[Senate Hearing 110-229]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-229
DARFUR: A ``PLAN B'' TO STOP GENOCIDE?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 11, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Morrison, Dr. J. Stephen, director, Africa Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC............ 62
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Natsios, Hon. Andrew S., President's Special Envoy to Sudan,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Rice, Hon. Susan E., senior fellow, Foreign Policy Studies and
Global Economy and Development Programs, the Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC.................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Rossin, Hon. Lawrence G., senior international coordinator, Save
Darfur Coalition, Washington, DC............................... 54
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire............ 3
(iii)
DARFUR: A ``PLAN B'' TO STOP GENOCIDE?
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Lugar, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. This is just a brief interlude here. The
Ambassador is caught in traffic. He's going to be about 5
minutes late. I wanted to explain why we're going to wait
another 5 minutes or so, because we should start off with the
administration witness first. So, we're going to just recess
until the Ambassador arrives.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I beg your
pardon.
Thank you for being here. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. And
welcome, to our outside witnesses, as well: Susan Rice, a
former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, now at
Brookings; Stephen Morrison, one of the leading think-tank
experts on Africa, from CSIS; and Larry Rossin, the leader of
the Save Darfur Coalition.
Folks, it's been 4 years now since the crisis in Darfur
erupted, 4 years since the genocide began. And it's been 3
years and 9 months since Congress formally recognized this as
genocide. The resolution in both the House and Senate passed, 3
years and 9 months ago, and it passed unanimously. Not a single
member denied the horror that was underway. It's been 3 years
and 7 months since the administration added its own
recognition. On September 9, 2004, in testimony before the
committee, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said clearly
that the killings in Darfur were genocide; shortly thereafter,
so did President Bush.
So, now, all these years later, the question still remains:
What are we going to do about it? What are we going to do to
stop the slaughter, to return the survivors to their homes, to
bring those responsible for the murder, rape, and terror to
justice, and to build a lasting peace? What are we going to do
about Darfur? That's the question I've asked the Ambassador.
And he's the administration's point person for Darfur. And,
like his predecessor, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, I have no
doubt about his dedication and determination to do the right
thing.
In December, the Ambassador told a group of Senators that
Khartoum had until the end of the month to agree to the
deployment of U.N. peacekeepers. That deadline has long since
passed, with no agreement by Khartoum to accept the
peacekeepers, and no reaction, from the United States or the
international community, to its refusal.
Today, this committee expects to hear from the Ambassador a
concrete plan of action. I hope that he'll flesh out the
administration's plan B, as was referred to earlier, and tell
us how and when the administration will act on that plan.
What should we do about Darfur? Well, that's the question
I've asked our outside witnesses, because there are almost
certainly steps the administration is not planning to take that
this committee should consider from these outside witnesses.
I have my own strongly held view on what we should do. Most
importantly, we need a comprehensive approach to what is a
complex problem. We have to work all six sides of what John
Prendergast, one of the leading experts on Darfur, rightly
calls ``The Policy Rubik's Cube.'' That will require the kind
of resources, coordination, and sustained engagement at the
highest levels that, in my view, we have not yet seen or we
have not--not only from this administration, but also we have
not seen from our partners around the world.
Let me quickly suggest some of the pieces of the complex
approach that need to be taken.
First, pursuing Khartoum is necessary, but not sufficient.
We need to work on the major rebel groups, as well. Three years
ago, after visiting a refugee camp on the Chad-Darfur border, I
met with the leaders of two of the major rebel groups. I urged
them to come up with a common program. I offered to host them
in Congress if they did. I warned them that if they did not,
Khartoum would use their division as an excuse to do nothing.
We need a major sustained diplomatic initiative to bring these
rebels together.
Second, peacekeepers are essential, but they're not enough.
We need a peace process. If we end the violence, but fail to
achieve a sustained political settlement in Darfur, the
violence will return. That puts a premium on a single peace
process, supported by the international community, including
the African Union and the United Nations, and managed by an
oversight group of concerned countries.
Third, unilateral sanctions may be necessary, but will not
suffice. We need a coordinated action from many other
countries. The United States has had significant sanctions on
Khartoum since 1990. We're almost sanctioned out, to use a
phrase the President used in another context.
For pressure to be meaningful, it must be multilateral. The
Chinese, the Arab world, the Europeans, the African Union,
everyone should be joining together in this campaign. Without
American leadership, I see absolutely no prospect of that
happening.
Fourth, limiting our focus to Darfur is too narrow. We have
to include the neighbors, especially Chad and the Central
African Republic. I saw firsthand the spillover effects of
Darfur--of the Darfur crisis on Chad, and it has gotten much
worse over the past 3 years. The crisis is putting an
incredible strain on the neighbors. And, at the same time, they
have tremendous influence with some of the key players. Our
Darfur diplomacy and initiatives must include the neighbors.
Finally, and most urgently, convincing Khartoum to accept a
meaningful peacekeeping force should be our goal, but if it
refuses, imposing such a force must be our mission. I wish that
the African Union had the mandate, the manpower, and the
material to do the job, but it does not. We must set a hard
deadline now on Khartoum to accept the hybrid African Union-
United Nations force, and we must start planning to impose that
force if Khartoum refuses, and to take other concrete steps
that can start saving lives now.
I've long advocated a NATO-led no-fly zone to stop the air
support Khartoum provides to the Janjaweed. Recently, Khartoum
stepped up its slaughter from the skies. It is within our power
to clip their wings. Yes; a no-fly zone could make it more
difficult for humanitarian groups to operate, so we should do
everything possible to design it with their concerns in mind.
And I expect to ask the witnesses about that.
I hope that we could come out of this morning with a clear
plan for action. For too long, all of us have expressed our
outrage at the destruction of Darfur, without doing anything
meaningful to stop it. I think it's long past time we must act,
even if that action is in the face of the refusal of Khartoum
to accommodate anything. I realize that sounds reminiscent of
what I said 12 years ago about Bosnia, but I think this is
incredible. Our grandkids are going to be seeing their own
version of Hotel Rwanda that may look even worse.
So, I thank you very much. I also want to point out that
Senator Lugar will be here, but he is testifying before the
Armed Services Committee on Nunn-Lugar, and he's introducing a
judge, before the Judiciary Committee, from Indiana. But he
will be here.
I thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador. And I indicated to the
Senator from New Hampshire, if he had an opening comment on the
Republican side, he's welcome to it.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. If I might just offer a couple of brief
comments. First----
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Sununu. I want to mention that Senator Feingold
isn't here, but he chairs the Africa Subcommittee, I'm the
ranking member, and I know he has a great interest in both
testimony from Mr. Natsios and in the situation.
There's no greater manmade humanitarian crisis that I can
think of in the world today. And, Mr. Chairman, I think you've
outlined, very effectively, the moral obligation that we have
to pursue a--really, a just outcome here. The slow pace that
we've seen is absolutely unacceptable, and we need not just a
proper response and an effective plan, but we need to
understand what the reasons are for such a slow pace.
I was in the room with you when Secretary Powell testified
before our committee and talked about the genocide that was
occurring. That was 2\1/2\ years ago. And, to be sure, at that
time the expectations were much, much higher.
So, we need to understand exactly what the reasons are for
the slow pace of progress, and I think we need to be very
frank. If there were disagreements within the State Department
or within the administration about the path we should be
pursuing, we need to know about that, we need to understand
that, so that we can, you know, best decide, as legislators,
what might be done to either help build consensus or pursue a
particular path that might reinforce the goals and objectives
of Mr. Natsios and those that have spent the most time in the
region.
So, I hope this hearing might put out some of those, sort
of, frank assessments of what can be done better, what can be
done differently, and where there might be alternatives and
options in order to deal with this incredible humanitarian
crisis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ambassador, again, welcome. Thank you. You've got a
difficult job. We're anxious to hear what you have to say.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY
TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Natsios. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
inviting me before the committee.
President Bush appointed me to this position in September
of last year, about 7 months ago. I--actually, my first trip to
Darfur was in 1990, 17 years ago, during the first Darfur war.
This is the third war in 20 years, and by far the most
destructive.
I do have written testimony. I'm not going to read that;
it's very long. But, for the record, I'd like to submit that,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The entire statement will be included in the
record.
Ambassador Natsios. Thank you.
I went then as a USAID official. My job then was to make
sure people didn't die in what was a drought and a war at the
same time, and I wasn't focused on the politics of it. It was a
tribal war between the Fur people, an African tribe, and the
Arabs. And so--and then, there's another war, in the 1990s,
between the Masalit tribe--which are Africans--and the Arabs.
And now, this is a third war between the Masalit, the Fur, and
the Zagawas and the Arabs. And it's mostly the northern Arabs,
not the southern Arabs. The southern Arabs--the southern
Rizegat, actually have been neutral in the war and the Nazir of
the southern Rizegat have actually helped protect some of the
African tribes from attacks from the Janjaweed. So, I think
it's a very bad idea to assume this is all Africans versus all
Arabs. That is simply not true, and it may make peace harder if
people think the bad guys are all the Arabs and the good guys
are all of the African tribes. That's simply not the case.
The war has been dangerously regionalized, at this point.
It's destabilized Chad, it's poured, now, into the Central
African Republic, and we are very worried about the regional
consequences of this, not just from a political standpoint, but
from a humanitarian standpoint. There were 400 people killed,
or who died from exposure, in attacks in Chad in the last week,
which is very disturbing, according to reports coming in from
the field.
We believe the only way to deal with this is, ultimately, a
negotiated settlement, and--because over the long term we have
to have some kind of an agreement between the people who live
there, who have been at war with each other, with--one side,
with support of the Government of Sudan--for the economy and
the social structure and the social fabric of the province to
be put back together again.
We think coercive measures will be necessary; in fact, are
necessary. When you said, Senator, ``I gave them a deadline, at
the end of December,'' actually they met the deadline for that
phase. In December, I met with President Bashir, and I told him
that he had said: Under no circumstances would there ever be a
``blue helmet'' ever in Darfur, under phase 1, phase 2, phase 3
of the Kofi Annan plan, which we negotiated on November 16,
with 30 countries and 3 international organizations at the
meeting. And he said, ``I've still--that's still my position.''
I said, ``That's completely untenable.'' And I said, ``We're
going to have to impose these new coercive measures if you
refuse to do that.'' He agreed, at that point, to allow blue
helmets. And blue helmets are in Darfur now--not a large number
of them, but he has agreed to all of the provisions of the
first phase, which is about 190 people.
And so, there was, in fact, some action, but it's very
slow. And there's a reason it's slow. The Sudanese Government
sees the peacekeeping force as regime-threatening. And the
reason they see that is, they believe that if a U.N. force
enters Darfur, they will begin to arrest people for war-crimes
trials in Europe, under the ICC. And there is a fear that--I've
told them that is not in the resolution, that's not what
they're there for. They said, ``Well, it may not be, now; but,
once the troops arrive, you can change the resolution, later
on.''
In any case, that's the fear. And it's a real fear,
because, of course, they committed crimes, and they're going to
be held accountable. And we know that the ICC has already
announced they're investigating people and will be, shortly,
making some indictments of some major figures in the regime.
We believe, finally, that a negotiated settlement is the
only way. But we must deal with the property, livelihoods, and
security issues for the people in the province, in a peace
agreement that has to be implemented. I mean, there's a lot of
broken agreements that have been signed over the years. I've
watched them for 17 years, between the north and the south.
They sign agreements--they sign agreements and then they don't
implement any of them. So, it's not a function of simply
signing things; it's a function of doing them.
Once the blue helmets arrived in Darfur under phase 1, I
complimented them publicly for agreeing to what they did agree
to. But, before that, I didn't talk about it, because I wasn't
sure they were going to actually physically let them in.
Where are our diplomatic efforts and our policy? Our focus
is on human rights and on humanitarian issues. We have no
military or economic interest in Darfur. I repeat that, because
this is a refrain that is being used to, sort of, exaggerate
among the Arab tribes, what the purpose of the United States
and other countries' interests in Darfur are. They're for oil,
they're for building a military base--other ridiculous
arguments are being made to fuel tensions--ethnic tensions
within the country in a very unhelpful way.
We believe that we need to energize, although this is not
the purpose of this hearing, the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south.
We think there's a direct relationship between peace in the
south and peace in Darfur. We have asked the southerners, who
are actually the most influential with the rebel groups, to get
involved in this. I asked them last December, I asked them
again in March, and they have done that--Salva Kiir is getting
involved, who is the President of the south; and the First Vice
President of the northern government. At first, the northern
government said, ``Absolutely not, you will not do this.'' Over
time, we've, I think, convinced the Sudanese Government that it
was in their interest to have them involved. And they are
involved now.
