[Senate Hearing 106-706]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-706
THE UNITED NATIONS: THE STATE OF ITS EFFICACY AND REFORM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 10, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-221 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Grams, Hon. Rod, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, opening statement.. 2
Johnson, Harold Jim, Associate Director; accompanied by: Dr.
Tetsuo Miyabara, Assistant Director, International Relations
and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, DC............ 26
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Welch, Hon. C. David, Assistant Secretary for International
Organization Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC...... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Response to questions posed by Senator Rod Grams............. 14
Responses to additional questions for the record submitted by
Senator Jesse Helms........................................ 25
(iii)
THE UNITED NATIONS: THE STATE OF ITS EFFICACY AND REFORM
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Operations,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:38 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Rod Grams (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Grams and Boxer.
Senator Grams. Well, good morning. I would like to bring
this hearing to order.
I want to welcome all of you here and especially the two
people that will make up our panels this morning: the Honorable
C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs; and on our second panel, Mr. Harold Jim
Johnson, Associate Director for International Relations and
Trade Issues, the National Security and International Affairs
Division of the General Accounting Office. He will be
accompanied by Tet Miyabara as well this morning. So, I want to
welcome both of our witnesses to this hearing.
Now, first I want to, of course, thank the witnesses for
participating this morning. GAO is releasing a report \1\ today
which looks at the progress that has been made since the
Secretary General of the United Nations announced his
intentions to reform the U.N. This morning I hope Secretary
Welch will look at this report carefully because it does
underscore major flaws in the ability of the U.N. to be an
effective organization.
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\1\ The report, entitled ``United Nations, Reform Initiatives Have
Strengthened Operations, But Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been
Achieved,'' report number GAO/NSIAD-00-150, can be accessed on the
Internet at: http://www.gao.gov
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to GAO, there is no system in place within the
U.N. to monitor and evaluate program results and impact. In
other words, the U.N. undertakes numerous activities on social,
economic, and political affairs, but the Secretariat cannot
reliably assess whether these activities have made a difference
in people's lives and whether they have improved situations in
a measurable way. I am very interested in the administration's
assessment of how well the U.N. can demonstrate that it is
making a difference without such a system in place.
I am also eager to discuss the progress of reform in the
peacekeeping area. However, given the situation in Sierra
Leone, I want to take this opportunity to get the
administration's view on why this train wreck, to use
Ambassador Holbrooke's term, occurred and what is going to
happen now. It is my considered opinion that 500 kidnapped U.N.
peacekeepers and rebels riding around in U.N. armored personnel
carriers reflects a lot more than a weakness in the DPKO; it
reflects a short-sighted and ill-planned U.S. approach that is
willing to jeopardize the future of U.N. peacekeeping for a
symbolic show of support for engagement in Africa. A feel-good
operation with no impact on keeping civilians safe and with
peacekeepers held as hostages sounds a lot like a replay of
U.N. forces in Bosnia. Have we not learned anything in the last
couple of years?
During the historic visit of members of the U.N. Security
Council to the Senate, I was struck by an exchange between the
Representative from France and the Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee. Now, I already mentioned this in a hearing
that I chaired last month, but it bears repeating. When
Chairman Warner stated, ``Don't take on more than you can do,
and do effectively,'' Ambassador Levitte replied, ``Is it
morally possible to say `no' to populations which are
desperately in need of help?'' Well, my rejoinder to that
remains, ``Is it morally possible to say `yes' when you know
the U.N. can't deliver?''
The desire to make political statements of support for
nations in turmoil appears to be drowning out considered
opinion as to whether the U.N. is able to carry out the
mandates that it has been given. The operation in Sierra Leone
is not collapsing just because neither the U.N.'s management
structure nor the financial system currently in place will
support the projected expansion of peacekeeping in Africa. It
is collapsing because as witnesses before this committee last
month repeatedly stressed, unlike NATO, the U.N. is only
successful when it takes on limited missions where a political
settlement has already been reached. This was not the case in
Sierra Leone.
And equally as important, the use of peacekeeping
commitments as political statements are obscuring the
transformation of peacekeeping from the separation of
belligerants into an exercise in nation building that goes far
beyond what Congress may be prepared to accept. Under PDD-71,
the administration is agreeing to endorse an indefinite U.N.
commitment to govern distressed nations, from sewage to social
services to setting up judiciaries, when we commit to
supporting peacekeeping operations. I am not sure this Congress
or our Nation is aware of the far-reaching implications of this
Presidential decision directive.
So, this morning I look forward to hearing your explanation
of this and other matters, of course, relating to the United
Nations as you testify today. So, Mr. Welch, thank you again
for taking your time to be here to testify before this
committee, and I would like to open it up for your testimony.
[The opening statement of Senator Grams follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Rod Grams
First, I want to thank the witnesses for participating in this
hearing. GAO is releasing a report today which looks at the progress
that has been made since the Secretary General of the United Nations
announced his intention to reform the U.N. I hope Secretary Welch will
look at this report carefully, because it underscores major flaws in
the ability of the U.N. to be an effective organization.
According to GAO, there is no system in place within the U.N. to
monitor and evaluate program results and impact. In other words, the
U.N. undertakes numerous activities on social, economic, and political
affairs, but the Secretariat cannot reliably assess whether these
activities have made a difference in people's lives and whether they
have improved situations in a measurable way. I am very interested in
the Administration's assessment of how well the U.N. can demonstrate it
is making a difference without such a system in place.
I am also eager to discuss the progress of reform in the
peacekeeping area. However, given the situation in Sierra Leone, I want
to take this opportunity to get the Administration's views on why this
``train wreck'' (to use Ambassador Holbrooke's term) occurred and
what's going to happen now. It is my considered opinion that 500
kidnapped U.N. peacekeepers and rebels riding around in U.N. armored
personnel carriers reflects a lot more than weaknesses in DPKO; it
reflects a short-sighted and ill-planned U.S. approach that is willing
to jeopardize the future of U.N. peacekeeping for a symbolic show of
support for engagement in Africa. A feel-good operation with no impact
on keeping civilians safe and with ``peacekeepers'' held as hostages
sounds a lot like a replay of U.N. forces in Bosnia. Haven't we learned
anything since then?
During the historic visit of members of the U.N. Security Council
to the Senate, I was struck by an exchange between the representative
from France and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I
already mentioned this in a hearing I chaired last month, but it bears
repeating. When Chairman Warner stated, ``Don't take on more than you
can do, and do effectively,'' Ambassador Levitte replied, ``Is it
morally possible to say `no' to populations which are desperately in
need of help?'' My rejoinder to that remains, ``Is it morally possible
to say `yes' when you know the U.N. can't deliver?''
The desire to make political statements of support for nations in
turmoil appears to be drowning out considered opinion as to whether the
U.N. is able to carry out the mandates it has been given. The operation
in Sierra Leone is not collapsing just because neither the U.N.'s
management structure nor the financial system currently in place will
support the projected expansion of peacekeeping in Africa. It is
collapsing because--as witnesses before this committee last month
repeatedly stressed--unlike NATO, the U.N. is only successful when it
takes on limited missions where a political settlement has already been
reached. That was not the case in Sierra Leone.
And equally as important, the use of peacekeeping commitments as
political statements are obscuring the transformation of peacekeeping
from the separation of belligerents into an exercise in nation building
that goes far beyond what Congress may be prepared to accept. Under
PDD-71, the Administration is agreeing to endorse an indefinite U.N
commitment to govern distressed nations--from sewage to social services
to setting up judiciaries--when we commit to supporting peacekeeping
operations. I'm not sure this Congress, or our nation, is aware of the
far-reaching implications of this Presidential Decision Directive. I
look forward to hearing your explanation of this, and other matters
relating to the United Nations, as you testify today.
STATEMENT OF HON. C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity
to come before you again to have this dialog with you about the
issues that you have mentioned. I want to repeat our
appreciation for your personal role, Mr. Chairman, in pursuing
this reform effort, including your trip to the United Nations
in January and your participation when the Security Council
members came down here at the end of March. That kind of focus
is critical to the agenda that we have, that we are pursuing
together, for U.N. reform.
I would like to go through this a little bit with you today
and talk about the general status of U.N. reform efforts,
concentrating on peacekeeping, which you have highlighted.
I was not here for your hearing last month where
peacekeeping was discussed, but I have read the transcript and
seen the statements by the other witnesses. I can address some
of the questions that you have raised to the best of my
ability.
We are approaching the 1-year anniversary of the Council
resolutions authorizing four large, new missions, Mr. Chairman,
in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo. These have
brought critical new challenges and significant increases in
peacekeeping costs and U.N. personnel on the ground, really a
change in the circumstances that obtained from the middle
1990's until recently. These changes justify your committee's
interest in this matter and our own concern.
But let me be clear. We believe that peacekeeping, I think
as you do, sir, when done right, can be one of the most useful
foreign policy tools we have. I would like to elaborate on this
in three parts.
First, I will describe what peacekeeping can accomplish
under the right circumstances. Second, I will describe how it
serves our national interest. Third, I will discuss what we are
doing to make it work better so that it can better serve those
national interests. I will, of course, conclude by talking
about U.N. reform in general, particularly now that the GAO is
releasing its report, which I have read and I commend. It is a
very good job. And I would like to use the opportunity of this
hearing, too, to mention our financial situation because that
impacts directly on the reform effort.
To discuss what peacekeeping can accomplish, we first have
to define what we expect from these operations; in other words,
what is success? When peacekeepers are deployed, the
international community is taking a step toward repairing a
breach of security and peace, averting a humanitarian disaster,
stopping violations of human rights, supporting public
security, or implementing a settlement.
In taking on these responsibilities, peacekeeping provides
breathing room and helps the agreements take root. They can
allow refugees to go home, disarm combatants, enable citizens
to live without fear, help bring war criminals to justice, and
assist national leaders building democratic institutions.
There have been some successes. In Mozambique, the U.N.
mission served U.S. aims, separating, demobilizing, and
reintegrating combatants; monitoring a cease-fire; and
observing and verifying an election process. Mozambique is
democratic and at peace.
In Namibia, the U.N. served U.S. aims in that civilians,
police, and military officers of the transition assistance
group successfully facilitated democratic change.
In Macedonia, U.N. missions served U.S. aims by containing
the spread of Serbian terror, which allowed the Macedonians
also to establish democratic institutions and to participate in
Europe.
Well, there are difficulties, of course, especially if you
look at the history of violence in some of these situations,
some of which remain very volatile. Sometimes when a peace
agreement is signed and agreed by each and every one of the
parties, the process is assaulted by one or the other of those
parties. We know that the successful implementation of a
negotiated settlement, however, may not necessarily proceed
unless there are peacekeepers present to assist it. Sometimes
peacekeeping has also failed altogether. You have spent some
time in this room examining those cases, Bosnia, Somalia, and
Rwanda, to mention some examples.
But in keeping the focus on the positive, I think that
peacekeeping can work, and I also believe it can be in our
national interest.
That does not take away from our willingness to act
unilaterally if it is in our vital national interest. We have
demonstrated our willingness to do so. We remain ready to do
so.
But at other times when our vital national interests are
not threatened, we have an important stake in resolving the
conflicts. In these situations, peacekeeping is a way to
further U.S. interests while sharing the risks and the costs.
That has been the case in Macedonia, Lebanon, Haiti, Eastern
Slavonia, and elsewhere. And there are operations that continue
around the world today where I think we would agree that that
is the case.
The four most prominent peacekeeping missions right now are
good examples of this, and they are the ones that assume the
majority of our attention and resources.
Our interest in Kosovo stems from a longstanding desire for
a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic Europe, no longer threatened
by Soviet power, and our need to help the emerging democratic
nations under a stable NATO-Russian cooperative security
arrangement.
In East Timor, we have important security, political, and
commercial interests in Indonesia, one of the most populated
nations in the world. It is an opportunity to resolve a problem
that has been a source of regional tension and humanitarian
concern for over two decades. We also want to support a close
ally, Australia.
In Sierra Leone, this is an 8- to 9-year civil war where we
have had a clear humanitarian interest in helping to
consolidate a peace and in supporting the British in what is a
key country for them. The war in Sierra Leone not only
generated large refugee flows and economic displacement,
horrendous human rights violations, but it also led to the
direct military involvement of some neighboring states.
And in Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States
has an interest in supporting U.N. efforts to stabilize
Africa's world war, its most widespread war in modern history.
This war has not only destabilized one of Africa's largest
countries, but also threatens to spill across nine borders and
destabilize much of central Africa.
To put it another way, when we support U.N. peacekeeping
operations, we are not in it just for the sake of peace, we are
in it because we think this peace is important to our
interests.
This brings me to a third point, sir. Even when
peacekeeping can succeed and even though it may serve U.S.
interests, it can do neither unless we look at the way the U.N.
performs peacekeeping operations while at the same time keeping
member states' support for those operations.
We have an emphasis on peacekeeping reform, and that is
nothing new. We can wield considerable influence, particularly
through the Security Council decisionmaking process, on
peacekeeping. And we have used that influence in recent years.
There have been some notable reforms in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations. For example, giving the Secretariat an
effective situation center for running missions; simplifying
operations and reducing costs through a contingent-owned
equipment system which, if performed well, would help missions
get the materials they need at the time when they need them;
improving mission planning by thorough ``lessons learned''
reviews of past operations; working to improve the recruitment,
training, deployment, and logistical support of civilian police
operations; improving rapid deployment capabilities by
establishing a U.N. logistics base and standby arrangements.
These steps are a good beginning, but they are not
sufficient. Let me sketch for you some of the reforms in the
area of peacekeeping that are among our priorities.
