot possess a nuclear fuel
production capability. This will reinforce efforts to stop the
further proliferation of this dual-use capacity, and with it
the spread of a capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
Background and Purpose
Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1946, the United
States has believed that an increase in the number of countries
that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such
weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing
the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in
which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all
concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more
countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear
weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear
weapons.
It is therefore in the general security interest of all
countries, and in the vital national security interest of the
United States, that the number of countries that possess a
nuclear weapons capability be kept to a minimum and ultimately
be reduced.
Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities
produce nuclear material that can be used either for peaceful
purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or to produce
uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, these
facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, allowing their
possessor to be just months away from the production of a
nuclear explosive device.
It is therefore in the general security interest of all
countries that the number of countries that operate uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also be kept
to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for nuclear
power reactor fuel.
The financing and construction of additional uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities in additional
states around the world is indefensible on economic grounds
alone, given current and future supplies of uranium and
existing providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing services to the world market.
The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing facilities by additional countries, therefore, is
often based upon considerations other than economic
calculations. The possession of such facilities is often
elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration to the
world that the country that possesses this technology has
arrived at a level of technological development comparable to
that of the United States and other countries with advanced
civil nuclear power programs.
Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and
spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a
demonstration of the developing world's independence from
technological domination by the more developed states. Article
IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) recognizes that State Parties have an ``inalienable right
. . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination.'' However, this
is a qualified right conditioned by a State Party's acting in
conformity with the NPT's obligation for such countries not to
acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices.
It has been long recognized that the proliferation of
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of
new nuclear weapon states.
Concerned governments, nongovernmental organizations, and
individual experts have for decades recognized the need to
address this problem through multilateral assurances of the
uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful
application of nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to
provide fuel if the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and
even multilateral participation in international uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, as a means
of reducing incentives of countries to develop and construct
such facilities themselves.
Until recently, such efforts have produced little more than
reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-market in
uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined with the
attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such technology and
equipment to provide the basis for nuclear weapons programs,
have rekindled this debate with a new urgency.
Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable
international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for
developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also
produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear
weapons.
Several initiatives have been proposed over the last year
to address these concerns. The United States has proposed the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a
consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities
providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of
used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear
energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities.
The United States also joined France, the Russian
Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on
May 31, 2006, in proposing a ``Concept for a Multilateral
Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would
facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and
recipients to provide fuel to countries with good
nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.
Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should meet the
condition outlined by President George W. Bush on February 11,
2004, that ``The world's leading nuclear exporters should
ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to
fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce
enrichment and reprocessing.''.
The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its uranium
enrichment facilities be placed under international management
and oversight, as part of a ``Global Nuclear Power
Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear fuel
cycle centers.
In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system to
assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current market
prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, could
reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct
nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of
nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as such
countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing facilities and are committed to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Rice
and other senior Administration officials have expressed their
approval for the concepts of this bill, as it directly supports
U.S. efforts to create an international regime for assured
nuclear fuel supply for peaceful purposes.
Hearings
On May 10, 2007, the Committee held a hearing on nuclear
nonproliferation policy, with a focus on H.R. 885. Witnesses
were: former Sen. Sam Nunn of the Nuclear Threat Initiative;
Joe Cirincione of the Center for American Progress; and Henry
Sokolsky of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. On
January 11, 2007, the Committee held a briefing entitled,
``Next Steps in the Iran Crisis,'' with the Honorable Thomas R.
Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, and the Honorable R. James Woolsey, Jr., former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which the
issue of an international fuel assurance regime, in the context
of possible responses to Iran's development of an uranium
enrichment facility, were considered.
Committee Consideration
On May 23, 2007, the Committee marked up H.R. 885, and
reported it favorably to the House, as amended, by voice vote,
a quorum being present.
Votes of the Committee
There were no recorded votes on the bill.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
The legislation authorizes $50,000,000 to establish an
international nuclear fuel bank.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 1, 2007.
Hon. Tom Lantos, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 885, the
International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act
of 2007.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sam
Papenfuss, who can be reached at 226-2840.
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag.
Enclosure
cc:
Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
H.R. 885--International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act
of 2007.
H.R. 885 would authorize the appropriation of $50 million
in 2008 for a voluntary contribution to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This contribution would allow the
IAEA to establish an international nuclear fuel bank that could
be used to provide eligible countries with nuclear fuel in the
event of disruptions that affect the market for nuclear fuel.
Before making the contribution, the bill would require the
President to certify that:
LOther countries have pledged at least $100
million to the IAEA for the nuclear fuel bank and the
IAEA has received at least $75 million of the pledged
amounts;
LThe international nuclear fuel bank would be
established in a country without nuclear weapons under
the oversight of the IAEA;
LThe host country for the nuclear fuel bank
has an agreement with the IAEA regarding safeguards,
has always been compliant with that agreement, has
effective export controls over nuclear technology, and
does not support international terrorism; and
LThe international fuel bank will not provide
nuclear reactor fuel to any country that does not meet
certain guidelines specified in the bill.