The rebels I met with in January in Chad told me the most
influential group for them were the southerners, because
together the south and Darfur make up half the country, and the
model for the DPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement that was signed
last May, is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the
north and the south. They see their brothers in the south as a
model for what they want to do in Darfur.
We have encouraged--I have personally encouraged--I spent a
week in Chad, in January, working with the rebels and working
with Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, to unify the rebels. They're
broken down into 14 or 15 different groups, depending on the
week. It is a very chaotic situation. One of the problems with
the security situation at this point, is not two sides fighting
against each other; it's anarchy. The government has lost
control of large parts of the province now; and some of the
rapes, by the way, that are going on, are by rebels raping
women in their own tribes. We know, in one of the refugee camps
that's now controlled by the rebels formally, there have been
terrible atrocities committed by the rebels against the people
in the camps.
We also believe that there needs to be one negotiating
process. When I started, last year, there were six different
tracks for negotiations between the rebels and the Sudanese
Government. We said, ``That is not going to work.'' There has
to be one route. And we've actually moved toward that, and that
is what part of the Addis agreement was, to have just the
United Nations and the African Union track. Our job was to
support them, not to set up separate independent negotiations,
which will be used as a mechanism for forum shopping by the
rebels or even the government. We don't want that to happen.
The only way this is going to be solved is a comprehensive
settlement that is between two sides, with one negotiating
position on each side, which we're encouraging the rebels to
have.
I might add, the southern agreement would never have taken
place if there were 12 John Garangs. There was one John Garang
leading the southern negotiations, and one northern government
official, the Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, who negotiated
the agreement. It would never have happened if there were
multiple parties on each side, with different agendas and
different positions.
The current situation is very troubling to us, because of
the government's loss of control, because of rebel attacks on
aid agencies which are now increasing, of the 120 vehicles that
were stolen by--from aid agencies--and, by the way, the U.S.
Government has spent $2.4 billion keeping people alive over
just the last 2 years. We are, by far, the largest
international donor. I think 65 percent of all the food comes
from the United States to feed people; 2\1/2\ million people
are in over 200 displaced camps all over Darfur, and there are
hundreds of NGOs and eight U.N. agencies that are at work, and
they all have heavy funding from the United States--but 120 aid
trucks were looted last year. The great bulk of those,
actually, were from the rebels, and a few from the Janjaweed
militias.
We now have Arab-on-Arab violence. The principal people
getting killed right now are one Arab tribe fighting with other
Arab tribes. Since February 11, there has actually been no
aerial bombardments, according to very credible sources on the
ground. So, there's been 2 months of no aerial bombardments.
Second, the principal deaths since the beginning of the year
actually have been Arabs being killed by this Arab-on-Arab
violence.
There have been about 80,000 new IDPs, in January and
February. That's slowed down in February and March. And right
now we're seeing a relative lull in the fighting in Darfur. The
fighting, however, has intensified to a dangerous degree in
Chad, and that's where the bulk of the people getting killed
are, at this point.
I'd just like to make a quick point on the CPA, and that--
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement--it is not the case that the
CPA is not being implemented. It is being implemented, parts of
it. A billion dollars in oil revenues have been transferred
from the north to the south. That's a significant change. There
is no war in the south. There is no famine in the south. The
economy's picking up. Roads are being built--a lot with U.S.
Government support, I might add--and health clinics built and
schools being built, teachers being trained. The economy is
moving. However, the transformational provisions of the CPA,
which John Garang insisted on being in there--elections, the
sharing of revenue, not just with the south, but all of the
provinces in the north, because many of the rural provinces in
the north are getting no money from the oil revenues at all--
that is in the CPA. It's not just a transformation of the
south. Those difficult provisions of transformation are not
being implemented. They're the most dangerous, in terms of the
stability of the central government in its own interests, and
it seems those interests are under attack right now, because of
the instability in Darfur. And so, they have been unwilling to
implement those provisions. It is critically important that the
CPA be implemented if we're going to have a model for a
successful implementation of a peace agreement in Darfur.
There is little progress on border demarcation. There's an
impasse in Abyei. I've raised all these issues repeatedly with
President Bashir, and told him if he wants to stabilize Darfur,
he needs to implement the CPA with the south, because if the
rebels see that the CPA is being implemented, I believe there's
a greater likelihood they will return to the negotiating table.
Our policy is in three areas. That is, to stabilize the
humanitarian situation. While the death rates in the camps are
well below emergency levels, we are nervous, because access by
the NGOs has deteriorated because of the anarchy in the
province now and the attacks on aid agencies which has led to a
couple of them leaving. A very dangerous situation.
Two, we are very nervous about the rainy season that's
coming up. We have a lot of food--more than enough food in the
capital cities--but the problem is getting it, without attacks
on the convoys, into the camps before the rainy season starts,
in 9 weeks.
Second, our political solution is simply to get the rebels
back to the negotiating table with the government. The
government has not put preconditions, other than one--they want
to use the DPA as a basis for further negotiations--with
additional amendments, and they've told me they will be
flexible on that. I talk to Jan Eliasson quite often; he's an
old friend of mine. He's leading the negotiating teams. He has
a plan in place for how we can proceed, in the next month, to
move toward that.
And, finally, we want the full three phases of the Bashir--
I'm sorry--the Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon plan that was agreed
to and Addis implemented. As of today, the United Nations has
announced, with the African Union, that the Sudanese Government
has agreed, it appears, to the--what is called the ``heavy
support package,'' phase 2, which they trashed in a letter to
Ban Ki-moon, a month ago, when I was--they signed it when I was
there--literally, when I was in the city, they signed it and
sent it, but did not give us a copy.
They appear to have reversed themselves on this. Now, I
have to say ``appeared,'' because there's a long history of
them signing things, announcing things in communiques, and then
not doing them. So, what will be the proof of this is whether
or not we're allowed to go ahead with the work we're going to
do in building more camps to house more soldiers. The big
impediment to phase 1 has been the absence of barracks, which
are now constructing for the 190 troops who will be arriving.
And then, there will be assistance that will be given by the
international community for the construction for the additional
3,000 people under phase 2.
They have not agreed to phase 3, and there are two
remaining issues on phase 3, called the ``hybrid force.'' One
is U.N. command and control. I put U.N. command and control in
the text of the Addis agreement. I insisted on it. I said,
``That is the bottom line for the United States. If there's no
United Nations in command and control, we do not support the
agreement.''
Two--and the Sudanese Government is resisting that; they
don't want orders coming from--to these troops from New York
directly--two, they do not want any troops from outside Africa.
We believe--and I believe there are people in the United
Nations who can confirm this--that there are not enough
sufficiently trained peacekeeping troops in Africa to handle
this, that we need troops from other peacekeeping countries
outside Africa, which the Sudanese have been very resistant on.
And there are a number of other smaller issues, but those
are the two central issues, at this point.
And let me just conclude by saying, we were about to impose
plan B, at least this phase of it, and we did not want to
announce them, frankly, when a congressional delegation was in
Khartoum; we didn't think that was particularly good timing.
And then, there's been a request made by Ban Ki-moon, the
Secretary General of the United Nations to our Secretary of
State, and to me. I met with him last Monday, and he repeated,
``I need 2 weeks to 4 weeks to try to see if the current round
of negotiations is going to work to get the paralysis that
we're facing moving.'' As a courtesy to the Secretary General,
we've agreed to that delay, but there is a finite limit to it,
and if we continue to see stonewalling, then those measures are
going to be implemented.
It's up to the President. It's his decision to make. But I
know where he is on this; he's as angry as all of us are on
this, and wants action. But the Secretary General requested it.
He did it publicly; it's not a secret. And we've agreed to wait
a short time while we let the negotiations that he's
undertaking now take their course.
I'd be glad to answer questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Natsios follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Andrew S. Natsios, President's Special Envoy
to Sudan, Department of State, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss how the United
States (U.S.), together with the United Nations (U.N.) and our
international partners, is addressing the crisis in Darfur.
A great deal has happened since I last gave testimony--some of it
frustrating, some of it hopeful--but what has not changed is the
administration's firm commitment to ending the violence and responding
to the immeasurable suffering of the people of Darfur. The only U.S.
interest in Darfur is a peaceful end to the crisis. Our goals are to
provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to the millions of people
who have been affected by violence; to promote a negotiated, political
settlement to the conflict within the framework of the Darfur Peace
Agreement; to support the deployment of a robust African Union (AU)/
U.N. hybrid international peacekeeping force; and to ensure the
successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
We have no military or economic interests in Darfur and we oppose any
effort by any group to separate Darfur from Sudan. While we have a
relationship with the Sudanese Government on counterterrorism issues,
this relationship has not prevented us from elevating humanitarian and
human rights concerns to a preeminent position in our policy toward
Sudan. As a country and as a government we are appalled by the
atrocities that have occurred in Darfur including those in 2003 and
2004 when some of the worst violence occurred, and the United States
has made solving conflict in this region a priority.
This is the third war in Darfur in just over 20 years, but it is by
far the most destructive in terms of lives lost and people displaced.
The current war is not a ``simple'' conflict between Arab and African
tribes, but a much more complex dispute fueled by drought and
desertification, disputes over land rights, competition between nomadic
herders and farmers, and longstanding marginalization of Darfur by the
Government in Khartoum. The Sudanese Government's disastrous decision
to arm, direct, and pay Northern Arab tribes, now called the Janjaweed,
as their proxies in the war against Darfur's rebels led to genocide and
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians
and the destruction of their villages and livelihoods.
Since then, the security situation on the ground has continued to
evolve and has become increasingly chaotic. The Government of Sudan
(GOS) is using the same strategies against Darfur that Sadiq al-Mahdi
first developed and used against the south in the 1980s. By
manipulating preexisting tribal divisions, creating militias drawn from
the youngest and most disenfranchised members of Arab tribes, forcing
people from their homes, and separating them from their traditional
leaders, the government has created a lawless environment where
banditry and violence are on the increase as rebel groups and tribal
structures fragment and begin to fight amongst themselves. We are now
seeing more examples of Arab on Arab violence in Darfur, localized
tribal conflicts, and looting, extortion, and hijacking by rebel
groups. In January and February of this year, 80,000 people have been
forced from their homes and into camps because of violence. In
addition, regional political agendas are being played out in Darfur and
violence and refugees are spilling across borders into Chad and the
Central African Republic.
Against this backdrop, however, there are some small signs of hope
and progress. Credible reports from Darfur indicate that there has been
a slow, steady decrease in civilian casualties since January 2007 and
direct fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and nonsignatory
rebel groups has virtually ceased in the past months. When I visited
Sudan in October and again in December 2006, a broad range of GOS
officials appeared to believe that they could solve their ``Darfur
problem'' through military means. This policy has proven to be a
disaster as government troops have taken a beating at the hands of
rebels and as they have lost weapons and equipment to rebel forces. I
have stressed to Khartoum and the rebels that a military solution is
not possible, as have our allies. Several regional powers have also
begun to play a positive role. Most notably, in late February 2007
Libya brokered an agreement between Chad and Sudan to reduce hostility
along their common border. Unfortunately, this appears to have
unraveled in recent days and we note with great concern the recent
attacks inside Chad against civilians in the villages of Tiero and
Morena and escalating violence along the border. However, these types
of constructive efforts are welcome and we encourage Libya and other
regional powers to work closely with the United Nations and African
Union on these initiatives.
Perhaps most heartening, groups inside Darfur are beginning to push
back against the terrible violence they have seen over the past 4
years. The Nazir of the southern Rizegat, the leader of an Arab tribe
in south Darfur, has remained neutral over the course of the conflict
despite attempts to draw him in. In other parts of Darfur, there are
indications that Arab and African tribes are trying to rebuild
cooperation, with a few scattered reports of groups returning looted
livestock to the original owners and beginning to meet and trade in
traditional markets.
We will continue to watch the security situation very closely. If
the government and rebel groups continue to exercise restraint between
now and the end of the rainy season, there will have been a full 20
weeks of relative quiet, enough time to restart political negotiations.
If, however, either side breaks the fragile calm that appears to be
holding between government and rebel forces inside Darfur--directly or
through their proxies--we will take this as a clear signal that the
parties to the conflict are not serious about the peace process and
will respond in the strongest possible terms.
The current security environment has had an extremely negative
impact on humanitarian operations in Darfur and eastern Chad. The U.S.
