

**NOMINATION OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON TO
BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

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NOMINATION OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2006

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. The committee meets today to consider President Bush's nomination of John Bolton to be United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

This is the third Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in which Ambassador Bolton has testified since his appointment less than a year ago. In addition, in February, he hosted a delegation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that traveled to the United Nations. I wish that all members of the committee had been able to make that journey to New York with us. On that occasion, Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich, and I had opportunity to meet with a number of key individuals and groups involved in deliberations on United Nations reform. The visit was especially informative on the complexity of the reform debate in New York and on the challenges faced by the United States delegation.

In the spring of 2005, our committee spent several weeks reviewing the nominee's qualifications for this post. Few executive branch nominees have ever received more scrutiny than Ambassador Bolton. By any measure, this was an exhaustive review, particularly for a nominee who has been acknowledged as highly experienced in the subject matter he would be overseeing and who has been confirmed five times previously by the United States Senate.

In the end, despite two majority votes on the Senate floor, the nomination did not receive the 60 votes necessary to bring debate to a conclusion. President Bush subsequently exercised his authority to give the nominee a recess appointment.

We have returned to the nomination because the President has resubmitted the nominee for our consideration. And, in doing so, he

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has expressed his view that Ambassador Bolton is important to the implementation of United States policies of the United Nations and of broader United States roles on the global stage.

The President has made clear that this is not a casual appointment. He wants a specific person to do a specific job. We should recognize that the United Nations Ambassador always is closely associated with the President of the United States and the Secretary of State. They are responsible for what the ambassador says and does, and they can dismiss the ambassador who does not follow their directives. Consequently, there are few positions in Government in which the President should have more latitude in choosing his nominee.

As we evaluate the nominee, we should not lose sight of the larger national security issues concerning U.N. reform and international diplomacy that are central to this nomination. Our Nation is confronted, as it was last year, by serious diplomatic challenges that will have a profound effect on U.S. national security.

At the heart of our efforts to resolve these issues is a basic question. Can the United States build relationships and alliances around the world that will give us the tools we need to protect our national security? In almost every recent case, the Bush administration has embraced a multilateral dimension to problem solving that recognizes that we need allies.

And as we attempt to reverse the weapons programs of North Korea, we are depending heavily on the Six-Party Talks that involve China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. As we attempt to stop the Iranian nuclear program, we utilize negotiations carried out by Great Britain, France, and Germany, and we have sought the United Nations Security Council votes of Russia, China, and others. And throughout our experience in Iraq, we've requested the help of countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere to support the nascent Iraqi Government, to help train its army, and generally to contribute to stability in the region. As we search for ways to promote stability on the Israeli-Lebanese border, an international peacekeeping force is being considered as a possible solution. In Afghanistan, we have turned some U.S. military missions over to our NATO allies, who are increasing their contributions. In what may be the most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by the Bush administration, the United States is seeking a groundbreaking partnership with India.

In each of these cases, and many others, success depends on the reserve of support that we can tap with our allies and our friends. It depends on the willingness of other nations to expand the options and resources that can be applied to solving problems that threaten our security. The process of building international relationships cannot be reserved for times of crisis. It must be a constant preoccupation of any administration, and it must be a core diplomatic mission of our United Nations Ambassador.

During the last year, Ambassador Bolton has shared with us his efforts at reforming the United Nations and his efforts to represent our Nation in that forum. We're pleased to have an opportunity today not only to examine his qualifications, but also to review the status of several crucial initiatives he is overseeing in New York.

President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and representative at the United Nations. Given the importance of this position, it's vital we evaluate the nominee fairly and expeditiously. We look forward to learning how the nominee has worked on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State during the past year, and what he would do in coming years, if he is confirmed.

Let me mention that the distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Biden, will be with us in the hearing in due course. He is at the White House presently attending an important signing ceremony on the extension of the Voting Rights Act. And when he returns obviously we'll recognize him for the opening statement he might have presented at this moment.

We will proceed. Senator Warner is here. And I understand, Senator, you have come to introduce the nominee. And you're recognized. And we're delighted to have you.

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is, indeed, a privilege for me to come. And I wish to point out I was on time. I think you started early. [Laughter.]

And—but, nevertheless, I very much wanted to join, this morning. And I'll ask that my statement be placed into the record—

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in full.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. Because it was fortunate for me to have the opportunity to listen to your carefully prepared and well-delivered, very comprehensive statement in support of this nominee.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, colleagues, I join you once again—as I did on April 7, 2005—to introduce John Bolton, the President's nominee for U.S. Representative to the United Nations with the Rank of Ambassador.

When the President nominated John Bolton to this position last year, the President and his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, expressed their confidence that John Bolton had the experience and skills to represent the United States at the United Nations and to carry out the President's priorities to strengthen and reform the U.N.

Ambassador Bolton has clearly demonstrated by his exceptional professional performance of his duties over the past 15 months that the confidence of the President and the Secretary was well-placed. While serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Bolton was instrumental in:

- Negotiating a formal Security Council statement calling on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment activities;
- Encouraging adoption of resolutions to establish a mandate to arrest Charles Taylor and bring him to justice; and to ensure peaceful presidential elections in Liberia;
- Leading the effort to have the Security Council take a firm and clear stand against the recent North Korean missile launches. This was effectively accomplished through the adoption of Resolution 1695; and
- Working with the Security Council to authorize contingency planning for the transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan to a U.N. operation, and to permit the entry of a joint African Union-U.N. assessment team to Darfur.

These are just a few examples of Ambassador Bolton's effectiveness at the U.N. I share the President's and the Secretary's confidence that John Bolton will continue to forcefully and diplomatically represent the United States and advance the Presi-

dent's goal of making the United Nations a stronger, more effective international organization.

Given the many challenges that face the United Nations Security Council at this time, I believe continuity of U.S. representation there is critical. John Bolton is a key member of the President's national security team, and the President needs him in place as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Speaking at the U.N. and before the international media on behalf of the President and the United States, Mr. Bolton should have the benefit of the credibility, confidence, and support that is conferred by Senate confirmation.

Senator WARNER. I would simply wish to add a personal note, Mr. Chairman. You and I came to the Senate about the same time, and we have often reminisced together about our—opportunities this country has given us to observe history in the making. And we both started in the tail end of World War II, went through Korea and Vietnam, and today. And I would say, without any hesitation, it is my observation that our President is faced with a more complex framework of challenges than any President before us in contemporary history.

We're talking here today about the continuity of his representative to the United Nations. You very carefully and thoughtfully outlined he is the President's choice. The President, as well as all America and all the world, have had the opportunity to see this fine man exercise his professional and diplomatic skills in a very extraordinary way. And now, the sole thing that remains is that constitutional authority of the Senate to give its advice and consent.

I do believe, without any reservation whatsoever, that the Senate will, and should, give that advice and consent to this nominee, because he becomes an integral member of the President's national security team at a time when our Nation is faced with these many complex issues.

So, I wish you well, Mr. Chairman, as you guide this nomination. I say to my good friend, thank you for your public service, and that of your family, and your resolve to carry on. Good luck.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We appreciate, as always, the wonderful cooperation our committee has with the Armed Services Committee that you chair. And you're most thoughtful to come over to make a statement on behalf of the nominee.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I note the presence of Senator Dodd, and I mention Senator Dodd specifically, because, in the absence of Senator Biden, the Senator has asked that Senator Dodd might be permitted to make a statement at this time corresponding to the opening statement that I've made. And so, I'll recognize the Senator for that purpose, and then we will recognize the nominee.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Senator DODD. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize for being a couple of minutes late coming over to the hearing.

And welcome to my good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner. Always a pleasure to have you come by. Both Senators from Virginia here, sitting together this morning at the dais.

Senator WARNER. I thank you, Senator Dodd. I note that this hearing started on time, which is somewhat unusual.

Senator DODD. That doesn't happen in the Armed Services Committee, does it?

Senator WARNER. No, no, not at all. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, when the Senate considered this nomination last year, I strongly opposed the confirmation of Mr. Bolton to the position of United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations on both procedural and substantive grounds. Mr. Chairman, I remain opposed to this nominee, and I'd like to explain why.

Before being nominated to this position in 2005, Mr. Bolton's own statements evidenced great skepticism and disdain for the United Nations and to multilateral diplomacy generally. Nothing he has said or done since assuming his current position in New York suggests he has altered his views on the United Nations or on multilateral diplomacy generally.

Mr. Chairman, I'm not one who has made the determination that Mr. Bolton hasn't changed his spots, so to speak, when it comes to his views on the usefulness of diplomacy in advancing the United States interests. Some 30 of his colleagues at the United Nations with whom he serves have said as much. In a recent New York Times article, one colleague characterized him as intransigent. Another suggested that Mr. Bolton's high ambition are coverups for less noble aims and oriented not at improving the United Nations, but at belittling and weakening it. A third has essentially written off working with Mr. Bolton. I quote him. He said, "He's lost me as an ally now, and that's what many other Ambassadors who considered themselves friends of the United States are saying."

Mr. Bolton clearly has an aversion, in my view, to being diplomatic or to building consensus for U.S. position, and that is deeply troubling to me, particularly as we witness chaos erupting in Iraq and the substantial commitment of American resources and manpower being consumed to prevent full-scale civil war there. And then I turned around to find a virtual explosion of other international crises around the globe, and the United States hamstrung by fewer resources and options for responding to those crises.

When the committee considered Mr. Bolton's nomination last year, we heard unprecedented criticism from colleagues who served with him in the State Department. A number of them were appointees by the current President. Among other things, he was described by his colleagues as a bully and a bean counter. I said at the time that Mr. Bolton's personality really— isn't really the issue, as far as I'm concerned, at all. There are lots of bullies in this town, and, I suspect, New York, as well. My objection isn't that he's a bully, but that he's been an ineffective bully and can't win the day when it comes—when it really counts. For example, prior to a vote early this month on the United Nations Security Council resolution intended to sanction North Korea for its provocative 4th of July missile launches, Mr. Bolton publicly assured anyone who would listen that he could get support for a resolution with teeth for the so-called Chapter VII obligations. Turns out, of course, he

couldn't. The resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council fell well short of that.

Last September, Mr. Bolton told the House International Relations Committee that the negotiation of an effective Human Rights Council was a key objective of the United States, and that it was a very high priority, and a personal priority of his. High priority? I don't think so. There were 30 negotiating sessions, a very critical issue, to hammer out the framework of this Human Rights Council, and Ambassador Bolton managed to attend only one or two of those sessions. In the end, the United States was one of four countries to vote against approval of the new U.N. Human Rights Council.

When the score is tallied on the effectiveness of Mr. Bolton at the United Nations, I think he receives a failing grade.

There is a procedural dimension, as well, to my concerns with the nominee, as well. Last year, the administration refused to provide this committee with documents relevant to its deliberations concerning Mr. Bolton's conduct while serving as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. The Senate validated this committee's right and obligation to receive information it determined to be relevant by refusing to invoke closure on the nomination until the administration honored those requests. The administration chose not to do so, and instead made the decision to give Mr. Bolton a recess appointment.

Specifically, documents were requested related to Mr. Bolton's use or misuse of NSA intercepts and his practice of advancing his own political agenda by overstating available intelligence. That information remains relevant, I think, Mr. Chairman, to this committee's consideration of this nominee. And, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would publicly restate my earlier request for that material. We are told that we must not delay the nomination any longer. Forget about getting additional information that is clearly relevant. "The Senate must confirm Mr. Bolton," his supporters argue, "because of the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, and we need his strong voice in New York to deal with that crisis." I would first ask what Mr. Bolton has done in his 12 months to avert any crisis in the first place. What did he do to push for key provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 to be implemented, specifically those related to the disarming of Hezbollah? Clearly, the answer is "not enough," in my view. Had 1559 been implemented in full, Israel would not have been attacked, and we wouldn't be waiting—or watching, rather—Lebanon being destroyed in order to deal with the still-armed Hezbollah.

Mr. Chairman, I would then return to the point that I made earlier; namely, that Mr. Bolton has largely burned his bridges with his colleagues in New York, and isn't likely to be an effective diplomat when diplomacy is increasingly becoming the coin of the realm in protecting the advancing U.S. interests at this very unstable moment in our history.

Mr. Chairman, the administration should put the Nation's interests first, in my view, and nominate an individual with strong diplomatic skills who believes in diplomacy rather than placing his conservative agenda by continuing to push for confirmation of an unsuitable nominee. Now, I doubt very much, Mr. Chairman, that today's hearing is going to change any minds, but I stand ready to

listen to Mr. Bolton respond to the questions of our colleagues and hope that the committee would certainly give them serious attention.

And I thank the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

We will have a period of questions after the nominee's opening statement.

And I call now upon the nominee, John Bolton. We are pleased to have you here, sir, and I ask you to proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a prepared statement I'd ask be submitted to the record, and I just have a brief summary of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be published in full.

Ambassador BOLTON. I want to thank Senator Warner for his kind introduction this morning before he has to leave. I'm grateful, once again, Senator, for your introducing me to the committee.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Ambassador BOLTON. I'd also like to thank, Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues for the support that you had given me over the course of the past year. Whether it is the attention this committee has focused on reforming the United Nations or the myriad of critical issues currently on the agenda of the Security Council, your work has helped to advance important policy goals of the United States. I thank you for your help and look forward to continuing and strengthening our close working relationship if I am confirmed.

As I said earlier, I thank Senator Warner. I'd also like to thank Dr. Kissinger, who I had hoped would be here today. We do have a letter that he was able to submit that perhaps we'll be able to read at an appropriate point.

I want to thank my wife, Gretchen, who's here again today, for her love and support. I want to thank my daughter, Jennifer Sarah, who's a junior at Yale this fall, who is pursuing her course on Grand Strategies by traveling through South America studying the colonial policies of King Philip II of Spain. So, she is unable to be here today.

The need for a strong and effective U.N. remains as powerful today as ever. As President Bush has declared, "Now more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

For close to a year now, I've had the privilege and honor to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I've also had the privilege and honor to work with a fantastic team in our mission up in New York, and I cannot thank them enough. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close working relationship with them, in addition to doing my utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.

In the time I have before you today, I would like to discuss several of the most critical issues confronting the U.N. and the Security Council.

Mr. Chairman, we are all aware of the crisis and tragedy unfolding in the Middle East. The United States is exhausting all diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation. With her recent trip to the region, and then traveling to Rome to meet with the Lebanon core group, Secretary Rice has been very clear that our goal is to achieve a doable solution, one that strengthens the forces of peace and democracy in the region.

This does not mean, however, that we are ignoring the humanitarian impact of the immediate crisis. Indeed, just 2 days ago, Secretary Rice authorized \$30 million in assistance to victims of the conflict in Lebanon. To meet the most urgent needs, the United States has also dispatched two large-scale medical deliveries.

The Security Council is also actively seized of the matter. We are working closely with other members to ensure that appropriate action is taken by the Council. Any action we take must recognize that the current conflict is a direct result of the terrorist acts of Hezbollah and Hamas, and their state sponsors in Iran and Syria. Lopsided resolutions, such as the one the United States vetoed this month, would do nothing to promote a long-term solution, and would only prolong the suffering of innocent civilian populations in the region.

As the Secretary has noted, we must defang Hezbollah. We appreciate the bold and courageous action of the Arab League in condemning Hezbollah for instigating this conflict. As I speak, though, Hezbollah continues to operate in southern Lebanon with impunity, defying the will of the Security Council as established in Resolution 1559. We are working hard with others to bring about its full implementation and the full extension of its authority by the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. If that were done, then Israel would be less subject to terrorist attacks, and the people of Lebanon would not be subject to the reign of terror that Hezbollah inflicts.

We are actively considering a variety of methods on how best to secure the implementation of Resolution 1559. Some member states have called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, but we must ask our colleagues, how do you negotiate and maintain a cease-fire with a terrorist organization, one which does not even recognize the right of Israel to exist? We're also considering the insertion of a stabilization force into the region, while considering important questions related to its scope and mandate.

These are all important issues currently under discussion by the Secretary and in the Security Council. The question of Israel's response has come up, as well. Of course, it is a matter of the utmost concern to us, as President Bush has stressed, that civilian deaths are occurring. It is a tragedy, and I would not attempt to describe it any other way. We have urged the Government of Israel to exercise the greatest possible care in its use of force. The legitimate exercise of Israel's right of self-defense is not the moral equivalent of the terrorist acts of Hezbollah, but all of these civilian deaths are tragic.

We hope that from this current crisis we can seize the opportunity to once and forever dismantle Hezbollah, restore democratic control by Lebanon over all of its territory, and lay the foundations that would allow Israel to live in peace with its neighbors.

The Security Council is also actively seized with the proliferation threats posed by both Iran and North Korea. In the case of Iran, we are currently in the process of negotiating a resolution that will require Iran to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Firm and decisive action by the Council is necessary, because Iran has consistently rebuffed the diplomatic efforts pursued by our friends and allies in Europe.

It is critical that we succeed in these efforts. Iran's unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a grave and direct threat to international peace and security. This is particularly clear in light of the inflammatory rhetoric of Iran's leader, who recklessly calls for Israel to be wiped off the map, and who even questions the tragic events of the Holocaust.

I am pleased to say that we have already taken firm action in the case of North Korea following their decision to violate several international commitments and launch seven ballistic missiles, including a long range Taepodong II, in the vicinity of Japan. On July 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1695, which demands that North Korea suspend all activities relating to its ballistic missile program, including a return to its moratorium on test launching. The resolution also requires member states to cease all trade in goods and technology which might contribute to North Korea's missile or other WMD-related programs. This resolution was the outcome of 11 days of intensive negotiations. Bear in mind, when North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan's airspace in 1998, the response of the Security Council was a weak press statement. This time, however, we were able to bring along China and Russia to support a very strong resolution, even though they initially supported issuing yet another press statement. The fact that both China and Russia supported the resolution, the first one on North Korea since 1993, cannot be lost on the North Korean leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I know that the situation in Darfur is also of particular interest to the committee. We continue to push hard to bring relief to the citizens of Darfur, where over 200,000 people have lost their lives and over 2 million have become displaced since 2003. The United States remains committed to establishing a new and expanded U.N. force in Darfur by year's end.

Significant challenges, however, remain. Russia and China continue to voice opposition to a resolution with a binding Chapter VII mandate. There is also the issue of the Government of Sudan agreeing to a U.N. force in Darfur.

Significant efforts are underway in New York and other venues to overcome these obstacles. The U.N. Technical Assessment Mission has returned from Sudan and is finalizing its report to the Security Council.

In the interim, we are working with our NATO allies to support the current mission on the ground in the form of planning, logistics, intelligence support, and other help. As President Bush has said, "America will not turn away from this tragedy. We will call

genocide by its rightful name, and we will stand up for the innocent until the peace of Darfur is secured.”

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to the issue of U.N. reform. The assessment I gave you in testimony before the committee 2 months ago broadly remains valid today. Some modest progress has been achieved since the world summit last September, including establishing a much-needed U.N. Ethics Office, strengthening financial disclosure requirements for U.N. staff members, protecting U.N. personnel from retaliation for reporting misconduct, and providing needed resources for oversight. While these reforms are important steps in the right direction, we had hoped for more. The goal now is to identify priority targets where progress can be made, and take the necessary steps to demonstrate that the U.N. and its member states are fully engaged in launching what Secretary of State Rice has termed “a lasting revolution of reform,” one that would transform the United Nations into an institution fully capable of addressing the complex array of challenges now confronting us all.

To this end, the United States recently joined consensus on the adoption of several reforms relating to information and communication technology, budget implementation, financial management practices, and improved reporting mechanisms, including increased public access to U.N. records.

These issues all speak to our attempts to change the “culture of inaction,” the phrase used by Paul Volcker before this very committee when discussing the Oil-for-Food scandal. To change this culture, we are working to increase the transparency and accountability of the U.N., not just to shine a light on the agencies or bodies which may be in need of reform, but to allow those that do work effectively to better advertise and market their expertise in ways that might serve as a model for others. If confirmed, I pledge to continue working on this important issue.

Mr. Chairman, allow me briefly to update you on where we stand with regard to the new Human Rights Council. We are still in the position of evaluating the Council’s first session, which recently wrapped up in Geneva. As you know, the United States did not vote for this body this past spring, because, in our view, it did not go far enough to differentiate itself from its widely discredited predecessor. While we have not yet made a decision on whether or not to run for next year’s council, it gives us considerable pause for concern that this newly reformed body managed to adopt only one country-specific resolution against one of the U.N.’s 192 members: Israel. That the HRC had to call a special session to do so is even more disturbing. This is, of course, highly disappointing, given the abuses being carried out in countries such as North Korea, Burma, Iran, and the Sudan, to name a few.

As I noted last May, though, despite our disappointment that the new council is too similar to the old commission, the United States will continue to work with democratic delegations through our team in Geneva, which still attends its meetings to advance our goals. My colleague, Ambassador Tichenor, and his delegation have worked energetically to promote U.S. interests and values there, and will continue to do so.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I want to just mention briefly the U.N. Democracy Fund, which was one of President

Bush's initiatives. We have contributed \$18 million of the \$49 million so far in that fund. We're looking to this to develop new and different kinds of projects in the U.N.; not to follow the same patterns as before, but to be innovative and creative, working hard to that end.

I also want to mention the work that we've done in connection with HIV/AIDS. We were very pleased, last month, that First Lady Laura Bush could address the conference, the special session on HIV/AIDS that the General Assembly had, and she was able to confirm that the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, which is a very innovative 5-year, \$15 billion plan, is well underway.

Mr. Chairman, I have had the opportunity to hold direct discussions with almost every permanent representative from other member states at the U.N. on a one-on-one basis. During this period, I've done my best to work with others to advance our national interests. I do believe important advances have been made. In cases where we would like to have seen even further progress, we now have greater clarity on the differences that we must still work together to resolve. Whether through the remaining tenure of my appointment or longer, if confirmed, I pledge to continue working with this committee.

Thank you for your consideration. I'm happy to answer any questions you or your colleagues may now have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE FOR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee today. I would also like to thank you and your colleagues for the support you have given me over the course of the past year. Whether it is the attention this committee has focused on reforming the United Nations, or the myriad of critical issues currently on the agenda of the Security Council, your work has helped to advance important policy goals of the United States. Forging a strong relationship between the United States and the United Nations, while advancing U.S. national interests, requires close cooperation and coordination between all branches of the U.S. Government, other member states, and the U.N. Secretariat. I thank you for your help and look forward to continuing and strengthening our close working relationship if confirmed.

