[House Document 106-277]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-277
BENCHMARKS FOR A SUSTAINABLE PEACE
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING BENCHMARKS FOR A SUSTAINABLE
PEACE IN BOSNIA
September 6, 2000.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committees on International Relations, Appropriations, and Armed
Services and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by the Levin Amendment to the 1998
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (section 7 of
Public Law 105-174) and section 1203 of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public
Law 105-261), I transmit herewith a report on progress made
toward achieving benchmarks for a sustainable peace process.
In April 2000, I sent the third semiannual report to the
Congress under Public Law 105-174, detailing progress towards
achieving the ten benchmarks adopted by the Peace
Implementation Council and the North Atlantic Council for
evaluating implementation of the Dayton Accords. This report
provides an updated assessment of progress on the benchmarks,
covering the period January 1 through June 30, 2000.
In addition to the semiannual reporting requirements of
Public Law 105-174, this report fulfills the requirements of
section 1203 in connection with my Administration's request for
funds for FY 2001.
William J. Clinton.
The White House. July 27, 2000.
Report to Congress on Progress Toward Achieving Benchmarks in Bosnia
This document is divided into two parts, corresponding to
two separate Congressional reporting requirements concerning
SFOR operations and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH). Part I responds to the requirements of section 7 of
Public Law 105-174 and outlines the latest developments in our
continuing efforts to achieve a sustainable peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Part II responds to the supplementary reporting
requirements contained in section 1203(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I submit these
two reports in a single document to afford Congress a broad and
comprehensive assessment of recent developments in BiH.
PART I
Introduction. In April 2000, I sent the third semiannual
report to congress under PL 105-174, detailing progress towards
achieving the ten benchmarks adopted by the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) and the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) for evaluating implementation of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP or the
Dayton peace agreement). This section provides an updated
assessment of progress toward achieving the benchmarks for the
period from January 1 through June 30, 2000.
the United States continues to have strong national
interests in fostering security and stability in Southeastern
Europe. To that end, working with our Allies and Partners, we
are making slow but steady progress in helping BiH on its way
to political and economic recovery. We have worked hard to
maintain a cooperative momentum. At the PIC ministerial meeting
in Brussels in May, ministers laid out priorities for the next
two years for Bosnian authorities and the international
community that focussed on achieving self-sustaining peace,
democracy, and economic growth in BiH. Continued active
engagement by the international community, led by the U.S. and
our partners in the PIC, will be needed if these objectives are
to be realized. It remains our goal to foster circumstances
that allow the people of BiH to assume stewardship of a self-
sustaining peace process leading to full integration of BiH
into the family of European democracies.
The following evaluation provides a detailed account of
progress achieved over the reporting period under each of the
ten benchmarks. Basic structures of government now in place are
slowly extending their reach, and Dayton-mandated central
institutions functions with increased, though still limited,
effectiveness. UN-sponsored training of a multi-ethnic State
Border Service is well under way. A small, specially trained,
multi-ethnic policy unit deployed in support of UN operations
in East Timor. In addition, Bosnia resumed control of its upper
airspace during the reporting period. Over the past six months,
the international community undertook planning for intensified
action against deep-rooted corruption in BiH. The international
community has intensified support for increased independence of
the still-fragile BiH police force and judicial system and has
carried out measures against corrupt and obstructionist
government and business officials. Nevertheless, there remains
much room to improve these institutions and prepare them to
contribute to establishing a truly multi-ethnic state.
Many political figures remain committed to mono-ethnic,
anti-Dayton visions of the future and resist taking steps that
would ensure a European future for a multi-ethnic BiH. Key
indicted war criminals remain at large, poisoning the
environment in which peace is taking root. The rate of minority
refugee returns, while registering four-fold increase in the
first quarter of calendar 2000, remains less than satisfactory.
Many needed economic and judicial reforms are still pending.
The April municipal elections demonstrated that hardline
nationalist parties remain a powerful political force, even
though their grip is weakening. Further forceful international
community action will be needed to eliminate the influence of
discredited opponents of the Dayton process.
A benchmark-by-benchmark analysis of the current situation
follows:
1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire.