We are concerned that DPKO, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, is stretched too thin. The Secretary General agrees
with that judgment and has informed the Security Council of his
view. We are working to correct the shortfall. There has to be
sufficient personnel both in New York and on the ground,
otherwise these operations, in our view, cannot succeed.
There is no quick fix to this. We are supporting the
Secretary General's review, which he launched in April, of
peacekeeping in general and of his particular attention to
looking at ways to enhance the permanent staff of DPKO and ways
in which that could be supplemented. This is especially
important in view of the change that has occurred and the
resultant greater demand for civilian police as a component of
some of these operations. That is a primary purpose of the
Presidential Decision Directive you mentioned, Mr. Senator,
PDD-71, which directs the administration to enhance our
civilian police capacities and also to help enhance the CIVPOL
capacities of the U.N. and member states.
Another key issue is use of experts-in-kind at the United
Nations, including civilians, not just military. DPKO has
suffered from the member states' decision, over our objections,
to curtail these experts-in-kind. Nowhere near as many U.N.
slots have been made available to make up the difference of the
shortfall when gratis military officers were removed, while
other U.N. departments continue to have what is in our view an
abundant and generous staffing pattern.
There are also questions involving the quality of troops
and equipment and the resources devoted to peacekeeping
operations, financial in particular, which need to be
addressed.
It is our judgment, Mr. Chairman, that Secretary General
Annan is an ally in this reform effort. He has appointed this
blue ribbon panel to look closely at how the U.N. can improve
its performance. There are two Americans on that panel, Brian
Atwood and William Durch. We are contributing some ideas and
thoughts to them so that they can pursue the inquiry.
But reform efforts in the area of peacekeeping are just
part of broader efforts to reform the U.N. which are the main
subject of the hearing today, efforts that have brought some
tangible results also. While there are many organizational and
management improvements, others are still in process, as I
think the GAO correctly observes in its report that it is
releasing today.
One of the most significant reforms was carried out in 1995
when the U.N. established the inspector general function for
the first time, the Office of Internal Oversight Services
[OIOS]. Now we are going through the first transition to a new
director of that, a gentleman we have gone out and met and who
appears well motivated and capable of taking up this job. Carl
Paschke, his predecessor, did an excellent job.
There are other improvements in recent years which are
highlighted in the GAO report. I will just mention a couple
here. Consolidation and restructuring of the economic and
social affairs departments; establishment of a Deputy Secretary
General slot with a cabinet-style management structure. I think
the good thing about that is not only was it established, but
the person who is filling that job is quite capable and
energetically moving to address some of the management and
coordination issues that come up in the U.N. A code of conduct
has been implemented to foster greater accountability. There is
a performance appraisal system that is being implemented.
While this has been done, there is a lot more that needs to
be accomplished. I think when I read the GAO report, not only
did they have some specific ideas in that respect, but they
point to the lag in this culture of change and reform which
seems to be, more or less, accepted in the top ranks filtering
down into the system itself. I think that is a critical
impediment right now.
Another area is to enhance the U.N.'s ability to evaluate
what it is doing--and it is doing a lot in a lot of different
areas--and identify ways in which the effectiveness of those
efforts might be increased, or where they are not effective,
where they might be adjusted, modified, or even terminated.
In addition, the Helms-Biden legislation has provided some
benchmarks as we work toward reform, in budgeting, in personnel
management, and most prominently, in the scales of assessment
for both the regular budget and peacekeeping. We have been
putting a lot of energy into this, as you might expect, because
this is the critical year to achieve change in the scales of
assessment.
This has been a big focus of Secretary Albright's and
Ambassador Holbrooke's work in recent months. No meeting goes
by where the Secretary of State does not raise this with key
foreign leaders and counterparts with whom she meets.
Similarly, Dick Holbrooke has been very energetic in working
not only in New York but in his travels. Our Ambassador for
management reform, Don Hays, I think has met several times with
probably each delegation. I have in this year alone been to
Geneva, Rome to work with the largest contributors to the U.N.
system, and then in Brussels to work with the EU, and I just
returned Monday from going to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait,
again to try and influence key regional audiences.
Important markers in that coming up. We hope the Fifth
Committee, when it resumes its deliberations this month, sir,
will agree to take a comprehensive look at scales because so
far the parliamentary mechanism in the U.N. system has only
admitted for a regular budget discussion, not of the
peacekeeping scale. We would like to get those merged so we can
work on both of them at the same time.
Obviously, the true test of this is what is decided at the
end of the day on scales of assessment, but I would say that so
far we are having some good success in getting attention to the
ideas we are pursuing for fair, equitable, and comprehensive
reform on both the scales.
Before I close, let me just review briefly the situation we
are facing in paying for our share of peacekeeping operations.
At the moment we have congressional holds, not from this
committee, sir, but from another committee, on paying our bills
for the four major operations I mentioned. This is for the
reprogramming of already appropriated fiscal year 2000 funds.
In addition, without the funds that we have asked for in the
fiscal year 2000 supplemental for Kosovo and East Timor, we
expect to fall well short of what we need to pay peacekeeping
assessments this fiscal year as a result.
Finally, we have made request for fiscal year 2001 moneys
for our share of U.N. operations, and there again, because we
expect a growth in the costs, the request is higher than for
this fiscal year, and we need sufficient funds to be able to
meet those expected needs also. Obviously, to the degree we are
not meeting our assessments for these operations, we are
incurring costs, not only costs to our diplomacy and to our
credibility, but also we are accumulating arrears.
When we deal with situations like the one you mentioned
today, Sierra Leone--and there are others which one can expect,
as we look at the operations around the world and the
operations possibly still to come--that these will be fraught
with challenge, just as they are with opportunity, to establish
peace.
The question you asked, Senator, of the panel with whom you
met in April was an excellent one. You asked them what are the
alternatives because, as we remind ourselves that it is our job
to try and get the U.N. to do a better job on peacekeeping, we
also have to ask ourselves what are our real choices in these
situations.
I am aware that this is an area where in some of these
cases, Sierra Leone in particular, the option of U.N.
peacekeeping was seen to be the most viable one under the
circumstances. If you look at the binary choice of doing
nothing or doing it all ourselves unilaterally, it is clear
that, in between, U.N. peacekeeping is one of the viable
options for dealing with these situations.
Let me point out too that, just as there are challenges in
these cases, many of the other operations are running well.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Welch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. C. David Welch
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear in front of
you today to discuss the United Nations. As Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke pointed out during your visit to New York in January, your
continued interest in the activities and vitality of the United Nations
is very important to us.
Today I will discuss the general status of UN reform efforts, but I
would like to concentrate my remarks on peacekeeping. Mr. Chairman, I
am aware that your subcommittee had a hearing last month in which you
discussed UN peacekeeping at length. I look forward to continuing this
discussion with you today, for as ongoing events in Sierra Leone and
elsewhere demonstrate, now is a crucial time for peacekeeping.
We are approaching the one-year anniversary of the Security Council
resolutions authorizing the peacekeeping missions in East Timor and
Kosovo. These two missions, along with expanded UN missions in Sierra
Leone and the Congo, have brought about new challenges, as well as
significant increases in peacekeeping costs and UN personnel on the
ground.
Mr. Chairman, these peacekeeping commitments justify your interest
in and concern over the prospects for UN peacekeeping--both in general
and with regard to specific operations.
But let me be clear--peacekeeping, when done right, can be one of
the most useful foreign policy tools we have. I will elaborate on this
in three parts:
First, I will describe what peacekeeping can accomplish under the
right circumstances. Second, I will describe how peacekeeping serves
our national interest. Third, I will discuss what we are doing to make
peacekeeping work better--so it can better serve these national
interests. I will conclude by talking about UN reform in general, and
how our financial situation could undermine all our efforts for reform.
To discuss what peacekeeping can accomplish, we first have to
define what we expect from UN operations--in other words, what is
success? When peacekeepers are deployed, we expect that the
international community is taking a step towards repairing a breach of
international peace and security, averting an urgent humanitarian
disaster, stopping gross and systematic violations of human rights,
supporting public security, or implementing a settlement leading to
democratic government and the rule of law.
In taking on these responsibilities, peacekeepers provide breathing
room and help peace agreements take root. They allow refugees to go
home, disarm combatants, enable citizens to live without fear of being
caught in the crossfire, help bring war criminals to justice, and
assist national leaders build democratic institutions.
Let us examine a few cases:
In Mozambique, the UN mission served U.S. aims by:
separating, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants;
monitoring the cease-fire; and observing and verifying all
stages of the election process. Mozambique remains democratic
and at peace.
In Namibia, the UN served U.S. aims in that the civilians,
police, and military officers of the UN Transition Assistance
Group successfully facilitated democratic change.
In Macedonia, the UN mission served U.S. aims by containing
the spread of Serb terror, which allowed the Macedonians to
establish democratic institutions and join the, European
community.
Neither the U.S. nor the UN expects a seamless transition to
stability and democracy in areas where peacekeepers are deployed, just
as we do not expect to achieve peace in the Middle East overnight.
We know there will be difficulties, especially if you look at the
history of violence in some of these situations, such as in Angola or
the Balkans. There will be temporary setbacks like sporadic violations
of cease-fires or civil disturbances. There will also be missteps by
hard-working people working under demanding, life-threatening
conditions. Often, even if a peace agreement is signed and agreed upon
by all parties, the process will continue in fits and starts. We also
know that successful implementation of a negotiated settlement will not
proceed in the, absence of peacekeepers.
And at times in the past, peacekeeping didn't just proceed in fits
and starts--it failed altogether. Just look at Bosnia, Somalia, and
Rwanda. President Clinton and Secretary Albright have acknowledged the
failure of these missions. The UN has also acknowledged these failures.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan himself stated that the UN's Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), under his supervision, failed the
people of Bosnia and Rwanda.
But the point is that in current situations like Kosovo, East
Timor, and Congo, the living conditions of thousands of people would be
much worse without a UN presence. They would also have no hope for a
better life. That is the case, we believe, in each of the areas where
operations are currently deployed around the globe.
And if success means that--as a direct result of the UN's
presence--people are not getting slaughtered, that terrorists or
tyrants are not finding a haven in failed states, that violence is not
destabilizing entire regions--then the UN is indeed succeeding.
So, I submit to you first that peacekeeping can work. Next I will
describe how peacekeeping is in our national interests.
Let me remind you that we are prepared to act unilaterally to
protect our vital national interests. We have demonstrated our
willingness to do so--Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Ladin know this.
At other times, our vital national interests are not threatened,
but we still have an important stake in resolving conflicts. When
conflicts break out, they pose a threat to America's values, such as
democracy; America's economic goals, such as access to open markets;
and America's political objectives, such as containing violence and
organized crime, and supporting human rights and the rule of law.
It is in situations such as these where, as a measure of response,
we can use UN peacekeeping as way to further U.S. interests, while
sharing the costs and risks. In the past, UN peacekeepers have served
U.S. interests in Macedonia, Lebanon, Haiti, Eastern Slavonia and
elsewhere, and they continue to do so around the globe today.
The four most prominent peacekeeping missions right now provide
good examples.
Our interest in Kosovo stems from our long-standing desire
for a stable, democratic, and multi-ethnic Europe, no longer
threatened by Soviet power, and our need to help the emerging,
democratic nations under a stable NATO-Russian cooperative
security arrangement.
In East Timor, the U.S. has important security, political,
and commercial interests in Indonesia. This is an opportunity
to resolve a problem that has been a source of regional tension
and humanitarian concern for 25 years. We also want to support
our close ally, Australia.
In Sierra Leone, we have had a clear humanitarian interest
in helping to consolidate the peace and in supporting the
British in a key country for them. The war in Sierra Leone has
not only generated refugee flows and economic displacement, but
it has also led to the direct military involvement of several
neighboring states.
And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U.S. has an
interest in supporting UN efforts to stabilize the most
widespread war in modern African history. This war has not only
destabilized one of Africa's largest countries, but also
threatens to spill across its nine international borders and
destabilize much of the continent.
To put it another way: when the U.S. supports a UN peacekeeping
operation, we're not in it just for the sake of peace, we're in it
because of what peace means for U.S. interests.
That brings me to my third point. Even though peacekeeping can
succeed, and even though it can serve U.S. interests, it can do neither
unless we reform the way the United Nations runs peacekeeping
operations, while at the same time bolstering the support of member
states for peacekeeping.
Our emphasis on peacekeeping reform at the UN is nothing new.
Presidential Decision Directive 25, issued in 1994, reflected the
commitment of the Clinton Administration to strengthening the way the
UN considers and manages peacekeeping missions.
With our position and veto on the Security Council, the U.S. wields
considerable influence over the decision-making process on
peacekeeping. We have used that influence in recent years, with
tangible results. For example, the UN's Department of Peacekeeping
Operations has strengthened its capacity to manage missions more
effectively by:
Giving the Secretariat an effective, state-of-the-art
situation center for running peacekeeping missions.
Simplifying operations and reducing costs through a
contingent-owned equipment system, which helps missions get the
materials they need at the time they need them.
Improving mission planning by conducting thorough ``lessons
learned'' reviews of past peacekeeping operations.
Working to improve recruitment, training, deployment and
logistical support of civilian police operations.
Improving rapid deployment capabilities by establishing the
UN Logistics Base and standby arrangements system.
DPKO should reflect the demands of UN peacekeeping missions in the
field. Unlike the exclusively military missions of the past, present
missions are increasingly multidisciplinary, involving civilian police
and civilian administration functions.
These steps are a solid beginning but are not sufficient. The
recent increase in UN peacekeeping costs and personnel only intensifies
the need for a sustained commitment to reform. Let me sketch for you
some of the peacekeeping reform issues that are U.S. priorities.