Government's (USG) first and most urgent priority is to ensure the
continued delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to the 2\1/2\
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees living in
camps in Darfur and eastern Chad. While civilian deaths may have
declined in recent months, people are still being forced from their
homes and nearly 80,000 new IDPs have flowed into camps in January and
February of this year. The United States has called upon all actors in
Darfur--including the government, the Arab militias, the rebel
signatories and the nonsignatories--to cease all interference in the
delivery of humanitarian aid. Representatives from NGOs have told me
that there are now so many rebel groups in Darfur, it has become
virtually impossible to negotiate deals for safe passage of workers and
supplies. The number of security incidents against humanitarian
agencies has increased, with more than a dozen local Sudanese staff
killed, one expatriate woman sexually assaulted, and approximately 120
vehicles hijacked over the course of 2006. Much of this violence,
particularly the theft of vehicles and supplies, has been perpetrated
by rebels who seem more intent on stealing and looting than
representing the people of Darfur. In my trips to the region I have met
repeatedly with rebel leaders and have insisted that this type of
activity cease immediately. While none of the rebels took
responsibility for incidents, this message was clearly heard and we
have seen a slight decrease in vehicle hijackings over the past few
months, although the number remains unacceptably high.
Relief efforts are also being slowed by bureaucratic obstacles and
continual harassment by the Government of Sudan. Visas and travel
permits are routinely delayed or denied and humanitarian goods languish
in customs for months. This seriously undermines the ability of aid
workers to deliver needed supplies and services to civilians in the
camps. We have pressed the government continually on this point,
stressing that they should facilitate--not block--the delivery of
humanitarian relief. During my recent trip to Sudan in March, I met
with President Bashir and insisted that his government lift burdensome
bureaucratic restrictions on relief workers. He gave his verbal
assurance that this would happen and U.S. pressure, together with that
of other donors, led to a breakthrough agreement signed March 28
between the Government of Sudan and United Nations that should
significantly improve humanitarian access. If the agreement is
implemented as written, it will signal the Sudanese Government's
intention to improve the humanitarian environment for aid agencies.
I should mention that despite difficult and dangerous conditions,
humanitarian workers have done a remarkable job of providing life-
saving assistance to 2\1/2\ million IDPs and refugees in Darfur and
eastern Chad. This is currently the largest humanitarian relief
operation in the world and the United States is the single largest
donor of humanitarian assistance. We have contributed more than $2.6
billion in assistance to Sudan and eastern Chad in FY 2005 and FY 2006
and have provided more than 72 percent of all humanitarian assistance
to Sudan. USAID is sending 40,000 metric tons of food aid to Darfur
every month and the United States provided 50 percent of the appeal by
the U.N. World Food Program in 2006. In addition to food, the United
States is providing shelter, water, sanitation, health, and hygiene
programs for those in need. We are also working to protect vulnerable
populations such as women and children by improving physical safety and
providing immediate services to victims of violence. Given the
extremely rugged conditions in Darfur, this assistance is saving lives
every day and we need to recognize the tremendous work the humanitarian
community is doing.
The only way to achieve long-term progress in Darfur is to promote
a political settlement among all the parties to the conflict within the
framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and this is where we are now
focusing our attention. We strongly support a leadership role for the
United Nations and African Union and stand ready to support the
important work of Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Dr. Salim Ahmed
Salim. We believe that the United Nations and the African Union can
play a critical role in keeping the attention of the international
community focused on a negotiated settlement and can help channel
disparate initiatives into a coordinated peace process. This will help
minimize duplication and confusion and will guard against ``forum
shopping'' by parties to the conflict. Again, these are issues that I
raised in my most recent visit to Sudan in March and I received
expressions of support for negotiations--without preconditions--from
the Government of Sudan, including President Bashir. It remains to be
seen whether the GOS will make good on these statements, but there
appears to be a growing consensus among key members of the ruling
coalition that a peace agreement with nonsignatory rebel groups may be
the only way out of the current crisis.
As the central basis for negotiations, the United States supports
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed by the GOS and the faction of
the Sudan Liberation Movement headed by Minni Minawi (SLM/MM) on May 5,
2006. Despite some limitations, the DPA is a good agreement that
outlines ways to address the root causes of the conflict, creates space
for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and gives international forces a
robust mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. In
further negotiations among nonsignatories and the GOS, we support
adding amendments, annexes, or clarifications to the DPA. What we do
not support is starting from scratch and spending another year
negotiating a new agreement that will likely be worse for the rebel
movements and the people of Darfur. We have made this point to all
parties involved.
We recognize, however, that implementation of the DPA has been slow
and this has made rebel groups reluctant to join the political process.
We have called repeatedly on the government to implement key portions
of the agreement, including disarmament of Arab militias and
empowerment of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. One of our
most important tasks is to bolster the position of Minni Minawi, the
sole rebel signatory to the DPA, in order to show that embracing peace
yields dividends. He has been marginalized by the government on key
decisions related to Darfur and the package of reintegration assistance
promised to his troops under the DPA has materialized very slowly, if
at all. Most recently, a violent and deadly March 24 attack by the GOS
on a house run by SLM/MM in Khartoum and the fatal ambush of a senior
commander in Darfur, only serves to raise questions about the
seriousness of the GOS commitment to a negotiated peace. Nonsignatory
factions might ask why they should sign the Darfur Peace Agreement if
the GOS continues to brutalize parties to the agreement.
The number of rebel groups now operating in Darfur also complicates
a negotiated settlement. As I mentioned earlier, the GOS has played a
major role in splintering opposition movements into factions and has
attempted to buy off one group at a time rather than pursuing a broader
peace through transparent negotiation with all parties. This tactic of
divide and conquer creates inequality, dissatisfaction and mistrust
among rebel factions, delaying or preventing the creation of a unified
political position. Surrounding countries have also exacerbated
divisions by providing support for rebel groups in pursuit of their own
geopolitical agendas. As a result, we now confront a confusing array of
rebel factions, the number of which fluctuates up to as many as 15 at
any given time. Rebel leaders frequently appear more focused on their
own ambitions than on the well-being of people in Darfur. No peace
agreement would have been possible in southern Sudan had there been
multiple rebel factions each with a different political agenda.
In January I met with rebel leaders to gain their perspective and
to deliver a strong message from the U.S. Government that they need to
unify politically and support humanitarian operations. I stressed that
while the people of the United States are appalled by the atrocities
committed against the people of Darfur, the rebels should not translate
that into support for their political movements, many of which are
personality based and the goals of which are obscure. I have urged them
to renounce the violent overthrow of the Government of Sudan, which
some have been publicly advocating, and which is an impediment to peace
negotiations. I urged them to be flexible and practical about their
demands in any upcoming negotiations; they will not get everything they
ask for.
We have begun to see a number of good, new initiatives that feed
into broader U.N. and AU efforts to negotiate a political settlement.
One particularly promising initiative that the United States strongly
supports is the process being led by First Vice President Salva Kiir,
who is also the President of southern Sudan. With the blessing of
Khartoum, Vice President Kiir has consulted with Darfur's tribal
leaders, community groups, and nonsignatory rebel leaders in order to
find a workable solution to the Darfur crisis. The Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) can play an important role in advising the
Darfur nonsignatory groups since they have the experience and
credibility that comes from successfully negotiating the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement with Khartoum.
Recently, international attention has focused on the need for an
enhanced peacekeeping capacity in Darfur. The African Union
peacekeepers have done, and continue to do, an admirable job under
extremely difficult conditions, but a more robust force is needed.
African Union troops have come under increasing attack, with the most
recent incident resulting in the death of five Senegalese peacekeepers
in Northern Darfur. Two Nigerian peacekeepers were killed earlier in
March. Missions that were once carried out as a matter of course, for
example, protection details for women leaving IDP and refugee camps in
search of firewood, have now been halted and the threat of increased
rapes and attacks is very real. The USG has provided over $350 million
in support to the approximately 7,700 strong AMIS force since FY04.
This includes construction and operation of 34 base camps, maintenance
of vehicles and communications equipment, predeployment equipment and
training, and strategic airlift. However, the AU has reached the limit
of its capabilities, and a robust force with the command and control of
the United Nations is desperately needed in order to function
effectively and minimize the risk of atrocities in the future. The AU
itself has called for a transition of the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations operation.
Transition of the current African Union Mission in Sudan to a more
robust hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping operation remains a policy priority
for the United States. U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706 of
31 August 2006 has a robust mandate, including the protection of
civilians, and remains the touchstone for the U.S. position on
peacekeeping in Darfur. In November 2006, the United Nations and
African Union convened a high level meeting in Addis Ababa where key
players, including the Government of Sudan and the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council, agreed to a three-phase plan that
would culminate in a hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 troops
and police under U.N. command and control.
This plan was reconfirmed at an AU Peace and Security Council
meeting in Abuja and by a U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement
(PRST). Sudan has repeatedly told us over the past months that they
agree to the Addis framework; and the PRST was done at their specific
behest. However, in a March 6 letter that President Bashir sent to U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, he essentially rejected the Addis
Agreement's Phase II Heavy Support Package, effectively also scuttling
the third phase or hybrid force. Furthermore, he stated: ``Command and
control after provision of the support packages is the responsibility
of the African Union, with the necessary support from the United
Nations.'' U.N. command and control of the hybrid operation was agreed
to by all parties in Addis, including Sudan, as an essential component
of any force. This is not negotiable.
We are very concerned with President Bashir's letter rejecting
major portions of the heavy-support package. We are hopeful that an
April 9 meeting in Addis Ababa signals that the GOS is willing to
reconsider its position. We trust that the GOS will honor its
commitments and move swiftly to implement all remaining phases of this
agreement, including a vigorous joint AU/UN peacekeeping force under
U.N. command and control. The U.S. Government strongly opposes any
efforts by the Sudanese Government or others to renegotiate, once
again, the agreement reached in Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006. The
failure to implement the Addis framework is not acceptable and will
soon be met, as we have long stated, with a more confrontational
approach.
I would like to add a word about international pressure on
Khartoum. In January, I made a visit to China where I had positive
meetings with several key officials, including State Councilor Tang
Jiaxuan and Assistant Foreign Ministers Cui Tiankai and Zhai Jun. The
Chinese have been largely supportive of our efforts to resolve the
Darfur situation through peaceful means and have been publicly
encouraging Khartoum to allow the AU/UN hybrid force as agreed to in
Addis. We confirmed with them our position that our interests in Darfur
are solely humanitarian and we have no economic or military interests
behind our policies. We also made it clear that we are not pursuing
regime change in Sudan unless the people vote for a new government in
free and fair elections agreed to under the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement framework. China's Ambassador to the U.N. Wang Guangya played
a vital and constructive role in helping to broker the Addis
compromise. During his recent visit to Khartoum, Chinese President Hu
Jintao encouraged Bashir to show flexibility and allow the AU/UN hybrid
force to be deployed. While we welcome and encourage China's efforts to
apply diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan, we look to
Beijing to join with the international community in applying more
forceful measures, should Khartoum remain intransigent. China's
substantial economic investment in Sudan gives it considerable
potential leverage, and we have made clear to Beijing that the
international community will expect China to be part of the solution.
Similarly we are pleased with the emergence of broad international
support for the humanitarian needs of people in Darfur. Many countries
in Africa and around the world have echoed UNSCR 1706 and called
publicly for Khartoum to admit U.N. peacekeepers and abandon its futile
effort to impose a solution by force. During my October trip, I also
made a stop in Egypt where I met with the Egyptian Foreign Minister
Abul Gheit and Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. Mr.
Moussa and the Arab league have recently played a much more active role
in urging the Sudanese Government to take a more constructive approach
to the Darfur crisis.
Despite all this, the regime in Khartoum continues to find the
weapons it needs for conflict, to find markets for its products, and to
find investors. So while I have conveyed a real appreciation here today
for many international efforts to push Sudan in the right direction, I
also want to be quite clear: The world needs to do more. Congress,
individual activists, and the huge array of committed nongovernmental
organizations can and should continue to shine a spotlight on
Khartoum's enablers.
While our primary topic today is Darfur, the crisis there must be
seen in the context of our overall policy goals in Sudan; ensuring the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and supporting the
democratic transformation of Sudan through free and fair elections in
2009. Unless there is progress on these two broader goals, there is
little chance that we will be able to find a lasting solution to the
crisis in Darfur. The international community needs to recognize the
fact that southern Sudan is at a crossroads. The CPA has created a
fragile peace between the north and the south after two decades of
conflict during which more than 2.4 million people died and 4 million
were displaced. However, over the next year, several important steps
must be taken to ensure that the CPA succeeds. Armed militias still
threaten the security of southern Sudan. These groups must be
demobilized or integrated into the SAF or the SPLA, and the withdrawal
of the Sudanese Armed Forces from all areas of the south must stay on
schedule. The southern economy is finally growing, but north-south
boundary disputes, including the lack of implementation of the Abyei
Border Commission's decision, and a lack of transparency in oil
contracts keep the south from getting its full share of oil revenues.
