[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GRANTING PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (PNTR) STATUS TO CHINA: IS IT
IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-143
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
66-818 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Francis C. Record, Senior Professional Staff Member
Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress from
California..................................................... 9
The Honorable Sander M. Levin, a Representative in Congress from
Michigan....................................................... 12
Wei Jingsheng, Former Prisoner of Conscience in China, Chinese
Democracy Activist............................................. 30
Sandra J. Kristoff, Senior Vice President, New York Life
International, Inc............................................. 31
Mike Jendzejczyk, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch/Asia... 33
Nicholas D. Giordano, International Trade Counsel, National Pork
Producers Council, and on behalf of the National Association of
Wheat Growers.................................................. 35
Steve T. McFarland, Executive Director, U.S. Commission for
International Religious Freedom................................ 52
Rev. Daniel B. Su, Special Assistant to the President, China
Outreach Ministries, Inc....................................... 54
APPENDIX
Prepared Members' Statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 70
The Honorable Christopher Cox.................................... 73
The Honorable Sander M. Levin.................................... 76
Prepared Witness Statements:
Wei Jingsheng, Wei Jingsheng Foundation.......................... 80
Sandra J. Kristoff............................................... 82
Mike Jendrzejczyk................................................ 86
Nicholas D. Giordano............................................. 95
Steve T. McFarland............................................... 105
Rev. Daniel B. Su................................................ 113
Additional materials submitted for the record:
Testimony of The China/U.S. Trade Agreement on behalf of the
National Association of Wheat Growers, Wheat Export Trade
Education Committee and U.S. Wheat Associates (Exhibit A)...... 115
Statement of Paul J. Cassingham, President, American Chamber of
Commerce in Taipei (Exhibit B)................................. 119
Letter to Paul Cassingham from Chen Shui-Bian, President-Elect,
Republic of China, dated May 4, 2000 (Exhibit C)............... 121
Letter from James P. Hoffa, General President, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, dated May 23, 2000 (Exhibit D)....... 122
GRANTING PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (PNTR) STATUS TO CHINA: IS IT
IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST?
----------
Wednesday, May 10, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. I am
very pleased to welcome you to our hearing this morning on
Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization and the
related legislation extending trade relations to China on a
permanent basis. Certainly I don't have to remind my colleagues
this will be one of the most important trade votes in our 106th
Congress. Our decision, pro or con, will send a powerful
message determining China's role in the global economy and in
the community of nations for years to come.
I take great pleasure in welcoming--about to arrive--
Congressman Chris Cox, from the 47th District of California,
and Sander Levin from the 12th District of Michigan, to our
hearing this morning. While I remain skeptical of the merits of
the PNTR arguments, in general, and the advantages of the so-
called parallel legislation, in particular, I would like to pay
tribute to their expertise on trade and security issues between
our two nations and their tireless efforts to try to find
common ground in a very polarized PNTR debate.
We are also joined this morning by several panels of
outstanding witnesses from the business, trade, and human
rights communities who can bring their personal and
professional experiences to bear on granting normal trade
relations to China.
I am concerned about China's poor track record of abiding
by its existing agreements with us in a number of trade, prison
labor and proliferation areas. We need enhanced monitoring of
existing agreements, yet our agencies are currently underfunded
and unequipped to meet the challenges of enforcing our current
agreements with China.
In the area of proliferation, a recent report by the
Council on Foreign Relations, National Defense University and
the Institute for Defense Analyses, cautioned that China's
continuing support to Pakistan's weapons program has fueled
continuing concern, and its involvement in the effort to
reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been weak.
Yet we are told by the Administration not to be concerned, that
their proliferation record will improve in time; but we are
still waiting.
We are also told that by giving permanent normal trade
relations to the People's Republic of China, we will be
granting benefits to American businesses without giving away
anything to China. I strongly disagree with that viewpoint. I
believe that supporting PNTR will give China something it
desperately wants: relief from the spotlight on its human
rights record. Under the current arrangement, we in the
Congress are able to open a door into the human rights
situation in China every year. Along with our attention comes
the attention of the world. Our hearings and debates focus the
cameras and tape recorders and word processors of the news
media. We have the bully pulpit on this issue, and I am very
concerned that once we give it away, we may never get it back.
Are Chinese human rights and labor practices important to
us? I believe that they are the most important in the world
today. China has the world's largest population and one of the
fastest growing economies. If China is allowed to trample on
individual freedoms, then how can we tell Indonesia or Malaysia
or Nigeria or Sudan or any other nation that they cannot do
that?
The Beijing regime has fought a vigorous public relations
battle to win this philosophical argument. They have
manipulated prisoner releases, effectively blackmailed dozens
of countries and nearly corrupted some of our very own American
corporations with their efforts. We must not shrink away from
this battle of values.
Public opinion polls show that many Americans have deep
reservations about our policies toward China and the proposal
to extend normal trade relations to that country. By granting
PNTR to China, we will be sacrificing much of our ability to
affect public opinion on Chinese human rights practices.
I would also note that the recent report of the United
States Commission on International Religious Freedom included a
recommendation by nine Commissioners that the Congress not
grant PNTR to China until substantial improvements are made in
respect for religious freedom in that nation.
While the nine voting members include strong free trade
proponents and represent a wide diversity of opinion and
religions, they are unanimous that China needs to take concrete
steps to release all persons imprisoned for their religious
beliefs, to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and to take other measures to improve respect
for religious freedom.
Metternich, the late Austrian Foreign Minister, said that
``public opinion is one of the most powerful weapons which,
like religion, penetrates the most hidden corners where
administrative measures lose their influence; to despise public
opinion is like despising moral principals.'' So I urge my
colleagues to think long and hard before we dispose of that
weapon.
Before I recognize our distinguished witnesses, I would
like to recognize our Ranking Democratic Member, the gentleman
from Connecticut Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening remarks he may
have.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
commend you for holding this hearing and particularly point out
the hard work by Representative Levin in trying to bridge what
are some considerable issues here. We are going to have to make
a decision on whether or not the advantages for market access
and lower tariffs outweigh our concerns about general
principles in our relationship with China and other countries
on labor rights, environmental rights and human rights. We are
going to have to decide whether, although the list of countries
the Chairman and others listed are already members of the WTO
and many do not respect human rights, whether China, being the
significant player it is, a place we need to make our stand.
It is clear that in other trade agreements, the United
States has long ignored human rights, the situation for labor
and environmental standards. The question for us is how do we
best move forward on those principles that are so central to
this democratic society.
There are those in the Administration and in Congress who
argue that simply by increased economic commerce, by increased
economic activity, we will improve the situation in the lives
of the average Chinese; that today, even with the Falun Gong
crackdown, with the horrors at Tiananmen Square, that the
average Chinese is freer to travel, freer to make decisions
about where they live and where they work. But there is still a
grave concern about a country in excess of a billion people
where the order of the day deprives people of human rights,
where workers have no say in their working conditions or their
salaries, and where even groups without political agendas are
often harassed by the government.
This Congress for many years refused to give the Soviet
Union any kind of favorable trade treatment because of its
treatment of Soviet Jews, small in number and even smaller in
the number they imprisoned. Today we are being asked to give
permanent status to China even though they imprison thousands
of their own citizens, have very few freedoms for people, and
continue to run an oppressive regime that is involved in
proliferation.
There is not an easy answer. Human rights and the rights of
working people are values that I think many of the Members in
this Congress have a strong concern about. The question is,
however, whether simply rejecting the President's proposal will
improve their situation, whether we will have a better
opportunity to move China in the right direction if we reject
this PNTR today and try to get an agreement that does address
some of those fundamentals, and whether that will be possible.
So I thank the Chairman for holding this hearing and look
forward to hearing from my colleagues and other witnesses.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be succinct
because I want to hear from our two distinguished colleagues.
First, the most important fact is that the approval of PNTR
is clearly in our national interest. That is the ultimate
bottom line.
Second, PNTR makes it substantially less likely that
American jobs are exported to China because of the WTO
accession agreement. That is a secondary but very important
element as well.
I would say that despite the inflammatory rhetoric we are
going to hear over the next several weeks, some of it
irrelevant, those are the considerations that are most
important.
Finally, I want to state my firm belief that the approval
of PNTR will advance human rights and democracy and the rule of
law in the People's Republic of China. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Any other Members seeking recognition?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This Committee is built
upon the common desire to promote democratic ideals throughout
the world. But as we strive to encourage democracy in
developing nations, something is sorely amiss in our China
policy. When the CEO's of multinational corporations lobby for
increased trade with China, they talk about access to the 1.2
billion potential consumers in the People's Republic of China.
What they don't say is their real interest is 1.2 billion
workers in China, workers whom they pay 20 cents, 30 cents, 40
cents an hour. These CEO's will tell you that increasing trade
with China, engaging with China will allow human rights to
improve. Democracy, they say, flourishes with free trade. But
as we engage with developing countries in trade and investment,
democratic countries of the developing world are losing ground
to authoritarian countries. Democratic nations such as India
are losing out to more totalitarian governments such as China,
where the people are not free and the workers do as they are
told.
In the post-Cold War decade, the share of developing
country exports to the U.S. for democratic nations fell from 53
percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 1998, a decrease of 18
percentage points. Corporate America wants to do business with
countries with docile work forces that earn below-poverty wages
and are not allowed to organize to bargain collectively. In
manufacturing goods, developing democracies' share of
developing country exports fell 21 percentage points, from 56
percent to 35 percent. Corporations are relocating their
manufacturing businesses from democratic countries to more
authoritarian governments where the workers don't talk back for
fear of being punished. Western corporations want to invest in
countries that have below-poverty wages, poor environmental
standards, no worker benefits and no opportunities to bargain
collectively. China is just perfect for that.
As developing countries make progress toward democracy, as
they increase worker rights and create regulations to protect
the environment, things that we applaud every day in this
Committee, the American business community punishes them by
pulling its trade and investment dollars and moving them toward
totalitarian government.
Decisions about the economy are made in China by three
groups of decisionmakers, the Chinese Communist Party, the
People's Liberation Army, and Western investors. The People's
Liberation Army, and Communist Party obviously control the
country. The People's Liberation Army controls a significant
amount of the businesses that export to the U.S., and Western
investors clearly are making major economic decisions. Which of
these three wants to empower workers? Does the Chinese
Communist Party want the Chinese people to enjoy increased
human rights? I don't think so. Does the People's Liberation
Army want to close the labor camps that Wei Jingsheng and Harry
Wu have talked about? I don't think so. Do Western investors
want Chinese workers to be able to organize and bargain
collectively? I don't think so.
None of these three groups--the Communist Party of China,
the People's Liberation Army, and Western investors--none of
these three groups wants the current situation in China to
improve; so when CEO's wandering the halls of Congress tell us
that engagement with China will bring democracy to China, I
think their real intentions are a bit suspect. I appreciate the
efforts of my friend, Mr. Levin, and what he is trying to do,
but the People's Republic of China has repeatedly ignored the
United Nations High Commission for Human Rights. They ignore
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. They
ignore the State Department's country reports, and they have
broken almost every agreement they have made with the United
States. Why would the Chinese pay any attention to a
congressional task force? Passing PNTR will only confirm that
China's behavior will continue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, seven years ago when President Clinton issued
an Executive Order linking significant progress on human rights
with the continuance of Most Favored Nation status (MFN) for
China, giving them a probationary year to reform, this
Republican Congressman had nothing but praise for the
Administration. I believe as do, I think, many other Members of
Congress that partisanship has no place in the struggle for
equality, fairness, and the observance of human rights. Yet in
1994, when it became clear that human rights had actually
deteriorated and suffered significant regression the President,
sadly, delinked MFN trading privileges with human rights.
Looking back in hindsight is often 20-20--the more cynical
take on that Executive Order was that, while we thought we had
the votes in both the House and Senate to strip MFN from China,
the preemptive, proactive action by the President--giving them
one more year--rendered that action in the House and the Senate
moot. When things regressed from no significant progress to
significant regression, the President then tore up his own
Executive Order.
Since then, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights, I have chaired 18
hearings and markups focused exclusively on Chinese human
rights abuses, and several others where China's shameless
record was a part, and led three congressional fact-finding
missions to China. The president of the AFL-CIO, John Sweeney,
the courageous Harry Wu, who spent 19 years in 12 different
forced labor camps in China, and perhaps the most well-known
political dissident of all who will testify again today, Wei
Jingsheng, the leader of the Democracy Wall movement, and many
others testified before our Subcommittee regarding the horrific
human rights abuses in China.
Mr. Chairman, today egregious human rights abuses in China
are commonplace, and that should inflame our conscience. With
all due respect for my good friend from Nebraska, when we get
impassioned about this issue, it is because people are being
tortured each and every day. It is a part of their way of
repression. The police and the army and the military use
torture in a commonplace, pervasive way.
Even the State Department's human rights reports make it
clear China's religious, political, and labor violations have
all increased with each passing year. Violations include, as I
said, the pervasive use of torture by government thugs and an
ongoing systematic crackdown on religious believers.
As Mr. Gilman, the Chairman, just pointed out, the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, which is
comprised of many free traders, said this is not the year to
convey permanent NTR on China, at a time when they are cracking
down on Falun Gong and many other religious believers,
Catholic, Protestant, and the Buddhists in Tibet and elsewhere.
Forced labor in ``the Laogai,`` and coercive population control
are getting worse, and there continues to be the stifling of
all political dissent. You can add to that the exponential
buildup of China's military war machine. It is not only in
response to Taiwan, but to their own country as well.
Mr. Chairman, Chinese workers are denied freedom of
association and the right to organize and bargain collectively.
China labor activists are routinely imprisoned in concentration
camps when they speak about working conditions, corruption,
inadequate wages, or for even speaking to Western journalists.
The dictatorship is especially cruel to those Chinese who
advocate for independent trade unions.
Mr. Chairman, the deplorable state of workers' rights in
China not only shows that Chinese men women and children are
exploited, but that U.S. workers are severely hurt as well by
the unfair advantage in trade by corporations who choose to
benefit from heinous labor practices. Perhaps that is why the
trade imbalance in China is a staggering $70 billion this year.
Let me be clear. Human rights violations in China are
robbing Americans of their jobs and livelihoods, and I believe
it must stop. Let's also be clear, I and my colleagues who want
to continue the annual review of MFN, or NTR as it is now
called, we don't advocate isolation. What we want, what we
demand, is principled engagement, respect for workers' rights
and human rights.
Let me just conclude by saying I respect those on the other
side of this issue. I respect them deeply. They come to it from
a different perspective. They think perhaps this may be a
constructive way of trying to promote change. But I have to say
in all candor I deeply resent comments made by the President of
the United States in today's Washington Post where he says that
lawmakers who oppose the measure are focusing on politics
rather than its merits. That is an insult, I say, Mr. Chairman.
Politics has nothing to do with this. This has everything to do
with people who are suffering as a result of a dictatorship.
As the President went on to say, virtually 100 percent of
the people at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue know it is
the right decision. No, it is not 100 percent, Mr. Chairman.
There are many of us who believe strongly and passionately that
human rights and now, increasingly, the security issues trump
continuing the most favored nation status or permanent NTR for
China this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to thank Chairman Gilman for the
leadership that he has provided on this issue. He has been a
steady hand, and he has been fair to both sides on this very
volatile issue, and at the same time he has maintained his own
moral and personal convictions. So I thank Chairman Gilman for
the good job he has been doing.
I would also like to associate myself with Mr. Brown's
statements. Mr. Brown, I didn't find anything I could disagree
with at all. I thought your statement was exceptionally
thoughtful.
Let me just say that permanent normal trade relations will
not be any different, as far as I can see, than what we have
had with most favored nations status over the years, just that
we would be making it permanent, and most favored nation status
that we had for over a decade has not been in America's
interest. It has demonstratively been-- undercutting America's
interest.
Economically, what have we seen in this relationship with
Communist China? We have seen the transfer of manufacturing
capability; in other words, jobs going overseas under the guise
of, we have to have this because we need it for American
exports. We are not exporting American products over there. We
have studied it now and know that is just not true. What is
happening is the term ``exports,'' American exports, is being
used to cover the fact that we are setting up factories over
there to take advantage of slave labor, of people who have no
rights to quit their job or to ask for a raise or to ask for
better living conditions.
Sending our manufacturing capabilities over to a country
like that, is that good for the United States in the long run?
Even in the short run it just helps some American billionaires,
so that hasn't been good for us.
In terms of our national security, Congressman Cox will be
testifying in a few moments, verifying that there has been a
heinous transfer of technology, of weapons technology, to
Communist China that now puts us in jeopardy. This has worked
against our national security to have this kind of relationship
with Communist China, and morally--Mr. Smith has outlined it
very well--morally this has been a catastrophe for the United
States of America. We have just thrown away the moral
foundation that we have been so proud of here in the United
States since our Founding Fathers established this country, a
country supposedly based on liberty and justice for all. We
just have cast that aside so a few billionaires could make a
quick buck. This will turn around and hurt us in the long run.
If we continue just trying to let some very powerful
interest groups in here, make a quick buck off just discarding
all of the moral parts of the equation, that is not debatable.
How many businessmen have to tell us that you don't mix
business with moral decisions like human rights? We don't need
to hear that, because the fact is that if we act immorally, it
is going to hurt America in the long run, and it already has
with this transferred technology and this transfer both of
weapons technology and manufacturing technology. We have given
leverage to this monstrous regime, the world's worst human
rights abuser, a belligerent, militaristic regime.
This is not with whom we should establish a permanent
normal trade relationship, especially considering the past. It
serves so much against the interest of our country and against
the interest of human freedom.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Martinez, my colleague, our witnesses have other
obligations and would want to be on their way shortly, so
please be brief.
Mr. Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as brief
as possible, but I am a little appalled at some of the
statements I have heard in this debate on permanent normal
trade relations with China. We are appalled by the human
rights. I think we have every right to be. They have not had an
exemplary human rights record. But they are changing, and you
know what I have always believed, and I have seen it in the
past years. Communism has given way to capitalism, and to be
engaged in China in an economic way is to further that
capitalism growth and eventually have that conquering
communism. We saw it in East and West Germany. We saw it in
Communist Russia. If you look around the map, I remember a
while back looking at a map that showed in red the colors of
the Communist countries, and that has been reduced
dramatically, especially even in our own Western hemisphere.
The fact is we talk about human rights. I wonder if people
judging us on our human rights when we had slavery in this
country would have given us any better record than these people
are giving China today.
I was in China right after World War II for two and a half-
years, and I saw the kinds of deprivation that the Chinese
people suffered under the nationalist government which we
recognized, and with whom we had great relations with and
praised all the time. I think conditions have improved and will
continue to improve.
I have a tape in my office that I will share with anyone.
An American gentleman went over to China, and he is now
franchising paint stores. Have you ever heard of such a thing
in a Communist country, franchises? It is a little change.
Like I say, capitalism will conquer communism in the end. I
think we ought to keep engaging these people. I am not
absolutely certain we should give them permanent normal trading
relations, but we have been doing it, like Dana Rohrabacher
said, for the last ten years. It hasn't yet changed much, but I
think it is just the beginning and you have to give things
time. At this point in time I lean toward voting for it,
because I think that the sooner that we fully engage the
Chinese people, the sooner we will see communism give way to
capitalism.
I think that we are divided in the House, and in Congress
probably in both Houses, into two kinds of people: one part the
Henny Penny, the sky is falling, the Chinese are going to take
all our help and build missiles and then blow us up with them;
and the other part who are very optimistic people, who can see
only the bright future of full trading relations with China. I
think somewhere along the line we have got to come back to
reality and say what is factual and what is fiction in our
minds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Martinez. I understand that
Mr. Levin has an appointment downtown. Would Mr. Cox agree to
allow him to proceed?
Mr. Cox. By all means.
Chairman Gilman. I look forward to hearing from our
colleagues from both California and Michigan: Mr. Cox, the
distinguished Chairman of our Republican Policy Committee, the
gentleman from California; and Mr. Levin, the gentleman from
Michigan, Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Ranking Member.
Both gentlemen, feel free to summarize your statements, and we
will make certain that your full statement will be entered into
the record.
