[Senate Hearing 106-752]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-752
KOSOVO: ONE YEAR AFTER THE BOMBING
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-874 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Abramowitz, Hon. Morton I., board of trustees, International
Crisis Group; and former Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC...................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 49
Bugajski, Janusz, director, Eastern Europe Project, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC............ 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Pardew, Hon. James W., Jr., Principal Deputy Special Advisor for
Kosovo and Dayton Implementation, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Williams, Dr. Paul R., assistant professor of Law and
International Relations, American University, Washington, DC... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 26
(iii)
KOSOVO: ONE YEAR AFTER THE BOMBING
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THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Smith, Lugar, and Biden.
Senator Smith. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We
apologize for the delay in convening this hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Too many duties early in the
morning before this one today.
I am pleased to have with me my colleague, Richard Lugar of
Indiana, and our witnesses today. This morning we are here to
examine the situation in Kosovo. It is almost exactly a year to
the day since the war ended. We welcome on our first panel
Ambassador James Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Advisor for
Kosovo and Dayton Implementation at the State Department.
We will then welcome Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, a member
of the board of directors at the International Crisis Group,
Dr. Paul Williams, assistant professor of Law and International
Relations at American University, and Janusz Bugajski, the
director of East European Studies at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies.
I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses to share
with us their thoughts on what has occurred in Kosovo over the
course of the past year, and I look forward to hearing their
views on how the United States should go about winning the
peace.
With the withdrawal of the Yugoslav military forces from
Kosovo last June and the end of the NATO air strikes, the
United Nations set up an interim administration and NATO
deployed tens of thousands of troops in the region for
peacekeeping duties.
The goal of these missions was to establish a secure
environment so that self-governing institutions could be formed
and could function effectively. Certainly much has been
accomplished since that time. Over 1 million ethnic Albanians
were able to return to their homes in Kosovo and begin the
process of rebuilding their lives.
With the assistance of the international community, no one
froze or starved this past winter. Elections are being planned
for this fall, allowing the residents of Kosovo to choose their
political leaders in a fair and open process. If serious
problems persist in Kosovo, it may make it impossible for the
United Nations and NATO to accomplish its stated goals. Of
these, the most significant are the inherent contradictions
between the statements of the international community, which
call for substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the wishes of
nearly all ethnic Albanians for independence.
I wonder if the current policy of the alliance, that is,
intentional ambiguity about the future status of Kosovo,
whether this is the most effective way to proceed.
Additionally, KFOR has been unable to prevent ethnic violence
against Kosovar Serbs and other minorities, leading tens of
thousands of them to flee Kosovo. Those that remain have
boycotted interim structures established by the United Nations
designed to bring Serbs and Albanians together for purposes of
governing.
The tensions are especially high in the northern areas of
Kosovo, where most ethnic Serbs are living, and I fear that
radical elements controlled by Belgrade will persist in
undermining any chance of a peaceful resolution of those
tensions. Incursions by ethnic Albanian militias into southern
Serbia is also a serious cause for concern. Although they
stated they will give up their effort to unify this area with
Kosovo, I fear that their ambitions have not been fully
abandoned.
When the American soldiers intervene to prevent these
incursions, there is a danger that they could be seen as the
enemy by all sides. The slow pace at which the United Nations
established its presence in Kosovo and its continued lethargic
efforts at fully implementing its mandate has led to other
difficulties as well.
Judicial reform has barely begun, allowing various criminal
elements free rein to operate. Indigenous administrative
structures are not operational. The international police is
woefully understaffed, and local police will not be able to
fulfill these functions for quite sometime.
I supported the NATO air strikes in Kosovo and I support
doing what is necessary to win the peace as well. Difficult
decisions will have to be made regarding what kind of Kosovo we
want to see emerge. Postponing these decisions may be
detrimental to the long-term interests of the United States and
our allies in the Balkans.
Again, I welcome our witnesses, and will turn to my
colleague for his opening statement.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming the
witnesses. I look forward to the testimony, and why don't we
just proceed.
Senator Smith. Very good.
Mr. Pardew, we welcome you and thank you for your presence,
and invite your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. PARDEW, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pardew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
pleased today to update the committee on the situation in
Kosovo 1 year after the NATO air campaign and intensive
diplomacy brought the conflict there to a halt. I will briefly
summarize my more formal testimony, which I would like to
submit for the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Ambassador Pardew. My presentation will highlight the
accomplishments to date in Kosovo, identify the challenges--
many of them mentioned in your statement--facing the
international community, and outline the course of action for
the next several months as we see it.
Next Saturday is the 1-year anniversary of the adoption of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 [UNSCR], authorizing the
Secretary General to establish an international security
presence and interim civil administration in Kosovo. This
resolution is the foundation for the international effort in
Kosovo, and will remain in effect until it is withdrawn by the
unanimous vote of the Security Council. With the passage of
UNSCR 1244, NATO forces already deployed in Macedonia and
Albania moved quickly into Kosovo as the nucleus of the
international security force, or KFOR.
The international civil administration organization--the
U.N. Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK]--last June had no funding or
standing capability except for a humanitarian effort. The
conditions facing the international organization in June 1999
were daunting. Thousands of Kosovars were killed or missing,
more than 1 million ethnic Albanians had been expelled from
their home, Kosovo had no government, its economy was
devastated, an insurgent force, the Kosovo Liberation Army
[KLA], had grown from a very small group to over 26,000 people
at the end of the conflict.
Kosovo was devoid of laws and judicial institutions. There
were no police, no judicial system, no prisons. Press
facilities and equipment had been destroyed. Community service
organizations, schools and clinics were damaged, looted, and
destroyed.
Much has been accomplished in the past 365 days. We have
stopped the killing by Serb security forces. We have returned 1
million refugees and displaced persons to their home areas, and
we got them through the winter. Services are available to some
degree in most areas. Schools are open. Basic health services
are available, and the civil administration staff is being
paid.
The international community has begun Kosovo's transition
to a market economy with a hard currency monetary system, and a
new central bank. KFOR has overseen the demilitarization and
disarmament of the KLA and created a civilian-oriented Kosovo
Protection Corps [KPC]. UNMIK has appointed local judges and
prosecutors, and trials are occurring in all districts.
The international community has deployed over 3,000 police
of the 3,500 authorized, and more than half of the special
police have been deployed. Nearly 800 new recruits have
graduated from the OSCE police school, and we hope to have
4,000 trained by early 2001.
Although recent violence has set back the Kosovar Serb
participation in the interim administrative process, we are
hopeful that the local Serbs will continue to participate in
activities that affect their future. Today, 193 in-country
voter registration sites are open, and almost 500,000 Kosovars
have registered for voter registration and personal
documentation. We have 7 daily newspapers, 39 radio stations,
and 5 broadcast outlets operational.
Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, securing the peace and
promoting democracy in Kosovo has been no easy task. Allow me
to summarize some of the major challenges we face. I want to
use this forum this morning to highlight one current issue, the
recent vicious attacks on Serbs in Kosovo. We condemn these
extremist attacks in the strongest possible terms.
Vigilante attacks against minority citizens violate the
principles of democracy and tolerance which we hold so dear,
and divert attention and limited resources away from assistance
to law-abiding people of Kosovo. We are urging local Kosovar
Albanian leaders and the people to work with the UNMIK and KFOR
to stop these attacks.
Other challenges include the U.N. staffing procedure. The
United Nations must improve its capability to deploy and
organize staff for civil administrative structures. With over
60 percent of its authorized strength, municipalities are not
adequately governed, and key managerial positions have gone
unfilled.
In mid-May, the U.S. Government began an initiative with
the United Nations and the European Union to resolve these
staffing shortfalls. The United Nations in New York is
delegating hiring authority to the field and assigning
personnel specialists to UNMIK to speed up the hiring process.
The criminal justice system in Kosovo remains inadequate. This
spring, the United States conducted a comprehensive judicial
assessment and organized a quick start program for local
courts.
OSCE is strengthening judicial training, and as an interim
measure the Special Representative to the Secretary General
plans to place international judges in Kosovo district courts
to handle sensitive cases.
Mitrovica and southern Serbia continue to be potential
flashpoints. KFOR and UNMIK have developed a set of measures to
address the issue in Mitrovica. The United Nations has
appointed a strong regional administrator in Bill Nash, an
American. KFOR has established control zones of confidence, and
international judges and prosecutors have been appointed there
to deal with the criminal issues.
UNMIK is engaging an international consortium in the mining
program in the area to begin preliminary work on the mines.
Another challenge is demobilized members of the KLA, including
those who have joined the Kosovo Protection Corps. Some of them
have acted inappropriately. KFOR retains high standards for
participation in the KPC organization, and we support a zero
tolerance policy regarding illicit activities by members of the
KPC. So far, KFOR has initiated 95 individual investigations,
expelled four and suspended nine members of the KPC for
misbehavior.
Finally, the continued retention of power by the Milosevic
regime in Belgrade obstructs progress in Kosovo, as it does
elsewhere in the region. The sooner the Milosevic regime is
replaced by a democratic alternative, the sooner the region can
begin to heal.
The recent crackdown on independent media and students
shows that the regime is fearful, brittle, and in a downward
spiral. We continue to oppose those individuals and actions
that reinforce Milosevic, and we support those who promote
democratic alternatives. Our focus for the next several months
will be on establishing democracy in Kosovo, but defining the
term in the UNSCR 1244 substantial autonomy in the interim
period.
The first step is to overcome the practical challenges that
I have discussed previously. The second step is to establish
the provisional institutions for democratic self-government
under the international supervision of UNMIK, including
municipal elections to be held in October.
The issue of final status of Kosovo was set aside for now
as we promote democracy, autonomy, and economic development. We
have been clear and consistent that Europe must shoulder the
lion's share of the resource burden in Kosovo. Our European
allies accept this responsibility. Under normal conditions, the
U.S. fields about 5,500 of the 45,000 troops in Kosovo plus 800
support troops in Macedonia, thus our contribution to KFOR
remains at about 14 percent of the total KFOR deployment.
In other areas in the general category of revitalization
and reconstruction for Kosovo, the total contribution for
calendar year 2000 for all donors is about $1.1 billion. At
$168 million, the U.S. contribution for 2000 for Kosovo's
revitalization and reconstruction is about 14.6 percent.
We understand and agree with the Senate's concerns about
adequate burden-sharing in Kosovo, and we are vigilant in
ensuring that our European allies honor their commitments. At
the same time, the United States needs to fulfill its
obligation as a party in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, for months now several ideas have been
proposed in the Congress that limits U.S. participation in
Kosovo, or links our participation to levels of resource
support provided by Europe. The message from the Congress on
burden-sharing has been received loud and clear on both sides
of the Atlantic.
We continue to believe that legislation which limits the
flexibility of this administration and the next one is
unnecessary and unwise. Arbitrary percentages on ceilings on
our participation risk reciprocal actions in the future, limits
our policy actions, and degrades our leadership in the key
security institutions.
The engagement of the United States in Europe and our
allies in Kosovo has been a success, but much work remains. We
stopped the killing, restored regional stability, and are
beginning to reinvigorate society and bring democracy to
Kosovo. Our continuing engagement in Kosovo relates directly to
our national security interest.
Two days ago, we had another anniversary, the anniversary
of the D-day landing, and that anniversary reminds us of our
security linkage to Europe. Our security is served by our
leadership and participation in European security institutions
like NATO and the OSCE. We cannot expect these institutions to
support our interest if we do not participate in important
European security issues.
Second, we know from history that a stable Europe is vital
to American security, and that Europe is not stable if its
southeastern corner is in turmoil. In the past 5 years, the
United States and our allies have successfully contained and
then subdued conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo as the
former Yugoslavia broke apart, but the area's stability remains
at risk from the Milosevic regime and the fragile states
recovering from the conflict.
The international security and civil administration
presence is critical not only to creating a secure environment
in Kosovo, but for sustaining the peace and establishing the
conditions for long-term stability in the region. The costs of
our engagement have not been excessive, Mr. Chairman, and we
must remain engaged with our allies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to update the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardew follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James W. Pardew, Jr.
DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to update the committee
on the situation in Kosovo one year after the NATO air campaign
expelled Milosevic's security forces from the area. Today, I wish to
review the current situation in Kosovo, highlight the accomplishments
to date, and identify the greatest challenges we face. I will conclude
with some points on the key objectives in Kosovo over the next several
months.
First, let me go back slightly more than one year to pay tribute to
the men and women of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) and
OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). These unarmed international
peacekeepers and diplomats, including a significant number of U.S.
Foreign Service personnel, risked their lives daily on the ground in
Kosovo seeking to avoid war in the autumn and winter of 1998. On March
20, 1999, these peacekeepers were forced to withdraw, as the Milosevic
ethnic cleansing program against the Albanian majority in Kosovo became
increasingly brutal and made peacekeeping ineffective. Three days after
they withdrew, NATO began the air campaign against the FRY that, in
combination with an intensive diplomatic effort on many fronts,
expelled Milosevic's security forces from Kosovo.
KOSOVO--JUNE 1999
Almost exactly one year ago, a rapid series of events established
the conditions for the international security force and the interim
civil administration organization operating in Kosovo today. On June 3
of last year, Belgrade accepted the G-8 conditions to pull its security
forces from Kosovo and agreed to negotiate with NATO a Military
Technical Agreement (MTA) spelling out the conditions for that
withdrawal. On June 10, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1244, authorizing the Secretary General to establish an international
security presence and an interim civilian administration to restore
order and governance to Kosovo. NATO suspended the air campaign the
next day once the MTA was signed and the withdrawal of Serbian security
forces had begun in earnest.
Already deployed on the perimeter of the conflict to assist the
humanitarian relief efforts in Macedonia and Albania, NATO forces moved
quickly into Kosovo on June 12 as the nucleus of the international
Kosovo Force (KFOR). The international civil administration
organization, the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), had no funding or
standing capability except for the humanitarian effort and could only
begin to be organized after UNSCR 1244 was adopted.
The conditions facing the international organizations in June 1999
were daunting:
More than one million ethnic Albanians had been expelled
from their homes. Over 800,000 refugees were in camps in
Albanian and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and
550,000 were internally displaced within Kosovo. Over 120,000
Kosovar homes had been systematically destroyed.
Kosovo had no government. Opposed to the 1989 imposition of
a Serb apartheid regime in the province, the Albanian majority
established a shadow state. FRY security forces murdered many
Albanian leaders and destroyed many of the informal networks
through which they governed.
Kosovo's economy was devastated. Without food, power,
sanitation, and shelter, a humanitarian disaster appeared
imminent.
An insurgent force--the Kosovo Liberation Army--had grown
from a small local group to an estimated 26,000 troops at the
height of the conflict.
Kosovo was devoid of laws and institutions. There were no
police, no judicial system, and no prisons.
Significant portions of Kosovo's television network were
incapacitated, including the large-scale destruction of its
towers, masts, and repeaters. Press facilities and equipment
were destroyed to prevent Albanian voices from describing the
scale of the devastation perpetrated by Belgrade.
Many community service organizations, schools, and clinics
were damaged, looted, or destroyed.
While UNMIK continues to struggle in fulfilling its mission, please
keep in mind the ad hoc nature of new international civil
administrative organizations, and the sheer scale of the devastation in
Kosovo. Both make the effort of rebuilding from the war and converting
old communist structures to democratic ones much more arduous.
JUNE 2000--MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE FIRST YEAR
The international effort to organize the interim civil
implementation mission in Kosovo drew heavily on the lessons learned
from Bosnia. The U.N. gave UNMIK a strong mandate supported by NATO and
the international community, and established clearer lines of authority
for the mission. Additionally, the relationship between the civilian
and military missions in Kosovo has also been close and effective.
We often wish implementation measures would move faster, but much
as been accomplished in Kosovo in the past 365 days:
The intervention by the international community stopped the
killing by Serb security forces.
International agencies helped return over one million
refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Last winter the
international community provided 75,000 shelter kits to 387,000
Kosovars, averting a large-scale humanitarian disaster. Since
August 1999, UNMIK has begun to rebuild destroyed houses,
primarily with European donations. Electricity is being
restored to the province, with the repair of 50 power station
transformers. Two of Kosovo's five generators are also
operational.
Services are available to some degree in most areas, schools
are open, basic health services are available, and the civil
administration is being paid.
The international community has begun Kosovo's transition to
a market economy with a ``deutschmark'' monetary system and a
new Central Bank. A micro-credit bank has been established in
Kosovo, and will assist in the financing of small start-up
businesses. UNMIK has submitted a strategy for private sector
development, which has been favorably received by the Interim
Administrative Council (IAC). Upon IAC approval, UNMIK will
implement the proposed commercial code and phased privatization
program.
KFOR and UNMIK together have begun to establish public
order, but under a new system that will promote a rule-of-law
society. The level of ethnic violence remains too high, but it
is down significantly from the early days of the international
deployment.
KFOR has overseen the demilitarization and disarmament of
the KLA. The former KLA handed in 10,000 arms during the
demilitarization process; 3,800 other small arms have
subsequently been collected and destroyed. The international
community created the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civil
emergency services organization of 5,000, to employ former KLA
in useful public service efforts.
UNMIK has appointed 242 local judges and 75 local
prosecutors, and re-established the Supreme Court, municipal
courts, and other minor courts. Trials are occurring in all
district courts and some lower courts.
The international community has deployed 3,035 of 3,593
regular police authorized for Kosovo; 540 of these are from the
United States. More than half of the 1,125 special police (609)
have also deployed, with more on the way. A Spanish unit should
arrive in Kosovo in about a week.
UNMIK and OSCE have accelerated the training of an
indigenous, multi-ethnic police force to hasten the
commissioning of 4,000 officers by early 2001. To date, nearly
800 new recruits have graduated from the OSCE police school.