The need for a strong and effective U.N. remains as powerful today as ever. As President Bush has declared, "Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

Mr. Chairman, for close to a year now, I have had the privilege and honor to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I have also had the privilege and honor to work with a fantastic team at our mission up in New York. The dedication and commitment of the staff at the U.S. mission has been instrumental in advancing our policy goals, and I cannot thank them enough. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close working relationship with them, in addition to doing my utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.

In the time I have before you today, I would like to divide my remarks into three broad categories. First, I would like to discuss the important work we have been engaged in on the Security Council, which is currently handling one of its busiest schedules ever in light of recent developments in the world, notably the situation in the Middle East. Second, I would like to provide an update on where we stand on reforming the United Nations, discussing both the challenges and the opportunities that lie ahead of us. Third, I would like to mention some of the work we are doing in cooperation with the U.N. to achieve our long-term objectives on critical

policy goals like economic development and eradicating HIV/AIDS. Following that, I would be happy to answer any questions you or your colleagues may have on these or other subjects.

SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. Chairman, many have remarked, and I agree, that this has been one of the busiest times for the Security Council. Sadly, world events do not pause for summer. Emergency meetings have become the norm. After months of working side-by-side with other members on the council, I believe I have established a good working relationship with them, and if confirmed, I pledge to continue deepening those relationships, while still advancing our national interests. Let me now turn to a few specific subjects.

The situation in the Middle East

Mr. Chairman, we are all aware of the crisis and tragedy unfolding in the Middle East. The United States is exhausting all diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation. The situation is so fluid that it is inherently difficult for me to go into specifics, given that the Lebanon Core Group, including foreign ministers, just met in Rome. Secretary Rice was unequivocal, though, in making clear that the United States seeks a "durable solution . . . one that strengthens the forces of peace and democracy in the region." A truly democratic Middle East is our best long-term hope to ensure that we achieve a lasting, permanent peace.

While policy discussions are underway in Rome to devise a solution, important steps are already underway to alleviate the suffering of civilians. Just 2 days ago, Secretary of State Rice authorized \$30 million in immediate humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict in Lebanon. To meet the most urgent needs, the United States has dispatched two large-scale medical deliveries. Each of these deliveries contains enough medicine and supplies to meet the basic medical needs of 10,000 people for a 3-month period. The United States will also begin delivering other direct U.S. assistance to Lebanon, including plastic sheeting and blankets.

The Security Council is also actively seized of the matter. We are working closely with other members of the council to ensure that appropriate, I stress appropriate, action is taken by the council. It would be a disservice and only bring increased hardship to the peoples of Israel and Lebanon if the Security Council adopted stop-gap measures, which would do nothing to address the root causes of the violence. It was with this in mind that the United States felt it necessary to veto a lopsided resolution, 2 weeks ago, on this matter, the first time we had to do so in almost 2 years.

We are actively engaged in New York to identify lasting solutions to bring about a permanent peace in the Middle East. To do so, however, requires that we have a shared understanding of the problem. The United States has held the firm view that the root cause of the problem is terrorism—and that this terrorism is solely and directly responsible for the situation we find ourselves in today. This terrorism manifests itself, not only in the form of Hezbollah and Hamas, but also in their state sponsors in Tehran and Damascus. We should all take note, particularly Iran and Syria, of the important statement from the Arab League for its courage and conviction in condemning Hezbollah for its role in instigating this latest round of violence.

As we speak, Hezbollah continues to operate in southern Lebanon with impunity, defying the will of the Security Council as established in Resolution 1559. We are working hard with others to bring about the full implementation of Resolution 1559 and the full extension of its authority by the Government of Lebanon over all of Lebanese territory. If that were done, then Israel would be less subject to terrorist attacks, and the people of Lebanon would not be subject to the reign of terror that Hezbollah inflicts.

We are actively considering the variety of proposals on the table on how best to secure the implementation of Resolution 1559, including the insertion of an international stabilization force. I would value any thoughts you or your colleagues may have on this matter. For our part, our view is that we must always keep at the forefront that the key goal should be to disarm and "defang" Hezbollah, to quote Secretary Rice.

We take note that some member states have called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah—but we must ask our colleagues, how do you negotiate and maintain a cease-fire with a terrorist organization, one which does not even recognize the right of Israel to exist? The United States has no confidence that Hezbollah would honor an unconditional cease-fire. History shows us that it would only allow them time to regroup and plan their next wave of kidnappings and attacks against Israel. The United States seeks an end to the

violence that afflicts innocent civilians, and for that very reason we are working for the conditions that will make a real cease-fire possible and permanent. Our aim is to address the underlying causes of the violence in southern Lebanon—namely terrorism.

In considering any stabilization force, we need to consider several questions. Would the new force be empowered to deal with the real problem, namely Hezbollah? How would such a force deal with Hezbollah armed components, and would it be empowered to deal with arms shipments from countries like Syria and Iran that support Hezbollah? How would the new force relate to the existing U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, or LTNIFIL, which already has been there for 28 years? Finally, would such a force contribute to the institutional strength to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to help fully implement Resolution 1559?

These are all important questions currently under discussion by the Secretary in Rome and the Security Council. The question of Israel's response has come up as well. Of course it is a matter of great concern to us, as President Bush has stressed, that civilian deaths are occurring. It is a tragedy, and I would not attempt to describe it any other way. We have urged the Government of Israel to exercise the greatest possible care in its use of force.

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains firmly committed to working through the Security Council, indeed through all diplomatic channels, to finding a lasting end to the violence. We hope that from this current crisis we can seize the opportunity to once and forever dismantle Hezbollah, restore democratic control by Lebanon over all of its territory, and lay the foundations that would allow Israel to live in peace with its neighbors.

Iran

While the crisis in the Middle East is, of course, a priority at the moment, we are effectively dealing with other major issues as well. We are currently involved in intense negotiations on the subject of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. We have expended considerable diplomatic efforts through a variety of venues to try to persuade Iran that its pursuit of nuclear weapons makes it less, not more, secure. Iran has consistently rebuffed those efforts, most recently just last week in Paris, which led to the collective decision of the P-5 Foreign Ministers, plus Germany, that it is now time for the Security Council to take action.

It is critical that we succeed in these efforts. Iran's unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a grave and direct threat to international peace and security. In tandem with their pursuit of even longer-range ballistic missiles, we must treat the threat they pose to our friends and allies in the region and beyond with the utmost gravity. This is particularly clear in light of the inflammatory rhetoric of Iran's leader, who is recklessly calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map" and even questions the tragic events of the Holocaust.

The discussions are still ongoing, but I am hopeful that the council will recognize the threat Iran's program poses to international peace and security and take appropriate action. We are doing a full court press, both in New York and in capitals around the world, to seek a diplomatic resolution to this matter, and we are confident that a strong resolution from the council will be instrumental in this regard.

North Korea

Allow me to update you on where we stand on North Korea since they launched seven ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepo-dong 2, in the vicinity of Japan. On July 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1695, which demands that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, including a return to its moratorium on test launching. It also requires member states to cease all trade in goods and technology which might contribute to North Korea's missile or other WMD-related programs.

The administration is very pleased the council was able to take such firm and decisive action. This resolution was the outcome of 11 days of intensive negotiations, often lasting late into the night between the five permanent members of the council and Japan. Bear in mind, when North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan's airspace in 1998, the response of the council was a weak and feckless press statement. This time, however, we were able to bring along China and Russia to support a very strong resolution, even though they initially supported issuing yet another press statement. The outcome of our diplomatic efforts has been to send a clear, unambiguous, and unanimous signal to North Korea that their provocative behavior is unacceptable. The fact that both China and Russia supported a resolution, the first one on North Korea since 1993, cannot be lost on the North Korean leadership.

As called for in Resolution 1695, North Korea remains very much on the council's agenda. This is particularly important in light of North Korea's rejection of the resolution some 45 minutes after its passing, where they also vowed to continue testing missiles. We believe that Resolution 1695 highlights the important role the Security Council can play to help buttress other diplomatic efforts, such as the Six-Party Talks. We call upon North Korea not only to return to Six-Party Talks, but to implement the joint statement it agreed to in September 2005. If North Korea chooses a different path, however, it should know that the Security Council stands ready and willing to consider further steps.

Sudan and Darfur

Mr. Chairman, I know that the situation in Darfur is of particular interest to you. We continue to push hard to bring relief to the citizens of Darfur, Sudan where over 200,000 people have lost their lives and over 2 million have become displaced since 2003. This past May, the Government of Sudan and one of the rebel groups took a large step forward by signing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA, if fully enacted, establishes critical security, wealth sharing, and power-sharing arrangements that address the long-standing marginalization of Darfur. We believe that the DPA, along with the deployment of a strong U.N. force, provides real hope and a way ahead for the people in Darfur.

While we do see a way forward, significant challenges remain. We are working within the Security Council to craft a robust resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that will afford any U.N. force the capability and the mandate to defend itself and the civilians in Darfur. Russia and China continue to voice opposition to a Chapter VII mandate. However, in May, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1679, designed to facilitate planning for the future deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region. We believe this to be a viable precedent for upcoming Darfur resolutions. There is also the issue of the Government of Sudan agreeing to a U.N. force in Darfur. Significant efforts are ongoing bilaterally and multilaterally to achieve this. While this plays out, we continue to do our part toward adopting a resolution, determining force requirements and identifying troop contributing countries so that we are fully prepared to go in and complete the mission.

The U.N. Technical Assessment Mission has returned from Sudan and is finalizing its report to the Security Council, however preliminary indications are that Department of Peacekeeping Operations will recommend a U.N. force package in Darfur of approximately 15,000 to 17,000 troops to be operational on or about January 1, 2007. We prefer to have a credible force there sooner than that and are concerned about the interim. Therefore, while we continue to do all we can to hasten the deployment of a new force, we are also working with our allies and the U.N. to provide support to the existing African Union force presently on the ground in Darfur, known as "AMIS." AMIS has done all it can to keep order by patrolling an area nearly the size of Texas with about 7,000 troops, but they have reached the limits of their capabilities. So until we have a U.N. force on the ground, we are working with our NATO allies to support AMIS with immediate assistance in the form of planning, logistics, intelligence support, and other help.

As President Bush has said, "America will not turn away from this tragedy. We will call genocide by its rightful name, and we will stand up for the innocent until the peace of Darfur is secured." We are working tirelessly in New York to bring this to fruition.

Burma

Despite some initial reluctance on the part of some council members, the United States has led the drive to make certain that the issue of Burma does not fade from the council's attention. We are still discussing with other members the best way for the council to address the deteriorating situation in Burma, and how best to secure the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Her imprisonment remains a stain on the current leadership. We will be working closely with our colleagues in the Security Council to find a way to back up Under Secretary General Gambari's efforts to obtain the release of political detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi. And, we intend to promote an inclusive and genuine political dialog in Burma that empowers Burma's people to decide their own future.

REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS: A STATUS REPORT AND PLAN FOR THE FUTURE

Increasing transparency: An important first step

Mr. Chairman, it has been close to 1 year since the World Summit Outcome Document was signed by some 150 world leaders last September in New York on the 60th anniversary meeting of the U.N.'s General Assembly. The assessment I gave

you 2 months ago, broadly speaking, remains valid today. Some modest progress has been achieved since the World Summit, including establishing a much-needed U.N. Ethics Office; strengthening financial disclosure requirements for U.N. staff members; protecting U.N. personnel from retaliation for reporting misconduct; and providing needed resources for oversight.

While these reforms are important steps in the right direction, we had hoped for more. It was with this in mind that the United States supported the approval of only a 6-month interim budget last December. That was the right decision to focus the attention of member states not only on how badly needed are reforms, but on the seriousness of purpose with which we approach the subject. Now that the cap has been lifted, we will continue to work with other member states and the secretariat to achieve our mutually shared objectives.

The goal now is to identify priority target areas where progress can be made and take the necessary steps to demonstrate that the U.N. and its member states are fully engaged in launching what Secretary of State Rice has termed a "lasting revolution of reform"—one that will transform the United Nations into an institution fully capable of addressing the complex array of challenges now confronting the global community. To this end, the United States recently joined consensus on the adoption of several reforms related to information and communication technology; budget implementation; financial management practices; and improved reporting mechanisms, including increased public access to U.N. records. The key now, of course, is to seek effective implementation.

These issues all speak to our attempts to change the "culture of inaction" described by Paul Volcker before this very committee when discussing the Oil-for-Food scandal. To change this culture, we are working to increase the transparency and accountability of the U.N., not just to shine a light on the agencies or bodies which may be in need of reform, but to allow those that do work effectively to better advertise and market their expertise in ways that might serve as a model for others.

While the steps mentioned above take us in the right direction, implementation remains a key priority. Last month I had the opportunity to meet with the leaders of the U.N. Staff Union. They expressed some concern that while the reforms enacted to date are a step in the right direction, they do not go far enough, for example, to protect U.N. staffers who actually do "blow the whistle" on undesirable U.N. activities. We are working now to help ensure that these reforms are not only enacted, but implemented as well. Interestingly, the Union also raised the issue of transparency—an issue that we have stressed as well on a wide-range of subjects. We concur with the U.N. Staff Union that an open and transparent decision making process is integral to the success of management reform, regardless of the specific reforms adopted.

The last point about public access is part of an innovative new approach to increasing accountability and transparency at the United Nations, something we think will benefit everyone. Under the auspices of a new program called "The Transparency Initiative," the U.S. mission at the United Nations is making reports published by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) available to the public via our Web site.

We believe making OIOS reports more readily available will strengthen the hand of OIOS within the U.N. system. You may recall that last May before this very committee, I raised concerns about OIOS independence and autonomy, citing a report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Their conclusions supported our own determination that OIOS is potentially beholden to those it is responsible for investigating, thereby creating an inherent conflict of interest. This situation is untenable and only abets those who may seek to defraud or abuse the system. But this is all the more reason to open up OIOS reports to public scrutiny. OIOS can serve as a valuable tool for member states to take action or push through reforms that are sorely needed. To this end, we will also push hard to make sure that the Independent Audit Advisory Committee is fully established to validate OIOS' working methods and ensure OIOS' operational independence from the U.N. Secretariat.

Fostering awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of various U.N. agencies is a necessary and critical, though we acknowledge not solely sufficient, first step to deepening the reform process currently underway. If confirmed, I pledge to continue working on this important issue.

Management reform

In terms of specific reform issues, let me begin with the one that remains a priority for this administration—management reform. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, we must acknowledge some difficulties ahead—difficulties which, if confirmed, I would continue to work to overcome. Since I last spoke to you, we have continued to see sharply divided positions emerging on some key issues. Many members of the Group

of 77, or G-77 as it is known, are resisting efforts by the secretariat to reform and streamline basic managerial structures and practices. Bear in mind, the reforms they are now blocking were not put forward by member states, but by the Secretary-General himself. It bears repeating my earlier citation of the report issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan from last March, where he noted, "The earlier reforms addressed the symptoms, more than the causes, of our shortcomings. It is now time to reach for deeper, more fundamental change. What is needed, and what we now have a precious opportunity to undertake, is a radical overhaul of the entire secretariat—its rules, its structure, its systems—to bring it more in line with today's realities, and enable it to perform the new kinds of operations that member states now ask and expect of it. . . . Such a radically expanded range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat—its rules, structure, systems and culture. Up to now, that has not happened."

This remarkably frank assessment included a number of specific proposals to reform the U.N. system to increase efficiency. Recently, the Fifth Committee, which is the member state body in the U.N. system that handles budgetary and management-related issues, voted against many measures that would have increased the ability of the secretariat to implement a number of significant and genuine reforms. To be sure, we did not agree with every single reform proposed by the Secretary-General, but we certainly agree with his diagnosis of the problem and support his efforts.

What was particularly interesting about the recent Fifth Committee vote on some of the Secretary-General's proposed reforms was the way the vote split. On one side was a group of 50 nations, including the United States, who were pushing an ambitious reform agenda, whose combined contributions totaled 86.7 percent of the U.N. budget. On the other side were over 120 nations who contributed 12 percent of the budget and chose to block these reforms. Clearly there is work that needs to be done to bridge this divide.

Despite that vote, there has been some recent progress, including adoption of international accounting standards and the creation of a Chief Technology Officer for the U.N. We must acknowledge, though, it will be an uphill battle, with a majority of member states expressing their opposition to some of the most basic and important management reform measures, such as giving the Secretary-General more discretion on budget and personnel matters.

It has become apparent that some members of the General Assembly are trying to hinder the Secretary-General from serving in his Charter capacity as the Chief Administrative Officer of the U.N. due to their desire not to cede any authority from the General Assembly. We agree that the member states should have the bulk of the authority, but believe that the Fifth Committee's micromanagement hampers the secretariat from effectively achieving goals of member states. And when the G-77 calls for an "accountable" secretariat, we hope its members will be more concerned about ethics, oversight, and transparency, than with preserving micromanagement prerogatives over personnel and other administrative matters.

Mandate review

The review of program mandates adopted by either the General Assembly or the Security Council is another area where we are working closely with other like-minded nations to push ahead our reform agenda. We must acknowledge, though, our concern about the lack of progress to date in mandate review and express our hope that we can now begin to make more sustained progress on this vital task, consistent with decisions of our leaders and the Outcome Document.

We have been hard at work in this regard. Since the establishment of the General Assembly Informal Plenary on Mandate Review at the end of last year there have been some 20 meetings of the plenary, including 12 previous informal consultations. During these meetings, member states tabled some 100 proposals, 40 of which were tabled by the United States. In addition, the co-chairs also circulated a paper prepared by the secretariat, at the request of the member states, identifying a significant number of other proposals relating to the consolidation or reduction of reports.

Unfortunately, we are still bogged down in the "process" of how to review the mandates as opposed to conducting the actual review of live, substantive mandates. There has been a refusal by some states since the signing of the Outcome Document to consider a review of mandates 5 years and older which had been renewed unless certain conditions were met. This effectively eliminates 96 percent of the total existing mandates and is inconsistent with both the spirit and clear decision by leaders who signed the World Summit Outcome Document last September. We are not giving up, however, and still hope that we can move forward to complete our review by the end of this year provided in the Outcome Document.

Human Rights Council

Mr. Chairman, allow me briefly to update you on where we stand with regard to the new Human Rights Council. We are still in the position of evaluating the first special session convened with the new council, which recently wrapped up in Geneva. As you know, the United States did not vote for this body this past spring because in our view it did not go far enough to differentiate itself from its widely discredited predecessor.

While we have not yet made a decision on whether or not to run for next year's council, it gives us considerable pause for concern that this newly reformed body managed to adopt only one country-specific resolution against one of the U.N.'s 192 members—Israel. That they had to call a special session to do so is even more disturbing. This is, of course, highly disappointing given the abuses being carried out in countries such as North Korea, Burma, Iran, and the Sudan to name a few. That this newly formed body would launch their work through this kind of selective adoption of resolutions can only undermine the council's credibility to address human rights violations.

As I noted last May, though, despite our disappointment that the new council is too similar to the old commission, the United States will continue to work with democratic delegations through our team in Geneva, which will still attend its meetings to advance our goals. My colleague, Ambassador Tichenor, has worked energetically to promote U.S. interests and values there and will continue to do so.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, some of the most important issues on which the United Nations focuses do not often make headlines, but remain vitally important. The United States has consistently made clear that we feel there is an important and integral link between democracy and development. President Bush, since his inaugural address, has declared that America will stand with those who stand up for their own freedom. This was the reason he launched the U.N. Democracy Fund. We are pleased that the fund has grown to \$49 million, with close to \$18 million being provided by the United States. As the President noted, "the advance of liberty is the path to both a safer and better world."

We are also working to achieve greater economic openness and liberalization in trade and investment flows so that all may share fully in growing global prosperity. To help those most in need, we have almost tripled Official Development Assistance since 2000, to \$27.5 billion last year. We are pleased that after months of intense negotiations, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution on development that emphasizes not only the rights of countries, but their responsibilities as well.

Of course, we all recognize that for the poor in developing countries, the greatest need is not development assistance: it is a job—meaningful, productive employment, "decent work." It is the experience of the United States that job creation cannot be separated from economic growth and enhanced productivity. Other countries will face different challenges, but fostering an environment that promotes entrepreneurship and provides legal protection and regulatory stability for the private sector is a necessary if not sufficient condition for success.

The United States is working to help nations through the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, which allocates its assistance based on criteria such as rule of law, investment in health and education, and economic freedom. The United States also believes that job creation must go hand-in-hand with respect for fundamental principles and rights at work, namely, freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to bargain collectively, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation. The United States supports the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Decent Work Country Programs as a valuable contribution to broader development frameworks.

There are some types of employment we don't support, such as exploitative child labor and forced labor. Children need to be in school mastering the skills and knowledge they will need to be the workforce of the future. That is why the United States has contributed more than \$295 million to the ILO since 1995 to fight the worst forms of child labor.

HIV/AIDS

Mr. Chairman, last month the United Nations convened its special sessions on HIV/AIDS. We were honored to have the U.S. delegation headed by First Lady Laura Bush, who outlined the steps the United States is taking to combat the scourge of HIV/AIDS. She was able to confirm that the President's Emergency Plan

for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is on track. This remarkable plan is a 5-year, \$15 billion initiative to combat AIDS in 120 countries around the world.

The Emergency Plan works in partnership with the hardest-hit countries—and that partnership is saving lives. When President Bush announced PEPFAR at the beginning of 2003, only 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were thought to be receiving antiretroviral treatment. Now, in PEPFAR's 15 focus nations, the United States has helped provide treatment for more than 560,000 people. Even more are being reached through America's contributions to the Global Fund, demonstrating the variety of venues and forums the United States is working through to help vulnerable populations. This direct medical care keeps people in good health. It also focuses on education, not only in terms of prevention, but in how to cope with the infection if you are living—I emphasize living—with HIV/AIDS. That emphasis is necessary because now millions are learning to live with HIV/AIDS—instead of waiting to die from it.

While much work, of course, remains to be done, there are some rays of hope where we can point to models of success. In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, new data show Africa's ABC model of AIDS prevention has led to dramatic declines in HIV-infection rates in young men and women. Pregnant mothers with HIV are now being taught that their unborn children do not have to inherit their disease.

