[House Document 110-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 110-45
INITIAL IRAQ BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT
__________
MESSAGE
from
THEPRESIDENTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES
transmitting
A REPORT THAT ASSESSES THE STATUS OF EACH OF THE 18 IRAQI BENCHMARKS,
CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 1314 OF THE U.S. TROOP READINESS, VETERANS'
CARE, KATRINA RECOVERY, AND IRAQ ACCOUNTABILITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF
2007, PUB. L. 110-28
July 13, 2007.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, and ordered to be
printed
To the Congress of the United States:
Consistent with section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the ``Act''),
attached is the report that assesses the status of each of the
18 Iraqi benchmarks contained in the Act and declares whether
satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is
not, being achieved.
This report has been prepared in consultation with the
Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National
Forces--Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the
Commander of United States Central Command.
George W. Bush.
The White House, July 12, 2007.
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
July 12, 2007
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with
Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care,
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act,
2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the ``Act''). It includes an
assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is
performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific
benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to
strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance.
This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent
with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the
Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National
Forces--Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the
Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with
Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements
other reports and information about Iraq provided to the
Congress and is not intended as a single source of all
information about the combined efforts or the future strategy
of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.
INTRODUCTION
Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care,
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act,
2007 (Public Law 110-28) states that the President is to submit
to Congress two reports assessing the status of each of the 18
benchmarks contained in the Act and declaring whether, in the
President's judgment, satisfactory progress is being achieved
with respect to those 18 benchmarks.
These benchmarks relate to Government of Iraq actions
believed to be important to advance reconciliation within Iraqi
society, to improve the security of the Iraqi population, to
provide essential services to the population, and to promote
its economic well-being. These efforts complement other U.S.
and Iraqi collaborative actions as part of the New Way Forward.
CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY: NEW WAY FORWARD
Current U.S. strategy--the New Way Forward--recognizes that
the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi
Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a
democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself,
and be an ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong
strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will be an
important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which
remains a long-term goal, and requires the application of all
elements of national power, including especially diplomatic,
economic, and political power.\1\
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\1\Over 2007 and into 2008, we are focusing on the following core
objectives:
1. Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist
safe haven exists in Iraq.
2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and
regain control over the capital.
3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit
destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq.
4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong
democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing
the return of the forces of tyranny.
5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with
the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead.
6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and
accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi
Government.
7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy, including by helping Iraq
maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development.
8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the
international community.
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While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a
transition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its
security forces, the New Way Forward recognized that, in
response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was
necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a greater
role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in
securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace
Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the
necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can
continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts
against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in
Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), and can
meaningfully address the all-important issue of reconciliation
among the various segments of Iraqi society. The strategy
recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined
efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling
sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting
the Coalition and Iraqi Government. Amid such violence, it
became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to make the
difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation.
At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help
build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying
on lessons learned from our experience in training and
equipping the ISF, we have significantly enhanced our training
and mentoring commitment. We will continue this commitment
through a combination of partnering Coalition units with Iraqi
Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team
personnel with the majority of ISF units. U.S commanders are
committed to helping the Iraqi government expand the size of
the ISF to make it a more capable counterinsurgency force.
We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi
governmental capacity not just at the national level, but at
the provincial and local levels as well. Most notably, this has
required an expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) program with 10 new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT leaders and BCT commanders
additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders
are charged with supporting moderate elements against
extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching
projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of
terrorists and insurgents.
Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only
about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel
deployed to date. The full complement of ``civilian surge''
personnel will be completed by December 2007. In addition,
economic assistance funds provided by Congress in the Act for
Iraq have yet to be released. As provided for in the Act, the
President has waived certain restrictions on a portion of these
funds in a determination, which is being provided to Congress
separately.
As the President explained in January, all of these
efforts, together with a new diplomatic offensive in the
region, are designed to set the conditions for U.S. troops to
begin coming home, without risking a humanitarian catastrophe
in Iraq, sanctuaries for international terrorist networks, or a
broader regional conflict that would threaten U.S. national
security interests for generations. (The strategy is explained
in greater detail at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/
iraq-strategy011007.pdf) While all of those conditions have not
yet been met, and the new strategy is still in its early
stages, there are some encouraging signs that should, over
time, point the way to a more normalized and sustainable level
of U.S. engagement in Iraq, with a decreasing number of U.S.
combat forces increasingly focused on a core set of missions,
such as those set out by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group.
SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTFALLS
This report provides, consistent with the Act, an
assessment of how the Iraqi Government is performing on 18
specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated.
Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some
sense of future trends; but many are more accurately
characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved
after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved
conditions on the ground. For example, local political
accommodations have dramatically improved conditions in what
had been some of Iraq's most violent areas, and we are
deploying our resources to help ensure that these trends
continue and spread. It will take time, however, for improved
conditions locally to translate into broader political
accommodations at the national level; what is important is the
overall trajectory, which, under our present strategy, has
begun to stabilize, compared to the deteriorating trajectory
seen over the course of 2006. Thus, the assessments in this
report should be viewed in a larger context: the discussion
below provides a snapshot of achievements and shortfalls that
can round out the picture given in the detailed assessment
section of this report.
Security: The security situation in Iraq remains complex
and extremely challenging. Iraqi and Coalition Forces continue
to emphasize population security operations in Baghdad, its
environs, and Anbar province to combat extremist networks, and
create the space for political reconciliation and economic
growth. As a result of increased offensive operations,
Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased attacks in
Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Tough
fighting should be expected through the summer as Coalition and
Iraqi Forces seek to seize the initiative from early gains and
shape conditions for longer-term stabilization. These combined
operations--named Operation Phantom Thunder--were launched on
June 15, 2007, after the total complement of surge forces
arrived in Iraq. The full surge in this respect has only just
begun.
These new operations are targeting primarily al-Qaida in
Iraq (AQI) havens in Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, and Anbar
provinces. While AQI may not account for most of the violence
in Iraq, it is the organization responsible for the highest
profile attacks, which serve as a primary accelerant to the
underlying sectarian conflict. We presently assess that
degrading AQI networks in these critical areas--together with
efforts to degrade Iranian-backed Shi'a extremist networks--is
a core U.S. national security interest and essential for Iraq's
longer-term stability. Since January of this year, AQI has
proven its resiliency and ability to conduct high-profile,
mass-casualty attacks, mostly targeting Shi'a population
centers through suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (SVBIEDs) attacks. The number of suicide and SVBIED
attacks in March and April approached all-time highs, further
exacerbating sectarian tension and making political deals more
difficult to close. These incidents have shown a decrease in
May and June, which may be the result of aggressive Coalition
and Iraqi operations into former AQI havens. The surge of
additional U.S. forces into these areas allows us to better
combat AQI and other terrorists. We should expect, however,
that AQI will attempt to increase its tempo of attacks as
September approaches--in an effort to influence U.S. domestic
opinion about sustained U.S. engagement in Iraq.