Barred from participation in official Yugoslav institutions,
Kosovar Albanian leaders are involved in democratic governance
with UNMIK's guidance. Recently, the Gracanica Serbs, under the
leadership of Bishop Artemije, joined Kosovo's interim
administrative institutions as observers. Although recent
violence has set back Kosovar Serb participation in these
institutions, we are hopeful that the local Serbs will continue
to participate in activities that affect their future.
In April, UNMIK, through the OSCE, began a Kosovo-wide voter
registration program. Today, 193 in-country sites were open,
and over 400,000 people have been registered. Out-of-area
registration is underway in-person in Montenegro, Macedonia,
and Albania. The voter registration process is the basis for
issuing internationally recognized identity papers, but more
importantly, it lays the foundation for the involvement of the
people in democratic political institutions.
An independent and vibrant media environment is emerging in
Kosovo today. Kosovo now has 7 daily papers, 39 radio stations,
and 5 television broadcast outlets. The U.S. is supporting
independent television stations, and is working with moderates
in the Serb National Council to establish a radio station in
Central Kosovo that is scheduled to open in June. Its
broadcasts will reach the majority of Serb enclaves in Kosovo.
CURRENT CHALLENGES
As expected, securing the peace and promoting democracy in Kosovo
is no easy task. Allow me to summarize some of the most significant
challenges we face today.
The U.N. must improve its capability to deploy and organize staff
for its civil administrative structures. While UNMIK has begun to
address the problems caused by Belgrade's actions, it has not fully
established its authority over civil administration. With only 60% of
its authorized civil administration staff deployed, it has not been
able to adequately govern many municipalities. Additionally, some key
managerial positions have gone unfilled. The United Nations' system of
personnel recruitment and appointment has slowed significantly the
civilian implementation process in Kosovo.
The Department of State is making a concerted effort to focus
international attention on UNMIK's staffing problems. In mid-May, a
U.S. government team began coordinating with the U.N. and EU on a plan
to remedy civil administration staffing shortfalls. The EU is also
supporting an initiative with the aim of soliciting qualified personnel
from its member nations for vacant positions in the EU pillar. In
addition, the U.N. in New York is delegating hiring authority to the
field and assigning personnel specialists to UNMIK to speed the hiring
process. These measures are a welcome beginning to much-needed reform.
The criminal justice system in Kosovo remains inadequate. Courtroom
facilities must be improved and the trial monitoring structure should
be strengthened. In some instances, local judges have been unable to
effectively try cases and the number of supplemental international
judges is not enough to compensate. More civilian prison space is
required. This spring the United States conducted a comprehensive
judicial assessment and organized a ``quick start'' program to deliver
much needed electrical generators and office equipment as early as this
month to local courts. We are also working with the OSCE to strengthen
its judicial training capacity. As an interim measure, until local
judges are sufficiently trained in democratic law and secure enough to
consider adjudicating a full docket, the SRSG plans to place
international judges in all Kosovo district courts to handle sensitive
cases.
Another weak spot in the criminal justice system is the lack of
sufficient detention facilities and experienced personnel to run them.
UNMIK has trained about 260 corrections officers, and an additional 60
are currently in training. More needs to be done to fulfill the
requirement for 600 officers to operate the prison system. A prison in
Istok that can hold 520 inmates re-opened on June 1 and will expand
significantly the system's current incarceration capacity. We are
working with our allies to shore up the system in the interim, and
provide the resources necessary to create and sustain a functioning
penal system.
The municipal elections, which will be held this fall, will further
focus the involvement of local leaders in municipal administrative
structures by providing a public mandate to guide their participation.
Organization for the elections is well underway.
The Serbs who remain in Kosovo feel insecure and are reluctant
partners in steps to establish democracy in Kosovo. The OSCE and UNMIK
are engaging with the Serb community to stress the importance of civil
registration, but thus far few Serbs are registering. We are also
working on a pilot project to return Serbs to Kosovo, and are
investigating possibilities for enhanced assistance to existing Serb
communities.
Mitrovica and southern Serbia continue to be potential flashpoints.
Ethnic Albanian insurgents in the Presevo region had pledged to reject
the use of violence and seek a political solution, but we know that
their insurgency continues. We continue to warn extremists on both
sides of the border that provocation and violence will not be
tolerated. Additionally, KFOR and UNMIK are monitoring the situation
carefully.
KFOR and UNMIK have developed a set of measures to address the
issue of Mitrovica. The U.N. has appointed a strong administrator for
the region, American retired General William Nash. KFOR and UNMIK have
returned more than 140 displaced Albanians to homes north of the Ibar
River and KFOR-controlled ``Zones of Confidence'' have been established
in problem areas around two bridges and one neighborhood. Two
international judges and an international prosecutor have been
appointed in Mitrovica. Additionally, UNMIK is engaging an
international mining consortium to begin preliminary work in elements
of the Trepce mining complex, previously the largest economic
enterprise in Kosovo.
The violence toward minorities and the atmosphere of intolerance in
Kosovo is of serious concern. The overall reduction in violence over
the past year is heartening and is a tribute to KFOR and UNMIK police
efforts. However, recent violence against Serbs and Roma, the isolation
of those communities and the appearance of provocative ``vigilante
journalism'' undermines the international effort in Kosovo and sets
back the process of creating a tolerant democratic society there. We
believe that those who aspire to lead in Kosovo should denounce these
developments as UNMIK and KFOR take measures to improve security for
minorities.
We are keenly aware of the possibility that demobilized members of
the former KLA, including those who have joined the KPC, may act
inappropriately. KFOR retains high standards for participation in the
organization and enforces a zero tolerance policy regarding illicit
activities by members of the KPC. In March, KFOR and UNMIK put into
force the KPC Disciplinary Code (DC), which constitutes the formal
mechanism for enforcement of the rules for compliance and disciplinary
action against offenders. The DC applies to all KPC members and
provides the legal basis for the commander of the KPC to take
disciplinary action against non-compliant members. UNMIK and KFOF also
recently signed the Compliance Enforcement Framework Document, which
assigns responsibility for investigating criminal actions to UNMIK,
administrative discipline to KPC, and compliance violations to KFOR.
Thus far, KFOR has initiated 95 individual investigations, expelled 4,
and suspended 9 KPC members.
One regional challenge is critical to Kosovo. The continued
retention of power by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade obstructs
progress in Kosovo as it does elsewhere in the region. The Milosevic
factor confuses engagement with Kosovar Serbs and prevents any serious
discussion of long-term options with the Kosovar Albanians. The sooner
the Milosevic regime is replaced by democratic alternatives, the sooner
the region can begin to heal. The recent crackdown on independent media
and students shows that the regime is fearful, brittle, and in a
downward spiral. While no one can predict when a change in Belgrade
will occur, we continue to oppose those individuals and actions which
reinforce Milosevic, and we support those which promote democratic
alternatives.
PROJECTIONS FOR YEAR TWO
Our focus for the next several months will be on establishing
democracy in Kosovo, not on defining its final status. The first step
is to overcome the practical challenges I previously described. The
second step is to establish the provisional institutions for democratic
self-government under the international supervision of UNMIK. Democracy
should be well-established in Kosovo before we can resolve the issue of
final status. Over the past few months, with the Rambouillet draft
constitution as a point of departure, we have begun building consensus
with key allies on the form that the provisional self-government will
take, and its relationship to UNMIK and KFOR. These discussions will
also include consultations with Kosovars.
UNSCR 1244 establishes the foundation for this undefined interim
period. We believe the resolution requires no modification and it may
only be withdrawn upon the unanimous consent of the U.N. Security
Council.
BURDENSHARING
We have been clear and consistent that Europe must shoulder the
lion's share of the resource burden in Kosovo. Our NATO Allies,
partners and other countries do contribute the large majority of KFOR's
forces. Under normal conditions, the U.S. fields about 5,500 of the
45,000 troops in Kosovo, plus 800 support troops in Macedonia. Thus,
the U.S. contribution stays close to 14% of the total KFOR deployment.
In the general category of revitalization and reconstruction for
Kosovo, the total contribution for CY2000 from all donors is about $1.1
billion. At $168 million, the U.S. contribution for 2000 for Kosovo's
revitalization and reconstruction is about 14.6%. We understand and
agree with the Senate's concerns about adequate burdensharing in
Kosovo, and are vigilant in ensuring that our European allies honor
their commitments. At the same time, the United States needs to fulfill
its obligations. With the European's providing the lion's share, the
U.S. contribution is affordable.
Mr. Chairman, for months now several ideas have been proposed in
the Congress that limit U.S. participation in Kosovo or link our
participation to levels of resource support provided by Europe. The
message from the Congress on burdensharing has been received loud and
clear on both sides of the Atlantic. We continue to believe that
limiting the flexibility of this Administration and the next is
unnecessary and unwise. Arbitrary percentages to our participation
risks reciprocal actions in the future, limits our policy options, and
degrades our leadership in key security institutions.
U.S. INTEREST IN KOSOVO
The engagement of the United States and our allies in Kosovo has
been a success. We stopped the killing, restored regional stability,
and are beginning to reinvigorate the society and bring democracy to
Kosovo. Our continuing engagement in Kosovo relates directly to our
national security interests. First, our security is served by
leadership and participation in European security institutions like
NATO and OSCE. We cannot expect these institutions to support our
interests if we do not participate in important European security
issues.
Second, we know from history that a stable Europe is vital to
American security, and that Europe is not stable if its southeastern
corner is in turmoil. In the past four years, the U.S. and our allies
have successfully contained, then subdued, conflicts in Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo as the former Yugoslavia broke apart. But the area's
stability remains at risk from the Milosevic regime and the fragility
of states recovering from conflict. The international security presence
is critical to not only creating a secure environment in Kosovo, but
for sustaining the peace and establishing the conditions for long-term
stability in the region that will allow robust political, economic, and
reconstruction programs backed by sufficient resources to make a
difference. The costs have not been excessive given the outcome. We
must remain engaged with our allies.
Senator Smith. Mr. Ambassador, from the beginning of our
involvement in Kosovo I have supported the administration both
in the decision to engage and in defending it recently on a
move in the Senate to withdraw.
But I have also said from the beginning that I do not
believe our objective is realistic. The objective of the
international community is autonomy within Yugoslavia for
Kosovo. The problem I have is that nobody on the ground seems
to want that. The Serbs want Kosovo on their terms, and the
Albanians want independence of the Serbs. Can you allay my
ongoing skepticism of the achievability of our stated goal?
Ambassador Pardew. Mr. Chairman, the difficulty in
discussing long-term status of Kosovo is compounded by the
Milosevic problem in Belgrade. It is impossible to have a
meaningful discussion with Kosovars over the long-term status
with Milosevic in power in Belgrade, and so close to the tragic
events that have occurred in Kosovo.
Senator Smith. Does it substantially abate if Milosevic is
gone? Do you think the Albanians will want to be----
Ambassador Pardew. Not immediately, I do not, but we
continue to believe that some appropriate relationship with
Serbia yet to be defined is better than independence.
We have not supported independence, but we do insist that
the final status of Kosovo must be acceptable to the people of
Kosovo. Right now, we have set that issue aside while we work
to achieve democratic institutions, a market economy, and to
bring Western democratic values to the area. It is just
impossible at this point in time, sir, to have a serious
discussion with them on the status question.
Senator Smith. But the consequence of sticking to this
hybrid end game is, we are there for an indeterminate amount of
time, nation-building on our terms and not their terms. Am I
wrong in that fear?
Ambassador Pardew. We certainly cannot put a timeframe on
our presence there. Again, we believe that the area is
important, regional stability is important, and we have to take
the necessary measures to ensure regional stability. However,
we learned from Bosnia not to set specific time lines on when
we can leave.
I can only say our focus right now is on defining what
substantial autonomy means in this interim period. We are doing
everything we can to give them effective governance under the
UNMIK structure for this interim period and set aside the long-
term status.
Senator Smith. What I think you have implied, in order for
that ever to be achievable we have got to get rid of Mr.
Milosevic. What is being done on that score?
Ambassador Pardew. We are working with our allies in Europe
in a range of measures to undermine the Milosevic regime and to
promote those forces that support democracy. We are pursuing a
number of initiatives. We are supporting independent media in
the FRY. We are working with the Serb opposition. We are
promoting the democracy in Bosnia and in Montenegro and in
Kosovo and in the surrounding area. We have a very serious
sanctions regime which we are tightening with our European
allies right now.
So there are a whole range of very serious measures we are
using, but ultimately, Mr. Chairman, whether Milosevic goes or
stays is an issue for Serbs. The Serbian people have to decide
when he goes. We hope that that will happen sooner rather than
later.
Senator Smith. So if he stays, that means we stay as well?
Ambassador Pardew. It makes it much more difficult to
leave.
Senator Smith. It seems to me the international community
ought to go get him and take him to The Hague, and things would
get better a lot quicker.
Can you speak to Russia's involvement? Are they our partner
there, or our opponent there? They are hosting a Serb war
criminal during Mr. Putin's inauguration, giving him a nice
week of good food and camaraderie. What role are they taking on
the ground?
Ambassador Pardew. This whole Serbian issue and the breakup
of Yugoslavia has been a very difficult problem for the
Russians. They have their own domestic political factors to
consider, and quite frankly, their actions have sometimes been
inconsistent. For example, Foreign Minister Ivanov apologized
publicly for the visit to Moscow by the person under indictment
by the War Crimes Tribunal.
In other cases the Russians have been extremely helpful.
They were helpful in the negotiation of the end of the air
campaign. We are working with them expectively in the contact
group, so the relationship with Russia over Kosovo has varied
from time to time.
Their forces, if I could go on, have been responsible
members of the alliance in Kosovo and have, in fact, acted
professionally. So in many ways Russia has been a plus, but
there have been those instances in which they have made things
a little more difficult for us, and they have made mistakes
which they have openly admitted.
Senator Smith. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pardew,
you have described, I think accurately and very thoughtfully,
the status of our forces in Kosovo, and the job they have to
do, and that is a very difficult one. Chairman Smith has
surveyed the larger picture and your role as advisor to the
President and Secretary for democracy in the Balkans. You have
taken a larger view even as you try to help bring democracy to
2 million people in Kosovo.
I would just underline the thought that the debate that we
had the other day on the Byrd-Warner amendment was especially
important because it drew the Senate's attention for the first
time to the responsibilities of the United States in Europe. We
all understand that role in a way, and Chairman Smith's
underlining of the D-day anniversary is significant. You have
talked about this as well.
We are in Europe because we want to be there and because
Europeans want us to be there. The German Foreign Minister and
the French Foreign Minister have come through here, have met
with us and have emphasized that our presence in Europe has
made all the difference in terms of peace in Europe for the
past 60-years--all because the United States is there, and we
are there in a very large way as a leader of NATO.
Now, the thing that was upsetting about the debate the
other day was that, because of the irritation of many Members
of the Senate who reflect the public as a whole, we might cut
and run under very dubious circumstances. They feel this way
out of irritation or weariness, over a lack of foresight in
Kosovo, a lack of comprehensive plans now, or the lack of an
end game plan.
For each of us who have been involved in these discussions,
whether it be the White House or the State Department, there
was not a consensus in the Senate or the House as to what had
occurred. The votes were always very problematic, and on
occasion, as you recall, even after we had been involved in
bombing for several weeks, there was a tie vote in the House on
whether we should be bombing at all.
So, in a way democracy works, and we finally confronted in
this very close vote the fact that we have a responsibility,
and it is a very tough one, but it is an ongoing
responsibility.
This was a close call, and the administration understands
that, and, in fairness, Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright
and perhaps yourself and others were very busy, as you needed
to be, to explain how drastic circumstances might be.
Now, having said that, I am concerned that there does not
appear to be in our administration, quite apart from NATO or
the United Nations, an overall strategy. There are pieces of
this, and sometimes persons like yourself are able to be an
interlocutor and relate them.
For instance, the Southeast European Assistance Plan is
extremely important. It is important for those in that area,
for the United States, for NATO, Bulgaria, Romania and other
countries because the problems in Serbia have isolated them in
terms of trade and development even as they wish to become a
part of NATO and wish to become affiliated with us. There has
been almost no debate here and very little word about our
participation, although it is a European situation primarily.
Likewise how are Albania and Macedonia to be supported
given Serbia in the middle of all this, quite apart from the
Kosovo situation or from Montenegro? From time to time we edge
up to what we should be doing in Montenegro.
Not all of it is covert, but it sometimes takes on that
flavor. After all, Kosovo is a part of Serbia and, therefore,
it is unseemly to get into too much discussion about the whole
place which might be stabilized this summer, and we may have a
big NATO problem again for which we're not very well prepared.
And I don't see, as the chairman has pointed out, an end
game at all with regard to Kosovo. Now, you have to answer
these questions diplomatically because our European friends are
very sensitive on the issue of independence and autonomy, and
therefore public testimony by you or anybody else is likely to
be difficult.
But the fact is that, as I rephrase the steps of how we got
involved to begin with, we were involved at Rambouillet.
We felt a responsibility to make that conference credible.
Whoever made the estimate that the bombing raids would change
the opinion of Milosevic may or may not have been correct.
Whether we were prepared for that war is beside the point,
because it is over, but the fact is there are lots of questions
about Rambouillet, our negotiating position, and how we came
into such a war to begin with, and all the ramifications that
follow it.
Now, I think at some point either your administration or
the next one has to put in context what is going to happen, and
we have to take leadership in the United States and in NATO to
make it happen.
As it stands, it seems to me we are mostly reactive and
defensive. Some say that 15 percent of the people there doing
peacekeeping seems like a fair share, but we are skeptical
whether the Europeans are doing their share. It is a very small
area anyway and very tough for any of these people to make a
difference in southeastern Europe, its economy, and lack of
overall strategy.