Mr. Levin?
Mr. Levin. Mr. Gilman, I know I will be available for
questions, and Mr. Cox was going to go first, so I would like
to respect that so he can proceed. I appreciate your courtesy.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Cox.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER COX, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Cox. I have already offered to let Mr. Levin go first.
He wishes for me to go first, and one of us has to start, so I
will be pleased to do so.
I don't think there has been a stronger voice for PNTR with
the People's Republic of China in the media, at least, than the
Wall Street Journal, but in recent weeks the Wall Street
Journal has also recounted on page one the extent of human
rights abuse that is ongoing in the People's Republic of China.
They describe how a 57-year-old mother was forced by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to endure
Communist reeducation because of her religious beliefs; how she
was subjected to repeated shocks from a cattle prod and forced
to endure barefoot marches through the snow; and how ultimately
on February 21st of this year, Chen Zixiu died, while in
custody, from a heart attack.
I don't think anyone here, whichever side of the PNTR
debate you find yourself on, believes that it should not be our
priority to promote freedom and human rights around the world,
and specifically in the People's Republic of China. I am
confident that this Congress will refuse to renounce its belief
that human rights are a vital part of the American character
and any conception of American foreign policy, whether
Republican or Democrat. That is why we are having this hearing
today, because the legislation that has been submitted by the
President for Congress to vote on has a fatal flaw. It goes too
far.
The President has told us that he is in favor of permanent
normal trade relations (PNTR) with the People's Republic of
China; that our annual review of those normal trade relations
should be no more. There is a healthy debate about whether that
is a good idea or not. But the present legislation does more
than this. It not only ends the annual review of the trade
status of the People's Republic of China, it not only
establishes permanent normal trade relations, but it does
something else separate, something else very different and
something unsupportable. That is, it completely repeals all of
the nontrade parts of the 25-year-old Jackson-Vanik law as they
pertain to the People's Republic of China. There is no excuse
for this, no justification for it. Indeed, I am quite sure
most, if not essentially all, of the proponents of PNTR are
unaware that the legislation was drafted in this way, that it
contains this illegitimate rider.
The Jackson-Vanik law has served the United States well for
a quarter century. It covers far more than tariff levels,
although that has been the subject of the PNTR debate. If we
were to vote for the President's bill without considering
separate legislation in this Committee, as you are wisely doing
today, then not only would we establish permanent normal trade
relations with the People's Republic of China, but we would end
the statutory annual Presidential review of human rights
conditions in China. We would end the opportunity of this
Congress to either concur or dissent in whole or in part with
that assessment; and we would yank out the non-trade teeth
contained in that legislation, specifically, a prohibition on
U.S. credit facilities and U.S. subsidies for human rights
abusers.
Those nontrade-related provisions--they are nontrade-
related because no trading partner of ours or of any nation has
a right to subsidies from its other trading partners--ought to
be maintained. The annual human rights review--the routine
regular human rights review--ought to be maintained in this
Congress. The Presidential role ought to be maintained. The
President of the United States has not advanced a single reason
for us to repeal those things, and so we need to simply fill
the void that we are creating unnecessarily with this
legislation.
Wherever you stand in the debate on granting permanent
normal trade relations, I hope that one principle that we can
all agree on is that the protection of human rights is an
essential element of America's foreign policy. That is why I am
here today. I have proposed legislation that is appropriately
not titled the Cox bill, not the Levin bill, not even the
Gilman bill, Mr. Chairman, but Jackson-Vanik II, because it
restores what we would otherwise negligently erase in current
law. I have named it after these two Democratic ancestors of
this Congress as well, to do them honor, because their
legislative product has served our country so well for so long.
Under Jackson-Vanik II, we would actually step up the
nontrade human rights role of the Congress and the President.
Semiannually the President would report to the Congress, not
just annually. And semiannually, the Congress would have the
opportunity to consider that report and to vote up or down on
it. If the President and the Congress did not give a clean
human rights bill of health not just to the People's Republic
of China, but all 15 of the countries covered by Jackson-Vanik
currently, then those countries would be ineligible for foreign
aid and subsidies, for affirmative U.S. taxpayer benefits.
There is no reason in the world that this feature of existing
law should be jettisoned. If the President sought to do so for
national security reasons and for good human rights reasons
because, despite the problems in a given country, he thought or
she thought--whoever the future President might be--that human
rights progress is being made, then the President could grant a
waiver. In fact, in Jackson-Vanik II, a modest change that is
made, an improvement, is that the President can grant this
waiver by Executive Order, but the Congress as under current
Jackson-Vanik would have the opportunity to reconsider that and
to overrule it by a joint resolution. As under current law, the
President could then veto the joint resolution, and it would
require two-thirds vote in the House and the Senate to
ultimately prevail.
That is the existing system. We ought to retain it. There
is no reason for us to dismantle the U.S. human rights review
in current law. Some good reasons have been advanced, whether I
or anyone on this panel agree with all of them or not, to have
permanent normal trade relations with the People's Republic of
China. Not a single good reason has been advanced to dismantle
the annual human rights review in current law.
Seated to my right is the father of the Chinese democracy
movement, Wei Jingsheng, who is well known certainly to all of
the Members of this Committee and I daresay to many people
throughout the United States of America. He served 18 years in
prison for doing nothing more nor less, because it was
extraordinarily important, than founding the Democracy Wall
movement and advancing the cause of that modernization to add
to Deng Xiaopeng's list. After serving 18 years in prison, in
part because of the efforts of the U.S. Congress, but also in
part because of the efforts of our counterparts all around the
world, the Communist Government of the People's Republic of
China finally agreed to release this man of courage from
prison, but they didn't permit him to stop enduring punishment.
Instead they send him into lifelong exile and so he is sitting
next to me listening to our testimony today through a
translator because he does not speak English. This is not his
native country, and more than anything else he would like to be
in China, but the latest gruesome punishment inflicted on this
leader of the Chinese democracy movement is exile from his
homeland of China.
If we believe in human rights, if we share his cause, we
cannot in good conscious cast a vote on the floor of the House
of Representatives to repeal the U.S. human rights review that
is a part of Jackson-Vanik and that has been American Policy
for 25 years. So I implore my colleagues whatever else you do
with parallel legislation--my colleague, Mr. Bereuter, and my
colleague, Mr. Levin, have proposed some very good ideas that I
am looking forward to hearing more about this morning--at least
retain the parts of Jackson-Vanik that deal with human rights
review. Don't erase them.
One of the tragedies of where we find ourselves today is
that we are on the precipice of taking yet another step away
from U.S. support for human rights. President Clinton has
already thoroughly delinked trade and human rights. There are
intellectual arguments that have been made, I think very well,
in support of that. But there is no argument in support of
taking the next step, through negligence, of going beyond
delinking trade and human rights to altogether erasing the
nontrade human rights review. We can't do that. We can fix the
PNTR legislation here so that those who believe in permanent
normal trade relations might pursue their arguments, and those
who are strongly opposed to those same trade changes can
advance those arguments.
Jackson-Vanik II, were it enacted today, with or without
the PNTR legislation, would improve the law, and so I would
urge you to take up this legislation anyway regardless of
whether PNTR advances. Most significantly, while the annual
Jackson-Vanik debate has come to encompass a whole panoply of
human rights covered by the universal declaration, the statute
itself written a quarter century ago mentions only one such
human right, emigration. We should codify our recent pattern of
practice, and that is what this legislation does.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I hope that everyone here will
take seriously your responsibility, just as Members of the Ways
and Means Committee have taken seriously their responsibility,
to move legislation in real time so that we can have an honest
debate on the merits when this issue comes to the floor in just
a few weeks. I would urge you to mark up this legislation in
Full Committee so that it is available for us to vote on in the
House of Representatives at precisely the same time that we
consider permanent normal trade relations. I thank you for your
time.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cox appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Levin.
STATEMENT OF HON. SANDER M. LEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to all of
your colleagues whom I have had the privilege of knowing over,
in most cases, a number of years and whom I deeply respect.
Deeply respect.
The issue before us in this Congress, as we know, is not
whether China is going to go into the WTO, because it is going
to in almost all likelihood. The U.S. has no veto power over
its admission into the WTO. I don't think the basic issue is
over globalization. It is here to stay. It is here to grow. In
my judgment, the issue is whether we are going to actively get
involved in shaping globalization so that it widely benefits
Americans and everyone else.
Let me say just a couple of words on the economic aspects,
if I might, since they have been raised, just a few words. It
may take me beyond five minutes. If we don't grant PNTR, the
evidence is clear we are going to lose many of the benefits of
what we negotiated, while our competitors will gain all the
benefits. Also, we will not be able to enforce effectively what
we negotiated. For example, Mr. Rohrabacher, the technology
transfer provisions, they are much stronger in our agreement
with China than we have with virtually any other country, and
we will be able to use the dispute settlement mechanism if the
Chinese--the WTO dispute mechanism, if the Chinese violate
their promise, their commitment not to insist on any more
technology transfers that I have been deeply worried about in
the industrial sector.
There is also an antisurge provision in there. Mr. Bereuter
and I issued a framework document yesterday that incorporates
it, so for the next 12 years, if there is a surge in any
product area that will adversely affect American workers and
producers, there can be essentially an instantaneous response
by the United States beyond what is presently in place vis-a-
vis any other nonmarket economy. So I think in many, many
respects economically there are very valid arguments, provided
we place in legislation the antisurge provision, and provided
we put in place some strong compliance oversight mechanisms
that Mr. Bereuter and I have contained in our proposal.
But if I might, let me talk about the third peg of what we
have been working on with a number of you that Mr. Bereuter and
I described yesterday, and that relates to human rights. It is
a third and critical peg of this, and I deeply appreciate the
chance to join you, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Wei Jingsheng. Welcome to
this Committee, though I am not a member of it. I am glad you
are here.
First of all, engagement, in my judgment, is an important
aspect of the effort on human rights. I think we need to
actively engage, vigorously engage in order to have some impact
on the course of human rights in China. I also think, though,
that we need to confront. I think that the challenge is whether
we can combine engagement and confrontation with the Chinese.
In this respect, I don't think the status quo is working. I
don't think that the annual review has worked effectively. It
is a threat that hasn't been implemented in the past. I don't
see any plan to use it in the future, and I think it is an
instrument that is unlikely to be utilized barring a threat to
national security. There is a WTO exception for our taking back
our permanent NTR if there is a threat to national security.
So let me just focus, if I might, then, on our proposal in
terms of human rights, and that is a Helsinki-type commission,
a U.S. congressional executive commission that is familiar to
many on this Committee.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Gejdenson, you have my full testimony,
and I assume it will be placed in the record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, the full testimony will
be made part of the record. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. The Helsinki Commission has demonstrated that
benefits can be gained from bringing two branches of government
together in a single institution to pursue a common, focused
objective. Particularly in the area of human rights, the
Commission's role has complemented that of the State
Department, providing additional expertise, focused attention
on priorities that reflect its unique institutional
perspective. Its achievements include putting pressure on the
former Soviet Union to release prisoners of conscience. I
believe that a similar commission focused on China--and I agree
so much with Mr. Cox, there must be no vacuum here--that a
commission focused on China can achieve a comparable record of
effective pressure. It would consist of Members of both houses
of Congress and Presidential appointees. Its scope would have
three pillars: human rights, labor market issues and the
development of the rule of law. It would have a permanent
professional staff with expertise in areas including law,
workers' rights, economics, and Chinese politics and history,
with a rich intelligence network that would be developed,
including contacts with NGO's. It would report once a year to
the President and Congress on developments in the areas within
its jurisdictions, and importantly, it would make
recommendations for congressional and/or executive action that
may enforce or help bring about positive changes. It would also
maintain a list of persons subjected to human rights abuses and
other abuses in China.
So it would be, first of all, a permanent concentrated
spotlight on human rights. Second, it would serve as an
effective base from which to mobilize bipartisan pressure on
China in this vital area. Third, as people in China gain
greater access to the Internet--when I was there in January for
ten days, it was clear how dramatically that is growing--it
would be an important point of contact between Chinese
citizens. Also, you could provide recommendations for action by
this Congress that were WTO-consistent.
Recommendations for action: As I said earlier, my ten days
in China of person-to-person exchange with people from various
walks of life in Beijing and Hong Kong demonstrated to me the
change in China is irreversible, but its direction is not
inevitable. We must persistently continue to strive to impact
that change. In my judgment, there is no realistic choice but a
step-by-step activist approach. I remember, in closing, the
work of so many of us when it came to the former Soviet Union,
our visits there, our efforts to pressure them, the work of the
Helsinki Commission. I think it was a useful device and can
well be here.
Chairman Gilman. Permit me to interrupt the witness. We
will continue right through the voting, so if you'd like to go
over and vote and come right back, I welcome that.
Mr. Levin. In my last paragraph, Mr. Chairman, is a
reference to President Carter's statement of yesterday, and I
was in AID when Mr. Carter introduced human rights into foreign
assistance. His record was way beyond anybody else's. China, he
concluded in his statement yesterday, has still not measured up
to the human rights and democracy standards and labor standards
of America, but there is no doubt in my mind that a negative
vote on this issue in the Congress will be a serious setback
and impediment for the further democratization, freedom and
human rights in China. That should be the major consideration
for the nation and for the Congress.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levin appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Cox has gone over to vote and will be
right back.
The so-called parallel legislation has drawn fire from
those critics who argue that it would duplicate WTO procedures
and lacks teeth in enforcement mechanisms. Is this a fair
criticism?
Mr. Levin. No.
Chairman Gilman. Can you tell us why not?
Mr. Levin. First of all, it has teeth. For example, on the
antisurge provision, which is not right before you, it has very
clear teeth. If there are imports that come into the United
States that would injure our workers and producers, there could
be a prompt and swift and meaningful action.
Second, in my judgment, the Helsinki Commission proposal
has teeth. Indeed, I think it will end up having more of an
impact than our present annual review that has essentially been
perfunctory. It will be a continuing, strong focus spotlight on
human rights, including labor rights practices and malpractices
within China with the power of making recommendations for
action to this Congress. Those actions, if we so determine,
would have teeth in them. They would have to be WTO-consistent
and essentially nontrade-related. So this has teeth; indeed, I
think it has more reality to it in terms of impact than the
status quo.
Mr. Levin. How much time?
Chairman Gilman. Seven minutes. I am reserving my time and
yielding to Mr. Smith for questions.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I will be
very brief and continue when we get back.
Mr. Levin, as you know, I chair the Helsinki Commission. I
have been on the Helsinki Commission for nine of my ten terms
in the U.S. House of Representatives. There are gaping
differences between what you are proposing and what the
Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975, and the Helsinki Commission
that was created by Congress in 1976 to monitor the three
baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. One basic difference is that
all of the countries that are part of the OSCE process have
agreed to the human rights, the security, and the trade baskets
and the documents that follow it.
I proposed way back in the 1980's that we consider such a
thing for China. We did a report on it, the State Department
did, and the bottom line was how do you get China to sign such
a thing so that there is indeed access to prisoners, so that
there is indeed a real transparency without which it is just us
knocking on the door--the way the ICRC, the human rights
organizations, and our own Congress does. You and I, if we had
tried to get into a prison to visit Wei Jingsheng when he was
in prison, would have been shown the door. I did try to visit
him when he was in prison.
The other point is we already have Assistant Secretary of
State Harold Koh of the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
Bureau, who does a magnificent job. The Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices shows a very fair assessment of the
abysmal state of human rights in China. This year's report is a
good, accurate record of the state of affairs. I know your
motives are pure and you want to do the right thing, but there
will be some people who will use this creation of another
watchdog Committee when we already have a number of such things
as a cover, a fig leaf. That is one of the concerns I have.
Mr. Levin. Could I respond quickly, because I may not be
able to come back unless the Chairman orders me because I am
supposed to go elsewhere.
Chris, I have been so determined over these years that
there is a vacuum, in that we handle in Congress these issues
sporadically. There is an executive department, but it is out
there. There is no high-level congressional executive
commission that has as its sole responsibility to shine the
spotlight, to go there on a regular basis, to interface with
other countries--we do a poor job of this--that really makes it
our first line of responsibility, that recommends concrete
actions to the Congress of the United States. I want to tell
you my deep faith that if we institutionalize this, if we
concertize it, if we put a number of us on as our first line of
responsibility to put the pressure on the Chinese, that
combined with engagement--and if we vote down PNTR, it is going
to undermine our engagement with the Chinese--that we will make
more progress on human rights and labor rights than what has
become a perfunctory, and it isn't for you. You are out there
all the time, but it has become a perfunctory exercise. What I
want is an institution that has a clear charge, a clear
responsibility, a clear obligation. I deeply believe that it
will be a more effective step than we now have.
Mr. Smith. Just very briefly, because I know we all have to
vote. The Helsinki Final Act was agreed to by Russia, then the
USSR, and the other Warsaw Pact countries. But even after they
agreed to its provisions, we still denied most favored nation
status to the USSR. The idea was that, until there was a
demonstrable improvement, we don't reward them with significant
trade.
Mr. Levin. But they granted it after that.
Mr. Smith. Not for a very, very long time, as you know.
Mr. Levin. But they were granted it.
Mr. Smith. But my deep concern, I say to my good friend and
colleague, is that this will be seen as something in lieu of
the annual review and the pressure that can accrue from that,
rather than something that is stand-alone.
Mr. Levin. Let me just say I don't think the annual review
is a useful pressure, and this will not be in lieu of. This
will be a crystallization of what is badly needed on a day-to-
day basis.
Mr. Smith. Would it be your view that the Human Rights
Bureau is not doing its job then?
Mr. Levin. It doesn't have the statute, the standing, the
involvement of us, the resources. To do the job that we need to
do, we need to combine engagement and confrontation, and I
think this is the way to do it.
Chairman Gilman. If I might interrupt, Mr. Cox is on his
way back. I am going to ask Mr. Levin if he would be kind
enough to return for just a few minutes of interrogation. I am
going to ask Dr. Cooksey to take over. Mr. Cox is on his way
back, and he can continue as soon as Mr. Cox comes back. The
Committee stands in recess momentarily.
[Recess.]
Mr. Bereuter. [Presiding.] The Committee will resume its
sitting. Chairman Gilman asked me if we would start. Mr. Cox is
here. Perhaps Mr. Levin is coming back shortly.
At this time we will recognize the gentleman from
Louisiana, Dr. Cooksey for questions that he might have for
Representative Cox. Dr. Cooksey.
Dr. Cooksey. Congressman Cox, we welcome you to the
International Relations Committee. We have a lot of fascinating
debates here. We have passed great resolutions, and oftentimes
they are ignored, but we are glad to have someone with your
integrity and background in this area.
I have a question. I, too, am concerned about the human
rights abuses not just in China, but everywhere. I agree that
no matter where you fall on this issue, whether you are for
PNTR or for admission of them and subsequent admission of China
to the WTO. My question I have is that last week we voted on
the African trade bill and the CBI, which I voted for and I
think a big majority of the House voted for. We voted for this
at a time that there is major turmoil in Zimbabwe. They are
shooting white farmers just because they are white and have
land. In Sierra Leone the same people that were amputating the
hands of children and adults with machetes a year or so ago are
now shooting people in the streets. The very groups that are
opposed to PNTR and the admission of China into the WTO labor
unions, protectionists, isolationists, environmentalists, have
not raised their voice about this issue. I used to work in east
Africa. I was in Mozambique toward the end of that civil war,
and I know that there were some atrocities over there. So why
all of the very loud discussion about China, and everyone is
ignoring the atrocities that we know are being committed in
Africa right now, and we voted for that trade bill?
Mr. Cox. I think some of the reason that so much trade
attention is paid to the People's Republic of China amounts to
the same reason that so much human rights attention is paid to
it. It is the most populous nation on Earth. At the same time,
I would agree with you that human rights are universal, and
wise U.S. foreign policy would address itself to human rights
in general and try to be evenhanded in our application of our
policies.