In Baghdad, an overall decrease in sectarian violence is
due in part to intensified Iraqi and Coalition operations
focused on population security. An apparent decision earlier
this year by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to largely stand
down its operations appeared to have a temporary effect, but a
breakdown in Muqtada al Sadr's ability to control JAM--or
elements thereof--coinciding with the return of JAM fighters
from Iran after receiving training in combat and explosives has
spawned a recent increase in attacks on Coalition and Iraqi
forces. Iran continues to train, fund, and equip extremist
groups, both Shi'a and Sunni, that attack Iraqi and Coalition
forces in and around Baghdad and the provinces in southern
Iraq. JAM ``secret cells'' are a major recipient of that
assistance--and are responsible for sonie of the most
sophisticated attacks on Iraqi and Coalition Forces. As stated
in the President's January 10, 2007, speech announcing the New
Way Forward: ``We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran.
And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing
advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.''
Operations against these networks are ongoing and will
continue.
In Anbar province, the local population is turning against
AQI and seeking support from the Coalition. At the same time,
U.S. military operations and cooperation with local tribal
leaders have created openings for local political compromise
and more effective civilian assistance. To reinforce these
early signs of success, the President ordered additional U.S.
military and civilian resources to Anbar. The trends have
remained positive. The provincial government--for the first
time in a year--is now able to meet in the province and
recently approved a comprehensive provincial budget that
appropriates virtually all of its $107 million allocation for
capital expenditures. Attack levels have reached a 2-year low
and some families that had fled Anbar are beginning to return.
These developments have been noted in other primarily Sunni
areas of Iraq, such as Salah ad-Din province, and areas around
Baquba, in Diyala province, where efforts are underway to build
on the Anbar experience.
The ISF continues to show slow progress. ISF capability is
increasing, but further ISF proficiency, improved logistics,
and expanded forces are needed in order to assume more
responsibility from Coalition Forces. Comprehensive data and
statistics on the ISF--including its projected growth--can be
found in the report Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,
submitted quarterly to Congress by the Department of Defense,
pursuant to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-289). It should be
noted that Iraqi Security Forces bear the brunt of attacks from
insurgents and terrorists. Despite casualty rates two to three
times that of Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces continue
to fight bravely for their country.
Political Reconciliation: Moving key legislation depends on
deal-making among major players in a society deeply divided
along sectarian, ethnic, and other lines. Meaningful and
lasting progress on national reconciliation may also require a
sustained period of reduced violence in order to build trust.
For this reason, most of the major political benchmarks
identified in the legislation--i.e., final passage of
monumental pieces of legislation through Iraq's Council of
Representatives by consensus--are lagging indicators of whether
or not the strategy is succeeding or is going to be successful.
As demonstrated by our PRT initiatives and moving resources
outside of Baghdad and into the provinces, our strategy
envisions ``bottom-up'' reconciliation to be as important, if
not more important, than top-down reconciliation. Bottom-up
reconciliation involves working at the local and provincial
level, seeking local political accommodations and getting more
Iraqis to invest in the future of a united and democratic Iraq.
Bottom-up reconciliation can take many forms: in Anbar, we have
seen greater involvement of tribal groups; in Salah ad Din, it
is involving local and provincial leaders taking greater
responsibility for their political and economic future; in
Baghdad, it has involved local neighborhood councils working
with newly deployed Coalition and Iraqi units to identify and
isolate extremists. All of the new resources devoted to this
strategy--the arrival of military reinforcements, the expansion
of PRTs, and the diplomatic surge--can be leveraged to produce
bottom-up reconciliation. Over time, we expect bottom-up
reconciliation to be reflected in, and latch up with, progress
on top-down measures.
Effective steps toward national reconciliation will require
national leadership from all communities and expression of a
common national political will, or ``vision,'' that has so far
been lacking. The consensus nature of Iraqi politics, and the
checks and balances built into the Iraqi governance structure,
inhibit Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ability to govern
effectively--and would pose obstacles to any prime minister.
These inhibitors slow progress on high-priority legislative
benchmarks, although they are designed to create a decision-
making process through which all major communities have a voice
and a stake. The increasing concern among Iraqi political
leaders that the United States may not have a long-term
commitment to Iraq has also served in recent months to
reinforce hedging behaviors and made the hardest political
bargains even more difficult to close.
Nonetheless, there have been recent events that provide
hope for the ability of the Government of Iraq to overcome
these inhibitors. For example, the response to the June 13,
2007, bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra was a well
orchestrated unison of statements of condemnation and calls for
calm by Prime Minister Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, Vice
President Tariq Hashimi, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and
other leaders. This indicates that when necessary, the
Government of Iraq and major political figures can overcome the
dynamics that otherwise inhibit effectiveness. Iraq's Council
of Representatives on July 8 voted to extend its present term
through July 31, and for working sessions to last 6 days a week
from July 16 through July 31 (taking only Fridays off). We will
be working closely with Iraqi leaders and members of the
Council of Representatives to move important pieces of
legislation forward during this time frame--taking account of
the extended legal process mandated by Iraq's constitution for
moving a law to final passage.
Diplomatic Engagement: Iran and Syria have continued to
foster instability in Iraq. As noted, Iran funds extremist
groups to promote attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces,
and the Iraqi Government. We see little change in Iran's policy
of seeking U.S. defeat through direct financial and material
support for attacks against U.S. military and civilians in
Iraq. Iran is engaging in similar activities in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, foreign fighters (especially suicide bombers)
continue to use Syrian territory as their main transit route to
Iraq. The Syrian Government also allows major insurgent
organizers and financiers to operate in Damascus. We continue
to assess that nearly 80 percent of suicide bombers are foreign
fighters--with the vast majority traveling to Iraq through
Syria--and to Syria from their home countries by air travel to
Damascus. This Syria-based network is able to supply some 50 to
80 suicide bombers to AQI per month. Since January, there have
been nearly 280 suicide events in Iraq, accounting for nearly
5,500 casualties, mostly innocent Iraqis going about their
daily lives. Syria can and must do more to shut down these
networks.