The challenge ahead is to see that more people know how HIV is transmitted—and every country has an obligation to educate its citizens. As the First Lady so eloquently noted, "This is why every country must also improve literacy, especially for women and girls, so they can learn to make wise choices that will keep them healthy and safe."

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, it has been almost exactly 1 year that I have had the privilege and honor to serve as the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. I have had the opportunity to hold direct discussions with almost every Permanent Representative from other member states at the U.N. on a one-on-one basis. During this period, I have done my best to work with others to advance our national interests. I do believe important advances have been made. In cases where we would have liked to have seen further progress, we now have greater clarity on the differences that we all must still work together to resolve.

Whether through the remaining tenure of my appointment or longer if confirmed, I pledge to continue working with this committee. Your work on has been instrumental in helping us achieve our objectives in New York. Both the U.N. Secretariat and delegations of other member states have a much greater appreciation of the importance the Congress—mirroring the American people—attach to the subject of U.N. reform. As the U.N.'s largest financial contributor, totaling some 22 percent of the regular assessed budget, the United States has a vital stake in ensuring that the U.N. succeeds. On issues before the Security Council, I can not emphasize enough the positive and constructive role members of this committee have played in helping us to advance important goals, whether in Iran, the Sudan, or in other troubled regions of the world.

I thank you for your consideration and am happy to answer any questions you or your colleagues may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Bolton.

We'll begin our round of questions with 10 minutes for each member, and I'll begin the questioning.

I want to mention that a—

The committee will be in order. The committee will be in order. The committee will stand in recess until police can restore order.
[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will continue the hearing.

Let me just mention that Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, Kristen Silverberg, is with us today, and I wanted to acknowledge her presence. We appreciate that.

I want to take a few moments of my time to read the letter that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written on behalf of the nominee. He said, "Mr. Chairman, when John Bolton's nomination for the position of Ambassador to the United Nations was before the committee, I wrote a letter, together with a number of

other former Secretaries of State, urging confirmation. I did so, because I believe that the President should be given wide discretion in selecting his advisors. Since then, I've had the opportunity to observe Ambassador Bolton perform his duties under a recess appointment skillfully and with dedication. He has had to deal with a wide range of issues, from Darfur to the recent resolution concerning North Korea's missile tests. He has handled these assignments effectively and with great articulateness. I've observed him at a number of official functions. This enabled me to note that his relationship with his colleagues has been professional and mutually respectful. It would be unfortunate if he were to be prevented from continuing these tasks, especially as a new General Assembly is about to begin and a number of crises, such as the Middle East crisis and the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis, are on the verge of coming before the United Nations. For these reasons, I respectfully urge the committee to deal favorably with the President's recommendation to confirm John Bolton." And signed, "Warm regards, Henry Kissinger."

The committee will be in order. The committee will be in order.

The committee will stand in recess until police can restore order.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume the hearing.

Ambassador Bolton, in your written testimony, you note that in 1998, when North Korea conducted a missile launch over Japan's airspace, the Security Council issued what you called a "weak and feckless press statement." Now, following North Korea's most recent provocative missile launches, the Council was able to work together to adopt a resolution, No. 1695, which condemns North Korea, calls upon it to stop all tests. How significant is this resolution? And what can you tell us about Russian and Chinese cooperation on the matter, and how you obtained that?

Ambassador BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a significant resolution, the first since 1993 to deal with North Korea. And when we started discussions in the Security Council, on July 5, the first business day after the launches, it was the initial position of Russia and China that they wanted to deal with this, again, with a press statement. And as I know you know, and the committee knows, in the hierarchy of things that the Security Council can do, the lowest is a press statement; intermediate is what we call a presidential statement that the president of the Council reads, reflecting the views of the Council members; and then the most important, of course, is a resolution of the Security Council.

During the course of the discussions, I think we and many other members of the Council made it plain that circumstances of these missile launches put us in a very different position, that we wanted a strong and binding resolution. So, the Russians and the Chinese moved away from the press statement idea and agreed that they could consider a presidential statement. Nonetheless, we persevered, because we thought it was important that North Korea know unequivocally how isolated it was internationally. We continued to work in these negotiations with other members of the Council and concerned governments in the region. And ultimately, on July 15, we did get a unanimous Security Council resolution that, in our judgment, is fully binding on North Korea. It demands—

that's the word the Council used—demands that North Korea suspend all activity relating to its ballistic missile program, and it requires—that's the word the Council uses—requires member governments not to trade with, to supply to, or to procure from any of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs any materials that could be useful to them.

I think that this is a strong signal to the North Koreans. We have been hoping and working to try and get them back into the Six-Party Talks. Secretary Rice is in Kuala Lumpur now, also trying to advance that region in meetings that she's holding, and we'll know better, I think, after those discussions, what the next step will be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you for that comment. I think it was a significant statement, and one which, obviously, as you've reflected, I think, modestly in your statement, has had an impact upon North Koreans. Now, how things will progress, we shall see. But, in terms of the United Nations aspect of this, why, this clearly was progress over anything we have seen with regard to the North Korean problem.

And I would just reflect anecdotally, because I know that Senator Coleman and Senator Voinovich and I want to acknowledge our appreciation to you for your having us at the United Nations in February, the month that the United States presided over the Security Council. I was honored, because you asked me to speak to the Council, and even more honored that the Council was all there. And I think that is in respect for you, as the president of the Council, and in respect for our country and for your coordination with that group. It was a pretty large audience for the Security Council. And then you made it possible for us to see the leaders of the so-called Group of 77, the people handling the business arrangements, which are very infinitely complex for the U.N., vis-a-vis New York and the real estate and all the nitty-gritty which is behind the scenes. It is a part of your responsibility, as our Ambassador to the U.N., but, likewise, as an American citizen working with people in New York.

And so, I mention all of these situations, because we have had at least some eyewitness experience in working with you there.

Now, let me ask about Iran for a moment. Iran's influence in the Middle East and the support for Hezbollah is unquestionable, as we have seen in recent days. Its use of Syria as a conduit and puppet master for Hamas is also not in doubt. Yet we're hearing that Iran's neighbors and fellow Muslim states are growing nervous with each Iranian attempt to strengthen its role in the region through Hezbollah or through whatever means. How are such concerns playing out, in your judgment, at the United Nations as you take a look at the membership of the Security Council that may be called upon to take action in regard to Iran?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think, Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my statement, the Arab League meeting, about 10 days ago, issued a very important statement on the activity of Hezbollah and the aggression that it conducted against the civilians in Israel. And there is, I think, larger and larger understanding of the fact that Hezbollah really is a surrogate for Iran, due to its financing of perhaps up to \$100 million a year or more, and that the notion that

Iran and this extensive terrorist network it supports, together with its activity designed to acquire nuclear weapons capability, in our judgment, and to increase the range and accuracy of its ballistic missile force, shows that Iran is a growing threat in the region. And this plays out in various complex ways, but I think it has helped us, in a number of respects, as we have considered how to deal with Hamas and the occupied territories, and Hezbollah, how to deal with the implementation of not only Resolution 1559, which calls for the removal of all external influence from Lebanon, from the arming of the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to trying to extend the control of the democratic Government of Lebanon over the entire territory, to implementation of Resolution 1595, investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, that many of these things are tied together, that the growing closeness of Syria and Iran is a problem for the region, the coordination that those two governments have in their support for Hezbollah and Hamas, is a problem that goes much more broadly than a problem in the context of the Arab/Israeli concern.

The CHAIRMAN. You've touched upon the U.N. reform efforts in which you have been heavily involved and on which you've spoken frequently. Where is the reform business likely to go, at this point? And what sort of timetable can you envision for at least another significant or substantive debate to occur on reform issues?

Ambassador BOLTON. We're expecting the—what we call the “mandate review” that was required by the outcome document of last September—last September's summit, adopted by over 150 heads of government, to continue this fall. There's a very significant amount of work that needs to be done. The work that has been done so far has not brought us very far. Despite many, many meetings, there's not been one single mandate out of 9,000 mandates identified by the Secretariat that have been imposed on the Secretariat over the years. Of these 9,000 mandates, not one has been eliminated, not one has been consolidated. We've run into considerable obstacles. But this is a high priority for us, for a number of other countries, the group we call JUSCANZ—not probably the best name for it, but it's Japan, United States, South Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, which, if you string all that out, gives you the acronym JUSCANZ—European Union and other countries. But it's been slow going, and I think it's a measure of that culture of inaction that former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker spoke about. But we're continuing to press it. We will, through the remainder of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Just having visited with the Group of 77 leaders, as I've mentioned—during our visit in February—it appears that at stake here for many nations, maybe as many as 100 nations, is the fact that they contribute very, very small amounts of money, in terms of dues, to the U.N. But the current organization offers what we would call, in local politics, patronage—that is, jobs. At least there was an attempt made, I suppose, to apportion these jobs around broadly. Likewise, these mandates, they're much like congressionally mandated reports that go on and on forever. And someone at the State Department keeps churning out hours and hours each year, because we can't quite ever bring it to an end. But in the case of 9,000 of these, this, to say the least, encumbers, con-

siderably, the bureaucracy, efficient or inefficient as it may be. Now, this is a monumental task. I'm wondering, is the task not perceived in the same way by some other nations, in addition to the United States? In other words, is there tolerance, really, for this kind of gross manipulation of the system to continue forever, or is that the price of having, oh, 150-plus nations aboard?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I hope it's not the price. And I think this brings us to the question we're going to have to continue to pursue, given the disjunction between voting power in the General Assembly and contributions. I think when I testified a couple of months ago, I recounted the vote that we had first in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, and then in the General Assembly itself, in connection with a package of reforms suggested by the Secretary General. These were reforms coming out of a report he submitted, called "Investing in the United Nations." We didn't support each and every one of the reforms, but we did support the thrust of them. The Secretary General said, in his words, that what we needed was a "radical restructuring of the entire Secretariat." And some of the key elements of the Secretary General's reforms, many of which we considered to be first steps—important, but first steps—were put to a vote, and, overwhelmingly, the G-77 outvoted the major contributors. The vote, I think, was in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, about 122 to 50. The 120-plus countries that voted against the Secretary General's reforms contributed something like 12 percent of the total assessed budget. The 50 countries, which included the United States, which voted in favor of the reforms contributed 87 percent of the budget. So, that was a—that was a pretty significant indication of the opposition to the reform agenda.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Ambassador.

I want to recognize, now, the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden. And let me just mention, Joe, I recognized Senator Dodd to make his statement.

Senator BIDEN. I will—

The CHAIRMAN. But, nevertheless, I don't want, in any way, to inhibit your participation. If you want to proceed with your statement, please do so, and then with the question period.

Senator BIDEN. I understand—I read Senator Dodd's statement. I happen to agree with it. And my statement's not substantially different, so I'll not take the time to do that, but I thank you.

And, by way of explanation to my colleagues and to the Ambassador, I was at the signing of the Voting Rights Act. It's been the only constant in my entire political career. That's what got me involved in politics. And, quite frankly, I didn't see how I couldn't be there. And I apologize for the tardiness.

My concerns continue to relate to substance and not so much style, Mr. Ambassador. One of your predecessors, Mr. Holbrooke, was no wallflower at the United Nations, but he was very effective. He pulled off what seemed at the time a fairly near impossible feat, and that is, while we were in arrears about a billion dollars, he got a reduction in dues for the United States, and helped settle that. And my overriding concern that will overlay the questions I have relate to my continued conviction that you—and I must admit, your boss, the President and the Vice president, I don't think they, in

this, quote, "Year of Diplomacy," really think diplomacy is all that consequential. My concern is that, at the moment of the greatest need for diplomacy in our recent history, we are not particularly effective at it. And it seems to me that there is a fundamental—I was going to say lack of understanding that's—that would be presumptuous—fundamental disagreement on the role and necessity of diplomacy. I thought there was a great line that Tom Friedman had in one of his articles. I think it was the end of last week in the Times. He said, "We must understand that American power is most effective when it's legitimated by global consensus and embedded in global coalitions." And so, I'd like to pursue my questions in the spirit of whether or not the value that you place in diplomacy—you're going to be—you're playing in the biggest diplomatic field we have; maybe not the single most important, but you're a major, major player in this—in diplomacy. And sometimes it seems to me that what you say and do are at odds with even what the Secretary is saying. Let me speak to that, quickly.

In the Financial Times last month in London, you gave an interview, and it was asserted in the Times that you stated that, quote, "I'm not much of a carrots man." You went on to say, "It would be a mistake to think these negotiations," referring to Iran, "are the first step toward some kind of grand bargain." You went on to say, "Our experience has been, when there's dramatic change in the life of the country, that's the most likely point at which they'd give up nuclear weapons." Just 10 days earlier, the Secretary of State announced that the United States was going to encourage Iran to take a positive path, and benefits of this path would go beyond civil nuclear energy and can include progressively greater economic cooperation.

And so, my question is, did your statements—were they cleared by the White House, your comments about negotiations with Iran? Or were they as much of interest to the White House as they were to me?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think they were consistent with our policy. I might say, I had—that was at a breakfast I had with three reporters. And if you read the stories written by the other two reporters, you'll see, I think, a somewhat different take on the context in which those comments were made. What I said was, in the context of the grand bargain, exactly what Secretary Rice has been saying, and I said, we were offering—we were making the offer that Javier Solana presented to the Iranian negotiator on June 6, and that they had two roads ahead of them, the Iranians did. One would be to accept this very, very generous offer, in which case they could find themselves in an entirely different relationship with the United States, or they could reject that offer, in which case they would find themselves increasingly on the road to international isolation. And you can see, based on the recent meeting in Paris—again, between Solana and Larijani—but the Iranians have simply declined to give a clear answer. Despite every effort at persuasion that our European allies were able to make with them, that led to a meeting of the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany in Paris the next day, recognizing that, in substance, Iran had rejected the offer and authorizing us, in the Security Council, to go forward with the

resolution I discussed in my statement, that would require Iran to suspend all of its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activity. That's the pattern that Iran has followed for over 3 years now, of purporting to enter into negotiations, and then rejecting them. And, you know, there was a very telling comment made by Hassan Rohani, the former chief negotiator for Iran in the nuclear field. He said—and this was reported, I guess, about 3 months ago now, that Iran had used the cover of its negotiations—his word—the cover of the negotiations with the EU-3 to perfect their uranium conversion technology at their Isfahan plant, and that that's why the—Secretary Rice and the other foreign minister, in effect, said that they weren't going to allow the Iranians to extend this discussion forever, that they wanted an answer in weeks, not months. And when the answer came back as a nonanswer, we were authorized to proceed in the Security Council.

Senator BIDEN. Did we make a mistake joining the three European countries in pursuing these negotiations?

Ambassador BOLTON. No, this was a decision, clearly designed to eliminate tactical differences that had existed between us and the Europeans, that Secretary Rice authorized right at the beginning of her tenure as Secretary of State, and it was intended, by closing those tactical differences, in particular, to bring about their support, if required, for action in the Security Council. And that judgment has proven correct.

Senator BIDEN. So, you think that their support is necessary for us to be able to effectively respond to Iran's intransigence.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think that's what's proven to be the case. And I think we've seen, in the negotiations on the resolution, which I regret to say we have not yet concluded, that we have stuck very close with what we call the EU-3—Germany, France, and Britain.

Senator BIDEN. But I guess my point is, do you think sticking close to the EU-3 so we are not divided, we are not the odd man out—do you think that is an important diplomatic objective?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think it always has been. And I think, as I mentioned earlier, we had tactical differences with the EU-3 previously. There were never any strategic divisions among us on the overall objective of preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability. There had been differences as to how to achieve that, that's correct, and I think Secretary Rice, over a year and a half ago now, moved to bridge those tactical differences, and has succeeded.

Senator BIDEN. How important is it, on many of the things that are on your plate now that are going to get—I think the plate's going to get more full—how important is it that particularly our European allies and the United States are on the same page? Is it—

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think it can—

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Consequential?

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. I think it can be very important, and something we work hard to achieve. In the context, for example, of Lebanon, in 1959, we've worked not only generally closely with our European allies, but particularly closely with France, where we have, I think, accomplished a number of things

in the Security Council, not just on 1559, but 1595, as well, that have put pressure on the Government of Syria to fully withdraw from Lebanon, not just its military forces, but its intelligence services, as well, put pressure on Syria to truly recognize that Lebanon is an independent state, to exchange ambassadors, and to move to demarcate the border and take other steps. These are part of the assignments that I have on a daily basis in New York.

Senator BIDEN. Well, one of those assignments was 1559. You didn't negotiate it, but you inherited it. And during your tenure heading up the Council, what steps did you take to put on the agenda the two parts of 1559 that seemed to be totally ignored? That is, the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the extension of the Lebanese army into the region along the border. Did you put those up on the agenda?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah, there were, I think, at least two presidential statements by the Council, one of which actually, for the first time, mentioned Hezbollah by name as one of the militias that was being supported by Syria and by Iran, and also the adoption of a resolution that called on Syria to fully exchange—to exchange full diplomatic missions with the Government of Lebanon and, as I said, to demarcate the border. These were several of the things we've done to carry through. Now, a lot of what we need to do is done not just in the Security Council. I wouldn't pretend that that's the only forum for applying pressure to Syria and Iran, or for mobilizing support to—in—to help the democratic government—

Senator BIDEN. But they didn't call for disarming of Hezbollah. They didn't—and I may be mistaken. My understanding is, they did not call for actual implementation of the second two critical pieces of 1559. I mean—

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think in each case, we reaffirmed 1559, and that's part of pressuring Syria, I think, in connection with 1595 on the Hariri assassination, as well, to continue the diplomatic efforts that we're able to do. There's no U.N. force that's going to make Syria do any of those things.

Senator BIDEN. No, but there is the ability, if we had, let's say—a year ago—let's say we had pushed and worked closely with the permanent five on the Security Council to bring in a force to help—an international force like we're trying to do right now. I mean, what we're doing right now is what 1559 was supposed to do. 1559 was supposed to have three parts—one, when the Syrian army left, everyone—you, I, all of us knew that there would be a serious vacuum created. That's why the next two pieces were critical. We knew that vacuum would be filled by Hezbollah if someone didn't move in. We knew the Lebanese army didn't have the capability to move in, and we didn't do a thing. We just sat around with our thumb in our ear like we thought something was going to happen, other than a—this vacuum being filled by Hezbollah.

My question is, was there any action taken to generate the same kind of consensus and support for bringing in what you're trying to do right now? We're trying to get a consensus to bring in an international force that can shoot straight, that can sit along the Israeli border. And, I assume part of what we're doing—I hope the heck we're doing—is coming up with initiatives as to how we are

going to help, either through the French, through NATO, or through other means, to train up a Lebanese army that can actually ultimately supplant that force. So, you've got Israelis there; we want Israelis out. The Israelis want out. There's going to have to be an international force in its place. And there's going to have to be a Lebanese army in the place of that. What has been done along any of those three lines, which are being done now, the last year?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think much of the work that has to be done to strengthen Lebanese institutions is being done on a bilateral basis directly between the United States and Lebanon, between the European Union and Lebanon, in order that a variety of components of the Lebanese Government will be stronger. I think, for example, we've done a significant amount, both in New York and bilaterally, to strengthen institutions of the Lebanese justice system, which are very important in extending authority, but it was—there are a variety of things that were done in New York specifically at the suggestion of the Lebanese Government that were communicated to us and France and others, that we followed through on, that I do think have had a significant impact.

Senator BIDEN. Well, maybe we can come back to that. I'm over my time. I just was suggesting—I don't want to hold you accountable for the administration's non-U.N.-related activities. My understanding is—and we checked—is that, for example, the Iranians put five times as much money into Lebanon as we did during this period. I saw precious little action taken in any concerted way to deal with their judicial system. But I'll come back to that later.

But I thank you very much for your time, and I apologize for going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador.

As you said, we have a crisis and tragedy unfolding in the Middle East. And, without a doubt, this is an extremely important area in the world—energy-rich, all the religious areas that are important. And in addressing that, you said that, "We are actively engaged, in New York, in identifying lasting solutions to bring about a permanent peace in the Middle East. To do so, however, requires that we have a shared understanding of the problem. The United States has a firm view that the root cause of the problem is terrorism. And this terrorism is solely and directly responsible for the situation we find ourselves in today."

You're a brilliant man. That statement doesn't make any sense. Terrorism is a device. There's got to be something deeper for the root cause. Can you go a little deeper?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the statement really refers to the conflict in Lebanon now. I think the real root cause is the absence of a fundamental basis for peace in the region. And I think that that—that striving to get to that point is the objective of our diplomacy now—not to simply acquiesce in a return to the status quo ante, but to see if there's not a way to turn the hostilities that are now going into shifting the basis on which we really deal in the region. And that's why we have resisted calls for an immediate

cease-fire, which has the risk of simply returning to the status quo ante.

Nobody is under any illusions about the complexity of the problem, but I think that we need to use the current circumstance as a fulcrum to try and move toward a longer-term solution. And that does require, I think, addressing very directly, and not sweeping under the rug, the support that regimes like Syria and Iran give to terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Senator CHAFEE. Can't you get any deeper? It's just terrorism?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think—

Senator CHAFEE. How about a little history of terrorism in the region?

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Yeah, I think—

Senator CHAFEE. Where does it go back?

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. I think that that's why the effort we want to make in Lebanon, as Senator Biden and I were discussing, through 1559, that that—the full implementation of 1559, which is to have a democratic Government of Lebanon in full control of its territory and to get Hezbollah, that says it wants to act like a political party in Lebanese politics, in fact, to do that and give up the course it's been following, which is to have one foot in as a political party and one foot in as a terrorist group. If Hezbollah really carried through on the things that it said publicly about being a legitimate political party in Lebanon and not being an armed state within a state, then I think you'd see a very different situation there.

That, alone, is not the solution. I don't pretend that it is. I think you've got, in the case of Syria, an authoritarian country—

Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Ambassador, this is a very complex problem, and it's a conflagration right now. And you said the root cause of the problem, "we have to get to it"—that's what you said—in order to have a permanent peace. Is there anything deeper than "it's just terrorism" to the root cause of the problem in the Middle East? These are your words.