Indeed, one of the reasons that Jackson-Vanik II is
necessary is that if we were to vote on the PNTR legislation as
it is drafted, not only would it do the one thing that
everybody expects it to do, and that is establish permanent
normal trade relations with the People's Republic of China, but
it would do something else. It would establish a special carve-
out from the nontrade parts, the human rights review of
Jackson-Vanik. This would be done for only one of the 15
countries that is currently covered by Jackson-Vanik.
So you would have the irony of disparate treatment between
the world's largest Communist country, the People's Republic of
China on the one hand and a democracy like Ukraine, which would
remain covered by Jackson-Vanik. You would be according special
treatment where it is not deserved.
In order to maintain the consistency and coherence of our
foreign policy and of the Jackson-Vanik statute that is already
on the books, we need to be careful not to negligently erase
the nontrade human rights review for the PRC.
Dr. Cooksey. Let me ask you this: Would Jackson-Vanik II,
as you have proposed, have any impact on similar trade reviews
or human rights reviews for African countries, because we are
now going to really enhance the trade with Africa?
Mr. Cox. Jackson-Vanik, as it was written, encompasses what
was a statutory euphemism for Communist countries: ``nonmarket
economies.'' Therefore, in the post-Soviet era Jackson-Vanik
encompasses the following: the PRC, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Albania,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. No
African country is on that list, and our African human rights
review, therefore, falls under a different rubric.
Dr. Cooksey. I was in Mozambique in 1991 and 1992, and we
were over there doing eye surgery at a hospital, and the
Russian eye surgeons left the day before we got there because
their contract ran out, and Mozambique was under a Communist
government when I was there theoretically, the day before I got
there. What is the difference? These other countries have
disavowed--some of the countries you mentioned have disavowed.
Mr. Cox. Precisely. That is why I think there is this irony
that we would take the world's largest Communist country, and
have a special carve-out for it, while leaving newly mended
democracies covered by Jackson-Vanik under stricter human
rights review. Just a few weeks ago when I was in Russia, I met
with the Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, who very
pointedly in his opening comments to me--we met for an hour and
a half, I think--laid out Russian complaints that they are
still covered by Jackson-Vanik even though it was designed for
the Soviet Union, even though they are no longer the Soviet
Union, even though they are now a democracy, and even though 75
percent of the state-owned assets have been transferred into
private hands. Now, with Chechnya ongoing, one wonders whether
it would be viable to propose lifting Jackson-Vanik from Russia
at this time, but surely any objective observer can see the
strange message that we are sending when we excise the People's
Republic of China from Jackson-Vanik coverage while leaving
Russia, and certainly while leaving the Ukraine and other
democracies covered by the law.
But I take your point. As you know, there are some
Communist countries, such as Cuba, that were not on the list I
just read you for Jackson-Vanik coverage not because nominally
they aren't covered, but rather because they are covered by
even stricter trade sanctions, such as a complete embargo with
respect to Cuba, for example.
Dr. Cooksey. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cox, you have raised a real interesting issue of which
I was totally unaware until I heard you talking about it a few
days ago. I am curious about your use of the term
``negligent.'' Is that based on your assumption that the
Administration could never have intended to provide executive
branch discretion regarding all the provisions of Jackson-
Vanik, and, therefore, they must never have realized the bill
that has been introduced went far beyond the trade issues, or
is there some other reason why you refer to it as negligence?
Mr. Cox. I am confident that it is at least negligent. If
it is willful, I have much greater concern. The reason I am
willing to extend the benefit of the doubt is that there has
been no advertisement this is the purpose of the legislation.
All of the debate, all of my meetings with my business
constituents have been focused on normal trade relations with
the People's Republic of China. No business has come to me, for
example, and said they wish to have the nontrade parts of
Jackson-Vanik repealed or that they wish to get rid of the
annual human rights review. Likewise, there has been no
intellectual argument advanced by the Administration in support
of lifting the nontrade portions of Jackson-Vanik from the PRC.
Mr. Berman. Putting it aside, the issue whether negligence
is a compliment compared to willful, it could well be that the
business community you have talked to hasn't even focused on
the other implications of the bill the Administration has
introduced, and it might be that the Administration hasn't
addressed the substance of those issues because there has been
no criticism of those issues until you came along.
Mr. Cox. That is possible.
Mr. Berman. And that they might have a very coherent and
rational explanation for doing that, or it could be negligence,
I don't know. You are surmising at this point that it was not a
conscious intent on their part.
Mr. Cox. That is right. As a Member of the leadership in
the Congress, I have been a participant in many discussions of
this issue over many, many months, and I simply have not heard
from the Administration that they are asking us to repeal not
only the trade, but also the non-trade human rights review.
Mr. Berman. Have you ever asked them why they did this?
Mr. Cox. I have not had that opportunity. But our
consideration of this legislation has been like opening the
toys at holiday time. If you ever tried to assemble a toy for
your little kids, you know that when all else fails, you read
the directions. Every once in a while after we debate a
proposal around here long enough, we go and read the
legislation, and that is what I did.
Mr. Berman. I am just getting to that point. Then we have
plenty of time.
Mr. Cox. It is not a long piece of legislation, by the way.
It is very simple in its operation, but it has two very
different impacts. One is to establish permanent normal trade
relations. The other is an illegitimate rider. It repeals all
the nontrade parts of Jackson-Vanik.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both
of our distinguished colleagues for their presentation. In
particular, I appreciate the opportunity to work with my
colleague from Michigan, Sandy Levin, on our proposed draft
framework. He and I have both made it clear that we welcome
constructive ideas, and this is a place for us to start on
parallel legislation.
I know with respect to Mr. Cox, our distinguished
colleague, his intent is to always be constructive as we look
at various bills that relate to Asia. My comments will be
directed to Mr. Cox because I have specific points of concern
about his legislation. I must say that the questions are based
upon draft legislation you were good enough to give me about
eight or ten days ago. There may well have been changes of
which I am unaware.
Mr. Cox. Let me preempt at least one potential comment but
saying that based on our discussions in our meeting, I did make
changes to the legislation to simplify it. The legislation that
is before the Committee at this point is, with respect to the
nontrade sanctions, precisely the same as existing law,
existing Jackson-Vanik. There is no other provision in the bill
than that.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Cox, I knew you were planning to do that
so I hope my comments are based upon what you have actually
presented. My basic conclusion is that your legislation loses
U.S. votes for PNTR, and, given how close the vote is expected
to be, obviously I am not interested in seeing that happen.
Here are the concerns I would specifically mention.
The certification standard in section 2 of the bill is much
higher and more far-reaching than the current Jackson-Vanik
freedom of immigration standard. Your certification, I believe,
is a comprehensive human rights standard. Section 2 also
requires biannual reports analyzing these wide-ranging human
rights issues in comparison to the current Jackson-Vanik
requirement for a biannual ``determination of full
compliance,'' with the freedom of the annual Presidential
waiver of full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, as in the case of
Belarus and China. This would result in two China debates per
year, something our colleagues are not looking forward to, I
would guess. The Cox certification would apply to all countries
subject to Title 4 of the Trade Act of 1974 as of January 1,
2000. That would include countries like Kyrgyzstan, which were
subject to the title on January 1st, but may not be at the time
of the enactment of any bill here, that would occur because
Kyrgyzstan and Albania are removed from Title 4 status and
accorded full NTR in the Africa trade conference report.
Section 3 of your bill is designed to compel debate and
action of the Senate regardless of whatever action may or may
not be taken in the House. The sanctions required in section 4
are sanctions on all forms of bilateral/multilateral foreign
aid--perhaps you can correct me if that has been changed--
including development of systems, democracy and rule of law
programs.
Mr. Cox. That one was changed at your request.
Mr. Bereuter. I appreciate your effort in that respect.
On a more positive side, section 5 provides a broad and
fairly minimal presidential waiver standard that virtually any
targeted country could meet.
Section 6 uses the current Jackson-Vanik procedures as a
basis of the proposed Jackson-Vanik II resolution consideration
process.
Those are my concerns. They form very important reasons why
currently, as it's drafted, the bill loses U.S. votes. I am
hoping if you can and if you care to, accommodate those
concerns which you have not already taken into account.
Thank you for listening to this, Mr. Chairman.
Perhaps you might like to respond.
Mr. Cox. I think I am with the gentleman in his narrative,
but not in his conclusion. The narrative--I made quick notes--
went as follows. First you mentioned that there is a higher
standard for giving a country a human rights clean bill of
health. That is an explicit point in the legislation that
coincides with the pattern and practice over the last quarter
century. The Jackson-Vanik debate, the annual debate is not
just about emigration rights, so the bill, Jackson-Vanik II,
enumerates human rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of
the press and so on that are always the subject of our debate.
I certainly intended that. It is meant to be an explicit
rendition of human rights, not drawn from one's left ear, but
rather coinciding with the universal declaration of human
rights. As you pointed out, we actually streamlined the waiver
process. The President can waive these by Executive Order, and
in that sense there is a balance. While the existing standard,
at least in statute, concerns only emigration, the PRC has
never met the standard. So it has always required a waver
making explicit the rest of the human rights statue doesn't
really change pattern and practice. It has the same statute. It
has the same debate that we have always had.
You mentioned, second, that there would be semiannual
rather than annual debates. As I mentioned in my opening
testimony, that is one of the upgrades in focusing on human
rights. The reason that that is important is that we are
admittedly and intentionally in the PNTR vote disconnecting
trade from human rights. If there are no longer any trade
sanctions, and all you have is the debate, then at least you
ought to have a healthy and regular debate. But what we are
doing in the PNTR legislation as written is erasing the debate,
too. I think that is wholly legitimate and loses you votes. It
certainly loses mine.
The third thing is that----
Mr. Bereuter. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. Cox. Sure.
Mr. Bereuter. We have, as you know, very little foreign
assistance to PRC. Generally, what we have now is aimed at
human rights and democracy. I can't imagine us wanting to
eliminate that small amount, but that seems to be the direction
we are trying to push the Chinese. I would like to hear a
response if you wish.
Mr. Cox. There is no reason to maintain that. We have
Jackson-Vanik now. We provide that aid. All I am saying is
leave that statute alone if it doesn't involve trade. The
argument has been made, and I think roundly, that trade
sanctions are not helpful to the U.S. interests. Some--many
people perhaps on this Committee disagree with that, but the
debate is full; and on the other hand, no argument has been
made that nontrade sanctions or a Presidential review of human
rights or a congressional review of that Presidential review
and a debate about it is illegitimate. That, in fact, is quite
constructive, and it is probably right that Beijing doesn't
like it. They probably would just as soon we stop talking about
human rights. If we ask the Ambassador whether, after we get
rid of all the trade sanctions, he would like us also to get
rid of the human rights debate, he would probably say yes, but
that is why we need to have it.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bereuter. He probably would. That is why the Levin-
Bereuter proposal is there.
Mr. Cox. We need to have it in Congress. I don't think we
want to send the PRC a signal that we are repealing the
existing procedures for monitoring human rights abuse.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Pomeroy.
Mr. Pomeroy. I want to pursue the questions asked by
Congressman Bereuter, and I want to begin by commending
Congressman Bereuter and Congressman Levin for their bipartisan
effort to articulate an ongoing concern of the United States on
human rights and workers' rights even as we move PNTR forward.
We are very close to a vote, and the vote is going to be
close, and I think that the proposal you have advanced, Mr.
Cox, is quite interesting, but I worry just as a matter of
almost process and politics if we start to have a mushrooming
of these other alternatives that address human rights even as
we move PNTR forward, it is going to at least confuse and at
worst divide the intention to address that concern in a manner
that still captures support for PNTR.
Have you tried to work with Congressman Bereuter and Levin
and meld your two proposals?
Mr. Cox. Indeed, the reason that I am the lead-off witness
at this hearing is I came to the Committee of jurisdiction as a
Member of the leadership of the House with a proposal on which
I had previously met with Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr.
Bereuter, and I fully intend to be constructive in doing so.
Wei Jingsheng, who is seated next to me, has written a
letter, which I think now is public, that complained about the
inadequacy of the brand new process, the completely alternative
process that is being suggested in Levin-Bereuter. He said that
a review outside of the Congress, outside of the current
process of Jackson-Vanik, is not enough; and so I am here and
he is here on this panel simply to ask us to do what a doctor
would do--first do no harm. Our object is to enact permanent
normal trade relations; let's do that. But let's not
negligently, as I put it earlier, do more than that.
You have to remember that the very vote that we are being
asked to cast on the bill, as reported from Ways and Means,
will do two things: It will not only give us permanent normal
trade relations, but it will also erase the nontrade parts of
Jackson-Vanik. We don't have to do that. There is no reason to
do that.
Mr. Pomeroy. On that point, Mr. Cox, you would be more
persuasive to me had you discussed with the Administration
whether or not it was negligent omission or whether or not it
was essentially tied to the----
Mr. Cox. I don't think it much matters.
Mr. Pomeroy [continuing]. The initiative. You indicated to
us you have yet to have the dialogue with the Administration on
the----
Mr. Cox. The Administration has yet to advance a single
argument in favor of repealing Jackson-Vanik. I think Mr.
Berman put his finger on it. Even the business community hasn't
focused on this. It may be that somebody is trying to pull a
fast one here. I don't know. But in any case, there isn't a
good reason for it. I don't think that Democrats or Republicans
agree with it. As I said earlier, I don't have any objection
to----
Mr. Pomeroy. You have told us you haven't had the
discussion, and so you assert that there is no good reason for
it. You don't know. I mean, it seems to me that Jackson-Vanik,
I would be the first to say I have but a layman's understanding
of it. It was passed to basically address concern about the
Soviet Union stopping emigration of Soviet Jews. That was the
purpose for Jackson-Vanik. Now, the so-called Jackson-Vanik II
idea that you are advancing, and I haven't seen the language--I
guess the Minority staff got some language yesterday--does seem
to be a brand new application. You are using an old name of two
revered legislators, but a brand new application of something
devised for quite a different purpose.
Mr. Cox. I would point out to the gentleman that as a
participant, as he has been, in the Jackson-Vanik debates on an
annual basis, he knows that in our pattern and practice in
Congress over the last quarter century, the Jackson-Vanik
debate has come to encompass human rights, all of them. If one
reads the record of last year's debate, the year before and so
on, you will see full discussion of freedom of religion,
freedom to join a trade union, all of these things covered in
our annual debate. All that we are doing in this legislation is
codifying current practice.
If the Committee found that objectionable--this is a
Committee of jurisdiction. I hope you mark up the legislation.
If for some reason you wanted to leave it precisely the same as
exists in Jackson-Vanik, and focus only on emigration, frankly
that would be acceptable to me. I don't think that this
represents the best work that Congress could do, because while
you are at it, you might as well make it conform to what we
know Congress is doing.
Mr. Pomeroy. This looks--and I just basically offer this
as an observation, I am going to vote for the PNTR proposition
for China, but I am very supportive of the effort Congressman
Bereuter and Levin to identify these other issues and
constructively find a way to respond to them. I find that your
initiative, while maybe--obviously well-intended, it occurs in
a process that I think complicates the effort to achieve both
ends, PNTR and codified means to effectively monitor human
rights and worker rights issues in China.
Mr. Cox. I have to say the gentleman must misunderstand
the proposal because they are perfectly complementary. Indeed,
Jackson-Vanik II is perfectly complementary to the Bereuter-
Levin initiative. The only question is whether or not, if all
you did were Bereuter-Levin, when would you be satisfied that
you aren't worse off than you started. On the nontrade human
rights side, I just want us to do no damage, no unnecessary
injury to the Jackson-Vanik process.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. First of all, I would like to
congratulate Mr. Cox. For those who don't know, Chris worked
for several years in the Reagan White House during the height
of the Cold War and understands fully how different strategies
have an impact on human freedom. The first question I would
like to ask Mr. Cox, with your experience in the White House
and since in Congress, was it the trade expansion that
President Reagan focused on with the Soviet Union that helped
bring down that tyranny and end that threat to the United
States and the rest of the world, or did Ronald Reagan insist
on Jackson-Vanik and other human rights measures and strategies
in order to accomplish that great end that we enjoy today?
Mr. Cox. I think the gentleman puts his finger on an
important fact of history, and that is that we have a lot of
experience with bringing down Communist governments through the
use of sanctions and bringing down other noxious governments,
such as the apartheid government in South Africa. We have no
experience in the history of the 20th century ever bringing
down a Communist government through trade.
It is not to say it cannot work, and indeed not every
Communist government is the same. It is always pointed out
early and often in this debate about the People's Republic of
China that Chinese communism or, as Jiang Zemin has wont to put
it, ``Socialism with Chinese characteristics,'' is different
than the Russian variety of it that started in 1917. Our
policies, certainly under President Reagan and under succeeding
Presidents toward the Communist Government of the People's
Republic of China, have been different than they were toward
these other Communist governments.
Having set out in a direction, I think a lot of people want
to see if we cannot make it work, but I wouldn't rely on some
economic determinism here to guarantee our results. As
President Reagan said in a different context, in this ideology
of advancing democracy and political rights through advancing
trade, we should trust, but we should also verify. We should
have some other means; at a minimum we ought to talk about
human rights.
What has pained me in watching the Clinton Administration
implementation of our China policy is that while they have put
a very healthy emphasis on trade, they have not put a
concomitant emphasis on human rights. When the President took
that extended visit to the People's Republic of China, the
founders of the Chinese Democratic Party were not yet in
prison. He could have met with them, as President Reagan
certainly would have in the Soviet Union under similar
circumstances. He did not do that.
Sometimes just talking about human rights when you have the
world's media at your disposal or when you are in the Congress
of the United States can accomplish a great deal, and I know
that Wei Jingsheng, who is sitting next to me, is very grateful
for the efforts of Democrats and Republicans in this Congress
to attempt to secure his release through public diplomacy.
Perhaps if he had not been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize,
perhaps if we had not kept such an intense glare of publicity
on his imprisonment which caused the Communist government in
Beijing to squirm, he might still be imprisoned. As it is, he
is now in exile. That is somewhat better, but we would still
like freedom for Wei Jingsheng.
Mr. Rohrabacher. This proposal that if we keep expanding
American economic trade and ties with Communist China, that it
will result in greater freedom and respect for human rights,
runs totally contrary to the strategy that Ronald Reagan used
in order to bring about the greatest expansion of human freedom
in the history of mankind.
Mr. Cox. That is right, but it doesn't run totally contrary
to the strategy that President Reagan used with the PRC. Since
President Reagan is not here for us to inquire, the only
thing--since you and I worked in the White House, we know a lot
of people who made the policy--the only thing that we can ask
is whether or not, with the collapse of the Soviet empire, we
might have reoriented our China policy.
Mr. Levin. Would you give me 30 seconds?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will, but just let me make one point
first, and that is having also worked with Ronald Reagan and
written some of the speeches that he gave when he went to
China, let me note that when President Reagan dealt with
Communist China, there was an expanding democracy movement at
that time, and that President Reagan was fully aware of that
and fully aware that it was becoming--that there was an
alternative building, and that China was going in the right
direction, and while it was going in the right direction, he
had those policies. Yes, I would be happy to yield.
Mr. Levin. If I might, just give me 30 seconds or 45
seconds.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would ask unanimous consent for an
additional one minute.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Levin. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
I urge that we not put this in either/or frames of
reference. It seems to me that expanded trade by itself is not
a magic wand. I think it will need to be reinforced, to put it
mildly, by pressures on China in terms of human rights and
worker rights; but, a lot of leadership was at the White House
yesterday, including some from the Reagan Administration, who
do believe that economic freedom can have some impact, though I
don't think by itself it is enough in terms of developing
democratic freedoms. For example, the breakup of the state-
owned enterprises in China, which I think is a good idea, there
is a very good argument that as you break up the state-owned
enterprises, that you are going to foster the opportunities for
more freedom because the state-owned enterprises essentially
are controlling the lives of people not only in terms of the
factory, but in terms of housing, in terms of how they get
help, and there is no chance for a free trade labor movement
with state-owned enterprises. The more that changes, I do think
it can help lead to democratic processes provided there are
other important external pressures and internal pressures
leading in that direction. It is not really either/or.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will be voting ``no'' on this agreement, and I am very
concerned that those of us who are voting ``no'' are
characterized as isolationists, as people who do not want to
let the sun shine into China, and that simply is not true. As a
matter of fact, it is the exact opposite of what is true. Trade
with China is going to continue because the Chinese need it to
continue. They send 42 percent of their exports to the United
States. We send less than one percent of our exports to China.