The signing of the International Compact with Iraq, an
initiative jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the
Iraqi Government, and the Expanded Neighbors ministerial
conference, with attendance by the Permanent Five members of
the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League, the Organization of
Islamic Conference, and the G-8, on May 3-4 in Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt, helped provide more public international and regional
support for Iraq. Compact implementation, including debt
relief, will be our near-term focus. The Neighbors Process
energy working group had a successful meeting in Istanbul,
Turkey, last month, and the other two working groups are
planning to meet later this summer. We expect the next Expanded
Neighbors ministerial to be held later this summer or early
fall in Istanbul.
Economics and Essential Services: The economic picture is
uneven. Key economic indicators paint a modestly improved
picture--unemployment has eased slightly and inflation is
currently abating. Government revenue is steady due to high oil
prices, but the Iraqi Government has not yet made needed
investments to increase oil and refining output. Private-sector
activity is picking up in some areas, notably the more than $1
billion that have been invested in wireless telecoms, but
investors remain wary due topoor security and the continuing
need for a stronger legal framework. The Iraqi Government has
begun to show resolve in initiating budget execution and
capital investment to restore services, but citizens nationwide
complain about government corruption and the lack of essential
services, such as electricity, fuel supply, sewer, water,
health, and sanitation.
At the provincial level, the economic governance picture is
a patchwork, with some provinces performing better than others.
Security conditions, ethnic and sectarian divisions, political
dynamics, corruption, and leadership qualities of key political
actors vary significantly by province. As a result, provincial
governments vary greatly in the effectiveness of using their
central government budget allocation to provide services for
citizens. Where security is improving, such as in Anbar
province, we see positive trends in governance, delivery of
government services, and the efficacy of U.S. assistance.
The International Compact with Iraq provides the framework
through which the Iraqi Government will reform its governance,
budget execution, and fiscal management, as well as improve
service delivery. The Compact sets out the roadmap of reforms
Iraq will need to implement over the next 5 years to be
economically self-sufficient. Iraq's IMF Stand-by Arrangement
is on track and has been extended to September 2007. For a
follow-on IMF program, Iraq will need to continue increasing
fuel prices.
CONGRESSIONAL BENCHMARKS
This background discussion provides a context for assessing
the performance of the Iraqi Government with respect to the 18
benchmarks. The Iraqi leaders face a challenging situation, and
they and their families run great risks on a daily basis. We
continue to encourage and press them to achieve the established
benchmarks, since we believe that those efforts will contribute
to Iraq's stability, its ability to provide for its own
security, and to the international effort to counter violent
extremism. Nonetheless, our efforts in Iraq extend far beyond
these benchmarks. Every day, our Embassy and military officials
are working with Iraqis to encourage stability and
reconciliation in ways that are not easily measured by these
benchmarks. As Congress has requested, in September General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will report on these efforts
and provide a more comprehensive assessment of the situation in
Iraq, including an assessment of the 18 benchmarks measured
herein. This assessment will provide a clearer picture of how
the new strategy is unfolding, and what if any adjustments
should be made.
Standard of Measurement: Section 1314(b)(2)(A) states:
``The President shall submit an initial report to Congress, not
later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the
specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his
judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these
benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.'' In order to make
this judgment (e.g., whether ``satisfactory progress . . . is,
or is not, being achieved''), we have carefully examined all
the facts and circumstances with respect to each of the 18
benchmarks and asked the following question: As measured from a
January 2007 baseline, do we assess that present trend data
demonstrates a positive trajectory, which is tracking toward
satisfactory accomplishment in the near 8 term? If the answer
is yes, we have provided a ``Satisfactory'' assessment; if the
answer is no, the assessment is ``Unsatisfactory.'' For those
benchmarks receiving the latter assessment, we have explained
what, if any, strategic adjustments may be required to improve
the present trajectory. The present analysis and assessment of
these 18 benchmarks follows.
Assessment of the Benchmarks
Section 1314 (b)(2)(A) The President shall submit an
initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the
Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of
each of the specific benchmarks . . . and declaring, in his
judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these
benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.
Section 1314 (b)(2)(C) If the President's assessment of any
of the specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory,
the President shall include in that report a description of
such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and
military components of the strategy, as announced by the
President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall
include in the report the advisability of implementing such
aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, as he deems
appropriate.
Section 1314 (b)(1)(A) The United States Strategy in Iraq,
hereafter, shall be conditioned on the Iraqi Government meeting
benchmarks . . . including:
(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the
constitutional review
The Council of Representatives (COR) formed the
Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) on November 15, 2006. The
Constitutional Review is now underway. The CRC presented a
partial list of recommendations on May 23, 2007, in an interim
report and received an extension from the COR until the end of
August to resolve outstanding issues concerning: (i)
Presidential powers, (ii) the powers of the regions vs. the
central government, and (iii) the status of Kirkuk (Article 140
of the Constitution). The political blocs still need to reach
an accommodation on these difficult political issues.
The Embassy will continue to discuss with the CRC Chairmen
and the COR Speaker and Deputy Speakers the need to develop a
well-defined plan for the COR debate of the report. The Embassy
is also continuing to discuss with the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) the necessary preparatory
steps for a public referendum on proposed constitutional
revisions. As noted in the Iraq Study Group Report
Recommendation 26, there is a role for UNAMI in the
constitutional review process.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC)
and then completing the constitutional review. The CRC has been
formed, and, while difficult issues remain, significant
progress has been made on many substantive issues and technical
details involved in the constitutional review process. The CRC
has requested an extension to resolve remaining issues, and its
Chairman remains committed to moving the process forward. While
the progress on this benchmark has been satisfactory, the
achievement of the desired reconciliation effect depends on
progress with respect to several other benchmarks as well as
this one.
(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform
De-Ba'athification reform is among the most sensitive
pieces of legislation being considered as it involves competing
conceptions of justice, accountability, reconciliation, and
economic compensation. Senior Iraqi political leaders remain at
odds over some of the most fundamental aspects of de-
Ba'athification reform, including over which categories of
former Ba'ath party members would be proscribed by the law. For
example, there is division among political and ethnic groups
regarding what rank of ex-Ba'athists should be allowed to
return to civic life. While leaders have been discussing the
law, a public discussion on the accommodations that different
parts of Iraqi society will have to make with each other is not
yet underway. An inflexible time line on this issue could be
detrimental, as a bad law would not improve prospects for
reconciliation.
Reintegration of former Ba'athists who have not committed
crimes has already begun; however, a sweeping, government-led,
legislated, and institutionalized reform program over time
would send a positive signal in favor of reconciliation.
Alternatively, allowing former Ba'athists who do not accept a
democratic Iraq into the government or security services could
undermine the Iraqi government and embolden the insurgency.
Many Iraqis are understandably frightened by the prospect of
their former Ba'athist tormentors replaying their previous rise
to power by subverting the government from within.