Since the July 1-December 31, 1999, assessment, BiH continues
to be relatively calm. NATO deemed the security environment in
Bosnia sufficiently improved to undertake substantial cuts in
SFOR's total troop strength, reducing SFOR personnel by about
30 percent, to approximately 23,000 (about 22,000 in Bosnia),
by May 2000. The U.S. component was reduced to around 4,600
troops or about 20 percent of SFOR strength. As of May 1, 2000,
the planned reduction from 34,000 to 23,000 troops was
complete. As a result of this drawdown, local commanders have
to cover their assigned areas with fewer forces, which in some
cases may be located farther from potential trouble areas.
SFOR's new operational concept compensates for the reduction in
troop numbers through enhanced flexibility, which permits the
restructured force to accomplish its mission with the same
overall effectiveness. NATO Secretary General Lord George
Robertson reported to the PIC ministerial on May 23 that SFOR
would ``always retain the forces necessary to get the job done,
and in today's environment, we are at the right level.''
Progress continued towards increasing mutual confidence
between the entity armed forces (EAFs). The Office of the High
Representative (OHR), OSCE, and SFOR have cooperated to
increase the professionalism and education of the EAFs. The
political leadership of Bosnia has agreed to formulate a common
Bosnian security policy as a first step towards creating a
state dimension of defense. The permanent secretariat for the
Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) made progress in
developing its role in coordinating actions of the EAFs at the
policy level. In addition to working on the common security
policy, the SCMM secretariat assisted in planning and
implementing reductions of the EAFs' budgets and military
personnel by 15 percent. SFOR verified that this drawdown was
completed in a report to the SCMM in May. This process was
advanced in March, during Secretary Albright's visit to
Sarajevo, with an agreement among the United States, Croatia,
and the Federation to notify all future security assistance
from Croatia and the United States through the SCMM. The United
States implemented this arrangement immediately, and in May
Croatia and the Federation signed an Agreement on defense
Assistance Transparency. However, BiH still has no state
security policy, and the SCMM will require more staff, more
resources, and greater authority to deal with security issues
directly, if it is to carry out its envisioned role.
2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured
and democratic police force in the Federation and Republika
Srpska (RS). Signs of reform in both entities continue to be
observed. With UN and other international training, the multi-
ethnic State Border Service began operations. The Service has
selected its executive leadership, and the first units deployed
at Sarajevo airport on June 6. More deployments are expected in
the near future. In addition, a twelve-member multi-ethnic BiH
policy unit was deployed to East Timor in support of UN
operations there. As a result of UNMIBH's creation of the
Standing Committee on Police Matters, on May 3, the entities
signed an agreement to facilitate the voluntary redeployment of
200-300 police across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to
return them to their pre-war assignments. In Mostar, local
cantonal authorities have begun to integrate the police
headquarters. However, organized crime and anti-Dayton forces
remain major impediments to reform and continue to exert
political influence on elements of the police. It was necessary
for the OHR to remove two cantonal interior ministers for non-
compliance with Dayton-related mandates, and assistance from
the international community and SFOR is still needed to
effectively combat organized crime, civil disorder, narcotics
trafficking, ethnic violence, and public sector corruption. The
International Police Task Force (IPTF) is nearing completion of
its human rights and transition training and is planning to
phase out its training function. It will focus on monitoring/
advising police activities and staffing specialized units for
helping local police deal with organized crime and corruption.
UNMIBH continues intensive audits of local police operations
and will vigorously enforce non-compliance and de-certification
policies.
3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform
program. Significant judicial reform legislation was adopted by
the RS parliament in April and imposed by OHR in the Federation
in May. The aim of these Entity judicial and prosecutorial
service laws is to de-politicize the appointment and dismissal
of judges and prosecutors by establishing judicial selection
commissions composed of serving judges and prosecutors to
advise legislators on all appointments and dismissals. The laws
also provide that the Commissions will review all sitting
judges and prosecutors over a period of 18 months. The United
Nations' Judicial System Assessment Program (JSAP) has stated
that it will complete its work by the end of the year. A
follow-on program focussed on reform implementation is being
designed by OHR. Progress was also made in the area of judicial
training with the establishment in February of an Inter-Entity
Judicial Training Advisory Board. The Federation Government
established the new first instance criminal court to try inter-
cantonal crime, terrorism, and organized crime in accordance
with a law imposed by OHR last year. OHR continued to press the
Federation for proper funding for this court, which was not
forthcoming. Though steady progress is being made structurally
in the area of judicial reform, more effort is needed to ensure
implementation of these new structures and real independence
(political and financial) of the judiciary. Successful
execution of judicial reforms is critical to establishment of
the rule of law and establishing once and for all the
confidence of all Bosnia's citizens regardless of ethnicity in
the domestic court system.