First, we are concerned that the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations is stretched too thin. Secretary General Annan agrees and
told the Security Council so at the end of February. We are working to
help correct this shortfall. UN peacekeeping operations cannot succeed
without sufficient personnel, both in New York and on the ground.
There is no quick fix for this. We are actively supporting the
Secretary General's review of permanent DPKO staff and ways that they
could be supplemented to provide surge capacity and specific expertise.
This is especially important in view of the internal nature of many
conflicts and resultant tremendous increase in demand for civilian
police (CIVPOL).
To demonstrate the priority we place on this, in February the
President signed Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71). PDD-71
directs the Administration to enhance U.S. CIVPOL capacities and help
enhance the CIVPOL capacities of the UN and other member states. We
look forward to working with the Congress as we move forward to
implement this new directive.
Another key issue is the use of experts-in-kind at the UN
(including civilians, not just military officers). DPKO has paid a real
penalty for the decision to curtail the experts-in-kind. Nowhere near
as many UN slots have been made available to DPKO as were filled by
gratis officials, while other Departments continue to enjoy overly
generous staffing.
We are working to get DPKO to utilize experts-in-kind where it
currently has authority to do so. And we are seeking to reintroduce
this on a basis acceptable to UN members, including the Non-Aligned
Movement.
Fortunately, Secretary General Annan is an ally in our reform
efforts. He recently appointed a blue-ribbon panel to look closely at
how the UN can improve its performance in peace operations. We are
pleased that two Americans are members of the panel: former AID
Administrator Brian Atwood and William Durch of the Stimson Center.
The panel's focus includes the nuts and bolts of UN peacekeeping--
getting the structure right, proper planning, improved organization. We
welcome the panel. It's an important initiative, and we look forward to
its recommendations. We will make it aware of our views and will keep
you apprised of its work.
But as you know as well as anyone, Mr. Chairman, our peacekeeping
reform efforts are just part of our broader efforts to reform the UN,
efforts which have brought tangible results. While we are continuing
this pursuit, we have quite a bit to show for our efforts even today.
Many organizational and managerial improvements have been achieved,
while others are in process, as GAO has pointed out.
One of the most significant reforms was carried out in 1995, when
the UN established an Inspector General function for the first time.
The Office of Internal Oversight Services--OIOS--has made remarkable
progress in developing a management culture aimed at accountability,
efficiency, and effectiveness. Its auditors have saved the UN--and
member states--millions of dollars by identifying duplication and
mismanagement throughout the organization, while its investigators have
greatly enhanced the deterrent value of oversight by successfully
pursuing cases of fraud and abuse.
Other improvements in recent years include:
the consolidation and restructuring of the UN's economic and
social affairs departments;
the establishment of a Deputy Secretary General along with a
cabinet-style management structure to improve coordination;
the implementation of a code of conduct to foster a culture
of accountability; and
the implementation of a performance appraisal system to link
employees' work to the achievement of program objectives.
While much has been done, more needs to be accomplished. For
example, we will work hard to enhance the UN's capacity for evaluating
its myriad activities and identifying ways to increase their
effectiveness. We will also promote ways to make the UN's recruitment
process more responsive to the critical and often urgent needs of
missions and projects mandated by members.
In addition, the Helms-Biden legislation has provided concrete
benchmarks as we work to achieve UN reform in budgeting, in personnel
and management, and most prominently, in the scales of assessment for
both the UN regular budget and the peacekeeping budget. I assure you
that we are making every possible effort in New York and in capitals
around the world to achieve a more equitable distribution of
peacekeeping and regular budget costs.
And, while not the focus of this hearing, reform of the Security
Council is an important aspect of our overall UN reform effort.
Hopefully, the flexibility we have expressed regarding possible Council
composition will create momentum to move the reform process forward,
but the effectiveness of the Council will remain our primary objective.
conclusion
Before I close, Mr. Chairman, allow me to review briefly the
situation we are facing in paying for our share of peacekeeping
operations.
At the moment, we face Congressional holds on paying our bills for
four major operations: in Kosovo, East Timor, Congo, and Sierra Leone.
These holds have been placed by the Appropriations Committees. This
committee, however, has not put holds on any of these missions and has
supported our using FY 2000 funding for these missions.
In addition, without funds included in the FY 2000 supplemental
budget request for Kosovo and East Timor, we will fall well short of
what we need to pay peacekeeping assessments this year. We seek your
help in ensuring that we can pay our share for UN operations. It is our
sincere hope that these holds will be lifted and that sufficient funds
will be made available for the United States to pay its peacekeeping
bills in full.
As Ambassador Holbrooke noted last month at a hearing before the
House Commerce, Justice, and State Subcommittee, not paying our
assessments to these peacekeeping operations would be disastrous. We do
not want to accumulate even more arrears, just as we are working so
hard to marshal support for regular budget and peacekeeping scale
reform as well as other important UN reform measures. Our inability to
pay current assessment bills undermines our credibility and could de-
rail our reform efforts to date.
Mr. Chairman, in the end, we believe that despite the UN's
problems, our engagement in the UN and support of its initiatives can
be an effective and low-risk way to pursue U.S. interests.
And when evaluating the UN's activities and effectiveness in
dealing with peace, security, human rights, or other issues, I suggest
that you ask: What's the alternative? I'm aware that during the
peacekeeping hearing last month, you asked some of the panelists who,
if not the UN; we should expect will help bring peace to East Timor,
Sierra Leone, Congo, and elsewhere. I am glad you asked this question.
Because when one considers the alternatives to UN peacekeeping in
these situations--either inaction or unilateral engagement--it is clear
that UN peacekeeping is one of the best tools we have for advancing
U.S. interests.
Were the situations in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia complex and
difficult? Of course. Are current peacekeeping operations sometimes
dangerous and costly? Yes. But as the President said in his speech to
the General Assembly last September, ``difficulties, dangers and costs
are not an argument for doing nothing.''
And, if I could add to what the President said, difficulties,
dangers, and costs are often very good reasons to share the burden and
risk with other nations.
The same can be said for multilateral engagement in general: that
it is a good way--not a perfect way or the only way--to pursue U.S.
interests. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you to ensure
that the UN remains an effective and useful forum for advancing U.S.
foreign policy.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Welch.
We have been joined by Senator Boxer, and if you would like
to have an opening statement before we go into questioning.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
brief opening statement.
I want to welcome Secretary Welch here today. I know you
have a hectic schedule. We are glad to see you.
I also want to welcome the representatives from the General
Accounting Office who will testify on the second panel.
Let me say clearly that I support the United Nations in the
work that it does throughout the world. I do not think it is
perfect. I do not think we are perfect. I do not think there is
any organization that is perfect. We all make mistakes. But I
am very proud that the U.N. charter was signed 55 years ago in
my home State of California, and I am proud of the role that
the U.N. has played in promoting worldwide peace and security.
In today's world of ethnic conflict, infectious disease,
and non-state terrorism, it is now more important than ever for
the U.N. to be strong, effective, and efficient. And that is
why I am very pleased we were able to pass the Helms-Biden
legislation last year which does pave the way for the U.S. to
pay its arrears owed to the United Nations. I trust, sir, that
we will abide by that law.
I am also very pleased that Chairman Helms invited the U.N.
Security Council to Washington to meet with the Foreign
Relations Committee. It was very interesting and exciting, I
thought, to have them here. I do feel that those kinds of
meetings are an important way to improve the relationship
between our Nation and the U.N.
I just want to make a couple of quick comments on
peacekeeping. In general, I believe U.N. peacekeeping
operations can certainly be successful if they are implemented
and conducted correctly. Peacekeeping can stop deadly and
costly conflicts from escalating. They can prevent humanitarian
disasters and provide a stable environment following an
agreement between the warring parties.
But I do agree in part with a point that Senator Grams
made--and I read his statement--and that is, that peacekeepers
should really go in when there has been a political settlement,
where there is calm, otherwise it seems to me bad things can
happen and it is not truly peacekeeping. It becomes an
extension of a conflict with more parties involved.
So, it is not that again we can always be perfect. It is
not that we can predict that every time we do this, it is going
to be perfect. But I think we need to have the criteria pretty
carefully spelled out so that peacekeepers are going in to keep
the peace that basically has been agreed to, and that should be
pretty well thought out because otherwise we are putting people
at risk.
Beyond that, I am concerned that the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations may not have the ability
to carry out the mandates given to them by the Security
Council. DPKO is simply undermanned at this time and the U.N.
must find a way to give these peacekeepers the tools that are
necessary to carry out their missions.
I do agree with you, Secretary Welch, when you say if we
were to turn our back on peacekeeping, it would bring us down
to two bad choices. In the face of deaths and rapes and
refugees, the two choices would be essentially, as you said,
acting unilaterally or doing nothing. To me that is not a
choice.
So, this is a difficult time and we have a lot to do. I am
very pleased the chairman has called this hearing. I certainly
look forward to working with you and Secretary Holbrooke and my
chairman and the rest of the subcommittee to make sure that we
can move forward because I think, regardless of where we come
out on all of this, we all want a peaceful world. That is what
we are committed to. That is what we owe our children and our
grandchildren and the children and grandchildren of the world.
So, we have to work harder and we have to tackle these issues
even when they are in fact contentious. We have contentious
issues here, issues of budget, issues of reform of an
institution, issues of peacekeeping. These are all key.
So, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Grams. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Welch, I would like to start off with some questions
dealing specifically, first of all, with Kosovo. It has come to
my attention that the status of U.S. soldiers participating in
the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Kosovo is still
unresolved. Specifically, privileges and immunities for
individuals in KFOR are not guaranteed. That leaves our troops
open to potential legal risk. I realize that setting up a
traditional status of force agreement is not possible in this
instance, but I think it is outrageous that after 11 months
after KFOR first went into Kosovo, this situation has been
allowed to stand unresolved.
So, I would like to ask you, Mr. Welch, has the
administration raised this issue with the head of the U.N.
mission, Bernard Kouchner?
Mr. Welch. Senator, I am not prepared to answer that
question right now. I simply do not know. If I could provide an
answer for the record. I will check. My own recollection of
this, when I last looked at it, was a difference of view about
who we would conclude this SOFA with and some reluctance on our
part to--we were inhibited from doing anything with the
government in Belgrade, in particular. But let me check into
this for you, sir, if I may.
Senator Grams. I have a series of questions dealing with
that. I would like to submit those all to you in writing such
as, have there been any attempts to resolve the status of our
troops participating in KFOR? Procedurally is it possible for
Mr. Kouchner to issue a regulation clarifying the status of
KFOR? Are our diplomats assigned to the U.N. mission in Kosovo
similarly left unprotected, and why has the administration
allowed this state of affairs to persist, as I mentioned, for
nearly a year? So, I would like to submit these questions and
maybe others with them as well to you and if you could get back
something in writing for us.
[The following was received in response to Senator Grams'
questions:]
Response of Hon. C. David Welch to Questions Posed by
Senator Rod Grams
Questions. Regarding the status of the privileges and immunities of
U.S. troops participating in KFOR and U.S. civilian personnel assigned
to the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: Has the
administration raised this issue with the head of the U.N. mission,
Bernard Kouchner? Have there been any attempts to resolve the status of
our troops participating in KFOR? Procedurally, is it possible for Mr.
Kouchner to issue a regulation clarifying the status of KFOR? Are our
diplomats assigned to the U.N. mission in Kosovo similarly left
unprotected? Why has the administration allowed this state of affairs
to persist for nearly a year?
Answer. On August 18, UNMIK formalized the legal status of UNMIK
and KFOR personnel and contractors with the promulgation of UNMIK
Regulation No. 47 ``On the Status and Privileges and Immunities of KFOR
and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo.''
UNSCR 1244, in establishing KFOR with authority to use all
necessary means to fulfill its responsibilities under the authority of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, confers such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for its mission. This includes immunity
from local criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction, and from
any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting for or on
behalf of the sending state. KFOR personnel have enjoyed these
privileges and immunities since their arrival in Kosovo. Similarly,
UNMIK personnel, under the authority of UNSCR 1244, have from the
inception of their mission enjoyed ``U.N. experts on mission''
privileges and immunities.
This legal status has been clarified by both UNMIK and KFOR. On
August 17, UNMIK and KFOR issued a Joint Declaration by the Special
Representative for the Secretary General of the United Nations and
Commander KFOR regarding the Status of KFOR and UNMIK and the Personnel
in Kosovo. The following day, UNMIK issued Regulation No. 47 ``On the
Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel
in Kosovo.'' The regulation, which is deemed to have entered into force
on June 10, 1999, applies retroactively back to the date of issuance of
UNSCR 1244, publicly affirms the privileges and immunities of the
organizations, their personnel, and their contractors, and will be
applied by courts in Kosovo.
Senator Grams. Sierra Leone. Recent events in Sierra Leone
have forced the State Department to issue a near-term policy
goal of supporting the United Nations to maintain the
credibility of the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. In
recent months and days, the peacekeeping mission has
relinquished between 300 and 700 peacekeepers, 20 armored
personnel carriers, vast amounts of small arms and ammunition.
The peacekeepers cannot maintain security for themselves, let
alone anyone else. There is no freedom of movement for any
party other than the RUF rebels throughout Sierra Leone.
The disarmament program has processed over 23,000 people,
yet has not even collected half that number of weapons from the
people. Weapons continue to come across the border from third
party states.
Mr. Welch, the United Nations has stated that it will
respond to the current crisis by expediting the deployment of
authorized peacekeepers. Do you honestly believe that this
mission will be better served by providing more troops to the
conflict? And are troops-contributing countries hesitant to
provide the additional peacekeepers?