In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the
need for United States Government support of reintegration of
former Ba'athists and Arab nationalists into civic life. The
New Way Forward strategy makes de-Ba'athification reform an
integral part of the United States Government's Iraq policy.
The Embassy has pressed hard on all political elements to move
forward.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform. This is among the
most divisive political issues for Iraq, and compromise will be
extremely difficult. Given the lack of satisfactory progress,
we have not achieved the desired reconciliation effect that
meaningful and broadly accepted de-Ba'athification reform might
bring about. This does not, however, necessitate a revision to
the current plan and strategy. DeBa'athification remains a core
priority of U.S. political engagement, and pushing reforms too
fast or in a manner that results in a poor law could be
detrimental to our overall reconciliation objectives.
(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq
without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and
enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy
resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and
other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner
The final draft of the Revenue Management Law must be
approved by the Council of Ministers (COM) and vetted by the
Iraqi Government's legal office before submission to the COR.
The United States has provided technical advice to the Iraqi
Government and is actively engaged in encouraging both sides to
expeditiously approve the draft law in the COM and move it to
the COR. Prime Minister Maliki intends to submit the Revenue
Management Law to the COM soon, for subsequent consideration by
the COR along with the framework Hydrocarbon law.
Assessment: The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is
too early to tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and
implement legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of
hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis. The Government of Iraq has
not met its self-imposed goal of May 31 for submitting the
framework hydrocarbon and revenue-sharing laws to the COR.
Although the KRG and the Shi'a parties have agreed to the text
of the Revenue Management Law, Council of Ministers' approval
has been delayed by a Sunni party boycott. The effect of
limited progress toward this benchmark has been to reduce the
perceived confidence in, and effectiveness of, the Iraqi
Government. This does not, however, necessitate a revision to
our current plan and strategy, under which we have assigned a
high priority to this subject, and the process overall has
continued to move forward.
(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-
autonomous regions
The COR enacted a law in October 2006 that establishes
procdures to form regions. Under the Iraqi constitution,
regions have certain powers, such as control over regional
security forces, that provinces do not. The law will come into
effect 18 months after being passed, which means no steps can
be taken to form regions before April 2008. The United States
Government encouraged Iraqi political parties to reach a
compromise on this law and believes that the 18-month delay in
implementation is in the interests of Iraq and the United
States, given current political conditions in Iraq.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on
procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. The regions law has
been passed. Implementation of this legislation should take
place after provincial elections are held and after the passage
of an updated elections law. The procedures are in place, but
whether establishment of additional regions (in addition to the
already-recognized KRG) is desirable depends on a number of
factors, including the outcome of efforts at constitutional
reform. The progress toward this benchmark has been
satisfactory, and the effect is that this potentially
contentious issue has not been a source of discord.
(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent
High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial
council authorities, and a date for provincial elections
On January 23, 2007, the COR passed the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC) Law, which the Presidency Council
(the President and two Deputy Presidents) approved on February
27, 2007. On April 28, 2007, the COR appointed the nine IHEC
Commissioners in a process that the U.N. deemed fair and
transparent. The Commissioners have completed appropriate
training and are in the process of selecting representatives to
oversee elections in the provinces. A Provincial Powers Law
that defines the authorities and structures of local
governments has been read twice in the COR, but changes are
being considered, particularly related to the powers of the
governor and the reach of the central government at the local
level.
At the highest levels, the Embassy is urging the Iraqi
Government to take the legislative and administrative action
necessary to ensure timely and fair elections. The Embassy is
intensively engaged with the GOI and the COR at all levels to
expedite legislation or amendments to existing legislation that
will allow provincial elections to take place. New legislation
or amendments to the existing law are required to set a date
and secure funding for elections, as well as to establish the
electoral system to be used for the vote, among other issues.
In cooperation with the U.N., the United States Government
is providing program support to the new IHEC in three areas:
(i) building immediate IHEC staff capacity, particularly in
public outreach and internal organization; (ii) building
database capacity that will support the new voter registry; and
(iii) standing up provincial, district, and precinct-level
election bodies. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are
monitoring political and security conditions in provinces that
may affect elections.
In Recommendation 29, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the
need for provincial elections at the earliest possible date.
The United States Government and UNAMI are working closely with
the Iraqi Government to accelerate the drafting and passage of
the Provincial Powers Law and set a date for provincial
elections. Additionally, the United States Government is
working with Iraq Security Forces to ensure that they are
adequately prepared to provide security for free and fair
elections.
Assessment: There are multiple components to this
benchmark, each deserving its own assessment:
Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government
of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an
IHEC Commission. The Commission has been established.
Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial
elections law. Drafting of the law has just begun.
Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of
Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing
provincial council authorities. The COR is working on
legislation, which has had its second reading; however, the COR
committee continues to work on revisions to the draft law, and
it remains unclear when the legislation will come to a third
and final vote by the full COR.
Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq
has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date
for provincial elections. Legislation required for setting the
date has not been enacted.
The effect is that there is still no mechanism in place to
address the under-representation of Sunnis in provincial
councils that was caused by past Sunni election boycotts.
However, at this time, this does not necessitate a revision to
our current plan and strategy, under which we regard movement
on this issue as one of the highest priorities, and have seen
progress in key areas--particularly with respect to the IHEC,
which is a critical building block to holding genuine and
credible local elections with U.N. assistance and support.
(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty
There is little progress toward legislation establishing
amnesty for those who fought against the government since 2003
or who committed crimes in the name of the Iraqi Government.
Neither the GOI nor the COR are pressing forward the passage of
amnesty legislation.
At some point; Iraq's process of reconciliation would
benefit from an amnesty that recognizes the need to avoid
criminal prosecution of certain acts of a military nature
committed since 2003. However, a general amnesty program would
be counterproductive in the current environment. As long as
violence remains extensive and no major armed group has
signaled a willingness to cooperate with the Iraqi Government
and renounce violence, there is no group for which amnesty
would be appropriate.
Opportunities to offer amnesty locally, to specific
populations and individuals, may appear quickly and will
require Iraqi Government legislation or programs to exploit the
willingness of fighters to abandon violence. Such actions could
serve as a model for a wider amnesty program. United States
officials have made clear to Iraqi leaders that any amnesty,
when it comes, should not distinguish between acts against
Coalition Forces and acts against Iraqis.
In a token of progress, an amnesty workshop was conducted
on May 12, 2007, in Baghdad. Political-party representatives
and academics gathered to discuss amnesty concepts. From this
small workshop, 10 recommendations were developed and forwarded
to various government representatives for comment, thus
beginning a dialogue on amnesty.