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah. Well, I think, in addition is the fact that some elements have still not acknowledged the right of the state of Israel to exist. That's why the peace process that's been going on for 30 years now is still incomplete. There's still—Israel still has not been able to achieve full peace agreements with many of its neighbors. And in the case of Iran you have a government that continues to threaten to wipe Israel off the map. That's one reason why Secretary Rice, in the meeting in Rome, was trying to get this broader basis, to have this wider discussion, to address the possibility of something more comprehensive. But, as you said, these animosities are complex. They go back a long way.

The question for us, the diplomatic question for us, is, can we take the current circumstances, in southern Lebanon, in particular, and not simply say, "Let's have a cease-fire that goes back to the situation before a month ago," but can we now use this—can the other Arab states that have joined in, in their declaration in the Arab League, expressing concern about what Hezbollah did—can we now move this process dramatically forward? That's why this is an opportunity, at the moment.

Senator CHAFEE. When we had the Ambassador to Iraq—our Ambassador, Ambassador Khalilzad—before the committee, he said that shaping the Middle East is the defining challenge of our time. Do you agree with that?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think it's certainly one of the most important challenges of our time. I think—reflecting my own background; we all have a background—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains another challenge. And—but it's the—really, the tying in of those two challenges in the Middle East, if you look particularly at Iran, and the risk that Iran itself poses, and the risk that failing to deal with Iran adequately would have as an incentive for other governments to turn to pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, that would make that region even more volatile than it is now.

Senator CHAFEE. And does that shape of the Middle East include a viable contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in peace with Israel?

Ambassador BOLTON. Absolutely. I think that is—you know, we're focused now on the problem of Lebanon, but just before that we had—there were difficulties in the occupied territories, as well, and that's precipitated by the role of Hamas, which is—itself remains a terrorist group that doesn't recognize the state of Israel. So, that is something that I think we hope, the administration hopes, that, as part of a—of an effort for resolving the larger issues, we're certainly not going to lose sight of, is very much on Secretary Rice's mind as she traveled to the region, met with Abu Mazen, even in a very brief trip, and was discussed in Rome, as well.

Senator CHAFEE. And you notice I said “contiguous.” What has the United States done about that vision of a contiguous Palestinian state?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think a lot of—a lot of our emphasis has been—before the election of Hamas, was to try and get—to pursue the direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. They're all going to have to live with whatever outcome they come up with, and there are a variety of different proposals to deal with the fact that Gaza Strip is in one place and the West Bank is in another. But I think our interest is in not one particular way of resolving that conflict, but of trying to help the parties find something that would be mutually satisfactory. That has all, as with many other things, been enormously complicated by Hamas.

Senator CHAFEE. I suppose—would you agree with me?—that many of our allies, who you work with daily, would say that—back to the root cause of our—of the problems in the Middle East are associated with our failure to have any progress on this viable contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in peace with Israel?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think—I think—yeah, I think they would, and I think—I think we would say essentially the same thing. There's been no—there's been no lack of interest in the United States Government, for 60 years now, in trying to resolve this problem, but it is—it's obviously difficult. That's why, even as the hostilities continue to—in south Lebanon, this is a time that we need to look at broader solutions that could well make progress on the Palestinian front, as well. I think that's something we

should very much have in mind. I know the Secretary does as she works on the diplomacy in the region.

We obviously have it in mind in New York, where discussions about Lebanon occur simultaneously with discussions about the occupied territories.

Senator CHAFEE. All right. I might disagree with you the effort put behind the rhetoric to that end. But, back to the shape. If I take you at your word it includes this concept of a viable, contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in peace with Israel. What else does the shape of the Middle East look like? I mean, this is a very proactive pronouncement. Shaping the Middle East—

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I—

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Is the defining challenge of our time. I'm curious, what's it look like?

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. I think it's very important for the governments in the region fully to renounce support for terrorism and to find a way to persuade them to stop pursuing weapons of mass destruction. I think it's complicated by sales of technology from places like North Korea and China into the region. And I think that's one reason why the notion of convening the core group in Rome the way the Secretary did is very important. There are a lot of elements at play here. And unless we're willing to look at some of these causes that lie behind the immediate violence, we won't—the—a cessation of hostilities here will simply postpone another violent reckoning to a few months or so down the road. I don't think we should accept that. I think we have to look at the possibility of the kind of arrangement in the region that will lead to longer-term stability instead of just fixing the immediate problem.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, it—once again, it's a little frustrating trying to get an idea of what this shape looks like. It started with a regime change in Iraq, and we've seen our challenges associated with that, and then the failure of the road map, and now the conflagration, as I said, in southern Lebanon. But it's difficult to get an idea of what the administration has in mind, and you're our witness, so I'm asking you if you could give me some idea of what unfolds from here.

Ambassador BOLTON. Right. Well, I do think it's important, if you look at the case of Lebanon, that, if you had—if the steps that have been taken toward the implementation of a full, viable democracy in Lebanon were to continue—if, for example, in addition to having not just the free and fair election of a Lebanese parliament, but the free and fair election of a Lebanese President, if you had the security institutions, the police, the prosecutors, and the courts, able to function independently of external influence, if you had the government exert its authority over the full reach of Lebanese territory, I think that would be a significant step forward that would be visible to others in the region. We know, from conversations, that the efforts to establish a viable democracy in Iraq, and the efforts in Lebanon, have an influence in places like Syria, which has a literate and educated and aware populations, and where people not just in the diaspora, but in Syria itself, are saying, "Well, if they can vote in Lebanon, and they can vote in Iraq, why can't we

vote in Syria, too?" That's a powerful influence, over time. And it's something that we should continue to foster.

Senator CHAFEE. I know my time's up. One quick question. You said that the Chinese and North Koreans are selling arms into the Middle East. Do we have evidence of that? Chinese, in particular?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah, this is—and especially disturbingly in the area of ballistic missile technology, which, in a volatile region, obviously makes things much worse.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, how high a priority do you place on getting a peacekeeping force up and running in Darfur?

Ambassador BOLTON. Very high priority.

Senator SARBANES. This is going to be a U.N. force, is that right? You're quoted as saying, "We think the sooner the U.N. takes control of the mission in Darfur, the better."

Ambassador BOLTON. That's correct.

Senator SARBANES. Now, the United States is very substantially in arrears with respect to peacekeeping dues at the United Nations, is that correct?

Ambassador BOLTON. I wouldn't say "very substantially in arrears." I think that part of this comes from the—part of the calculation comes from the way in which our budget cycle operates, where we will pay the bulk of our assessments for—in what's called the CIPA account, Contribution to the International Peacekeeping Activities, at the end of this year, because of the congressional and administration budget cycles, so that as the U.N. defines arrearages, which become arrearages 30 days after the bill is paid, there are outstanding balances which hopefully will be—when Congress is able to act on the appropriations bill, which I'm sure they will—will be paid before the end of this calendar year.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I have figures that indicate there we're almost a trillion dollars in arrears on peacekeeping operations at the United Nations.

Ambassador BOLTON. I can't believe that's right.

Senator SARBANES. A billion, I'm sorry.

Ambassador BOLTON. Right.

Senator SARBANES. Yeah, 966 million.

Ambassador BOLTON. Right. I think that's, in part, due to the nature of the budget process, as I've just described it.

Senator SARBANES. What part of it is due to that, in your thinking?

Ambassador BOLTON. We project that at the end of fiscal year 2006, we will have \$119 million in arrears, not counting the long-standing pre-Helms-Biden arrears of approximately \$450 million. Of the \$119 million, \$54 million will be paid in the first quarter of fiscal year 2007, and the remaining \$64 million paid when Congress lifts the 25 percent cap on payments to the U.N.

Senator SARBANES. How can we go in and push for the U.N. to assume new peacekeeping operations when we're not paid up for our peacekeeping assessments?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the—we are attempting to pay up for our peacekeeping assessments. The nature of the way

the assessments come in, the way the budget cycle works in the United States, don't mesh. That's a problem with other countries, as well. But I think the—and I don't think—I would have to say, in my experience, that our situation with the arrearages in the peacekeeping account has not been a factor in the discussions in New York on rehatting the force currently in Darfur and making it a U.N. peacekeeping mission. I think everybody's aware of the arrearages, but I don't think that's a factor in any of the negotiations; at least I have not encountered it myself, and I'm not aware that anybody else has raised it.

Senator SARBANES. It's not just peacekeeping; we're also behind on the regular budget, as I understand it.

Ambassador BOLTON. That's correct.

Senator SARBANES. And you don't think that sort of inhibits your ability to function?

Ambassador BOLTON. I'd have to say, quite honestly, I do not.

Senator SARBANES. So, you don't regard it as a matter of high importance—

Ambassador BOLTON. I didn't say that.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. To get it corrected?

Ambassador BOLTON. No, I didn't say that. You asked me if I regard—if I—if it inhibited my activity, and I—

Senator SARBANES. Right.

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Said it did not. But we do regard it as a matter of high importance. That's why the President's budget requests full funding of our assessments, and why we consider it a priority.

Senator SARBANES. On July 24, there was a piece on National Public Radios Morning Edition during which the reporter, Michele Kelemen said, "The idea of regional rotation is not one that U.S. Ambassador John Bolton is buying." Would you say that is an accurate characterization of your position?

Ambassador BOLTON. That sounds like something I've said.

Senator SARBANES. The President, on July 11, was quoted as saying, "We're really looking in the Far East right now to be the Secretary General." What's the U.S. policy on this issue?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the President, at that time, was speaking in response to a question about the potential candidacy of Jordanian Prince Zeid, their permanent representative in New York. And he was essentially saying, that's where the bulk of the activity is. But there—that—it reflected no change in our position that we want the best-qualified person, wherever that person may come from. It is the case, as was indicated in the straw poll that we took in New York on Monday for Secretary General in the Security Council. So far, there are only four candidates announced, endorsed by a member government, and they are all from Asia.

Senator SARBANES. So, you feel your statements are consistent with the President's?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, I do.

Senator SARBANES. When the President is interpreted, at least in the Financial Times, as saying, "Asia's claim appeared to be increasingly firm after George W. Bush, the U.S. President, last Tuesday, appeared to concede the principle of regional rotation."

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, that's the—

Senator SARBANES. "We're really"——

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Financial Times'——

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. "Looking in the Far East"——

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Characterization.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. "Right now to be the Secretary General."

Ambassador BOLTON. That was the Financial Times' characterization. And the White House has developed and issued press guidance that makes it clear that—what I just said, that the President was responding to a question about Jordanian Prince Zeid, and that our policy remained that we wanted the best-qualified person, and that the statements are consistent.

Senator SARBANES. When you first went up to the U.N., you sought to delete the references to the Millennium Development Goals from the outcome document, is that correct?

Ambassador BOLTON. What I sought was to eliminate an ambiguity that had developed over the course of years about that term, which I'd be happy to explain here at greater length, if you'd like.

Senator SARBANES. When the President went to speak at the U.N., he specifically endorsed the Millennium Development Goals, is that not right?

Ambassador BOLTON. That's exactly right. And the ambiguity that we corrected, in fact, in the course of negotiating the outcome document, was as follows: The Millennium Development Goals, as they're frequently called, were originally written in the Millennium Declaration, which was the outcome document that came out of the 2000 Summit in New York. Those goals were endorsed by the United States and by all the member governments, and—that was during the Clinton administration—and were endorsed by the Bush administration shortly after it came into office, as well.

Subsequent to the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, the U.N. Development Program and other U.N. agencies took those goals and attempted to put them in quantifiable terms. Those efforts at quantification were not endorsed by all member governments, and specifically not by the United States. And yet, over time there developed an ambiguity as to what one meant when one used the phrase "Millennium Development Goals."

In the negotiation of the outcome document, we made several efforts to eliminate the ambiguity, and, ultimately, all of the member governments accepted a definition in the outcome document for "Millennium Development Goals" that said, "These are the goals adopted in the Millennium Declaration of 2000." So, obviously, that was something we had accepted, and that President Bush had previously endorsed, even before his speech in New York last September.

Senator SARBANES. I want to address this budget-cap issue at the U.N., which I understand you pressed very hard for. In a column recently in the Washington Post, Sebastian Mallaby wrote, "Not many reformers at the United Nations believe that the budget threat achieved anything. To the contrary, Bolton has so poisoned the atmosphere that the cause of management renewal is viewed by many developing countries as an American plot." In fact, the cap's now been lifted, has it not?

Ambassador BOLTON. That's correct.

Senator SARBANES. You told the committee, in May of last year—

Ambassador BOLTON. May of this year, probably.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. I'm sorry, May of this year—"I think the worst option is that the G-77 comes in, let us say, in the next week, and adopts a resolution that says the spending cap is hereby lifted, period." Isn't that pretty much what eventually happened?

Ambassador BOLTON. The spending cap was lifted without substantial reform being achieved, that's correct. I might say, the spending cap was developed as an idea originally that—something that could be put in place for about 3 months because of our hope that there would be such progress on mandate review that that would be reflected in sufficient changes in the budget that we wouldn't want to adopt a 1-year budget for 2006 and not have the option to change it. And that obviously didn't work out.

Senator SARBANES. You, of course, have seen the New York Times article, just a few days ago, "Praise at Home for Envoy, But Scorn at U.N." That article says, and I quote it now, "Over the past month, more than 30 ambassadors consulted in the preparation of this article, all of whom share the United States' goal of changing United Nations management practices, expressed misgivings over Mr. Bolton's leadership." The article quotes Peter Maurer, the Ambassador of Switzerland, who characterized the American approach as "intransigent and maximalist," and an unnamed ambassador who is said to have close ties to the Bush administration, remarked, "My initial feeling was, let's see if we can work with him, and I have done some things to push for consensus on issues that were not easy for my country, but all he gives us in return is, 'It doesn't matter, whatever you do is insufficient.' He's lost me as an ally now, and that's what many other ambassadors who considered themselves friends of the United States are saying."

What's your response to that?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, look, I am honored to work with the other ambassadors in New York. I think we have effective professional relationships. I think people are motivated by their national interests and policies. And a number of ambassadors came up to me after that article and said they thought it was unfortunate, because it certainly didn't reflect their views, and they hadn't been contacted. But, look, I don't think it's useful to respond to stories that quote anonymous people. In my daily relationships with the ambassadors, I treat them with respect, they treat me with respect. I think we get the job done.

Senator SARBANES. Well, you didn't get the reforms done, did you?

Ambassador BOLTON. We faced substantial opposition to the reforms. I think I've described some of the reasons why. I think we have to continue our efforts. There's no question about that.

Senator SARBANES. After you appeared before this committee and made statements about forming the JUSCANZ group and working with them, were there any objections or protests lodged with the State Department regarding your statements about the JUSCANZ group for its proposal on mandate review?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think that a number of countries that we discussed—that were discussed—didn't realize that there would be as much attention to it as we had gotten, but I—as I said to all of them later, in making amends, that what happens in the United States is, you go into hearings in Congress, and a lot of these things come out.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Ambassador Bolton, thank you for your service and your willingness to run the gauntlet again through this hearing process. I am hopeful, at the end of this hearing process, that we'll be able to exercise our advice and consent and actually have a vote up or down on your nomination. And I think that sort of fairness has not been accorded to us, or to you. And I'd hope, at the end of this, we will have an up or down vote on the Senate floor rather than obstruction.

You have been successful in many areas in your tenure as Ambassador to the United Nations. Rather than blame the United States for North Korea launching missiles, I would blame, first, North Korea, and, second, the country that has the most influence in sustaining North Korea, and that is the People's Republic of China. You have, and we have, worked with our friends and allies, the Japanese, to get as strong a resolution as we could get through without China vetoing.

Insofar as Syria is concerned, you have led an effort, after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, to work with other countries; with France taking the lead, to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. The United Nations had their resolution, which we sponsored with the French, 1559, which still needs to be enforced.

As far as the reform of the United Nations, you tried to get the United Nations, particularly the Human Rights Council, to be reformed. But here we have China and Cuba on the Human Rights Council until the year 2009. That is the sort of lack of credibility this organization has to have such countries actually on the U.N. Human Rights Council. And I know you tried as best you could, and you're going to continue, and the United States will continue in that regard.

Now, insofar as our mission in the United Nations with regard to the current conflict in southern Lebanon and Resolution 1559 from the Security Council, could you share with us the challenges that you face, we face, that Israel faces, and the realistic expectation of getting real action, action that will have an impact on this situation in enforcing Security Council Resolution 1559?

Ambassador BOLTON. Okay. Well, there are many aspects to it, but it seems to me the fundamental aspect is that as long as Hezbollah continues to maintain its capacity as a state within a state, that 1559 cannot be implemented. It's just—it's not realistic to think that you can have an effective government where there's a—an armed group operating within the state functioning as if it's its own government, controlling its own territory, using its own weapons, and functioning at the behest, in many cases, of foreign governments. Given that Iran, by at least some reliable estimates,

contributes \$100 million a year to Hezbollah, they're the paymasters, and they're calling the tune.

And I think this is—the continued existence of Hezbollah as an armed force, contrary to the authority of the Government of Lebanon, is something that's a risk, obviously, not only to our interests and Israel's, but it's just fundamentally contrary to the interests of the Lebanese people. I said earlier, I think, in partial response to one of Senator Chafee's questions, that Hezbollah has a choice to make here. If they want to be a legitimate political party, they can operate like a legitimate political party. They—but they can't be in a situation, as they are now, where they have ministers in the Lebanese Government, but maintain a military capacity, up to and including anti-ship cruise missiles, separate from the Lebanese Government.

So, the responsibility to implement 1559 fundamentally has to address this fact.

There are many other aspects, as I mentioned earlier. Getting Syria to internalize the fact that Lebanon is going to be an independent country, but it has to exchange ambassadors with Lebanon, which you only do between two independent countries. It has to demarcate the border and get its people—its intelligence services out of trying to run parts of the Lebanese Government. That is what the fact that we're in hostilities now in southern Lebanon may give us the opportunity to do, because of Hezbollah's terrorist attacks on Israel. We need to seize the advantage of this opportunity. And one fundamental change that has to come—one of the road maps we have to follow is to get 1559 implemented.

Senator ALLEN. Right. We can look at all the details of exchanging ambassadors between Syria and Lebanon. This recent statement, though—I think everyone has to have some sense of the global picture, the realism of this war that we're engaged in against these radical Islamic terrorists. Al-Qaeda issues this statement, and it shows that al-Qaeda's joining in with Hezbollah and Hamas, and they're all joined in, with statements that, "This jihad will last until our religion prevails from Spain to Iraq." Of course, they've also hit in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well. He said that, "The regimes, some Arab regimes in the region"—referring, undoubtedly, to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—"are accomplices to Israel." And that they're trying to get these martyrs to fight all our enemies. This is a global war.

Now, you take Hezbollah, with these thousands and thousands of rockets—you mentioned the phrase, "Iran is their payment—or their paymasters, and they're calling the tune." Hezbollah is armed by Iran. Is that correct?

Ambassador BOLTON. And by Syria, yes.

Senator ALLEN. And Syria. All right. Where does Iran get these rockets? Do they manufacture or build them themselves, or do they get them from some other country?

Ambassador BOLTON. Some are their own; some, these—the C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles are purchased from China.

Senator ALLEN. Do we know when the most recent purchases from China were?

Ambassador BOLTON. I don't know, myself. We may.

Senator ALLEN. Do you know if China or any other country is presently selling rockets to Iran, or missiles?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, there's no doubt of very extensive Chinese cooperation with the Iranian ballistic missile program. That is one reason why, repeatedly, year after year, numerous Chinese entities are sanctioned by the U.S. Government for violating the provisions of our law that deal with the transmittal of materials and technology involved with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to terrorist states.

Senator ALLEN. Well, as we're dealing with Iran, in the nuclear capabilities of Iran—clearly, China, and then, particularly, Russia, are very important, Iran is important, as they are the funders, the supporters, the directors of Hezbollah. Without Iran, Hezbollah would not have the resources, nor the armaments, to be firing these rockets, in however many thousands they have, into Israel. Do you see them being of—potentially of use, or more of an impediment to a unified United Nations and unified world, precluding Iran from potentially getting nuclear weapons?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think this is—this is something we're trying to work with, with China on now; in particular, in the context of the Perm-5 agreement that said that if Iran failed to take up the offer, the very generous offer that was made to them, that we would move to sanctions in the Security Council. And we have not yet achieved the first step in that resolution. But I think it's critical that China, over—as soon as possible, frankly, internalize the same nonproliferation objectives that we and most other developed countries have, not because we're trying to impose sanctions on China, not because we're trying to deny them commercial sales, but because they need to appreciate, as we have come to appreciate, that the sales of these kinds of technologies and weapons ultimately are threatening to them as a destabilizing force in the world, as a whole.

Senator ALLEN. Well, the reality is, these sales of—whether it's from China or any country to Iran, as I—and Iran funding Hezbollah—to some extent, other—potentially, other terrorist organizations in the world. And then you have the Secretary General, in May of this year, Secretary Annan, issued a recommendation for a global counterterrorism strategy to be considered by the General Assembly. Now, this should be something that the entire world, from Spain to East Asia and everywhere else in the world, ought to be concerned about, with the statements that we get from Hezbollah, from Iran, statements you hear from al-Qaeda, with the deadly intent to carry out these martyr/radical Islamic attacks, killing innocent men, women, and children everywhere.

Now, what is the status of these consultations on this strategy to have a global counterterrorism approach?

Ambassador BOLTON. The short answer is, consultations continue, but the—one of the principal difficulties we have is that we can't reach agreement on a definition of terrorism, which makes it hard to develop a strategy. We have made many efforts, both at the time of the summit in September and since then, and the problem is, there are still a number of governments that think that some kinds of terrorism are acceptable under certain circumstances, versus our view that no form of terrorism is ever acceptable.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. My time is up, and I look forward to, hopefully, voting for you on the Senate floor. And thank you for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Allen.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Ambassador Bolton, welcome to the committee.

Mr. Ambassador, as most of my colleagues here will tell you, I've been on this committee for 25 years, and my normal operating procedures is to be supportive of nominees who come before this committee. I didn't go over the numbers here, but I'm of a mind that Presidents, as a general matter, ought to be able to have their choices to serve in high government positions. That's been my view. In fact, to the extent I've ever been criticized by votes I've cast in those matters, it's usually been because I've supported nominees that many people on my side of the dais here have disagreed with. But I firmly believe that generally that's the case. And I take no great pleasure at all in disagreeing with this nomination. It's not something that I enjoy engaging in normally, but I feel as though I must. And I regret that it seems to me the issues that provoked the opposition I raised a year ago are still with us today, to some degree, and I want to go over some of them, if I can, with you in the time we have here. Some of them may seem like ancient history to some people, but I think they're still very important.