4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption.
Aim: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. The
new reform Government of Croatia, which emerged from elections
this spring, has stated its commitment to transparency in its
relations with Bosnia. The March agreement to channel support
for the Bosnian Federation military through the SCMM (above,
Benchmark 1) is an important example. It cuts support from
Croatia for nationalist Croat organizations in BiH.
Under pressure from the international community, the
Bosnian authorities have taken a more active role in fighting
corruption. For the first time, a Bosnian court convicted three
former Tuzla canton officials on abuse of office charges. The
Federation Government produced an anti-corruption strategy in
March 2000. In the RS, Prime Minister Dodik also produced an
anti-corruption plan and asked for assistance in implementing
it. U.S. support to the OHR's anti-fraud unit will underwrite
the hiring of auditors, prosecutors, and investigators. The
United States has also increased assistance to police,
prosecutors, judges and other legal professionals in fighting
corruption, particularly in the banking sector. Two FBI agents
are in Bosnia now to assist in preparing several key organized
crime/corruption cases for prosecution and in enhancing local
law enforcement and prosecutorial capacities in this area.
OHR's Anti-corruption and Transparency (ACT) Group and the
interagency Frowick Anti-corruption Task Force (FACT) continue
to provide a valuable contribution that specifically addresses
corruption issues.
5. Media Reform. Aim: A regulated, independent, and
democratic media. Progress in the course of the reporting
period has been notable. The Independent Media Commission (IMC)
has actively developed regulations and guidance. In January
2000, the IMC Rule on Broadcast License Fees, an important part
of the long-term licensing process, entered into force. The IMC
also adopted new guidelines for equitable access to media
during election periods and issued an Advertising and
Sponsorship Code of Practice for Radio and Television. Most
important, steps have been taken to remove political control
and bias in the media. More still needs to be done.
In February, the IMC implemented its November 1999 decision
to shut down hardline Croat-dominated Erotel TV for failure to
accept the terms of an IMC Provisional Broadcast License, which
would have involved shrinkage of its coverage area and Erotel's
turning over surplus transmitters needed to establish
Federation Television. Thanks to OSCE international oversight,
broadcasts during the election period covered the campaign in a
manner more consistent with international norms than in the
past.
Despite these positive steps, pressures persist, including
political pressure aimed at encouraging self-censorship by
journalists. Individual journalists continue to receive
anonymous threats, some of which appear to be politically
motivated. In April, OHR and OSCE jointly condemned abusive
publications threatening independent journalists in Livno
(Canton 10). The international community will continue to
insist on adherence to licensing regulations and professional
standards of conduct in journalism and through training and
technical assistance programs, help journalists meet those
expectations and understand why they are important.
6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National
democratic institutions and practices. At the State level, all
Dayton-mandated central institutions meet regularly, but their
effectiveness could be enhanced. Pursuant to last November's
New York Declaration agreed to by the Joint Presidents, a joint
secretariat for the Presidency was created, and efforts were
made to increase funding for the three under-funded State
ministries. (Under a law adopted by the State Parliament, the
number of ministries will increase to six.) In addition, BiH
authorities have committed to issuance of a common passport and
establishment of a central passport registry. With its
deployment June 6, the State Border Service (see Benchmark 2)
became the first multi-ethnic armed force under central
government control. On June 6, the BiH House of Representatives
approved the nomination of Spasoje Tusevljak as Chairman of the
BiH Council of Ministers, a position which had been vacant
since February because of the inability of the Parliament and
the Joint Presidents to agree on a nominee. The United States
has made clear that it intends to monitor closely Tusevljak's
performance in carrying out critical government initiatives in
a number of key areas of Dayton implementation.