What can you inform us about any overall strategic plan, or
a way in which the administration might explain or take
leadership in bringing some plan so that you then come to the
Congress and say this is the way it is. It may be expensive,
but these are things we have got to do, and they involve all
these countries, and they involve money and investment and the
rest.
This is preferable to a piecemeal approach to Kosovo
appearing, in ways suggesting that we might do something more
or we might not, or defending the amount that we are doing. I
think ultimately you would have to admit this is an interim
stop-gap affair or a finger in the dike, and hope that some
good things might happen, like Milosevic leaving, or other
countries stepping to the fore.
Can you give us any grand idea about all of this?
Ambassador Pardew. I do not know how grand it will be
Senator, but I will give it my best shot.
First of all, I think we appear sometimes to be reactive,
because we are in some ways responding to events we do not
control. I mean, we simply cannot predict what Milosevic is
going to do tactically. This all started in the early nineties
as Yugoslavia came apart, and we were faced with confrontations
between these new countries. Bosnia was a particular difficult
example.
We tried long ago to deter Milosevic from taking action in
Kosovo but we were not successful, and we do not know for sure
what he might do next. But you are exactly right in that it is
very difficult to deal with regional issues because of Serbia's
current leadership, its location and the size of its
population.
I would say that our strategy is governed by our interest
in regional stability. We wish to take a regional approach to
problems, not just a piece by piece approach.
Part of the regional strategy is the Stability Pact and
what we are trying to do to integrate countries of the region
into the European economic system and the European political
institutions. We seek to bring these countries into NATO, OSCE,
EU, and other regional institutions, and to have them work
together toward common economic structures and goals. The
Stability Pact is a large part of that effort.
Another element of our strategy is the replacement of the
regime in Serbia, because such a change is so critical to the
region, and our goal of building democracies in these
countries. We have made great headway in Croatia. We have not
had as much success in Bosnia as we would have liked, but
things have gotten better there. We are working very hard in
Kosovo to improve the situation. Overall, I would characterize
our strategy as based on regional stability and regional
cooperation. Then you go into the individual countries and what
we are doing there.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think you can
infer from both of our comments and questions that our ability
to keep support in the U.S. Senate for the current end game is
not indefinite, and the sooner we get on to realizing that we
picked a side on the side of the Kosovar Albanians the better
off we will be, because that will lead us to a goal that is
achievable, and that is their independence, and if the
Europeans do not want that, I believe they will find that they
are the ones enforcing something other than that.
We thank you, sir.
Ambassador Pardew. Thank you.
Senator Smith. We invite now our next panel, Ambassador
Abramowitz, Dr. Williams, and Mr. Bugajski.
Ambassador Abramowitz, we will start with you, sir. Thanks
for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Abramowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate the chance to discuss Kosovo with you. Let me just
say that there have been very powerful voices on this committee
over the past decade saying some very important things, and it
is an honor for me to be with some of them here today. Thank
you very much.
Kosovo is a subject of great political and moral
importance. For all the ills of Western policy in the Balkans
the past year, the useless rhetoric--past decade, I should
say--the useless rhetoric, the evasions of reality, the half-
way measures, in the end Kosovo represented an extraordinary
allied motivation effort and accomplishment.
Kosovo, of course, is not over. It remains a poor,
disorganized society with a long-term security problem. It is
essential for the people of Kosovo, peace in the Balkans, and
to the cohesion and the values of the alliance that our efforts
to create a stable and reasonable democratic Kosovo be
successful. That will require continuing personnel, military
and civilian resources of sizable magnitude, determination, and
some political imagination.
There is no easy exit strategy, that wonderful phrase which
is often used to lead democratic countries to less decisive
action or no action at all, and ultimately produces greater
cost and greater suffering. How long Western forces have to
stay, and the magnitude of the resources needed, will be
heavily dependant by what we and our allies do in Kosovo in a
wider regional setting.
I thought it might be useful to raise at least five
important questions about our efforts in Kosovo, and I will try
to be brief. The first and most obvious is where are we, and
what has been accomplished?
Mr. Chairman, you have already answered that very well.
Your description at the beginning of the session I think was
dead on, and I am not going to repeat essentially what you had
said. I would like to just close that part with a little
paragraph which I have written which says, it seems inevitable
that after a war the resources and attention of concerned
nations to post-war reconstruction fall far behind what is
needed, indeed, in some cases imperiling the results of the
war.
The U.N. administration has been burdened with a deficiency
of all sorts of resources, as well as a mandate to keep Kosovo
as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which flies in
the face of reality. However valiant their effort, it is clear
that UNMIK has neither the resources, time, nor ability to
reshape Kosovo society, but UNMIK, with the help of KFOR, can
establish a reasonably secure political environment, encourage
responsible political parties, promote movement or democratic
practices, and institute an elective process.
My second question is, do Serbs still have a place in
Kosovo? In Kosovo our ideals collide with popular fears and
profound antagonisms. It is not a situation that can be changed
overnight. Serbs have been leaving Kosovo for the past 20
years, as Albanian predominance in the province increased. The
outcome of the war sped further departures. Probably half of
pre-war Kosovo's 200,000 Serbs, not all of whom were long-term
residents, fled partially because of Albanian violence or
provocation, but in part because they also feared to live under
Albanian rule, or lost their jobs when Serbian administration
ceased.
Despite their inhospitable reception in Serbia, and the
presence of KFOR in Kosovo, it is uncertain whether many Kosovo
Serbs want to return to Kosovo without jobs to go to, which
have largely been taken over by Albanians, and without the
restoration of Serbian authority. The latter is not likely for
a long time to come, if ever. To encourage Serbs remaining in
Kosovo to stay and those in Serbia to return is no easy task,
and from the perspective of many Albanians in Kosovo the fewer
Serbs in Kosovo the better, and the less likely in the future
that Serbia would attempt to take back the area.
The issue of Serb returns is a tricky one, in part because
Belgrade is deeply involved in the Serb presence in Kosovo.
Many Serbs also came late to Kosovo, as part of Belgrade's
apparatus. In part, this issue of returns is also intimately
related to the establishment of a serious Kosovo entity, one
with a real court system, a better rule of law, and adequate
policing, in short, a functioning society where there is
security and predictability.
That does not yet exist in Kosovo, and encouraging Serbs to
return at this point is questionable, since they will almost
certainly end up in enclaves controlled by Belgrade, but while
a stable environment is necessary, it is probably not
sufficient. Getting Serbs to return will also require
continuing Western pressure, lots of material support and
military and police protection for some uncertain time to come.
This means: No. 1, that Serbs must somehow be assured
security, democratic rights, power-sharing in their
communities, and political participation outside their
communities, however difficult that will be in Albanian areas.
No. 2, that Serbs in Kosovo will have to accept that they
will have to live in a single Kosovo not ruled by Belgrade.
Right now, that does not seem to be the case for a large number
of them.
No. 3, that Albanian violence must be controlled, and
Albanian leaders need to understand that they will ultimately
have to accept the return of those Serbs wishing to return to
Kosovo and make that work as well as possible if they are to
sustain the international community support for majority rule
in Kosovo.
Given the difficulties and uncertainties involved, one
practical strategy does not answer the problem, but one
practical strategy might be to focus initial returns on the
much smaller number of displaced Roma gypsies, who invariably
get the short end of the stick. If their returns can be
successfully managed, it could offer some confidence to move
ahead with a program to return Serbs to Kosovo.
My third question, one that you have alluded to and Senator
Lugar has alluded to, is the uncertainty of the future status
of Kosovo inhibiting the political and economic development of
Kosovo. The answer to this is almost certainly yes, although it
is hard to quantify.
Economic and political decisions are made because the only
international mandate is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244,
which says that Kosovo's part of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia [FRY], and that is used in many quarters to
contribute to delay in creating meaningful institutions which
are run by the people of Kosovo. There seems to be a continuing
struggle between UNMIK and Pristina and the United Nations in
New York over the implementation of a mandate and the structure
and timing of self rule.
Russia and China are against any change in the
international status of Kosovo. The allies continue to fear
that a too rapid movement toward Kosovo self-rule and any
enunciation of Kosovo independence as a goal will imperil the
viability of Macedonia and stir up a major international
dispute.
They all apparently believe that the issue of Kosovo's
status could be better dealt with once Milosevic leaves the
scene. That is, there is a greater possibility of keeping
Kosovo and Serbia together in some way if Serbia has a more
democratic government, or conversely, that a more democratic
government in Serbia is more likely to accept the succession of
Kosovo, or at least a republic status for Kosovo in the FRY.
One problem with this approach is that no one is smart
enough to figure out when Milosevic will lose power. However
significant the weaknesses of his regime, his departure could
be delayed a long time. We have seen that with Castro, we have
seen that with Saddam Hussein. It could be delayed a long time,
creating tension and instability in Kosovo should power and
responsibility continue to be denied the Albanians.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that a post-Milosevic
Government will have the desire or the political backing to
accept a change in Kosovo's status. One could reasonably argue
that it is better for the international community and the Serb
opposition to change Kosovo's status while Milosevic is in
charge.
Another problem is our use of so-called Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the FRY. I think we all know why the term was used
in 1244 and not Serbia. The sad fact is, the FRY is the family
enterprise of Mr. Milosevic that serves to give his rule some
legal patina. Every republic has gotten out, and the last
remaining one, Montenegro, also wants out, much to our
discomfiture.
Resurrection of the FRY is a highly dubious enterprise even
in a post-Milosevic period. It is, however, at this time not
possible politically in the international community, whether it
is desirable or not, easier now rather than later, to change
the status of court in Kosovo by the international community,
and that, I believe, is producing a drift in Kosovo and in
allied determination.
The people in Kosovo still do not know what local elections
which are to be held in the autumn mean, and there seems to be,
at least among some allies, a sense that Kosovo is really part
of Serbia. It is important for the United States to make its
views crystal clear to the people of Kosovo and to the world at
large that while the status of Kosovo still has to be
determined, Serbian rule will not return to Kosovo and
independence is a possible goal once certain conditions about
the nature of independent Kosovo are met, including a
demonstrated commitment to minority rights, and an adherence to
internationally recognized borders.
Credible elections will also be needed to establish the
legitimacy of Kosovo Governments, and the growing
responsibility of those voted into office. In short, we either
start to set the rules for a transition to what may be Kosovo
independence, or we allow ourselves to be hostage to events in
Kosovo and the region.
My fourth question: How do Serbia and Kosovo live with each
other in the long run? If Western forces are to ever be
withdrawn from Kosovo, clearly Serbia and Kosovo must be able
to work out some sort of stable relationship. Whether this will
be possible, and when, I am not smart enough to predict.
The history of the two communities has obviously been a
violent one, but even if that objective is difficult to attain,
it is important not to lose sight of it. I think we can say at
least a few things about the longer term. First, the
relationship cannot improve while Milosevic remains in power.
He is still trying to preserve the potentiality for Serb rule
in Kosovo, and to undermine UNMIK authority. We cannot do
business with him, and a different type of Serbia will be
needed.
Second, even if a Serbian Abe Lincoln took charge and
offered malice toward none, not one Albanian would support any
serious political tie to Belgrade. Nevertheless, the Albanian
leaders of Kosovo must realize that, while independence is
their goal, they will have to coexist with next door ultimately
a much stronger Serbia. They must examine the government that
succeeds Milosevic in that light, and how they might proceed
constructively with its leaders. They must also recognize that
a continuing Western military presence in Kosovo could be
challenged by the domestic considerations and domestic politics
in allied nations.
Third, and this is, I think, in the end ultimately the most
important thing, much will depend on Europe and what it does in
Kosovo, in Serbia when it is free of Milosevic, and in the
broad Balkan region. The prospects for stability and ultimate
reconciliation in the Balkans depend in great part both on
economic growth in all the countries, but also on their
respective relationships with Europe.
It will be only possible to remove Western troops when both
Kosovo and Serbia are bound to European institutions in some
serious fashion. Whether Europe can rise to the occasion and
produce a long term integrative process remains to be seen.
Europe has plenty of things on its mind. But I believe that the
EU increasingly recognizes that connection, and Mr. Solana and
Mr. Patten have added enormous energy and urgency to the EU
effort.
Finally, what is the role of the United States in shaping
the future of Kosovo? The United States was the heart of the
alliance war effort, but long term, however, it is the EU, as I
noted above, which has a central role in ultimately stabilizing
the former Yugoslavia, but it can take a long while to get to
the long term, and the United States remains essential for
security and for political purposes.
The United States supplies only 15 percent of KFOR, but the
continued presence of a significant American force is needed to
provide the assurance to the Kosovo Albanians that Serb forces
will not simply be able one day to walk in and resume control.
The presence of American forces conveys a similar type message
to any Serbian Government. Certainly, until more progress is
made in creating new, self-sustaining political institutions in
Kosovo, and we see the impact of a post-Milosevic Government in
Belgrade, serious American forces will be required.
While the bulk of the military presence will have to come
from European countries, I think it would be a mistake to
simply consider the division of forces a burden-sharing
problem. The nature and role of American forces are also
important, whether U.S. military efforts are narrowly confined
or significantly robust, and determined to get the job done.
I note that Kosovo Serbs have complained a few days ago
that British forces do a better job of providing protection to
Serbs than American ones. That may be unfair. I do not know.
But I think the way our forces are being used in Kosovo is
worth serious review.
There is, moreover, an important political purpose served
by the continuing presence of U.S. forces in Kosovo, namely, a
stronger voice in determining allied strategy in the Balkans,
where we have a major investment in interests and values to
protect.
The United States, to its credit, is an important catalytic
government, particularly in the Balkans. It needs to remain
involved in working to avoid backsliding so that we do not fall
into repeating our past experience in Kosovo, and that we do
what is necessary to ensure that the alliance maintains a
sufficiently strong posture in Kosovo and indeed the whole of
the former Yugoslavia, so that we will be successful, rather
than doing just enough to fail or create uncertainty and
further instability, and in this regard I must express some
concern as to our involvement in the nonmilitary aspects of the
Kosovo problem.
An Albanian friend has commented that the United States has
won the war and seems to have disappeared from Kosovo. In
helping make things happen in Kosovo, in the vital tasks,
particularly building a civil society, the U.S. Government
seems to me to be largely absent. I am sure you will get a
catalogue, and we have already heard a catalogue of all the
U.S. Government is doing in Kosovo if you ask the question, but
I believe it is another subject worth seriously looking at.
Let me close by saying that in western Europe in the 1940's
our exit strategy in peace and war was to be successful. If you
need an exit strategy for Kosovo, I suggest that is still a
fitting one.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abramowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Morton I. Abramowitz
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the invitation to discuss Kosovo with you. It is a
subject of great political and moral importance. For all the ills of
Western policy in the Balkans the past decade--the useless rhetoric,
the evasions of reality, the half-way measures--in the end Kosovo
represented an extraordinary allied motivation, effort, and
accomplishment. The saga is, of course, not over; Kosovo remains a poor
disorganized society with a long-term security problem. It is essential
to the people of Kosovo, to peace in the Balkans, and to the cohesion
and values of the alliance that our efforts to create a stable and
reasonable democratic Kosovo be successful. That will require
continuing personnel--military and civilian--resources of sizable
magnitude, determination, and some political imagination. There is no
easy exit strategy, that wonderful Washington phrase which often is
used to lead democratic countries to less decisive action or no action
at all and ultimately produces greater cost and suffering. How long
Western forces have to stay and the magnitude of the resources needed,
will be influenced by what we and our allies do in Kosovo and its wider
regional setting.
I thought it might be most useful to raise at least five important
questions surrounding our efforts in Kosovo that need to be aired, and
to give my answers. I will try to be direct and brief.
1. The most obvious question is where are we: what has and has not been
achieved in not quite a year of U.N. rule?
Views diverge, often radically--some see the glass half full, some
see it mostly empty. In the media pessimism usually predominates, with
the overwhelming emphasis on continuing violence against Serbs. Much
depends on when you entered the Kosovo problem. One needs to be
reminded of Kosovo's tortured post-1989 history: the repression, the
dislocation of people, the ethnic animosities, and the destruction of
property in evaluating developments under U.N. rule. Here is how I see
it, and I rely on my own observations and particularly the work in
Kosovo of the International Crisis Group, of which I am a board member:
The vast bulk of Kosovo's people are now better off,
livelier, and more hopeful than before the war. That is, of
course, because the Serbian ruling apparatus with its hallmark
of fear and repression is gone. Incidents of violence against
Serbs and other minorities continue. The present security
climate is heavily dependent on a significant Western military
and police presence.
Whatever the suspicions and accusations--true or false--
hurled at the KLA and some of its leaders, the organization has
been significantly demilitarized. Whether it can turn itself
into a popular and cohesive political force not tainted by
intimidation, corruption, violence, or fractiousness remains to
be seen.
Albanians got through a hard winter and moved quickly,
mostly on their own, to reconstruct homes, establish small and
medium sized private business, and resume farm production.
Basic public services have begun to function after a slow
UNMIK start--garbage collection, traffic, etc., are all
improving and ninety percent of the children are back in
school.
A process has begun to hold local elections in the fall and
to give some political power to the people of Kosovo;
However, there are major areas where little has been done or even can
be done in the short-term:
The communities are more ethnically separated than ever.
Kosovo's remaining Serbs live in enclaves under permanent KFOR
guard and are mostly supplied by Belgrade. Other minorities
remain at risk.
Kosovo is still divided. Albanians have been entirely driven
from territories north of the city of Mitrovica--this area
functions de facto as part of Serbia. Indeed, Belgrade's hand
is still felt throughout Kosovo.
Major infrastructure has not been repaired or reconstructed,
most notably utilities.
Very little Kosovo administration has been established.
There is U.N. rule but not a real government and Albanian
administration is noted mostly by its absence. Kosovo lacks the
rule of law and a serious judiciary. Most publicized has been
the inability of the international community to provide an
adequate police presence; less than half those originally
planned have arrived.