There are four issues, basically. One has to go back with the NSA intercept issue. And I realize that's a matter that was raised a year ago. I realize it's not a matter entirely in your control, because it's a decision made by others, other than yourself. And I'm going to give you a chance to respond to that. The second set of issues has to do with the matter raised, again, a year or so ago, but has to do with the attempts to fire analysts at the CIA. The third issue has to do with decreasing support for the United States among our allies, which is a more current question, and the coordination efforts that you must maintain as an Ambassador to the United Nations with the Department of State. Some of these issues have been raised already by some.

The first issue, the NSA intercept issue, why do I still bring that up? Well, I happen to believe that, as a matter of right, this co-equal branch of government, through appropriate channels, should be able to see and make judgments about matters involving intelligence questions. I've never suggested that all members of this committee or all members of the United States Senate ought to have access to that information. We have appropriate committees and appropriate members, who ought to be able to see this information.

Now, on 19—excuse me, 10 different occasions involving 19 individuals, you requested to see the transcript of these intercepts. Nothing inappropriate about that at all, in your previous position, to see them. I respect that. What I disagreed with, that concerns me, is you also, I'm told—you can correct me if I'm wrong here—requested to know the names of the Americans who were part of those conversations. Now, while it's not extraordinary to request the information, it seems to me it was important to find that infor-

mation out through the appropriate members of this body, as a co-equal branch of government, with an Intelligence Committee, two chairmen, who should have access to it. We went through a lengthy process, myself, Senator Biden, and others, writing letters to Ambassador Negroponte, to Secretary Rice and others, trying to resolve this matter. In fact, to the point of even suggesting we'll provide the name and you just tell us whether or not these people were on the list or not.

Now, first of all, let me ask you whether or not—because I think you've answered this to me, but I—but I want to be on the—I want it to be on the public record—as I recall, you have no objection—correct me if I'm wrong here—that the names of these 19 individuals, U.S. citizens, be revealed to the appropriate members of the United States Senate. Is that still your position?

Ambassador BOLTON. I have no objection. Can I just explain what the circumstances are there? I—

Senator DODD. Well, why don't you just answer that question first, so we can move on, and then I'll give you a chance to respond to it.

Ambassador BOLTON. Fine.

Senator DODD. You have no objection to those names being revealed?

Ambassador BOLTON. Personally, I do not, no.

Senator DODD. Well, then why don't you explain what—let me ask you this. Have you—what important—what was so important in that information that you needed to know the names of those individuals, in addition to the actual content of the conversations?

Ambassador BOLTON. Let me just say, as I said at the beginning of the hearings, 15 months ago, I guess they were, from my personal point of view, I'd have all of this in public, because, frankly, I think if all of these—of all of these things were out in the open, it would be a lot easier to explain. I feel a little constrained now, even talking about the intercept issue in public, but I will try and answer your question to the best I can.

Senator DODD. Well, I'm not going to ask you to reveal any names at all. I'm just—

Ambassador BOLTON. But let me—

Senator DODD [continuing]. Curious about the—

Ambassador BOLTON. No, I understand. I know you would not do that. But let me just explain how this works, and—every day, usually twice a day, sometimes more than that, I get packages of intelligence material—I did, in my previous job—as do senior officials in State and Defense and the NSC. I'm a voracious consumer of intelligence. I read as much as I can. I make no bones about it. I and—in my previous job—and lots of other senior officials, see the results of intercepts. And they're written up in various different ways. But it is the policy of the NSA not to put in the intercepts the names of Americans.

Senator DODD. Correct.

Ambassador BOLTON. Okay? And that includes American entities.

Senator DODD. Correct.

Ambassador BOLTON. Companies, as well as individuals. They follow different patterns. And I couldn't begin to explain why.

Sometimes it'll say that "material's going on," and then it will say "a named American person." Sometimes it says "a named government official." Sometimes—and I've seen this for myself—it will say "the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations." Not hard to figure out who that is. But there are times when, as you're reading along the material trying to understand what it really means, it can be enhanced if you know the name of the American involved. So, what I did on 10 occasions—you're quite right, 10 occasions—4 times in 2003, 3 times in 2004, and 3 times in 2005—following procedures that are set up for precisely this purpose, made a request of the INR Bureau of the State Department to receive the names of the—what is called the "minimized names." That's the whole process—this is called "minimization." The INR, pursuant to procedures, passed that request along to NSA, which, pursuant to their procedures, I believe, in all 10 cases, agreed to provide the name.

Now, all of this has been extensively written up in correspondence and statements by Senator Roberts, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, but I think what I'm trying to make clear is, I didn't say, "Send me all the information on Mr. Smith," or, "I want Mr. Smith—I want information about Mr. Smith." You're sitting there at your desk, reading along, and suddenly you come upon "a named American individual," and you say, "Well, who is that? How—would that help me understand the intelligence better?" And it's not just that I, or any other senior official, asks for it and we get it automatically; you have to state a reason, it goes through INR, it goes through NSA, and, as I say, in these cases, appears to have been approved. Other senior officials do the same thing.

And I have to tell you, when I took this job, and I was coming in, and getting my intelligence briefings, I was briefed. The official giving me the briefing said, "Now, let me explain to you how you request a name under minimization," and then laughed and said, "Well, I guess you already know that, don't you?" This is something that is—it's part of the legitimate needs of the jobs involved. It is subject to check. It's not at the individual's exclusive discretion—

Senator DODD. I appreciate—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. By any stretch of the imagination.

Senator DODD [continuing]. I appreciate the answer. And you'll appreciate, as well, that, as a member of this body here—and, again, I'd reiterate for you here, not a request by all 100 members of the United States Senate, but the appropriate members of this body to be able to have access to that kind of information. It was an issue that was raised, obviously at a sensitive time. We have since discovered, of course, in December of last year, a widespread issue involving warrantless wiretaps that have provoked even further discussion. But for the two members of the committee to be told by the administration that they couldn't have access to that same information, which you, as a member of the administration, had, to determine—in fact, to corroborate, if you will—that which you've just said here, was the source of significant contention, considering your nomination. And—

Ambassador BOLTON. I remember.

Senator DODD. Of course you do. And I make the point here again, it's still an issue, in a sense. And I think my colleagues—while some may discount it, I think it's very important for the United States Senate, when matters arise like this—this matter could have been dealt with, I would point out, if it had—along the lines you just described, I think it might have become almost a minor issue, if in fact, your analysis and your description of this is as it is, then certainly it might have moved right along. The fact that there was such resistance to it provoked a lot of concerns among members on this side of the dais about the rationale for seeking those names, what happened to those names. That's all the point I wanted to make.

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah, that's—I appreciate that. I just want to follow up on one point. As I said, if it were only my equities at stake, it would be fine with me, because I think it would eliminate this issue. There are other equities. It's not just my personal fortunes that are at issue here, having to do, in part, with the relationship between the intelligence community and Congress, and the relationship between the Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House and the other committees. But, as you know—you were kind enough—at one point, I asked Senator Biden, during those discussions, if I could come up and see him, and you joined that meeting. I thought we had a good discussion about it. I would—nobody would be more pleased if we could resolve the issue. But I do think these—there are other serious considerations. I'd certainly be willing to continue the discussions about the question. I'd have to talk to others in the administration. I have spoken to John Negroponte about it, and—you know, let's see what might happen.

Senator DODD. Well, I appreciate that.

And, Mr. Chairman, I might make a request of you and Senator Biden that, in light of Mr. Bolton's—Ambassador Bolton's response here, that maybe a request of Ambassador Negroponte about this could be one way of trying to resolve this issue. Again, my request is not that all members of this committee, or even necessarily the chairman or the ranking member of this committee, but the appropriate members of the Intelligence Committee, have access to the information to determine whether or not it would warrant any further investigation by the committee. And if that's the case, it would certainly help alleviate this issue. I know you did once, already, a year ago, Mr. Chairman. I was very grateful to you at that time. But I might request that a similar request be made again to see if we can't resolve this matter. I'll leave it to your consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the chair respond that we will try to obtain this information. As the Senator remembers, there were long arguments between committees about jurisdiction, quite apart from the administration. And all of these powers that be may have changed their minds. But, nevertheless—

Senator DODD. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. I acknowledge the request, I honor it, and I will try to make certain our record is as complete as possible.

Senator DODD. And I appreciate that. And I just—I realize this is going back in time, but the issue is still an important one, in my view, in terms of the relationship between the executive and legislative branch, in the conduct of this kind of business.

Let me move, if I can, to another issue that came up at the time, and it has to do with my concern. And let me say, Mr. Ambassador, this is—of all the issues, I think this one, in my mind, is maybe the most significant one, and a problem that I just have, generally, and that is the issue of attempting to pressure analysts in our intelligence agencies to produce information that would conform to a particular point of view in the conduct of foreign policy. And I would want to say, over and over again here, whether this was a Democratic administration or a Republican administration, in my view, anyone—whoever attempts to do this, in my view, does not deserve to be confirmed—or confirmed for any high-ranking position. I'm just deeply concerned with this—the ability to have solid, reliable information. And I know that it may—I don't disagree with the arguments and disputes over this, but when attempts are made—and it was seven high-ranking Bush officials who strongly recommended to this committee, over a year ago, that you not be confirmed for this position, because of matters relating to this issue.

And one of the matters that occurred—and I raise it with you here again today, because we didn't have a chance to raise it during your confirmation hearing—involved the case of a national intelligence officer for Latin America, who we'll call Mr. Smith here. When asked about your conversation with a senior official at the National Intelligence Council, Stuart Cohen, you said the following at the committee hearing, "I also knew that in the weeks and months previous thereto dealing with this Mr. Smith, who was the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere, had told me and others he had very grave concerns with Mr. Smith on a range of issues. And I think I said to Mr. Cohen, in the course of our conversation, that, based on what I had seen in my limited area, that I agreed with him. And that was it. I had one part of one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. Smith, and that was it. I let it go," end of quote.

That was your testimony before this committee. The committee subsequently found documentary evidence to the contrary. For example, in late July of 2002, after your meeting with Mr. Cohen, your staff drafted letters to the CIA leadership seeking the removal of Mr. Smith and indicated in e-mails that, quote, "John doesn't want this to slip any further." Discussion between your office and Mr. Reich's office continued until October.

I'd ask you whether or not you stand by your earlier testimony that your effort to seek the removal of Mr. Smith was one part of one conversation, one time.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, let me say, as a general proposition, I have not had a chance to go back over all the materials generated last spring. I've been a little busy in New York, and my memory is now 15 months older than it was then. But I can tell you this, those letters were never sent, because I didn't want to do that.

Senator DODD. You didn't want to do what?

Ambassador BOLTON. I didn't want to seek Mr. Smith's removal. I had made the point that his conduct—not his intelligence analysis, but his conduct—saying to people that the famous Heritage speech on the "beyond the axis of evil" had not been cleared by the intelligence community, when it had been. And it disturbed me

that people—that—it always disturbs me when people promulgate falsehoods, and that's what bothered me about his conduct. Otto Reich, you quite rightly say, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, had much broader concern with Mr. Smith. I think I testified an opinion that he was—he felt strongly about because of his area of policy responsibility.

Senator DODD. Did you draft the letters, or did your staff draft the letters—

Ambassador BOLTON. The staff drafted the letters, and they were never sent.

Senator DODD. And did you review the letters? Did you agree with the drafts of the letters?

Ambassador BOLTON. Of course. That's why they were never sent.

Senator DODD. So, you disagreed with them.

Ambassador BOLTON. I did not want them sent, and they were not sent.

Senator DODD. All right. Thanks.

Let me move on to the second—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, your—

Senator DODD. Time up? I apologize. Then I'll come back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was reflecting on the comments of Chairman Warner—it seems too long ago—when he talked about the complexity of the challenges facing the United States today and the importance of the continuity of representation. And I do want to say, up front, that that's important and that I think the decision facing us is whether we confirm the nomination—the renomination of this President. We have an acting ambassador who is there, he's doing the job—whether we walk in, in January, with the possibility of not having that continuity of representation, when the issues that face us are so great, in North Korea, in Lebanon, and in Israel, in Iran, and on and on and on. And so, I just hope my colleagues reflect upon that.

Just a couple of questions. In the—when the G-77 rejected the—what I saw as the modest reforms set forth by the Attorney General, I think you said the vote was about 122 to 50. Is that correct?

Ambassador BOLTON. The General Assembly (plenary) vote resulted in 121 in favor, 50 opposed, and 2 abstentions.

Senator COLEMAN. And in terms of the JUSCANZ group, did Japan vote with us on that?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, they did.

Senator COLEMAN. And Canada, are they part of that group? Did they vote—

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. With us on that?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, they did.

Senator COLEMAN. And New Zealand, did they vote with us on that?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, they did.

Senator COLEMAN. And when one looks at the breakdown of the U.N.-member contributions to the assessed budget—we're first, Japan's second—what about Germany? Did they vote with us on that?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, all of the European Union countries voted with us.

Senator COLEMAN. So—and I—one of my concerns here, as I listen, is, you're being held to account, or held to blame, for the G-77 trashing reform, when, in fact, our allies, and those who are contributing the money, were all with us. I mean, that coalition you held together, but the nature of the U.N. is, not everybody is with us.

I—and it's interesting, I was just listening to the protesters, and I was reflecting on it, and I would bet that if you asked the two protectors that we had, to cite a single statement of John Bolton or a single action of John Bolton that they object to, I doubt that they could do it. Their opposition is to U.S. policy.

And perhaps the most encouraging thing I heard this morning was from the ranking member, who said, "I don't want to hold you accountable for the administration action or inaction." And if you really look at the opposition, at times, to this nomination, there are two things. It's—one, it's opposition to U.S. policy, which, by the way, even amongst us, on this side of the table, I think it's fair to say we don't always agree. We don't always agree with this administration. But I think what we do fundamentally agree with is the belief that the President has the right to have his voice and his representation, somebody he trusts, representing us at the United Nations. That's the—to me, the fundamental question here.

And to look at the area of U.N. reform, and to say that somehow the failure of those nations that don't have an interest in—and, by the way, don't have the skin in the game, aren't funding the United Nations, that their resistance is somehow a reflection of your failure, I—just a little bit of history. The ranking member talked about—gave Ambassador Holbrooke great credit for—when we had the issue with our arrears. Was Helms-Biden in effect at that time?

Ambassador BOLTON. No, that was the—the negotiation that actually led to Helms-Biden.

Senator COLEMAN. And tell me a little bit about Helms-Biden.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, it was a—an arrangement whereby the United States essentially paid back the arrearages that had been developed during the mid-1990s as a consequence of congressional withholdings because of dissatisfaction with the U.N., in exchange for lowering the United States' assessed share of contributions to the budget.

Senator COLEMAN. But, in part, then, it was what I might label playing hardball, saying, "Congress is saying we're going to hold back some dues," that led to a resolution of this matter.

Ambassador BOLTON. The hardest kind of hardball, holding the money back.

Senator COLEMAN. And my question, then, would be, today, kind of, looking at U.N. reform and the failure of the G-77 to move forward, would it be fair to say that many folks at the United Nations do not believe that there's the political will in this body, in the Congress, to hold back, to do what we did with Helms-Biden, if that was necessary to achieve reform?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think many of them do have the attitude that, "This, too, shall pass," and that life will go on. I really think Paul Volcker's insight, his characterization of the problem, that he came to after the enormous study of the Oil-for-Food Programme, of describing the problem at the U.N. as being the "culture of inaction"——

Senator COLEMAN. And I need—I actually asked him whether it was a "culture of corruption."

Ambassador BOLTON. Right.

Senator COLEMAN. He wouldn't go that far, but he said—and, by the way, that "culture of inaction," that was there before John Bolton was appointed Permanent—acting as Permanent Representative.

Ambassador BOLTON. It's been there for a long time. But it's a profound insight, because it indicates not simply opposition to moving this box or changing this line on an organizational diagram, it's a more—it's a more profound difficulty that we have, and why I think that real reform, to get to what Secretary Rice called "the lasting revolution of reform," is going to—is a difficult task.

Senator COLEMAN. So, help me understand. What's next for real reform? What—if there is—if there can be any sense of optimism, what's the next step, in terms of real reform? And is there anything that we, in Congress, can do to assist the efforts to achieve reform?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think we're going to continue to pursue all three of the broad areas that we outlined: management reform, which was the subject of the unfortunate vote in the Fifth Committee, opposing many of the Secretary General's management reforms; the mandate review, which is the—I think, the principal requirement of the outcome document in the area of U.N. reform, to look at these 9,000 U.N. mandates and try to eliminate the ones that are outmoded, consolidate those that are duplicative, and reprioritize what the U.N. is—focus the priorities among other things—when you have that many mandates, it's hard to see how you have any priorities; and then, also, to work on continuing to strengthen things like whistle-blower reform and the Ethics Office.

I might say, in that regard, I've met, some weeks back, with the head of the U.N. Staff Union. I think I may be the first U.S. Permanent Representative to meet with the head of the Staff Union. And they had had a study commissioned of the whistle-blower protection regulations and the Ethics Office, because they, in effect, represent the people who are going to be the whistle-blowers, and their conclusion was that the regulations were weak, and the office was weak, as well.

So, that was a—that was a disturbing piece of news, but it's—these are important priorities. We're going to continue to work with them. I hope to have the chance to talk to the Staff Union again and learn some more from them. I wish I had done it earlier in my tenure, frankly, but I'm glad I did it when I did.

Senator COLEMAN. But I'm still trying to understand—other than discussion, is there any kind of leverage that we have to actually make mandate review happen, actually to have a strengthened Office of Investigative Services? Is there any kind of leverage that

you have, in dealing with G-77, who have made it clear that they don't have a—an interest in significant reform?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think that it's very important that the—all the countries in New York know that Congress is acutely interested in the outcome of this reform, and that it's not just the administration, or certainly not just yours truly. And I think that Senator Lugar mentioned earlier that you and he and Senator Voinovich had come up, back in February, your colleagues on the other side of the Hill have come up, as well. I think it's important that those kinds of trips continue, and that Congress make its voice heard that these reforms are important to making the U.N. stronger and more effective, and that we're not in a position where we're going to wait forever for this to happen.

Senator COLEMAN. Let me just get back to that historical point, because I think it has relevance for today. When we go back to the clearing up arrears, is it fair to say that Helms-Biden and the threat of—or using our financial leverage was a critical factor in resolving that situation?

Ambassador BOLTON. I don't think there's any question about it. And I've had my own personal experiences with the use of the—of financial resources as leverage. And it's been effective.

Senator COLEMAN. Just on a personal note, because I admire your commitment to service, Ambassador, and, kind of, going through what you've had to go through to even be here at this point. First, overall, your impression of the U.N. You had some strong feelings. You knew the organization. You were involved in it. Then, you were on the outside. Then you—now you're there. Is there—has your impression of the U.N. changed? Has there been anything that surprised you in the last year?

Ambassador BOLTON. Not really.

Senator COLEMAN. I don't know whether that's good or bad, by the way, but—

Ambassador BOLTON. I think there's a lot of work to do. I thought it on July 31 of last year, the day before the President appointed me, and on July the 27th; today, I still think there's a lot of work to do.

Senator COLEMAN. As you look to the future, understanding all the shortcomings, understand the culture of inaction, understand the difficulty of pulling together consensus on a Security Council, as we look, kind of, into the crystal ball—and if I just pick a couple of areas—Lebanon: the time is not ripe now for negotiations, and I think you've made it clear, and the Secretary's made it clear, that we need a—some longer-term—the possibility of longer-term stability there. But what role do you see the Security Council playing in dealing—resolving the Lebanese situation at some point in the future?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the Council can have, and should have, a—an important role in continuing to push for full implementation of 1559 and 1680 and the other resolutions that flow from that. And I think 1559 is an interesting example, if I may point out. That resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 6 abstentions, including Russia and China. So, there was a case—and 9 being the absolute minimum number of votes under the U.N. charter by which the Council can adopt a resolution. So, that was

a case where there was not unanimity on the Council, but where the plan laid out by 1559 has been, I think, critical in helping to shape the way ahead. There's more work the Council can do. I think there's more work in backing up the International Investigatory Commission that was set up under 1595 to investigate the Hariri assassination, where we've also granted it additional authority to cooperate with the Government of Lebanon in investigating some 14 other terrorist assassinations that were conducted there, hopefully to see if there are patterns that persist among those assassinations that may tell us more about who the perpetrators are. So, I think the Council has a lot of work to do in the Lebanon area, and I think it's a principal part of Secretary Rice's planning and her negotiations, that 1559 and the Taif Agreement provide the guiding principles.

Senator COLEMAN. And thank you. But I just want to, Ambassador, in closing, I've been to the United Nations with the chairman and Senator Voinovich, I've watched you work, I've visited with your colleagues. I want you to know you have my unequivocal, unhesitating support that we need to confirm this nomination, and I hope we get a chance for an up or down vote.

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Now, let me mention, before I recognize Senator Feingold, that I've asked Senator Coleman to chair the committee. The Chair will need to leave the hearing for a period of time, starting at about 11:45. I presume the hearing is going to go on for a while, and I'm grateful to Senator Coleman for his longstanding interest in the United Nations, as well as the Ambassador, for taking hold, at that point.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bolton, welcome. I obviously don't have to tell you how important the position of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. is today. We're looking to the United Nations to help us respond to some of the biggest threats to international peace and security, including violence in the Middle East, escalating nuclear crises in Iran and North Korea, growing instability in Somalia, and ongoing genocide in Darfur. We need the U.N. to serve as a forum where we can work with other nations to address issues that directly affect our own national security, and to get real results. That does mean we need to reform the U.N. to make it more effective and more accountable, but real reform will require U.S. leadership, not just brinksmanship, bullying, or scorn.