The pilot census must proceed in order to lay the foundation for
elections in 2009, and legislative reforms--including the election
law--must be passed. Without international action to energize
implementation of the CPA, the most likely outcome will be two Sudans,
not John Garang's vision of a united ``New Sudan.''
Should the CPA collapse it is likely that security issues will be
the cause. At ceremonies to celebrate the CPA's second anniversary on
January 9, Salva Kiir, the first Vice President of the Government of
National Unity and the President of the Government of southern Sudan,
accused the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of deliberately violating the
security provisions in the CPA. South of Juba and along the border
between northern and southern Sudan, other armed groups associated with
the central government remain a serious and destabilizing problem in
the south. In Malakal, a state capital on the Nile, such tension led to
combat in early December 2006; only the aggressive and timely
intervention of United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) troops
prevented the violence from spreading. I visited Malakal just after the
incident to show the support of the U.S. Government for the U.N.'s
efforts to stabilize the situation.
It is my belief that one of the most important efforts we are
undertaking in southern Sudan is to support the transformation of the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) into a smaller, more professional
military force. This will offset outside efforts to destabilize the
GOSS through militias or other armed groups. The discipline and
competence afforded by modern, professionally trained troops and
officers will prove a stabilizing factor in southern Sudan. At the same
time, the U.N., U.S., and other partners need to press forward with
reform of the police and criminal justice sector so that local conflict
does not escalate, thus requiring an SPLA response. Reform of the
security sector in Sudan is proceeding, although more slowly than we
would like. According to UNMIS, the U.N. Mission in southern Sudan, SAF
redeployment from southern Sudan is verified at 68 percent but further
progress is hindered by delays in other security-related requirements,
such as the formation of units composed equally of SAF and SPLA troops
known as Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). SPLA redeployment from the
transitional areas along the north/south border is mostly complete but
is being held up due to a delay in the formation of the Joint
Integrated Units. CPA security provisions need to be implemented now or
conflict is likely to erupt in several areas around oil-rich Abyei and
near Juba. Joint Integrated Units have been assigned locations in the
main towns but are without proper training or support. Contrary to the
provisions of the CPA, companies in these battalions remain in separate
units for both housing and training. The SPLA is gradually downsizing
into a professional army, but still needs proper training, facilities
and administration for the downsized force. The United States plans to
financially and materially support this important process of providing
strategic training and mentoring to the SPLA at key levels. This
assistance will not include any weapons or weapons systems and is
specifically provided for under the CPA.
Economic issues divide the north and south. The Sudanese economy is
growing at a rate of 12 percent per year. Their Gross Domestic Product
will double in the next 6 years if current growth rates are maintained,
after having already doubled over the last 5 years through a
combination of growth and currency appreciation. Wealth is concentrated
in greater Khartoum (in the Arab triangle between Dongola, El Obeid,
and Kasala) while other regions of the country remain impoverished and
neglected. Under the CPA, the Government of National Unity is required
to begin making sizeable increases in the budgets and revenues in 2007
to impoverished provinces throughout the country. These provinces have
yet to see the benefits of oil revenues. The Parliament has approved
these expanded provincial budgets, however the money has not yet been
sent to the provinces by the Ministry of Finance.
The United States is a major partner for aid, but not for trade.
Unilateral economic sanctions are a central element in the U.S.
economic policy toward Sudan. As a result, the United States has
negligible trade with Sudan and minimal investment in the country. At
the same time, Sudan has built stronger economic ties with China, India
Malaysia, and Gulf Arab States and substantial trade continues with
Japan and Europe. The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA) and
the President's Executive Order 13412 modified the U.S. comprehensive
sanctions regime against Sudan under Executive Order 13067 by easing
many restrictions with respect to the Government of southern Sudan, and
certain other geographic areas, though Sudan, and specifically the
Government of Sudan, is still subject to significant sanctions under
U.S. law.
On the surface, Sudan's political reform has moved forward. The
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) formed the Government of National Unity (GNU),
organized the Parliament and distributed positions at senior levels of
government as they had agreed in the CPA (though civil service reform
is still outstanding). The SPLM established the Government of southern
Sudan in Juba, with a limited number of positions for its NCP partners,
and likewise set up the 10 state governments in the south. The new
government in Juba is still a weak institution in its infancy,
especially in such areas as service delivery, financial management, and
human resource development. In recent months, however, I am happy to
note that President Salva Kiir has taken steps to confront the issue of
corruption in his government. In the past weeks he took decisive action
to counter corruption among GOSS officials with alleged involvement in
mismanagement of resources, which we believe was a needed step in
improving the management of the GOSS.
Below the surface, there has been little political transformation.
Whether in Khartoum or in Juba, military officers are in charge. The
NCP uses the instruments of state power, particularly the security
services, to limit the scope for opposition parties and to manipulate
the public agenda. It would be seriously challenged in a genuinely free
and fair election. The SPLM, which has broad popular support in
southern Sudan, has made impressive first steps to establish itself in
the north but has never faced elections itself.
There remains a major risk that elections will not be held on time.
The CPA specifies that before elections, a census will be conducted
throughout Sudan, but arrangements for the census are falling behind
schedule. If the elections are to be held as scheduled, the census must
be expedited.
Despite these serious shortcomings, there has been some progress
under the CPA. Peace is holding in the south for the first time in 24
years. The GOS has transferred over $1 billion in oil revenues to the
new GOSS. Designed by both the north and the south, the new Sudanese
pound has been introduced as the new common currency. A new government
has been created in the south, commerce is thriving, the economy is
growing, displaced people are returning to their ancestral homes and
farms, and 75 percent of the 40,000 militias (most created by the GOS
during the war) have been demobilized or merged into either the
northern or southern armies. There is no famine in southern Sudan. We
should not underestimate these achievements or the benefits of peace
and increased economic growth for the average southern family. These
are not insignificant achievements, but these achievements are fragile
and at risk because of a failure to carry out all of the provisions of
the CPA.
Overall, the situation has more cause for alarm than for
reassurance. U.S. policy intended the CPA to be a turning point for
Sudan's transformation from an authoritarian state to a more just and
democratic state that can be a partner for stability and security in a
dangerous part of the world. Sudan is now at the halfway mark between
signature of the peace accord and its first major turning point,
national elections. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), set
up to monitor CPA implementation, has only a muffled voice because both
the NCP and SPLM must agree to any of its decisions. The ruling
National Congress Party, which has been alarmed by this trend, has done
little to create the atmosphere for southerners to want to remain in
Sudan: The continuing conflict in Darfur and the tactics used by the
central government there only confirm southern fears that nothing has
really changed in Khartoum. The CPA needs renewed, high-level
international political attention. Along these lines, the United States
strongly supports the proposal being considered for an East African
summit through the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) to reassemble the heads of state in the region involved in
supporting the initial CPA agreement, to review progress to date and
define steps needed to accelerate implementation.
These are our objectives: To provide life-saving humanitarian
assistance to the millions of people who have been displaced from their
homes and affected by violence in Darfur; to promote a negotiated,
political settlement to the conflict that is agreed to by all parties
within the framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement; to support the
deployment of an AU/UN hybrid international peacekeeping force to
protect civilians and ensure continued humanitarian access; and to
ensure the successful implementation of the CPA. However, if we find
the Sudanese Government is obstructing progress on these objectives,
the United States Government will change its policy and will pursue
more coercive measures. The burden is on the Sudanese Government to
show the world that it can meet and implement the commitments it has
already made.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I now understand why you have not begun to implement plan
B. But what are some of the specific coercive steps in plan B?
Ambassador Natsios. There are three--and, I might add, plan
B is a series of things that will be phased, over time,
depending on how things go. If we see a deterioration of the
Sudanese Government's attitude and cooperation on phase 1 and
phase 2, which they've clearly agreed to, then there are going
to be other measures. But the measures now that are before the
President are, No. 1, personal sanctions against one rebel
leader who's an obstructionist. I mean, the perception is: All
the rebel leaders are John Adams and Abraham Lincoln and George
Washington. They are not. Some of them are very able people.
I've known them for many years. But some of them are dangerous
extremists. And one of them has been obstructing any peace
deal, and he is on the list. Two war criminals, people who we
think have committed terrible atrocities, are on that list. And
there will be travel bans, there will be bans on--or the
confiscation of bank accounts and other measures against
individuals. Is it going to have a big effect? You know, are
they traveling widely in the United States? No; they're not.
But it--they do not like being on this list, I have to tell
you. People are very worried in Khartoum as to who the other
two people are in the Sudanese Government. Everybody keeps
asking us, which, of course, we're not telling anyone. That's
the President's decision--the announcement.
The second provision of this round of sanctions, should the
President decide to go ahead with this, is--are 29 companies
that are, in fact, owned by the Sudanese Government, that are
very large companies, very powerful companies, through which a
lot of money moves, particularly oil revenues. And many of them
do their transactions in dollars, and we believe that, under
the new enforcement mechanisms, which is part 3 of this, these
sanctioned companies, in fact, will have some of their
operations paralyzed.
Under the third part of this are new enforcement mechanisms
to implement the sanctions that the President put in place 2
years ago, and then new sanctions he put in place under the
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act that the Congress passed,
that were put in place--I remember, distinctly, the date,
because it was in October, because the executive order was
signed the day I arrived in Khartoum, which is one reason the
Sudanese--because they were so furious, they would not let me
see President Bashir.
And so, we have new mechanisms that we've developed since
9/11 that were not available in the 1990s, or even in the
earlier period. This is just in the last 2 years, these new
mechanisms have been put in place. They are the mechanisms,
Senator, that are being used in Iran and North Korea, and we're
going to employ those mechanisms to do a much more aggressive
enforcement mechanism for existing sanctions plus the 29 new
companies that we would add, should the President decide to go
ahead with this.
The Chairman. Give us some sense of what the impact of
sanctioning these 29 companies would have on the overall
economy.
Ambassador Natsios. Well, it is the 29 plus the existing
130 that are already on the list. We're just adding--we're
going to keep adding more and more companies, is what we're
going to do. And this phase--we have 29--you have to go through
a long, apparently, legal process. It's the Treasury Department
that does this. The head of OFAC, I meet with constantly;
we're--he spends a huge amount of time on this to make sure
that all of the legal hurdles required under Federal statute
are followed, so we don't have lawsuits on our hands and that
we effectively can enforce these.
We believe it will have an effect on the economy, a
substantial effect, be--and the reason we know is because it's
having an effect on the Iranian and North Korean economy. I
would not be as enthusiastic about this--these measures, having
had experience with sanctions before, except for the fact that
we know what it's doing in these two other countries; it's
having a real impact.
Finally, I would add that all oil transactions--and there
are a number of oil companies that are state-owned by the
Sudanese Government, and state-run--all those transactions are
in dollars, even though we don't buy the oil and the oil has
nothing to do with American companies. The current practice is:
All international oil transactions, regardless of which country
or which company, are in dollars. And so, they have to go
through American banks in order to take place. And so, that's
one of the mechanisms that will be put in place that does not
exist, at this point.
The Chairman. What impact would that have on the oil trade
that the Sudanese engage in, for example, with the Chinese?
Ambassador Natsios. I don't want to go in, in a public
session, to the details of which companies are on that list, or
which one. One, it's the President's--I don't want to get into
White House prerogatives on announcing which companies are on
the list and which companies are not.
I think, Senator, the largest, most powerful effect here is
not on individual companies, it's on the enforcement
mechanisms, which are new; because we didn't have these
enforcement mechanisms in place. In fact, we're the only
country in the world that has such a powerful enforcement
mechanism, through the Federal Reserve Bank, to actually
enforce these sanctions. And that is something that's, as I
said before, relatively new.
The Chairman. The Secretary General has asked you to hold
off, but do you support a new Darfur Security Council
resolution?
Ambassador Natsios. He asked the British, who were the
primary sponsors of that resolution, to hold off, as well, for
2 to 4 weeks, for the same reason.
The Chairman. My question----
Ambassador Natsios. And we have been working with them on
it, yes. We support a resolution. I don't know the current
state--I'd have to ask Kristen Silverberg--about the drafting
of a resolution. But they asked also for that. That's been
public comment by Ban Ki-moon, to ask the British to hold off
on that temporarily.