In Recommendations 31 and 37, the Iraq Study Group advised
three elements for any amnesty legislation: 1) it must be far-
reaching, 2) it must involve reconciliation by those in
government with their enemies, and 3) the legislative and
executive branches of the United States Government must not
undercut it. However, the Study also notes, as mentioned in the
assessment above, that ``there are many armed groups within
Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.''
Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful general
amnesty are not present; however, in the current security
environment, it is not clear that such action should be a near-
term Iraqi goal. The Government of Iraq has established a high-
level Government of Iraq Reconciliation Committee to support
and oversee efforts of groups that want to oppose AQI and other
extremist elements--working with ajoint U.S. Embassy/MNF-I
group that is facilitating such actions in coordination with
units on the ground. These efforts are more relevant at this
point than are general amnesty initiatives. Nonetheless, the
Government of Iraq should develop amnesty programs later in the
year, so they are ready to be implemented if opportunities
arise. Given the absence of the necessary conditions for
amnesty, the absence of amnesty legislation has had no effect.
The current plan and strategy calls for the passage of such
legislation when the necessary conditions are present.
(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong
militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces
are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the
constitution of Iraq
The COR included $150 million in its 2007 budget for
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), but the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) is waiting to release the funds
pending development of a Government of Iraq plan for DDR.
However, the COR has not moved toward passage of legislation to
establish a disarmament program, nor are senior Iraqi officials
or political-party leaders focused on passing such a law. There
is disagreement among Iraqi experts as to whether new or
additional legislation is necessary as militia and other
illegal armed-group activity is already against Iraqi law.
Although the Iraqi Government has formed a DDR Committee, there
is no momentum in the Government of Iraq toward developing and
implementing a comprehensive disarmament program for militia
members. No armed group has yet committed to disarmament. The
necessary preconditions for a DDR program, such as political
reconciliation and security provided by the government, do not
yet exist despite considerable efforts by the Iraqi Government,
MNF-I, and the Embassy.
The resources and personnel currently dedicated to the DDR
effort would be better used elsewhere in the process of
reconciliation that will ultimately lead armed groups to lay
down arms. In the meantime, other measures to give young men
alternatives to committing violence, such as a vigorous
vocational-training program, micro-financing opportunities,
education programs within the theater detention system, and
jobs creation programs, should and are being pursued. Improved
use of these tools to take advantage of localized security
gains will require further planning by the Iraqi Government.
In Recommendation 38 and 39, the Iraq Study Group proposes
that neutral international experts act as advisors to the Iraqi
Government and that the United States Government fund and
support a single office to provide assistance to these experts.
The study also notes ``. . . solving the problem of militias
requires national reconciliation'' and states that, as a party
in the conflict, the United States Government should not be
directly involved in a DDR program's implementation.
Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful militia
disarmament program are not present. In fact, international
experts, including the U.N., have expressed reservations to
advancing this proposal at the present time. The U.N. DDR
Advisory Mission to Baghdad Report (April 25-May 2, 2007)
stated, ``The Iraq environment makes it most unlikely that
traditional DDR can take place, and planning should take this
into account.'' Likewise, a State Department internal review
has shown that the timing is not right for a full-scale DDR
program in Iraq. Given the absence of the necessary conditions
for DDR, the absence of legislation on militia disarmament has
had no effect. The current plan and strategy calls for the
passage of such legislation when the necessary conditions are
present.
(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services
committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan
As part of Operation Fardh AI-Qanun (FAQ), the Iraqi
Government established an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to
better coordinate and synchronize the non-kinetic aspects of
FAQ with security operations. The ESC is chaired by the Prime
Minister and meets weekly to discuss appropriate issues. In
support of the ESC, six sub-committees have been formed to
address topics of economics, services, political issues, media,
popular mobilization, and security. These subcommittees are
chaired by Iraqi Government leaders and are supported by United
States Government officials. Additionally, the Iraqi National
Security Advisor is responsible for the ESC secretariat and
coordinates weekly planning meetings with the subcommittees.
While the secretariat and subcommittees vary in their
effectiveness, the overall level of coordination and focus on
non-kinetic aspects is significantly higher than previous
efforts.
While establishing political, media, economic, and services
committees is important, it is even more vital that the Iraqi
Government steadily increase its relevance to Iraqis outside
the International Zone through proper provision of services,
security, and offering a viable alternative to militias.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward establishing supporting political, media,
economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan. The establishment of the ESC and related
subcommittees meets the requirement of the benchmark.
Nevertheless, both the U.S. Mission and MNF-I will remain
intensively engaged with the ESC to continue to improve its
effectiveness and ensure that the subcommittees fulfill the
purpose for which they were created as their contribution to
date has not been adequate. Progress toward achieving this
benchmark has been satisfactory, and we will continue to
monitor and engage with the committees to produce a
satisfactory effect over the next 60 days.
(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support
Baghdad operations
The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) had difficulty
deploying three additional full Iraqi Army (IA) brigades at
sufficient strength to Baghdad, but compensated by pulling 16
units from a variety of IA divisions to provide the equivalent
additional force. Since the initial deployment, the IGFC has
continued to generate the required additional forces by first
extending a brigade from 1 IA Division and battalions from 4 IA
Division in Baghdad and then identifying and deploying a
replacement brigade from I IA Division and battalions from 4 IA
division to relieve other units by mid-June 2007. Manning
levels for deploying units continue to be of concern. However,
MNF-I is working with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) to
implement policies to improve present-for-duty numbers, and in
the current 30-day period, for example, over 10,000 soldiers
will have completed basic training and been assigned to units.
Iraq Study Group Recommendations 20 and 21 call for the
Iraqi Government to shoulder a greater share of the security
mission in Iraq, and ultimately take it over. Iraq Study Group
Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi Government to establish
milestones for reconciliation and improve security. Providing
three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations reflects implementation of these recommendations.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi
brigades to support Baghdad operations. While manning levels
for the deployed Iraqi units continue to be of concern, the
Iraqi Government has provided the equivalent of three
additional brigades to Baghdad and has made provisions to
sustain this level of effort and to address manning issues--in
addition to steadily increasing the strengths of Iraqi units
already deployed in Baghdad. The progress toward this benchmark
has been satisfactory, and the effect is satisfactory in that
the three brigades are operating in support of Baghdad
operations.