Ambassador Bolton, I opposed your nomination last year because of your hostility toward the United Nations. Concerns that you had pursued a personal policy agenda while holding public office that led me to question whether you were really the best person to advance U.S. interests at the U.N. And it gives me no pleasure to say that your record over the last year has not sufficiently put those concerns to rest. It's not just a question of being tough, it's a question of achieving U.S. objectives. We need that kind of leadership now more than ever. It is simply not enough to blame all of our failures at the U.N. over the last year on bureaucratic inefficiency

or organization ineptitude. We need an Ambassador at the U.N. who can deliver results.

And my first question, Ambassador, is, sort of, taking a look at the record over the last year at the United Nations, I tend to see, time and time again, a failure to build consensus on a number of important issues. Let me just mention a few, some of which my colleagues have already mentioned: A World Summit outcome document that failed to include a single reference to nuclear non-proliferation or a definition of "terrorism"; a flawed Human Rights Council; lack of significant progress on management reform; a divisive budget-cap deadlock, slow progress toward an effective Security Council on Iran; a watered-down resolution on North Korea. Let me ask you why we should have confidence that you will have more success in the future, particularly as we're facing an almost perfect storm of international crises that we're looking to the U.N. to help us address.

Ambassador BOLTON. In part, Senator, I would take issue with your assessment of the outcomes in some of the areas that you've mentioned. I think the resolution on North Korea unanimously adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 1695 was a significant step—first resolution in 13 years on North Korea. I think we are going to get the resolution on Iran, and I think it will be a significant step forward to make mandatory the requirement that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. I think that the negotiations that we engaged in, in the outcome document, substantially improved that document, and the fact that there were no provisions in it on arms control and disarmament was due to some fundamental disagreements that existed, and it certainly takes more than one to disagree.

There is a process of—that's required to get the reform that we want undertaken, and that does require a significant amount of effort. I think it's significant that, while the scandals of the Oil-for-Food Programme, for example, had a profound influence on this country, in Congress and in public opinion, that was difficult to get the attention of many people to the need for sweeping reform that was revealed by the Oil-for-Food Programme.

I think when we had examples of procurement fraud and U.N. peacekeeping activities, when we looked at the continuing extent of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, we ran into opposition with even having the Security Council investigate those matters.

So, I don't, believe me, take full credit for successes at the U.N. I'm fully aware that a lot of the work that goes into those successes takes place in Washington and through our embassies in other capitals. But neither is the case, I think, that it's accurate to say—when you have the accumulated inertia that we see at the U.N., and the need to overcome that culture of inaction, that whatever success, or lack, that we have to date is entirely attributable to me, one way or the other.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, and I think that's fair. But the question is whether the approach and the emphasis and the tone that you take assists us in getting those resolutions, or does not. And that's my main concern.

And, just as a point, the North Korea resolution, did—as you well know, did not include Chapter VII sanctions, something that you indicated was crucial.

Ambassador BOLTON. No, I—actually, I did not indicate that. What I indicated, and said to the press and said in all the negotiations, that we wanted a binding resolution on—a resolution that would bind North Korea. And it's our judgment that that's exactly what it does. There is a lengthy and, some would say, theological debate about how one does that in a Security Council resolution. I think the conclusion we reached is that you look at the entire language of the resolution, and that—our conclusion was—and the conclusion of our friends—and I include, specifically there, Japan, which was, of all the Council members, in addition to the United States, most concerned that that resolution bind North Korea—that we concluded that it did.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, that surprises me a little bit. I—it sounds like a little bit of—like an after-the-fact characterization. But let me move on.

Senator Coleman alluded to this. Lately you've been quoted in the press talking about the pressure building in Congress to withhold contributions from the U.N. At this time, when we're working with the U.N. on a number of global crises, do you think the United States should pay its obligations to the U.N.?

Ambassador BOLTON. It is unequivocally the position of the administration to pay our assessed contribution, but I've worked in and studied the U.N. for roughly 25 years now, and I've seen, in the mid-1980s, in the mid-1990s, the dissatisfaction levels in Congress grow to the point where our assessments were withheld. And I think there is enormous dissatisfaction. I think it's one of the reasons why we have tried to persuade others of the urgency of U.N. reform, so that we don't find ourselves in that situation again.

Senator FEINGOLD. But, having said that, do you think the United States should pay its obligations to the U.N.?

Ambassador BOLTON. As I said about 30 seconds ago, yes, I do.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. Getting a U.N. peacekeeping mission into Darfur has been a high-level U.S. priority. And I just want to ask why you didn't travel with other Security Council members to Darfur when they went to Sudan earlier this year. Is this some indication of the importance of the issue to you? If you could say a bit about that.

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah, I had, long before the timing of that mission was scheduled, made a personal commitment in the United Kingdom. A lot of people had gone to a lot of effort to put that in place, and I didn't feel that I could break the commitment, as a matter of my personal word. Instead, I sent the—our alternative representative to the Security Council, Ambassador Sanders, who was with the delegation through its entire trip in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad.

Senator FEINGOLD. You're saying it was a personal commitment of a business nature, not a—

Ambassador BOLTON. No, no, of—well—

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. It was not a personal commitment, in the sense of your own family.

Ambassador BOLTON. Right, that's correct.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right.

On June 19 of this year, you told the press that you did not see the need for an expanded United Nations mission in East Timor, despite the severe breakdown of the new nation's security forces that took place in April and May. And the next day, the United States voted for a Security Council resolution requesting a report on the role for the United Nations in Timor, taking into account the current situation, the need for a strengthened presence of the United Nations.

How would you characterize this apparent discrepancy between your statement to the press and the later official U.S. position?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, the—I don't know what you're quoting from, but I know there was a—there were statements, at the time, that the U.N. had left East Timor prematurely. And I—in response to a question, I said I didn't think that the current difficulties in East Timor had anything to do with the reason for the earlier U.N. presence in East Timor, which was the independent struggle from Indonesia, and made the comment in response to that kind of question. So, I think it was addressing the historical circumstances, but was not—it was not related to the current situation, where we are actively consulting with Australia and other key countries to determine exactly what the appropriate U.N. response is to the outbreak of violence in East Timor.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, other questions today have had to do with the importance that our Government be consistent in its message. So, this has—this issue about East Timor relates to that concern. And can I—

Ambassador BOLTON. If you could show me the quotation, Senator, I'd be happy to take a look at it again.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are you talking about your quotation?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah.

Senator FEINGOLD. I will be happy to get that for you.

But, first, I want to do a follow-up question. I understand that East Timor will be a focus of the Security Council in August to discuss the report findings and determine the possible need for a larger U.N. presence. If the report calls for an expanded U.N. force, would you support it? And what do you consider to be the appropriate role for the international community in East Timor?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I'd have to—I'd have to look at the entire report and, obviously, consult within the Government. I don't make these decisions on my own. I follow instructions from Washington. As I said to you a moment ago, we've been in very close touch with the Australians, particularly their permanent representative, who is a former minister of defense of Australia, to be sure that our policy is closely coordinated with that government, given their troops on the ground. And I would expect that we would want to stay in very close touch with them and align our policies. And I would expect that's what will happen.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COLEMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator VOINOVICH.

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, welcome back to the committee. And I wanted to thank you for your service at the United Nations.

You serve at one of the most challenging, critical, and fragile times in our Nation's history. I think our President has more on his international plate than maybe any President since FDR. We're confronting serious national security and humanitarian challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan. I think Senator Feingold did a good job of defining what we're confronted with. We're now in the midst of a crisis in the Middle East, where Israel is battling with Hamas and Hezbollah. A cease-fire is being contemplated, and all that goes along with it. And Israel's relations with Lebanon is at an all-time low.

And, last but not least, I think that we need to understand that we have a war against Islamic extremists who have hijacked the Quran to make people believe the jihad against us and people that share our values is consistent with the Quran. And yesterday I was really pleased that Prime Minister Maliki made a point that suicide, killing of women and children, is not consistent with Quran, and that freedom, rule of law, human rights was consistent with the Quran.

And I would think that all of us should be praying to the Holy Spirit that he enlightens our President and other world leaders at this time to make good and wise decisions.

Mr. Chairman, my position regarding Mr. Bolton's stewardship at the U.N. is outlined in an opinion piece that appeared in the Washington Post last week. I would also be happy to speak to any of my colleagues about the time I've spent talking to John Bolton in person and on the phone, and also the telephone conversations that I have had with John Bolton's colleagues on his performance at the United Nations.

And, I think, for members of this committee to rely on a recent article in the New York Times as the basis for judging his performance is not fair, and I would suggest that they pick up the phone and talk with his colleagues at the U.N., as I have.

And, again, I'd be glad to share those conversations that I had with these people that work with you, Mr. Bolton, with the members of this committee.

Now, you've served as Ambassador since August of last year. You've faced a very difficult atmosphere at the U.N. Anybody representing the United States at the U.N. has got a tough job. I congratulate you on the success that we had on the compromise resolution on North Korea, with Russia and China. I think it was significant. In fact, this committee had a wonderful presentation by Chris Hill—was it last week or the week before?—about how significant that resolution was in getting Russia and China to go along with it.

My first question is, what is your opinion on the chance that the P-5 and Germany will be able to agree on a strong resolution that will deal with Iran's defiance of the International Atomic Energy, the International Arms Control Regime, and the United Nations?

Ambassador BOLTON. Senator, I'm optimistic we're going to reach agreement. I had hoped we would have reached agreement more quickly, but, in part because of the hostilities in southern Lebanon, it's been a busy time, and we've had to juggle a number of things. But this is a priority, because we contemplate in the resolution that when we make the suspension of uranium enrichment activi-

ties mandatory, we're going to give Iran a brief grace period within which—yet again, to give them another opportunity to accept that they're going to have to suspend their uranium enrichment activities—after which we will return, as our foreign ministers have already agreed, to the question of Security Council sanctions. So, we're eager to get this in place. There's yet time for the Iranians to respond affirmatively to the very generous offer we've put forward. But, in any event, it is important to get the uranium enrichment activities suspended, or at least order Iran to suspend those activities promptly.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would suggest that that's a good example of the multilateral approach that we've been following in the United Nations, and one that you have been participating in. I think one of the concerns that everyone had was that you might go up there and do your own thing and didn't understand how important consensus was. And I think that you've been very, very active in working on consensus to get things done in the United Nations.

The other question that I have is the—tell me about the status of reforms now. Senator Coleman made some reference to that. The budget cap has been lifted. And the cap was lifted by consensus in late June. We disassociated with consensus with Japan and Australia. And, specifically, what is the status of the management reforms that Kofi Annan proposed in his report entitled "Investing in the United Nations"? And I think it's important for everyone to understand that what he recommended pretty much mirrored with what George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich suggested. It mirrored what Paul Volcker had suggested after he did his investigation into the Oil-for-Food scandal. The proposals were blocked by the G-77. And now that the budget cap's lifted, is there still hope that we can achieve the reforms in this proposal and streamline the organizations as its procurement policies—and its procurement policies?

Now, 50 countries opposed the G-77's resolution to block the Annan management proposal. So, that's pretty significant, that they were—they wanted to see those proposals go forward. The question now is that—now the cap is lifted—what kind of cooperation are we going to get from these 50 people—countries—to move forward with these reforms that are absolutely necessary if the United Nations is going to be successful?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think for many of the 50 countries that voted with us on the management reforms, there was a great deal of disappointment that when we came to the expiration date for the expenditure cap, June 30, that we did not have any progress, any real progress in the mandate review area, and that we were stymied on the management reform front. We all said—we had a meeting with the G-77 a few weeks before that date; Japan, the United States, and Austria, which was then president of the European Union—and we all said essentially the same thing to the G-77. We wanted to see the cap lifted, by consensus, but we wanted substantial progress in management reform by June 30, and we wanted a road map to the end of the year as to how we were going to finish the mandate review.

And the state of play now is that the expenditure cap has, in fact, been lifted, but we do not have—we did not make substantial progress, and we're still going to have to work on the way ahead.

I think it's very important that we continue to make a maximum effort, although the expenditure cap is lifted. When we were in the final days of deliberation, one ambassador from a Latin American country very close to the United States said, "You know, look, the expenditure cap was necessary. We need an incentive to push ourselves along here. But we're going to have to now try and do it without the expenditure cap." And I think the—you know, the question remains unanswered whether we'll be successful.

Our commitment, and I think the commitment of the JUSCANZ countries and the European Union and the major contributors as a whole, is to continue this effort.

Senator VOINOVICH. So that there is a strategy to continue to push this. I know that the European Union did not go along with disassociating, as you did, but—

Ambassador BOLTON. Right.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. I understand, from talking to some of them, that they are still very much in favor of reform.

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, they are. And I think that commitment is even stronger now, in a sense, because when they did disassociate, there wasn't any coinciding success that they could point to. So, the importance of achieving some of these objectives remains very high for them, for exactly that reason.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is there anything that this committee can do to be helpful to you? I know, once, we talked about the possibility of getting resolutions passed in various parliamentary groups indicating how concerned we all were about the fact that reforms have been stymied.

Ambassador BOLTON. I think that's the kind of idea that would still be worth pursuing, if members of the committee are interested in doing it. You know, I've had occasion, when parliamentarians from other countries visit, and the—their permanent reps invite me and others to come and speak to the visiting delegation. I've been impressed, with a number of these visiting delegations of parliamentarians, how strongly they feel about U.N. reform, too. And they're concerned about where their contributions are being—how they're being spent and whether they're being spent effectively.

So, I think, at the level of people who are actually elected by citizens, this concern is quite widespread, and I think it would send an important signal. I'd welcome any activity that the committee might be willing to undertake, or individual members, in that regard.

Senator VOINOVICH. I understand that Mark Wallace is doing a great job up there. I know we've met—

Ambassador BOLTON. He is, indeed.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. I met with Mark. I was impressed. And, in fact, I understand he has put on a lot of weight attending—

Ambassador BOLTON. Diplomatic lunches and dinners, absolutely. [Laughter.]

Senator VOINOVICH. Yeah. And I just want to make it clear that, from what I understand, that you and your staff have made an at-

tempt to do more outreach, which is one of my recommendations, to get out there and meet these folks. And I want to express my gratitude for these efforts. I'm very pleased to hear that there is more communication and outreach going on at the United Nations, and I really sincerely hope that it will continue.

Last, but not least, mandate review. The G-77 has expressed its opposition to the review of almost 96 percent of the organization's mandates, and also seems to oppose any kind of deadline for conducting the review. I have personally spoken to the Canadians and the Pakistanis, who cochair the Committee on Mandate Review. I feel pretty bad that the Canadian is leaving. I was very impressed. I spent over a half an hour with him, a really top-notch person, and probably some setback that he's walking away and—will a Canadian take his place?

Ambassador BOLTON. It has been decided by the president of the General Assembly that he'll be replaced by the Irish permanent representative. And he has already begun his work.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you want to comment on those negotiations? And what chance do you think that—that we're going to make progress?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, the point that you made is a good example of some of the difficulties that we've had. In the outcome document in September of last year, the language we negotiated said that the mandate review would examine all mandates older than 5 years, and—that's what it said, all mandates older than 5 years—on the theory that that was a manageable undertaking, not really realizing, then, it would encompass something like 9,000 mandates. But the G-77, after we agreed to that, interpreted that language as saying all mandates older than 5 years that have not been renewed within the last 5 years. And, because General Assembly resolutions tend to repeat themselves and reaffirm other resolutions, it turned out that 93 percent of the mandates older than 5 years had been reaffirmed within the last 5 years, which means, if you bought the G-77 interpretation, 150 heads of state—

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, can I ask you something? Why is the G-77 doing what they're doing? Explain it to us.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think it's—I wish I could give you an answer that covered it completely, but I think, in part, because the way—there's a level of satisfaction with the way things are going that says, "We don't really have a problem here, we don't really need to change, we're satisfied with the way things are, we're a little worried about what the differences might be." We have made the argument to them that if we could make the U.N. stronger, more effective, more transparent, more efficient, that, in a way, it would be a strong inducement to the United States to turn to the U.N. more often for problem solving, but that the failure to make these reforms happen is an impediment to us doing that. So that, ironically, what we see is that many of the people—many of the governments most critical of the United States for not turning to the U.N. more often are exactly the governments that are standing in the way of reform.

We've tried to make the point that reform is in everybody's interest. This is not just a U.S. priority. This should be a priority for

everybody, as it was on the management side with the Secretary General. And it's—I think the point is correct, and I think we need to keep making it, because I'm hopeful we'll be persuasive.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Voinovich, your time is expired.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

Thanks, Mr. Bolton, for being here—Mr. Ambassador.

I just want to talk about this particular argument that we're having over this nominee and whether to confirm him, because I think it's important to note that Senator Voinovich has changed his views, but he didn't—he voted to bring this nomination to the floor, so it really hasn't changed, in terms of this committee's vote. I just—unless others have changed. And I really haven't talked to anybody else.

And I also want to make a comment about this argument that Senator Coleman makes about continuity. And I have to say this as clearly as I can. I think this argument is reflective of a very weak and subservient Senate, because, regardless of who is the President, be it a Republican or a Democrat, what kind of message are we sending?

Senator Dodd, in a very respectful and clear way, pointed out that the issues a lot of us had are still there. Now, maybe Mr. Bolton would help us get the information we need, but, as of this point, he's—maybe he's trying to; it's beyond his ability to deliver—but the fact is, this administration wants this particular candidate confirmed. We still haven't gotten the answers to our questions. The problems prevail. And now we're going to have another debate now. So, here's the message: continuity. Continuity. So, it sends to any future, and certainly to this administration—and, again, whether Democratic or Republican—"Simply pick whoever you want, and then come back in a few months and argue continuity." I mean, what does this say about the balance of powers and the separation of powers? So, it goes beyond Ambassador Bolton. He's just a particular person now that's caught up in this situation.

I want to talk about Iraq, because I'm very troubled by so many things that are happening there, in addition to the problems on the ground.

When you were asked by Senator Chafee, "What's key to reshaping the Middle East?" you—I thought you had a good answer. Your first response was, "We need countries there that are with us in the war against terror. They have to renounce terrorism." And that goes, certainly, to what President Bush said right after 9/11, quote, he said, "All nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something. A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy, they must perform. You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror." Now, let's remember that, because it's a very clear statement and a very forceful statement.

Now we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars in Iraq, sacrifices are enormous, more than 19,000 now wounded, many of them severely wounded, and past 2,500 dead. And we have as your stated goal that all our allies in the world with whom we're going to even have relationships, let alone give tens of billions of dollars, hundreds of billions of dollars to, have to renounce terror. And we have the prime minister saying about the situation in Lebanon

today—he called actions of Israel against Hezbollah, quote, “beyond a catastrophe. It violates everything the international community can be based on.” And he said he couldn’t find any justification for what Israel is doing. And, further, “We call on the world to take quick stance to stop the Israeli aggression,” which our President has said very clearly what Israel is doing—and we all, I think, agree; I haven’t heard anyone disagree—taking on Hezbollah is defending yourself. And we all agree that Hezbollah is a force for terror.

So, now we have this situation. And it’s not as if this is just someone with whom we have relationships—this is someone who appears before a joint session and asks us for more and more money to rebuild, et cetera. The monthly cost of the war has gone up to 8 billion. The estimated number of insurgents has gone from 3,000 to 20,000. Insurgent attacks have gone from 5 a day to 90 a day. Incidents of sectarian violence, which the prime minister never really referred to, have gone from 5 per month to 250 per month. And Iraqis optimistic about the future have gone down from 75 percent to 30 percent. And the prime minister can’t use the word “Hezbollah.” Now, some members met with him in private, and I think, reading between the lines, he—he never said “Hezbollah.”

Now, Tony Snow, the President’s spokesman, when asked about it, said something to the effect of, “Well, he’s not our puppet.” That’s true. But then, why do we have to give them tens of billions of dollars? Did the President’s words mean anything when he said, “You’re either with us or against us”——

And then it goes further than that. That’s mild compared to the other part of the government, the speaker of the parliament over there in Iraq, who the President thought he had a nice relationship with. And I’ll quote from an article in the Review of Books that I’ll make part of the record, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COLEMAN. Without objection.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

[The information previously referred to follows:]

SECTION 5 OF THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

While I was in Iraq in June, American forces killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and, on the same day, Iraq formed its government of national unity. President Bush greeted these developments with unusual restraint and announced he was convening a two-day Camp David summit to review his Iraq strategy. Any hopes that there would be a serious rethinking of Iraq policy were dashed when it turned out that the summit was really a ruse so that Bush could fake out his own cabinet by appearing on a videoconference from Baghdad when they expected to see him at the presidential retreat for breakfast. The President was so impressed with his own stunt that he had the White House press office put out the word that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had only five minutes’ notice of his arrival, not understanding that this undercut both Maliki and Bush.

On his return, Bush held a press conference during which, it seemed, he could barely contain his enthusiasm. In response to a question about progress in providing electricity, producing oil, and controlling violence, he swerved into a discussion of his encounter with the speaker of Iraq’s parliament, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani. The President didn’t seem to recall his name but readily remembered his religion:

The Sunni—I was impressed, by the way, by the Speaker—Denny Hastert told me I’d like him; Denny met with him. And I was impressed by him. He’s a fellow that had been put in prison by Saddam and, interestingly enough, put in prison by us. And he made a decision to participate in the government. And he was an articulate person. He talked about running the parliament. It was interesting to see a person

that could have been really bitter talk about the skills he's going to need to bring people together to run the parliament. And I found him to be a hopeful person.

They tell me that he wouldn't have taken my phone call a year ago—I think I might have shared this with you at one point in time—and there I was, sitting next to the guy. And I think he enjoyed it as much as I did. It was a refreshing moment.

The incurious White House press corps never asked the obvious question: Why had the United States jailed al-Mashhadani? According to Sunnis and Shiites at the top levels of government in Iraq, al-Mashhadani was a member of, or closely associated with, two al-Qaeda-linked terrorists groups, Ansar Islam and Ansar al-Sunna. The first operated until 2003 in a no man's land high in the mountains between Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran while the second has been responsible for some of the worse terrorist attacks on Iraq's Shiites and Kurds. The Iraqis say they gave the Americans specific intelligence on al-Mashhadani's affiliations with those groups and his actions in support of terrorists.