So, again, I will go back. Do you honestly believe the
mission will be better served if more troops are committed to
the conflict, and what about those countries providing these
troops? Are they at all hesitant because of the situation that
continues to prevail in Sierra Leone?
Mr. Welch. These are good and tough questions, Senator. I
think what has happened in Sierra Leone over recent days is a
grievous setback both to the peace process that we thought had
been agreed there and to what will happen to U.N. peacekeeping
in Sierra Leone.
At the moment, this is a highly unsettled military
situation. Some of the basic facts are still unknown to the
U.N. and even to us. For example, how many U.N. troops are
affected by either being held hostage, by being surrounded but
not under the control of, yet, rebel forces, or by being in
communicado or out of communication? Some of the basic data is
still not in yet.
Will additional troops help? I think the U.N.'s key
objective right now and the one that they have expressed to the
Security Council is to try and stabilize the situation,
particularly in Freetown. This seems to be occurring, but it is
a little early to tell yet because the intentions of those who
have violated the peace arrangement are also not really well
known or clear. In particular, it is hard to assess their
military ambitions at this point.
Is there a reluctance on the part of other countries to
pitch in? Well, not surprisingly, they are equally as concerned
about the future of this operation and particularly about the
future of the peace arrangement. After all, a viable peace
arrangement is a fundamental for any of these operations, and I
think that has been badly shaken in this case. We do not know
whether it can be restored.
And yes, we have encountered some skepticism from potential
contributors. We can go into that in some detail if you like.
It is necessary in a situation like this to have strong and
capable contributors too. Countries who have those kinds of
military forces are understandably very careful about how they
commit them.
I would add that the possible effects of this go well
beyond Sierra Leone because, if you look at how the Congo
situation could evolve, with phased operations there to support
the peace arrangements as they are arrived at and the cease-
fire as it is implemented, contributing nations there too will
ask are these sufficiently viable that we can go in.
For now, the U.N. is concentrating on, as I said, trying to
stabilize the military situation in Freetown and get a hold on
the situation of its people there. At the same time, regional
leaders are trying to restore a diplomatic effort to contribute
to not only improving the military situation, but also to see
whether a viable peace process can be restored. The jury is
still out on the success of either one of those.
Senator Grams. Would this be a situation where the
recommendation might be to pull out the peacekeepers? Maybe you
could give me some details, or at least one or two examples, of
some of the hesitation by some of the other countries or
concerns that they have.
Mr. Welch. No. We are not looking at a decision to pull
them out.
Senator Grams. Well, then you are asking them to fight a
war. Are we at that point?
Mr. Welch. We are not at that point either.
There are two ways to look at the opportunities for
bolstering forces in Sierra Leone. One is on those who are
nearby and have previously played a role, Nigeria in
particular, or second, those who had committed earlier on to
form part of the authorized 11,000 for UNAMSIL who had not yet
put all of their troops in place. There we are looking at
Jordan, Bangladesh, and India. There are Jordanian troops
already on the ground, for example, and the Jordanian
Government is considering an immediate reinforcement of its
units there, plus speeding up the deployment of the battalion
it had committed to in advance.
Now, we obviously are supportive of those quality troops
coming into this situation because we think that they are
capable. Their hesitations range from the concern I mentioned
about the situation that they are entering, but people like the
Jordanians also want to help out the people they already have
on the ground.
There is a hesitation that is associated with the logistics
of this effort. Many of these countries, while they might have
the forces available at home, do not have the capability to
move them easily into the theater, and they want to know how
they are going to be able to accomplish that particularly
quickly.
Senator Grams. What actions has the United States decided
to take in support of the mission? And what options are still
on the table for us?
Mr. Welch. We have not made any decisions yet. We will not
participate with our own military forces in UNAMSIL.
Senator Grams. Personnel or what about support activity?
Mr. Welch. Well, support is another question. If the U.N.
requests it, we will entertain supporting, for example, on lift
of troops into the area or on other logistical support. To be
honest with you, this is a fast-breaking situation and some of
those requests could well be coming in as we are speaking here
now. I do not personally know of any. We are disposed, however,
to help if we can.
In the case of some of the other contributors, the
potential contributors, including the ones I just mentioned,
Senator, I believe other nations are also offering the same
kind of support that we are. Some, like the British, have gone
ahead and put people on the ground, not as part of UNAMSIL, but
to protect their own citizens and play a presence role at the
airport, and that is underway too.
Senator Grams. What other options are there on the table
that we have?
Mr. Welch. Well, the one I mentioned earlier would be to--
--
Senator Grams. I am talking again about U.S. participation.
Mr. Welch. Oh, in terms of U.S. participation, there is
none other that I am aware of. The only support we would
provide is at request to help people get in or with logistical
arrangements. Perhaps medical teams, but again I do not know if
those have been requested yet.
Senator Grams. You mentioned a couple of countries. Are
they the countries that would contribute to any so-called rapid
reaction force? And if they did, what would be their mandate?
Would it include, say, Jordanian forces or more British forces?
Mr. Welch. That is a possibility. However, the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations has not come to the Council and
suggested that option yet. What they are looking at instead is
reinforcing the units that are already there and trying to
expedite the ones that had been committed but had not yet
arrived.
Excuse me. I should just add one other thing, if I may.
They have not suggested any change in the mandate of the forces
that are presently there.
Senator Grams. I just have a couple of followup questions
and then I will recognize the Senator from California.
Does the failure of this mission cause you to reconsider
what the United Nations can effectively accomplish in the realm
of peacekeeping? Again, I think this goes back to Chairman
Warner and what he mentioned when the U.N. Security Council
paid a visit about we should not commit unless we can do the
job. Do you have any reconsideration of how the U.N. can
effectively accomplish the realm of peacekeeping?
Mr. Welch. I tend to agree with that judgment, but I think
it is, at this point, premature to announce this as a failure.
We do not know yet what the consequences will be. There will be
some lessons learned even if this succeeds from what has
happened now because, as I said, this is a grievous setback to
what we thought had been a viable peace arrangement in Sierra
Leone.
I would also like to segregate the lessons learned with
respect to the peacekeeping operation from that which we have
learned again about the peace arrangement that these are
designed to support. Senator Boxer said that the peacekeepers
really can only do as good a job as the arrangements they are
designed to support. I think some fundamental lessons will be
had there too with respect to the commitment, integrity, and
honesty of the parties in this case.
Senator Grams. That leads to my final question dealing with
this, but does this have any reflection on what is going on in
the Congo right now and the impact on whether or not the United
Nations should support the deployment of peacekeepers to the
Congo? Knowing what we know here, not a true peace in place, I
think the situation we would place the peacekeepers in and
maybe in harm's way of many of the citizens as well--but does
that have a reflection on plans for the Congo?
Mr. Welch. Yes, inevitably it will. But this is the reason
why we have been focusing a lot of our diplomatic attention on
the situation in the Congo, including with Ambassador
Holbrooke's most recent travels to the region, because it is
precisely because of that concern that we have to see that the
arrangements that are being put into place are real and
effective and that the parties are determined to live up to
them.
I think it is understandable that even before the Sierra
Leone debacle, there has been some skepticism about that. We
have said all along that it is a highly dangerous situation,
that we share many of these concerns, but the only way to
tackle that I think is to do what Dick Holbrooke is doing, is
go out there and measure the commitment of the parties and try
and find ways to make it stick.
Senator Grams. So, in other words, peacekeepers will not be
committed to the Congo until they are more satisfied that there
is a peace there that is going to stick.
Mr. Welch. There is a phased program for the deployment of
peacekeepers in the Congo, and those phases are interlocked to
the parties living up to specific obligations that they have
undertaken under the Lusaka agreements. And we are trying to
tighten those obligations as much as possible. For example,
when Ambassador Holbrooke and the U.N. Security Council team
were discussing this with the leadership there, the conclusion
of the status of forces arrangement for MONUC was critical
because, without that, you cannot deploy outward and have the
access into these areas that you need.
At the same time, the Congo agreement is a cease-fire
agreement, and the cease-fire is also under stress, to put it
mildly, in some places. That needs to be enforced before you
can have the deployments. These things will not proceed,
though, unless those arrangements are in place.
Senator Grams. Thank you, Mr. Welch.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a few followups on Sierra Leone and then a couple of
questions about these holds that you referred to so that I can
understand them better.
Can you give us any latest news on the location and
condition of the U.N. peacekeepers that have been taken hostage
in the last few days?
Mr. Welch. I wish I could be more clear on this, Senator
Boxer. I am aware of four Kenyan fatalities. I am aware of a
number of wounded. There were reports of units who had either
been captured or were missing, but whom have now either been
released or turned up. Those are coming in. In the former
category, those who have been released, for example, there was
a helicopter that was seized and it and its crew were released.
The situation is vague both in terms of the numbers who
might be held hostage and another number, I have to say in all
honesty as yet indeterminate, of others who are either
surrounded but still in control of themselves--that is, not
held prisoner--and others who are in communicado, and the
reason for them being in communicado is, as I understand it,
totally unclear to the U.N. military leadership on the ground.
Senator Boxer. It sounds like a bad situation, for sure.
The Lome agreements called for a power sharing agreement
between the rebels and the government. Did both sides actually
sign this agreement?
Mr. Welch. Yes.
Senator Boxer. So, both sides agreed in writing to a power
sharing agreement.
Mr. Welch. They signed the agreement. The cause of this
recent debacle could not be more clear. One side has violated
that agreement.
Senator Boxer. Right.
This is a very difficult question. Can you talk about the
ability of the U.N. peacekeepers to defend themselves? Are they
equipped to do the job that they were tasked with? Are they
able to communicate with each other? They come from different
countries. Can you give us an assessment of that?
Mr. Welch. I can try a thumbnail assessment. I think the
U.N. spokesman has addressed this over the last couple of days
too.
There have been some real inadequacies in both their
comportment and their equipment. This is not a Chapter 7
mission; that is, they are not there to enforce this peace.
They were there to keep it. But they were entitled to defend
themselves if set upon. Some may have done so and lost.
Obviously, there have been some people killed and wounded, and
that is a very tragic development.
I have to say, frankly, that earlier this spring when there
was an incident involving seizure of some weapons and vehicles
from one of the units, it was our impression that they could
have done better to defend themselves. They are entitled and
mandated to do that. Commanders on the scene may elect not to
for their own reasons, but we felt that that was their job.
There are some inadequacies in their equipment too and in
their ability to communicate with each other. There is sort of
a life cycle to these missions, and the early days are often
the most troublesome. As I understand it, when this happened,
there were two critical vulnerabilities for UNAMSIL. One is
they were making the transition, that is, having the job turned
over to them by the previous forces that were there, the ECOMOG
forces. The second is they were deploying outward from Freetown
to some of the areas where they were going to monitor the
disarmament and demobilization. The latter may have been
premature because they were not fully staffed up.
When we go back to look at this case, after it hopefully
has been stabilized, a question we will need to ask ourselves
is how did the U.N. leadership handle this between February
when the mission was authorized and now when it ran into a
problem when it was only at three-quarters strength. That is a
very valid question.
Senator Boxer. Well, I just want to thank you. I feel you
have been very forthright on this, and I appreciate it so much,
not defensive and not glossing over. I know I appreciate it
very much.
I had a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman, on the
congressional holds. You mentioned the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees have holds on the U.N. peacekeeping
funds. Is it possible for you to tell us what effect are these
holds having on Ambassador Holbrooke's efforts to push for
further reforms at the U.N.? I will ask you this series of
questions. Then I will stop.
Are the holds on funding for peacekeeping in Kosovo having
a detrimental effect on our ability to ask the Europeans to
undertake a greater role in financing reconstruction in Kosovo?
Are these holds creating brand new arrears at a time when
we are struggling to pay off our old debt? For example, have we
received bills from the U.N. we are unable to pay? If you could
let us know because I do not know how my chairman feels on
this, but I thought we were moving forward on all this, and it
is distressing to hear that we are still fighting this battle.
So, maybe if you could give us a sense of what effect these
holds are having.
Mr. Welch. Thank you and thank you for your supportive
observations on this. I appreciate your remarks about my
handling the questions on Sierra Leone. I wish that the
situation there were more clear and I could give you more
information.
Senator, unquestionably these holds are having an effect.
These are the four biggest peacekeeping operations. They
consume the lion's share of our CIPA budget, and we have bills
in hand from the United Nations that we should pay for these
operations.
Let me just say that this committee has not put holds on
these. There is money already appropriated. We are trying to do
this within our means for our present budget, and our present
budget, as I said earlier, is also insufficient to deal with
all of the demands. That is why we had a Kosovo and East Timor
supplemental request of $107 million.
Yes, this is going to have an impact on our efforts to seek
reform, especially if it continues. The message here that we
are trying to convey is America is prepared to step up and pay
the amounts appropriated by the Helms-Biden process if certain
changes and benchmarks are agreed to by the U.N. membership. At
the same time, it does take a stab at our credibility when we
are running up new bills.
Do others raise this? Absolutely they do. When I was in
Brussels, meeting with the European Union and they complained
to us about all the complaints we had launched against them for
not having come forward with their pledges on reconstruction
and other critical parts of the effort in the Balkans, they
pointed out, well, where is the $50 million you were asked to
pay by the United Nations, money that they are stepping up and
paying when they are billed.
Obviously, I think if we exit this year, instead of having
achieved the changes we would like on scales of assessment, but
with an abundance of new arrears, we are going to be in a world
of hurt in 2001, precisely the opposite situation this
committee had intended when it passed the legislation, and when
it agreed to the appropriations, and when it said that it would
not put these operations on hold.