It seems inevitable that after a war the resources and attention of
concerned nations to post war reconstruction fall far behind what is
needed, indeed in some cases imperiling the results of the war. The
U.N. administration has been burdened with a deficiency of all sorts of
resources as well as by a mandate to keep Kosovo as part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which flies in the face of reality.
However valiant their efforts, it is clear that UNMIK has neither the
resources, time, nor ability to reshape Kosovo society. But UNMIK can
establish a reasonably secure political environment, encourage
responsible political parties, promote movement toward democratic
practices, and institute an elective process.
2. Do Serbs still have a place in Kosovo?
In Kosovo our ideals collide with popular fears and profound
antagonisms. It is not a situation that can be changed overnight.
Serbs have been leaving Kosovo for the past twenty years as
Albanian predominance in the province increased. The outcome of the war
sped further departures. Probably half of pre-war Kosovo's two hundred
thousand Serbs (not all long term residents) fled, partly because of
Albanian violence or provocation but in part also because they feared
to live under Albanian rule or had lost their jobs when Serbian
administration ceased.
Despite their inhospitable reception in Serbia and the presence of
KFOR in Kosovo, it is questionable whether many Kosovo Serbs want to
return to Kosovo without jobs to go to (which have largely been taken
over by Albanians) and without the restoration of Serbian authority.
The latter is not likely for a long time to come, if ever. To encourage
Serbs remaining in Kosovo to stay and those in Serbia to return is no
easy task. From the perspective of many Albanians the fewer Serbs in
Kosovo the better, and the less likely in the future that Serbia would
attempt to take back the area.
This issue of Serb returns is a tricky one in part because Belgrade
is deeply involved in the Serb presence in Kosovo. Many Serbs also came
late to Kosovo as part of Belgrade's apparatus. In part this issue of
returns is also intimately related to the establishment of a serious
Kosovo entity: one with a real court system, a better rule of law, and
adequate policing--in short a functioning society where there is
security and predictability. That does not yet exist in Kosovo and
encouraging Serbs to return at this point is questionable since they
will almost certainly end up in enclaves controlled by Belgrade. But
while a stable environment is necessary it is probably not sufficient.
Getting Serbs to return will also require continuing Western pressure,
lots of material support, and military and police protection for some
time to come. This means:
that Serbs must somehow be assured security, democratic
rights, power sharing in their communities, and political
participation outside their communities, however difficult that
will be in Albanian areas;
that Serbs in Kosovo will have to accept that they will have
to live in a single Kosovo not ruled by Belgrade. Right now
that does not seem to be the case for at least a large number
of them; and
that Albanian violence must be controlled and Albanian
leaders need to understand that they will ultimately have to
accept the return of Serbs to Kosovo and make that work as well
as possible if they are to sustain the international
community's support for majority rule in Kosovo.
Given the difficulties and uncertainties involved, one strategy
might be to focus returns turns initially on the much smaller number
displaced of Roma, who invariably get the least attention. If their
returns can be successfully managed it could offer some confidence to
move ahead with in a program to return Serbs to Kosovo.
3. Is the uncertainty of the future status of Kosovo inhibiting the
political and economic development of the country?
The answer to this is almost certainly yes, although it is hard to
quantify. Economic and political decisions are delayed because the only
international mandate is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which
says that Kosovo is part of the FRY and that is used in many quarters
to contribute to the delay in creating meaningful institutions run by
the people of Kosovo. There seems to be a continuing struggle between
UNMIK in Pristina and the U.N. in New York over the implementation of
the mandate and the structure and timing of self-rule.
Russia and China are dead set against any change in the
international status of Kosovo. The allies are divided but most
continue to fear that too rapid movement toward Kosovo self-rule and
any enunciation of Kosovo independence as a goal will imperil the
viability of Macedonia (although any declaration of Montenegro
independence from the FRY would throw even greater doubt on allied
perspectives of the Kosovo issue) and stir up an international dispute.
They all apparently believe that the issue of Kosovo's status could be
better dealt with once Milosevic leaves the scene, that is, there is a
greater prospect of keeping Kosovo and Serbia together in some way if
Serbia has a more democratic government, or conversely, that a more
democratic Serbian government is more likely to accept the secession of
Kosovo or at least a republic status for Kosovo in the FRY.
One problem with this approach is that no one is smart enough to
figure out when Milosevic will lose power. However significant the
weaknesses of his regime, his departure could be delayed a long time,
creating tension and instability in Kosovo should power and
responsibility continue to be denied the Albanians. Moreover, it is not
at all clear that a post-Milosevic government will have the desire or
the political backing to accept a change in Kosovo's status. One could
reasonably argue that is better for the international community and the
Serbian opposition to change Kosovo's status while Milosevic is in
charge.
Another problem is our use of the so-called Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia--the FRY. Everyone knows why that term was used in 1244 and
not Serbia. The sad fact is that the FRY is a family enterprise of Mr.
Milosevic that serves to give his rule some legal patina. Every
republic has gotten out, and the last remaining one--Montenegro--also
wants out, much to allied discomfiture. The U.S. does not recognize the
FRY, although we appear to have stopped saying that. Resurrection of
the FRY is a highly dubious enterprise even in a post-Milosevic period.
It is, however, at this time not possible politically--desirable or
not, easier now rather than later--to change the status accorded Kosovo
by the international community. And that, I believe, is producing a
drift in Kosovo and in Allied determination. The people of Kosovo still
does not know what local elections--which are to be held in the
autumn--mean; and there seems to be, at least among some allies, a
sense that Kosovo is really just a part of Serbia. It is important for
the U.S. to make its views crystal clear to the people of Kosovo and to
the world at large: that while the status of Kosovo still has to be
determined, Serbian rule will not return to Kosovo and independence is
a permissible goal once certain conditions about the nature of an
independent Kosovo state are met, including a demonstrated commitment
to minority rights and the adherence to internationally recognized
borders. Credible elections will also be needed to establish the
legitimacy of Kosovo governments and the growing responsibility of
those voted into office. In short, we either start to set the rules for
a transition to what may be Kosovo independence or we allow ourselves
to be hostage to events in Kosovo and the region.
4. How do Serbia and Kosovo live with each other in the long run?
If Western forces are ever to be withdrawn from Kosovo, clearly
Serbia and Kosovo must be able to work out some sort of stable
relationship. Whether this will be possible and when is, of course,
hard to predict. The history of the two communities has been a violent
one. Even if attainment of that objective is difficult, it is important
not to lose sight of it.
We can say a few things about the longer term. First, the
relationship can not improve while Milosevic remains in power. He is
still trying to preserve the potentiality for Serb rule in Kosovo and
to undermine UNMIK authority. Business can not be done with him. A
different type of Serbia will be needed.
Second, even if a Serbian Abe Lincoln took charge and offered
malice toward none, not one Albanian would support any serious
political tie to Belgrade. Nevertheless, the Albanian leaders of Kosovo
must realize, that while independence is their goal, they will still
have to coexist with a next-door, much stronger Serbia. They must
examine the government that succeeds Milosevic in that light and how
they might proceed constructively with its leaders. They also must
recognize that a continuing Western military presence in Kosovo could
be challenged by domestic considerations in allied nations.
Third, much will depend on Europe and what it does in Kosovo, in
Serbia when it is free of Milosevic, and in the broad Balkan region.
The prospects for stability and ultimate reconciliation depend in great
part both on economic growth in all the countries in the area but also
on their respective relationships with Europe. It will only be possible
to remove Western troops when both Kosovo and Serbia are bound to
European institutions in some serious fashion. Whether Europe can rise
to the occasion and produce a long-term integrative process remains to
be seen. Europe has many other things on its mind. But I believe the EU
increasingly realizes that connection and Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten
have added energy and urgency to EU efforts.
5. Finally, what is the role of the U.S. in shaping the future of
Kosovo?
The U.S. was the heart of the Alliance war effort. For the long
term, however, it is the EU, as I noted above, which has the central
role in ultimately stabilizing the former Yugoslavia. But it can take
quite a while to get to the long-term and the U.S. remains essential
for security and political purposes. The U.S. supplies only 15-20
percent of KFOR, but the continued presence of a significant American
force is needed to provide the assurance to the Kosovo Albanians that
Serbian forces will not simply be able one day to walk in and resume
control. The presence of American forces conveys a similar type message
to any Serbian government.
Certainly until more progress is made in creating new self-
sustaining political institutions in Kosovo and we see the impact of a
post-Milosevic government in Belgrade, serious American forces will be
required. While the bulk of the Western military presence will have to
come from European countries, it would be a mistake to simply consider
this division a burden sharing problem.
The nature and role of our forces are also important--whether U.S.
military efforts are narrowly confined or significantly robust and
determined to get the job done. I note that Kosovo Serbs have
complained a few days ago that British forces do a better job of
providing protection to Serbs than American ones. I think the way our
forces are being used in Kosovo is worth serious review.
There is, moreover, an important political purpose served by the
continuing presence of U.S. forces in Kosovo, namely a stronger voice
in determining Alliance strategy in the Balkans, where we have a major
investment and interests and values to protect. The U.S., to its
credit, is an important catalytic element, particularly in the Balkans;
it needs to remain involved in working to avoid backsliding so that we
do not fall into repeating our past experience with Kosovo, and that we
do what is necessary to insure that the Alliance maintains a
sufficiently strong posture in Kosovo, and indeed the whole of the
former Yugoslavia, so that we will be successful, rather than doing
just enough to falter and create uncertainty and further instability.
And in this regard I must express some concern as to our
involvement in the non-military aspects of the Kosovo problem. An
Albanian friend has commented that the U.S. won the war and seems to
have disappeared from Kosovo. In helping make things happen in Kosovo,
in the vital task of building a civil society the U.S. government seems
to be largely absent. I am sure you will get a catalogue of all the
U.S. government is doing in Kosovo if you ask the question, but, I
believe, it is another subject worth seriously looking at in detail.
Let me close by saying that in Western Europe in the 1940's our
exit strategy in war and peace was to be successful. If you need an
exit strategy for Kosovo I suggest that is also the most fitting one.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Dr. Williams.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL R. WILLIAMS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON,
DC
Dr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
appear before the members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to discuss American efforts to build peace in Kosovo
and throughout the former Yugoslavia.
I am particularly grateful to appear before this body, as
many of its members have a long and active role in seeking to
ensure a coherent American policy that promotes America's moral
interest in human rights and human dignity in the former
Yugoslavia while also protecting America's strategic interest
in a stable Europe, a democratic Balkan region, and the
preservation of American military capability and readiness.
Before I begin my testimony, I should mention by way of
background that I served as an advisor to the Kosovo Albanian
delegation during the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations and to the
Bosnian delegation during the Dayton negotiations, and
previously served as a lawyer with the Department of State's
Office of Legal Adviser for European Affairs.
Let me now turn to a summary of the substance of my written
testimony, which I would like to submit for the record. I have
entitled it, ``Winning the Peace in Kosovo, Time to Formulate a
Strategy.''
To win the peace in Kosovo the United States must
articulate a clear and attainable objective and develop and
pursue a coherent strategy. To date, the United States has not
articulated a meaningful objective and has pursued only a
tactical approach to the crisis in Kosovo and to the broader
crisis in the former Yugoslavia. If this vacuum of strategic
policy continues, the United States will be unable to extricate
its military forces from either Bosnia or Kosovo in the
foreseeable future, and will find itself confronted with
perpetual conflict and crises, as it has for the past decade in
this region.
Although some American officials have proclaimed an
objective of integrating the Balkan region into the economic
and democratic structure of Europe, no official has articulated
a clear and realistically attainable objective for Kosovo
beyond securing the peace. Rather, they have pursued a policy
of intentional ambiguity on important matters such as the final
status of Kosovo.
Consistent with this policy, the American Government has
pursued only a tactical approach of addressing the consequences
of the conflict, such as promoting the return of refugees,
reconstructing homes, drafting legal codes, repairing the
electrical grid, and getting children back to school. While
necessary first aid, these actions are not sufficient to heal
the wounds of the conflict, or to prevent further conflict.
Importantly, the American Government has deployed over
5,000 military personnel to support this Band-Aid approach in
Kosovo. At no time, however, not even during the debate over
the Byrd-Warner amendment, has the U.S. Government publicly
articulated the overall strategy which the deployment of
American troops is designed to support.
This purely tactical approach represents a failure to learn
the lessons of the Bosnia conflict, where the absence of a
strategic policy has cost the United States billions of dollars
and tens of thousands of military man-hours. The results of
this effort have been that only a fraction of the refugees have
returned to their homes, while Serb nationalists still exercise
significant, if not determinative, political influence in the
Republic of Srpska which they use to prevent the implementation
of the Dayton agreement.
One reason why the U.S. Government has been unable to move
beyond the tactical approach is that since the origination of
the conflict American policy has revolved around accommodating
the interests of Slobodan Milosevic, and now that he has been
indicted for crimes against humanity by the Yugoslav War Crimes
Tribunal, he can no longer be relied upon as our partner in
peace.
As a result, rather than now crafting an aggressive
strategy to confront Milosevic and deny him the fruits of
ethnic aggression, American diplomats have developed a passive
shadow strategy of waiting for a democratic transformation in
Serbia to remove Mr. Milosevic.
In formulating a clear and obtainable objective for U.S.
policy, it is necessary to assess the costs of losing the
peace, assess the causes of the conflict, and understand the
requirements for further peace-building. The consequence of
losing the peace in Kosovo will be a politically radical Kosovo
population, devoid of Serbian or other minorities, which is, de
facto if not de jure, partitioned along the Mitrovica fault
line, leaving the Kosovo Albanian controlled territory to seek
unification with Albania and/or the Albanian areas of
Macedonia.
Senator Biden. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. What do you mean by
losing? Does your little scenario mean that there are no NATO
forces any longer in Kosovo?
Dr. Williams. It means failing to win the peace, withdrawal
of NATO forces, and the failure to democratize properly within
Kosovo.
Senator Biden. You think that this would result in the
Kosovars in control of Kosovo? Good luck.
Dr. Williams. Well, on a good day.
Senator Biden. They would last about a day.
Dr. Williams. I did not want to be too pessimistic, but I
will get to that more pessimistic part in a few moments.
The Kosovo crisis is largely the result of the failure to
win the peace in Bosnia, the failure to politically confront
Milosevic before the use of force becomes necessary, and the
failure to ensure equal protection of rights and the security
of Albanian and Serbian ethnic groups.
Now, to create the circumstances necessary for winning the
peace in Kosovo, the United States must immediately undertake a
process for determining the final status in Kosovo. The
approach of delaying the resolution of Kosovo's final status in
hopes of a near-term democratic transition in Serbia is flawed,
as either Mr. Milosevic will be replaced by a strong
nationalistic force that would pursue a similar or even more
aggressive policy toward Kosovo.
And when over time a more democratic force will come to
power, it will be unlikely to cope with the responsibilities
and burdens of addressing the Kosovo crisis as well as the
multitude of other tasks that will confront them as they try to
politically and economically reconstruct Serbia. In fact, Mr.
Milosevic and not the democratic opposition should be held
politically accountable for Serbia's inevitable loss of Kosovo.
The second important element is to exercise American
leadership to coordinate and to constrain the actions of our
allies, in particular the French, who seem to have embarked
upon a separate policy of engagement with Kosovo Serbian
political forces based on the principal of maintaining peace
through the accommodation of hard-line local Serbian interests,
which we know are directed from Belgrade. It is also necessary
for the United States to take the lead in containing the
influence of Russia.
To win the peace in Kosovo, the American objective should
be to create an economically and politically self-sufficient
multi-ethnic Kosovo capable of defending itself against
possible further acts of Serbian State-sponsored ethnic
aggression.
In return, this entity must protect the rights of minority
populations resident on its territory and act responsibly
toward its neighbors. The strategy for accomplishing this
objective should be for the United States, supported by its
allies, to manage a process of intermediate sovereignty and
earned independence for the people of Kosovo.
This process would entail arrangements whereby the people
of Kosovo for a period of 3 to 5 years would be entitled to
exercise specified sovereign rights while under the continuing
mandate of Resolution 1244, and undertake certain essential
political commitments. After this period, Kosovo would be
entitled, subject to an internationally conducted referendum
within Kosovo, to seek recognition from the international
community.
During the interim period, the people of Kosovo would
exercise, in cooperation with UNMIK, complete legislative,
executive, and judicial control over their internal affairs.
The people of Kosovo would also be entitled to begin to conduct
their own international affairs, and to appoint international
representatives.
In exchange for the exercise of these sovereign rights,
Kosovo would be required to implement specific guarantees that
it would protect the rights of all minority populations within
its territory, respect the territorial integrity of neighboring
states such as Macedonia and Albania, and accept its borders as
confirmed by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. Compliance with
these obligations should be measured and assessed by an
independent international entity.
At the end of this interim period, the criteria for
recognition of Kosovo would be based upon an assessment of the
fulfillment of these commitments. If recognized by the
international community, Kosovo would remain bound by these
commitments.
Now, as the most recent crisis in Kosovo is but a
continuation of the Yugoslav crisis begun in 1991, it is also
necessary to establish objectives and strategies for winning
the peace throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia,
which I go into in more detail in my written testimony. To win
back the peace in Bosnia it is necessary to acknowledge the
nature of the Dayton Accords as a flawed peace agreement and
either renegotiate or evolve these accords in a manner which
deconstructs the resulting institutions and attributes of
Milosevic's efforts to partition Bosnia.
To prevent the conflict in Montenegro, it is necessary to
demonstrate tangible benefits to democracy on a political path
separate from that of Serbia. Montenegro must be provided with
security guarantees, and Serbia must be confronted with clear
warnings of economic and political sanctions in the event it
sponsors a coup or other covert action in Montenegro. Moreover,
Montenegro must be engaged in the Kosovo peace-building
process.