The Chairman. What is the administration's assessment of
the utility, the efficacy, of imposing a no-fly zone?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, I recognize there's been a lot
of discussion about this. I have made an offer to the committee
to come brief you in a classified session. All military options
are on the table for discussion within the executive branch.
And I'm happy to tell you the state of that, in a classified
session, and let me tell you why.
There are 2\1/2\ million people in those camps, in 13---the
displaced camps in Darfur--and there are 13,000 relief workers,
working for U.N. agencies and NGOs. They are extremely
vulnerable. Every comment I make--literally every comment--is
in the Darfur newspapers, not just the Khartoum newspapers--in
Darfur. They have TV stations. They broadcast everything we
say. It's one thing for someone from the legislative branch to
make comments. When I make comments specifically about any kind
of military activity, it has a profound effect. And I have to
be very careful that it does not cause a reaction that could
put people's lives in danger on the ground. When other people
make the comments, that's a different matter, but when someone
from the executive branch does it, it causes very severe
reactions in the field. So, I have been asked repeatedly in the
field by my friends in the international community to be very
careful what I say. I'm happy to brief you and your committee
privately on this----
The Chairman. Well, we'll set a----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. In a classified session.
The Chairman. We'll set a time up for that.
My time is up. Is the Senator coming back? I guess not.
Governor, you're up.
Senator Voinovich. About a month ago, I had an opportunity
to meet with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and
talk with him at length about Darfur. He claims that the
situation there is on his mind early in the morning and late at
night. I would like your assessment of his commitment to taking
action to resolve the problems in Darfur and his determination
to implement Resolution 1706. You have mentioned that he has
discouraged adopting a new U.N. Security Council resolution on
Darfur. I would like your honest appraisal of his commitment to
action and how much support he may or may not be getting from
other members of the United Nations.
Ambassador Natsios. Let me first say that I spent an hour
with him last Monday, and I was very impressed by his
commitment. And the evidence is, from, just, people I know in
the U.N. system, that he is seized with this issue. And he told
me this is his No. 1 priority. He has spent a lot of time on
it. His staff is spending a lot of time on it. I met all of the
Under Secretaries General who are dealing with this, at length
last Monday, separately, and it was clear that he had given
them very, very aggressive instructions as to what was to
happen. I think we need to give him a chance.
I should tell you----
Senator Voinovich. May I ask you, What does that mean----
Ambassador Natsios. That means that----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. ``A chance''?
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. If he asked for a 2- to 4-
week delay, that we need to respect that. That's what he asked
for, specifically, publicly.
Second, let me just say that there's been a lot of
speculation of the role of other countries in the negotiations
on Darfur. I believe that the Chinese have already played--I
know the Chinese have already played a constructive role.
Ambassador Wong, who's become a friend, who is the Perm Rep for
the Chinese Government in New York, in fact, came, at Kofi
Annan's request, to the Addis Conference, in November--November
16. And we worked together on the language. And the Chinese are
committed to what we agreed to November 16. And they now are
saying something they seldom do. The Chinese do not conduct
diplomacy the way we do; they do it very quietly. But they're
now making public statements, telling the Sudanese they must
be, No. 1, flexible, and, No. 2, they must accept and implement
the agreement that was reached, as it was reached November 16.
In fact, their special envoy for Darfur just returned to
Beijing, and he repeated this. We have indications, at this
point, that the Chinese are now taking even a more aggressive
role than they have in the past. So, I actually think we need
to encourage Chinese involvement in this. I think they may be
the crucial actors. I think there's been a lot of China-bashing
in the West, and I'm not sure, to be very frank with you, right
now it's very helpful. I think the Chinese actually may be the
critical factor that led to the Sudanese reversing their
position in Addis, 2 days ago, on the second phase of the
``heavy support package'' of the Kofi Annan plan. We have
evidence that they put very heavy pressure on them.
So, I don't want to violate confidences, Senator, publicly,
but I believe, actually, other members of the Security Council
are working on this. We talk constantly, every week, with the
Chinese--at the Presidential level, at the--Deputy Secretary
Negroponte just spoke to the Deputy Secretary of the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, I think yesterday or day before yesterday. I
met with Ambassador Wong last week in New York. I've met with
the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, and I think we've
had very good conversations of that. So, I think Ban Ki-moon
has the support of member states. I even think, now, many of
the Arab States are fed up with the way in which the Sudanese
Government is conducting itself, and they are beginning to put
pressure on--in their own way, quietly, on the Sudanese
Government to resolve this.
Senator Voinovich. Well, it's comforting to know that U.N.
members are substantively working on progress in Darfur,
because there are so many of us that have wondered just how
conscientious the United Nations really was about this issue.
And it's comforting to know that the Chinese, who have always
been held out as the obstructionists, now seem to be onboard to
use their influence to be successful there.
When you met with the Secretary General, did he raise the
issue about the peacekeeping funds in the budget? We're asking
the United Nations to do all kinds of things in the area of
peacekeeping, but the fact of the matter is that the budget
that we have provided, Mr. Chairman, is inadequate. We are not
providing the money that we need for peacekeeping, our dues and
our arrears. And this organization, which is really carrying a
lot of water for the United States in so many areas, needs the
support of this administration and of Congress. And I wonder if
he raised that issue with you.
Ambassador Natsios. He did not raise it with me, Senator,
but, let me just mention, in the supplemental budget that is
before you--I know other issues are sort of clouding this, or
are pushing this aside, but in that budget that you have
before--there's quite a lot of money for Sudan. And there's
$150 million in that budget request, the supplemental, for the
AMIS force, supporting the AMIS force in Darfur. And there's
$99.8 million for the international peacekeeping activities for
the United Nations under that. So, there's about $250 million--
I'm sorry--the $100 million--the $99 million is in the 2008
request.
We have a lot more money in the account for peacekeeping
operations, but we have to get agreement, first, to transfer
the cost of this operation in Darfur, which is one of the
critical issues--we do not want to come--keep coming back to
Congress for special appropriations; it doesn't work, and it's
not working for the European Union either--we want the United
Nations to fund this under the regular appropriation so we can
go through a normalized process to do this. In order to do
that, we have to have U.N. command and control.
So, U.N. command and control is not just a matter of
military operations, it's a matter of--the member states are
not going to agree to have the United Nations fund this unless
they have control over the operation. I've told that repeatedly
to President Bashir and to his ministers. It's not just a
function of United States wanting the United Nations to be in
control, it's a function of member states not willing to vote
for a resolution that would allow this to be funded by the
United Nations.
Right now, phase 1 and phase 2 of the ``light support
package'' and the ``heavy support package'' under the Addis
agreement of November 16 can be funded out of existing funds
and the funds we have in the supplemental appropriations. So,
we're taking care of it, in terms of that.
We will have discussions with the Congress, later on,
should there be a transfer of this funding from the episodic
funding to regular U.N. appropriations. Right now, we've put in
the current state of affairs--what's in the budget will support
the current state of affairs, and what we believe--the startup
money needed to fund the U.N. operation.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sir, I want to thank you for your testimony and, obviously,
for your service.
I wanted to ask you, in particular, about legislation which
you may have already spoken to this morning, and I apologize
for coming in when I did. But we have--among many things that
are being proposed here on Capitol Hill and in the Senate,
there's legislation, introduced by Senator Durbin, Senate bill
S. 831, the Sudan Disinvestment Authorization Act of this year;
of 2007. I wanted to get your perspective on that, and also to
ask you, in particular, about the administration, whether or
not the administration has taken a formal position on that
legislation.
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, I'm aware of many different
pieces of legislation on this issue, and I--prior to my taking
this job, when I was a--I'm still a professor at Georgetown;
this is--I have another job; I have my students--I stated my
position on this issue. But I am a member of the
administration, I suppose the administration's position--I
don't know if it's been made public--but there is a great deal
of concern about this legislation in the administration. I do
not think the administration supports the notion of
divestiture, and there are several reasons for it.
My concern about it, personally, is, from our past
experience with divestiture legislation it would take a couple
of years before it had an effect, and we don't have a couple of
years. Divestiture legislation is not going to have an affect
on the Sudanese economy in the next year, even if it passed
immediately, was immediately enforced. It will take a while. We
don't have a while.
No. 2, I remember, when I was a State legislator in
Massachusetts, 22 years ago, I voted for sanctions on South
Africa to purge the State pension fund of any investments of
companies in South Africa. And I remember that. What people
don't realize is, many States still have statutes on the books
from 20 years ago; they never rescinded them. So, there is a
reluctance in the administration to support legislation that
would have the States--and there's been, by the way, a Supreme
Court ruling that actually had my name on it, at one point,
because I was the chief operating officer for State government;
I was being sued by the Board of Trade. And, when I was the
secretary of administration in Boston, I had a staff in Boston
on this issue, so I'm very familiar with it, in the legal
sense, since I was being sued as a representative of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
There is now a Supreme Court ruling that has three
conditions for any State or municipality to do divestiture. And
it's a harsh standard. And I think one statute in Illinois has
already been ruled unconstitutional. There is a reluctance to
support this, because the fear is to have each State and
municipality conducting their own foreign policy could create
chaotic conditions. And once the legislation--or the crisis is
over, and we want to change the sanctions, some States may not
do it. That's still the case. There are still sanctions against
South Africa in some State pension funds because of something
that happened 20 years ago that is no longer the case. That's
the reason there is concern about the legislation.
Senator Casey. Well, do you see it as an either/or, or do
you think there's a middle ground? I mean, I support this
legislation, but let's talk academically for a second. Don't
you think we should create some pressure on companies who are
making investment decisions, or decisions about capital? Isn't
there a way to balance that against the concerns that you
raise?
Ambassador Natsios. There is already a lot of pressure. In
fact, many companies in Europe, where there are no sanctions,
have announced they're not going to do any more investments in
Darfur--or in Sudan, because of what's happened. And I,
frankly, think that's because of political realities, people
are getting so upset over what's happening. So, there already
is that kind of pressure.
The sanctions regimes that we are considering now, and the
President has before him, in fact, I think, would have a much
more immediate impact than divestiture legislation, because
there's a way of enforcing them very quickly. The problem with
this--it has a symbolic value, the divestiture legislation, but
it is actually not going to have a real effect on the Sudanese.
It would take 2 to 3 years, in my view, based on past
experience, for it to have any kind of real experience.
Senator Casey. The last question I have is in connection
with the approach we take. There are obviously a lot of
proposals about a multipronged deployment of peacekeeping
troops and using all kinds of other pressure, in addition to
any kind of use of force, but what's your sense of the right
balance of that, in terms of a hybrid approach? And how do you
think the administration views this? Because when you talk to
people--and I think this is a sentiment we all feel; it's not
just people who are outside of Washington, it's all of us--all
of us want to do something, and people are getting----
Ambassador Natsios. Frustrated.
Senator Casey [continuing]. Frustrated, because they don't
get a sense that there's any movement, that there's any
progress, that there's any consensus. And I guess it's also a
frustration because we feel--and I think--I don't think it's
any one party or institution to blame, but there's a sense that
there's--we try--we talk about things--this Government talks
about strategies, we talk about approaches, and they receive
attention for a couple of days--and I'm really honored to be
part of this hearing that Senator Biden called--but that
there's no sustained effort to do something that has real
impact. Just from your own experience----
Ambassador Natsios. Well, Senator, I think a lot of things
we do, we're not going to put in the newspaper. In fact, I
actually had a ban on talking to the press. I haven't taken any
reporters with me on my trips. When I went to Chad, I had a
press conference for a Chadian newspaper. I went to Libya, a
month ago--I didn't have any conversations publicly about what
those discussions were, because, frankly, I would not be--
people won't talk to me if they think I'm going to talk to the
press. So, a lot of the things we do, we cannot discuss
publicly, or my ability, as a diplomat, to influence other
countries is going to be diminished. The Chinese were not happy
that I had a press conference in Beijing before I left China,
in January. I told them I had to say something. I didn't talk
about what they said. I just discussed what our position was.
And so, I'm balancing the need for some confidentiality in
these conversations with your need to know what we're doing.
You have a right to know. I'm frustrated. I mean, I have a lot
of friends in Sudan. I've been going to Sudan for 18 years,
Senator, and I have to tell you, I've seen an awful lot of
suffering. I've seen famines go on. I've been in charge of
trying to save people's lives, not just in the south, but in
Darfur. Two and a half million people died in the war between
the north and the south. Two and a half million. Almost all of
them southerners. I went through famines where there are mass
graves. So, I know what people are going through. I've seen the
horror of it. And I know what happened in Darfur. I was in
Darfur in October 2003, when these atrocities really started in
earnest, and I think I was one of the first Westerners to have
a press conference in Nairobi and explain that it appears a new
civil war is starting. I mean, it's in a couple of books that I
had this press conference. It wasn't widely reported. So, I am
deeply concerned about this.