None of this seems to have mattered to a president who is as casual in his approach to national security as his defense secretary. At the same press conference Bush repeated that "the American people have got to understand that Iraq is a part of the war on terror."—July 12, 2006

Senator BOXER. Just this month, this is the President speaking, "The Sunni—I was impressed by the way—by the speaker. Denny Hastert told me I'd like him. Denny met with him, and I was impressed with him, and I found him to be a hopeful person. They tell me that he wouldn't have taken my phone call a year ago. I think I might have shared this with you at one point in time. And there I was sitting next to the guy, and I think he enjoyed it as much as I did. It was a refreshing moment."

Now, this was a refreshing moment with this particular individual, and I'm going to get his quotes in a minute. Here it is. This pleasant person, who Denny Hastert liked, who the President enjoyed and it was refreshing, said, "I personally think whoever kills an American soldier in defense of Iraq should have a statue built for him in that country. We know there was a corrupt regime in Saddam," he says, "but a regime should be removed by surgery, not by butchering. The U.S. occupation is butcher's work under the slogan of democracy and human rights and justice."

So, this policy in Iraq, which my colleagues on the other side—and not all of them; most of them—always equate with the central war on terror, has leaders in Iraq who won't condemn Hezbollah, and, worse yet, condemn the country that's leading the fight against Hezbollah, and call our soldiers "butchers." And it's no wonder we have a hard time winning support around the world, because our words don't mean anything.

Now, Mr. Bolton, this has nothing to do with you. I'm not putting this on you. As a matter of fact, I'm saying to you, you've got a tough job here. But I don't know how we say that "you're with us or against us on the war on terror," and then we sit quietly by and have a congressional address by someone who's—part of his government called our soldiers "butchers," 19,000 of whom are coming back deeply wounded, a third of whom are coming back seeking treatment for mental health problems, 2,500 will never come back. Our foreign policy is hollow. And it just doesn't pass the test.

And I want to change the subject from Iraq, because I want to ask you about Darfur, because I can't pin any of what I said on you, and I don't intend to.

I want to talk to you about Darfur, because I know you believe it's a tragedy going on over there, and I'm sure that you have

said—and I just want to make sure you have said—that it is, in fact, a genocide—would you agree with that?

Ambassador BOLTON. I did earlier this morning, yes.

Senator BOXER. Thank you for that. I think that's very important.

Well, I want you to help me with something, since we haven't ever really worked together. Maybe this gives us a chance. We heard that you had another engagement, and you couldn't go over to an important conference. And I've seen the list of who went from other countries. Most of them sent their number-one, like you would have been the number-one, or their number-two. We sent number-three. But I'll put that aside, because I want to tell you that many of us have been calling for a special envoy. And Senator Murkowski—Lisa Murkowski and I got together and thought—we need emissaries. This would be short of an envoy, this would be people who would just care about this issue from morning, noon, to night, go around the world, get this issue before the world, get countries to step up to the plate and give their contributions, help put pressure on other countries. It would really help you do your work, because, as you said, we're having trouble getting our policy through.

So, quickly let me tell you what we did. We sent a letter to the President on May 30. This was a bipartisan letter—Lisa Murkowski and myself. "Genocide in Darfur has resulted in an estimated 400,000 deaths, displacement of 2.5 million people. We share your view, Mr. President, that America cannot turn away from this tragedy. Two of Dr. Martin Luther King's children, Bernice King and Martin Luther King III, have generously embraced the idea of serving your administration in a way that would heighten worldwide awareness of the tragedy, compel foreign governments to increase aid, and bring hope to those who are suffering. We appreciate Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's tireless efforts to address this crisis. It is our hope that Bernice and Martin, as U.S. special emissaries, can complement the important work being done."

I was so excited with this. So, that was May 30. So, we get a letter back several months later. Do you have a copy of that letter? Because I put it somewhere. Thank you. On June 13. So, that was fine. Three weeks later. Although I had personal conversations with people to try and move it ahead. And this is what it says, "On behalf of the President, thank you for recommending Bernice King and Martin Luther King for appointment as U.S. special emissaries to Darfur. So that we have the appropriate background and contact information, please have Mr. and Ms. King complete the presidential personnel application located at www.whitehouse.gov. We appreciate your recommendation. We are always searching for people," and so on.

So, I am perplexed at this. It seems like it's being treated as if it's just some other application by someone who wants to intern at the White House. So, I went up on www.whitehouse.gov, and I came back with, you know, 10 pages. And I can tell you that Lisa Murkowski and I really wanted this to happen, and we were excited about it. Would you help us here? Would you see if you can contact Lisa Wright, Assistant to the President for Personnel, and

see if perhaps we can get a little bit of a higher-level interest in what we think—Senator Murkowski and I—is a good idea to show the world how important it is. Martin Luther King's children, I think, would send a very strong signal.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I will certainly do that, and also talk to the people at State to whom that letter probably should have been directed. Obviously, it didn't get to the right place. But I appreciate your interest in the subject. And it's a serious one. We do take it extremely seriously, and I will pursue this letter.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thanks, Senator Boxer.

Senator Martinez.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir.

Ambassador Bolton, welcome back. I'm very proud to have staunchly supported your nomination by President Bush, and I continue to do so. I'm more reassured now, not only by the need for continuity, which I think is an important circumstance, but really, more important than that, by what has been your performance.

I think, first of all, you have been a resolute and clear spokesperson to advance the President's foreign policy. And, at the time, we have only one President, we have only one foreign policy. It is this President's foreign policy. And you have been an astute and strong advocate for that.

Second, I also want to commend you for your very strong efforts and your performance on the issue of United Nations reform. It is, indeed, necessary for the world. We need a strong United Nations. And your efforts in that regard, incomplete as they are, but ought to be commended for the way in which you've handled that.

And, third, I want to, again, commend you for your performance and the way that you've conducted yourself personally. I think you've been someone that I think our Nation can be proud of in the way in which you have handled yourself. And I think many of those who question many things about you personally, questions that I didn't share, should be now more than laid to rest by what has been, I think, a sterling diplomatic performance by you in the time that you've been in the United Nations.

Let me ask you, now, on substance, a couple of questions. One is on the issue of the Middle East, that very troubled region. And I know that in one of the new things for which perhaps some would suggest your confirmation might not be appropriate is the issue of United Nations Resolution 1559. Perhaps you could enlighten us by a little bit of the history of that resolution—when it came about, was it under your tenure that it was negotiated, or, if not, what you've done, in terms of advancing that, while, at the same time, what difficulties are there in the implementation of 1559? In other words, is it the blame of the United States Representative to the United Nations that that resolution has failed in its implementation? Or are there other actors and players who would have a greater share of responsibility for its failure in implementation over the last year or two?

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you, Senator. The 1559, as I think I mentioned, was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0 to 6—Russia, China, and Algeria, which was then a member of Security Council, being

three of the countries that abstained. So, what that indicated was that it passed only very narrowly, but in response to the outcry over the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, and the determination of—expressed in demonstrations in Beirut and elsewhere, that the Lebanese people wanted to have a—that wanted to have an independent government, independent of Syria, independent democratic government.

The difficulties that have attended the implementation-in-full of 1559 have been largely because the Government of Syria has not complied with the resolution, case after case after case. They have withdrawn, almost entirely, their military, as 1559 required, but there are many other aspects where they've not, and it has been a continued subject of our efforts, both in the Security Council and elsewhere, to push for 1559 being fully complied with. And I would also, there, link Resolution 1595, which is the—created the Independent International Investigatory Commission to help the Lebanese Government investigate the Hariri assassination, another situation where the Government of Syria has failed to comply fully.

So that our efforts, both in the Security Council and elsewhere, have largely focused on this intransigence on the part of Syria, their unwillingness to go ahead, because to do so would mean they would have to give up their control over Hezbollah. Hezbollah would have to make the choice that it would be a legitimate political party, give up its military capability, and thus dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, Syrian influence inside Lebanon.

So, to the extent that countries like Iran, in particular, continue to support Syria in its intransigence, and to the extent that other members of the Perm-5 aren't fully on board, that remains a problem.

But I think this is one of the areas where, incomplete though it is, this is a representation of what can be done in the Security Council with American leadership and with the close cooperation of our allies, particularly France, and also with the United Kingdom.

Senator MARTINEZ. Just one more comment on the Middle East. You were also asked about shaping of the Middle East, words that were not used by you, but which I'm sure we all share in the desire to shape the Middle East. And would it not be essential, for there to be a future peace in the Middle East, for all the actors and players to recognize Israel's right to exist in peace?

Ambassador BOLTON. That's an absolute fundamental. And it was on the basis of that acknowledgment, that recognition, that Israel was able to achieve peace with both Egypt and Jordan over a long number of years. Syrian occupation of Lebanon prevented reconciliation with Lebanon, and Syria itself remains, at least among those states bordering Israel, the principal holdout. But certainly one of the objectives I think we should all be seeking here, given the turmoil in southern Lebanon, is that we come to a situation where the implementation of 1559 and the extension of full control over Lebanese territory by a democratic government provides the basis on which Lebanon and Israel can reach a peace agreement. That would leave us with Syria among the directly-bordering countries, but also, obviously, with Iran, which, at a distance, remains implacably opposed to Israel, their president having recently called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

But these are all important steps in getting to that ultimate objective.

Senator MARTINEZ. In the interest of my time remaining, I want to just simply mention my commendation and congratulations to you for your role in the very important resolution of the Security Council passed under your leadership condemning North Korea, in a 15-to-0 vote, which I think, in today's climate and in recent history, to do that, I think, is a major accomplishment, and I commend you for your success in that, which I think also should be a proud part of your performance at the U.N.

Speak, if you will for me, on the issue of humanitarian assistance to the people of Lebanon. We all are saddened by the destruction and the human suffering there, as we are by the suffering in Israel, as well, particularly in the city of Haifa, where we see destruction and death and maiming and sadness. How will we collaborate on that? And if you've already touched on that, maybe I'll just move on to something else.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, two things. We have authorized the provision of some \$30 million in assistance, but, more broadly, we're now working in New York, in the Security Council, and in the region—Secretary Rice has been leading this, as well—to establish conditions under which humanitarian assistance can be provided to Lebanon through humanitarian corridors, such as has been suggested by the U.N. Secretariat, accepted by Israel, obviously accepted by Lebanon, as well. We need to—having achieved the political agreement on this, need now to implement it, and we're working on that, both in New York and in other agencies of the U.S. Government, as well, to get that humanitarian assistance in, even as the hostilities continue.

Senator MARTINEZ. The Human Rights Council of the United Nations was reshaped. I know we were not happy with the outcome. Can you tell us your vision of what would be an appropriate Human Rights Council, what it is that we're trying to achieve in a Human Rights Council, and what is the outlook for true reforms of this body that could really include an agenda that's vigorous and that perhaps does not include in the membership some of the very culprits of the most serious human rights abuses in the world?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, it was the failure of the resolution, that created this new Human Rights Council, to really achieve the central objective that we sought, which was reshaping the membership of the council, that led us to vote against it. We did not think that the resolution creating the new council really did enough to keep some of the worst abusers of human rights off the council. And not just the worst abusers, but countries that didn't really share the commitment we and many other developed countries had to using the Human Rights Council as an effective instrument on a country-specific basis.

We did not achieve the objective of getting a requirement that members to the council be elected by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. We did not—we were not able to persuade others that it ought to be an automatic disqualification against serving on the Human Rights Council for any country under Security Council sanctions for human rights violations or support for terrorism. We could not persuade a majority of the countries to accept even that.

And I think the consequence of those decisions, and a variety of others, meant that the mechanisms for selection of members to the new council were not going to be sufficiently different from the old commission. That's why we voted against it.

We do—we are continuing to work on human rights. We've tried to work, even though not a member of this council, to try and make it a success. I've noted in my prepared remarks that we're disappointed at the early returns. We're going to continue to work, but we've not made a decision, ourselves, whether to try and seek election to the new council next year or not.

Senator MARTINEZ. I see my time is up. I just want to thank you for your continued desire to serve. And having sat in those chairs while members of the Senate come and go, I understand what a long morning it can be, so I appreciate your time and your willingness to serve our Nation.

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. Did the resolution regarding North Korea that Senator Martinez referenced include economic sanctions under Chapter VII?

Ambassador BOLTON. Under our definition, not sanctions, as directed against the economic activity broadly in North Korea, but it did contain two requirements on all member governments, that they not cooperate in any way with the—not only the North Korean ballistic missile program, but also its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program—that governments neither supply those programs nor procure from those programs. That is a form of sanctions, but it was mostly intended not for—not to impose economic pressure on North Korea, but to cut off those weapons programs from outside assistance.

Senator NELSON. Did the United States initially try to get the Chapter VII sanctions?

Ambassador BOLTON. We did not. Those were basically—those provisions, plus the requirement that North Korea suspend all of its ballistic missile activity, were the principal objectives we started out with. And we achieved those.

Senator NELSON. Japan, however, was asking for economic sanctions, meaning that the resolution did not meet the goals that the Japanese initially sought.

Ambassador BOLTON. One of their original thoughts—I mean, this was—you have to—I'm sure you do remember, in the July 5—indeed, during the day on July the 4—our time, July 4; July 5 in the Pacific—I was on the phone probably a dozen times with my Japanese counterpart, trying to share information with him about these ballistic missile launches as they took place. And he and his government were considering a variety of things, as was our Government. So, we looked at a whole range of things. When we went in—when we went in—

It's a little distracting.

I suppose, Senator, when—

Senator NELSON. I've seen a lot of things interpose—

Ambassador BOLTON. I'm not responsible for this, I might say. I'm not responsible for this. [Laughter.]

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Interpose between the questions and the witnesses, but I've never seen this.

Ambassador BOLTON. This is a form of transparency, I suppose. [Laughter.]

Senator, we—the—being, obviously, serious——

Senator NELSON. But I'm glad that's not right over here. [Laughter.]

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, it's right in the middle. I suppose that's the best it could be.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Nelson, we'll have the witness—we'll have the Ambassador respond to this question, and then we'll suspend for a couple of minutes, so we get a sense of what's going on here.

But, Ambassador Bolton, you can finish your response.

Ambassador BOLTON. No, we—it's certainly the case, Senator, we considered a number of possible options, and, in close consultation with Japan, came to the conclusion that we would proceed with a resolution along the lines that they took the lead on.

Senator NELSON. This is not going to distract me, if it's all right with you.

Ambassador BOLTON. I'm fine, Senator. [Laughter.]

Let's go.

Senator COLEMAN. As long as we can keep the buckets coming, we can——

Senator NELSON. All right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. The hearing can proceed.

Senator NELSON. Well, those two buckets will catch most of it, so let's continue. [Laughter.]

Going back to the same matter—on July the 14, the day before the Security Council acted, you said that the United States continued to insist on a resolution under Chapter VII, which would have made the sanctions mandatory for the U.N. member states.

Ambassador BOLTON. But, Senator, I would just say, before we get rained out. [Laughter.]

The purpose of a Chapter VII resolution is not necessarily only sanctions. Chapter VII is the chapter of the U.N. charter that deals with the Security Council's special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. And resolutions under Chapter VII are deemed binding on all members.

That's what we wanted, and it's our judgment that's what we achieved, even though there's not a specific reference to Chapter VII in the text of the resolution, because you have to look at the entire text of a resolution, not necessarily a few specific words.

Senator NELSON. Well, I just want to clarify the record here, because on that day you stressed the importance, and I quote, "of a clear, binding Chapter VII resolution. That remains our view, and the view of Japan." You then went on to warn that, quote, "If there is to be a veto, there comes a time when countries have to go into that chamber and raise their hand," end of quote.

Do you want to square that with what happened here?

Ambassador BOLTON. Right. The final text of the resolution does not include a reference to Chapter VII, as such. There's no question

about that. But it was our judgment, the judgment of the French, the British, the Japanese, and other delegations, that, in fact, you don't need to use those precise words to get a binding resolution. And that's how we construe it, and we made that explanation—we went through that analysis in our respective explanations of the vote.

Senator NELSON. All right.

Mr. Chairman, I'm going to broach one more subject, and then I'll stop. I appreciate the fact that you have been here for a long time.

Two months ago Russia and China blocked action in the U.N. against Iran's nuclear program, and in deference to the Russian and Chinese concerns, the United States and the European Union agreed to give diplomacy another chance, even though Iran has clearly been stalling for time.

Administration officials have stated that Russia and China had promised to back some of the limited U.N. measures against Iran if Tehran declined to negotiate. You said, and I quote, "If the Security Council can't deal with something like the Iranian nuclear weapons program, then it's hard to imagine what circumstances the U.N. charter contemplated the Council would be involved in." Everyone, of course, remembers the timeline. In early March, the issue was referred to the U.N. Security Council by the IAEA. The July 12 deadline for Iran to stop enriching uranium came and went with no response. The Iranians said that they will respond by August 22.

Many of us have been calling for Security Council action on Iran for a long time, and your work at the U.N. Security Council is an integral part of the international effort to end Iran's nuclear program. Secretary Rice was able to get the Chinese and the Russians to support an international offer of incentives and disincentives, but it appears that there isn't any progress on a meaningful resolution at the U.N. Security Council. This Senator believes that a resolution that asks the Iranians to stop enriching uranium, but that has no teeth is meaningless.

You have the reputation as being the tough guy who can solve these issues, and yet it seems like the Russians and the Chinese are getting their way with you. So, if you could please respond—is the U.S. going to settle for a resolution on Iran that does not include sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter?

Ambassador BOLTON. Senator, what the foreign ministers of the five permanent members and Germany agreed to in Paris a couple of weeks ago was a two-step process in the Security Council. The first step would be a resolution that would make mandatory the requirement that Iran suspend all of its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities, and give the Iranians some period of time—let's say a month—within which they had to come into compliance with the resolution. That was step one.

Step two, if the Iranians failed to do that, then the next step would be to go to economic sanctions, which we would have to discuss at that point.

We are, I judge, very close to agreement on a resolution that would embody the first step. In fact, Tuesday night we had agreement among the five permanent representatives in New York. Ob-

viously, we had to go back to our capitals to get final approval on it, and—but we thought we had it, and it turned out, yesterday, we did not. I'm hoping that we can either wrap that up today—depending on how long your hearing goes on, we might be able to wrap it up today, or certainly Ambassador Sanders is continuing to work on it. But I think we're very close on that first resolution, the first of the two steps.

But it is very important that we make it clear to Iran and to all U.N. members that that requirement for suspension of uranium enrichment activities be binding. And that is our intention. That's the intention of the—what we call the EU-3 countries. And we're very, very firm in that resolve.

Senator NELSON. I hope that you reach an agreement quickly because, in the meantime, Iran continues to reprocess uranium.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, it's—there's no doubt the Iranians, over the last 3 years, have used diplomatic negotiations as a cover under which they have advanced their mastery over the entire nuclear fuel cycle. And I think that's one reason why we do feel a sense of urgency about that, that it's important we try and get the maximum pressure we can on Iran if they choose not to accept this very generous offer that the EU-3 and the rest of us have made to them. It's an extremely serious problem. There's just no doubt about it.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Bolton, I want you to get tough with the Chinese and the Russians.

Ambassador BOLTON. I will be pleased to carry out that instruction, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bolton, sorry for the distraction here.

Ambassador BOLTON. It's coming in my direction, too.

Senator OBAMA. I will—I'll try to make my questions brief. I know you've been here—

Senator NELSON. Let's hope it's rainwater and not something else. [Laughter in observation of a water leak from the ceiling.]

Senator OBAMA. Okay, thank you for pointing that out, Senator Nelson. [Laughter.]

With that encouragement, let me proceed.

You know, last year, Mr. Bolton, we had a hearing in October, and we talked a little bit about the use of voluntary financing, as opposed to mandatory assessments, as a tool to extract cooperation at the U.N. And you mentioned two examples, UNPD and UNICEF, as being effective organizations, in part because they function as voluntary agencies. And, you know, when we start talking about our budget requests, last year they had cut funding for these two programs, despite the fact that you had pointed out that they were effective because voluntary—or voluntarily financed. And you said, and I'm quoting here, "I certainly intend to get into it in the next budget cycle. I think it can give us a lot of assistance and provide argument for other countries to show that this is not simply a charade behind which we want to reduce budgetary contribu-

tions, but a way in which we want to more sensibly contribute to agencies that are effective.”

I’m looking at the fiscal year 2007 budget request. You’ve been in New York a year, so presumably you’ve had something—I just felt something coming down on me. Let me scoot over here. [Laughter.]

Ambassador BOLTON. You can come over and sit with me, Senator. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. Yeah, exactly.

But here’s the thing. This year’s budget request seems to contain a similar result, which is a cut to UNICEF and UNPD. So, I’m wondering if you can explain that and how you’re thinking about it. And I’m going to move way down here. [Laughter.]

Go ahead.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well—although my last name is Bolton, it’s spelled “ton” and not “ten.” I was not director of OMB at the time. And, you know, there are a lot of factors that go into budget decisions. And it’s simply—it’s a fact of life, in budget decisions, that you can’t meet all of your priorities. But I would say that the question of assessed, versus voluntary, contributions as a mechanism of funding, and of possible greater utility to the United States, is still something that we’re looking at. We have not devoted—we have not concluded our review in that regard, in part because we’ve been consumed with the mandate review and the management reform processes. But these remain important areas of concern for us.

Senator OBAMA. Well, I guess the problem that I have—and we had this exchange before—the broader context of the debate between mandatory and voluntary dues has to do with the degree to which we feel that we are exerting leverage over an organization that we think is sometimes dysfunctional and the possibility of earmarking, essentially, our dollars to areas where we feel we’ve got some confidence. But isn’t it important to our diplomatic efforts on the reform—on the U.N. reform issue, that we recognize that—well, let me ask the question this way. If we are consistently cutting our budget at the same time as we are demanding reforms, aren’t we, to some degree, undermining our leverage precisely at a time when we’d like to expand it? It seems to me that it actually hampers or hamstring your ability to gain credibility with the other potential partners in reform.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think one of the things that we are doing is expanding our voluntary contributions in some other areas. For example, in the U.N. Democracy Fund, which is a new initiative, an initiative of the President’s, we’ve supplied \$18 million out of the \$49 million that are currently in the fund, and we’ve put up additional money in the area of HIV/AIDS and the U.N. AIDS Program, which is essentially voluntarily funded. So, the record may not be entirely perfect, I grant you that, but, in several critical respects, we have increased our voluntary funding along the lines that you suggest.