To win the conflict in Serbia, it is necessary to promote a
democratic transition beyond the current institutionalized
political opposition. This will require a series of
transitions. The Yugoslav tribunal's indictment of the top
leadership should be maximally utilized to delegitimize and
discredit the current nationalist regime, and America should
lead its allies in isolating Milosevic and his accomplices.
America should make clear that Serbia will be barred from
international assistance until Milosevic is not only removed
from power, but also surrendered to The Hague.
In conclusion, the lack of a strategic policy for bringing
a lasting peace to Yugoslavia has resulted in hundreds of
thousands of deaths, the displacement of over a million
refugees, the degradation of United States and NATO military
forces, diplomatic strains within the American-European
alliance, and a diversion of resources and attention from other
areas of strategic importance.
Unless the United States wishes to create a permanent
peacekeeping force in the region, it must develop an aggressive
strategy for each zone of conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
For Kosovo, that policy should be one of intermediate
sovereignty and earned independence.
I thank the members of the committee for this opportunity
to testify.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul R. Williams
WINNING THE PEACE IN KOSOVO: TIME TO FORMULATE A STRATEGY
It is an honor to appear before members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to discuss American efforts to build peace in
Kosovo and throughout the former Yugoslavia. I am particularly grateful
to appear before this body as many of its members have taken an active
role in seeking to ensure a coherent American policy which promotes
America's moral interest in human rights and human dignity, while also
protecting America's strategic interest in a stable Europe, a
democratic Balkan region, and the preservation of American military
capability and readiness.
Before I begin my testimony I should mention by way of background
that I served as an advisor to the Kosovo Albanian delegation in
Rambouillet and Paris, and as an advisor to the Bosnian government
delegation to the Dayton negotiations. I have also advised the
government of Macedonia on matters relating to the conflict. Earlier in
my career, during the initial development of America's response to the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, I served with the Department of
State as a lawyer for the Office of European and Canadian Affairs.
Let me now turn to the substance of my testimony, which I have
submitted for the record.
To win the peace in Kosovo the United States must articulate a
clear and attainable objective and develop and pursue a coherent
strategy. To date, the U.S. Government has not articulated a meaningful
objective, and has pursued only a tactical approach to the crisis in
Kosovo, and to the broader crisis in the former Yugoslavia. If this
vacuum of strategic policy continues, the United States will be unable
to extricate its military forces from either Bosnia or Kosova in the
foreseeable future and will find itself confronted with perpetual
conflict and crises in the region.
To win the peace in Kosovo the American objective should be to
create an economically and politically self-sufficient multi-ethnic
Kosovo capable of defending itself against possible further acts of
Serbian state sponsored ethnic aggression. In return this entity must
protect the rights of minority populations resident on its territory
and act responsibly toward its neighbors. The strategy for
accomplishing this objective should be for the U.S., supported by its
allies, to manage a process of intermediate sovereignty and earned
independence for the people of Kosovo.
As the most recent crisis in Kosovo is but a continuation of the
Yugoslav crisis begun in 1991, it is also necessary to establish
objectives and strategies for winning the peace throughout the
territory of the former Yugoslavia.
THE CURRENT TACTICAL APPROACH TO WINNING THE PEACE
Addressing the Consequences of the Conflict, While Failing to Address
the Causes
Although some American officials have proclaimed an objective of
integrating the Balkan region into the economic and democratic
structure of Europe, no official has articulated a clear and
realistically attainable objective for Kosovo or for the region of the
former Yugoslavia, beyond ``securing the peace.'' \1\
Moreover, while American officials have declared their intent to
promote vague principles of democracy, security, human rights, economic
development, and have discussed a second Marshall Plan or a
reapplication of the ``states in transition'' approach to the northern
tier of Central and Eastern Europe, they have not articulated concrete
objectives tailored to the specific circumstances of the former
Yugoslavia.\2\
Rather, the American Government has pursued a tactical approach of
addressing the consequences and not the causes of the conflict, which
include promoting the return of refugees, reconstructing homes,
drafting legal codes, repairing the electrical grid and getting
children back to school.\3\ More generally, the approach has included
efforts to build ``civil society,'' arrange elections, provide security
and revitalize the economy.\4\ The success of this policy has been
defined in terms of a reduced homicide rate, pledges for international,
funding, and an increasing number of international personnel deployed
to the region.\5\
The American Government has also deployed over 5,000 military
personnel to support its tactical efforts in Kosovo. At no time,
however, has the U.S. Government articulated the overall strategy which
these tactical efforts, or which the deployment of American troops is
designed to support, or has it demonstrated how the tactical efforts
and the actions of the military forces are interrelated as part of a
larger plan.
While necessary to repair and redress the consequences of the
Kosovo conflict, the tactical efforts currently pursued by the U.S.
Government, absent a strategic approach, are insufficient to build the
foundation for a lasting peace in Kosovo or the former Yugoslavia. Even
if the U.S. successfully restores electricity, reconstitutes the police
force, redrafts the school curriculum and trains an impartial
judiciary, the U.S. still will not have resolved the underlying causes
of the conflict, which emanate from Belgrade and have become deeply
rooted in the Kosovo political context. To win the peace it is
necessary to address the fact that the primary cause of the conflict
and the continued instability in the region is the use of ethnic
aggression and political oppression by Milosevic's Serbian nationalist
regime as a means of perpetuating its political power.
Failing to Learn the Lessons of Bosnia
In fact, if pursued in a policy vacuum, even these limited tactical
objectives are unlikely to be met. In the case of Bosnia, the absence
of a strategic approach has meant that despite billions of dollars in
international assistance and tens of thousands of military man-hours
few Bosniac refugees have been able to return to their homes in Serb
controlled Republika Srpska; there is only the most minimal freedom of
movement across the inter-entity boundary line; Serb nationalists still
exercise significant if not determinative political influence in the
Republika Srpska; the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian central
government are politically gridlocked along ethnic lines; the economy
continues to teeter on the brink of collapse; and the Bosniac political
community has become polarized.\6\
More importantly, the rush to pursue tactical objectives on their
own is likely to undermine the prospects for a meaningful peace, as has
been the case in Bosnia. For instance, in an effort to demonstrate
movement toward the tactical objectives of the Dayton Accords the U.S.
Government essentially directed the OSCE to hold elections even though
the circumstances all but precluded the possibility of free and fair
elections. After 104% of the population voted, the OSCE, again under
pressure from the U.S. Government, declared these elections to have
been substantially free and fair.\7\ As a result, hard-line Serbian
representatives took up power in the Republika Srpska institutions and
the Serbian section of the Bosnian parliament, and Momcilo Krajisnik
was elected as the Serb representative to the Bosnian Presidency. From
this vantage point, and. with support in the Bosnian parliament and the
Republika Srpska, Mr. Krajisnik continued to pursue the policy of a de
facto partition of Bosnia and ethnic segregation which he had
orchestrated during the campaign of ethnic aggression. After completing
his term, Mr. Krajisnik was indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal for
crimes of genocide which he had committed prior to being elected to the
Bosnian Presidency.
The continued absence of a strategic policy for Bosnia has created
conditions where even just this last May an Italian military contingent
assigned to provide security to a convoy of Bosniac women returning to
visit graves in Bratunac stood by while Serb protesters stoned the
Bosniac women in their care. Moreover, growing weary of the inability
of international efforts to secure their return home, increasing
numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are engaging in
spontaneous returns. Even then, the international community is only
capable of providing reconstruction assistance to approximately 10
percent of these returnees.\8\
Affirmatively Declining to Formulate or Declare a Strategy
As a consequence of the absence of a strategic approach to the
Kosovo crisis, and in light of concerns about the proper use of U.S.
military forces and the extent of European financial and military
commitments, Senators Byrd and Warner recently unsuccessfully sought to
insert a provision into the Military Construction Appropriations Act,
2001. This provision would have terminated funding for the continued
deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001,
unless the President sought and received congressional authorization to
continue such deployment.\9\ A similar measure was adopted by the
House.
Notably, during the debate over the Byrd-Warner provision the
Executive Branch objected to the withdrawal of American troops on the
grounds that a number of negative consequences would occur, including
straining our relations with our European allies, undermining the
effectiveness of NATO and usurping the constitutional authority of the
Executive Branch. At no time, however, did the Executive branch offer
an affirmative public explanation as to what purpose the troops were
serving in Kosovo, beyond that of ``providing security.'' Notably, the
Executive branch failed to articulate the specific policy which
required that the troops be placed in harms way, or to establish a
standard by which the success of the mission could be measured and
American troops withdrawn. In fact, according to a recent International
Crisis Group report, the primary mission of American forces in Kosovo
is ``force protection,'' \10\ which is to say that the American
military forces in Kosovo are there to protect the American military
forces in Kosovo. Such a state of affairs could only occur in a policy
vacuum.
Failing to Aggressively Delegitimize Slobodan Milosevic
One reason why the U.S. Government is unable to move beyond a
tactical approach is that since the origination of the conflict, and
particularly during the Dayton negotiations and the run-up to the
Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, American policy revolved around
accommodating the interests of Slobodan Milosevic. Now that Mr.
Milosevic has been indicted for crimes against humanity by the Yugoslav
Tribunal, he can no longer be relied upon as America's partner in peace
and the American Government has found it difficult to formulate an
alternative strategy.\11\
Thus, rather than crafting a strategy to confront Milosevic and
deny him the fruits of ethnic aggression, American diplomats have
developed a passive shadow strategy of waiting for a democratic
transformation in Serbia to remove Milosevic.\12\ It should be
recalled, however, that much of the current institutionalized
``democratic opposition'' is based on Milosevic's failure to achieve
his nationalist agenda or on the negative consequences experienced by
Serbia, but not necessarily on opposition to his ideas of ethnic
supremacy or notions of a greater Serbia.
CRAFTING AN APPROACH TO WINNING THE PEACE: SETTING AN OBJECTIVE AND
FORMULATING A STRATEGY
In formulating a clear and attainable objective for U.S. policy
there are three important steps to undertake. The first is to assess
the costs of losing the peace in Kosovo, the second is to assess the
larger geopolitical context of the conflict, and the third is to assess
the causes of the conflict and the requirements of further
peacebuilding.
The Costs of Losing the Peace in Kosovo
A lost bid to win the peace in Kosovo will:
Undermine the pluralistic and moderate political forces,
which understand the necessity of maintaining an ethnically
diverse Kosovo and ensuring the protection of minority rights;
Strengthen less moderate elements of the majority population,
which are more inclined to act with hostility toward minority
groups in a manner designed to promote their emigration and
displacement;
Negate international efforts to provide meaningful physical
security and a sense of rightful participation in the political
or economic future of a unified Kosovo;
Enhance the international legitimacy and likelihood of
achieving Slobodan Milosevic's plan for a partition of Kosovo;
Legitimize the Kosovo Albanian interest in creating a larger
territorial entity, which might include portions of Macedonia,
Serbia and Montenegro;
Contribute to further conflict in the former Yugoslavia just
as the mismanaged peace in Bosnia significantly contributed to
Milosevic's calculation to undertake ethnic warfare in Kosovo.
In sum, the consequence of losing the peace in Kosovo will be a
politically radical Kosovo population, devoid of Serbian or other
minorities, which is de facto if not de jure partitioned along the
Mitrovica fault line, leaving the Kosovo Albanian controlled territory
to seek unification with Albania and/or the Albanian areas of
Macedonia.
Understanding the Broader Geopolitical Context of the Kosovo Crisis
The crisis in Kosovo occurs within a broader geopolitical context
of the former Yugoslavia and the Balkan region.
When formulating an objective for American policy in Kosovo, it is
necessary to learn the lessons of our failed effort confront ethnic
aggression in Bosnia, and how our continuing refusal to reassess our
Bosnian policy and renegotiate or further evolve the substance of the
Dayton Accords, inhibits our ability to develop a coherent Kosovo
policy. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that our primary
interlocutor, Slobodan Milosevic, is not a partner in peace, but a man
indicted for crimes against humanity, that the current Serbian regime
has a distinct interest in its own survival and is willing to invoke
ethnic nationalism, and rely on totalitarian acts by the military,
secret police and paramilitaries to manipulate political outcomes.
The peace in Kosovo is thus linked to the reversal of political and
territorial gains achieved in Bosnia through ethnic aggression, the
efforts of the Serbian people to topple Milosevic's nationalist regime,
as well as to the efforts of Montenegro to chart a democratic path
separate from that of the Milosevic regime. The Kosovo peace is also
linked to political and economic stability in Albania and Macedonia and
those countries interpretations of American and European intentions.
Assessing the Causes of the Conflict and the Requirements of Further
Peacebuilding
As we assess the causes of the conflict and the requirements for
the creation of political circumstances conducive to peacebuilding, we
find that they are the same issues which existed when the U.S.
Government accepted the Holbrooke/Milosevic Deal of October 1999
providing for the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission, and which pre-
occupied American efforts during the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations and
the drafting of UNSC Resolution 1244.
(1) The need to meaningfully protect the physical security,
human rights and property interests of all ethnic
groups in Kosovo
Throughout Kosovo's incorporation in the former Yugoslavia, the
equal and fair treatment of ethnic groups has been a major point of
friction, whether it was the treatment of the Serbian and other ethnic
groups from 1974 to 1989, or the treatment of Kosovo Albanians from
1989 until the summer of 1999. To remove this issue as a source of
conflict will be difficult and will require both an incentive for the
regionally and locally dominant ethnic groups to respect each others
rights and ensure their physical security. These efforts must be
matched by aggressive KFOR actions designed to ensure security for all
groups.
(2) The need to meaningfully restructure the economy and
promote economic development
In Bosnia the international community has created an aid dependent
economic structure, and political institutions which are structurally
incapable of exercising cogent control over the economy or raising
economic revenue through fair taxes and customs. To avoid a similar
situation in Kosovo it is necessary to first return to the Kosovo
government the state owned property illegitimately transferred to
Serbia after 1989 and privatized to Milosevic's supporters or to
international entities--primarily located in Greece and Italy. It is
also necessary to create an incentive for long term investment by
international concerns, and for long term planning by Kosovo's
indigenous governing institutions. Importantly, the state operation or
privatization of this industrial property could significantly enhance a
Kosovo government's financial resources separate from aid donations.
Finally, it is necessary to prevent the partition of Kosovo along the
current defacto line of segregation running through the industrial town
of Mitrovica. KFOR's removal of the Serbian Ministry of Interior Forces
serving as ``Bridge Watchers'' would be a constructive first step in
this process.
(3) The need to ascertain and articulate a final status for
Kosovo which promotes regional security
Articulating a clear and workable process for settling on a final
status for Kosovo is essential to preventing further conflict and to
promoting the political and economic progress discussed immediately
above. Without a clear timetable for resolution of the final status
issue, and without a clear objective toward which the people of Kosovo
can strive, there will be little incentive to protect minority rights,
and plan for long term economic growth.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has adopted only a short term
policy which calls for substantial autonomy under the interim
regulation of the United Nations,\13\ and avoids discussions concerning
determination of a final status. In fact, when asked about plans for
resolving the question of the final status of Kosovo, now former
Department of State Press Spokesman James Rubin summarized U.S. policy
as,
[UNSCR 1244] doesn't envisage independence. What the
resolution does is say that this issue is to be determined
pursuant to the same kind of process--and I think it refers to
the Rambouillet Accords--in which the international community,
the views of the people of Kosovo, will be taken into account
in some diplomatic process. That's how we, the United States,
see the future unfolding; that, at the appropriate time, a
conference or a meeting or discussion will be held in which all
the relevant views can be considered and decisions can be
considered. So that is our view.\14\
Delaying an initiation of a process for the resolution of the final
status of Kosovo plants the seeds of further, conflict, as the Contact
Group did during the Dayton negotiations when it failed to address the
status of Kosovo while it held maximum leverage over Milosevic.
The approach of delaying the resolution of Kosovo's final status in
the hopes of a near term democratic transition in Serbia is flawed as
either Milosevic will be replaced by strong nationalist forces that
would pursue a similar or even more aggressive policy toward Kosovo.
And, when over time more genuinely democratic forces came to power,
they would be unlikely to cope with the responsibilities and burdens of
addressing the Kosovo crisis as well as the multitude of other tasks
that will confront them as they try to politically and economically
reconstruct Serbia. In fact, Milosevic and not the democratic
opposition, should be held politically accountable for Serbia's
inevitable loss of Kosovo.
Interestingly, American officials have indicated that they believe
the Kosovars' desire for independence will wane as they experience
``genuine self-government'' under the interim U.N. administration.\15\
Such a development is unlikely given that even the most moderate Kosovo
Albanian political forces are calling for immediate independence.\16\
By acknowledging the Kosovo Albanians' well founded desire for
independence and structuring a process for establishing a final status,
the U.S. Government would both reassure the Kosovo Albanian majority
that they will not be pressured by the international community to
return to Serbian rule, while also permitting the international
community to demand responsible and accountable behavior on the part of
the Kosovo Albanian political leadership. The creation of such a
process would also signal the Kosovo Serbs that they will have to
choose between their Serbian and Kosovar identities, thus facilitating
individual decisions on whether to reside in Kosovo.
(4) The need to create and maintain political cohesion and
solidarity among the Kosovo Albanian political
forces, and to create a Serbian political force
separate from Milosevic's control and manipulation
The regime of near-apartheid imposed upon the Kosovo Albanian
population from 1989 predictably fragmented civil society. Moreover,
the failure of the peaceful resistance to yield tangible results led to
the militarization and in some instances the radicalization of certain
segments of society. This diversity of public views has become
reflected in the institutions of political representation.
To move forward in building peace in Kosovo it is necessary to
cultivate a process whereby through political dialogue these divergent
views and interests can be brought together to form common consent on
important political matters. During the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations,
the members of the Kosovo delegation demonstrated the ability not only
to make politically tough decisions, but also to operate by consensus.