Senator Boxer. I happen to agree with you, and I will work
with you to see what we can do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Just to followup on that, Mr. Welch, when Senator Boxer
talks about the hold, I think it is my understanding that the
holds have been placed because they feel they have not received
adequate information dealing with these operations. Do you feel
that the State Department or the United Nations, the DPKO, has
provided adequate details of these peacekeeping operations?
Mr. Welch. Senator, we come up here very often to talk to
staff and Members about these things. In some cases, we have
been at it for 6 months on a specific operation. We have tried
to answer every question we have been asked. However, it may be
that we have not answered your questions or those of other
Members. If so, I should know about that, if either you or your
staff can inform us, where the inadequacy is in what we are
doing. We feel like we have answered every question we have
been asked. We have briefed extensively on each one of these
operations and on every other operation too, and those
briefings have not only been from the people who work with me
on the budget issues themselves on the specific operations, but
also from the intelligence community staff, from the U.S.
military, and from the regional bureaus concerned with each of
these operations, particularly the ones in Africa.
Yes, these have been labeled informational holds. Well,
after a period of time, one has to ask, what is the further
information that might be necessary to resolve this? And in the
meantime, as I mentioned to Senator Boxer, we now have bills in
hand, which was different from several months ago when, in some
cases, we had not yet been billed, so one could be comfortable
that we could still go through this consultative process, it
having no implications on arrears.
Senator Grams. So, again, like I said, my understanding it
is for lack of information, but you believe and you are
testifying this morning that you have provided or the State
Department has or the DPKO has provided adequate information
that should resolve some of these concerns.
Mr. Welch. Yes, sir. But I am delighted to come and do more
if that is necessary, whatever it takes to get them released.
Senator Grams. Thank you.
Also, following up on DPKO, I am concerned that the U.N. is
overextended--and we have talked about this--not capable of
carrying out all of the commitments that it has made or would
like to do. The Secretariat keeps tasking the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations with more missions which it cannot
manage to do.
Should the U.N. review the type of peacekeeping missions it
is undertaking, in addition to the mechanics of whether the
DPKO has the proper personnel and also the financial resources?
In other words, should there be a pecking order or a limit of
what the peacekeeping operations can be expected to
successfully carry out?
Mr. Welch. Yes. That is precisely, I would hope, where the
Secretary General's blue ribbon panel will focus its attention.
We have focused on that both as a matter of how you
redesign peacekeeping, but also each time we look at a possible
new operation. There are some that never make it into existence
because of questions about are they necessary, can they really
do the job. Those are decision criteria that we tried to bring
to them.
I would argue also that these situations are each, in and
of themselves, unique. None of us lump them all together, but
frequently we refer to U.N. peacekeeping as kind of a lump sum,
and we have to relate the mandates to the specific context of
each situation too. There is a big difference between East
Timor, for example, and Congo, needless to say.
So, yes, you are absolutely right. This is what should be
an area of focus.
Now, my understanding is that the blue ribbon panel is
going to devote attention to precisely the question that you
asked, and we will be urging it to do so.
Senator Grams. I think there is a lot of pressure or
support or talk about sending in peacekeepers to the Congo, but
if we look back and look at the failure of the U.N. to fully
man the Sierra Leone operation, should that send, I think, some
very clear signals to the Security Council to stop approving
new mandates until it can really effectively carry out the
missions that it has already started? So, before trying to
commit to a new area, such as the Congo, should it be very
satisfied that it has fully manned and supported the
operations, say, like in Sierra Leone?
Mr. Welch. I would rather not condition it so dramatically,
Senator. I think it would depend on what kind of operation was
contemplated. For example, the Security Council might well
mandate an operation understanding it will be conducted by
regional forces rather than U.N. peacekeepers. That I do not
think would disturb the kind of conditionality you are
indicating.
There is going to be a natural reaction, though, on the
part of troop-contributing nations to situations like the one
we are seeing now. You spoke earlier, sir, about the caution
and reserve of potential contributors to the Congo, and I think
that, in fact, will help to bring more introspection to what is
intended to be done by these operations because if you cannot
stand them up because people are so skeptical about
participating in them, maybe this will encourage a tougher
minded approach to the quality of the peace that they are
designed to keep too.
That is our intent with respect to the Congo. There our
diplomatic effort has been concentrated very heavily on
assuring that the arrangements are real and viable before there
is a commitment on the part of the U.N. to the process.
Senator Grams. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. No questions.
Senator Grams. Mr. Welch, moving ahead, Israel. Israel's
foreign ministry--and quite rightly in my opinion--rejected a
European offer that Israel join the United Nations Western
Europe and Others Group, the WEOG, on a half-time basis.
According to a report in the Jerusalem Post, according to terms
of the offer, it would have been years before Israel was
allowed to sit on any U.N. committee, including the Security
Council. In addition, the offer would have allowed Israel to
participate in group activities in the U.S., but would have to
give up the right to participate in WEOG activities or run for
U.N. bodies as WEOG members anywhere else overseas. So, it
would be all right if it was done here in the U.S., but
elsewhere they would be excluded. This I think would have
signaled an exception of the unfair, the unequal discriminatory
status that has been given to Israel, a status unlike any other
state.
Is it true the United States recommended that Israel accept
the offer, and if so, why would we make such a recommendation?
Mr. Welch. The extraordinary situation that Israel has
faced for a long time needs to be corrected. We have been
working very hard on this. I personally have spent a great deal
of time, particularly with the European Union, on trying to
overcome some of the obstacles, as has Secretary Albright and
Ambassador Holbrooke. The story is not finished yet.
We think that a solution has to be based on Israel enjoying
rights of membership in a regional organization, just as we
would or any other member would. There cannot be any solution
arrived at that is not based on a consensus of those involved,
including Israel.
So, rather than speak specifically to anyone's conditions,
conditions, Mr. Senator, that have changed over time as we work
the problem, I would just leave it at that this is not finished
yet, and we will not rest until it is finished on the basis of
Israel participating just as anyone else would, in a manner
that is acceptable to Israel.
Senator Grams. I know you said it would have to be
acceptable on all parties. That gets back to my question. Did
the United States recommend to Israel that it accept what I
would consider a half-baked offer?
Mr. Welch. Israel makes its own judgments on this. It has
made its judgments about what the EU suggested, but this is no
longer just an EU matter. It has now gone beyond that
particular regional grouping to the WEOG as a whole. In the
WEOG as a whole, there are other players, including ourselves,
and we may have different views on how this is done. But
fundamental to how we come out with a solution here will be
whether Israel accepts that solution or not, and as yet, it has
not been arrived at.
Our intent is very clear. We want them to participate just
as we do.
Senator Grams. Again, as we know, Israel rejected, so they
have not accepted this offer. But I go back again, do you know
if we recommended that they do? Did we say to Israel, yes, you
should accept this offer?
Mr. Welch. No, we have not recommended anything specific to
them. We have talked to them about various parts of the
conditionality.
You are citing a press report, sir, that frankly I do not
know whether that is accurate or not. I have not talked to any
representatives of the Israeli Government in the last couple of
days about this. So, I do not know exactly where they are on
how they are reacting to the EU's latest conditionality, but as
I said, that is the EU position. It is not the WEOG position.
The WEOG position has not been formed yet. We are key players
in the WEOG, and when we form a position there, it will bear in
mind what Israel would agree to.
Senator Grams. That is why I am asking you the questions
because I do not always believe everything I read in the press
either. The press account did say that Israel was quoted as
saying the United States recommended and it rejected the offer
made.
Mr. Welch. No. We are still discussing this with them, and
we expect to continue that. The Foreign Minister of Israel is
coming to the United States shortly, as is the Prime Minister.
Our main interlocutor on this has been the foreign ministry. I
apologize for not having checked with them on where it stands,
but we will continue that discussion with them about what to
do.
Senator Grams. One last question, Mr. Welch. Did the United
Nations pass a zero nominal growth budget for 2000-2001
compared to the 1998-1999 budget? And if so, did the budget
passed for 2000-2001 exceed the $2.533 billion?
Mr. Welch. It did. It was a slight amount over it.
Senator Grams. How does the administration intend to
identify any offsetting cuts?
Mr. Welch. Within the U.N.?
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Welch. Well, we continue to press for budget
discipline. We felt that that budget could have come in under
the previous level. We thought we had good evidence for that.
When it was not accepted, we disassociated from consensus on
it. It continues to be our approach to seek budget discipline
not only in the U.N. regular budget but in all U.N.
organizations. We have had good success with that. I mean,
after all, the amount that was involved was quite small,
especially compared to what had been requested. I think
substantially less than 1 percent of the total budget.
I would point out too, Senator, that we have done well in
the three big specialized agencies which have adopted ZNG
budgets for the new biennia. That is a year-3 Helms-Biden
condition which we have delivered on in advance.
Senator Grams. The amount was only $3 million over.
Mr. Welch. I think it was, yes, nearly $3 million.
Senator Grams. It seems like an amount that could have been
worked in and the budget could have come in at zero growth. I
do not know if it was an attempt to make a point or what.
But if I was going to ask you a simple question for a
definition of what is zero nominal growth budget, what would
you give a definition to that?
Mr. Welch. No change from the previous level.
Senator Grams. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Welch. I do
not have any other questions.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. No, thank you.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much. Again, we will be
submitting some questions to you in writing dealing with the
questions on Kosovo.
Mr. Welch. We will answer those quickly. I am sorry I was
not prepared on that one.
Senator Grams. That is fine.
I would just like to leave the record open for at least the
next 3 working days to allow any other Senators on the
committee that would like to maybe submit a question in writing
as well. Thank you very much, Mr. Welch. We appreciate it.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
[Responses to additional questions for the record follow:]
Responses of Hon. C. David Welch to Additional Questions Submitted by
Senator Jesse Helms
Question 1. I understand that in the past two years, the number of
Americans in the U.N. has declined significantly and that few Americans
were hired during this period. This is a disturbing trend, if true.
Would you provide us with detailed information about this decline?
Answer. As we stated in our most recent Report to the Congress on
Efforts Made by the United Nations and Other International
Organizations in 1999 to Employ Americans, in the past two years the
number of Americans in the U.N. Secretariat has declined. On December
31, 1997, Americans held 368 professional posts subject to geographic
distribution, representing 15.3% of all such posts filled. By December
31, 1999, the number of Americans had declined to 339, representing
13.8% of such posts.
During the past two years, the U.N. filled 247 professional posts
subject to geographic distribution. Of these, only 13 (5.3%) went to
Americans.
Although the percentage of American citizens remains within the
U.N. parameter for ``equitable representation,'' we are concerned at
this trend and are re-invigorating our efforts to place more American
citizens.
Question 2. What is the Department of State doing to ensure that
the U.N. does not retaliate against Americans working in the U.N.
system as a result of the reform efforts. Is Ambassador Donald Hayes,
who spearheads negotiations on reform at the U.S. Mission to the U.N.
focusing on this concern? Are any other folks at the State Department
monitoring this potential problem? Is the Department dedicating
sufficient resources to this matter?
Answer. There is no indication that the U.N. is retaliating in any
way against Americans as a result of the reform efforts and our
continued arrears. The U.N. Employment Information and Assistance Unit
in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO/S/EA), working
closely with U.S.-U.N., monitors and reports on U.N. staffing and
hiring to guard against any such activities. They also work with the
U.N. to ensure that all staff members and applicants for U.N. positions
receive non-discriminatory and fair treatment.
Improving U.S. representation on the U.N. Secretariat staff is a
high priority. This includes ensuring that employment applications of
U.S. citizens are considered in a competitive, non-discriminatory
environment. Toward these ends, under the direction of Ambassador
Donald Hays, the staff of the Mission's Management and Reform section
is in regular contact with U.N. recruitment and human resources
management officials, monitoring performance and promoting the hiring
of Americans. Ambassador Hays is personally involved with the
coordination and development of a Mission-wide strategy for improving
U.S. representation on the Secretariat staff, with particular focus on
ensuring that the most critically important posts in the United Nations
are filled by U.S. citizens.
We believe sufficient resources are devoted to this matter.
However, our full employment economy may well be affecting interest on
the part of Americans in seeking jobs at the U.N.
Senator Grams. I would now like to invite Mr. Jim Johnson
for his testimony this morning. Mr. Johnson again is the
Associate Director for International Relations and Trade
Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division of
the General Accounting Office. He will be, I understand, joined
by Tet Miyabara as well. So, Mr. Johnson, welcome. Mr.
Miyabara. Mr. Johnson, we would like to hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD JIM JOHNSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR;
ACCOMPANIED BY: DR. TETSUO MIYABARA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Johnson. We are both very pleased to be here today to
participate in your hearing on U.N. reforms. As you already
mentioned, we are releasing a report that you and Chairman
Helms had requested earlier on to take a look at the status of
the reform effort that was put in place about 3 years ago.
As you know, the United Nations has long been in need of
management reform. By the mid-1990's the procurement process,
by the U.N.'s own admission, was in crisis. There was a failure
of the overall human resource system. Peacekeeping missions in
Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia had failed. And program overlap and
duplication was a serious problem.
In response to these problems that the Secretary General
had identified and also in response to pressure from member
states, not the least of which was the United States, the
Secretary General proposed a reform program that consisted
essentially of three core elements: first, to reform the U.N.'s
leadership structure; second, to develop a results-oriented
human capital system; and third, to introduce a programming and
budgeting process that focused on results. And this is key. We
have diagramed this so that you could see the relationship
among those three components, but it is essential in order to
have a management system that focuses on results to have these
components in place and working together.