That is unlikely to change whether we vote for or against this
agreement in any significant way. There may be some--if we vote
against this agreement--some tiny, occasional interruptions in
Chinese exports to the United States, but those exports will
pretty much continue.
We do not wish to isolate China. There is not going to be
an end of information exchange to China. Not a single Internet-
capable computer will disappear from China if this agreement
goes down, but if the agreement is accepted, then we lose any
opportunity to have any economic effect on what China does
either to open their markets, deal with nuclear proliferation,
or deal with human rights.
We have talked about economic freedom, but the only
economic freedom that this deal provides is it allows people to
work in near slave conditions, free in the knowledge that their
exports will come to the United States freely without the
slightest risk of impediment. If that is economic freedom, then
I think it is insufficient to bring political freedom to China.
Mr. Cox, I want to applaud you for going as far as you do
in Jackson-Vanik II. When we dealt with the world's other great
nonmarket economy, we insisted on human rights for a group of
people. I am and was very concerned about the Soviet Jews. We
should certainly not want to do less with regard to the
Christians and Muslims of China, with regard to those who are
struggling for autonomy in Tibet, et cetera. So for us to sweep
aside any part of Jackson-Vanik as an undisclosed part of this
trade agreement seems absurd.
But I would go further and say that while I agree with you
that just talking about human rights itself is important, let's
say China did something outrageous. Let's say 100,000 Buddhists
monks and nuns were killed in Tibet or a crackdown that made
Tiananmen--that exceeded Tiananmen Square. If we went with this
deal, could the United States do anything that would cost the
government in Beijing a penny in order to retaliate for such
future outrages that might occur?
Mr. Cox. I think the argument the gentleman is making is an
argument in support of his vote against PNTR. The arguments on
the other side, I am sure, the gentleman is very familiar with.
I just wish to add that the reason I am here today is not that
debate. That debate is taking place in this Committee and also
in the Ways and Means Committee. I am here to focus attention
on the other half of what this PNTR vote is doing, because I
think most everybody is focused on the trade part, and they are
not focused on the erasure of the annual human rights review.
Finally, I would say while supporters of PNTR ought to vote
for this because they want to advance trade, but not retard
human rights, opponents of PNTR should support this because if
PNTR does not pass, Jackson-Vanik II will improve the existing
process. First, it codifies the full panoply of human rights
that are subject of our regular discussions in Congress, and
second, it creates it a twice-a-year review.
Mr. Levin. Could I briefly respond?
Mr. Sherman. Briefly, because I have limited time.
Mr. Levin. First of all, in your comment about exports from
China without the slightest risk, I just want to urge that
there was negotiated an antisurge provision that is, as I said
earlier, an extremely important one, which our proposal, Mr.
Bereuter's and mine and others', would place into law so that
if there were a threat of serious injury to any American
worker/producer, we would have a mechanism considerably beyond
anything available.
Second, in terms of whether there anything that we could do
in a circumstance that you suggest, the answer is there are
nontrade institutions through which China has now been
receiving very considerable sums which would be subject to
action by the United States and other countries.
Chairman Gilman. The, gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Levin, just one question. You brought up the
idea of the breakup of businesses in China. It has come to my
attention, and I don't know whether this is in the agreement,
in the PNTR or the World Trade Organization, but that no
sanctions are allowed in some agreement--which one I don't
know--no sanctions are allowed in cases where businesses are
owned or managed by governments. This has come to me from one
of my companies back home that the basic idea is there is an
opening about a mile wide in there, considering that
substantial pockets of the Chinese economy are government-owned
businesses. Am I mistaken in this, or do you have any knowledge
about what I am speaking?
Mr. Levin. I don't think that is correct. The Chinese have
made certain commitments, and those commitments are subject to
the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, and I do not think
there is a blanket exemption for anybody.
Mr. Ballenger. That is a pretty broad statement. I just
wondered if there is some exemption that you might----
Mr. Levin. I don't know of one. I would be glad to take a
look at it, but I don't believe that that statement that you
recited is correct.
Mr. Ballenger. All I know is there was a commitment, a
verbal commitment by a trade representative, that they would
try to do something about this gaping hole in the agreement. So
it appears to me there must be something there, and I would
just----
Mr. Levin. I would be glad to follow that up and let you
know.
Mr. Ballenger. I appreciate it very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Faleomavaega. This will be our last inquiry of the
panel.
Mr. Faleomavaega. My personal welcome to the colleagues,
Mr. Cox and Mr. Levin, for their presence on the Committee. I
do want to commend Mr. Levin and Mr. Bereuter for sincerely
trying to find a solution to this very serious problem in
dealing with China, and probably no two Members can understand
and appreciate more the concerns expressed by my good friend
from California concerning the Jackson-Vanik provision as it is
currently applied.
I would like to ask the gentleman from Nebraska and Mr.
Levin from Michigan, in your packaging this proposal as it
addresses the human rights theme, the labor problems and
environmental issues, how did you address the Jackson-Vanik
concerns as has been expressed by our good friend from
California, Mr. Cox? I am sure that you have taken this into
consideration. Are we kind of putting a double-barrel effort
here? We have got the Jackson-Vanik to go with. Now you are
adding these provisions--addressing these very serious issues
that many Members have expressed concern about. I just wanted
your response in dealing with the Jackson-Vanik provision that
many Members are concerned about.
Mr. Levin. Yes. Thank you for your question. My strong
view, and it is shared by a lot, is that the annual review
mechanism has not been an effective instrumentality in terms of
pressuring China in the area of human rights. I voted
originally for a linkage proposal in the hopes that there might
be some efficacy. In my judgment, it hasn't worked. It is a
sporadic kind of attention to a very serious issue.
So what is proposed in the structure that Mr. Bereuter and
I have presented and has a lot of support among Democrats and
increasingly among Republicans, is to have a continuing
permanent institution on the highest level of Congress, and the
executive whose single charge and responsibility would be to
monitor human rights and worker rights and the rule of law
within China; to increasingly be in contact with citizens
within China; to increasingly use modern means of communication
to determine what is happening; and to impact what is
happening; and also then to make recommendations for specific
actions to the Congress and the executive that are appropriate
and WTO-consistent. Those actions would be placed within the
laps--those proposed recommendations would be placed within the
lap of the Congress and the executive for action.
It seems to me that that focused, sharp spotlight on a
regular basis would be a more effective instrumentality to
accomplish what we all believe than the once-a-year, now
perfunctory debate--and I don't mean for us participants, but
in terms of its impact, its being reported, where it stands in
the spectrum of our activity, it would be more effective than
the once-a-year discussion that we have that is attended,
unfortunately, by few of us, and that I think is reported,
unfortunately, by very few within the media.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Just one last question to both of our panelists. Are your
plans consistent, and if you would please be brief since our
time is running, with the rules of the World Trade Organization
and the U.S.-China bilateral agreement? Are they strong enough
to keep the pressure on Beijing to improve its policies on
human rights, on labor rights, on religious freedom and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Cox?
Mr. Cox. Yes, Jackson-Vanik II is WTO-compliant. It retains
the nontrade portions of existing Jackson-Vanik law and would
be completely consistent with either the passage of PNTR or its
defeat in the Congress. Second, I think it is vitally important
at a minimum as an adjunct to what Mr. Bereuter and Mr. Levin
are proposing, because while I agree with Mr. Levin that if the
measure of our success is the human rights performance of the
PRC, then nothing that we have done thus far has worked.
I would not infer from that that getting rid of the human
rights focus that we presently have in the Congress and the
executive branch is a good idea. I think that there is much
merit in the proposal that they are advancing. It would
probably augment what presently we are doing, but keep in mind
that if we repeal the existing Jackson-Vanik annual review, if
we repeal the Presidential reports to Congress and the
opportunities for Congress to debate this, that our strongest
voices in the Congress targeted on human rights abuse in the
PRC would be silenced. Mr. Smith would have no more
opportunity. Ms. Pelosi would have no more opportunity.
Chairman Gilman, you would have no more opportunity. Mr.
Gejdenson, you would have no more opportunity to speak on these
things unless you were one of a tiny handful of people that
might be appointed to this commission. But the whole U.S.
Senate and the whole House of Representatives would be on the
bench. I don't think that is a good idea.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Levin?
Mr. Levin. First, it would be consistent. Second, Mr.
Chairman, and your colleagues, my colleagues, I don't think any
instrumentality by itself is going to be enough. I think there
is going to have to be a combination of pressure points,
including a commission as we propose with its clear mandate.
There is also going to have to be effective engagement. It is
not going to be enough.
For my ten days by myself in China, talking to a wide
variety of people, I became convinced that change is hatching,
but we have to help shape it in the right direction, and my
feeling is that simply saying no after we have negotiated an
agreement with the Chinese is going to undermine our ability to
effectively broadly engage. As well as pressuring, you need
engagement and confrontation. One or the other isn't enough,
and it will take time, but I think that we need to inject
ourselves actively in the processes of time. Time by itself
won't be enough. We need to be an active force in the processes
of change and, by the way, try to be supportive of those that
are on the side of change in China instead of those who want to
stonewall and keep that present state that is under state
control.
Chairman Gilman. I want to thank our panelists, Mr. Cox,
Mr. Levin, for your patience for being here and for your
support of some very important resolutions. Thank you.
We will now move to the second panel. I would like to note
we very much regret that we were unable to work out an
arrangement with the Administration to testify on China PNTR
issues today despite intensive bipartisan efforts to do so. I
look forward to holding a future meeting of the Committee to
ensure that the Administration will be able to provide
testimony on this important issue.
Our second panel today is represented by members of the
American international business community and international
human rights organizations. It gives me great pleasure to
introduce Sandra Kristoff, New York Life International senior
vice president, is responsible for international government
affairs and represents New York Life International in the
Washington policymaking community. Ms. Kristoff has an
extensive background in the Federal Government spanning a 22-
year career that included serving as a special assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Asian affairs at National
Security Council. We welcome Ms. Kristoff.
Our second panel today also will open with the statement of
our good and courageous friend Wei Jingsheng, who is known to
us from previous appearances before our Committee. Mr. Wei
Jingsheng is a former prisoner from China who is now in exile
and exposing through his writings the failure of the Communist
Party to bring forth changes that would lead to democracy and
freedom for the people of China. We look forward to hearing
your testimony today, Mr. Wei.
Mr. Wei Jingsheng must leave shortly for a meeting at the
National Press Club and has agreed to join us on our second
panel.
We also would like to welcome Mr. Mike Jendrzejczyk,
Executive Director of Amnesty International, as our witness on
this panel. Mike has been with Amnesty International since the
mid-1980's, more recently has been associated with their
international secretariat in London. Mike has appeared before
this Committee on prior occasions due to his well-known
expertise on World Bank and trade policy issues, religious
freedom and human rights in China and Asia generally. We are
pleased that you are able to join us today.
Mr. Wei, would you begin your statement.
All of our witnesses, may submit their full statements for
the record. If you would like to summarize, please do so.
STATEMENT OF WEI JINGSHENG, FORMER PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE IN
CHINA, CHINESE DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST
Mr. Wei.
[The following testimony was delivered through an
interpreter.] I am happy to see many people who really care
about democracy in China, either for PNTR or against PNTR.
I have noticed Mr. Smith mentioned the fact that America
Government's pressure does indeed directly affect the human
rights condition within China. Yesterday former President
Carter mentioned that there was a change within China, but
which kind of condition made the change in China? I think Mr.
Carter should know very well that at the time when they formed
the diplomatic relationship with China, and that is also a way
my friend in the democracy war and myself got arrested in
China. In 1994 when Mr. Clinton, who disattached the human
rights condition from the most favored nation status, that is
the time I was sent to jail for the second time along with many
of my friends. Those situations tells you clearly that
international pressure, including the ones from America, do
have a direct effect in the human rights condition in China.
Nowadays, the White House always emphasizes that a free
economy in China would encourage progress of democracy in
China. That is right, but it is only half right. We need other
conditions to develop democracy in China.
In China we had 2000 years of free economy, but it never
brought democracy. After long times of thinking, we realized
that without human rights conditions guaranteed, we cannot get
the law of democracy in China. So if we want to promote
democracy in China, we have got to guarantee the human rights
conditions in China, not just for Chinese Government, but for
all the other dictatorship governments in this world that do
not voluntarily respect the human rights. So we must meet
internal and external pressure, both working together to
improve the human rights record.
There are people who also claim that, we have been
sanctioning China for all those years, but seems there wasn't
too much good coming out of it. So Mr. Levin and Mr. Cox, they
have all those proposals to increase--in Africa--to increase
such effect.
But while we were thinking of how could we improve it, we
should at least guarantee what we already have with the
capacity we already have. As a matter of fact, the annual
review in the Congress in the United States provides extremely
good pressure to the Chinese Government. Because of such a
pressure, our friends within China who work for democracy and
freedom got a little bit of tolerance from the Chinese
Government. If we provide PNTR to China, then we lose such a
leverage, and then we also lose the protection to those people
who fight for China.
This is kind of like a driver's license. It seems we always
have everything in our pocket. It seems it doesn't really work.
We could think of some good ways to improve those people's
driving records, but we should not let everyone get a permanent
driver license. Otherwise, I am afraid that driving records
will deteriorate instead of improve.
So while we try to improve--to have a moral means and the
manner to improve the human rights condition in China, we
should at least not give up the leverage and the means and the
manners that we have to maintain the present records.
Finally I must provide one fact. It seems we spent a lot of
time talking about whether we should isolate China or not; but
as a matter of fact, it is now the Chinese Government's time in
Africa to unite with the other dictatorships and Communist
countries in Africa to isolate the Western countries,
especially the United States.
As a matter of fact, the fight regarding human rights and
democracy is not just a single fight between American
Government and Chinese Government. It is a collective fight
between the countries of democracy versus countries of
dictatorship. In this regard America plays an extremely
important role in this fight, and I hope it shall not retreat.
Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Wei.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wei appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Ms. Kristoff.
STATEMENT OF SANDRA KRISTOFF, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NEW YORK
LIFE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Ms. Kristoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here
representing New York Life, but my perspective on this issue
was really formed through more than 20 years as a civil servant
in the Federal Government assigned to negotiating in the
trenches on trade, political, military, and security issues,
and it is that experience that leads to my assessment that the
full range of U.S. national interests can best be served
through the extension of PNTR to China.
First, it is profoundly in our national security interests.
At the core of our national security is our deep and abiding
interest in promoting peace and stability in the Asia Pacific.
That is why we have committed to maintain forward-deployed
troops of about 100,000. That is why we have nurtured five core
bilateral security treaty alliances, a host of other informal
political and military understandings with friends in the
region, and that is why we are building a regional security
architecture that aims to prevent an arms race, supports rules
on nonproliferation, and rejects the use of military force to
resolve disputes. Every ally and friend in the region,
including Taiwan, has said publicly and repeatedly that a
stable U.S.-China relationship is key to regional security.
Our approach toward China has to convince it that it is in
its own national security interests to support a strong
framework for regional stability. Every President for 30 years,
every Congress for 30 years, has extended normal trade
relations status annually precisely because it increases the
probability of cooperation with China, the probability of a
constructive, stable relationship, and the probability of China
determining that it is in its own national interests to help
develop peace and cooperation with the United States.
The burden is on the opponents of PNTR to explain how
denying that status will not isolate ourselves from China, will
not remove our ability to influence Chinese decisionmakers,
will not create the conditions for confrontation, will not
strengthen the hands of hard-liners in Beijing, will not
jeopardize the security of our allies and friends, will not
weaken the nascent international rules, rules-based regimes on
nonproliferation missile--missile technology, control of other
dangerous technologies, and will not deal a body blow to our
national security.
Second, it is profoundly in our national values interest to
extend PNTR to China. At the core of our American values is the
belief that economic freedoms spark and nurture social and
political freedoms. PNTR opens doors to China and expands the
presence in China of American companies, NGO's and religious
groups that support positive change and expanded freedom for
the Chinese people.
I am not suggesting WTO or PNTR is a silver bullet which is
going to overnight transform China into a Jeffersonian
democracy, but the past 20 years of extending normal trade
status annually have produced great changes within Chinese
society. Twenty years ago there was no such thing as a private
sector in China. There was no such thing as personal freedoms.
Today Chinese people can travel within and outside the country,
seek education abroad, select employment opportunities, vote in
rural elections, earn higher wages, enjoy higher living
standards, live in less poverty. They have increased access to
information. They can begin to rely on the rule of law that is
becoming an increasing part of the Chinese political and legal
system.
That is why virtually every Chinese dissident and Tiananmen
Square leader has spoken out in favor of PNTR. That is why
Martin Lee in Hong Kong has spoken quite eloquently about the
value of having China inside the rule of law system. That is
why religious leaders like Billy Graham, Pat Robertson, the
Christian Coalition, and NGO's like the International
Republican Institute and the Carter Center all support PNTR for
China as a means of advancing political and religious freedom.
The burden is on the opponents of PNTR to demonstrate how
isolating ourselves from China will advance political,
religious freedom or improve the life of even one Chinese
citizen or worker. It is their burden to demonstrate how
rejecting PNTR would not shut down lines of communication and
would not undermine the important role that NGO's have played
in promoting the rule of law. It is their burden to show that
cutting off U.S.-China trade would not push Chinese reforms
backward in time to the days when China was isolated, markets
were closed, and the worst abuses in human rights took place.
Third, it is profoundly in our national economic interest.
No one seriously argues against the merits of the U.S.-China
WTO agreement. Occasionally people raise issues about jobs. I
think that argument is somewhat disingenuous when one
recognizes that we are operating practically at full
employment, and none of the exports that China makes to this
market are any longer produced in this country. So I would
argue that even in the economic area, it is the burden of the
opponents of PNTR to explain how denying this status could
possibly enhance America's competitive advantage in the global
economy.
I would only wrap up by referring you to Steny Hoyer's
recent speech, which I think was a revealing reflection of a
personal struggle on whether to support this issue, and he
based it on the confluence of national economic and national
security interests and a recognition that 20 years of annual
renewal and review of China has produced little, if any,
evidence of improvement in human rights.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ms. Kristoff.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kristoff appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Jendrzejczyk.
STATEMENT OF MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, D.C.
OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA
Mr. Jendrzejczjk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Mike
Jendrzejczyk. I am the Washington director of the Asia Division
of Human Rights Watch. You are right, Mr. Chairman, I did work
for Amnesty International up until 1990 when I took on this
position for Human Rights Watch. Again, we appreciate the
opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss this
very important issue.
My organization does not take a position on trade
agreements per se, and we don't endorse any particular
agreement, including the one negotiated between U.S. and China
last November. However, we do believe that the WTO process
should be used to press for human rights improvements. We think
that trade can be consistent with advancing human rights, but
only if it is combined with effective and sustained pressure.
Here I very much endorse Mr. Levin's comments that
engagement and pressure go hand in hand. As a WTO member, China
will commit itself to respecting global trading rules, and this
is a step toward China's integration into the international
system regulating not only trade relations, but also the
government's treatment of its own citizens. Restructuring
China's economy to fit WTO standards, I think, will give a
boost to those within China who are arguing that it must open
up not only economically, but also politically.
However, I don't think you can argue credibly that WTO
membership will in itself automatically lead to political
change. It could be an important catalyst over the long term,
especially in the area of legal reform. It certainly will
increase pressures and expectations inside and outside China
for creation of an independent legal system, which now does not
exist, and may, in fact, be years away.
Again, I want to stress that WTO membership will not in
itself guarantee the rule of law, respect for worker rights or
meaningful political reform, and, in fact, economic openness
could be accompanied by tight restrictions on basic freedoms
and an overall lack of government accountability. For example,
the government might seek to build a rule of law in the
economic sphere while simultaneously continuing to undermine
the rule of law elsewhere.