There is resistance, particularly from the Serb side, to
investing State institutions with real power, as they view
increased State power as an infringement on entity
prerogatives. Within the Federation, the threat of the National
Interest Clause renders the legislative process slow and often
ineffective. The April 8 municipal elections, successfully
supervised by OSCE with SFOR's support, yielded free and fair
results and overall increases for more moderate parties in the
Federation and the Republika Srpska. The BiH Parliament has so
far rejected the OSCE-drafted Election Law, despite
international pressure. Some opposition parties strongly
opposed the law as well. Nevertheless, planning is underway for
the general elections, which OSCE has scheduled for November
11, 2000, to be held under OSCE supervision and under
provisional rules and regulations that have been updated to
incorporate essential elements of the draft election law. In
November, voters will select members of the federal parliament,
parliamentary bodies in both Entities, cantonal assemblies in
the Federation, and the RS presidency.
Development of stronger central institutions continues to
be of paramount importance. Last December, OSCE rules that no
one illegally occupying another person's property could run for
or hold office. Some officials have already been removed from
office for refusing to obey this order, and a number of
candidates for the municipal elections were disqualified. Other
officials have been removed for obstructing Dayton. In April
and May, the administration in Livno (Canton 10), known for
anti-Dayton activity, saw the removal from office of its
governor, prime minister and minister of internal affairs by
the High Representative. (See also Benchmark 5.) The President
of the Federation Privatization Agency Management Board was
removed in May. Enforcement of these actions by OSCE and OHR
are supported by SFOR's continued maintenance of a secure
environment, in which State and entity institutions can
function and democratic elections can take place.
7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-market reform. Progress
continues to be slow and uneven. While obstructionist politics
prevent the implementation of many free market reforms,
officials within the Bosnian government increasingly accept the
need for them. Privatization remains a key goal of the economic
reform effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the U.S.
Government suspended privatization assistance, Federation
authorities began to address some of the issues impeding
privatization. Progress has been made by increasing the number
of privatization plans submitted and approved and by protecting
investors from restitution claims. However, the pace remains
slow. Both entities recently bowed to international community
pressure to conduct privatization tenders in accordance with
international standards. The tender process will utilize
international experts. Republika Srpska authorities are more
cooperative and continue to make solid progress in moving the
privatization process forward.
Despite improved anti-corruption efforts (see Benchmark 4),
corruption continues to be endemic in the economic systems of
both entities. Payment bureaus, which developed in the 1950s
and are non-transparent economic and management control
institutions, are scheduled to be phased out by the end of
2000, which should pave the way for establishment of a sound
banking sector. To this end, the law was changed to remove the
Payment Bureaus' monopoly on transferring funds. The Central
Bank has begun preparations to take over major inter-bank fund
transfers, and commercial banks are being licensed to do
routine transfers. Several banks have prepared privatization
plans, and the first should be privatized soon. Also, Banking
Agencies in both entities are moving to assume more authority,
though OHR had to impose the immunity legislation necessary for
their full effectiveness. The need for sound, prudent, fiscal
management at both the entity and national levels cannot be
overstated. The international community strongly supports
establishment of a treasury function at the state and entity
levels to optimize the financial management of government
resources. We also encourage the state to assume a stronger
economic regulatory function to reduce investment barriers and
help unify BiH as a single economic space. Treasury legislation
has passed one house of parliament at the state level and
awaits parliamentary consideration in both entities.
8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A
functioning and orderly minority return process. This period
has seen an unprecedented surge in displaced persons and
refugee returns to pre-war homes. Minority returns to some of
the previously most hostile regions in the RS have taken place
and appear to be gaining momentum. Only occasionally have
majority groups in the RS publicly resisted returnees, and even
these demonstrations were largely orchestrated rather than
spontaneous. UNHCR estimates that for the first quarter of this
year 7,377 registered minority returns took place, as compared
to 1,721 for the same period of 1999--a four-fold increase. Due
to the nature of spontaneous returns, only anecdotal
information is available, but there appears to be a major
increase in these as well. The bulk of these returns, however,
continues to be to outlying, destroyed rural villages, where
individuals take advantage of improved security conditions
provided by SFOR to begin rebuilding while awaiting
international assistance. Lack of assistance funds for shelter
repair is the greatest obstacle to sustaining these returns.
Returns to urban areas continue to lag, particularly in the
larger towns. One reason for the relatively slow pace of
returns to cities has been the reluctance of local officials to
adjudicate resolution of property claims, as well as the
reluctance of local authorities to evict illegal occupants.