In summary, the United Nations has substantially reformed
the leadership and operational part of its reform effort, and
it has partly implemented the results-oriented human capital
system. However, while progress has been made, the overall
objectives of reform have not yet been achieved. Specifically,
the United Nations has not yet implemented reforms to focus its
programming and budgeting on managing for results. These
initiatives would enable the states to hold the Secretariat
accountable for results, and they are key to the success of the
overall reform effort because they institutionalize a shift in
the organization's focus from simply carrying out activities to
accomplishing specific missions.
Again, I refer to the graphic display.\2\ You can probably
see that better in the prepared statement. I apologize for the
small print.
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\2\ The graphics referred to appear in Mr. Johnson's prepared
statement beginning on page 30.
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The major problem for the United Nations that the Secretary
General wanted to address by reorganizing the way the U.N. does
business was the fragmentation and lack of cooperation among
the Secretariat departments and programs. To begin addressing
this problem, the Secretary General formed a cabinet-style
senior management group and executive committees.
The senior management group consists of heads of all the
U.N. departments and programs and has been meeting weekly since
1997 to collectively decide on unified U.N. policies.
Previously, the heads of the departments and programs seldom
met, usually only at the time of a general assembly. Now there
is a regular mechanism for developing a single U.N. policy
direction.
The four executive committees are organized around the
U.N.'s core missions of peace and security, development
operations, humanitarian affairs, and economic and social
issues. Human rights is also a core mission that cuts across
all other missions and the executive committee translates the
senior management group decisions into coordinated action by
all the committees. This is depicted again on the graphic on my
right.
This aspect of the reform initiative has resulted in a more
coherent and unified leadership at the U.N. It has also begun
to reduce the competition among the various U.N. agencies and
foster a more coordinated action in the field. I will just cite
one example, although there are several.
When the crisis in Kosovo emerged in late 1998 and 1999,
the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General, the
Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the High Commissioner for
Refugees and Human Rights, and other senior managers working
within the structure developed a single U.N. response. The High
Commissioner for Refugees was given the lead role at that point
in time to undertake the U.N.'s initial response. She regularly
reported to the group through video-conferencing and provided
real-time information on the situation on the ground. Since top
level managers were members of the group, the United Nations
was able to develop a unified response and provide clear
direction to the departments and programs.
This type of arrangement has continued with regard to
Kosovo. It continues with regard to East Timor. There are
examples in Guatemala where this arrangement has worked very
well in establishing coherent policies for the various
departments and agencies of the U.N. to follow.
Despite these positive signs, the reforms are still in
progress. The U.N. still does not fully coordinate their
activities at the working level and in the field. During our
field work in the Middle East, senior and mid-level
peacekeepers and political officers told us that coordination
between them remains at a fairly low level and they continue
their practice of following instructions from their home
departments. Moreover, they simply do not see the evidence from
their instructions that they receive from the department level
that coordination is taking place on a day-to-day basis.
We also found impediments to fully integrating country
development activities. In Mozambique, the U.N. had set up
various working groups under kind of a thematic approach such
as for education, water and sanitation. But some of the working
groups were largely inactive because officials were reluctant
to spend their time working on issues that were not directly
related to their agency's priorities. About one-third of the
U.N. officials we interviewed had no requirement or job
expectation to work on issues within the U.N.'s development
assistance framework, and according to these people that we
talked to, their careers, promotions, reward paths run through
their own individual agencies, and working on framework issues
is simply an adjunct that they are not specifically rewarded
for.
Now, this brings me to the second area of reform that I
wanted to discuss: to develop a results-oriented human capital
system. The Secretariat has partially implemented the
initiatives to begin transforming its human resource culture to
one that is results-oriented, responsive, and accountable.
Fundamental tasks remain to be completed, such as developing
U.N. procedures that allow the organization to staff critical
needs and fully automate its personnel data base. Nonetheless,
in comparison to the situation that existed in the mid-1990's
when the human capital system was in crisis, positive steps
have been taken. For example, the Secretariat now has the
performance based appraisal system and an organization-wide
code of conduct.
We noted that the overall plan for reforming the human
capital system shares many of the elements and values that are
common to high performing organizations. The GAO has done a
number of studies in this area to identify best practices in
those organizations. For example, a hallmark of high performing
organizations is that the human capital procedures are directly
linked to achieving organizational objectives. The
Secretariat's new results-oriented appraisal system requires
that managers set performance expectations for all staff and
that the expectations be linked to achieving specific U.N.
objectives. The new appraisal system is intended to help
introduce a results-based culture to the Secretariat by
providing honest feedback to their staff on their performance.
Ratings are based on a staff member's performance in meeting
expectations measured by agreed upon indicators. In comparison,
the old appraisal system did not set work expectations and
ratings were uniformly high. The Secretariat did not routinely
compile statistics on staff performance.
The current situation is depicted on this graph. Again, you
can probably see it a little better in the prepared statement.
But what it shows is that now, under the new system which has
been fully in place for the last couple of rating cycles, most
individuals, more than half, are rated as fully meeting their
expectations, and fewer are consistently rated as exceeds
expectations. Under the old system, just the reverse would be
seen.
The U.N. plans to fully put in place its human capital
reforms over the next 2 to 4 years. We have a few examples to
illustrate the progress that has been made and the tasks
remaining. I'll just mention one.
The Office of Human Resource Management now has basic data
on all Secretariat staff with a contract of 1 year or longer,
such as staffing hiring dates, current and past positions, work
locations, and office nationality, age, and gender. Now, these
things seem fairly simple, but the U.N. previously did not have
that kind of information readily available. The office now
generates regular reports on the Secretariat's work force,
including projections of retirement by position, grade level,
type of employment for short-term planning.
This provides the United Nations with a basic management
tool, but there are still gaps. For example, an inventory of
existing staff skills and knowledge has yet to be completed and
an automated list of job qualifications for each position is
still being developed.
This brings me to the third and final area of reform,
managing for results. A core element of the U.N. reform was to
introduce processes to hold the U.N. Secretariat accountable
for results. This would be done by focusing and clarifying the
objectives member states expect the Secretariat to achieve, and
second, by adopting results-based programming and budgeting,
that is, to link budget activities with expected results.
The United Nations is pursuing these initiatives. However,
these proposals have not yet been adopted.
Also, the Secretariat does not have an overall system to
evaluate the results or impacts of its programs. It does do
evaluations, but ordinarily the evaluations look at management
efficiencies or specific outputs and not results of their
programs. Such a system is necessary to implement results-based
management. This cycle is depicted again in the chart on my
right.
To move this process forward, the Secretary General
proposed that the General Assembly focus the Secretariat's work
by limiting the number of new requirements or mandates and
clearly stating what is expected of the Secretariat. This
proposal also has not been adopted.
For 1997 and 1998, the most recent 2-year period for which
the information was available, we found that the number of new
tasks mandated by the General Assembly increased from about 250
to almost 600, and that at least 20 percent, probably more, of
these mandates had vague and open-ended expectations where
results really could not be measured.
The Secretariat has proposed revising the budget process to
focus on results. He has proposed that the budgets would
specify not only program costs but also expected program
results and performance indicators. Member states could, thus,
hold the Secretariat accountable for results.
The General Assembly is considering these proposals but has
not yet approved them. As you well know, some member states
have expressed concern that results-based budgeting is simply a
tactic to cut the budget.
Although the General Assembly has not yet approved the
results-based budgeting, it did authorize the Secretariat to
specify expected program results and performance indicators in
its primary program and planning document, which is the medium
term plan. So, some progress is being made.
In conclusion, what distinguishes this U.N. reform from
others tried in the past is the effort to transform the United
Nations into a results based organization. The initiatives put
in place thus far are moving the United Nations in this
direction. There is also evidence that these reforms are
strengthening operations on the ground where U.N. services and
programs are actually being delivered. However, without full
implementation of the programming, budgeting, and evaluation
process, focused on performance, the U.N. will not have a
management system to sustain the gains made and transform the
organization.
To help ensure that the United Nations maintains momentum
in its overall reform effort, we have made a couple of
recommendations to the Department of State and to the U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N.
First of all, we have recommended that at least on an
annual basis, the State Department report to the Congress on
what progress is being made in fairly specific areas, such as
the effectiveness of coordination at the country level, the
effective implementation of the human capital system, and what
progress is being made on results-based budgeting.
We have also recommended that the Ambassador to the U.N.
work with other member states to take some intermediate steps
at the Secretariat to implement the results-based budgeting
process and set measurable goals. As I have mentioned, they are
in the process of doing that. We have also suggested that they
require the Secretariat to develop an organizational strategy
for monitoring and evaluating the results and impacts of
Secretariat activities.
That concludes my prepared statement. We will try to answer
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harold J. Johnson and Tetsuo Miyabara
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the status of reforms to
improve the United Nations (U.N.). Our remarks are based on our report
prepared for this Committee and released today, which provides a
comprehensive analysis of the reforms.\1\
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\1\ United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened
Operations, but Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved (GAO/
NSIAD-2000-150, May 10, 2000).
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In recent years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems.
In 1994, the U.N.'s inability to procure goods and services fairly and
on time reached a crisis. Also there was an overall failure of its
human resources system to staff critical posts with the right people.
Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia failed to
accomplish their missions. By 1997, the Secretary General stated that
the United Nations had become fragmented, inflexible, and, in some
areas, superfluous. Member states demanded improvements. In response,
the Secretary General proposed a reform program consisting of three
core elements--(1) restructuring U.N. leadership and operations, (2)
developing a performance-based human capital system, and (3)
introducing programming and budgeting processes focused on results. The
Secretary General stated that these elements formed an integrated
program; all were necessary to create a United Nations that achieved
results and continuously improved. While not all of the reform elements
applied to the entire United Nations,\2\ the overall program provided a
model for a U.N.-wide reform process. The Secretary General set the end
of 1999 as the target date to put the reforms in place. Today, I will
discuss the status of the reform program and highlight some results.
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\2\ The United Nations is composed of the Secretariat, which
carries out much of the work mandated by member states, and the
programs, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees, which conduct
specific lines of work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
summary
The United Nations has substantially restructured its leadership
and operations and partly implemented a merit-based and performance-
oriented human capital system, and these reforms have strengthened U.N.
operations. However, while progress is being made, the overall
objectives of the reform have not yet been achieved. Specifically, the
United Nations has not yet implemented reforms to focus its programming
and budgeting on managing the Secretariat's performance. These
initiatives would enable member states to hold the Secretariat
accountable for results and are key to the success of the overall
reform because they institutionalize a shift in the organization's
focus from carrying out activities to accomplishing missions. As figure
1 illustrates, U.N. reform is an interrelated process and requires that
all core elements be in place to succeed.
background
The United Nations carries out a wide range of activities,
including peacekeeping in locations such as Kosovo, East Timor, and the
Congo; humanitarian and refugee operations in Sudan and Tajikistan; and
thousands of development, economic, social, and human rights projects
worldwide. Organizationally, the United Nations is comprised of three
types of entities. First are the member states' governing or
intergovernmental bodies, such as the Security Council and the General
Assembly, which set U.N. objectives and mandate activities in
accordance with the U.N. Charter. Second is the Secretariat, the
central working unit of the United Nations, which carries out work
mandated by the governing bodies. The Secretariat consists of the
Secretary General, whom the U.N. Charter specifies as the chief
administrative officer of the United Nations, and the staff necessary
to carry out the mandated work. Third are the U.N. programs and funds,
which the General Assembly authorized to address specific areas of work
of continuing importance. Examples of the programs and funds are the
U.N. Children's Fund and the U.N. Development Program. Many of the
programs are authorized to have their own governing bodies and budgets
(paid for by voluntary contributions from participating nations).
Consequently, while the Secretary General is the U.N.'s highest-ranking
official and his reform proposals influence these programs, he does not
have authority to direct the programs to undertake reforms.
The expenses of the Secretariat are funded through regular budget
assessments of the U.N. member states. The U.N. regular budget for the
biennium 2000-2001 is $2.5 billion, of which the U.S. contribution is
assessed at 25 percent.\3\ Member states are assessed separately for
U.N. peacekeeping activities. For 2000-2001, the cost of U.N.
peacekeeping operations is estimated to be $3.6 billion, of which the
United States is to contribute 25 percent.\4\ Member states are also
assessed for the costs of international tribunals on war crimes and
genocide. Finally, the United Nations receives voluntary, or
extrabudgetary, contributions for the funds and programs--estimated to
be $3.7 billion for the 2000-2001 biennium. The United States has
historically paid about 25 percent. Figure 2 shows U.N. budgets for the
last three bienmums.
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\3\ Members' assessments for the regular budget are determined by a
scale of assessments approved by the General Assembly on the basis of
advice from the Committee on Contributions. Each member has a single
vote in the General Assembly regardless of its assessment.
\4\ U.N. peacekeeping is assessed on an annual basis. The U.S.
share of U.N. peacekeeping is 30.4 percent; the U. S. Congress has
capped U.S. contributions at 25 percent since 1994.
u.n. leadership and operations substantially restructured
The United Nations has substantially restructured its operations,
and we found this has provided more cohesive and unified leadership for
the organization. A major problem for the United Nations has been the
fragmentation and lack of cooperation among the Secretariat departments
and the programs. To begin addressing this problem, the Secretary
General formed (1) the senior management group and (2) the executive
committees. The Senior Management Group consists of the heads of all
U.N. departments and programs and has been meeting weekly since
September 1997 to collectively decide on unified U.N. policies.