I was in Beijing in March with the U.N. High Commissioner
of Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and heard the Vice Premier Qian
Qichen lecture all of the delegates on the benefits of the rule
of law, stressing, however, that it is up to each government to
decide how the rule of law is to be maintained. As you know,
China has justified locking up Falun Gong members and
activists, saying it is simply maintaining and supporting the
rule of law and doing this according to the law.
But it is, I think, crucial that the Administration and
Congress look carefully at the question of permanent normal
trade relations and how this can be used in the context of
China's entry into the global economic system to exert
significant leverage on human rights. We believe that Congress
should set meaningful and realistic human rights conditions
that China must meet before receiving permanent NTR. We think
the President should be required to certify these conditions
have been met before they get PNTR, and this could happen any
time following China's succession to the WTO.
In my testimony I have recommended four areas where we
think there is a realistic possibility China could make
significant progress in exchange for getting PNTR: One,
ratifying two important U.N. human rights treaties that China
has signed, but yet to ratify; two, taking steps to begin
dismantling the huge system of reeducation through labor which
allows officials to sentence thousands of citizens to labor
camps for up to three years every year without judicial review,
and we could provide technical and legal assistance if the
Chinese were to move in this direction; three, opening up Tibet
and Xinjiang to regular, unhindered access by U.N. human rights
and humanitarian agencies, foreign journalists and independent
human rights monitors; and four, reviewing the sentences of
some 2000 so-called counterrevolutionaries convicted under
provisions of Chinese law that were repealed in March 1997.
Getting China to meet these conditions I don't think would
be easy, but it would require the same kind of hard-nosed
negotiating that the Administration committed itself to get the
trade agreement last November.
Second, to replace the annual trade review, we would
strongly support the creation of a new mechanism such as a
special commission appointed jointly by Congress and the
executive branch along the lines of Mr. Levin and Mr.
Bereuter's proposal. I met with Mr. Levin in Seattle, in fact,
just before the tear gas started flying, and several times with
his staff, and we believe that this could play a very useful
role.
My organization has worked closely with the CSCE both
during and after the Cold War, and we have found it an
effective and constructive mechanism. However, I think for this
to be effective in the case of China, more is needed beyond the
pro forma process and the issuing of a report on an annual
basis. I think that the legislation establishing the commission
should require a debate in both the House and Senate and a vote
by a certain date each year on both the findings and the
recommendations of the commission. This would accomplish, I
would add, what Mr. Cox is looking for. It would guarantee that
the commission not only is engaged throughout the year, but
every single year, instead of the trade debate, we would have a
debate and a vote in both the House and Senate on the findings
and recommendations of this commission.
A second----
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Could
you please----
Mr. Jendrzejczjk. I will wrap up, Mr. Chairman.
The second aspect of his proposal has to do with prison
labor, and that, I think, would also be useful, especially if
it entailed renegotiating the original prison labor MOU of
1992.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we very much support the creation of
a code of conduct for American companies in China. This was an
idea first drafted as legislation in this body in 1991 and
again in 1995. I think with the trade agreement implemented and
China and its entry into the WTO, American businesses will have
even greater incentive to be on the ground where I think they
can play a positive role. We think a sense of Congress bill
setting out a code of conduct for American companies with an
annual report to the Secretary of State on how these principles
are being adhered to would take at face value the claims and
assertions by the American business community that their
presence cannot only help liberalize China, but can also lead
to the better treatment of Chinese workers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Jendrzejczyk.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jendrzejczyk appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Now our fourth witness on this panel is
Nicholas Giordano, speaking today on behalf of the U.S. Pork
Producers. He is the international trade counsel for the
National Pork Producers Council, a national association that
represents 44 States and generates over $11 billion in sales.
The National Pork Producers Council is the co-chair of the
Agriculture Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, a group of over 80
organizations that represent farmers, ranchers, food and
agriculture companies in all 50 States.
We welcome you here today, Mr. Giordano. You may summarize
your statement or put the full statement in the record,
whichever you may deem appropriate.
Mr. Giordano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize my
statement, and I do ask that the entire statement be included
in the record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, your full statement
will be made part of the record.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS D. GIORDANO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE COUNSEL,
NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL
Mr. Giordano. As you indicated, I am with the Pork
Producers, but I am also here wearing two hats, as the Pork
Producers are the co-chair of the Agriculture Coalition for
U.S.-China Trade which, as you mentioned, is comprised of over
80 organizations really from farm to table, with all 50 States
represented in our coalition.
Most sectors of U.S. agriculture have suffered from very
low prices during the past few years. Indeed, pork producers
just came through a period with the lowest prices ever in real
terms. As President Clinton, Secretary Glickman and many
Members of this body have pointed out, U.S. agriculture is
missing out on the longest period of economic growth and
prosperity in our Nation's history.
For U.S. agriculture, the importance of consummating this
deal with China and getting China quickly into the WTO cannot
be overstated. The United States Department of Agriculture
estimates that the U.S.-China WTO accession agreement could add
about 1.6 billion annually to U.S. agriculture exports of bulk
commodities such as grains, oils, seeds and products, and
cotton by the year 2005. U.S. export gains could approach two
billion as the Chinese reduce their tariffs on high value-added
products such as pork, poultry, beef, citrus and other fruits,
vegetables, tree nuts, and forest and fish products. While the
United States gains access to its growing market, China does
not gain any greater access to the U.S. market under the WTO
agreement, making it a win-win for American agriculture.
As part of its WTO negotiations with the United States,
China agreed to slash tariffs on many food and agriculture
products. Indeed, the tariffs agreed to by China for many of
these products are much lower than the corresponding tariffs in
countries such as Japan and Korea. The agreement also will
obligate China to reform its monopoly state purchasing
agencies, eliminate scientifically unjustified sanitary and
phytosanitary barriers, and provide strong provisions against
unfair trade and import surges. It requires China to stop the
subsidization of exports, which is a huge concession given the
vociferous opposition we face from the European Union when it
comes to the elimination of agriculture export subsidies.
Finally, WTO membership will require China to play by the same
rules and disciplines of the multilateral trading system as the
United States. The United States will have recourse to WTO
dispute settlement mechanisms should China not live up to any
of its obligations, an avenue of recourse we currently do not
have.
With respect specifically to pork, the package negotiated
by the United States with China has the potential, if fully and
fairly implemented, to transform China into the single greatest
export opportunity for U.S. pork producers. Currently China has
a de facto ban on pork imports. China blocks pork imports
through a system of high tariffs, restrictive import licensing
and distribution practices, and complicated and arbitrary
sanitary requirements. Under the terms of the U.S.-China WTO
agreement, China will, upon WTO accession, phase out its
restrictive import and distribution procedures, lower tariffs
on pork, and cut subsidies. Under the terms of a separate
bilateral sanitary agreement negotiated with the United States,
the U.S.-China agriculture cooperation agreement, China agreed
to accept pork from any USDA-approved packing plant, which
again is a huge concession, particularly given the problems
that we have had with the European Union on meat and poultry in
getting them to extend equivalence to us and recognize our
inspection system.
According to Professor Dermot Hayes, an Iowa State
University economist, the Chinese market, if fully opened to
U.S. pork variety meats, these are the variety meats, the parts
that we don't eat too much in this country, the internal
organs, if China fully opens its market to the variety meats as
stipulated by the agreement, this would add about $5 per head--
this isn't our number, this is an Iowa State economist--about
$5 per head to each of the hundred million hogs we slaughter
each year.
Overall this agreement is comprehensive. It is enforceable,
and it levels the playing field in our favor. In order to
realize the benefits of this agreement, Congress must vote for
permanent normal trade relations with China. If the United
States fails to provide permanent normal trade status to China,
which is not special treatment, but the same trade status that
the U.S. provides to other WTO members, China would have a
right to withhold the benefits of key WTO commitments from the
United States. In such cases, the U.S. will be greatly
disadvantaged as our trading partners enjoy the benefits of
China's entry to the WTO while we are left on the outside
looking in.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Would
you please sum up?
Mr. Giordano. Danish pork producers, Australian beef
producers, Canadian wheat producers, French poultry producers,
Brazilian soybean producers and Argentine corn producers
ironically would reap the gains from America's leadership in
negotiating strong commercial WTO accession terms.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we won the Cold War. There is
no Warsaw Pact. China wants to join the multilateral system
that was largely designed by the United States. We think that
is a good thing, and we ask that the Congress not block U.S.
farmers and ranchers from benefiting from China's integration
into the international system. We ask that Members of Congress
please vote yes on PNTR for China.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Giordano.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Giordano appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. I thank all the panelists.
Mr. Wei, do you think the vote on PNTR would affect the way
that Beijing acts toward Taiwan?
Mr. Wei. If we talk about this issue, we should see what
kind of danger Taiwan is facing. Chinese Government has lots
that must happen to solve the internal problems, so they would
use typical strategy to transform those problems into a war
against somewhere else. It has been a very hot debate within
the Chinese leadership regarding whether they should have the
war against Taiwan or not. We think China--the Chinese
Government has to be successful in making everyone extremely
call for patriotism and have nobody to say not to attack
Taiwan. The only meaningful way out the Chinese Government can
say is that they claim they don't have enough money to start a
war. On one side they say, we don't have the money, and the
other side they say, if the war starts, our economy will
suffer.
The PNTR from America would virtually give them confidence
in the trade and economy, and thus they are more likely to
start such a war. I believe this war would not be just against
Taiwan. It would also directly affect America.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Wei.
To the panelists, are you confident that the U.S.-China
agreement is enforceable, and are the so-called parallel
legislative efforts needed to improve the prospects for its
enforcement?
Ms. Kristoff.
Ms. Kristoff. If I could start, Mr. Chairman, I think that
through the agreement we have access to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanisms for the first time with China, and we can
hold their feet to the WTO dispute settlement fire, if you
will. We will also be able to draw upon all the other members
of the WTO to create a bilateral pressure, a multilateral
pressure on China to live up to its commitments.
I don't believe that China's record on enforcement on deals
that it has negotiated with us in the trade area is any better
or any worse than any other trading partner, and, frankly, if
we trusted the Europeans on agriculture, as Nick intimated that
we don't, or if we trusted Japan on anything on trade, we
wouldn't need the WTO. I would expect us to have disputes with
China, but I would expect us to be able to use what is already
proven to be an effective system.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Jendrzejczyk.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I would just comment in two ways, Mr.
Gilman. One is to allude to the fact that we have bilateral and
multilateral agreements with China, some of which are trade-
related and also have to do with human rights where their track
record is very poor. One reason I suggested in my testimony
that the MOU on prison labor allowing the Customs Service
access to suspected prison labor sites negotiated in 1992,
needs to be renegotiated, is that China continues to stonewall
attempts by the Customs Service to conduct such investigations.
We, in fact, made the same recommendation before this Committee
in September 1993. According to the State Department, the most
recent investigation allowed was in 1997. So I think, again,
this points to the need for vigilant enforcement efforts to
ensure that whatever agreements China makes in the context of
WTO, there are mechanisms to verify and press for compliance.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Giordano.
Mr. Giordano. I would associate myself with Ms. Kristoff's
comments. In addition, I would say our colleagues in
agriculture, the cattlemen, have had very difficult experience
with the European Union on the hormone issue. I think we would
be hard-pressed to believe that we are going to have as
difficult a time with the Chinese in enforcing agreements.
We don't know what the future holds. This is a fantastic
agreement. What we do know is that the side agriculture
agreement, which is a bilateral U.S.-China-only agreement that
I alluded to in my statement, the Agriculture Cooperation
Agreement, has been fully implemented, and that agreement
covers meat and poultry, citrus and wheat, and all of the
affected sectors are very pleased with China's implementation
there, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Giordano.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a great panel
that you have assembled.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk, I have some questions for you. I think
almost all of us, if not all of us, are in accord with the
goals and the outcome that you would like to see, whether or
not this is the proper vehicle, or whether the WTO can
effectively effectuate what we would like to see accomplished
in addition to the trade side of the issue. Do you think that
if we insisted on these things that we could force China to go
along with our program?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I want to understand what you are
suggesting. Are you asking do I think that if Congress were to
attach certain human rights preconditions, that China would
meet those in order to get PNTR? Is that what you are asking?
Mr. Ackerman. That is my question.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I would answer this in two ways. One,
Jiang Zemin, the President, has staked his political future in
part on his relationship with the U.S.--continued access to the
U.S. market and investment and American technology. Therefore,
I think he has an enormous political incentive, given what he
has invested, in getting this agreement signed to get it
implemented. So I think, in fact, by the time a multilateral
protocol is negotiated for WTO accession, it is possible that
Jiang Zemin could be convinced to at least make progress on
some of the specific areas I mentioned if it meant that he
would get in the end what he wants most of all, which is PNTR.
Mr. Ackerman. Do you not think that if we do not give him
PNTR--as you have appropriately stated, he has staked his
political future on this--that those elements within Chinese
society, such as people in the military who would like to see
him not have much of a political future, would use this as an
excuse to get rid of him?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. There is a constant tension and struggle,
as you know, going on within the leadership on a whole range of
these issues. Much of the Chinese bureaucracy still isn't
convince that the WTO membership is a good idea. I think the
fact, however, that Zhu Rongji went home empty-handed last year
when he came here to get an agreement did far more damage to
those in the leadership who are trying to move toward greater
economic openness, frankly, than anything Congress does this
year on PNTR.
If PNTR isn't voted on this year, I should add, I would
favor simply continuing the renewal process for another year. I
bet you by next year the Europeans will finish their
negotiations, we will have a multilateral protocol, and then we
can revisit the issue of PNTR.
Mr. Ackerman. I would think everybody would be finished
with theirs and have all the benefits of what we have
negotiated with the exception of us.
I think I know your position on the death penalty, your
former organization and yourself personally, and I think I know
that that is probably the same position as a great many other
Western and westernized democracies. Do you think that if any
of those Western democracies or China or any other country
would say to us that we have to give up the death penalty in
this country because they believe it is the vilest abuse of
human rights, otherwise they won't trade with us, do you think
we would tell them to get lost, or do you think we would get
rid of the death penalty? I know your view, but what do you
think we would do?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I don't know what we would do. I would
like to see pressure applied on the U.S.
Mr. Ackerman. Do you think it is possible that if Belgium
said to us they won't trade with us unless we give up the death
penalty, we give up the death penalty?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I don't, because despite the fact that--
--
Mr. Ackerman. If China said to us that we had to give up
the death penalty, would we give it up?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. Despite the fact that the U.S. is greatly
out of step with democracies in Latin American, Western Europe
and others on this issue, which is a still emerging
international norm, there is a long-term interest that our
European, Latin American and other allies have in trading with
us that I think trumps their concern about the death penalty,
strongly as they hold that concern.
Mr. Ackerman. But if they played that card and said to us
that it would affect our trade relationship, what would we do?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I don't know. I hope we would reconsider
the use of the death penalty, to be honest.
Mr. Ackerman. I know you do. I share your position on that,
but that is not the question. The question is as a practical
matter will China change its view because we are trying to push
them around? Will we change our view in American society and do
away with prison labor--you do know we have that here--because
other countries find that an abomination?
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I think it is much too complicated, to be
honest, to answer in such a black and white way. There are
growing constituencies within China for exactly the kind of
economic and political changes that have been discussed here
today. I think the question is how can we support, enable and
empower those in Chinese society, even within the party, who
want to move toward greater economic and ultimately, hopefully
someday, political openness? That is the issue. I think,
frankly, that is the only way to address this in an intelligent
way.
Mr. Ackerman. You and I have no disagreement on these
issues, but what you are suggesting is that these vehicles
aren't effective in changing our way because nobody is using
them, and they are looking for other vehicles to try to
convince us as to what their view of morality is on other
positions. Maybe I come to a different conclusion than you do
because I am a politician, but I would certainly get my dander
up, and almost everybody that I talk to would get their dander
up, if somebody insisted that we release people from prison
that we have convicted under our system because they don't like
our system, or because we have prisoners who are working for 17
cents an hour and they think that is not enough, and they think
we are executing people and that is an uncivilized thing to do.
Even though I agree with you on the positions, that we should
change them, I would be really peeved if some country said that
to us, and I would think that that is the reaction of the
Chinese.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. All I can say, Mr. Ackerman, is that the
reaction of every country. When we issue, the State Department
that is, issues its annual human rights report, no government
likes to be criticized. When our State Department has to go up
to the U.N. to defend--it is a natural reaction. I don't think
there is anything that would dissipate that.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panel for the exceptional quality
presentations they have made. I have found them very helpful
and very positive.
It occurs to me, and perhaps Mr. Wei would agree with this,
that the great majority of the 1.2 billion people in China have
no particular political ideology. They are not particularly
sympathetic to communism. They would just like to go on with
their lives in as positive a fashion as possible. Our opening
up China to trade to a greater extent will mean that those 1.2
billion people will benefit. The Chinese Government may
continue to ``buy China,'' as we have pressured to ``buy
America,'' but what we are interested in the vast number of
people in China who have no particular political orientation.
We hope to convince them to move toward--support moves toward
democracy and human rights.
I also wanted to mention, since the subject has come up,
that the dispute settlement mechanism for the WTO is one that
the U.S. thus far has used far more than any other country.
With a couple of recent exceptions, we have had a very
favorable outcome from the use of those mechanisms.
I hope all of you do focus on the recently circulated
proposed framework that Mr. Levin and I have distributed. The
accession of Taiwan to WTO that Congresswoman Dunn and I have
pushed would occur, we would hope, at the same meeting that
China's accession to the WTO occurs. Tainwan, is our seventh or
eighth largest trading partner. I would think, Mr. Giordano,
that information would be particularly interesting to you to as
well as to others representing the agriculture groups.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk and Dr. Kristoff, you noticed perhaps that
we do have a push for an interagency task force on the subject
of prison-produced goods and the labor conditions related to
prison produced goods. In section 5 of our proposal, Mr. Levin
and I significantly attempt to increase the resources available
in our government to promote the rule of law and to monitor
whether or not there is agreement with the trade agreement of
the WTO and the U.S. accession agreement. We also pushed very
hard for additional technical assistance for the Departments of
Commerce, of Labor, and of State, which they support, for
additional resources for dealing with labor market standards,
commercial law, and rule of law. We also urge that additional
resources be allowed for those purposes through the WTO, and
the international financial institutions. I would welcome any
comments any of the panel members might have, and I do thank
you for your very specific suggestions, Mr. Jendrzejczyk.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. I would just
quickly add we very much support the kind of technical rule of
law programs both for reform and better enforcement of the
Chinese labor laws as well as commercial law. As you know, Mr.
Gejdenson had introduced separate legislation with much of the
same impetus behind it. We have had a number of discussions, in
fact, with the U.S. Labor Department about precisely how to go
about doing this. As you know, the Chinese Labor Minister was
here in March 1999, invited Alexis Herman, our Secretary of
Labor, to visit China, which we hope she will do relatively
soon not only to begin a dialogue on worker rights and social
safety nets, but also to begin putting in place precisely these
kinds of programs.
Mr. Bereuter. You are right to give Mr. Gejdenson credit.
Mr. Levin and I drew heavily on his legislation for some
sections.
Ms. Kristoff. Mr. Bereuter, I think the technical
assistance on the development of rule and law and commercial
labor markets in China is an excellent idea. The American
business community has been involved in those kinds of
technical assistance programs in the regulatory areas in China
in the financial services area for some time, and I think it
would be exceptionally helpful if this were a mandated program.
I think compliance by China is going to be the critical
next question in the WTO. We have got to monitor its
implementation of these very time-specific and very clearly
drafted commitments that Charlene has negotiated, and I think
the Commerce Department and USTR are going to need additional
resources in order to be able to do that. So anything that you
can do to create within the interagency structure and the
executive branch and in cooperation with the Congress, a more
focused view or more focused scrutiny of compliance by China
with its obligations I think we would welcome.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Wei?
Mr. Wei. There are some good discussions regarding how to
negotiate with the Chinese Government to improve the Chinese
labor condition, et cetera. But I must remind everyone to
negotiate, to bargain, you do not give the money to the person
first, otherwise you lost all your possibility of negotiation.