Officials in the RS and in hardline Croat majority areas
commonly obstruct evictions and minority reinstatements. To
address this problem, OHR initiated a Property Legislation
Implementation Plan (PLIP) late last year as the follow-up to
the October package of amendments to property laws imposed on
both entities by the High Representative. Security is no longer
the primary concern of most returnees, with the possible
exception of some hardline regions in the RS and, to a lesser
extent, the Federation. According to a USAID-sponsored study,
security and shelter remain the greatest needs for sustainable
returns. Other important factors cited by respondents included
employment and education, as well as infrastructure issues
(power, water, health facilities, and transportation).
9. Brcko. Aim: Implementation of the Brcko Final Award. The
March 1999 Final Award issued by the International Arbitral
Tribunal for Brcko directed that a new, self-governing District
be created by reunification of the entire pre-war opstina
(municipality) of Brcko, although the IEBL is to remain in
place for the time being. On January 20 Supervisor Farrand
established a new, unified police force to replace the three
separate forces that have operated there since the end of the
war. On March 9, the Supervisor put into effect a new District
Statute that is to serve as the ``constitution'' of the
District and appointed to office the Mayor and other officials
who will comprise the District administration. On March 31 the
Supervisor installed a multi-ethnic District Assembly.
Demilitarization of Brcko was completed in March by the full
withdrawal of RS military forces from the District. Few
protests against any of these developments took place, freedom
of movement is now the norm, and minorities continue to return
to the more rural areas of the District. Despite the seeming
ease with which these major changes have been implemented,
SFOR's presence remains crucial to deterring attempts by
hardliners to disrupt implementation of the Brcko Award through
violence.
10. Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim:
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to
The Hague for trail. Thus far 49 PIFWCs have been transferred
to The Hague for trial under open and sealed indictments.
Acting within its mandate, SFOR has assisted in the transfer of
indictees to The Hague and continues to support ICTY filed
investigations in Bosnia. The most recently captured indictees,
Mitar Vasiljevic (January 25), Dragoljub Prcac (March 5),
Momcilo Krajisnik (April 3), Dragan Nikolic (April 21), and
Dusko Sikirica (June 25) were detained by SFOR in Bosnia.
Mladen Naletilic (Tuta), indicted for crimes in Herzegovina,
was surrendered by the Government of Croatia on March 21.
Cooperation from the parties, who are responsible for
apprehending and turning over PIFWCs to ICTY, continues to vary
widely. RS Prime Minister Dodik has expressed full support for
SFOR to arrest indictees, but Bosnian Serb extremists continue
to oppose action against PIFWCs in the RS. The RS Interior
Minister has reportedly denied his Ministry's responsibility to
execute ICTY warrants, while HDZ officials in BiH have openly
supported Croat indictees. As noted above, democratic changes
under the new government in Croatia have already made a
positive impact in this regard.
The United States considers apprehension and detention of
Serb PIFWCs Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to be of the
highest priority in serving the interest of justice and
facilitating Dayton implementation. Their success in avoiding
apprehension to date sustains Bosnian Serb extremism, inhibits
the establishment of trust between ethnic communities,
undermines the credibility of the international community, and
erodes the rule of law.
Conclusion. In my April report, I emphasized the critical
role SFOR plays in providing the secure environment needed for
democratic principles and free-market reforms to take root and
grow. That role continues to be essential, as is noted in
several places in this report. Progress on security and
military stabilization has reduced our force requirements, but
SFOR remains a vital part of the international community's
efforts to help Bosnia and Herzegovina as it makes the
transition from a period of military detente and reconstruction
to emergence as an independent, democratic state with a viable
economy. During the May 2000 PIC ministerial in Brussels, High
Representative Petritsch, the European Commission, and the
United States, along with other nations and international
institutions, made clear that international assistance for BiH
is diminishing and that in coming years its government and
people must take ``ownership'' of their own future.
Results in this reporting period were tenuous but moving in
a positive direction. In the April elections voters showed
signs of weaning themselves from ``nationalist'' loyalties and
moving toward government based on cross-ethnic, mutual
interests such as the economy, law and order, and a future for
their children. Multi-ethnic police forces are being trained
and put in place. Efforts are underway to demolish party links
to key sectors of the economy. The democratic change of
government in Croatia and the possibility of medium- or long-
term improvement in the FRY have removed or weakened negative
external influences in domestic BiH politics. However, the
continued presence of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade poses a
threat of cross-border political manipulation and associated
instability in the RS in the short term.