(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this
plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in
consultation with U.S. Commanders without political
intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists
including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
The Prime Minister has given Iraqi (and MNF-I) commanders
the necessary authority to conduct security operations and has
taken initial steps to reduce political interference in
decisions on military actions. Coalition military leaders work
closely with their Iraqi counterparts to plan and carry out
security operations. Coalition military forces also contribute
to the operation of joint security stations and provide the
embedded transition teams that mentor Iraqi military and police
counterparts. New Rules of Engagement for the Baghdad
Operational Command have come into effect. There have been no
reported instances of political interference in operations that
U.S. commanders have recommended against Sunni Arab insurgents
or AQI since the start of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. There have
been concerns, however, about political interference (though
not at the Prime Minister's level) in some operations to target
Shi'a extremist networks, especially JAM. In recent
engagements, particularly in some areas in southern Iraq, Iraqi
forces were called upon to quell JAM-fueled violence and
performed admirably. The Iraqi Army continues to be a more
nationally oriented institution than the Iraqi National Police
or local police forces.
ISF forces are currently fighting alongside Coalition
Forces and jointly manning Joint Security Stations (JSS)
throughout Iraq. In most cases, tactical commanders act on
mission orders issued by their chain of command or coordinated
locally with MNF-I forces. In addition, the ISF has done a
reasonably good job policing its own ranks by reporting
infractions and removing guilty parties.
There continues to be evidence of sectarian bias in the
appointment of senior military and police commanders, which in
turn gives rise to suspicions that political considerations may
be behind Iraqi commanders' decisions on which operations to
undertake or support. Prime Minister Maliki is willing to take
action when evidence of this is clear. Seven of nine National
Police Brigade Commanders and 16 battalion commanders have been
relieved in the past 7 months due to concerns over sectarian
activities; however, sectarian-based decisions continue to be
evident through intelligence channels. There is evidence of
target lists emanating from the Office of the Commander in
Chief that bypassed operational commanders and directed lower-
level intelligence officers and commanders to make arrests,
primarily of Sunnis. Authority to make tactical and operational
decisions without political interference is an issue of trust.
Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi
Government to establish milestones for reconciliation and to
improve security. This benchmark helps establish the conditions
for reconciliation by pursuing non-sectarian security policies
without political intervention, in line with this
recommendation.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with
all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and
operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders
without political intervention to include the authority to
pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite
militias. Iraqi and coalition forces have been given
authorities to go after insurgents and militias, but there
remains a negative political influence at a variety of levels
with evidence of sectarian behavior. Thus, while there has been
progress, it has been too uneven to warrant a satisfactory
judgment at this time. MNF-I and the Embassy continue to
monitor developments for evidence on the transparency of
security decision-making and the degree of political or
sectarian influence on security operations. We have observed a
mix of positive and negative examples of civil-military
relations with the current surge in operations, due largely to
increased overwatch and partnering relations. While progress
toward this benchmark at this time is unsatisfactory, and the
resultant effect has been negative in terms of overall
perceptions of performance, this does not necessitate a
revision to our current plan and strategy, under which we
continue to improve Iraqi command and control capabilities, and
expand our embedding and partnership with Iraqi units.
(xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed
enforcement of the law
Left on their own, many ISF units still tend to gravitate
to old habits of sectarianism when applying the law. The good
news is that individual units have demonstrated the ability to
act as responsible partners when employed with Coalition
influence, and some Iraqi commanders have demonstrated clearly
that they are Iraqis first. Some Sunni residents of Baghdad
continue to believe that Shi'a-dominated National Police units
and, to a lesser degree, Iraqi Army units are biased against
them. There have been inadequate efforts to detain some senior
Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials believed responsible for
human rights abuses, although 7 National Police Brigade
Commanders and 16 National Police Battalion Commanders have
been replaced, along with both Division Commanders. Some senior
officials responsible for abuse continue to hold positions of
responsibility. At lower levels, experience shows that even-
handedness across the ISF is patchy with various units
displaying differing degrees of even-handedness; however, a
number of extremely capable and non-sectarian senior military
and police leaders have emerged and are making a difference
with their units.
The expansion of partnered units and embedded-training
teams has increased the Coalition's ability to monitor the
actions of the ISF. In Baghdad, for example, Coalition Forces
and ISF have established 30 JSSs to provide an extensive
permanent security presence throughout Baghdad's neighborhoods.
These JSSs allow greater oversight of the ISF by Coalition
Forces, which maintain 24-hour coverage throughout Baghdad in
an effort to protect the city's population. An expanded use of
embedded U.S. military and police advisor teams has also
ensured that the ISF now receive greater exposure to modern
policing techniques that are both more effective and in
compliance with international human rights standards.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not at this time
made satisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraqi Security
Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law;
however, there has been significant progress in achieving
increased even-handedness through the use of coalition
partnering and embedded-transition teams with Iraqi Security
Force units. The presence of Coalition Forces in JSSs and
Combat Outposts (COPs) has had a positive effect on ensuring a
more even-handed approach, and Iraqi officials continue to
communicate the importance that all terrorist organizations be
targeted, regardless of their affiliation or ethnic background.
ISF performance has generally been adequate, particularly when
partnered with Coalition Forces. Because we are holding the ISF
to a high standard, however, the overall judgment at this time
remains unsatisfactory. This does not necessitate a revision to
our current plan and strategy, under which we continue to press
the Government of Iraq on these issues, improve command and
control capabilities, and expand our embedding and partnership
with Iraqi units.
(xii) Ensuring that, as Prime Minister Maliki was quoted by President
Bush as saying, ``the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a
safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or
political affiliation''
The United States has surged more than 30,000 military
personnel into Iraq. These forces support Operation Fardh al-
Qanun in Baghdad, Anbar, and in the regions to the north and
south of the capital. As noted above, Coalition Forces, in
conjunction with ISF, have established and staffed JSSs in all
sectors of Baghdad and are conducting joint operations in once
contentious neighborhoods, such as the Shi'a dominated Sadr
City and Sunni-dominated Mansour District. There is currently
only one JSS in Sadr City, though more are planned and
operations have been conducted throughout Sadr City on a near-
daily basis. The completion of additional JSSs throughout
Baghdad should significantly increase the success of this
effort.
Operations in some parts of Baghdad remain a significant
challenge, though there are currently no areas of Baghdad where
Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces are not allowed to
conduct operations. The Government of Iraq has supported
operations by Iraqi and Coalition Forces targeting insurgents,
militias, and terrorists across Iraq. United States diplomatic
and military personnel have engaged the Iraqi Government at the
highest levels to stress the importance of aggressively
targeting all violent groups, regardless of sect or
affiliation. The Iraqi Government has shown increased
willingness to target and conduct actions against extremist
groups and militias, such as Jaysh al-Mahdi Secret Cells, in
order to establish a more secure environment in Baghdad.
Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi
Government to establish milestones for reconciliation and to
improve security. This benchmark helps establish the conditions
for reconciliation by denying safe havens, regardless of
sectarian or political affiliation, in line with this
recommendation.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress in ensuring the Baghdad Security Plan does not provide
a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or
political affiliations. United States commanders report overall
satisfaction with their ability to target any and all extremist
groups. United States diplomatic and military personnel
continue to engage the Iraqi Government at the highest levels
to stress the importance of aggressively targeting all violent
groups, regardless of sect or affiliation. Tribal elements in
Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din are seeking support for tribal
initiatives similar to those that have shown success in al-
Anbar against AQI. Cache-finds averaging over three times last
year's levels result from civilians increasingly providing
intelligence leading to these discoveries, indicating an
erosion of insurgent safe havens. The Government of Iraq has
supported operations by Iraqi and Coalition Security forces
targeting extremists across Iraq, including in Sadr City and
the outer belts of Baghdad. Coalition Forces operate in these
areas almost every night, though there remains one individual
that Prime Minister Maliki has made the decision to delay
targeting. The progress toward this benchmark has been
satisfactory, and the effect is that the Coalition and the ISF
are able to continue clearing and securing areas in and around
Baghdad from which the enemy had been operating.
(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating
militia control of local security
Though precise measurements of sectarian violence vary,
trends data supplied over time by MNF-I demonstrate a decrease
in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since the
beginning of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. Militia activity
initially decreased but staged a resurgence in mid-May before
falling again in June to the lowest level in a year.
Similar trends have been observed throughout Iraq; however,
it is too early to determine how sustainable they will prove to
be. As part of Operation Fardh al-Qanun, Coalition Forces have
established over 30 JSSs and almost 30 COPs, throughout
Baghdad. These stations bring security forces into the
neighborhoods and provide the Iraqi populace with a means to
deliver valuable information to security forces in order to
target groups that incite sectarian violence. Similar outposts
have been established throughout cities and rural areas of
Iraq.
The United States Government is supporting a Ministry of
Interior initiative to inspect all 47 Baghdad police stations
to verify station police are performing their duties to
standard. This action, coupled with the expanded use of
embedded U.S. military and police advisor teams, helps ensure
that Iraqi Security Forces are exposed on a daily basis to
modern policing techniques that are more effective and in
compliance with international human rights standards.
Nonetheless, the police remain the element in which progress
has been slowest and in which improvement is most needed.
Militia presence is still strong and reaches into the
security services of a number of ministries. Despite some
progress, militias are still a dominant force in parts of
Baghdad, Basrah, and many provinces in Iraq--and will likely
remain so until the security situation begins to stabilize over
time. (See pages 14-15, above.)
Assessment: The Government of Iraq--with substantial
Coalition assistance--has made satisfactory progress toward
reducing sectarian violence but has shown unsatisfactory
progress towards eliminating militia control of local security.
Furthermore, though sectarian violence has been reduced, it is
not yet reduced to a level the Coalition judges acceptable. The
effect of unsatisfactory progress toward eliminating militia
control of local security has been negative in terms of
perceptions of the authority and fairness of the Government of
Iraq. However, this does not necessitate a revision to our
current plan and strategy, under which we continue to press the
Government of Iraq on these issues and are conducting
aggressive operations with Iraqi forces to uproot the command
and control of the most violent and destabilizing militia
elements in Iraq.
(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in
neighborhoods across Baghdad
Many of the planned JSS, U.S. Combat Outposts, and other
patrol bases have been established across Baghdad and the
surrounding area. Over 60 of these stations are located within
Baghdad, and 30 more are planned. Joint Security Stations
provide an around-the-clock security presence in most of
Baghdad and JSSs are particularly effective as they merge
Coalition technology and resolve with Iraqi presence and
calming influence. There are numerous examples where Iraqi
presence has facilitated a lower application of force. This
increased interaction with the local population should directly
contribute to reducing crime and sectarian violence, such as
murders and executions.
Other stations are being established in outlying areas
where interaction with the local people can have a direct
impact on the reduction of violence within the city. As
security conditions on the ground warrant review of the
location and quantity of these stations, Coalition leaders will
consult with the Baghdad Operational Commander, LTG Abboud, to
determine future emplacements and additions.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq--with substantial
Coalition assistance--has made satisfactory progress toward
establishing the planned JSSs in Baghdad. As of June 16,
Multinational Division-Baghdad reports 32 JSSs have achieved
initial operational capability and 36 COPs have achieved
initial or full operational capability. This benchmark is on
track for completion at the required time. The progress toward
this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effects are
increased control and security in the areas where these JSSs
have been established.
(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of
operating independently
Coalition Forces continue the Train-and-Equip program for
the Iraqi Security Forces and field advisors to the Ministries
of Interior and Defense in order to build Iraqi capacity to
manage and sustain forces in the field. To advance the
development of the fledgling Iraqi bureaucratic processes for
committing funds, we have obtained the Iraqi Government's
approval to pursue many of its procurement and logistical
requirements through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.
The United States is also negotiating an Acquisition Cross
Service Agreement (ACSA) with the Iraqi Government. As the
security ministries increase their capacity to support and
sustain Iraqi forces, Iraqi units will become more capable of
operating independently. Iraq earlier this year invested $7.3
billion for the training and equipping of its own security
forces--an impressive investment that will need time to have an
impact on the ground.
There are 9 Iraqi Army divisions, 31 Brigades, and 95
battalions in the operational lead for their area of
responsibility. For an Iraqi unit to be designated capable of
independent operations, it must achieve an Operational
Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1 status. There has been a
slight reduction in units assessed as capable of independent
operations since January 2007. This reduction is due to a 20
percent increase in unit authorization levels (meaning the
equipment numbers against which the unit is measured are
higher), a fixed number of equipment sets and training seats, a
lack of officers and NCOs (with some provided to less capable
units to help stand them up), combat losses, and the
sustainment challenges that come with these dynamics. In
addition, there are more Iraqi units in the field and more
being moved around the battlefield. This of course increases
the logistics, services, and combat multiplier (close air
support and artillery support) requirements exponentially.
Ministry of Interior capacity requires continued
development. The Fiscal Year 2007 Department of Defense
supplemental funding request focused on key shortfalls,
particularly in MOI equipment maintenance. Because the MOD is
only partially effective at managing ministry functions, the
Coalition continues to assist with fielded Iraqi Army forces.
Assessment: The Iraqi Government has made unsatisfactory
progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces
units capable of operating independently. Development of ISF
capabilities continues to grow while the ISF increases
operational tempo for Operation Fardh al-Qanun. Readiness
assessments for the National Police continue to show slow but
steady improvement, but we continue to have concerns about the
sectarian leaning of some national police units. The effect is
that the presence of Coalition partners and support remains
necessary for ISF operations. This does not necessitate a
revision to the current plan and strategy, however, because the
plan and strategy emphasize the importance of embedded trainers
and the partnering of Iraqi and Coalition units. ISF
performance has generally been adequate, particularly when
units are partnered with Coalition Forces.