Every year we hold PNTR in our hands, and every year we give
NTR. Now we have all the quality and leverage of the right
person to negotiate, but otherwise we lose everything. Thank
you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Wei.
Mr. Giordano. If I could comment?
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Giordano.
Mr. Giordano. Thank you so much.
Mr. Bereuter, with respect to your proposal, Mr. Levin's
proposal, we in agriculture don't have a formal position on
this point, but I think you will find a lot of support out
there, and we may be moving toward a formal position. I think
as a political matter, anything that helps us to get to 218 we
view as very positive. I think as a policy matter, anything
which provides more of a basis for enforcement above and beyond
the rights we already have is also very positive.
I also want to comment on the nontrade aspects of some of
the things that are in your proposal and some of the other
things that have been discussed here today. I want to
underscore that people in American agriculture, farmers and
ranchers, are not deaf to the concerns and to the pain that
many feel in China. American agriculture represents mainstream
American values. Many of our people are people of faith. There
is great concern, but they have an underlying faith in our
system and in free enterprise, and they believe that through
trade and through engagement, through increasing incomes in
China, China being integrated into the multilateral trading
system, that there will be greater respect for human rights,
greater respect and religious tolerance, greater environmental
protection, all the things that we believe in. So while we
certainly have a very parochial interest in trading with China,
in increasing our exports there, we very much believe that it
is in our best national interest and are very much interested
in promoting other American values in China as well. We think
that your legislation does that.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just ask a couple of questions. First of all to Mr.
Wei Jingsheng; Bottom line, do you believe human rights will
improve if PNTR is approved by Congress in the next couple of
weeks?
The Interpreter. If PNTR is given to China?
Mr. Smith. Is given to China. Will human rights improve?
Mr. Wei. I want to mention not only the human rights
condition after the PNTR is given to China, but that the human
rights condition will not be improved. As a matter of fact, it
will deteriorate. The reasons are very simple. For a
dictatorship government, they do not really want to respect
human rights at all. They will only be forced to respond if
there is any pressure, such as we would really like to have the
trade conditions be granted to them so they figure out maybe
they have to respect the human rights matter.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask Ms. Kristoff, and perhaps Mr.
Giordano might want to touch on this. In your view, especially
now that we have had the MFN renewed annually under the Clinton
Administration, has religious freedom gotten better?
Ms. Kristoff. I would say that over the course of the
almost now 30 years that----
Mr. Smith. Let me take the timeframe of the linking of MFN
with human rights under the Clinton Administration. Since then
has it gotten better, worse or stayed the same?
Ms. Kristoff. I think it has gotten better over both the
last eight years and the 12 or 22 years before that,
cumulatively. I believe that American missionaries, American
religious leaders have spoken out in favor of continued
engagement with China rather than to create a condition where
they can't have access to that market. Ten years ago you
couldn't find a Bible in China. Now they are everywhere. The
estimates of the number of religious believers in China far
understates the reality of the number of Buddhists, Muslims,
Catholics, Protestants that worship in China, albeit not in
sanctioned churches. This is vastly different than it was ten
years ago, and I think the NGO's and the religious
organizations that have made this happen deserve an awful lot
of credit. I just don't think that the credit should go to the
perceived leverage of the annual review, because, in fact,
having given it every year for 30 years, it produces no
reaction on the part of the Chinese.
Mr. Giordano. Mr. Smith, let me start by commending you and
many others in this Congress who have really carried the banner
on human rights issues, and as I previously said, this is
something that our producers are very concerned about. I know
that growing up, the picture that I had of China when President
Nixon opened the country right after the Great Leap Forward and
the Culture Revolution was a very bleak time I think in China's
history. What we saw on the television set were people in blue
Mao uniforms, carrying red Mao books, riding on bicycles.
I can tell you that in the past four years I have been to
China four times, most recently just a couple of weeks back,
and the country is opening up. Is there religious persecution
there? Absolutely. I would not be credible, and I would be
misleading you, and you know better. It is certainly something
our producers are concerned about.
As I said, we believe that China's integration into the
world trading economy is something that ultimately will lead
them to greater democracy and greater respect for human rights.
It is a problem, and I believe--yes, I believe that the
persecution is diminishing, and I think as we look out in time
20 years from now, after we have a successful vote and after
China is integrated, that we will see perhaps as much or more
difference than we see when we look back 20, 30 years ago to
people in those blue Mao uniforms, carrying those red books.
Mr. Smith. Obviously I am out of time again. That is one
thing about my Subcommittee, we usually provide almost
unlimited time, but let me make a couple of quick concluding
points.
The United States Commission for International Religious
Freedom will testify, as did their voluminous document, that
there has been a sharp deterioration of freedom of religion in
China during the last year. I myself visited with Bishop Su of
Baoding, who, because he visited with a United States
Congressman, was arrested or rearrested, having spent so many
years in their prison camp, the Laogai. He is a full-fledged,
bona-fide bishop with an allegiance to the Holy Father in Rome,
and for that he was arrested and interrogated.
I met with Wei Jingsheng when he was briefly out in the
mid-1990's, but he was rearrested after meeting with John
Shattuck and myself at two different times, and was quizzed and
told that we are members of the CIA, some fanciful idea by the
public security police.
My point is that we are dealing with a dictatorship.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk talked about the MOU. I was actually in a
prison camp, Beijing prison number 1. Forty Tiananmen Square
prisoners were there. We couldn't meet with them individually.
They were there because they carried signs and said, we want
democracy.
It seems to me that it is at best premature to be giving
permanent normal trading relationship to a government that is
not normal in any sense of that word. We need to see some
progress. I would respectfully submit--and I respect your
opinions and I hope you respect mine--they are going in the
wrong direction. The evidence from the U.S. Commission, from
the Country Reports of Human Rights Practices and from a myriad
of human rights organizations, including Mr. Jendrzejczyk's,
Amnesty International and all the others, paints a voluminous,
very incriminating picture of overlapping layers of repression.
My good friend Mr. Ackerman talked about the death penalty.
I am against the death penalty, but there are no due process
rights. If Doug or I or my friend Dan Burton or any of us are
not within the very tightly circumscribed circle of an official
church--or are Falun Gong practioners, or Buddhists in Tibet,
or we're Catholics aligned with Rome, or evangelical
Protestants, you can forget it. We go to prison, we are
interrogated. There are thousands of Falun Gong right in the
face of this vote who are being arrested and interrogated.
It seems to me we do have some leverage, and I respectfully
submit that not using it makes their lives that much worse. The
Chinese will laugh and say they can have their cake and eat it,
too. I say that with all due respect.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are on the precipice here, about to give up any chance
at all for having any way to respond if Beijing clamps down on
human rights, at least any way to respond as the United States.
Obviously if we could--if the clamp-down was so solid that the
Europeans and Japanese were ready to give up money and trade,
that would be a truly extreme circumstance.
Right now China has clamped down a little bit on dissenters
and those who practice religion, but one can only imagine what
they will do if they know that the worst that can happen to
them from Washington is that they will get a strongly worded
letter. Perhaps if Mr. Cox is successful, they would get a bad
Jackson-Vanik II report.
But they wouldn't risk either a day without MFN or what I
would like to see this House do, and that is have a graduation
of MFN so that we are not in a situation where every year we
just vote yes or no, but we are able to vote for a 10, 20, or
30 percent reduction in the MFN benefits so that if without MFN
the tariff would be $10, and with MFN the tariff is $1, that we
are able to vote for, in effect, a $2, $3, or $4 tariff on that
particular item.
A lot has been said that supporters of human rights in
China support this agreement. To me, the most courageous of
those in China are those who have actually spent time in the
Chinese gulag, in prison, and the people we need to listen to
are those who are free to speak to us, not those who are still
subject to additional imprisonment in China.
Mr. Wei, can you comment for those who have served time in
Chinese prison because of their human rights activism who are
now outside of China and free to speak their minds, what is the
view of that group of people toward whether we should go along
with this agreement?
Mr. Wei. I think that the attitude from those who could
speak freely, their attitude is quite clear. I have received
many inputs, including the inputs from China from those people
who have had to spend lots of years in Chinese jails, and they
are against the PNTR.
Also, we notice that there are a few people of a little bit
of fame who seem to change their attitude in this regard, and I
think they may not speak what is really in their heart. We must
remember the pressure from the Chinese Communist is not
necessarily just within China--they have successfully spread
overseas. So some people's attitudes may not reflect the people
who have had to spend years in Chinese jails. They cannot--
especially--they cannot represent on several thousands of
people who are still spending their time in Chinese jails who
are much less famous. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. We are a huge market for the Chinese, and I
don't think they are going to jeopardize that market by
starting to defer trade with us to some other country, because
we are probably the biggest market they have in the world. I
don't see anything wrong with renewing this on a yearly basis
rather than giving them permanent trade status. Once we give
them permanent trade status, we have no more leverage with them
as far as trade is concerned.
I think one of the panelists said that our national
security depends on this, and they also said we won the Cold
War. I remember one of the generals recently said that--when we
were talking about Taiwan and our possible defense of Taiwan,
they said America won't defend Taiwan. They are more concerned
about Los Angeles than they are Taipei. That was a direct
threat, and it was recent. Our memory seems to be so short. We
don't remember Tiananmen Square. We don't remember hearings we
had in this Congress just a few months ago where we found out
they are taking prisoners into prisons, who are alive, and if
somebody from a foreign country needs a kidney, they take them
and they remove one of their kidneys. They immediately
transplant it into a recipient at a makeshift hospital or close
hospital nearby, and sometimes they kill that prisoner to take
their heart or another organ. That goes on right now.
They are selling organs of live prisoners. Many of these
prisoners are political prisoners who committed no murder,
nothing that would involve the death penalty. If you don't
think taking someone's heart is the death penalty to give it to
someone else who needs a new heart, then you and I don't have
the same definition of a death penalty. That goes on today,
right now.
People are being put in these gulags. They are slave
laborers right now. They are living on very meager rations.
Millions of them are in slave labor camps making products that
we buy. We have a multibillion-dollar trade deficit with China
right now. I think it is about $40 to $50 billion right now.
Mr. Sherman. Seventy.
Mr. Burton. Seventy right now.
But the fact of the matter is the Chinese don't want to
lose our market. We are the biggest market in the world. So
this argument about if we don't go along with this, they are
going to start trading with somebody else and hold our feet to
the fire, why would they do that? Why would they want to risk
losing our market? Why would they want to risk some reciprocity
if they wanted to try to stop doing business with us?
I have a lot of agriculture in our district. I would like
to see our farmers have access to that market. I think it would
be great for us to get more trade with China, but not at the
expense of people who are having their livers and their hearts
and their lungs removed who are alive in prison camps, at the
expense of millions of people who are starving and dying in
gulags and making products that we are buying here today, at
the expense of kids who died in Tiananmen Square under tanks,
who were squashed into dog meat, and to have the Chinese just
recently say, hey, we don't worry about you guys because you
are more concerned about Los Angeles than Taipei?
How about the espionage that took place just recently. The
W-88 warhead that we couldn't even talk about because it was a
security risk, that security risk is no longer a security risk
because the Chinese have it. They stole it. We believe Wen Ho
Lee. We are not sure who gave it to them, but all of your
nuclear secrets, almost all of them have been given to the
Chinese Communists. They can now make a mobile-launched vehicle
they can put in a forest, they can launch it at America, and in
orbit, when it gets into the outer atmosphere, it splits into
ten warheads, can hit ten cities with pinpoint accuracy, and we
have no defense for it.
You say there is no arms buildup? They are building the
biggest military in the history of mankind. They are buying
more ships, more technology all the time, at the same time that
this Administration in our country is diminishing our military
preparedness.
Now, let me just tell you MFN permanently right now, in my
opinion, would be a mistake. I have no objection to doing it on
an annual basis, but we ought to hold that carrot out there and
say, when there is positive change, we will be more liberal
with MFN here in America. They are not going to quit doing
business with us as long as we are going to be a benefit to
them, and we are right now. Once we give that up by giving them
permanent trade status, the human rights aren't going to
improve there. They haven't improved in Cuba, Vietnam, North
Korea, and they aren't going to improve in China. They are
Communists. They believe in a dictatorship and repression, and
the only way they are going to change is from pressure, not
from giving them everything they want.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
Do we have any--Mr. Brady, I am sorry.
Mr. Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this is a wonderful debate Congress is having. We
are debating the value of opening Chinese markets finally to
American farmers, to American businesses. We are asking a
simple economic question: Is it in America's best interests
that American farmers, American businesses be treated as every
other business in every other country in this world?
My answer clearly is yes. It is in our best interest, but
we are also asking not if we should continue pressure on China
to improve human rights, to improve religious freedoms, to stop
the practice to force abortion, to rein in their military
aggressiveness; the question isn't should we be doing it, it is
how best we can do it.
I am convinced the answer is that it will take many
efforts, opening markets, opening minds, opening information,
exporting our strongest--one of our strongest freedoms. That is
economic freedom. There is no question that it has helped.
There is no question we need to continue pressure on China
to improve in so many ways, and one of them at the heart of
this issue is can we best bring about lasting change from
within China or from without, and the question is how best to
do it. Character is described as what you do when no one is
looking. Human rights religious freedoms also occur when you
change the hearts and minds of a country, and I am convinced
that as we open markets, we help promote those freedoms.
I am also convinced we must have strong leverage and
pressure on China. I am frustrated because the annual debate on
MFN is not working. It is not bringing about those changes. But
I do know that improved trade is opening doors for our
missionaries and for our businesses. I know that we must have
Congress and the President engaged on a daily basis on all the
issues we have talked about. I know that economically if we
reject PNTR, China will continue to have one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world. They will continue to sell
outside America. They will do business with everyone in the
world except us. It has no impact on them. It is only
economically that can we compete.
I guess my question to any of the panelists today is, isn't
it going to take all of this to bring about change in China?
Don't we need open markets, pressure at every point, an engaged
President, an engaged Congress in our best efforts to change
China from within to bring about the change that we desire? I
would open it to any of the panelists.
Mr. Jendrzejczyk. I would just say briefly I agree change
will come from both within and without, that we need carrot
sticks. We need a process of engagement because it has got to
be tough and consistent.
I very much agree that Congress and the President need to
be involved in a consistent manner as well. One of our
disappointments was that at last month's annual meeting of the
U.N. Human Rights Commission, there was an attempt by the U.S.,
which this Administration should get enormous credit for
putting forward, but there was little other support. I think,
to be honest, that was in part because though the President was
heavily involved in lobbying Members of Congress on PNTR, as
far as I know, he was not involved at all in lobbying on this
resolution in Geneva, which, again, is only a loss of face. It
doesn't impose sanctions.
China, for months, has been lobbying governments all over
the world just to keep this relatively mildly worded, innocuous
resolution off the agenda. They won. I think that could have
been prevented, and I know Members of Congress in this body and
in the Senate were urging, in fact, the Administration and the
President personally to play a much stronger role. Secretary
Albright flew all the way to Geneva from India just to give a
speech, for which, again, she should be given credit, as should
Assistant Secretary Kott for his vigorous efforts; but absent
Presidential leadership has been a consistent matter. The
President can't just go to China in 1998, say a lot of very
strong things about human rights in Tibet, and not follow them
up throughout the year. I think that, in fact, undermines the
Administration's own engagement policy.
Ms. Kristoff. I think Mike and I have worked for a number
of years on China issues together. I think we share your goals.
Mike and I sometimes have disagreements on the best means to
get to them. I am always disturbed that during this debate
every year, there seems to be posited this choice between trade
and values, trade and things that make us Americans as we walk
around, and that somehow if you want to bring China into the
international rules-based community and the WTO, that somehow
that is a statement in favor of prison labor or human rights
abuses.
I don't think engaging China in a clear-eyed, pragmatic,
coordinated way among the agencies in the executive branch and
with the U.S. Congress, involving deeply the other elements of
the community here, the private sector, the NGO's, the
religious leaders, that that kind of engagement is tantamount
to endorsing some of the worst human rights abuses that have
occurred. I think it is a false choice, false dichotomy, to
have to choose between trade and values. I think we can walk
and chew gum at the same time. I think, in fact, 30 years of
Congress granting normal trade relation status annually says
that it believes that that can happen, too.
What we have to do, I think, is have a continual debate on
the best way in which to do this engagement with China, and it
should be a public debate. It should involve the
Administration. It should involve the Congress. It should
involve those of us who are out here in the private sector.
There are multiple tools available to all of us to achieve
security goals, economic goals, values goals. We ought to use
each and every one of those tools, but what we have found year
in and year out, that the tool--the annual review of relations
does not do anything. I think you have to question whether that
lever is an effective lever or, in fact, if it is ever used and
you yank it, it is going to break the relationship between the
United States and China.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
I would just like to ask a followup to Ms. Kristoff.
Is there anything that the Chinese dictatorship can do that
would lead to your saying that we ought to cutoff MFN? I say
that because, again, the human rights abuses in every category
have gotten worse over the last several years ever since the
delinking of MFN with trade, the crackdown on religious
freedom, the use of forced abortion. Our Subcommittee has had
numerous hearings, one of which included a woman who ran a
family planning program in Fujian Province, Mrs. Gao, whom
Harry Wu helped to get out of China through a whole series of
means. When she testified, she said, ``By day I was a monster;
by night I was a wife and mother,'' and said that the regime
compels the family planning cadres right from the top--contrary
to the myth that is promulgated by some in the population
control community and UNFPA--to carry out forced abortions and
to meet quotas.
In the area of the Laogai, we know that the amount of
prison-made goods is high. Mr. Jendrzejczyk talked about the
MOU. I fault, unfortunately, George Bush and equally President
Clinton, for accepting a piece of paper that is as porous as
Swiss cheese. It gives China advance notice, first of all, and
we have to prove that there is an origin. You have got to have
compelling proof, and then the Chinese Government reserves unto
itself the right to investigate and report back to Customs as
to whether or not in their view there is a problem. It is like
the fox guarding the henhouse. Then added to that, once we want
to have access to a suspected Laogai where prison-made goods
are being made, 60 days or so have to pass. That is like giving
a drug pusher all kinds of weeks or months advance notice that
the ATF or the FBI is going to do a raid. It becomes a Potemkin
village and it is nonsensical to think we are going to find
anything after that process has been exhausted. The MOU needs
to be seen for the fraud that it is.
Mr. Chairman, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I
myself proposed in the 1980's that there be a Helsinki-type
process for Asia, and I asked the State Department to study it,
and I have pushed it many times. Regrettably you have got to
get the countries themselves to be signatories to that. We now
have the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
that Jiang Zemin has milked for years in terms of their
acceding to it. It has no enforcement mechanism. That has to be
kept right front and center at all times, but it hasn't even
been ratified. Countries like the Sudan and many other barbaric
regimes routinely sign international covenants where there is
no enforcement.
So I think we are on notice, Mr. Chairman. If there is
going to be this overlay of a new Helsinki-type process, we at
least have to have the countries signing and agreeing to access
to their prisoners. You or I or any of us would love to go and
visit. But even the International Committee for the Red Cross
doesn't have access. I remember when that carrot was dangled in
front of the international community when another MFN debate
was coming up for vote, and China said, maybe we will let the
Red Cross come up. As soon as the vote was over, they just
ripped up that promissory note and said, there is no way they
are coming in. We have no access to the prisoners. When I
wanted to meet with Wei Jingsheng and others, there was no way,
absolutely no way. As a matter of fact, people I met with who
were out of prison were arrested afterward.
The point I am making is: Is there anything that this
dictatorship can do that would lead to you say, time out,
enough is enough? We did it with Russia. We did it because we
cherished Soviet Jews and said that because of the grotesque
treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union; that country would not
get the trading benefit until it allowed the Jews to leave
pursuant to Jackson-Vanik.
Now we have a situation where layer after layer of human
rights abuse have piled on top of one another. The human rights
organizations to a group, and the State Department as well,
have said that what is really going on there says there is
deterioration. As I mentioned before, the U.S. Commission's
Rabbi Saperstein is a great and honorable man. The people that
make up his board are free traders by and large. I don't know
if all of them are, but many of them are. The collective wisdom
that they have conveyed to the Congress is, ``Don't grant MFN
on a permanent basis.