We are at a critical juncture: democracy and market
economics, which donor nations and international financial
institutions seek to introduce, are new concepts for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Ethnic rivalries persist, and political groups
continue to exploit them to remain in power. The High
Representative is removing the most egregious oppontents of
peace and democracy in greater numbers than ever before, but
existing power cadres resist losing power wherever possible.
The intentional community has agreed to focus its efforts in
three major areas where this opposition is strongest: economic
reform, building central institutions, and increased refugee
returns. SFOR has proven its value in these areas, especially
by fostering a more secure environment that has led to a surge
in spontaneous returns of refugees and displaced persons.
Through its role as a deterrent force, SFOR remains a critical
partner in the Dayton peace process and a bulwark against the
instability that the current FRY regime continues to generate
in the region.
PART II
Section 1203(a) of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense
Authorization Act requires submission of a semiannual report to
Congress as long as United States ground combat forces continue
to participate in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This report
supplements the ``Bosnia Benchmarks'' report required by PL
105-174 and is therefore submitted here in conjunction with
that report. Where possible, where requirements overlap, I have
sought to avoid duplication in the two reports. The numbered
responses that follow correspond to specific numbered reporting
requirements contained in section 1203(b).
1. Expected duration of U.S. forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. No time limit has been established for total
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
Ongoing reevaluations of required force structure have
significantly reduced the U.S. footprint from a high of
approximately 20,000 in 1996 to the current level of
approximately 4,600. While SFOR has ensured an absence of war
in BiH between the Entity Armed Forces (EAFs), the uncertain
timetable for implementation of the political, humanitarian,
and economic provisions of the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP or the Dayton agreement)
makes prediction of a military withdrawal impossible.
Additionally, the destabilizing influence of FRY president
Milosevic in the entire region and the resulting potential for
further conflict underscore the importance of a continued
international peacekeeping force in Bosnia. While there has
been progress in Dayton's implementation, much remains to be
accomplished before NATO can consider total troop withdrawal.
During the last six months SFOR's successful restructuring,
as approved by the North Atlantic Council, resulted in a
manning reduction from approximately 34,000 to 23,000, a 30
percent decrease in forces. Restructuring initiatives included
downsizing the number of battle groups and establishing a
dedicated ground and air operational reserve for rapid
employment options to support COMSFOR requirements. (See Part
I, Benchmark 1.)
2. Percentage of benchmarks completed. No benchmark has
been totally fulfilled to date, nor would I expect any to be
completed in the next reporting period. Substantial progress
has been recorded in many areas, but completing the benchmarks
will require time and continued commitment, as described fully
in Part I of this report.
3. Status of the NATO ``force of gendarmes.'' The
Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) continues to be an
essential component of SFOR, which provides unique capabilities
in information gathering and crowd control. The MSU carries out
liaison with the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and
local police. It deters disruptive civil behavior by
demonstrating that SFOR can deal effectively with outbreaks and
by maintaining a police-like professional presence throughout
BiH that is less confrontational than a military response.
These qualities, combined with the MSU's continuous patrolling
and cooperation with local police and community leaders, help
to foster an atmosphere of security and rule of law. During
1999, the MSU conducted over 300 control operations, and only
two resulted in the use of force. There are about 470 mostly
Italian troops assigned to the MSU in Bosnia. They operate
under an Italian Carabinieri Commander, who oversees
certification of specialized units from other contributing
countries. Under recent SFOR restructuring, the MSU was to gain
a second battalion, but due to continued manning problems, this
has yet to take place.
4. Military and non-military missions directed by the
President for U.S. forces in BiH. The U.S. Government supported
the decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to task
COMSFOR, through SACEUR, with the mission of providing a
continued military presence in order to deter renewed
hostilities, contribute to a secure environment, and help
stabilize the peace in BiH. The tasks outlined below were
identified for NATO forces deployed to BiH.
Key military tasks:
Maintain a deterrent military presence.
Ensure continued compliance with the military
aspects of the GFAP.