Previously, the heads of some of the programs met only once a year at
the General Assembly. Now there is a regular mechanism for developing a
single U.N. direction. The four executive conimnittees are organized
around the U.N.'s core missions--peace and security, development
operations, humanitarian affairs, and economic and social issues. Human
rights is a core issue that cuts across all U.N. missions. Consisting
of the senior managers of the departments and programs in each area,
the executive committees try to translate senior management group
decisions into coordinated action by all U.N. entities, Figure 3
provides an overview of the U.N.'s leadership structure as it exists
today and shows that the intended goals are to carry out more unified
and effective U.N. activities, particularly in the field and at the
working level where services are delivered.
We found that these reform initiatives have resulted in a more
coherent and unified leadership for the United Nations and have begun
to reduce competition among the various U.N. agencies and to foster
more coordinated actions in the field. The following examples help
illustrate areas where the reforms have made a difference.
During the Kosovo crisis, the Secretary General, the Deputy
Secretary General, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Fligh
Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights, and other senior
managers used the senior management group to develop a single
U.N. response. The High Commissioner for Refugees would
regularly report to the group through video-conferencing and
provide real-time information on the situation on the ground.
Since the top-level managers were members of the group, the
United Nations was able to develop a unified response and
provide clear direction to the departments and programs. One
initial direction was that the High Commissioner's office would
lead the U.N.'s initial response to the crisis and other U.N.
entities would support the Commissioner. As the U.N.'s role in
Kosovo evolved, the Secretary General continued to work through
the Senior Management Group to develop a unified concept for
U.N. operations and to ensure that all departments and programs
pooled their resources to support U.N. tasks in humanitarian
affairs, civilian police, and civil administration. According
to senior U.N. officials, the management group was also used to
ensure that all heads of U.N. departments and programs had a
consistent understanding of the U.N.'s mandate in Kosovo,
particularly for their dealings with the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the World Bank, which
were also responsible for tasks in Kosovo.
Leadership by the executive committee on peace and security
enabled various U.N. departments to integrate some peacekeeping
efforts and has resulted in better planning for new missions.
For example, in developing plans for the U.N. operation in East
Timor in 1999, the Under Secretary General for Political
Affairs provided the group a full and candid assessment of the
political situation and strategies for conducting the
referendum, according to members of the executive committee.
According to a senior political officer in the Department of
Political Affairs, his openness with his priorities paved the
way for unified strategy and planning among his department, the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Human Rights
Coordinator, and others on the committee. As a result, the plan
for the East Timor operation was more comprehensive and better
integrated than other U.N. peacekeeping plans we have examined
in our past work, and resulted in deploying the mission more
quickly and with fewer problems than past complex operations. I
should add that these reforms do not address the capacity of
the United Nations to undertake the scale of its current
peacekeeping responsibilities or the organizational limits of
the United Nations in leading operations calling for the use of
force.\5\
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\5\ United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force
to Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34, Mar. 27, 1997).
In Guatemala, initiatives to integrate U.N. development
activities under the development assistance framework have
helped improve the effectiveness of U.N. support for the 1994
peace accords by coordinating the work of 17 separate U.N.
agencies. The U.N.'s efforts to demobilize combatants, which
officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development
described as a model for international cooperation, resulted in
U.N. agencies conducting joint planning and taking steps to
avoid duplicative programming. For example, the U.N. Population
Fund had incorporated reproductive health activities into the
U.N. Children's Fund and the U.N. Development Program's
development projects. In addition, all U.N. agencies fully
coordinated their efforts in an effective response to Hurricane
Mitch and in producing a country development report, which for
the first time included a candid section on human rights.
Although the government objected to this report, all U.N.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agencies in country were united in defending the report.
Despite improvements in some of the areas, we also found that the
reforms are still in process and that U.N. agencies do not fully
coordinate their activities at the working levels and in the field. The
following examples illustrate areas where we found some continuing
weaknesses in U.N. cooperation.
The improved policy coordination and information sharing
apparent at the U.N.'s highest levels and on critical issues
are less evident in day-to-day activities at working levels of
the organization. Several U.N. officials who recently worked
both in U.N. headquarters and in field peacekeeping operations
confirmed the need for increased interdepartmental coordination
and cooperation on day-to-day policy and operational matters.
During our fieldwork in the Middle East and Guatemala, senior
and mid-level peacekeeping and political officers told us that
coordination between them remains at a low level and they are
continuing their practice of following instructions
respectively from both the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and the Department of Political Affairs They do not
see evidence from their instructions that these departments are
coordinating their work on a day-to-day basis.
We also found impediments to fully integrating country
development activities. In Guatemala, the common country
assessment was delayed because agencies sought to include
development indicators in line with their own mandates and
programming, rather than agreeing on overall indicators of U.N.
success. In Mozambique, U.N. officials said that some of the
country team's working groups were largely inactive--such as
education and water and sanitation--because officials were
reluctant to spend time working on issues not directly related
to their agencies' priorities. About one-third of the U.N.
officials we interviewed had no requirement or job expectation
to participate in the U.N. development assistance framework.
According to these officials, their career, promotion, and
reward paths are through their parent organizations, and their
work on the framework is an adjunct to their agency duties.
reforms to develop a results-oriented human capital system partly in
place
The Secretariat has partly implemented initiatives to begin
transforming its human resources culture into one that is results
oriented, responsive, and accountable. Fundamental tasks remain to be
completed, such as developing U.N. procedures that allow the
organization to staff critical needs and fully automating its personnel
database. Nonetheless, in comparison to the situation in 1994, when the
human capital system was in crisis, positive steps have been taken,
such as implementing a merit-based appraisal system and a U.N.-wide
code of conduct. Also, the overall plan for reforming the human capital
system shares the elements and values that are common to high-
performing organizations.\6\ For example, a hallmark of high-performing
organizations is that human capital procedures are directly linked to
achieving organizational objectives. The Secretariat's new merit-based
appraisal system requires that managers set performance expectations
for all staff and that the expectations be linked to achieving U.N.
objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO reports on human capital describe the approach that leading
public and private sector organizations have taken. See, for example,
Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders (GAO/GGD-
99-179, Sept. 1999).
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Implementation of the new appraisal system helps illustrate the
progress the Secretariat has made in reforming its human capital
system. The appraisal system is intended to help introduce a results-
based culture to the Secretariat by providing honest feedback to staff
about their performance. Ratings are based on a staff member's
performance in meeting expectations, as measured by agreed-upon
indicators. In comparison, the old appraisal did not set work
expectations; ratings were uniformly high, with about 80 percent of
staff receiving the highest rating; and the Secretariat did not
routinely compile statistics on staff performance. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of ratings for the most currently available period and
demonstrates that most staff are now rated as meeting expectations and
that there is a relative dispersion in the ratings.
The Secretary General has also followed up on the application of
the appraisal system. For the 1998/99 appraisal cycle, the Deputy
Secretary General sent letters to two departments that had ratings
markedly higher than the other departments. The letters instructed the
departmental chiefs to counsel supervisors on the requirements for fair
and well-documented ratings. He also sent letters to the promotion
board informing the board that the ratings in these departments might
be inflated and to consider this in its promotion decisions. Finally,
in November 1999, the Under Secretary General issued an administrative
instruction that set out the consequences of receiving less than fully
successful performance ratings, ranging from not receiving the annual
salary pay increase to dismissal, depending on the length of time the
staff member had not fully met expectations.
The United Nations plans to fully put into place its human capital
reforms over the next 2-4 years. The following examples help illustrate
some of the progress made and the tasks remaining.
Beginning in 1999, the Department of Management extended the
use of the Integrated Management Information System--the
Secretariat's data system on budget, finances, management, and
personnel--to the entire Secretariat. This provided the Office
of Human Resources Management with basic data on all
Secretariat staff with a contract of 1 year or longer, such as
staff hiring date, current and past positions, work location
and office, nationality, age, and gender. The office now
generates regular reports of the Secretariat workforce,
including projections of retirements by position, grade level,
and type of employment for short-term planning. While this
development provides the United Nations with a basic management
tool, several steps need to be taken to make the personnel
information system fully functional, including linking the
databases electronically with all offices (currently the
Secretariat has real-time access to personnel data for 48
percent of professional staff--those located at headquarters in
New York and at the offices in Geneva and Vienna); completing
an inventory of existing staff skills and knowledge; and
automating a list of job qualifications for each Secretariat
position.
The Secretariat has begun identifying and filling critical
needs projected for the next 2-4 years but has not begun
developing a long-range workforce planning strategy. This will
start once basic tools are in place and after the General
Assembly debates the U.N.'s future role at the millenium
assembly in the summer and fall of the year 2000.
The Office of Human Resources Management has developed a
comprehensive plan to improve recruitment and mobility, which
includes lateral moves, job exchanges, temporary assigmnents,
and job rotation systems within departments and field missions.
The office discussed these proposals with staff committees
during 1999 and plans to continue discussing the proposals
through April 2000, as part of its policy to consider all staff
views regarding human capital reforms. At the end of April
2000, the Office plans to complete a report on the proposal and
submit it to the General Assembly, which must approve any
changes to staff rules and regulations needed to implement the
proposal.
reforms to manage for results not yet adopted
A core element of the U.N. reform was to introduce processes to
hold the U.N. Secretariat accountable for results by (1) focusing and
clarifying the objectives member states expected the Secretariat to
achieve; and (2) adopting performance-oriented programming and
budgeting, that is, linking budgeted activities with performance
expectations and measures. The United Nations is considering these
initiatives, including the use of performance measures in its principal
planning document--the medium-term plan. However, these proposals have
not yet been adopted because some member states believe they are
tactics to cut the budget. Another problem is that the Secretariat does
not have an overall system to monitor and evaluate the results and
impact of its programs. Such a system is necessary to implement
performance management. Figure 5 depicts the U.N. program planning
cycle and the status of the key initiatives to modify it.
The Secretary General proposed that the General Assembly focus the
Secretariat's work by limiting the number of new work requirements or
mandates for the Secretariat and clearly stating what it expected the
Secretariat to do. These initiatives were not adopted. For 1997 and
1998, the most recent 2-year period for which information was
available, we found that the number of new tasks mandated by the
General Assembly increased from 246 to 587 and that 20 percent of these
mandates had vague or open-ended expectations.
The Secretary General also proposed revising the budget process to
focus on performance. He proposed that budgets would specify not only
program costs but also expected program results and performance
indicators. Member states could thus hold the Secretariat accountable
for results. The Secretary General further proposed intermediate steps
to prepare for and build confidence in this results-based approach,
such as developing acceptable and reliable performance indicators;
incorporating qualitative information in the performance measures; and
pilot-testing proposed changes. The General Assembly is considering
these proposals but has not yet approved them. Some member states are
concerned that performance-oriented budgeting is a tactic to cut the
U.N. budget. For example, in 1998, the Group of 77--a block of over 130
U.N. member states classified as developing countries took the position
that results-based budgeting was a radical departure from accepted
practices. They stated there should be, no predetermined ceilings on
budgets, that all mandates should be fully funded, and that any attempt
to use results-based budgeting to cut the budget would be resisted.
Although the General Assembly has not yet approved performance
budgeting, it authorized the Secretariat to specify expected program
accomplishments and performance indicators in its primary program
planning document--the medium-term plan.
Member states were also concerned that the Secretariat lacked a
system to monitor and evaluate program results and impact. Currently,
numerous U.N. departments monitor their programs, and over 20 U.N.
departments and offices have their own evaluation units. However, in
the absence of results-oriented budgeting, monitoring largely involves
counting outputs, such as the number of conferences held or staff years
spent. Evaluations do not systematically provide information on program
impact and whether objectives have been met. Furthermore, the United
Nations has not developed a centralized strategy to improve monitoring
and evaluation. Presently there is no centralized strategy that
identifies limitations or gaps in existing efforts, employs guides to
help provide some consistency and reliability in evaluation, or creates
an approach to unify monitoring and evaluation functions to support
performance-oriented budgeting.
conclusions and recommendations
What distinguishes this U.N. reform from others tried in the past
is the effort to transform the United Nations into a performance-based
organization by implementing interrelated reform initiatives. The
initiatives put into place thus far--substantially realigning the
organization and introducing a merit-based appraisal system tied to
U.N. objectives--are moving the United Nations in this direction. There
is also evidence that these reforms are strengthening operations on the
ground, where United Nations services and programs are actually
delivered. However, without fully implementing programming, budgeting,
and evaluation processes focussed on performance, the U.N. will not
have the management systems to sustain the gains made and transform the
organization.
To help ensure that the United Nations maintains momentum in its
overall reform efforts, our report recommends that the Secretary of
State report annually to the Congress on the status of the Secretary
General's reform plan, including an assessment of whether U.N. agencies
and departments are effectively coordinating efforts at the country
level, effectively implementing a results-oriented human capital
system, and effectively implementing a performance-oriented management
system.
Additionally, to support the United Nations in transforming the
organization into one that is performance oriented and continuously
improves, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations work with
other member states to:
take intermediate steps at the Secretariat to implement
results-oriented budgeting, such as setting measurable goals
and performance indicators for each section of the budget, and
require the Secretariat to develop an organizational
strategy for monitoring and evaluating the results and impact
of Secretariat activities.
The Department of State, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations,
and the United Nations generally agreed with our findings on U.N.
reform. State and the U.S. Mission also said they would report
regularly to the Congress, in the context of the oversight process, on
the status of the U.N. reform plan and would continue working on
improving the U.N.'s planning, budgeting, and evaluation systems.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or
other members may have.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. I
appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Miyabara, did you have anything you wanted to add, or
are you in a support role here?
Dr. Miyabara. I am in a support role, and I think the
statement fairly summarizes the work that we did on the United
Nations.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Mr. Johnson, I would just like to ask one quick question
off the bat. If GAO has come up with this type of a report, why
cannot or why has the U.N. not done something similar, or have
they?