We do have a comprehensive plan. We're pursuing the plan.
We've been having meetings with the Europeans on what we are
doing to enforce these sanctions. Chancellor Merkel said
something quite remarkable 2 weeks ago, publicly, and so did
the German Defense Minister. And, of course, the Germans are
now in the Presidency of the European Union. Both of them said,
so I don't think it was a mistake or a misunderstanding or
mistranslation; they both said, ``We may have to impose
sanctions--European sanctions--against Sudan.'' And Chancellor
Merkel said something very unusual. And the Europeans are
always saying we need a Security Council resolution. She said,
``Even if we have no Security Council resolution, the Europeans
may impose bilateral sanctions on Sudan.'' That is quite
significant. We have been in discussion with them. I met Dr.
Solana, the equivalent of Secretary Rice in the European Union,
in December; his views on what needed to be done were the same
as our views. And he has been taking leadership there, quietly.
We've been meeting regularly with European diplomats. There
have been working-level meetings in Washington on how sanctions
work, in the American context, how these enforcement
mechanisms--how powerful they are. So, we've been doing a lot
of work very quietly to set the stage for this. And I think
we've made a lot of progress.
There is a plan. We're implementing the plan. We can't
always make all of it public, because it makes it much harder
to get people to talk to us, then.
Senator Casey. Thank you for your work.
Ambassador Natsios. There is something you can do. The
sanctions that exist in law that allow us to do what is on the
President's desk have very weak civil penalties for
corporations that violate them. If we could get legislation
through Congress to dramatically increase the level of those
financial penalties, it would be very helpful to the Treasury
Department, and it would be very powerful, in terms of sending
a message to countries that were--or companies that were
considering trying to get around the sanctions. So, if we could
work with you on that, that is something we would agree, not
only--enthusiastically agree to.
Senator Casey. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think that Senator Casey expresses, probably, the feeling
each one of us have as we visit with our constituents, who are
seized with this issue in the same way that we are, and want to
know what they can do, as groups, as church groups or civil
groups in our society. And you've been a very good interpreter,
for many months, given your own trips. So, I appreciate,
especially, your testimony, because it's founded, really, upon
being there.
Let me just ask you to trace potential solutions. If,
finally, things began to move, physically what would happen to
those who are now being persecuted or who are in the camps and
in danger of being persecuted by the Janjaweed, or whoever else
might attack them? Would you also try to describe the scene as
to so-called rebels who are in the territory who have a more
civil governmental function namely, upsetting the government
itself--perhaps leaving aside the agriculture people who have
lost their animals, lost their lands. Can you give some
scenario or sort of business plan of how life might become,
potentially, normal for each of these groups? Who would need to
do what?
Ambassador Natsios. Let me--actually, I think, Senator,
that is ``the'' question. We talk a lot in vague, abstract
terms about this. The reality is, there are 2\1/2\ million
people in those camps who cannot support themselves. That's why
we're spending $2.3 billion, along with the Europeans and the
Canadians and the Japanese, to support those people in those
camps. They need to go back to their villages. They need to get
their land back and their animals back.
I would estimate, myself, that 2 to 3 million animals were
looted from the farmers. People talk about the farmers versus
the herders. Most of the farmers had small herds of animals.
They didn't--they weren't--they were not nomadic. But the
investment account for these farmers is the animal herds that
keep them alive during a drought, for example. And we need to
recreate their livelihoods through a reconstruction program.
One of the things I've told the Arabs in Darfur, through
press conferences and meeting--I've met with some of them--is,
if we do a reconstruction program, it's going to be for
everybody. It can't be just for the people in the camps,
because, if it is, we will never have peace. We'll never have
peace. We can't argue that all of the Arabs are committing all
of this violence, because that is not true. And we, in some
ways, have villainized the Arabs in a way that's not very
helpful. I have told them, if they sign a peace agreement,
there will be projects for the herders, as well as for the
farmers, that will restore livelihoods and bring the economy
back.
They actually have a symbiotic relationship. When the thing
was functioning--the economy was functioning--you know, the
herders don't eat their animals, most of the time; they sell
their animals and buy grown food from the farmers in the
markets. And so, the two--that whole symbiotic relationship's
been destroyed by this war. If we do not deal with the property
issues in a peace agreement, we're not going to have peace.
I think the way this would play out, just in terms of
sequencing, is, hopefully, in the near future, Jan Eliasson and
Salim Salim will get the rebels to consolidate--not
completely--behind one leader. We're not going to have a John
Garang. Don't expect a John Garang. There isn't one for Darfur.
But if we consolidate those 15 movements into three or four
movements, and one negotiating position, the government will
sit down with them, and they will begin to negotiate amendments
to the Darfur Peace Agreement.
The rebels have told me they just--they want several issues
that have to be dealt with. One is compensation for the damage
done to their livelihoods. The amount in the DPA is $30
million. They said it was an insult. The Sudanese have told me
they're willing to substantially increase that. They've used
very high figures. I think they're serious about that.
Two, there has to be a disarmament of both the rebels and
the Janjaweed and all the militias, the border patrol, all of
the public defense force. There are too many people with heavy
weapons. The place is awash in weapons. And unless they are
confiscated, we're not going to have an end to the war.
I would add, the only institution in the world that has
significant experience in demobilizing rebel forces and
government forces in a war is the United Nations. I watched
them do a lousy job at this, 18 years ago in Somalia; they are
doing excellent jobs now in many countries all over the world.
They've developed expertise, which is critically important
here. I told President Bashir, ``The rebels are never going to
give their heavy weapons to you or your army under any peace
agreement. I don't care what's written in it. They don't trust
you. They're not going to give you the weapons.'' They told me,
``If the United Nations comes in, and the U.N. troops, we will
surrender our weapons to them if the Janjaweed do.'' So, we
need the United Nations there, not just for peace and stability
now; to enforce a peace agreement, or there's not going to be
an end to this violence, because if those weapons are not
confiscated, Senator, people are not going to go back to their
villages. People in the camps have told me, ``We're not going
back until we feel safe.'' And that means disarmament.
Once they go back, then we will start the reconstruction
program, which will involve livelihoods, agriculture programs,
nomad programs, and, I might add, health and education
programs. These--I was in Darfur 17 years ago. There's no
difference in Darfur now, versus 17 years ago, except that one
of the roads was paved in the capital city, the governor's
mansion was rebuilt, the governor's offices were rebuilt, and
the airport was rebuilt. There are no more health clinics, no
more agriculture programs, no more water projects. And people
in the rural areas are saying, ``Where is all this oil revenue
going? It's not going to us.'' And that's a legitimate
question.
Senator Lugar. How will the oil revenue figure into this?
Is this a part of the agreement, in broad terms, that comes
with peace, that the government makes a commitment of this
sort? What sort of commitment would we need to make?
Ambassador Natsios. There is a commitment in the DPA now. I
believe--I don't remember the exact sequencing, but in 1 year
it's $200 million for reconstruction, in the next year it's
$300 million, that would go to Darfur from oil revenues from
the central government.
Now, there's another interesting provision of the CPA, the
Comprehensive--between the north and the south--it says in it--
and it's being--hopefully, going to be in force this year;
we're waiting to see if the actual action is taken by the
Sudanese Government--to take oil revenues and increase the
provincial budgets of all the provinces. Most of the oil
revenues are spent in Khartoum now. They never see it in the
provinces. The provinces, there's a--all of them are as
impoverished in the north as the south.
Under the CPA, this year, this calendar year, they are
supposed to dramatically increase the revenues going to the
provinces. The Parliament has--Sudanese Parliament--has
approved a new budget with dramatically increased spending. The
problem is, the Ministry of Finance has not yet disbursed that
money. We're waiting to have it disbursed. I put it in my
written testimony. We're watching that. If they disburse it, it
will be a sign to me that they're serious about sharing oil
revenues with the periphery of the country that has been
discriminated against for decades in Sudan.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Webb--we understand you have another
engagement. They've been kind enough to suggest that I yield to
you.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that. And I also appreciate the fact that my
colleagues would allow me to speak, at this time.
Mr. Ambassador, first I would like to thank you for the
years that you've put into this issue. I have done a few of
these in East Asia, pretty much in the same way, and I know how
vital it is to really give it a comprehensive look at what's
going on. I first started going back to Vietnam in 1991, when
it was pretty much still a Stalinist state, and it's really
valuable, when you're looking at issues of the moment, to, sort
of, understand how this thing has played out on the ground. And
I would, again, express my appreciation to you for having spent
so much of your life on this particular issue.
I also would like to say that I would agree with you on
your comment about sanctions. We can look pretty clearly, I
think, at Iran right now, the evidence that has come out, even
with the limited sanctions that were put on Iran the first time
around, to see that they're having to make some very hard
decisions about whether they want to be isolated from their own
people, on the one hand, and also from the international
community. And there are areas where sanctions are valuable and
can work.
I wanted to get your--a little bit more of your thoughts on
the situation with China. You may know, I have written and
spoken for more than 20 years about what I saw, even back in
the late 1980s, as China's conscious strategic axis with the
Muslim world. And we can see it particularly in South Asia, to
a certain extent in the Middle East, and you can see it, to an
extent, also in Africa. Chinese investment in Africa, just over
the past 5 years, has quadrupled. And a big part of that is in
Sudan. On the one hand, we have--from your testimony, you were
saying that we look to Beijing to join with the international
community in applying more forceful measures, should Khartoum
become intransigent, and then, on the other, your comments
orally today, which I think have a validity, that the Chinese
are playing a constructive role--I'd like to see more of that--
and that they are a critical factor.
There's a Reuters article from today talking about the
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister just returning from a 3-day
trip to Sudan. And, in that, he is saying that basically the
international community should pay more attention to the way
that China has been conducting its diplomacy in Sudan, you
know, saying that Beijing was using its influence in its own
way, rejected suggestions that there should be further threats,
that the international community should pay attention to the
way that the Chinese have been doing this, in order to get
better results.
So, basically, my question is: Should we be more aligned
with the way that China is doing this, or is this a tandem
approach?
Ambassador Natsios. I----
Senator Webb. Or is it something else, by the way?
Ambassador Natsios. Yes, Senator. I am aware, Senator, of
your work in Vietnam. I ran USAID for 5 years, and there's an
AID office there, and it has substantial programs. So, I'm
aware of the progress the country has made, and your interest
in that, and your interest in China, as well.
I've learned, over the years doing this sort of work on the
development side, that different countries act differently. I
mean, United States--Americans are more confrontational, more
direct, more blunt, more black-and-white than even our European
friends are. I actually think that our leadership is critically
important around the world, not just in Sudan, but in many
other countries. If every country behaved the way we did, I'm
not sure we could always get done what we need to get done.
Sometimes, more subtle approaches need to supplement what we're
doing. And my sense from the Chinese, from 3 days of meetings
in Beijing, is the Chinese are taking a more subtle approach
that is really affecting the behavior of the Sudanese
Government.
As I said before, I believe the reversal of phase 2, the
``heavy support package,'' where the Sudanese Government
basically trashed the whole thing in a 14-page letter President
Bashir sent to Ban Ki-moon a month ago. And I was with him in
his office. He said, ``I--Mr. Natsios, I just signed the
letter.'' He didn't give us a copy of it. If I had known it was
14 pages long, I would have been a little distraught, because
long letters mean bad things, usually, under these
circumstances.
They reversed their positions 2 days ago in Addis. They've
endorsed--they said, ``With the exception of the attack
tactical--attack tactical helicopters, they've accepted
everything else.'' Now, it remains to be seen whether they
actually cooperate with us in bringing those 3,000 troops in.
That's a different matter. We have to test this. But I think
the Chinese played a role in that. I don't want to discuss,
publicly, what that is, but there's a shift going on, and I
don't want to start making statements that are going to
discourage the Chinese from using their own influence to help
us in this, because I think they can be critically important.
And I think they are being helpful.
Senator Webb. Good. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. No, you're up, Senator. He's already gone.
Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize. I've been on the floor with another debate,
Mr. Natsios, but I'm--I want to--I'm glad that you're here.
And this is an issue that is--been very, very frustrating.
We continually hear the reaction that, ``Our commitment is
firm,'' that, ``We're going to do everything we can,'' and then
we continue to receive reports of violence, and it--almost as
if the international community appears to be unable to do the
things that have to be done. I know, your testimony, you say
that we continue to monitor the security situation very, very
closely.