As in Bosnia, where recent international efforts to influence local
elections have polarized the Bosniac political forces, the U.S. and its
European allies run the risk of polarizing the Kosovo political forces
and creating a situation where one can readily blame the victims for
the failure to win the peace.
Similarly, by failing to confront the henchmen of the Serbian
nationalist regime, the international community may stunt the
development of a responsible Serbian political class by allowing
Milosevic's Ministry of Interior forces to dictate political events,
particularly in the strategic town of Mitrovica.
(5) The need to create a democratic governing regime based
on majority rule and minority rights
The former Yugoslav political system, which failed, was based on a
series of ethnic representations and prerogatives. No other system like
this existed in Europe. During the Dayton negotiations, and again
during the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations the Contact Group, led by the
U.S., sought to recreate such a system for the people of Bosnia and the
people of Kosovo. While the Bosnians now suffer the consequences of
institutionalized ethnic identity and political gridlock, the people of
Kosovo have been temporarily spared this fate. To create a healthy and
functional political system for Kosovo it will be necessary to create a
system similar to those throughout Western and Central Europe based on
the principle of majority rule and minority rights.
(6) The need to constructively engage and transform the
militarized elements of the Kosovo Albanian
population
While the U.S. Government accurately asserts that the KLA has been
demilitarized,\17\ certain more radical elements have not been
constructively engaged or transformed. Rather they have been directed
into the police, Kosovo Protection Corps and the political process.
While this action disperses them throughout civil society, it does not
transform their beliefs or actions, but in fact provides them a wider
base from which to seek to accomplish their objectives. Importantly,
most of the members of the KLA or associated organizations are not
radical--yet there appears to be no clear program of enhanced
engagement for these more moderate elements demonstrate the political
benefits of their more moderate approach. Rather, the policy-makers are
relying on KFOR to maintain security in the region, while they simply
demand that the moderate elements exercise control over the more
radical elements.\18\
U.S. efforts thus should not be focused on the KLA as an
institution, but rather on members of the KLA who have become
radicalize by the near-apartheid regime of the 1990s and the atrocities
committed in 1998 and 1999. Moreover, U.S. policy should remove the
public attraction to these radicals by moving to actively address the
question of Kosovo's ability to carry out its own self-defense upon the
withdrawal of NATO forces. To accomplish this objective America should
lead efforts to create a Kosovo Defense Corps. The creation of such a
Corps would also serve as a key element of an exit strategy for
American military forces.
(7) The need for American leadership to coordinate and
constrain the actions of our allies, and to
moderate the influence of Russia
While the United States has sought to promote cooperation among our
allies through various multilateral mechanisms,\19\ our European allies
have been at the forefront of efforts to remove or weaken the sanctions
against the Belgrade regime, while allies such as Argentina, Australia
and Mexico have undermined American efforts to isolate Milosevic by
permitting their Ambassadors to meet with Milosevic personally to
establish full diplomatic relations. Moreover, numerous Chinese, Greek,
Nigerian, and Russian officials have met with Milosevic and other
indicted war criminals in Serbia. These allies and partners in our
peace effort bolster the interests of such states as Cuba, Iraq, Libya
and Syria (all of which maintain full diplomatic relations with Serbia)
in undermining U.S. policy in the Balkan region.
Most troubling is the fact that our French allies seem to have
embarked on a separate policy of engagement with Kosovo Serbian
political forces which is based on the principle of maintaining peace
through the accommodation of hard-line local Serbian interests--which
are dictated by Milosevic's nationalist regime in Belgrade.
Under these circumstances it is imperative that the U.S. assert its
leadership role in the international efforts to bring lasting peace to
the territory of the former Yugoslavia as absent such leadership our
European allies are incapable of maintaining a united or coherent front
in the face of either Milosevic or a resurgent Russia.
In light of the risks of losing the peace, the geopolitical context
of the conflict, and the above assessment of the causes of the conflict
and circumstances necessary for peacebuilding, the American policy
objective should be to create an economically and politically self-
sufficient Kosovo entity capable of defending itself against possible
further acts of Serbian state sponsored ethnic aggression, and which
protects the rights of minority populations resident on its territory
and acts responsibly toward its neighbors. To accomplish this objective
the U.S., supported by its allies, must manage a process of
intermediate sovereignty and earned independence for the people of
Kosovo.
IMPLEMENTING INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY AND EARNED INDEPENDENCE
The status of intermediate sovereignty and the process of earned
independence would entail arrangements whereby the people of Kosovo
would for a period of three to five years be entitled to exercise
specified sovereign rights, while under the continuing mandate of
resolution 1244, and undertake certain essential political commitments.
After this period, Kosovo would be entitled, subject to an
internationally conducted referendum within Kosovo, to seek recognition
from the international community.
During the interim period, the people of Kosovo would exercise, in
cooperation with UNMIK, complete legislative, executive and judicial
control over their internal affairs relating to economic development,
internal security, education, taxation, extraction and processing of
natural resources, transportation, health care, media and news
broadcasting, cultural development, and the protection of minority
rights. The people of Kosovo would also be entitled to begin to conduct
their own international affairs and appoint international
representatives.
In exchange for the exercise of these sovereign rights, Kosovo
would be required to implement specific guarantees that it would
protect the rights of all minority populations within its territory,
respect the territorial integrity of neighboring states such as
Macedonia and Albania, renounce any intention of political or
territorial association with Albania, and accept its borders as
confirmed by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. Compliance with these
obligations should be measured and assessed by an independent
international entity. While UNMIK should be consulted as to its
assessment of Kosovo's compliance its efforts must remain focused on
the tactical objectives set out in resolution 1244.
At the end of this interim period the criteria for recognition of
Kosovo would include the traditional legal criteria of territory,
population, government and capacity to conduct international relations,
as well as the additional political criteria of whether it had
protected the rights of minority populations within its territory,
respected the territorial integrity of Macedonia and Albania, rejected
any political or territorial association with Albania, and maintained
the status of its borders. Once recognized by the international
community, Kosovo would remain bound by these commitments.
This approach to winning the peace in Kosovo is based on principles
of international law, which provide that all self-identified groups
with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are
entitled to collectively determine their political destiny in a
democratic fashion, and to be free from systematic persecution. In
cases where self-identified groups were effectively denied their right
to democratic self-government, and are consequently subjected to gross
violations of their human rights, as has been the case with Kosovo,
they are entitled to seek their own international status in order to
ensure the protection of those rights.
The case for intermediate sovereignty is further supported by: (1)
the legal and factual similarity between Kosovo and the other Republics
of the former Yugoslavia that were deemed by the international
community to be entitled to international recognition; (2) the legal
precedent of earned recognition established by the international
community in recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia; (3) the fact that Yugoslavia has dissolved, and the
international community has rejected Serbia/Montenegro's claim to
continue its international legal personality; (4) the historic fact
that Kosovo, while legitimately part of Yugoslavia, has never been
legitimately incorporated into Serbia; (5) the fact that the people of
Kosovo have been subjected to ethnic aggression; and (6) recent
precedent set by the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement and others.
SECURING THE PEACE IN KOSOVO BY WINNING THE PEACE THROUGHOUT THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
To win the peace in Kosovo it is necessary to recognize that the
recent crisis in Kosovo is but a continuation of the Yugoslav crisis
which began in 1991. As such, it is necessary to link the peace efforts
in Kosovo to those in the other former Yugoslav Republics, and in
particular to establish objectives and strategies for winning the peace
throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
To secure the peace in Croatia, it is necessary to continue to work
with the new government and the Yugoslav Tribunal to ensure the
indictment and transfer to the Hague of all high level officials
responsible for war crimes against Serb and Bosniac populations. It is
further necessary to provide the new Croatian government with the
political support, and when necessary political pressure, to severe the
political and financial links between Croatia and Bosnian Croat
political forces which continue to harbor an interest in a partitioned
Bosnia.
To win back the peace in Bosnia it is necessary to acknowledge the
nature of the Dayton accords as a flawed peace resulting from America's
failure to seriously confront Slobodan Milosevic or to truncate and
roll back political gains, achieved through ethnic aggression. This
effort must involve a three phase process. First, the U.S. Government
must discontinue its policy of moral equivalence and equal blame among
the parties, which undermines its efforts to constructively engage
Bosniac and certain Croat forces in the peacebuilding process. Second,
the U.S. Government must acknowledge the Dayton agreement was never
meant to be static, but rather that it was designed and intended to
evolve with changing political circumstances. And third, the U.S.
Government must seek to evolve the Dayton agreement in a manner which
deconstructs the resulting institutions and attributes of Milosevic's
efforts to partition Bosnia along ethnic lines, including the gradual
erasure of the inter-entity boundary line, the removal of the
institutionalized ethnic veto, and the dissolution of most of the
Republika Srpska political institutions--which are regularly used to
organize actions which undermine or inhibit the reintegration of
Bosnia.
To prevent conflict in Montenegro it is necessary to demonstrate
tangible benefits to democracy and a political path separate from that
of Serbia.\20\ Montenegro must be provided security guarantees and
Serbia must be confronted with clear warnings of economic and political
sanctions in the event it sponsors a coup or other covert action in
Montenegro.\21\ Moreover, Montenegro must be engaged in the Kosovo
peacebuilding process.
To secure the peace in Macedonia it is necessary to ensure
continued economic growth and the resolution of outstanding political
disputes with Greece. Most important is the need to further integrate
the Macedonian Albanian population into Macedonia's political and
economic infrastructure.
To win the conflict in Serbia and silence the engine of aggression
in the former Yugoslavia it is necessary to promote a democratic
transition beyond the current institutionalized political opposition.
This will require a series of transitions, with the first likely
including members of the current opposition, but with subsequent
governments including more genuinely moderate elements that accurately
reflect the views of the oppressed and silenced mainstream population
committed to a regionally responsible Serbia--such as the ones
currently driving the Otpor student movement. The Yugoslav Tribunal's
indictment of the top leadership should be maximally utilized to
delegitimze and discredit the current nationalist regime, and America
SHOULD LEAD ITS ALLIES IN ISOLATING MILOSEVIC AND HIS ACCOMPLICES.
CONCLUSION
The lack of a strategic policy for bringing a lasting peace to
Yugoslavia has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, the
displacement of over a million refugees, the degradation of U.S. and
NATO military forces, diplomatic strains within the American-European
alliance, and a diversion of resources and attention from other areas
of strategic importance.
Unless the U.S. wishes to create a permanent peacekeeping presence
in the region it must develop an aggressive strategy for each zone of
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
For Kosovo, the United States should pursue a policy of
intermediate sovereignty and earned independence as this provides the
best possible means for ensuring the long-term security of the Kosovo
Albanian population, and for creating a meaningful incentive for the
Kosovo Albanian political forces to ensure the protection of Serbian
rights and security. Such an approach will also permit the U.S. to
undertake a phased withdrawal of its troops over a reasonable period of
time as the security of Kosovo increases and as the rights of
minorities are increasingly safeguarded.
ENDNOTES
\1\ Madeleine Albright, Our Stake in Kosovo, The New York Times,
(March 28, 2000).
\2\ Anthony E. Wayne, Statement before the House International
Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999); Larry Napper, Statement before
the House International Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999).
\3\ James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International
Relations Committee, (April 11, 2000); William J. Clinton, Remarks by
the President to the Students, Organization Leaders and Community
Leaders of the Ferizaj (Urosevac) Area, Kosovo, (November 23, 1999);
James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International Relations
Committee, (August 4, 1999).
\4\ Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks at European Institute Awards
Dinner, (January 26, 2000). The most concise statement of a U.S. policy
with respect to Kosovo is, ``The United States and our European allies
are committed to winning the peace in Kosovo by: addressing
humanitarian needs and preparing for winter; easing ethnic tensions and
protecting minority rights; and strengthening democracy and supporting
civil society.'' The White House, Fact Sheet: Winning the Peace in
Kosovo: A Progress Report, (November 23, 1999).
\5\ Madeleine Albright, Our Stake in Kosovo, The New York Times,
(March 28, 2000); James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department
of State, (March 22, 2000).
\6\ For a more detailed account of the failure of Dayton
implementation, see Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the
Peace Agreement, Report of the International Crisis Group, (October 28,
1999).
\7\ For a more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding
the Bosnian elections, see Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report
of the International Crisis Group, (September 9, 1996); Why the Bosnian
Elections Must be Postponed, Report of the International Crisis Group,
(August 14, 1996).
\8\ Bosnia's Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International Community
Ready?, Report of the International Crisis Group (May 30, 2000).
\9\ The proposed amendment further directed the President to
develop a plan for turning over peacekeeping efforts to the Europeans
by July 1, 2001.
\10\ Kosovo's Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, Report of
the International Crisis Group, (May, 31, 2000).
\11\ As concisely articulated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, U.S.
policy has been, ``You can't make peace without President Milosevic.''
Jurek Martin, Holbrooke Sees ``Tough Slog'' to Peace in Bosnia,
Financial Times (London), (November 2, 1995).
\12\ Anthony E. Wayne, Statement before the House International
Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999).
\13\ James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International
Relations Committee, (April 11, 2000).
\14\ James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of
State, (April 21, 2000).
\15\ Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks and Q&A Session with the
Council on Foreign Relations, (June 28, 1999).
\16\ See, James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of
State, (April 21, 2000).
\17\ James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International
Relations Committee, (April 11, 2000).
\18\ James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of
State, (March 16, 2000).
\19\ Anthony E. Wayne, Statement before the House International
Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999).
\20\ To date, the U.S. Government has provided benefits only in the
form of financial and technical assistance in the amount of $25
million, with limited observer status in some of the regional political
cooperation mechanisms. See James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the
House International Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999).
\21\ To date, the U.S. Government has refused to provide any
express security guarantees for Montenegro. Rather it has engaged in
vague statements concerning American interests in Montenegro--similar
to those which preceded the ethnic aggression in Kosovo in 1998. See,
James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (March
22, 2000).
Senator Smith. That is excellent testimony as well.
Mr. Bugajski.
STATEMENT OF MR. JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EASTERN EUROPE
PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
inviting me today to speak on Kosovo, past, present, and
future. It is an honor to be here. I would simply summarize my
written statement, which is deliberately concise to begin with,
and so I am going to be very brief.
Let me just say that since the liberation and occupation of
Kosovo by NATO forces in June 1999, a year ago, both
constructive and negative developments have been evident on the
territory as a result of both internal factors and external
factors.
Let me just point out some of the positives that we
mentioned already, but I think it is worth underscoring. On the
security side, Kosovo has witnessed the expulsion of repressive
Serb security forces, and the successful return of over 1
million Kosovar Albanian refugees. NATO, despite some of the
security concerns vis-a-vis the minority groups, is effectively
safeguarding the territory from Yugoslav or Serbian military
reintervention.
Second, on the reconstruction side, some basic
reconstruction work has been accomplished, especially in
providing shelter, food, medical aid, and other services to the
destitute. Some initiatives have begun in encouraging
development of small businesses and in identifying key
infrastructural projects over the coming years. Efforts are
also underway to rebuild the educational system, the health
care system, the energy network, and public administration.
This is all to the good. However, what I would like to
focus on are the shortcomings, and I think there are four major
shortcomings with the U.N. mandate and with our operation
there. First, I would call it political paralysis. There is
currently no legitimate Kosovar Albanian authority, and this
contributes to paralyzing and polarizing the development of
political institutions. The creation of a Kosovar Advisory
Council under the supervision of U.N. Special Representative
Bernard Kouchner has not filled the political vacuum.
Second, criminality and corruption threaten the security of
residents. They perpetuate the climate of revenge against
minority Serbs and undermine the emergence of a democratic
system. In addition, Milosevic's special security forces and
paramilitaries sometimes in plain clothes continue to operate
in Kosovo, deliberately provoking violence to discredit
international institutions, to undermine the longevity of the
NATO mission, and to discount any realistic possibility of
Kosovar self-government.
Third, international failures. I would say Kosovo has
witnessed a number of institutional shortcomings by
international agencies. For example, lack of serious
reconstruction resources, insufficient number of international
police officers, turf battles between international
organizations, and the creation of deliberative councils
without any ultimate authority or decisionmaking power.
There have also been persistent delays in training and
deploying an indigenous police force and establishing a
credible and professional judiciary system that could enforce
law and order on the territory.
Fourth, and I think the most important failing, and it has
been mentioned already, but again is worth underscoring, is the
lack of final legal status for Kosovo as an independent state.
Western leaders still believe that postponing the decision on
Kosovo's status will allow for democratic changes to take place
inside Serbia and enable some new relationship to emerge
between Serbia and Kosovo.
In the interim, and regardless of whether such a rosy
scenario actually materializes, NATO may be faced with
escalating anger amongst the Albanian community if the United
Nations insists on preserving Kosovo within Serbia. As we know,
the vast majority of Albanians support statehood, irrespective
of any possible leadership changes, or regime changes in
Belgrade.
For the indefinite future, Kosovo it looks will remain an
international ward without any inspiring vision for its future
status, but such a scenario has raised, I believe, serious
questions about the self-determination of Kosovo's population
and the instabilities that could be generated by any planned
reintegration into Serbia.
Indeed, I would say a valid argument can be made that in
order to avoid future destabilization or permanent dependency
on outside agencies self-determination and independence for
Kosovo should be the primary objective of international
leaders.
Such a step could have several positive ramifications.
First, it would restore Kosovar confidence in the international
community and help preclude potential radicalization of
Albanian politics as long-term ambiguity on the status question
can undermine the democrats and favor the demagogues.
Most policymakers unfortunately still adhere to the
conventional wisdom that an independent Kosovo would
destabilize the Balkans. In reality, it seems to me it is the
forcible maintenance of Yugoslavia in which we are now ready
accomplices that continues to generate instability.