My question, and I ask it with all sincerity, is: Is there
anything they would do that would push you over the edge and
say enough is enough? The crackdown on the Falun Gong, the
Catholics, the Protestants? If my good friend Mr. Brady and I
went over and met with Bible teachers that weren't part of the
state-sanctioned church, they would be arrested. Minimally they
would be interrogated. They probably would get a prison
sentence.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms.Kristoff. I think Mike gave the answer to that a couple
of minutes ago when he said that the only way to frame this
debate so that we have a chance to succeed is to say we would
like to have China over a period of time embrace concepts of
economic freedom, political freedom, global peace and security.
What increases the likelihood and the chance that we will be
able to push China in that direction, the direction that we
want to evolve toward, I think, is our judgment and the
judgment of many that bringing China into the world community,
giving it a stake in the rules-based systems--not just on
trade, but on human rights, on nonproliferation, et cetera,
that that offers the best prospect of pushing China in the
direction that we want it to go.
To frame the debate in any other terms, in terms of the
death penalty or terms of a particular human rights abuse in a
particularly narrow snapshot, is really to distort what has
happened in China over the last 20 years and to distort the
effectiveness of tools that we have in our arsenal now to
affect China; and to deny PNTR, frankly, is not going to keep
China from the WTO. They will join it. It is just the benefits
will go elsewhere, and we will be cutoff from their market.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman.
We get the full benefits if China joins WTO without giving
them permanent MFN under the 1979 treaty we have with China,
but more to the point----
Ms. Kristoff. That is not accurate, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. If I could continue. I have been given 30
seconds. If that isn't accurate, we can simply compel it by
making it a contingent of our annual review of MFN for China.
But more to the point, to say that the annual review has not
protected people in China is to guess at what the future would
be. We don't know whether there are 5,000 or 10,000 or 100,000
people the Chinese Government would have imprisoned or killed
if they did not risk their $70 billion trade surplus with the
United States.
If we go along with this agreement, there will be nothing
the United States can do unilaterally that will cost Beijing a
single penny, and then we will see whether they limit
themselves to 5,000, or will it be 100,000 that they will kill?
I don't know. But they will be able to kill and imprison all
the way up to the level where the Europeans are unwilling to do
business with them because they have gotten so egregious, and I
don't want to know how large that level is.
Let's leave it so that the United States can deprive
Beijing of at least a few dollars, because I don't think that
roughly worded letters are sufficient to control and to limit
their egregious abuses of human rights.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
I want to thank our panelists. We are about to go to the
third panel. I thank Mr. Wei. I want to thank Ms. Kristoff, Mr.
Jendrzejczyk, and Mr. Giordano for being patient. We really
overextended our time, but, again, we thank you for your expert
opinions.
We will now proceed to the third panel, and we welcome
Steven McFarland, who is Executive Director of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, a Federal
legislative agency created by the International Freedom Act of
1998 which is charged with the responsibility of advising the
President, the Congress, and Secretary of State on conditions
of international religious freedoms. Mr. McFarland has been a
leader of a number of broad-based religious coalitions and
helped to shepherd the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to
passage in 1993, and the Religious Liberty Protection Act on
which we worked here in our Congress with the leadership of Mr.
Smith in 1999.
We look forward to hearing your testimony today, Mr.
McFarland.
Our other witness today is Reverend Daniel Su. He was born
in China and is now an ordained minister working as a special
assistant to the president of China Outreach Ministries, an
evangelistic Christian organization committed to reaching
graduate students from China currently studying on U.S.
campuses. Reverend Su is a frequent speaker among American
Christian groups. We welcome you here today.
Gentlemen, you may summarize your statement. Your full
statements will be put in the record, and we welcome your
proceeding.
Before you do so, I would like to ask unanimous consent
that the record be kept open for five legislative days to allow
statements from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. I would also ask that Mr. Smith conduct
this panel since I have to go on to another meeting.
We thank you gentlemen for being here.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN T. McFARLAND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COMMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Mr. McFarland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a particular
honor to testify before this Committee whose Chair, Ranking
Member and so many of its Members have been leaders in
promoting human rights as an integral part of U.S. foreign
policy. So thank you on behalf of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, which, as you know, is a
bipartisan legislative agency independently created by a
unanimous act of this Congress in 1998 to advise the President,
the Secretary of State and this Congress on conditions of
international religious freedom and what the United States can
and should do to promote it.
Our first annual report came out, as the Chairman mentioned
and Mr. Smith mentioned, just last week, focusing on three
countries, of which China was one. The Commission's nine voting
members come from both political parties and from a wide
spectrum of religious diversity. A number of them support free
trade. Yet the Commissioners were unanimous, unanimous, in
their report in asking that Congress not grant PNTR to China
until substantial improvements are made in respect for
religious freedom.
The Commission's reasoning is stated in its report, and let
me provide a short excerpt. ``The Commission believes that in
many countries, including some of China's neighbors, free trade
has been the basis for rapid economic growth, which in turn has
been central to the development of a more open society and
political system. A grant of PNTR and Chinese membership in the
World Trade Organization may, by locking China into a network
of international obligations, help advance the rule of law
there in the economic sector at first, but then more broadly
over time.
``Nevertheless, given the sharp deterioration in freedom of
religion in China during the last year, the Commission believes
that an unconditional grant of PNTR at this moment may be taken
as a signal of American indifference to religious freedom. The
Government of China attaches great symbolic importance to steps
such as the granting of PNTR and presents them to the Chinese
people as proof of international acceptance and approval. A
grant of PNTR at this juncture could be seen by Chinese people
struggling for religious freedom as an abandonment of their
cause at a moment of great difficulty. The Commission,
therefore, believes that Congress should not approve PNTR for
China until China makes substantial improvements in respect for
religious freedom.''
Then the Commission unanimously offered five standards for
Congress to measure whether China is making that kind of
substantial improvement in this fundamental human right: First,
whether China agrees to establish high-level and ongoing
dialogue with the U.S. Government on religious freedom matters;
second, whether China agrees to ratify the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed in
1998; third, whether China agrees to permit unhindered access
to religious prisoners by the Commission; fourth, whether China
discloses the condition and whereabouts of persons imprisoned
for reasons of religion or belief; and finally, whether China
releases from prison all persons incarcerated for religious
reasons.
Let me note that the Commission does not nominate these as
preconditions for the granting of PNTR, but rather as standards
or plumb lines. The Commission unanimously recommends that PNTR
be considered only if and when China agrees to a number of
these measures. Rather than proposing a strict formula, the
Commissioners leave up to the Congress how much progress China
must agree to on some or all of these five standards before
PNTR is granted. That China should make substantial improvement
in religious freedom before being awarded PNTR, is the
Commission's recommendation. Whether progress is sufficiently
substantial would be left up to the Congress.
The Commission concluded that these are significant yet,
frankly, doable requests to make of China. They are not pie in
the sky. The Chinese Government tomorrow could announce that it
intends to ratify the ICCPR, that it intends to commence high-
level talks on religious freedom, that it will invite this
Commission to visit incarcerated religious leaders, and that it
is going to begin a release of all religious prisoners, or at
least start with the elderly, the ill and those who are
children. They could announce that tomorrow. The vote of this
Congress on PNTR would not even have to be delayed.
What happened in China to lead the Commission to this
unanimous recommendation? Over the last several months, the
Commission has conducted research and held a hearing on limits
to religious freedom in China. We heard from Mr. Wei, Harry Wu,
a number of other experts both from the mainland as well as
Hong Kong, as well as experts from this country. The
Commissioners found that violation of religious freedom in
China is egregious, it is ongoing, and it is systematic. In
fact, conditions are worsening as the Chinese Communist Party
and government leaders promulgate new laws and policies to
eliminate religious activities that are beyond their direct
control.
What little religious freedom China enjoyed in the past is
being constricted. Protestant house churches, the underground
Catholic Church, Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims and Falun
Gong practitioners are all feeling the squeeze. This past year
we saw the continued prohibition of religious belief for large
sectors of the population, not to mention the 60 million
members of the party, the three million members of the army and
the hundreds of millions of minors under 18, all of whom are
prohibited from receiving religious education. We saw the
increase in the number of sects that are branded ``heretical
cults'' and, therefore, their followers are subject to
immediate arrest without due process; the continued use of
notorious extra judicial summary trials and the sentencing to a
``reeducation through labor'' camps for the so-called crime
associated with religion; and we also saw credible reports of
torture of religious prisoners.
In conclusion, let me reiterate the Commission's unanimous
conclusion that an unconditional grant of PNTR at this moment
may be taken as a signal of American indifference to religious
freedom. A grant of PNTR at this juncture could be seen by the
Chinese people struggling for religious freedom as an
abandonment of their cause at a moment of great difficulty. The
Commission, therefore, believes that Congress should not
approve PNTR for China until China makes substantial
improvements in respect for religious freedom.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, on behalf of the Members of the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, we thank
you for the privilege of appearing before the Committee today.
With your permission I would ask that the chapter on China in
both the Commission's report as well as the staff memorandum
that accompanied it be included in the hearing record with my
testimony.
Mr. Smith. [Presiding.] Without objection, that request
will be honored.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McFarland appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Smith. I do want to thank you for your excellent
testimony and your very thorough work and that of the
Commission on behalf of religious freedom around the world. I
read the report and staff memorandum cover to cover. It was
very disturbing, but well-documented and very enlightening. I
think every Member of the House and Senate and every member of
the media should read that before they make up their minds on
this issue and others that are similar to this. So thank you
very much, Mr. McFarland.
Reverend Su.
STATEMENT OF REV. DANIEL B. SU, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT,
CHINA OUTREACH MINISTRIES (COM)
Reverend Su. Thank you, Congressman Smith and other Members
of the Committee, for giving me this opportunity to testify
here regarding the trade status with China. As a newly
naturalized American citizen, I think it is an honor for me,
and service to the country as well, to participate in this
public debate.
When the White House called asking for my view on the issue
two weeks ago, I commended the President for his vision to
integrate China into the world community. Despite my honest
disagreement with the President on many issues, I do strongly
agree with him that granting PNTR to China is vital to the U.S.
moral interests as well as economic and geopolitical interests.
I believe there are compelling reasons to support China's PNTR
and the WTO membership.
First, as a clergyman concerned about religious freedom and
human rights, I am particularly excited that the WTO agreement
will initiate a dynamic process of change in China with far-
reaching consequences. It will greatly contribute to creating a
conducive environment for promoting international norms, the
rule of law and individual rights and freedom.
The WTO agreement obligates China to play by the rules. In
the process China will need to strengthen its legal
institutions, train more legal professionals, learn to follow
international legal procedures, and educate people about the
concept of rights, law and international norms. This process in
itself is a breakthrough with important philosophical
implications for China as a nation.
When a Chinese citizen realizes that he has certain rights
as a businessman that government should not violate, then more
likely he will also realize he has other rights as a human
being. By submitting itself to the WTO's norms, the Beijing
government is openly acknowledging the authority and legitimacy
of international norms in a very unprecedented manner. When
China learns to abide by the WTO rules, then it will more
likely learn to abide by other international norms as there in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Second, the WTO agreement will accelerate China's economic
reform, especially its privatization process. It will set more
people freer from government intrusion into their lives and
enable them to live as freer men and women. It will speed up
the free flow of information and expose the Chinese people to
more ideas and values which we cherish and could be potentially
revolutionary.
In its last annual report on human rights, the State
Department takes note of the increase in personal freedoms in
China. Some China trade critics are quick to argue that the
increase in freedoms is not intended by the Beijing government,
and it shouldn't get the credit. I cannot agree more. That
argument proves precisely the need to do more trade with China.
It proves the dynamics of the free market in creating personal
freedoms, even freedoms unintended by the government.
How can the same critics then in the name of human rights
use the same argument against free trade with China? Why kill
the process that is already creating freedoms for the people we
say we care about?
Finally, to grant PNTR to China is to strengthen the
reformers there. Reformers in China had fought hard to commit
Beijing to the WTO agreement. China's current reform has its
limits and has reached a critical stage where it is confronted
with daunting challenges such as massive unemployment and labor
unrest. Besides, there are strong forces in China trying to
derail the reform process. To grant PNTR to China and to bring
it into WTO is to provide the cover and momentum the reformers
need to jump-start their reform and to bring it to a successful
completion. To deny China PNTR is to abandon China's reformers
in this critical battle. To do that is to unwittingly play into
the hands of hard-line Communists. That would be a major
setback for China's reform, and it is bad news for America.
Despite my arguments for granting PNTR to China, I want to
acknowledge that PNTR is not a magic weapon that will somehow
bring democracy to China. There are no such magic weapons, and
it will likely take a long process for China to become
democratic. So let us have no illusions as to what PNTR can do.
In considering the PNTR vote, these are some good questions
to ask. If we grant PNTR to China, does that help it get onto
the right track toward a rule of law and improvements of human
rights? Will the Chinese and American people be better off as a
result? Will it help China play a more responsible role in the
international community? I believe the answer is a resounding
yes.
I share the deep frustrations you feel about China's human
rights situation. I personally have friends in China who are in
prison today for human rights reasons. Religious people and
political dissidents still find their basic rights limited and
violated in various ways. With or without PNTR for China, we
should always continue to work hard to address these concerns,
but it is counterproductive to deny China's PNTR because of its
human rights reasons.
I myself feel the urge to seize every conceivable
opportunity to send China a message. It would make me feel
good, but what good does it do for the people in China? When we
send a message, we need to also ask: ``At what cost?'' Is it
worth it if it causes a major setback in China's reform
process? Is it worth it if it costs us this strategic
opportunity to move China in the right direction? I don't
believe it is, especially when there are other existing
channels to send a message to China that is not
counterproductive. We can always create new channels to address
our concerns.
Which direction do we want China to go? That is what is at
stake in this vote. There is no guarantee China will go in the
direction we desire, but it is my conviction that granting PNTR
to China and its WTO membership give us the best hope that
China may become a more humane and responsible country. I am
hopeful and my prayers are with you as you consider this very
important vote. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Reverend Su.
[The prepared statement of Reverend Su appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask a few questions. Reverend Su, do
you agree or disagree with the U.S. Commission's conclusion
that there has been a ``sharp deterioration in freedom of
religion in China during the last year?''
Reverend Su. I believe so.
Mr. Smith. It has gotten worse, in your view? You agree
with that?
Reverend Su. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. You mentioned the issue of international norms.
I am sure you are aware that the WTO agreement actually further
isolates noncommercial human rights issues from being
considered with regard to trade.
Reverend Su. I am sorry, I don't understand that.
Mr. Smith. One of the more perverse outcomes of China
joining the WTO and the U.S. acceding to that by giving
permanent normal trading relations is that if we were to impose
upon imported Chinese goods some kind of tariff or some kind of
blockage because they were gulag-made, Laogai-made goods or
were child-labor-made goods, or produced in some other way that
violated our social conscience under the World Trade
Organization's protocol, China would be in a position to bring
us to court. It would be an actionable offense in Geneva; they
could say we have violated the spirit and the letter of WTO
rules. The only things that are protected under the World Trade
Organization, from my understanding--and we have had two
hearings on this which further illuminated this--are commercial
interests, against intellectual property rights infringements,
for example. But if the labor force is exploited ad nauseam, by
child labor, for example, and we said no, we put up a red flag
or stop sign and said, ``that is not coming into the United
States,'' they could bring us before a WTO tribunal and bring
an action against us. That is the perverse outcome of this. So
human rights are further isolated from trade if WTO and PNTR
are agreed to.
Reverend Su. I want to confess that I am not a trade expert
in those fields, and I don't want to speculate, but I do
understand that we do have current laws against prison labor
and child labor products being brought into the United States.
So I don't know how that interacts with the WTO rules
concerning these two issues.
Mr. Smith. Based on the best available information that I
have seen, and we are looking into this further, that would be
actionable on the part of the Beijing dictatorship because
human rights aren't on the table. They are off the table now,
and countries that unilaterally engage in that kind of
selective ban based on means of production--and even saying we
don't want those kind of goods coming in--could be held to
account. That is one of the perverse outcomes, in my view, of
the WTO ascension.
You mentioned that some of your friends are in prison,
which obviously is a very heavy burden. If you yourself wanted
to visit those friends and make representation for them--and I
don't know if you want to put their names on the record or not,
it might be better not to--would the Chinese leadership allow
you to do so?
Reverend Su. I don't assume so.
Mr. Smith. In terms of the trend line of where the
dictatorship is going, Wei Jingsheng has mentioned previously
that he feels that it is bad and getting worse, that the hard-
liners are in ascendancy, not the other way around. Matter of
fact, he even points to the bombing in Belgrade when NATO
inadvertently or unwittingly bombed the Chinese Embassy, which
was used by Jiang Zemin as a pretext to strengthen the more
hard-line view within his own ruling circle. I don't know if
you agree or disagree with that--perhaps, Mr. McFarland, you
might want to speak on this. The ship is moving in one
direction, getting more hard-line in its foreign policy vis-a-
vis other countries, especially Taiwan--which they don't
consider a foreign policy issue, but it is a security issue for
sure and there is a crackdown which is as plain as the nose on
my face against the Falun Gong, Tibetan Buddhists, and other
religious believers. We thought it couldn't get any worse, but
it is getting worse based on reliable evidence that we have.
Why, when things are moving in the wrong direction in a
systematic way, do you have any hope that just trading a little
more with them is somehow going to bring them out of that nose-
dive?
Reverend Su. I don't think there is cause and effect of the
two. By cutting off trade with China, I don't think we are
advancing any human rights concerns that we care about.
Mr. Smith. Where do you think they would find markets for
the $70 billion of trade deficit and the technological transfer
that they are reaping from the United States? Where would they
find that goody, for want of a better word, that they
desperately want? They are not going to find it in Europe or
Asia or anywhere else. That is why we think we have some
leverage to say, ``Our markets are open. Just reform''.
Reverend Su. I think it is an issue that they had to
consider. If they lose the U.S. market, they have to gradually
expand trade with Europe and Japan, and, of course, I don't
think they can overcome the loss overnight. But if they
continue to do that gradually, they will recover the loss they
will lose because of the U.S. sanction.
I think aside from considering what damage we can do on
China, we need to also consider how by doing that are we
advancing the moral concerns that we do have on the table.
Mr. Smith. With all due respect, our point of view on that
very simply is that if you have a dictatorship that shows total
malevolence toward those who dissent or exercise their
religious belief to the point that they routinely torture and
incarcerate, that would seem to be a group we would want to
engage in a principled way, but not by providing technological
transfers and access to our markets. We do have leverage that,
if unused, means they look at us and say, ``Profits trump human
rights. All the Americans care about is profit.''
Mr. McFarland.
Mr. McFarland. Representative Smith, the U.S. Commission
considered the concern that Reverend Su raised as his third
point, what would strengthen the hand of reformers, and
respectfully reached an opposite conclusion, that the message
that would be sent by giving China the biggest plum they seek
economically would be that business as usual is just fine; the
Congress and Administration are indifferent to; that marked
deterioration in religious freedom and human rights; so those
hard-liners who have been ostensibly getting their way in the
social and human rights field--their hand will be strengthened.
The reformers will not be strengthened by giving China the
biggest plum or the pearl that China is looking for. It would
simply reward and send, in the Commission's opinion, all the
wrong messages about the importance or unimportance of
religious freedom to the American people.
Mr. Smith. Let me yield to my friend Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. I want to trade with China, but I think we
need to trade from strength. Much has been talked about the
reformers in China, but we are blurring together two groups.
One group of reformers is in prison. They were not consulted by
the Chinese Government as to whether to enter this deal. The
other group of so-called reformers are the members of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and they are
in favor of this deal; but to call them reformers is to confuse
the people in prison fighting for human rights with members of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party who may believe in
certain economic reforms.
This deal has been put before us by China because the
overwhelming majority of the Central Committee of the Communist
Chinese Party is for the deal, and there is only one thing that
I am absolutely sure applies to every member of that Central
Committee. They are 100 percent dedicated as their primary goal
to maintaining a total monopoly on power with the Communist
Party.