Senator OBAMA. Just to follow up on the issue of reform, there have been some reports that we have allied diplomats, countries that at least say they’re interested in reform, that would indicate that there are still concerns that you have a tendency to produce amendments and demands at the 11th hour, pushing to reopen ne-

gotiations that have been painfully concluded, World Summit outcome development—World Summit outcome document, Human Rights Council. And I'm just wondering—maybe you've already commented on this, but I'm just curious as to why we're getting those reports. Is it your assertion that these are simply recalcitrant countries that don't want reform or—what do you think accounts for that?—I mean, when you've got 30 ambassadors, all of whom say they share the U.S. goals of management reform, expressing some misgivings about your leadership.

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah, 30 anonymous ambassadors. You know, I did mention, before you came in, that—

Senator OBAMA. And I apologize. I haven't been here the whole time, so—

Ambassador BOLTON. I understand entirely.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. I don't want to—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. That a number of ambassadors came to me after that article appeared and said they thought it was outrageous, that they couldn't understand why the reporter hadn't talked to them. But I don't—you know, I don't think that's the measure. I respect the other ambassadors. I deal with them on a professional basis. I think they deal with me on a professional basis.

I would like to just comment on one point, though, and that's this notion that—about coming in at the last minute with amendments and whatnot. You mentioned the outcome document in the—from the September summit. And, you know, that was a situation, when I came in, where the United States had been pressing a large number of amendments, for quite some time, very similar to the amendments that I circulated. But because of the way the negotiations were being conducted, those amendments were not being accepted. The real change that I made was moving away from the so-called facilitator process, where you, sort of, submit your amendments and hope the facilitator writes them in, to a process of direct international negotiation.

And I'd ask—Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I just want to read one paragraph from a letter written to Chairman Lugar by Thomas Schweich, who's currently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Matters. Tom Schweich was at USUN when I arrived, on August 1. He's a former chief of staff to Senator John Danforth, who was the Permanent Representative before me, and he—it's a nice letter. I'm only going to read one paragraph that deals with the outcome document.

Senator OBAMA. Go ahead.

Ambassador BOLTON. As I say, Schweich was there from—Tom Schweich was there from the time Senator Danforth arrived until I arrived, and stayed on until he came down to the Department.

And the letter from Tom Schweich says, and I quote, "While Ambassador Bolton received a good deal of media criticism for allegedly trying to," quote, "change the deal," close quote, "at the last minute with respect to the terms of the outcome document drafted for the World Summit on U.N. Reform in 2005, this criticism is without merit. In fact, Ambassador Bolton did nothing more than make public and transparent a lengthy series of objections that the

State Department had raised and had been negotiating for several months prior to Ambassador Bolton's arrival. I had been personally and directly involved in those negotiations."

So, the—you know, that's where this started with the outcome document. You know, some reporters said 400 amendments, some reporters said 700. I don't know how many there were, but they were essentially elaborations of changes to this document that were—had been advocated by the United States long before my arrival.

What I found—the change that I did make was that we abandoned the so-called facilitator process, where the facilitator listens to all the delegations and takes suggestions in, and then does his or her best to reflect what they think the direction of the negotiations is going. I felt that was inadequate. I did not think the United States was getting the best outcome from the facilitator method. And I asked, and there was widespread support for, and we did then move to a model, direct government-to-government negotiations, which is how the final outcome document was ultimately produced.

Senator OBAMA. Having been there for a year—and here, I'm—this is sort of an open-ended question—what do you think is the single biggest impediment to the lack of progress that's been made, in terms of some of the reforms that have been discussed?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think that Paul Volcker really had an important insight—and I had mentioned this earlier, but I think it bears repeating—when he said to this committee last year that he thought that the basic lesson he drew from his lengthy investigation into the Oil-for-Food scandal was not just the problems that existed in the Oil-for-Food scandal, but that the—but that those problems emanated from practices and policies deeply embedded in the U.N. itself, and that reform required not just addressing the more superficial aspects of the Oil-for-Food scandal, but involved addressing more fundamental aspects of the U.N., as well. And for him, the central—the underlying foundation of that problem was what he called the "culture of inaction."

And I think that until we really are able to make progress on that, that many of the specific reforms that we propose will really not have a lasting difference. They are important to pursue. We will continue to pursue them. But when Secretary Rice called for a "lasting revolution of reform"—you know, I've joked with people that it's not often you hear a Secretary of State call for revolution—but it is important in this context. Reform is not something you do on one day, and then you say, "Well, we're finished with that. Do we move on to something else?" You have to have making the organization more effective and more efficient a constant priority. And I think that is a view I've developed over 25 years of watching and participating in U.N.-related matters. And the past year has only confirmed that in my mind. I think that's the most fundamental obstacle we face, as identified by Paul Volcker.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman, how—am I out of time?

Senator COLEMAN. Your time has expired, Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Okay. Could you—I know that I'm the last guy, and it's raining in here, but can I ask one last question?

Senator COLEMAN. Absolutely.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Bolton, sorry to keep you, but I did want to ask specifically about the situation in Darfur. And I know that somebody else has already asked the question. And let me stipulate that the administration has done more than our European allies. And this administration's record has shown genuine concern for the situation there. Having said that, we still see a continuing deterioration of the situation. Bob Zoellick's not going to be playing the leadership role that he was playing. We don't seem to be making much progress with the Chinese, Russians, or Sudanese in standing up a U.N. force. Fighting between the main factions has been intensified, and there doesn't seem to be any strong follow-up on DPA.

So, I'm wondering, specifically what is your office doing, at this stage, to move us off the status quo, which I fear may end up deteriorating even further and resulting in a situation that, if we're not already ashamed of what's happening there, we'll be even more ashamed of?

Senator COLEMAN. This will be the last response.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I agree that the Darfur peace agreement is in jeopardy. I think it's in jeopardy for a variety of reasons having to do with the politics in the region, the attitude of the Government of Sudan and a variety of other factors. And that, to us, underlines the importance of rehatting the African Union force, the AMIS mission, in Sudan as rapidly as possible, because if the protections that a new U.N. force can provide do not get into place quickly, and if, in the interim, however long that interim is, we don't strengthen the existing AMIS capabilities, that will increase the risk that the DPA will break down. I don't think there's any question about that.

We have faced intransigence on the part of the Government of Sudan in—despite decisions by the Council on Peace and Security of the African Union, despite repeated decisions, despite the decision of the African Union in the Summit recently in Banjul, despite commitments made by the Government of Sudan previously, they continue to say they will not accept a U.N. force in Darfur. That has ripple effects with potential troop-contributing countries that worry about the situation into which their troops would be deployed. It has ramifications in the Council when people are reluctant to move up with the kind of expedition that we need to within the Secretariat, and how quickly they're able to proceed. It's a situation we worry about. My office, the Military Staff Committee Office, the uniformed officers who serve at USUN, with support from the Pentagon, which has sent up logisticians and planners to help out, have been pushing this at—with the greatest possible force. But the difficulties remain, and we are quite concerned if we don't expedite this, we're going to face difficulty.

Senator OBAMA. I know my time is up. I—let me just say that I know that you have a lot on your plate. I would like to see some sense of urgency and focused attention. We know Sudan is going to be recalcitrant and intransigent. And so, precisely for that reason, I think it's important that we use some of our diplomatic skills and apply them to pressure some of the others who are supporting Sudan. And I'm not sure we've used all our diplomatic cards on this one.

Senator COLEMAN. The Senator's——

Senator OBAMA. Thank you——

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Time has——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Expired. Thank you.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you. I know all the comments that have been made about the flood here, so I won't make any more.

I apologize for being delayed. We had a markup in the Small Business Committee. As ranking member, I had to be there.

I heard a few of the questions, from my office, and obviously, I don't want to go over territory that's been well covered, Mr. Ambassador, so I want to just have a chance to be able to pursue a few things with you.

I did hear, I think, in answer to one question from somebody—I think it was from the chair—that your views about the U.N. itself have not changed. And so, I'd just be curious to, sort of—what are those views, at this point? I mean, there was a lot of debate here, as you recall, about what those views were, and I'd just be curious to know what conclusions you've drawn about the U.N., at this point in time.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think his question was, what did I find at the U.N. that I had not expected? And I think my response was “very little,” because I've studied and worked in U.N. matters for 25 years. And I'm sure there are things I don't know, but I've worked in the area for a long time.

My views are, as I said in my opening statement in April of last year, that we are committed to a strong and effective United Nations; to do that, it requires substantial reform; that it can be an effective adjunct of American foreign policy—I think it's been demonstrated in a variety of areas that we've discussed here today in the context of Lebanon, North Korea, and Iran; and that that's why we're exerting the efforts that we are to—within the Security Council on a variety of substantive policy matters and on the question of U.N. reform.

Senator KERRY. Well, you say that to be effective it requires reform. What is the principal reform that is required for the U.N. itself to be effective with respect to Iran or with respect to North Korea or Lebanon? What reform would make a difference to that effectiveness?

Ambassador BOLTON. I'm not sure that reform, as such, would have a difference there. That is more a question——

Senator KERRY. Isn't that the policy?

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. In the Security Council of—policy—of reach policy agreement among the 15 members of the Council, and particularly the Perm-5.

Senator KERRY. And isn't it fair to say that we're, sort of, the odd person out on most of those policies?

Ambassador BOLTON. I wouldn't say that, no.

Senator KERRY. Well, with respect to North Korea—let's look at that for a minute. Russia and the South Koreans were unwilling to join us, isn't that correct, with respect to the sanction effort? Tough——

Ambassador BOLTON. That's clearly not correct, because they did. And, in fact, we worked very closely with the Russians in the negotiation, 11 days of very intense negotiation to get Resolution 1595, and worked very closely with the Republic of Korea's mission to the U.N. to get their agreement to the resolution, as well.

Senator KERRY. Well, I beg to differ with you, Mr. Ambassador. They didn't get on board a tough Chapter VII resolution, did they? That was our position.

Ambassador BOLTON. They got on board a resolution which is binding, as our judgment is binding, under Chapter VII, that's correct.

Senator KERRY. They didn't get on a tough chapter VII resolution, did they?

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes, they did.

Senator KERRY. Chapter VII.

Ambassador BOLTON. They did.

Senator KERRY. They did?

Ambassador BOLTON. We believe this resolution is binding under Chapter VII. It does not contain the words "Chapter VII," but our conclusion is, based on the entire wording of the resolution, that it imposes binding constraints on North Korea, and other—

Senator KERRY. Well, every—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. And other member government—that's the interpretation of Britain, France, and Japan, and the other four cosponsors, as well.

Senator KERRY. Prior to the adoption, speaking to reporters on July 6, you said, quote, "I think it's important that the Security Council speak under Chapter VII to make a binding resolution." Is that correct?

Ambassador BOLTON. That's correct.

Senator KERRY. Then, on July 14, just a day before they acted, you said you continued to insist on a resolution under Chapter VII which would make any sanctions mandatory. You stressed the importance of a, quote, "clear, binding Chapter VII resolution. That remains our view, and the view of Japan." You went so far as to warn that "if there is to be a veto, there comes a time when countries have to go into that chamber and raise their hand." That's not what happened, is it?

Ambassador BOLTON. As I said before, it's our judgment this is a mandatory—

Senator KERRY. Well, it's a judgment—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Resolution.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. But it's not the way it's viewed by the other parties.

Ambassador BOLTON. It's viewed that way by Japan, England, and France.

Senator KERRY. Well, it's not—the Russians certainly aren't prepared to join in it, nor are the—

Ambassador BOLTON. They voted for it.

Senator KERRY. But apparently not with the same understanding. I mean, Assistant Secretary Hill's testimony before this committee last week said that the administration's strategy on North Korea is shifting from failed negotiations to sanctions. And since you don't have Russia, you don't have China, and you don't

have South Korea on the binding resolution, how are you going to do that?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think we do. You know, what it—what the resolution says, Senator, is, the Security Council demands—that includes Russia and China—the Security Council demands that the DPRK suspend all activity related to its ballistic missile programs. Demands. And you know what North Korea did? You know what they thought of that resolution? They sat there in the Council chamber and, after we voted to adopt it, they rejected it and got up and walked out of the Council chamber. I think that resolution had a clear effect on North Korea.

Senator KERRY. What was the effect?

Ambassador BOLTON. That they understand how isolated they are. And you'll note that, as reported in the papers the other day, the Government of China has begun to take steps with respect to North Korean banking, the—which is consistent with operative paragraphs—

Senator KERRY. But—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution that require—“require” is the word we used—the Security Council requires that all U.N. member governments cease their procurement from, or supply to, any of North Korea's programs relating to ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction.

Senator KERRY. Well, let's come back, to be precise, because this is a precise world we live in. It is accurate—I have the resolution right in front of me—it says “demands that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program.” But it doesn't impose Chapter VII sanctions.

Ambassador BOLTON. We didn't seek to impose Chapter VII sanctions.

Senator KERRY. Well, how are you going to achieve this if you're not going to have sanctions, if you don't have the other countries prepared to have the sanctions? The reason you don't—

Ambassador BOLTON. Because the first—

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Have sanctions is, they weren't prepared to do it, isn't that correct?

Ambassador BOLTON. No, because that was not part of our original resolution. The first step here was to pass this resolution, which—

Senator KERRY. You're telling me they would be prepared to impose sanctions?

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Which is—you know, Senator, we had consultations with Japan and the United Kingdom and France about how to approach this resolution. And, as I mentioned earlier today, there were a variety of different steps that we could have taken. It was our judgment that the best way to proceed was along the lines that are now embodied in Resolution 1695. That is certainly not to say that the Council might not take other steps in the future. But the steps we sought to take, we have now taken, unanimously.

Senator KERRY. Well, I—you're losing me, a little bit, because—I mean, North Korea defied the world's request not to test an inter-continental missile. You are the ones who said you wanted sanc-

tions, but were unable to get Russia and others to sign on to that concept.

Ambassador BOLTON. Senator, we said we wanted what we got.

Senator KERRY. Well, the most that you seem to want is to go back to a Six-Party Talk that isn't in existence.

Ambassador BOLTON. No, no, no, quite the contrary. We said, expressly—

Senator KERRY. Are you prepared to go to bilateral talks?

Ambassador BOLTON. Quite the contrary. We said, expressly, that what we wanted from North Korea was not simply a return to the Six-Party Talks, but an implementation of the September 2005 joint statement from the Six-Party Talks, which would mean their dismantlement of their nuclear weapons program.

Senator KERRY. But this has been going on for 5 years, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador BOLTON. It's the nature of multilateral negotiations, Senator.

Senator KERRY. Why not engage in a bilateral one and get the job done? That's what the Clinton administration did.

Ambassador BOLTON. Very poorly, since the North Koreans violated the agreed framework—

Senator KERRY. But they—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Almost from the time it was signed. And I would also say, Senator, that we do have the opportunity for bilateral negotiations with North Korea in the context of the Six-Party Talks, if North Korea would come back to them.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ambassador, at the time—Secretary Perry has testified before this committee, as well as others—they knew that there would be the probability they would try to do something outside of the specificity of the agreement, but the specificity of the agreement was with respect to the rods and the inspections and the television cameras and the reactor itself.

Ambassador BOLTON. Senator, the agreed framework requires North Korea and South Korea to comply with the Joint North/South Denuclearization Agreement, which, in turn, provides no nuclear weapons programs on the Korean Peninsula. So, it was not limited only to the plutonium reprocessing program.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ambassador, the bottom line is that no plutonium was reprocessed under that agreement. No plutonium was reprocessed until the cameras were removed, the inspectors were kicked out, the rods were taken out, and now they have four times the nuclear weapons they had when you came on watch.

Ambassador BOLTON. Because the North Koreans—

Senator KERRY. The question here is—I mean, a whole host of people have testified before this committee and others—I mean, my objection is that—I mean, if you look at the policy—it's across the board, and we're not going to resolve it here now, obviously, I understand that—

Ambassador BOLTON. I guess that's right.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. But—well, there is another good reason to think about this.

It's hard to pick up the newspaper today, it's hard to talk to any leader anywhere in the world, it's hard to travel abroad as a Senator and not run headlong into the isolation of the United States

and the divisions that exist between us and our allies on any number of different issues. Now, it is very hard to sit here and say that the Six-Party Talks have been a success.

Ambassador BOLTON. I don't believe I've said that.

Senator KERRY. I know. I didn't suggest you have. But what I'm trying to get at is the policy foundation itself. Why insist on a Six-Party Talk process, which it seems to me never joins the fundamental issues between the United States and North Korea, which go back a long, long time, over Republican and Democratic administrations?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think the reason for that is that the disagreement is not fundamentally a bilateral disagreement between North Korea and the United States, it's a disagreement between North Korea and everybody else about their pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. And the aspect of the Six-Party Talks that we think was most important was not negotiating over the head of South Korea, which was the consequence of the agreed framework, but bringing in all of the regional partners—South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China—to address this question collectively, since it was in all of our interest to do so.

Senator KERRY. Well, most of the people that I've talked to have spent a lot of time in various thoughtful institutions thinking about these issues—a career—believe that what North Korea wants more than anything is an assurance that the United States of America isn't going to have a strategy similar to Iraq directed at them. Most people have suggested that if there were to be some kind of bilateral discussion to get at the issues between the two of us, you'd have far more opportunity to get at the nuclear issue than you do through these standoff, nonexistent Six-Party Talks that produce nothing over 5½ years. Why is the administration so unwilling to talk to Syria, for example—I mean, even to, you know, pursue these issues? It doesn't seem as though this non-talk approach is getting you very far.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, first, the Six-Party Talks have not been going on for 5½ years. Second, one of the principal reasons—

Senator KERRY. No, because no talks were going on for the first couple of years, and then the Six-Party Talks were a cover for not dealing with bilateral talks. I understand.

Ambassador BOLTON. The principal reason that we haven't had Six-Party Talks in 10 months is because North Korea won't accept China's invitation to come to the talks. But we have made it clear to them repeatedly that they could have, and they have had, bilateral conversations with the United States in the context of the Six-Party Talks. So, the question as to why the Six-Party Talks have not proceeded here, I think, lies sparsely in Pyongyang.

Senator KERRY. Well, the world and North Korea are getting more dangerous as you resist the notion of engaging in any kind of bilateral effort as an administration—not you, personally—

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah, but—

Senator KERRY [continuing]. I guess—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Senator—

Senator KERRY [continuing]. But I include—

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Senator, it—really, it's hard to understand how you can't look at the notion of conducting the bilateral conversations in the Six-Party Talks and not say that North Korea has an opportunity to make its case to us.

Senator KERRY. Sir, with all due respect, what I've seen work and not work over the course of the years I've been here depends on what kind of deal you're willing to make or not make and what your fundamental policies are. If you're a leader in North Korea looking at the United States, and you've seen the United States attack Iraq on presumptions of weapons of mass destruction that didn't exist, if you announce a preemptive strategy of regime change, if you are pursuing your own new nuclear weapons—bunker-busting nuclear weapons—and you're sitting in another country, you would have a perception of threat that makes you make a certain set of decisions. And historically throughout the cold war that drove the United States and the then-Soviet Union to escalate and escalate and—first one did, then the other—in fact—in fact, in every single case, we were the first, with the exception of two particular weapons systems, to develop a nuclear breakthrough first. They followed. Until, ultimately, President Reagan, a conservative President, and President Gorbachev, said, “We're going to come down,” in Reykjavik, “to no weapons.” So we reversed 50 years of spending money and chasing this thing.

I would respectfully suggest to you that North Korea is sitting there making a set of presumptions. And unless you begin to alter some of the underlying foundation of those presumptions, you're stuck. The problem is, we're stuck, too, as a consequence. And a lot of us feel very, very deeply that, you know, the Six-Party Talks have never been real, and never been a way of achieving this goal. And as long as we're on this course, we're stuck.

Senator COLEMAN. The Chair would note that it's been extremely generous. Senator from Massachusetts——

Senator KERRY. No, that's fine.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Is the final——

Senator KERRY. I'm—maybe you'd like to——

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Is the final witness——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Respond to that, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think that the effort that has been made is to give North Korea the opportunity to make the choice to come out of its isolation, to give up its nuclear weapons programs, and to enjoy the kind of life that the people in South Korea enjoy. You know, there's a great map, Senator—I'd be—I'm sure you've seen a copy of it—of the Korean Peninsula at night. And South Korea is filled with light. North Korea is black. It looks like South Korea is an island. That's what that regime has done to its people. We could——

Senator KERRY. Sir, I know what a terrible——

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. We——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Regime it is.

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. We could give them——

Senator KERRY. I understand that.

Ambassador BOLTON. We have tried to give them the chance, through the Six-Party Talks, to end that isolation. And——

Senator KERRY. Well, with all——

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. As I say, for 10 months, they haven't even been willing to go back to Beijing.

Senator KERRY. I have to tell you something. About 3 years ago, or 4 years ago—I can't remember precisely when—the North Koreans were casting about here in Washington asking people, "Who do we talk to?" They were looking for a deal. And the administration just blanked them. There was no willingness to do this. This is pre-going to the Six-Party Talks. Then we get to the Six-Party Talks, and we've gone through a series of evolutions since then.

So, with all due respect, a lot of folks think there is a different course. You don't. The administration doesn't. But I think it's important to talk about it, and I think it's important to lay it out there.

Ambassador BOLTON. And we have.

Senator KERRY. Similarly, on 1559, which called for the disarmament of Hezbollah, that was not a priority for the last year, and we are where we are.

Ambassador BOLTON. I would disagree. It was not a priority. But I'm not sure—

Senator KERRY. Well, can you tell me what you did at the U.N.—to put it on the front-burner agenda?

Ambassador BOLTON. I think, really, at this point, I'd just refer you to my earlier testimony, where I talked about a number of resolutions and presidential statements that we have adopted to put more pressure on Syria, both with respect to 1559 and 1595, which I think is another quite important resolution pursuing the Hariri assassination. And I think that, in fact, the issue of Lebanon, generally, is probably the best example of U.S. cooperation with France in a matter in the Security Council that we've had in recent years.

Senator KERRY. The—well, again, we can debate, and we're not going to here, so I'll let that go.

Thanks, Mr.—

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry. The Senate does have a tradition of unlimited debate, but we will bring this hearing to a close.

Mr. Ambassador, diplomats have to operate in all sorts of environments, all sorts of conditions. You've done that through your career. You've obviously demonstrated the capacity to do it today.

We will keep the record open until the close of business Friday, July 28.

With that, this hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