If the President is able to make the certifications
required in the bill, and based on historical spending patterns
for voluntary contributions to international organizations, CBO
estimates that implementing H.R. 885 would cost $45 million in
2008 and $50 million over the 2008-2009 period, assuming
appropriation of the authorized amount.
H.R. 885 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Sam Papenfuss,
who can be reached at 226-2840. This estimate was approved by
Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget
Analysis.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Act seeks to close a major gap in the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime by supporting the establishment of an
independent international nuclear fuel bank.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d) (1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority
for this legislation in article I, section 8 of the
Constitution.
New Advisory Committees
H.R. 885 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
Congressional Accountability Act
H.R. 885 does not apply to the Legislative Branch.
Earmark Identification
H.R. 885 does not contain any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS
Section 1. Short Title.
Section 1 states that this Act may be cited as the
``International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act
of 2007''
Section 101. Findings.
Section 101 includes several findings in support of the
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.
Section 102. Sense of Congress.
Section 102 declares the sense of Congress that:
(1) the ``Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable
Access to Nuclear Fuel,'' proposed by the United States,
France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be
expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
(2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian
Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities
under international management and oversight is also a welcome
development and should be encouraged by the United States;
(3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of
$50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an
international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States
and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively
at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to
fulfill the NTI proposal; and
(4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently
engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs
(1) through (3) and other initiatives should seek to identify
additional incentives to be included in an international regime
for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at
current market prices, including participation in non-weapons-
relevant technology development and fuel leasing to further
persuade countries that participation in such a multilateral
arrangement far outweighs the temptation and expense of
developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing facilities.
Section 103. Statements of Policy.
Section 103 declares that, as a general statement of
policy, the United States supports the establishment of an
international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for
peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the IAEA.
Additionally, Section 103 declares U.S. policy to: (1)
oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear
weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of
the NPT; (2) encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the
right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes,'' as described in Article IV of
the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the
overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining
from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not
demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT
obligations, as determined by the IAEA; and (3) strengthen the
Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by
members regarding violations of supplier and recipient
understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and
coordinated response by Nuclear Suppliers Group members to all
such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to
an involved recipient, that discourages individual Nuclear
Suppliers Group members from continuing cooperation with such
recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a
coordinated response has been achieved.
Section 104. Report.
Section 104 requires the President to report to the
Congress not later than six months after the date of enactment
of the Act, on the activities of the United States to support
the establishment of an international regime for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current market
prices under multilateral authority, such as the IAEA. The
report shall also include an assessment of the feasibility of
establishing an international fuel services center within the
United States.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
Section 201. Voluntary Contributions to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Section 201 authorizes the President to contribute funds
(authorized to be appropriated in Section 202, below) to the
IAEA to help establish an international nuclear fuel bank of
low-enriched uranium to provide to eligible countries in the
case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal
market mechanisms. Such funds can only be contributed if the
President certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, that the IAEA has received pledges of
not less than $100,000,000 and is in receipt of not less than
$75,000,000 of such pledges for a fuel bank. The President must
also certify that the international nuclear fuel bank will be
established within the territory of a non-nuclear weapon state,
under the oversight of the IAEA, which has a comprehensive IAEA
safeguards agreement and additional protocol for safeguards in
force, has never been determined by the IAEA to be in
noncompliance with such safeguards agreements, has effective
enforceable nuclear export controls comparable to those of the
U.S., and is not a state sponsor of terrorism under U.S. law.
Section 201 also requires that, in order to contribute
funds authorized by this Act, the President must further
certify that the international nuclear fuel bank will only
provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country if the country is in
full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and has an
additional protocol for safeguards in force; in the case of a
country that was previously determined to be in noncompliance
with its safeguards agreement, the IAEA determines that the
country has taken all necessary actions to satisfy any concerns
of the IAEA Director General regarding their activities; the
country agrees to use the nuclear reactor fuel in accordance
with its IAEA safeguards agreement; the country has effective
and enforceable export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use
nuclear technology and other sensitive materials comparable to
those maintained by the United States; the country does not
possess uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities of any scale; the international nuclear fuel bank
will not contain uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities; and fuel bank fuel will be provided at current
market prices.
In addition, the fuel bank cannot provide fuel to the
government of any country that has been designated a state
sponsor of terrorism under U.S. law. However, the President may
waive this requirement if he determines that it is important to
the national security interests of the United States to do so
and reports to the foreign affairs committees the reasons for
his determination.
Finally, Section 201 states that nothing in this section
shall be construed to authorize voluntary contributions to
support subsidization of the price of nuclear reactor fuel
whose supply would be assured by the United States, the IAEA,
or any other state or international entity covered by this
section.
Section 202. Authorization of Appropriations.
Section 202 authorizes $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 for
contributions to an international nuclear fuel bank.