Operate Joint Military Commissions (JMC) at
appropriate levels.
Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a
secure environment in which the international civil
organizations and the parties to the GFAP can carry out their
responsibilities under the agreement.
Ensure force protection and freedom of movement
for SFOR.
Monitor Entity Armed Forces activities and inspect
Weapons Storage sites, within capabilities and in close
coordination with relevant international organizations.
Be prepared to coordinate turnover of
responsibility for Airspace Management/Control to the BiH
Department of Civil Aviation when directed. (See below, Section
4(D).)
Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of
SFOR:
Provide support on a case-by-case basis to the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) in implementing the
civil aspects of the GFAP.
Support the implementation of the Brcko
Arbitration Award.
Support the conduct of elections and installation
of elected officials.
Support the return of displaced persons and
refugees by contributing to a safe and secure environment, but
not forcibly returning them or undertaking to guard individual
locations.
Support the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and efforts against persons
indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs).
Support the OHR and International Police Task
Force (IPTF) on a case-by-case basis in assisting local police,
providing back-up, and contributing to a secure operating
environment, without undertaking civil police tasks.
Provide support on a case-by-case basis to the
OSCE in implementing Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional
Stabilization) of the GFAP in BiH.
Support the continued development of the Standing
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM).
With regard to specific issues raised under reporting
requirement 4:
(A) Persons Indicted for War Crimes: During this reporting
period numerous operations were conducted in support of the
ICTY, including support for the exhumation of war crimes sites.
Five PIFWCs were detained by SFOR forces and transferred to
ICTY custody in The Hague. There was little public protest in
the RS and no significant political reaction. (See Part I,
Benchmark 10.)
(B) Support to civilian police functions: As long as
organized opposition to Dayton continues, the OHR, UN, and
other international organizations involved in civil
implementation will rely on SFOR to provide a secure
environment and to provide back-up in the case of civil unrest
fostered by Dayton opponents. (See also Part I, Benchmarks 2,
3, 4).
(C) Resettlement return of refugees: During this reporting
period, SFOR continued close co-operation with the OHR and
UNHCR to encourage returns. Minority refugee returns for the
first quarter of 2000 registered a four-fold increase over the
same time period in 1999. SFOR will focus on advanced planning,
enhanced information exchange to identify hot spots, and
maintaining a secure environment to minimize any efforts to
intimidate returnees. (See Part I, Benchmark 8.)
(D) Support to local and international authorities:
Elections. SFOR continued to provide wide-area security
during recent municipal elections. Reports of violence and
opposition to elections were few, and SFOR's presence proved
essential to a fair campaign and vote. (See Part I, Benchmark
6.)
Crime and Corruption. Crime and corruption remain
significant threats to the secure environment in BiH, impeding
progress in civil implementation of the GFAP. SFOR continues to
exploit information obtained during Operation WESTAR in 1999,
which revealed links between foreign intelligence services and
organized crime in BiH. However, civilian authorities have
achieved only limited progress to date in developing a proper
legal framework and comprehensive strategy to address these
problems. SFOR continues to support UNMIBH and OHR efforts to
develop a State Border Service, which just began operations.
(See Part I, Benchmarks 2, 3, 4.)
Brcko. Since the Brcko Arbitration Award in March 1999, the
Brcko District has been completely demilitarized with the full
co-operation of the EAF. (See Part I, Benchmark 9.)
Airspace Control. During January 2000, SFOR returned to
Bosnian authorities control of the BiH upper airspace, which
NATO had controlled, as provided for in the GFAP, since initial
implementation of IFOR. SFOR is currently working with local
authorities to develop a state-level approach to other civil
aviation issues, including management of the airport in
Sarajevo. Although progress has been slow in this area, this
latest development is a major step closer to realization of
full civil control of the country's aviation industry.
5. Assessment of threats to the United States forces: The
Secretary security situation in BiH remains stable but not
peaceful. The EAFs generally comply with the GFAP and cooperate
with SFOR, so maintenance of public order is normally not a
problem. The detention of several Bosnian Serb PIFWCs, the
announcement of a lengthy sentence for war crimes of a Croat
General, and municipal elections in April were all conducted
peacefully. As part of the weapons reduction initiative, the
EAF destroyed weapons and equipment while disbanding forces in
the Brcko District. Continued cooperation between the RS Army
and Federation Army on civil projects and demining continues to
improve. Following the successful completion of a 15 percent
force reduction by both EAFs, the BiH Presidency made a
commitment to achieve a further 15 percent reduction in 2000.