(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the
Iraqi legislature are protected
Article 37 of the Iraq constitution guarantees all Iraqis
freedom to form and join associations and political parties.
Minorities are guaranteed equal access to and participation in
elections for the COR. The COR elected in December 2005
includes representatives from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish,
Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities. The
Rules of Procedure for the COR guarantee the ability of its
members to express their opinions, regardless of political
party or affiliation, helping to ensure the full participation
of all its members. COR rules permit groups as small as 10
members out of 275 to propose legislation.
The electoral system used to elect the current COR--
provincial proportional representation--was chosen by the
previous Iraqi parliament in 2005 to balance a number of
factors, including the ability of women and of small minority
parties to gain a share of representation. Iraqi
parliamentarians and political parties are considering changes
to the electoral laws, but there appears to be no effort that
would adversely affect the rights of minorities.
The U.S. Mission is fully engaged with the Iraqi parliament
to ensure appreciation for the concern attached by the United
States to representation of women and minorities and a role for
minority parties.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority political
parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. Minority
political parties in the COR participate in COR activities in a
manner consistent with minority parties in other parliamentary
democracies. Women COR members work closely with each other,
often across party lines. We anticipate a continued role for
minorities and women in the parliament.
(xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential
services, on an equitable basis
In 2006, the Iraqi Government managed to execute only 22
percent of its capital budget (an estimated $1.35 billion of
$6.2 billion budgeted). It is worth noting that implementation
and expenditure of the budget were slowed by the fact that the
permanent government was not established until June 2006. A
significant improvement in performance is necessary to make
satisfactory progress on the 2007 benchmark. The benchmark
would be fully achieved by allocating and obligating $10
billion of investment capital during this calendar year, along
with satisfactory progress on contract disbursements. As is
normal in any capital budget, a portion of the funds will
disburse in future years based on contract progress. While it
is too soon to tell how much improvement will take place by the
end of 2007, many of the problems from 2006 are being overcome.
Most critical to the effort is the performance of the Ministry
of Oil, with nearly 25 percent of the total capital budget; it
remains unclear whether the Ministry has made any real effort
to expend those funds.
True success lies not only in the percentage of the capital
budget actually spent in 2007, but in the effects of spending,
as the Iraqi Government seeks to establish its credibility with
citizens through improved delivery of public services and
tangible economic development. Moreover, adherence to and
improved familiarity with the decentralized and accountable
fiduciary structures introduced since the fall of Saddam will
give Iraqi citizens added confidence in and a reason to support
their local, regional, and national governments. The effects of
this new emphasis and these new procedures are already being
felt, albeit unevenly, across the country. Some ministries have
developed and are implementing aggressive spending plans (such
as the Ministry of Education), and several provinces (Anbar, in
particular) are demonstrating their empowerment through their
new spending programs. Should these successes spread across
Iraq, this would mark the beginning of a new relationship
between citizens and their government.
The most important change in 2007 is that all parties and
all levels of Iraqi Government, from central to provincial to
local, share an acute and unifying emphasis on budget
execution. Unlike last year, the budget passed in February 2007
included detailed capital budgets. The Government of Iraq has
established a senior-level budget execution task force (led by
a Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the
Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation) to spur
spending and improve communications between the central and
provincial governments. New procedures have been enacted to
expedite spending processes, such as revised procurement
regulations and a rescission clause in the 2007 budget law.
Budget execution officials have been provided with additional
training and resources. Improvements are still needed in
tracking budget performance; audited figures are generally
available only 3 or more months after the end of any given
spending period.
These changes have nearly tripled the ministries' rates of
allocation when compared to last year at this time, though
efforts must continue accelerating to make sufficient progress
on this benchmark. Ministerial spending is moving ahead. The
Ministry of Finance has moved more than 21 percent of the
overall ministerial capital budget to the individual
ministries' capital investment accounts, which enables them to
award contracts and request additional releases based on
contract schedules. With respect to provinces, a majority of
the 2006 budget funding was released late in December.
Provinces continue to apply those funds to improving services
and advancing local reconstruction priorities, while at the
same time processing their 2007 budgets. Most provinces are
making significant progress in capital spending, but those with
security challenges are lagging. Importantly, provincial budget
allocations were calculated based on population statistics,
which supports the constitution's concerns with equality.
Assessment: The Iraqi Government is making satisfactory
progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces, but
even if the full $10 billion capital budget is allocated,
spending units will not be able to spend all these funds by the
end of 2007. Execution of the complete 2007 capital budget is a
very aggressive target for the Government of Iraq, which
expects significant increases in 2007 spending following major
initiatives to improve its budget execution processes. Although
the trend to date is positive, sustaining progress through
September to meet this benchmark at year-end requires
accelerated spending and procurement activity, which are
challenging tasks in the face of capacity constraints and
security problems.
(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining
or making false accusations against members of the ISF
Iraqi authorities continue to undermine and make false
accusations against ISF members. There are still several
reports each month of allegations of wrongdoing against ISF
members believed to be nonsectarian in their approach to
security. In most cases, we are unable to assess the validity
of these allegations but believe them to be untrue. It appears
from anecdotal evidence that Iraqi political authorities may
not be pursuing allegations even-handedly. Trumped up charges
by the de-Ba'athification Commission have been used in the past
to cleanse Sunni officers from formations. Questionable
judicial warrants by the Office of the Commander in Chief are a
more recent technique to target Sunni commanders while
influential sectarian actors linked to security ministries
continue to degrade formal command structures. Similarly, some
Sunni politicians have made baseless claims against ISF
officials, suggesting that unsubstantiated claims of sectarians
can cut both ways.
Some members of the COR and Council of Ministers have
publicly supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they
continue to turn a blind eye to sectarian activities. United
States military and diplomatic personnel continue to engage
Iraqi Government officials at the highest levels to stress the
need for Iraqi political authorities to cease making baseless
accusations against ISF leaders for sectarian and political
gain.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made unsatisfactory
progress in ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not
undermining or making false accusations against members of the
ISF. Accusations that undermine the independence and
nonsectarianism of the ISF occur and are not adequately
addressed by the Government of Iraq. The effect is at times to
deny the ISF the services of qualified officers or to
discourage them from operating in a professional non-sectarian
manner. However, this does not necessitate a revision to the
current plan and strategy, under which we continue to monitor
the situation by means of our close involvement with the ISF
and to press Iraqi political leaders to refrain from this
behavior.