Is it--can you that--we've talked about Darfur--in the
past, used the word ``genocide''--is it fair to say that the
genocide has stopped?
Ambassador Natsios. There is a lull in fighting since the
11th of February--in Darfur, not in Chad; there is increased
violence in Chad. We are trying to find out what exactly caused
the incident in eastern Chad that resulted in 400 people dying
in the last week. There was an incident, where the Chadian Army
was chasing some Chadian rebels into Sudan, who then were
intermingled with Sudanese troops, and the Chadian military
killed 17 Sudanese troops 2 days ago. And that was extremely
disturbing, because the cease-fire between Chad and Sudan is
one of the reasons why the United Nations and the NGOs and
diplomats and our embassies believe there's been a substantial
reduction in civilian casualties in the last 2 months. There
was a negotiated truce by the Libyans between Chad and the
United--and Sudan--which have been at virtual war the last 2
years. That has exacerbated the violence against civilians.
Whenever you have two countries fighting, civilians get caught
in the crossfire. So, it is very, very disturbing to me that
this happened.
Now, the report we have, from reliable field people who
said they investigated it, is that this was a mistake on the
part of the--the Chadians did not know they were firing at
Sudanese troops, the 17 they killed; they thought they were
just firing at Chadian rebels who were trying to unseat
President Deby.
I'm hoping--and I want to say this today, because the
Sudanese will listen to what I'm saying--please act with
restraint in responding to this incident. If we have a renewal
of the Chad-Sudan war, more civilians are going to get killed,
and we don't want that to happen.
Two, the rebel leaders have been meeting in northern
Darfur, for the last month and a half, to try to come together
to unify. The fact that they're not leading their troops means
they're not fighting as much.
Now, this lull may well dissolve, in the next few weeks,
because, before the rains start, there's typically military
offenses by both the rebels and the government. I hope and pray
that, in the next 9 weeks, both sides will restrain themselves
sufficiently, and we can minimize civilian casualties. And
then, the 10 weeks of the rainy season, there's very little
military activity, it can't move around because the rains are
so heavy. So, we could have 5 months of relatively stable
conditions, which would be an excellent platform to begin peace
negotiations between the rebels and the government.
Senator Coleman. Let's talk--I'd like to, then, explore
what our role can be in order to have the structure for a
successful negotiation. Do the rebels have a unified political
front? And if they don't, is there a role that we're playing to
establish the structure that would make a negotiation possibly
successful?
Ambassador Natsios. Yes. There is--the lead for this--and
we have to be very careful we do not create a separate
mechanism for talking to the rebels, that goes around the
United Nations or the African Union, because we want one track,
we don't want multiple tracks where they're playing off against
each other--on either the rebel side or the government side,
because that happens, too, all the time. We believe that the
rebel movements must be consolidated. We can't have 15
different movements. And that's what we have right now,
according to our latest analysis of the situation.
When I met with the rebels in January, I asked the American
Ambassador Marc Wall, who is a very able career diplomat. I
said, ``Marc, what can I do to help consolidate this?'' He
said, ``Your trip helped consolidate it. They've been meeting
for 6 weeks, because they don't want to be embarrassed in front
of you. And they're going to prevent--present a unified
position for a large part of the movement.'' And they did that.
We spent, like, the entire afternoon. We ate a goat together.
The U.S. Government paid for a stuffed goat. And we talked--
there were 50 of them there, and we spent a long time--I told
them, ``You must give up your public statements that you want
to violently overthrow the government. You can't be advocating
that and expect to negotiate with them. Two, you have to unify.
Three, you can't make ridiculous demands. I've read some of
your demands. No one will agree to that stuff. If you plan to
give up some of what you're demanding in a negotiation, then
that's fine, I understand that.'' But some of them think,
unless they get 95 percent or 99 percent of what they're asking
for, they're not going to sign the peace agreement. I said,
``That is not way--the way negotiating works.'' Some of them
have never negotiated before.
We have gotten involved, some conflict-prevention
institutions in Europe--I personally asked them to get
involved--in helping to prepare the way for these negotiations.
That is ongoing. We did not want the U.S. Government to do the
training. We wanted someone else, without connection to the
U.S. Government, that are competent at doing this. And they are
engaging in that now.
The third thing we do is, we have U.S. Government, State
Department, and AID officers on the ground in Darfur around the
clock; they live there. And they have been in constant contact,
meeting with the rebel leaders, urging them, trying to
negotiate with different ones to consolidate this. So, there is
an ongoing U.S. Government effort on the ground with career
Foreign Service officers from the State Department. I met with
them. I spent several days out in Darfur, in March, and then in
October of last year; and I think they're very capable, they're
making those connections. Our Charge has been out there to talk
to people, as well, Cameron Hume, one of our most senior
diplomats in the Foreign Service. And I think it's having an
effect, because the message is clear, ``You can't--we can't
wait forever to have these negotiations start.''
Once the negotiations start, it'll be much easier for us to
get President Bashir to agree to a cease---a formal cease-fire
that's enforceable, which is what happened in the south. Once
we got the negotiations going, then there was a--they called--
they didn't call it a ``cease-fire,'' they called it a
``cessation of hostilities.'' And that allowed them to
negotiate without fighting going on, on a large scale in the
south, and I think that was one of the contributing factors to
success of the north-south peace agreement.
Senator Coleman. I see my time is expired. If I can just--
one last question.
In addition to our--are the other Arab nations, the Saudis
or others, involved? Are we doing this alone, or have we got
some folks standing by our side?
Ambassador Natsios. There are other countries involved in
this. Let me just say--be a diplomat now--there are neighboring
powers on the periphery of Sudan. Some of them are playing a
constructive role, and some of them are not. Some of them are
working at cross-purposes with each other. I don't want to
start making accusations, because the Ambassadors will be in to
see me tomorrow, and I don't want to do that. OK?
It's not helpful for some of these tracks of negotiation to
go on outside the UN-AU process. The reason it isn't is, the
rebels simply will say, ``Well, I'm not getting what I want
from Jan Eliasson,'' and saying, ``So, I'm going to go to the--
this neighboring country.'' We don't want that to happen. And
so, when I've met with all of the neighboring countries, except
for one, I've urged them to unify their position, the way we
did in the north-south agreement, together, to have one
negotiating track. I think, Senator, that's a very good
question and a critical issue, actually.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd
like to begin by thanking you for holding this important
hearing. Previous Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings,
to consider responses to the horrendous violence in the Darfur
region of Sudan in April 2005 and September 2006, were
canceled, so I'm glad that this committee is making this crisis
a priority. However, I am dismayed by how little has changed
since that first hearing was scheduled, a couple of years ago.
I'm hoping this will mark the start of a different trend.
Mr. Natsios, while playing an important role in trying to
bring peace to Darfur and smooth the relations between Chad and
Sudan, Libyan President Gaddafi's involvement has seemingly
been unhelpful of late. Do you believe that Libya's involvement
so far in Sudan has done more good than harm? And what role do
you foresee for Libya in facilitating a sustainable political
settlement in Darfur and the region?
Ambassador Natsios. I should have left before you started
asking these----
Senator Feingold. Well----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Hard questions, Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold [continuing]. That's not how it works.
Ambassador Natsios. I know it. [Laughter.]
Unfortunately, you're right.
Let me say, I spent a couple of days in Libya in March. I
won't go through who I met with and what we discussed, because
it was--again, it was sensitive information. I think there are
some things the Libyans have done that have been constructive.
And I want to compliment President Gaddafi--or the leader,
General Gaddafi--on the effort to get a cease-fire between
Sudan and Chad. That effort, which he tried last year, was--the
next day, they started fighting again. OK? And that was a
failure. This time, he tried it--and I don't remember the exact
date of the negotiation, I think it was in February--it's been
successful, until yesterday, or 2 days ago, when there was an
incident in which--before you walked in, I mentioned there was
an incident where Chadian troops, from what our information is,
by mistake killed 17 Sudanese troops, according to the Sudanese
Government. We do not want this incident to start up the
fighting again. And I would ask the good offices, if the
Libyans are here listening, to use their good offices to
restrain both sides to prevent this cease-fire from collapsing.
We do not need another renewal of this conflict, because it is
making things much worse for civilians, who are getting killed,
and they get caught in the crossfire, for the stability of the
region, and for the NGOs and U.N. agencies trying to save
people's lives, and for peace. For peace. So, that has been
helpful.
Those are the helpful things, Senator. If you want me to
discuss other things, I'd rather do it privately; I don't want
to go into it in public session.
Senator Feingold. Well you know, I don't want to force you
to do that, at this point. We can talk at greater length in
some other setting. But does Deputy Secretary of State
Negroponte's upcoming visit to Libya--as the highest ranking
government official to visit that country since diplomatic
relations were renewed, last May--does that symbolize an intent
for greater and more regularized U.S. coordination with the
Libyans?
Ambassador Natsios. It is not just Darfur, as I understand
it, that will be on John's agenda. There are other issues, as
well. We have raised--Jendayi Frazer visited Mr. Gaddafi last
year, and had a very long discussion with him. I followed that
up this year. But our Ambassador, our Charge there, is a very
experienced diplomat. He's a retired ambassador, and he has
been raising these issues with the Libyan Government on a
regular basis. And so, we work through the Embassy there on
these issues, and he sat through all of the conversations I
had. I think he knows where we are and what we're trying to
accomplish.
Let me just say, the Libyans have invited me back at the
end of this month, in 2 weeks, just as, actually, school gets
out at Georgetown. And I intend to accept the invitation and go
back.
Senator Feingold. But does it--does the visit of Mr.
Negroponte to Libya have any significance, vis-a-vis the Darfur
situation----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes, it----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Or not?
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Does.
Senator Feingold. OK.
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
Senator Feingold. Last month, I chaired a hearing on the
regional impact of the conflict in Darfur to highlight the
destabilizing impact that this crisis is having on the
neighboring countries of Chad and the Central African Republic.
And your comments here have already highlighted these spillover
effects. How have you sought to address the regional dimensions
of the Darfur conflict? And what contingencies does the United
States have in place to address this spillover aspect of the
problem?
Ambassador Natsios. In December, I met with the leadership
of the French Government, on Chad and on the Central African
Republic, and we talked about a coordinated approach to how we
would stabilize the situation.
Two, in January I visited Chad, not just to meet with the
rebels, which I did, but I also met with President Deby, his
Foreign Minister, and his senior advisors, at length, and we
talked over the issues. I offered, in December, with President
Bashir, to send messages. I said, ``Mr. President, I know
you're having a problem, which is this problem between Chad and
Sudan. If you wish me to, I will send a message to President
Deby when I go visit him. Would you like me to do that?'' At
that point, he did not want me to do it. Since then, there have
been extra--additional diplomatic moves that have led to this
cease-fire. And we've encouraged that, and we support that.
So, the cease-fire that existed until 2 days ago, which we
hope will continue, in fact is evidence that some of this is
bearing fruit.
Senator Feingold. OK. What impact do you think a U.N.
peacekeeping force for eastern Chad and the northern Central
African Republic would have for Darfur? And is the United--is
the administration still actively supporting----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. A strong U.S.----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Peacekeeping force? And how
are you then, if that's the case, going to gain Chadian
President Deby's consent for the peacekeeping operation?
Ambassador Natsios. One, we believe that a peacekeeping
operation of the United Nations will stabilize the situation
for civilians, who are at risk now. Some of the worst
atrocities are being committed in Chad now, not in Darfur.
Senator Feingold. Right.
Ambassador Natsios. And, two, we believe it will stabilize
the security situation, in terms of the two sides. It is not
large enough. There are--I think there are three different
options that have been presented to the Secretary General on
how large that force would be. That's a huge border. I mean,
this is--Darfur is the size of Texas, it's not a tiny little
area. It's not like Rwanda, you know, where we had the
genocide; it was a very small area. This is huge area. And I've
flown over it for years, and it's a vast, vast area.
And so, patrolling a--making a commitment that we're going
to patrol the entire border between Chad and Darfur, I think we
should be careful not to overpromise. But we think that that
force would have a substantial effect on the security
situation, would stabilize things. We strongly support it,
still. And there are efforts being made now to advance it.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your work, but I must tell
you, it seems to me that we are being waltzed by--while people
die. And the reality is, looking at this latest report, the
United Nations Refugee Agency said that militiamen had killed
up to 400 people in the volatile eastern border region near
Sudan, leaving, ``an apocalyptic scene of mass graves and
destruction.'' The attacks by the Janjaweed took place in that
border area. And it goes on to say ``Estimates of the number of
dead have increased substantially, and now range between 2 and
400,'' a report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
said. The report added that many of the dead were buried in
common graves, and it says, ``We may never know their exact
number. The attackers encircled the villages, opened fire,
pursuing fleeing villagers, robbing women, shooting the men.''