Second, protection. Acceptance of future independence can
undercut the threat of a new Serbian takeover by delegitimizing
Belgrade's incessant provocations on the territory.
Additionally, criteria and timetables for a democratic
independent state will give both the internationalists and the
locals a concrete goal to which political, institutional, and
economic reconstruction can be directed.
And third, Kosovo's statehood can also help resolve the
wider Albanian question in the Balkans. I believe instead of
provoking calls for a greater Albania which we keep hearing,
such a step could actually pacify the more radical Albanian
demands, allow Europe to increase its positive influences by
dealing with Kosovo as a country in its own right, and
delegitimize any potential threat to Macedonian or Montenegran
territory.
Over the coming year I believe the international community
needs to focus attention on two overriding questions in Kosovo,
political legitimacy and international dependency. First,
political legitimacy. In line with the resolution of its status
question, Kosovo will need a new indigenous constitution that
can help concentrate political energy, give credence to
legality, and provide a more solid basis for democratic
development.
All major political players in Kosovo evidently support
such an approach, as it would create the foundations of
statehood. The organs of government, including the
constitutional assembly, would then acquire the confidence of
the public and the commitment of all major political leaders.
Second, international dependence. A dependency relationship
has emerged between the Kosovars and international
institutions. That may become more difficult to overcome the
longer the current stalemate exists. Moreover, I believe such a
relationship could seriously threaten the development of
indigenous institutions and democratic procedures.
To counter such a phenomenon, a comprehensive election
process for both local and national elections is essential
through a campaign of voter registration, political party
development, and civic education, and here I think the United
States can play a major role. This could help establish
structure, legitimacy, and authority for elected Kosovar
leaders. Local and central Kosovar authorities must then obtain
the authority and resources to govern, and not simply to
consult with international agencies.
Above all, I believe there needs to be clarity as to the
powers of the proposed local and central government, its
relationship with the interim U.N. authorities, and its
independence from the Serbian and/or Yugoslav regime.
Thank you very much. That concludes my summary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows.]
Prepared Statement of Janusz Bugajski
KOSOVA: ONE YEAR LATER
Since the liberation and occupation of Kosova by NATO forces in
June 1999, both constructive and destructive developments have been
evident on the territory as a result of internal and external factors.
On the positive side:
Security: Kosova has witnessed the expulsion of repressive
Serb security forces and the successful return of over a
million Kosova Albanian refugees and displaced persons to their
homes. Under the United Nations Mission in Kosova (UNMIK), NATO
established a Kosova Force (K-FOR) consisting of approximately
50,000 troops that is effectively safeguarding the territory
from Yugoslav or Serbian military intervention.
Reconstruction: Some basic reconstruction work has been
accomplished, especially in providing shelter, food, and
medical aid to the bulk of the destitute. Several initiatives
have begun in encouraging the development of small businesses
and in identifying key infrastructural projects over the coming
years. Efforts are also underway to rebuild the educational
system, the energy network, and the public administration.
However, four major shortcomings of the Kosova operation have also
been evident.
Political Paralysis: There is currently no legitimate
Kosovar Albanian authority and this contributes to paralyzing
the development of political institutions and the emergence of
a civic society. In some respects, such a situation suits U.N.
officials who argue that the Kosovars are simply unable to
govern themselves and need to be shepherded by international
players into some future Yugoslav framework. The creation of a
Kosova advisory council under the supervision of the U.N.
Special Representative Bernard Kouchner has not filled the
political vacuum.
Criminality: The problem of criminalization and the lack of
the rule of law has become widespread in Kosova. Corruption and
crime threaten the security of residents, perpetuate a climate
of revenge against minority Serbs, and undermine the emergence
of a democratic system. Such a phenomenon also serves those who
argue that the Kosovars are not prepared for self-government or
statehood. In addition, Serbian special forces and
paramilitaries continued to operate in Kosova, deliberately
provoking violence to discredit international institutions, to
undermine the longevity of the NATO mission, and to discount
any realistic possibility of Kosovar self-government.
International Failings: Kosova has witnessed a number of
institutional shortcomings by international agencies. This has
been visible in a lack of serious reconstruction resources, an
insufficient number of international police officers, turf
battles between international organizations, the undercutting
of embryonic Albanian local authorities, and the creation of
deliberative councils without any ultimate authority or
decision-making powers. There have also been persistent delays
in the training and deployment of an indigenous police force
and the establishment of a credible and professional judiciary
system that could enforce law and order on the territory.
Status Question: The most important failing is the lack of
final legal status for Kosova as an independent state. Western
leaders believe that postponing the decision on Kosova's status
will allow for democratic changes to take place inside Serbia
and enable a new relationship to emerge between Serbia and
Kosova once Yugoslav President Milosevic is ousted. However, in
the interim and regardless of whether such a rosy scenario
actually materializes, NATO may be faced with escalating anger
among the Albanian community if the U.N. insists on preserving
Kosova within Serbia. The vast majority of Albanians support
statehood for Kosova irrespective of any possible leadership
changes in Belgrade.
For the indefinite future Kosova will remain an international ward,
without any inspiring vision for its future status. The U.N. mandate in
Kosova is ultimately designed to return the region to Belgrade's
jurisdiction. A large-scale international presence will continue until
conditions have been met for a peaceful reintegration of the territory.
But such a scenario has raised serious questions about the self-
determination of Kosova's population and the instabilities that could
be generated by any planned reintegration into Serbia. A valid argument
can be made that in order to avoid future destabilization or permanent
dependance on outside agencies, self-determination and independence for
Kosova should be the primary objective of international leaders. Such a
step could have several positive ramifications.
Stabilization: It would restore Kosovar confidence in the
``international community'' and help preclude a potential
radicalization of Albanian politics as long-term ambiguity on
the status question can undermine the region's democrats and
favor its demagogues. The ``non-status'' stalemate or the
proposed return of Kosova to Serbian or Yugoslav control may
exacerbate the problems already faced by international actors
in guaranteeing security and building credible local
institutions. Most policy makers still adhere to the
conventional wisdom that an independent Kosova will destabilize
the Balkans. Comparable arguments were employed a decade ago in
opposition to Slovenian and Croatian statehood. In reality, it
is the forcible maintenance of Yugoslavia that continues to
generate instability.
Protection: Acceptance of future independence can undercut
the threat of a new Serbian takeover by deligitimizing
Belgrade's incessant provocations on the territory.
Additionally, criteria and timetables for a democratic
independent state will give both the internationals and the
locals a concrete goal toward which political, institutional,
and economic reconstruction can be directed.
Regional Security: On the international arena, it is worth
considering some positive implications of a Kosovar state,
initially under the auspices of an officially declared
international ``protectorate.'' For example, any potential
threat from Belgrade toward Albania will be terminated;
Montenegro could feel more secure from a Serbian attack; while
Macedonia's shorter border with Serbia will limit the
destabilizing effects of Belgrade's nonrecognition of
Macedonia's frontiers. Above all, a substantial NATO presence
while a national Kosova defense force is trained and empowered
will convince military forces in the surrounding region to
desist from any provocative actions.
Albanian Question: Kosova's statehood can also help resolve
the wider ``Albanian question'' in the south Balkans. Instead
of provoking calls for a ``Greater Albania'' such a step could
actually pacify the more radical Albanian demands and allow
Europe to increase its positive influences by dealing with
Kosova as a country in its own right. A timetable can therefore
be pursued by internationals working in tandem with indigenous
parties in the construction of Kosova's political, legal, and
security institutions. The interim international ``ward'' could
thereby evolve toward autonomy and sovereignty, regardless of
whether Serbia remains under the control of its kleptocratic
nationalist-socialist elite or descends into protracted
violence and civil war.
Over the coming year, the ``international community'' needs to
focus attention on two overriding questions in Kosova: political
legitimacy and international dependency.
Political Legitimacy: In line with the resolution of its
``status'' question, Kosova will need a new indigenous
constitution that can help concentrate political energy, give
credence to legality, and provide a more solid basis for
democratic development. All major political players in Kosova
evidently support such an approach as it would create the
foundations of statehood. The organs of government, including a
constitutional assembly, would then acquire the confidence of
the public and the commitment of all major political players.
In this context, extremist parties advocating ultra-
nationalist, anti-minority, and authoritarian solutions would
be exposed and marginalized so that they do not undermine the
body politic of the new state.
The OSCE can oversee the creation of a new Kosovar
administration in a much more resolute manner than was evident
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Indeed, during the next two to three
years Kosova can establish all the elements and qualifications
for statehood. The Prishtina government will of course have to
renounce any territorial aspirations and sign treaties with its
three Slavic neighbors, and commit itself to democratic
pluralism, the rule of law, a market economy, and European
integration.
International Dependence: A dependency relationship has
emerged between Kosovars and international institutions that
may become difficult to overcome the longer the current
``stalemate'' continues. Moreover, such a relationship could
seriously threaten the development of indigenous institutions
and democratic procedures. To counter such a phenomenon, a
comprehensive election process for the local and national
ballot is essential through a campaign of voter registration,
political party development, and civic education. This could
help establish structure, legitimacy, and authority for elected
Kosovar leaders. Local and central Kosovar authorities must
obtain the authority and resources to govern and not simply to
consult with international agencies. Above all, there needs to
be clarity as to the powers of the proposed central government,
its relationship with the interim U.N. authorities, and its
independence from the Serbian and Yugoslav regime.
Senator Smith. Thank you all.
I wonder if any of you would care to respond to, I think
both of us, what both of us were saying, that if we actually
just come forward and say we are now for independence, and that
is the stated goal and the condition of the United States
continued presence there, what dynamic does that set in place?
Ambassador Abramowitz. I will give you my perspective. I
think while one must have definite objectives, that one cannot
also depart from political reality. I believe it is very
important, as I said in the testimony, to make it clear that--
and this the United States can do without necessarily creating
a division in the alliance. Make it clear that Serbian rule
will never return to Kosovo. It does not now have to create, I
believe, a problem within the alliance and within the
international community by trying to change U.N. Resolution
1244.
But I think the most important thing to do over the next
year is basically what Mr. Bugajski just said, to start to work
to create Albanian institutions, and to give Albanians charge
to begin that process. That is not an easy process, because the
leadership is absent in many ways, but that, to me, is the
beginning of the process of establishing the movement toward
what I think will be eventual independence without creating an
enormous brouhaha in the international community.
So that is my view on it, is that we have to have that, I
think, as an ultimate objective, but we have to move there with
deference to what the circumstances are in the international
community, and particularly within the alliance. That may seem
a little faint-hearted, but that is what I feel at this time.
Senator Smith. That is a very valuable insight.
Dr. Williams. Addressing that question, there would be
three consequences of articulating a policy of conditional
independence. The first would be that it would create an
incentive, or at least a possibility of incentivizing the
Kosovo Albanian population to behave in a more moderate and
less radical fashion.
Generally a significant percentage of the population are by
nature moderate. However, the conflict and near apartheid of
the last 10 years has resulted in a radicalization of that
population. Denying them their aspirations for independence has
to date played into the hands of the more radical elements.
The second is that it would help us to create a political
reality with our European allies. We deferred to our European
allies in 1991. We had the conflict in Croatia and in Bosnia.
We stepped in, tried to fix the problem. We deferred to our
European allies at the initiation of the Kosovo conflict.
Again, the American Government had to step in, fix the problem
through the use of force.
We are now deferring to our European allies on winning the
peace in Kosovo. It is not going to work. The Americans have to
take a leadership role, and independence, or conditional
independence or some other forward-thinking policy would have
the effect, I think, of galvanizing the Europeans. They would
object. There would be difficulties, but we could bring them
along with us.
Third, and probably most importantly, it would lay the
blame for the loss of Kosovo, which will occur 3 years, 5
years, 10 years from now. Sooner or later Kosovo will be lost
to the people and the Republic of Serbia. It would lay this
blame at the foot of Milosevic.
It could then be used by the democratic opposition, which
are very pluralistic and diverse, in a good way and in a bad
way, but it would also remove it from the tasks that any
genuine opposition will have to deal with once they come into
power in a post Milosevic regime. If a truly democratic
opposition takes power and then gives the Kosovars the right to
vote for independence, they will lose Kosovo, and you will see
a transition back to more nationalist Serbian politics.
Senator Smith. Mr. Bugajski.
Mr. Bugajski. Yes. Just to reiterate what Paul has said, I
would say that it would send a very clear signal to Belgrade
and to the Serbian people that basically focus on your domestic
issues, Kosovo is out of bounds. This is now an international
issue. We are moving toward independence, whatever the steps.
Paradoxically, though, I think if it is important to the
Serbs--in other words, Kosovo is the heartland, so to speak--
then it would further delegitimize the Milosevic regime,
because it would be clear Milosevic had lost the territory. If
it is not important to Serbs, and according to recent public
opinion polls it does not even figure amongst the six top
issues that concern ordinary Serbs, then it really does not
matter to them, in other words, we may have exaggerated the
importance of Kosovo to the Serbs.
So either way, I think we will win vis-a-vis Belgrade.
Senator Smith. So if we set up this process, establish the
democratic institutions, and define the goal as conditional
independence, if you could all speak briefly to the collateral
consequence to Macedonia and Bosnia, what does it mean to them?
Ambassador Abramowitz. I think one should not be too
categorical. There is a lot we do not know. There is a lot of
things that can happen. For example, I think--take the case of
Greece. I think if--and this is no reason for not doing it, but
if Kosovo moved toward independence I think Greece would have a
fit.
Senator Smith. Greece would what?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Have a fit. What Greece would do in
that case, I do not know, and the situation in Macedonia is
uncertain. There are a lot of Albanians who recognize they do
not want conflict. They want to try to make Macedonia work.
There are a lot of people in Macedonia who have had longer term
means.
My own view is that we can proceed at some point toward
independence and still maintain the viability of Macedonia, but
I think it will require an awful lot of effort and an awful lot
of attention to what is happening in Macedonia internally, and
I do not say that with great confidence, and I do not think
anybody can speak with great confidence on this subject. It is
a legitimate concern to be worried about, but I believe--my own
belief is, it can be managed.
But it has to be very significantly thought through, the
things you have to do to make sure that nothing untoward
happens in terms of the stability of Macedonia.
Senator Smith. Do you have a brief comment, Dr. Williams?
Dr. Williams. I think there would be important consequences
both for Bosnia and Macedonia. In Bosnia it would demonstrate
the West's willingness to roll back the gains of ethnic
aggression. We need to resurrect the peace in Bosnia. One way
of doing that is to evolve the Dayton Accords. Working on
conditional independence for Kosovo would set a precedence for
managing and somehow constructing a new process in Bosnia.
In Macedonia, as Ambassador Abramowitz has pointed out, it
is highly unstable. There are three options. Either we manage
eventual independence of Kosovo, we keep our troops in Kosovo
indefinitely, or we withdraw our troops and there is a process
of de facto independence, which we will not be able to regulate
and which will be met with aggression by Serbian forces. It
brings us back to 1998 all over again.
Senator Smith. Mr. Bugajski.
Mr. Bugajski. I personally think a little bit what Paul was
saying, that Macedonia does remain a great unknown in terms of
its internal development and ethnic developments. However, I do
believe that the nonindependence option for Kosovo, either
long-term international dependency or reintegration into
Yugoslavia, does actually encourage radical elements,
particularly those factions that favor a Greater Albania, and I
think they could become more important and active and even gain
some popular support if they see the international community is
not favoring independence for Kosovo, and they could spread,
let us say, their message, their activities to part of
Macedonia.
At this point I do not believe most Albanians in Macedonia
would want to join either Kosovo or Albania. A lot, of course,
depends on the development of internal political relations
within Macedonia, and this is the key, of course, in the south
Balkans we should be focusing on.
Senator Smith. We are very pleased to be joined--much
earlier, but the first time we have acknowledged--by the
ranking member of the full committee and of this subcommittee,
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I apologize, gentlemen. There is a defense
bill on the floor and a lot of amendments, and I have been
called in and out to come do my amendment and then not, so I
apologize for the delay.
I found the testimony interesting and informative and, as
usual, Mr. Ambassador, I found your testimony to be first-rate.
Not that the others were not, but you quite frankly have
captured the nuances of the problem better than anybody.
I find it kind of fascinating, the little scenario, sir,
you just went through about if, in fact, we made it clear that
there was no independence in the future and there was going to
be some continued association with Serbia, that could
potentially radicalize the population and Macedonia could cause
a problem.
Well, if all of that happens, one of the things I am
confident of from meeting with Mr. Thaci on several occasions,
and being there on half-a-dozen occasions and talking, I think,
to every player in the process over the last 8 years, including
everyone in Kosovo the last 2 years, if any of that happens, I
just want to go on record doing something no one should ever
do, making a prediction, and the prediction is, we are out, the
Europeans are out, Slobodan Milosevic owns it all.
The idea that Thaci and any successor, KLA, could possibly
withstand any movement by Serbia is nonexistent--nonexistent--
and the possibility in the face of a withdrawal under the
circumstance I mentioned of NATO forces, of NATO going back in
is nonexistent, and your formulas are, in my humble opinion,
formulas for absolute disaster.
I think the only thing to focus on here is, how do you keep
this thing going as long as you can without things blowing up,
and hoping the dynamic circumstance emerges that provides
opportunities we do not even know exist now to take advantage
of moving toward stability, and I have a few questions along
those lines, if I may.
The idea that we defer to allies, the implication being
that had we not we would have had a better outcome, I do not
know where you have been the last 5 years. If we had not
deferred to our allies in some of the things, there was no
possibility this place would have given any--any--support for
sending any Americans anywhere in the Balkans if the allies
said, we are not in.
I find these exercises in what we should have done
fascinating. I mean, we just beat back by, what, seven votes a
proposal to set an end date to get out and conditions for our
allies that reflect, in case you have not noticed, that close
to half this place ain't sure about us even being there when no
one is being killed, and the absolute condition of being there
is that the allies do more.