Mr. Chairman, I have been a politician for awhile and have
learned something about politicians. They know their districts.
Lots of other people like to think they know what it takes to
be successful in politics, but a politician knows what it takes
to stay in office or stay in power, and the overwhelming
majority of those dedicated to the continued monopoly of power
by the Chinese Communist Party have brought us this agreement,
and they are counting on us to adopt it; and they are so
confident that they are cracking down. You gentlemen have
illustrated to us that they, just on the eve of this vote, are
cracking down because they are counting on corporate power in
America. They may have read too many Marxist books. They are
counting on corporate power in America to deliver this for
them.
Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit embarrassed as someone who
cared and worked for Soviet Jews. You know that I am Jewish,
and that is my own community, and when they were imperiled by
what was then the world's superpower-controlled market, we
stood up to the plate and we said, yeah, trade with Russia,
trade with the Soviet Union, fine; but human rights. Now we are
faced with a directly analogous situation. China is now the
other superpower. China is now the large, controlled nonmarket
economy, and we ought to be as dedicated to the Buddhists and
Christians and Muslims in China as we were to the Jews of the
Soviet Union.
Mr. Chairman, there is a linkage between human rights, the
trade deficit, and the government's control in China over what
goods actually get in, and I would like to illustrate that we
are running a $70 billion trade deficit with China. That is a
human rights harm to Americans. We have full employment, near
full employment in this country, but we have got a lot of $6-
an-hour jobs. If we didn't have that $70 billion trade deficit
because we could be selling $70 billion worth of goods to China
that we are not now, those same people would be working at $20-
and $30-an-hour jobs, and that is a big difference.
So why is China not buying from us? China needs the very
capital goods that the United States is expert in creating. Why
are they not buying from us? It is because the United States
stands up for human rights. It is because every time Nancy
Pelosi or Chris Smith gives a speech, there is another reason
for the Chinese Communist Party to decide to buy the French
goods or the German goods or the Japanese goods; and if we pass
this deal, there will be nothing we can do about it. That trade
deficit will remain enormous. Those U.S. workers will remain at
$6-an-hour jobs, and what will get worse? When a Taiwan vote
comes up, when a human rights vote comes up, people in this
House will hear from employers in their district, and they will
whisper in my ear, Brad, we have a chance of getting a contract
in China, and we won't get it if the Congress votes for human
rights. Then they will go buy from someone else. We will be not
only deprived of any dollar way, any economic way to respond to
human rights problems in China, but we will be deprived of our
voice as well. Or I will go back to my district, and people
will say, you cost us a contract; why did you vote that way?
Notice that under the present circumstance, if China were
to dare get that blatant, they might impair their MFN status.
Maybe we would do something in Congress for a change, but if
instead the word gets out, unofficially, of course, only
orally, not in writing, that continued American pressure for
Taiwan, Tibet and human rights will mean that U.S. companies
will be disfavored by Chinese decisionmakers, then the
corporate pressure that has come to Congress this last couple
of weeks to tell us to give China what it wants, otherwise they
will lose their contracts; they will be here saying, give China
more of what it wants. Don't vote on human rights. Don't cost
us a contract.
There should be no doubt that the Chinese Government in
Beijing does not need tariffs and quotas to prevent American
goods from getting in. First, the vast majority of importers
are actually owned by the government, those that would buy the
big capital goods. We are not going to sell tennis shoes to
China. We are going to sell, if we are allowed to sell,
telecommunications systems. Do you think you would sell a
telecommunications system for a whole city in China without the
approval of the Communist Party? I don't think so. But even if
it was an independent business, would you like to be an
independent businessman or woman and get a call from the
Chinese Communist Party suggesting that maybe you ought to buy
the French goods or Japanese goods because they are ticked off
by what Chris Smith said on the Floor?
I don't think there are many business people with the
courage of some of the religious leaders that were in prison,
than some of Reverend Su's friends. I don't think they are
going to say, oh, I am going to buy the American goods anyway
because they are 10 percent better, 10 percent less expensive.
The Communist Party of China will continue to control which
U.S. exports get into China and which don't. They will do it
orally. Oral statements are not subject to World Trade
Organization review; and so the more we speak out on human
rights for the people of China, the more we will deprive our
workers of the human right to get those $20- and $30-an-hour
export jobs instead of the $6-an-hour jobs.
We need to be in a position where we can actually do
something, and that would be if we vote every year, and if we
have hopefully not an all-or-nothing vote--I talked to Chris
about this before--but instead have an opportunity to vote for
90, 80, or 60 percent of MFN for China instead of now granting
them 100 percent every year almost like clockwork. Just in case
you haven't realized it, we will be voting against this deal.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First I want to thank you for all that you have done for so
many years on behalf of human rights all throughout this year,
and all of our efforts pale next to yours, and I want to thank
you for your leadership.
Let me second correct the isolationist view of my good
colleague Mr. Sherman regarding the trade deficit. We run a
trade deficit with China because we have one of the strongest
economies we have ever had, and we are buying more products,
good-quality products, good-price products from everywhere
around this world because, in fact, our economy allows that.
Second, we have a trade deficit specifically because China
is blocking our goods. If we do not pass PNTR, and China enters
WTO, they will continue to sell to America. We will continue to
buy from them, and the only difference is our American farmers,
our American ranchers, our American small businesses our high-
tech companies will still be blocked from markets in China. It
will not strengthen our American interests, our economies, our
jobs unless we open those markets to American competition and
we can compete.
But let me tell you what is encouraging about the sketch we
heard from Reverend Su and Mr. McFarland is with Reverend Su
what we know clearly, just like good-hearted Americans debating
this issue strenuously, it is clear that dissidents in China
and from China such as Harry Wu and Wei Jingsheng believe that
we should not do this. Yet leading dissidents like yourself,
Reverend Su; Wang Dang, the leader of the demonstration at
Tiananmen Square; Wang Jen Tou, sentenced to 13 years in
prison, believe that open trade and open access will bring
about these reforms. It is encouraging that both Mr. McFarland
and Reverend Su have talked about how trade can bring about a
more open society and political system, as you did in your
report, and that China's entrance to WTO may very well advance
the rule of law, which has good implications. The only
difference was what signal does this send?
That was the honest disagreement, and my question to you,
because I really do have a question, is whether this is not a
multiple-question approach for America, where we can either
trade, or keep pressure on human rights, or have Congress
engage in religious freedoms, or ending forced abortion and
military aggressiveness, or the President being engaged. Isn't
the answer all of the above? Open markets with open access,
continued higher congressional pressure for change in China,
more engagement by the President and the Cabinet on this, more
international consensus in making these changes within China
rather than from outside China where results have been limited
at best; isn't the real answer we have to do all of that to
bring about this change? I open it to both panelists.
Mr. McFarland. I think, Representative Brady, you have
spoken a lot of truth on that score. I think, speaking on
behalf of the Commission, that its opinion is that the PNTR
would have some benefits to the promotion of human rights.
However, we, the United States, would be squandering a profound
opportunity to leverage some very important progress, progress
that we haven't seen, progress that is going actually in the
wrong direction. So the calculation that the Commission made
was that the benefits of PNTR unconditionally at this time,
given what we see on this issue in the last year to two years,
are outweighed by the progress that could be extracted by
demanding that there be some substantial progress as determined
by the Congress in this fundamental freedom that is supposed to
be of equal weight to our economic interests.
Mr. Brady. Mr. McFarland, if our annual debate on this
issue is producing deteriorating conditions, why would
continuing that same debate reverse that?
Mr. McFarland. I think that is an indictment of the fact
that MFN has been rubber-stamped on a regular basis to the
detriment of human rights, which has been sending the wrong
message for the last number of years.
Mr. Brady. The Congress is strongly in support of annual
MFN. Do you see any reason that is changing?
Mr. McFarland. Do I see any reason that Congress' opinion
would change? I am really not the right person to ask to do
some fortune-telling in that regard. I am sure that given the
track record, there may very well be a good argument that there
will be continued granting of MFN on an annual basis; but we
know that the message we will send to the Chinese leadership is
they never will be held accountable on an annual basis, and
they know that we never will get to first base in Geneva,
either. So why relinquish any leverage whatsoever when this is
a plum they really want?
Mr. Brady. Actually I wish we did know, because here we
have two very good knowledgeable people with honest
disagreements, and then people like Chairman Smith and myself
with honest disagreements on what signal this will send. I wish
I had a crystal ball, and it certainty would sure make this
easier.
Reverend Su?
Reverend Su. First I want to say good people can disagree,
and we all have good intention of trying to bring about the
improvement to human rights in China. But I agree with
Congressman Brady that it takes more than one vote. It takes
more than one way to really accomplish the goals that we want,
and I don't think it is right to turn our current debate into a
referendum to say we don't know if we care for human rights in
China. I think that is a very narrow interpretation of the
debate. Our debate today has a lot more to do with China as a
whole society rather than just the referendum on the human
rights issue.
So I would like to encourage us all to take a look at the
whole picture. To say that our vote for PNTR is to send a
message to Chinese people that we don't care about human
rights, I think, is just too simplistic. I think it sends so
many messages. I don't think any one message alone is enough to
communicate what this vote is all about. It is a message to
encourage the reform process in China, and I think we all agree
the current economic reform is China is good for the Chinese
people. So I think it is so many multiple messages being sent
to China that it is just too simplistic to say that this means
that we don't care about human rights in China. I think
American people have legitimate concerns to ask about the
economic world, because we are living in a very competitive
world market, and I think all these concerns are legitimate.
Even though I come from a religious background, I wouldn't
want to define this debate as if it is all about the religious
freedom issue, and I think we all need to take a look at the
whole picture. I do believe that those of us who are concerned
about losing some leverage because we are not having this
annual debate with China in this way, I need to find good
alternatives.
The current debate, the annual debate on the normal trade
relationship with China, is no longer a useful tool at all. I
had hoped for it to become a useful tool, but it is not
effective anymore. Just like if I am driving a car, and it is
always causing me problems. Instead of fixing it and spending
thousands of dollars, why not invest in getting a better car? I
think this is what we are facing, too. Instead of trying to
beat up this bill into something else, why not us invest in
creating something good, effective and productive to accomplish
the human rights goals that we want.
The PNTR is mostly a trade issue. It is designed as a trade
bill. To try to beat it up, reshape it to turn it into a human
rights weapon, it is just at best awkward. It is just like you
cannot shape a baseball bat into a fishing pole. It is just
like--you cannot go fishing with a baseball bat. So this is
what I am saying. We are right in having concerns about human
rights, but let us find effective channels that do not have the
counterproductive effects on the Chinese people, on the
American people, on the American economy, and let's find a good
tool to do the things that we all agree that we want to
accomplish.
I don't understand why we need to disagree over this issue.
It is far bigger, far broader than one single issue, and I
think some--I guess some viewers may be wondering why we are
debating about this, making a very complicated issue into a
single issue.
Mr. Brady. Reverend and Mr. McFarland, I want to thank you
both for your informed views because they are very helpful,
and, we cannot give up on this issue, on human rights. We are
going to have to find and create better, more concerted
efforts, and we are going to be leaning on leaders like
yourself to help shape those as well. So thank you.
Mr. Smith. Let me make one final comment and ask one very
short question. I think human rights is not some single issue.
How well or poorly a country treats its own people is obviously
a measure of its fairness, humanity, and generosity. But labor
rights certainly have an absolute connection to trade. I don't
think it could be argued in any way, shape, or form that this
is somehow unconnected since labor produces the goods that are
eventually shipped or exported. There are no labor rights in
China. If you or I wanted to establish a free trade union, we
would be on the quick road to prison and we would be punished
severely for it.
Let me also say that WTO ironically does punish for
violations of certain types of rights, but only commercial
rights, intellectual property rights, and a host of other
similar rights. If a country violates those rights--pirates
CD's or video cassettes--the full weight of the WTO will come
down against them. Why is that? I find it hard to justify that
it is OK for a country to bring an action because intellectual
property rights have been violated, but not when the work force
that produces those items have no rights. The individuals
should matter more than pirated disks.
That is a major flaw, in my view and perhaps others, with
regard to the WTO. Human rights aren't even a side-bar. They
are nowhere to be found when it comes to trade or commerce
between nations. It would seem to me that there should be some
connection--otherwise just roll back the clock. Why not deal
with the Nazis? You might encourage them coming out of the
debacle of World War I to be more productive and more this and
more that, but we all know that they had very despotic
tendencies, and Hitler did terrible things to his people,
especially the Jews.
We now have a record that is indisputable that the
repression is getting worse, and that is why I find it so
incredible that when we have at least one small opportunity to
admonish a dictatorship that it won't be business as usual,
that we don't grab it and say, we are not going to give a
permanent NTR, we are going to have an annual review.
Let me also just make the point--and perhaps, Mr.
McFarland, you might want to answer this, I think you would be
the right person--the Commission suggested that it would be
very helpful for the Congress to invite His Holiness the Dalai
Lama to speak to a joint session of Congress, which I fully
support. How did that come to be, and what are your thoughts on
that?
Mr. McFarland. He is perhaps the world's greatest single
figure in personifying both religious freedom and passivism in
pursuit of human rights and a Nobel Peace Laureate. So it was
the Commission's opinion that while Beijing might not
appreciate the invitation, that this individual should address
a joint session of Congress. It would send the right message to
the Chinese people that, first, the atrocities going on in
Tibet by the Chinese Government are not forgotten; second that
it is worth Congress's time to hear from a person of his
stature, knowing that his message will be that business as
usual is not acceptable. I think it would send all the right
messages--the Commission believes it would send all the right
messages to both Beijing as well as the displaced government of
Tibet to invite His Holiness to address the Congress.
ReverendSu. May I have some comments on some good issues
you brought up? On the issue of labor rights--and I agree with
you that the Chinese workers today cannot set up their trade
union overnight, but that is not the issue we are concerned. We
are concerned about the long-term improvements of human rights
situations there, and I don't know whether you get a chance to
talk with the average Chinese workers in China. I am from the
city of Xiamen. I have talked with people who work with
different international investment, work for Hong Kong
investment company, companies set up by Americans, Japanese,
those from Taiwan and other European countries, and they all
told me the same conclusion, that workers working for American
companies are better treated than workers working for any other
companies run by any other countries.
So I don't think it is right for some people to say the
labor--the slave labor situation in China, and I think the way
to improve the labor situation in China is to bring in the
highest standards that American companies are practicing. The
Chinese people are smart. They can see the difference, and that
puts a lot of pressure on other companies to come up with
competitive labor standard measures, and I think that is a very
productive way to promote the improvements in the labor--in
companies for workers where you introduce the high standards
and create contrasts so that those companies that have lousy
standards may really come up with something to compete with the
high standards in the American companies.
When I visited China, people told me the same thing, either
in my home town in Beijing or elsewhere, and I don't think by
withdrawing American company we're going to help the labor
situation in China.
Mr. Smith. Can I just offer one response? There is no doubt
the Chinese dictatorship has taken the measure of Congress.
They can count votes, and can count on an Administration that
has been ready to give them MFN without strings. Matter of
fact, I went over to Beijing midway through the time when the
linkage was in effect, when they were on probation. Virtually
every Chinese leader I met with said, ``We are getting MFN.
This Administration will just give it to us.'' There will be no
strings at the end of that so-called review period.'' I didn't
meet a single Chinese leader who suggested anything other than
that profits would trump everything else.
I say that because we haven't really had a test to see
whether or not the economic leverage will work. We need 290
votes in the House and 67 votes in the Senate, a super
majority, to overcome a Presidential veto when it comes to MFN
renewal on an annual basis. Those votes are nowhere to be had.
They are not even close.
So we are in a different situation this year with permanent
MFN where one chamber, Senate or House, can stop this from
going forward, so this really is a real test. In the past it
has been a bogus test, and, again, the only time we came even
close to having what we thought was going to be a victory on
this post-Tiananmen Square was when the President was saying
all the right things, such as that he was for getting rid of
MFN. The House and Senate were poised to do just that, and in
came his Executive Order which rendered that moot.
So the Chinese Government may be a horrific dictatorship,
but they are not stupid. They have known ever since then, we
never had the two-thirds requisite number of votes to overcome
a Presidential veto, which we would have gotten had we passed
in both houses a denial of the MFN. So this has not been
tested.
Hopefully PNTR gives us a new first-time test as to whether
or not we really mean business, and that is why this is such an
important vote. Again, even the annual MFN, they will get it.
We can't stop that. It will be renewed for another year under
this Administration, which unfortunately caved seven years ago.
Reverend Su. I have to say I don't think this is a test to
see whether or not we care about human rights situation in
China.
Mr. Smith. Could I ask you one thing? I am sorry for
interrupting you, but if my family and extended family and
Kevin Brady's and yours were all being tortured today, would we
want MFN again? That is the everyday experience of many within
the PRC, the Country Reports make it very clear. Amnesty this
week has called for an end to torture in China, made a broad-
based appeal to the dictatorship in Beijing. Would we still
say, yeah, let's just trade; maybe someday my kids and my wife
and Kevin's and yours will all be let out of prison.
There is an urgency that is lacking. If we wait a decade or
two and say, ``Over time this will evolve'', those who are
being tortured will have lost their lives, and there are
thousands of political prisoners and religious prisoners being
tortured.
Reverend Su. I would agree with you about the urgency. I
feel the PNTR is not an effective channel to promote those
concerns that we are discussing now, and we need to move on and
create new and effective channels to deal with the concerns
that we are talking about.
If you are talking about those suffering for human rights
violation, religious freedom in China, in fact I talked to many
people in prison in China for their religious faith. They don't
want their persecution to become an issue in American politics.
They don't want to become the political football between the
two countries. It is not good for them. It is not good for the
church in China. Christians in China live in China, not in the
U.S., and I think we need to be more sensitive in suggesting
that they are for removing the trade with China, and I don't
think that is an accurate view of a lot of people that are
suffering for religious persecution.
Mr. Smith. Regrettably Wei Jingsheng is not here to rebut
that, but at our hearing he testified and said precisely the
opposite, that it is only when there is a realistic threat, a
credible threat, that they stand to lose something, and that
there is a significant economic benefit at risk, that the bully
boys in the prisons and working right up to the top will
ameliorate some of their brutality to the prisoners. When it is
business as usual, they have a free hand, he testified, to do
as they will with impunity, and prisoners are told, ``You are
forgotten''. So we have a difference of agreement on that.
Mr. McFarland. Mr. Wei so testified in Los Angeles on March
15 before the U.S. Commission, as did Harry Wu, and they were
quite clear, ``read our lips'' an answer on PNTR; this will not
work to the benefit of the religious adherents that are in
prison or even to those who would perhaps suffer worse. They
believe in Mr. Wu's opinion and Mr. Wei's opinion that it is
worth the cost. So it is certainly at best a mixed question,
and there is no unanimity on that.
Reverend Su. I want to say I respect the views of Wei
Jingsheng. My wife and I prayed for him many times when he was
in jail and even after he was released. But I have to say I
don't think it is accurate to say all Chinese political
dissidents are for the rejection of the PNTR vote. There are a
lot of good people speaking out of their own conviction rather
than under the pressure of Beijing government, as some
suggested. They truly believe in their hearts that granting
PNTR to China is good for the cause of human rights and
democracy in China.
Another very respected human rights leader stayed in prison
for many years as well. She shared our view that granting PNTR
to China is better for the human rights situation in China.
So I think good people can disagree over this issue rather
than say Chinese political dissidents all agree that to call
off trade with China is the best.
Mr. Smith. With all due respect, I didn't say that, and I
don't think anybody has ever said that.
Reverend Su. Another quote by Dai Quing, a Chinese
environmentalist and also a political human rights activist; he
was also in prison in China, and he said this: ``I believe that
permanent normal trade status with its implication of openness
and fairness is among the most powerful means of promoting
freedom in China''. I respect that view as well.
Mr. Smith. Let me thank our third panel, our two very
distinguished witnesses, for their testimony and your patience.
This has been a very long day, but very, very enlightening and
helpful. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 10, 2000
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