Plans are currently being developed by the EAFs to meet this
commitment.
BiH authorities, civil and military, have yet to develop
the legitimate, responsible, and accountable state institutions
necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of a self-sustaining
peace. However, the latest Supreme Headquarters Allies Powers
Europe (SHAPE) and SFOR estimates view the likelihood of an
internal military threat as remote. There has also been
significant improvement in the external security situation of
BiH, due to recent democratic political change in Croatia. On
the other hand, uncertainty and instability persist in the
neighboring FRY, particularly Montenegro, and provocations by
the Milosevic regime and other extremist forces in Serbia will
continue to threaten the security of BiH and the entire region.
In the circumstances, the force for moderation and stability
represented by SFOR remains essential for continued progress in
civil implementation.
6. Assessment of costs: Since FY 1996, the cost to the
Department of Defense of the military missions that I directed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been about $9.5 billion. These
costs are summarized below (in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2000 FY 1999 FY 1998 FY 1997 FY 1996
Operation PB actual actual actual actual
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deliberate Forge......................................... 142.7 141.4 159.4 183.3 225.9
Joint Forge.............................................. 1460.2 *1,431.2 1,792.8 .........
IFOR/IFOR Prep........................................... ......... ......... ......... 2,087.5 2,231.7
Provide Promise.......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 21.7
Sharp Guard.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... 9.3
Able Sentry.............................................. ......... 14.0 10.5 11.7 30.9
UNCRO.................................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.5
------------------------------------------------------
Totals............................................. 1,602.9 1,586.6 1,962.7 2,282.5 2,520.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*This reflects a correction of $48.7 million from the previously reported amount of $1,382.5 million.
Operation Deliberate forge (follow-on to Deny Flight,
Decisive Edge, and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations
for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.
Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate
Force, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation
to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a
secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil
authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operations financed
include continued support of a U.S. Division headquarters by a
U.S. Brigade Combat Team Task Force with a force capacity of
approximately 6,200 in Bosnia, reduced to 4,600 in April 2000,
support of approximately 600 enabling soldiers in adjacent
countries (RIM), five base camps reduced to four by the fourth
Quarter of FY 2000, and two troop rotations per year.
IFOR Preparation and IFOR included the costs of preparing
U.S. troops for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace
implementation force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Operation Provide Promise was the military operation that
airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.
Operation Sharp Guard enforced the United Nations-
sanctioned embargo against the FRY (excluding the enforcement
of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction
with Western European Union forces.
Operation Able Sentry was U.S. participation in the United
Nations preventive deployment along the Serbian/Macedonian
border (UNPREDEP).
UNCRO was support provided to the Zagreb hospital in
support of the United Nations in Croatia.
7. Status of future operation plans: As these two reports
indicate, there has been a continued, gradual improvement in
all aspects of civil implementation and the security situation
in Bosnia during the reporting period. The EAFs have been
cooperative, and implementation of the final Brcko arbitration
decision has been uneventful. The municipal election campaign
and vote were free, fair, and generally free of violence.
Increasing flows of returning refugees and internally displaced
persons continue, and national elections are scheduled for
November 2000. To the extent that Bosnia slowly moves toward
normalcy and as its leaders and citizens take on greater
responsibility for implementing all aspects of the agreement,
the requirement for an overwhelming NATO presence should
diminish. The restructuring of forces envisioned in SFOR's
revised OPLAN 10407 was successfully implemented and appears
thus far to have left SFOR with means and capabilities adequate
for continued fulfillment of its key objectives and supporting
tasks. The reduction in SFOR forces, including U.S. forces,
reflects an ongoing assessment at NATO and in Washington that
the threat of a resumption of hostilities by the Entity Armed
Forces remains low. NATO will continue to evaluate its presence
and the forces required based on these elements. Continued U.S.
presence and leadership in this force will remain a critical
element of its success.
In conclusion, the Administration is grateful for the
support of Congress for Dayton implementation. I look forward
to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuit of U.S.
foreign policy goals in the Balkans.