Mr. Johnson. Well, they do assess their progress on a
periodic basis. I think they have probably a more difficult
time than we do in being objective about what they look at. But
they do assess progress.
Dr. Miyabara. The last progress report they made on reform
was in 1998, and they did have this as an agenda item for the
last General Assembly, but they did not take it up. They plan
to take it up next time around, but there is no report yet out.
So, in essence, this is the only overall report on U.N. reform
that exists right now.
Senator Grams. That is what I was going to ask. So, in
other words, the Secretariat or the General Assembly has not
really had a report that it can study so it can gauge what
reforms have been made or the progress of these reforms.
Dr. Miyabara. No.
Mr. Johnson. Not of this nature, no.
Senator Grams. Now, would you want to explain more about
exactly what the chart represents? I know the top arrow is
darker. The arrow to my right is a little lighter in color, and
then the third arrow. Is this a similar type of assessment the
U.N. is doing itself, or are you looking at other things that
the U.N. is not looking at?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I do not think we are looking at things
the U.N. is not looking at, but I do not believe they have yet
adopted, although we have shown them our concept of how the
parts fit together and they are in agreement with that concept.
But essentially what we are looking at here with the darker
arrow illustrates the restructuring of the leadership function
at the headquarters level. That part of the reform effort has
been put in place, although it has not, as we mentioned,
completely filtered down to the working levels and needs to be
constantly monitored.
The next arrow, not quite so dark, represents the partial
implementation of the human capital system. For example, the
performance appraisal system is designed again to link into the
notion of the results orientation, and finally the lighter
arrow illustrates the results-based budgeting component of the
reform, which really are not in place yet.
Senator Grams. Not in place or not intended to do?
Mr. Johnson. Well, the Secretariat and the Secretary
General have been promoting this idea. They have urged the
General Assembly to adopt performance based budgeting. So, far
the General Assembly has not adopted it. The Group 77 has been
somewhat vocal in their opposition to adopting that kind of
concept or the sunset provision where a program would have a
particular period of life. Apparently they feel that this is a
way to undercut the budget and so far they have not supported,
although the General Assembly has authorized some pilot
projects in that area and they did authorize the new mid-term
plan to be designed in a way that will show results that are
expected. So, progress is being made in that area--and
hopefully, it will be adopted. I know our State Department has
been urging that for a long period of time. It is the final
component of this process that will help hold the Secretariat
accountable for achieving what they are supposed to achieve and
not just provide outputs.
Senator Grams. So, does the U.N. really believe that it has
programming monitoring and evaluation in place that would
reflect the same guides you are?
Mr. Johnson. That depends on who you say the U.N. is. There
are those in the U.N. who believe that they have a process in
place to evaluate program results, but when we submitted our
report to the Secretary General for his comment, he essentially
agreed with us, that he is not receiving the kind of
information that he needs to know whether or not programs are
achieving their results.
So, while there are components, there are piecemeal parts
of the evaluation process, there is no systematic way of
evaluating all the programs to know which ones need to be
modified, what the high priorities ought to be or where
resources need to be placed.
Dr. Miyabara. Let me add just a couple of things, first,
about the overall concept. The United Nations, and the
Secretary General in particular, have never put their reform in
this context.
Senator Grams. Is this kind of a typical way to assess an
operation like this, or do you have to create this special to
apply it to the U.N.?
Dr. Miyabara. This was clearly intended by the United
Nations, but they have never communicated this clearly in part
because they were trying to transform the organization into one
which was focused on getting results, being successful at
peacekeeping and other such things. But that would also force
them to then put the results next to how much they were
spending in those categories.
One problem that they have had--and that gets back to
results-based budgeting--is that the Group of 77 in particular
had been opposed to results-based budgeting for a number of
reasons. But I will quote one thing they have actually said.
``The Group's foreign ministers had declared''--and this is the
Group of 77 composed of approximately 130 member states--``that
there should not be any ceiling on the budget and that the
Secretary General should be provided with adequate resources to
carry out all mandated activities.''
The next thing that is said, in the context of results-
based budgeting, is that ``the program budget should be
considered under existing rules, that is, without putting
results next to the actual budget. Any attempt to use results-
based budgeting and sunset provisions without the express
approval of the General Assembly would be wrong and would be
resisted.''
So, what they are concerned about is, in stark terms,
putting results, which they do not completely agree with on
measurement, next to the amounts that are being spent. And that
is the concern underlying results-based budgeting, or at least
part of the concern.
Senator Grams. Mr. Johnson, in your report you discuss
increased efficiencies and effectiveness from the
consolidation. If this is so, why are there more U.N. posts and
more personnel than previously?
Mr. Johnson. Well, the general answer to that is that they
have gotten additional mandates. There were some cuts in
various areas when they did the consolidation and, for example,
when they consolidated the humanitarian affairs and the
coordinator for humanitarian assistance, there were some cuts
that were made in the number of positions, but those were taken
up by new mandates in other areas. So, I think you have some
details on where those were at.
Dr. Miyabara. Yes, I do have some details.
We talked about the increased number of mandates and
resolutions passed by the General Assembly. One of the
mandates, or continuing resolutions, has been a focus on
Africa. So, they actually cut 50 positions from the Department
of Economic and Social Affairs. Some of these positions were
shifted over to the Africa, the new agenda for development and
economic and social development in Africa, which increased by
12, which is about a 20 percent increase in their staffing
level.
Other locations it increased were the Department of
Management, which increased by about 25 positions.
So, even though the consolidation has been reducing posts
and abolishing them, no people actually lost jobs as a result.
They were transferred to other positions in the Secretariat,
higher priority positions.
Senator Grams. Was this for convenience or was it actually
necessary?
Dr. Miyabara. The General assembly mandated that no staff
were to lose their jobs as a result of the consolidation.
Senator Grams. So, with the consolidation then, would you
say it resulted in any great or greater effectiveness or
efficiency in the way it has been done or consolidated, Mr.
Johnson? If you could maybe give a specific example.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I think they are more efficient in the
way they run their programs, and you see that in a couple of
areas. As I mentioned, the Coordinator for Relief Assistance
operates in a much more efficient way in the way they do
consolidated appeals and coordinate those programs. The other
area that seems to be more efficient is in the operations of
the regional programs where they have also done some
consolidation.
I would comment that while there was a mandate that none of
the employees would lose their jobs, there also were vacant
positions to place those people in.
Senator Grams. One of the best indicators of real reform is
whether it substantially affects spending levels in the U.N.
budget----
Mr. Johnson. Right.
Senator Grams [continuing]. Showing that priorities have
been established and are being addressed. Are there any signs
of tangible reform in the biennial budget adopted by consensus
in the U.N. General Assembly last December?
Dr. Miyabara. One of the tangible things that I've actually
seen is an increase in positions in some of the priority areas,
in human rights, for example. Human rights increased both their
budget and their positions by quite a bit. When we were in the
field, we actually witnessed human rights being more
operational.
I think in 1997 there were only two actual operations
officers, that is, people who would go into the field and who
would work in countries that had human rights abuses. They have
increased that to over 1,000 operational positions. Previously
they were working on policy issues, but now they are actually
working in the field. So, that is one area in which I think
they have actually made quite a bit of improvement, and you can
tangibly see the change in the budget.
Aside from that, there are relatively modest changes in the
numbers of people and the actual changes in the budget numbers.
Senator Grams. Going back to the resolution where anybody
could not lose their job in consolidating, is that what you
said earlier?
Dr. Miyabara. Yes. There have been several resolutions
which have said that as a result of the consolidations and some
of the efficiencies, staff were not to lose their jobs.
Senator Grams. So, they had to find places to park these
positions then, and that has been the reorganization.
Dr. Miyabara. That has not been the complete
reorganization, but that has been at least part of it. They
have tried to move people to places in which they could be more
productive.
Senator Grams. Regarding personnel, can the U.N. now count
its staff and let you know how many people they actually have
on board even with its new computer systems?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator Grams. They can tell you now exactly how many
employees they have.
Mr. Johnson. Right, they do have that in their new
information management system. There are some problems with the
system still. As you know, that has been a troubled system for
a long period of time, but they are in a position now where
they can tell you how many people they have on board on any
particular date both within the regular budget, the extra-
budgetary process, as well as part-time and consultants. So,
they can give you that number.
Senator Grams. The Secretariat has said that they were
actually doing a better job of evaluating and monitoring these
programs. Your report indicates that the U.N. does not have a
strategy or an overall evaluation system that can
systematically report on the program results. Are you concerned
that the U.N. does not recognize that it has a major problem in
this area? Or does it?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think again the Secretary General
recognizes this is a concern, is a need that he has that he
knows what benefits are being achieved from the various
programs. I would emphasize the notion that they need a
systematic way of going through all their programs and
activities to measure results. As I mentioned, they do perform
some real evaluations where they try and measure results, but
it is on kind of a piecemeal basis and not a systematic
approach.
Senator Grams. You have also suggested one of the failings
of the reform initiative thus far has been to create a results-
oriented approach which allows one to measure improvement in
getting the job done throughout the U.N. system.
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator Grams. Is a results-oriented approach being
implemented in the area of peacekeeping?
Mr. Johnson. Peacekeeping is a troublesome area, and there
are a number of reforms that are needed. The basic problem in
peacekeeping is the lack of capacity within DPKO to carry out
the planning, logistics, and support activities that they are
required to do in New York. They also are in need of a process
to measure results, and that process we have not seen.
Dr. Miyabara. One of the problems in measuring results is
that you have to specify what the objectives are so you can
measure results against those objectives. When you have clear
criteria, you can do it. In peacekeeping it is particularly
difficult because, as we pointed out in the report, there are
some situations in which member states do not agree on what the
criteria are.
For example, we mentioned Kosovo in the report, and one of
the major questions there, as you well know, is, whether Kosovo
becomes independent or remains part of Serbia? There is no
resolution of that. Until you get resolution of that, it is
very hard to set up objectives about what you are supposed to
do on very simple things like how to hook up your phone lines
or your electricity grid.
One of the problems in peacekeeping is that you have to set
clear objectives. One of the problems in evaluating
peacekeeping is that unless you have those objectives, you are
not sure what standard you are evaluating against.
Senator Grams. Mr. Johnson, are there limitations remaining
on the U.N. in its ability to undertake peacekeeping?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, and it is primarily in the area that I
mentioned with the lack of capacity at the DPKO in New York.
They lost a substantial amount of capacity when they lost the
gratis military personnel. So far the General Assembly has not
seen fit to replace those numbers of people. The ACABQ----
Senator Grams. The budget committee.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, essentially their budget committee has
called for more specificity in how these people would be used,
but so far they have not added adequate capacity to the
peacekeeping operation in New York to do the planning,
logistics, support, finance, personnel, all the things that New
York needs to do.
Senator Grams. Without even expanding the peacekeeping
operations, they have work to do.
Mr. Johnson. Yes. They were stretched already before we
went into the large operations. I would not necessarily want to
blame some of the difficulties we are seeing now in Sierra
Leone on problems in New York, although I am sure there are
some links there, but clearly they were overstretched before we
got into some of these larger operations.
Dr. Miyabara. I wonder if I could just add one thing.
Although the United Nations has actually improved some of its
capacity to support peace operations, one of our studies
indicates there are organizational limits of the United Nations
that increase the risk of U.N.-led operations calling for the
use of force. These limitations have been overcome when a
nation with sufficient military prestige, credibility, and the
commitment of military forces necessary to conduct operations
has taken the lead role.
We did a study in 1997 that looked at every operation that
was either a Chapter 7 or that called for the use of force and
came to the conclusion that there were organizational limits to
what the U.N. could do in these situations. The mandate for
Sierra Leone actually calls for the U.N. to use the means
necessary to accomplish its mandate, which is one of the code
phrases that we used in identifying operations that called for
the use of force. We found that there are basic limitations
that have to be considered before approving these sorts of
operations.
Senator Grams. I would just like to sum up the questions by
asking--the focus of this hearing has been on the U.N.'s reform
and its efficiency. So, Mr. Johnson, based on your work, what
do you recommend to ensure effective reforms are adopted
system-wide in the sprawling United Nations?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I mentioned a couple of the specific
recommendations that we made to the Secretary of State to keep
the pressure and focus on reforms that the U.N. would
undertake.
An overall recommendation that we would have for the U.N.
is to focus on the type of structure that we have outlined in
this diagram and recognize that all of those parts need to come
together in some reasonable timeframe in order to have a
reformed organization. We fully recognize that organizational
change is a difficult thing, and it takes a lot of time.
Changing an organizational culture is never easy in any
organization, let alone one that is multinational the way the
U.N. is.
I think one thing that is in favor right now of the current
reform effort is that it has full support of the Secretary
General. That we were quite impressed with. He has taken a very
strong leadership role personally to see to it that these
reforms are implemented. He cannot do everything himself, but I
think he set up a structure in his leadership core that will
help him move these reforms forward. In that respect, I think
that there is greater hope for success in this reform effort
than we have seen in past reforms that have been attempted at
the U.N.
Senator Grams. So, do you believe the commitment is there
for the reforms?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I do believe the commitment is there on
the part of the Secretary General and his top leadership.
Whether it has filtered down throughout the organization I
think is of some question, but again that takes time. It
requires leadership and leadership that is committed. So,
hopefully over a period of time it will occur.
Senator Grams. Well, Mr. Johnson, Dr. Miyabara, thank you
very much for your testimony and for your answers. Again, I
would also like to remind you I would like to leave the hearing
open for about 3 days to allow any additional questions that
Senator Boxer or any other member of the committee might have
and would want to forward to you in writing. So, I would
appreciate any quick response. Thank you very much. Appreciate
it.
The hearing is complete.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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