So we are going to stand down our allies, right. We are
going to stand them down. Now we are going to get tough with
them and tell them we are going to do it our way, that is the
implication, because we have yielded to them.
I would like not to have to yield to them, but I would like
to find 49-plus votes here on the floor if we did not on some
of these things, which takes me to this question in point.
I think, Ambassador Abramowitz, if I understood the
statement correctly it is absolutely right. The way to do
this--and I would like you to respond--is to make it clear that
there will not be a return to any circumstance within Kosovo
where Belgrade dictates outcomes in any way in Kosovo, and we
have opened the question as to whether or not there will be an
incredibly loose federation, independence, or a process toward
independence.
I just got finished meeting with a number of Greek
officials. I promise you, Mr. Ambassador--you are more
diplomatic than I am--the prospect of us declaring that we are
for an independent Kosovo means goodbye Charlie. You know what
is going to happen. They will cease and desist from their
support. You will see the French follow them, and you will see
a vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate, because they will not
be coming forward with their commitments, for American troops
to be out of there by June. I will bet my career on it. By next
June, troops will be out.
So it seems to me that one of the things we have got to
figure out is, what are the things we should not be doing,
rather than what are the things we should be doing. One of the
things I want to raise is that we are about to vote on an
amendment by a Senator who I have great respect for, and who
has been the person who has most ardently disagreed with my
views on the Balkans for the past 8 years, and that is Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchison.
She has an amendment, and she has been consistent for 8
years, and so it is not like this is anything new--and some
think this is a good idea. She has a sense of the Senate
resolution calling for a Balkan stabilization conference that
contemplates a rewriting of the borders. She cites the Treaty
of Vienna, or the Treaty of Berlin from 1878, and she cites
London, 1913, et cetera, in all of which we wrote borders.
I will painfully point out that they are all disasters on
the floor, but they are the models that we are to use, and we
would invite all parties--I assume that includes Slobodan
Milosevic--to this conference.
Now, my general question is, should we be at this moment
making any substantial changes in our posture in Kosovo? Should
we be calling a major conference to get all the parties
together? Should we be declaring that we are on the road to
independence?
I was very intrigued--and I agree with some of what Dr.
Williams said. I wish there were a way in which we could say,
here is the deal. We are going to further establish clearly
Kosovar institutions and support them in return for commitments
that you will engage in a rule of law that is even remotely
approaching a rule of law, including acknowledging a
multiethnic society in your future, and we will see about
independence. We will see where this takes us.
But talk to me about whether or not we should be having any
big conference of any type now.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, Senator, you as always raise
very important considerations, practical as well as conceptual.
I do not know of any conference in the Balkans that has made a
contribution, an international conference, and certainly not
the Congress of Berlin, and that is one of the sources of the
continuing problems.
So the notion that we would get together a group of nations
with different views, particularly about where Serbia under
Slobodan Milosevic fits in, seems to me a formula for further
chaos, further disorder in the Balkans, and it is amazing, I
think, that this is being proposed in a serious way to resolve
really difficult problems.
Now, I do think, however, that--I guess I perhaps have been
in the State Department too long, and tend to see some of the
complexities more than I should. I do believe, however, that we
cannot just drift. We cannot just accept the fact that it is
very politically difficult, which it is. The Russians, the
Chinese, a lot of the allies, that they have different views.
Senator Smith. Ambassador, we cannot just drift. We cannot
keep seven votes here for who knows how long.
Ambassador Abramowitz. I am trying to answer the question
of what do we do in the short term, and we can be swept along,
so to speak and hope that something turns up. That usually
turns out to be American policy. Let us wait until something
good turns up and then we do not have to face critical
difficulties with our allies, or the Russians, or the Chinese.
I sort of believe that the best thing is to start a process
in which the people of Kosovo know that they are moving ahead
and that the facts that will be represented by functioning
Kosovo institutions establishes a basic underpinning.
Senator Biden. Can you give me a specific example of an
institution you have in mind?
Ambassador Abramowitz. The obvious institution is an
assembly, a legislative assembly, because the place does not
have a constitution. We are now developing a constitution. I do
not know what degree of consultation with the Albanians is, but
clearly, if you are going to develop an entity it has got to
have some rules. It does not have any rules now.
You have a half-hearted United Nations administration which
provides a certain amount of law and order but clearly does
nothing to build an entity, so you have to start building an
entity, it seems to me, or you are going to get ultimately
developments in Kosovo that are going to create an awful lot of
trouble and make it even worse on the Hill.
So I do not believe it is a prudent policy, whatever the
international complexities are, and they are great, and the
domestic complexities, to sit still and hope for the best. My
answer is a very limited one under the circumstances, that the
United States, for its own, should make it clear that while it
is not precluding Kosovo independence, it is saying what will
not happen any more, that we will not stand by and we will not
accept Serbian rule for Kosovo.
That to me is an important beginning, and I think it does
not create a major crisis in the alliance.
Senator Biden. I am of that view, Mr. Ambassador, and I
will cease because Senator Lugar has not had a chance to speak
and I will ask you to refrain from answering the rest of my
question until Senator Lugar is done. However, the last two
times I was there, I asked all the parties I could meet,
including former and present KLA people, about us just imposing
a constitution, just writing a constitution, just simply having
the United Nations go in there as a mandate and lay out a
constitution and set up those institutions now.
Everyone I spoke to said they would welcome the idea of
this being done by a committee, or this being done by
consultation, Albanian as well as Serb, because they cannot
figure out how to get from here to there.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, you are referring to an
existing problem, that the Albanians are divided. There is a
lot of fractionating organizations there, fractionated
politics, and some people will say, post constitution. I am an
American. I have little problems about the constitution----
Senator Biden. When I say impose a constitution, I mean we
did not, quote, impose a constitution in Germany, and we did
not impose one in Japan, but we did--but that is another story.
I would yield the floor. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate each of the papers enormously. I thought they were
brilliant, and make a real contribution and have stimulated our
conversation.
Picking up where Senator Biden left off, it seems to me
there is a case to be made for the United Nations, NATO, the
United States, or somebody to formulate a constitutional
system. We discussed today--and this is not a pejorative term--
that Kosovo is a ward of international security forces which
for the moment, depends on NATO or the U.N. mandate and is
likely to be the case for a long time.
In other words, this is a very special case which, for a
good reason, the rest of the world and us got involved with 2
million people, a million of whom were dispersed, and we
discussed that. A million came back. How in the world can
people who are shifted around in 1 year, lose their lives and
families and fortunes, are redistributed back and expected to
have a deliberative assembly and then work all this out. It
seems to me to stretch the imagination, but the failure to do
so does not stretch imagination. It is chaos.
In any event, I think, and am stimulated by your testimony
today, that I can conceive the international ward, where we
provide a constitution, and people begin to think and
deliberate on democracy.
Now, meanwhile, as you suggest Ambassador Abramowitz, it is
clear, that since we have surrounded this in protective
coating, the Serbs are not going to get into it. We have the
armed forces, and we would beat them, and we could stay there
and demonstrate that. That would be true if there were
Albanians coming in, Greeks coming in, whoever wants to come
in. This is going to be a sacrosanct place for 2 million people
involved in learning how to build democratic institutions.
Your suggestion, and Dr. Williams' suggestion, is that
eventually there has to be integration not only of Kosovo but
of a lot of places in southeastern Europe into European
institutions, perhaps joining the European Union, maybe joining
NATO in some form, but at least becoming involved and
integrated, but that may take some time, too.
As a matter of fact, even well-developed situations may
have to be discussed 10 years from now including European Union
membership. That was always the problem in discussing NATO
expansion. Ideally, some said, let the economics flow, and the
institutions, and then you pick up the military, but that just
did not happen.
It seems to me if the United States is to be involved, we
are going to have debates on the floor of the Congress, the
rest would be a demonstrated American interest in this that is
more substantial.
Now, a part of this may be that we would say the Europeans
are not moving fast enough, but we believe that we Americans
want to establish much more of a relationship with an expanding
Romania, or Bulgaria, or with Greece, for that matter.
In other words, we accept the fact that they are in Europe,
but the world is very small. You know, why not have much more
extensive bilateral relationships with the United States? Why
not allow or facilitate the United States to come in in a very
big economic way?
So you do have stability here, but at the pace the
Europeans are going at it, you will never make it. They will be
quarrelling, warring, be back into it trying to separate the
pairs again.
This might get the European juices going and they would
say, this is an American invasion. We already think you are
involved in hegemony and trying to do your own thing, and this
simply proves it, and we might just say, you are right. You are
absolutely right. That is what we are going to do, because you
folks again and again come to us and say, we cannot handle it.
That really is the basic reason for the American presence.
The Europeans say, we cannot handle it, so we say, we
accept that, and you accept that, because we are coming. We are
not about to devote tens of billions of dollars to fight wars
spasmodically, then have big debates whether we come in or out,
or what the end game is.
The end game for us is a prosperous southeastern Europe.
Kosovo got us going. It may be a dubious enterprise. It may be
a good one, but nevertheless we are not a cut-and-run group. We
are not going to undermine NATO. We are not going to undermine
integration. As a matter of fact, our policy is really to come
in in a big way and to get it all straightened out.
Now, how does that strike you? In other words, as we had
been talking today, we criticize the previous testimony as
there being no strategy, and you have talked about tactics, and
that is about, muddling through, hanging on, hoping for the
best. Maybe the seven-vote margin Senator Biden mentioned
disappears, and we all leave. Maybe Montenegro comes or goes,
and no one really cares.
I am suggesting that if we do care, and I think we should,
for strategic reasons and security reasons of our own, there
has to be something for the American people and its elected
representatives to support, something to hang onto to say, this
is us, this is our strategy. This is good for America.
Now, why do we not try to do that, Dr. Williams? Do you
have an idea about this?
Dr. Williams. Yes, Senator. I would agree with you and
Senator Biden that the first step in a policy of intermediate
sovereignty or earned independence is imposing a constitution.
Now, the important question is, which type of constitution?
In Bosnia we imposed a constitution on the Bosnian Government
similar to the constitution of the former Yugoslavia, the only
one of its kind. It institutionalized ethnic division and
created institutionalized political gridlock.
The alternative approach would be constitutions like
everywhere else in western and central Europe and the U.S.,
majority rule with minority rights protections.
One of the concerns we have about that first step of
intermediate sovereignty is that we are working with the
European allies rather than leading our European allies to a
policy, and they are pursuing a similar approach to Dayton,
which is institutionalized ethnic vetoes, rotating
presidencies, rotating supreme court justices. We cannot
dismiss the Europeans, but we need to demonstrate to them the
benefits of majority rule, minority right protections, and
putting it in part of a larger package.
I think from afar one reason why some Senators are
uncomfortable with our continued presence in the Balkans is the
lack of a strategic policy. If we lead the European allies to a
policy, starting with the constitution, and not only imposing a
constitution but also imposing things that you could not impose
on a sovereign state--thou shalt not have a political or
territorial association with certain neighboring states--and
then things which are part of international law, respecting the
territorial integrity of neighbors.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Senator Lugar, I think you are
asking some very fundamental questions, and the problem is that
we are trying to solve a very difficult problem in a short
period of time, and it cannot be done that way, and our
domestic politics or domestic considerations prevent it from
being done, or insisting that it be done in an impossibly short
time.
I do not know how to correct that, because for me there is
no way, at least, that American troops can be withdrawn from
Kosovo for many years. Whatever we do in terms of enunciating a
long term goal, that happens to be the case.
I also believe that these countries are not going to create
stability by regional associations. That is a wonderful thing
to encourage. I do not think it will happen that way. If you
are going to create stability, you have got to bring them into
a wider association of Serbs dealing with the Kosovars, and
Kosovars dealing with the Macedonians. You have got to give
them a wider goal.
That is why I always have said that if you were ever going
to create stability in Yugoslavia, it is not going to be done
by the--the Americans are necessary, but the long term has to
be to draw them in seriously, and I believe the Europeans--I
probably will regret ever saying this. I believe the Europeans
increasingly recognize that.
Now, whether they can get their act together, whether their
institutions have enough flexibility to do that, I do not know,
but I believe that is one reason why we need troops there, so
we can bang on them and legitimately say, it is your
responsibility to do certain things, and we are going to keep
reminding you of this, and we are making a contribution,
because I believe that if we do take out U.S. forces, or we go
down to a platoon or company, or even a battalion, I believe
that I think it would send terrible security signals, but I
believe it would undermine any serious long term effort.
How you get the U.S. Congress to accept that this is a long
term effort is beyond my capability, and I think one of the
things Mr. Milosevic quite frankly is looking at is the
Americans, if we get a new administration, are going to take a
long term view of Kosovo.
Senator Lugar. I think there has to be an economic
dimension, not just a political one. In other words, that will
not make it on humanitarian grounds alone for strategic
stability. There has to be a context in which there are jobs,
and arguments in which grassroots America sees some value in
southeastern Europe beyond what they see now.
Ambassador Abramowitz. I am sort of skeptical it can be
done economically.
Senator Biden. I agree. I wish, if we are going to have a
Republican President, that it would be you, and I mean that
sincerely. Unfortunately, we have both been through that, and
it did not work.
I probably just ruined his reputation by saying that. But
all kidding aside, I think if a President, if someone came
forward with a strong proposal saying what we were going to do,
what the objective was, et cetera, we would have the ability to
go more than seven votes.
I would point out to everyone that we went through Bosnia,
declared a failure, continued to be declared a failure, and we
beat back on three occasions an attempt to withdraw from
Bosnia. Now no one is trying to withdraw from Bosnia.
Bosnia clearly has a long way to go, a long way to go. But
my point is, I do not think it is as hard to sustain American
commitment down the road as we are making it sound when I talk
about the seven votes.
The general point I wanted to make is, it is close to
impossible to sustain it if the end result is an open fissure
within NATO that results in any one of the NATO parties
withdrawing. That is the thing that will, I think, toll the
bell here quickly.
We have more forces there, or as many forces there as last
year. You do not hear that, and even though all of us who know
the issue well can point to an incredible number of failures in
Bosnia and what has not been done, we have the support now, I
believe, to sustain a continued effort to try to make it work.
That is the only general point I wanted to make.
And I did not want to mislead people by suggesting that I
thought the support was so fragile that it would evaporate. It
will evaporate only if we end up in a shooting match with our
European allies that results in them withholding either troops
or money or police or whatever. That will be the thing that I
think will change 14 votes.
I am not sure I am making my point clear, but I hope I am,
and I think a more robust effort is not inconsistent with
getting American support.
Senator Smith. If there is no objection we will include
Senator Biden's opening statement in the record as if read.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this important
hearing.
My views on Kosovo are a matter of record:
First, I believe that the Balkans--Kosovo included--are
not a strategic sideshow as some have asserted. The region is vital to
U.S. national security, since its destabilization would harm all of
Europe.
Second, for that reason, we did the right thing in
Operation Allied Force. In fact, I introduced the resolution
authorizing U.S. participation in a NATO air campaign, which passed the
Senate. The House, as we know, failed to pass such an authorization.
In the middle of the war, I co-sponsored with Senator McCain a
resolution, which was tabled, authorizing the President to use all
necessary force to achieve victory.
Third, Operation Allied Force was successful in that it
succeeded in reversing the vile ethnic cleansing of Slobodan Milosevic.
Ensuing problems in peace-enforcement cannot detract from our having
achieved the air campaign's principal goal.
Fourth, although a year after the end of the air campaign
there remains a huge amount of political, economic, and societal
reconstruction to be done, measurable progress has been achieved.
Fifth, our European allies are for the first time in
memory carrying their fair share of the burden in the peace-enforcing
and reconstruction effort. This is a development of the first order of
importance, particularly for NATO.
And sixth, and last, we must stay the course in the
Balkans, including Kosovo. This follows from my first postulate, that
stability in Southeastern Europe is a vital U.S. national security
interest.
We Americans are not noted for our patience, but we must learn that
mammoth reconstruction tasks take time.
Mr. Chairman, I have a great many questions on the specifics of the
current situation in Kosovo, and on U.S. and U.N. policies there.
We have assembled two panels of excellent, expert witnesses, whose
testimonies I am eager to hear.
Once again, thank you for holding this hearing.
Senator Smith. Senator Lugar, do you have anything else?
Senator Lugar. No.
Senator Smith. Do any of you gentlemen want to make a
closing response to any of our comments or criticisms or
questions?
Mr. Bugajski. I just wanted to make a short statement in
response to Senator Biden's comments. I do not think anybody is
seriously suggesting the Albanians could defend Kosovo if NATO
withdraws. I think the message is, NATO is in there for a long
time, but the involvement will be more costly and more complex
and potentially more damaging if we do not have a vision for
the Albanians as to their future status, and if in the interim
we do not seriously build the institutions which are not
completely dependent on the international community. That is
the way I put it.
We are there for a long time, but it is going to be even
more complicated, more costly, if we do not engage in those two
strategies.
Senator Biden. I agree with you, as long as that vision is
brought along, or shared, or not completely at odds with the
European vision, with the NATO vision. That was my only point.
Senator Smith. Dr. Williams.
Dr. Williams. I would just conclude, in agreement, that we
will likely have continued U.S. Government support for the
troops on the ground in Kosovo. However, we must understand why
they are there, and articulate their objectives.
Conditional independence and immediate sovereignty is an
option, and it has been deliberately crafted in a way which is
long term, which is phased, and I think with substantial U.S.
leadership we can bring the Europeans--who understandably make
policy through conferences, we can bring them into our vision
of a stable Kosovo in a slow and incremental fashion.
Senator Smith. Gentlemen, thank you. It has been very, very
helpful and insightful, and we appreciate hearing about the
nuances of a very complicated situation.
So with that, this committee hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]