The agency said, ``Many who survived the attack died from
exhaustion and dehydration.''
You know, I want to ask you a question. Do you still stand
by what you were quoted in the Georgetown Voice, saying that
the ongoing crisis in Darfur is no longer a genocide situation?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, I actually--there was a
retraction of that by the newspaper, the following week. I
actually looked at my statement. Very clearly, I did not say
that at the--there were three mistakes, and the Georgetown
Voice, which is an----
Senator Menendez. So----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Alternative student news-
paper----
Senator Menendez. So, would you now tell the committee:
What is the situation in Darfur? Is it a----
Ambassador Natsios. Darfur----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Genocide?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, right now, there is very
little fighting in Darfur----
Senator Menendez. That does----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Itself.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Not mean that we do not----
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, could I----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Have an ongoing----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Finish----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Circumstance----
Ambassador Natsios. Could I----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Of genocide. The question
is: Do you----
Ambassador Natsios. Senator.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Consider----
Ambassador Natsios. Let me----
Senator Menendez. Answer my question.
Ambassador Natsios. I am----
Senator Menendez. I have a limited----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Answering you----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Amount of time----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Answering your question.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Ambassador.
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
Senator Menendez. So, I ask you to be specific and answer
my question.
Ambassador Natsios. I'm answering your question.
Senator Menendez. You can't answer it if you haven't heard
it. Do you consider the ongoing situation in Darfur genocide?
Ambassador Natsios. The----
Senator Menendez. Yes or no?
Ambassador Natsios. What you just----
Senator Menendez. Yes or no?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, please. What you just read did
not take place in Darfur. It----
Senator Menendez. I didn't----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Took place in----
Senator Menendez. I didn't----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Chad.
Senator Menendez. I didn't refer to that.
Ambassador Natsios. There is very little----
Senator Menendez. I'm asking you----
Ambassador Natsios. There is----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Yes or no----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Very little violence in--
--
Senator Menendez. Ambassador----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Darfur----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. What is the difficulty----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Right now.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In my question?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator----
Senator Menendez. Give me an honest----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. I just answered your----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Answer.
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Question.
Senator Menendez. Is the circumstances in Darfur today a
continuing genocide; yes or no?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, there is very little fighting
between the rebels and the government, and very few civilian
casualties going on----
Senator Menendez. Ambassador----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. In Darfur right now. I
just told you----
Senator Menendez. Ambassador----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. The answer.
Senator Menendez. Ambassador, I'm not asking whether
diminished fighting, I'm asking whether the situation in Darfur
today is a genocide; yes or no?
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, there----
Senator Menendez. Yes or no?
Ambassador Natsios. The situation is very volatile.
Senator Menendez. All right.
Ambassador Natsios. There are periods of killings, which
could be construed as genocide, that took place----
Senator Menendez. You know, in the----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Last fall and----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In the present----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Earlier this year----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In the present convention
that the United Nations has on the prevention and punishment of
the crime of genocide, it says ``genocide'' means ``any of the
following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national ethnic, racial, or religious group, such
as killing members of the group, causing seriously bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction, in whole or in part; imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; and false--and
forcibly transferring the children of the group to another
group.'' It seems to me that those clearly are elements of what
is taking place----
Ambassador Natsios. That is correct.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In Darfur. Let me ask you--
because you don't want to answer the question yes or no, so
let----
Ambassador Natsios. I did answer----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Go on----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. The question, sir.
Senator Menendez. Let me go on to the following question.
What are we willing to accept from the Secretary General?
Anything less than the agreements that we have had to date that
we expect to be enforced? Do we expect----
Ambassador Natsios. Well----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Anything less than that?
Ambassador Natsios. Let me just say, very clearly, sir, I
follow what's going on, on the ground every day, from cables,
from reports; and there are acts of barbarity against people.
Some of them are now being committed by rebels in one of the
camps. The rebels have begun to rape women. Rebels. OK? There
are--there is anarchy in much of Darfur now. And there is--300
Arabs were killed in southern Darfur----
Senator Menendez. Ambassador, I appreciate your----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. By one Arab----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Your lengthy----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Tribe against another----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Anecdotal----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Arab tribe.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Responses, but please just
answer my question.
Ambassador Natsios. I am answering the----
Senator Menendez. The question----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Question, sir.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Is: What are we willing to
accept from the Secretary General's negotiations? Is it
anything less than the agreements that we previously thought we
had?
Ambassador Natsios. No. We are not willing to----
Senator Menendez. OK.
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Accept anything less.
Senator Menendez. Are we ready to implement plan B if the
Secretary General fails? Yes or no?
Ambassador Natsios. We were asked--as I said earlier,
before you arrived, Senator--Secretary General Ban asked Dr.
Rice, and asked me last week when I met with him, for 2 to 4
weeks, before we go to plan B. We had actually intended to go
to it, and there was a congressional delegation going there,
and we decided not to announce it--or, the President decided
not to announce it----
Senator Menendez. I----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. During the visit.
Senator Menendez. I understand all that. The question is--
--
Ambassador Natsios. The plan is prepared----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. If the Secretary General
fails in his efforts--I hope----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. He succeeds----
Ambassador Natsios. The answer to----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Are we ready----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. To go to plan B?
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. We are.
Senator Menendez. And then, are we ready to immediately
move to plan B, and implement it----
Ambassador Natsios. Well, once----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In that case?
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. It's signed, it will be
immediately implemented.
Senator Menendez. Once it's signed.
Ambassador Natsios. Well, the President has to sign the
orders.
Senator Menendez. Well, my point is: Are we at the point
where, if the Secretary General fails, the administration is
ready to move forward?
Ambassador Natsios. I just said, Senator, if--at the end of
the 2 to 4 weeks he requested, if we haven't made the progress
that we believe needs to be made, I believe the President will
make the decision. I'm not going to presume what the
President's going to decide and the announcement that he's
going to make. That's not for my--my place to do that. But I
know how angry he is, and impatient he is, over this, as I am,
as Dr. Rice is.
Senator Menendez. Well, I think part of our problem is, is
that we are quickly losing credibility in this process with Mr.
al-Bashir and others. It's like a child when you're
continuously telling him, ``Don't do that. Don't do that.'' I
mean, you use your public opportunities to say, ``Don't do
that. Don't do that.'' And they continue to do it, and they
continue to do it, and you say, ``Don't do that,'' guess what?
That child never believes that, in fact, you are going to
exact----
Ambassador Natsios. I agree----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. A punishment.
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. With you, Senator.
Senator Menendez. And so, ultimately it seems to me we're
at that point. Let me just say--I've got the corrected
Georgetown version here. And you are quoted, in the corrected
version, in saying ``the term `genocide' is counter to the
facts of what is really occurring----
Ambassador Natsios. No.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. ``in Darfur.''
Ambassador Natsios. Senator, I did not say that. But that--
look, that's----
Senator Menendez. That's the corrected version.
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. That's not the point.
Senator Menendez. Well, I hope that----
Ambassador Natsios. The fact----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. This administration----
Ambassador Natsios. The fact of the matter is----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Views what is happening----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. There is terrible----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In Darfur as genocide----
Ambassador Natsios. There is terrible----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. I hope----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Violence----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. The words ``never again''
are meaningful, and those words can only be meaningful if we
act. And I hope that we will not permit this to continue to
happen on our watch. I hope you take that back to the
administration. It is time to get past the talk about plan B,
and it is time to begin to enforce plan B.
Ambassador Natsios. If we want to get the international
community to support our efforts under plan B, and other
countries to implement unilateral sanctions--or bilateral
sanctions against the Sudanese Government, we have to cooperate
with them, we have to talk with them. We cannot simply ignore
what everybody else is doing. As I said before, Senator, before
you came in, we've had extensive meetings with the Europeans,
over the last 3 months, over how they might unilaterally,
without a U.N. resolution, impose their own sanctions, which
would be similar to ours. They would be much more powerful--
much more powerful--if a new set of sanctions is both--uses the
dollar and the euro to enforce. We know that from experiences
in Iraq, Iran, and Northern--and North Korea.
We are now engaged in diplomacy to get the Europeans
onboard. Chancellor Merkel, I believe it was 2 weeks--and the
German Defense Minister--they're in the Presidency of the
European Union--have now said, even with the absence of a U.N.
resolution, the European Union may consider, seriously,
imposing sanctions, which they never do, they always want a
Security Council resolution. This was a big change of position.
If we want to affect the behavior of the Sudanese Government,
we have to have a coordinated international approach. That's
what we have right now. It takes a little bit more time to do
that, because you have to talk to other people, as I'm sure
you're aware, Senator. If we simply do what we want to do, I
would have done it a long time ago, but Ban Ki-moon--we need
Ban Ki-moon's support on this. He asked for 2 to 4 weeks; we're
going to give him 2 to 4 weeks.
The Europeans asked us to work with them on how this could
be done in a way that would effectively paralyze the Sudanese
economy. They've asked us how it is that we're going to do
this, from an enforcement mechanism. We're working with them.
We've had a meeting in Washington, 3 weeks ago, on this, on a
technical level, to go through the steps needed for them to
impose parallel sanctions to what we're doing.
So, if we're going to do this, whether it's 2 weeks or 4
weeks, Senator, what's--the important thing is, it has the
necessary effect on the behavior of the Sudanese Government.
That's the purpose of this.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is over, but
I just----
The Chairman. Go ahead. Take your time.
Senator Menendez. I listened to you carefully. A hundred
and one days ago, you, on behalf of the administration,
announced plan B. Now, 2 to 3 weeks more. What does it matter
if it takes a little time? If I was sitting in those camps, I
could not stand the counsels of patience and delay. And I hope
we get to the point that we understand that. I understand about
multilateral action. But, at some point in time, we must lead.
Ambassador Natsios. I agree with you.
Senator Menendez. And it seems to me that we have not
gotten to the point where we are truly leading. And I hope that
the administration will do that sooner rather than later,
because people are dying. That's the reality.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I must say, Mr. Ambassador, it sounds like the
administration is changing its position. And I thought you said
to me that the most useful sanctions available to us were
unilateral sanctions that we could impose that weren't
available to us in the 1990s, that we're now using in Iraq--I
mean, excuse me, in Iran, and that----
Ambassador Natsios. And in North Korea.
The Chairman [continuing]. And in North Korea. And so, I'm
confused. What are these--what are these multilateral sanctions
that are going to be so consequential that you're worried, if
we acted on our own, we would lose?
Ambassador Natsios. Well, it's not that we would lose it,
but obviously our sanctions are going to affect dollarized
transactions. They're not going to affect euro transactions.
The Chairman. I got that.
Ambassador Natsios. And if we can get the Europeans to do
the same thing we're doing, it would have a much greater
impact, because they're the two currencies of the world right
now.
The Chairman. But in the meantime, a lot of people are
going to die.
Ambassador Natsios. Well----
The Chairman. I--Senator. Sorry.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, first let me say that I concur in Senator
Menendez's questions and frustration and--we've run out of
patience.
But I want to, first, thank you for your efforts. You have
kept us informed. You have relayed, I think, our message to the
players. And, I think, as a result of your efforts, lives have
been saved. And that's a record that you can be very proud of.
You've been very persistent. And I think the administration has
been strong in regards to our position on Darfur. But it lacks
a sense of urgency internationally.
This month, we will commemorate the Day of Remembrance for
the Holocaust caused by the Nazis. And since I've been in
Congress, we've seen genocide in the former Yugoslavia
Republics, in Rwanda, and now in Darfur. And we need to take
action.
The open violence may have been reduced in the Darfur
region or the Sudan, but the circumstances in the villages are
very vulnerable. The circumstances in the refugee camps are
very vulnerable. And relief workers are at extreme risk. At any
day, violence could continue and expand, and there could be
additional tragedies. And, as you've pointed out, we do have
genocidal conditions every day with people being killed,
displaced, and raped.
So, we need to move forward, at least on two fronts. One is
the plan B, the sanctions. I understand another delay--I really
don't understand another delay. I think we originally said that
we were going to impose sanctions several months ago, and that
date has passed. We can be very effective in imposing
sanctions, with or without the support of other countries.
I heard you mention some of the other--same countries, that
we are not getting the type of cooperation we need in regards
to Iran, in imposing sanctions against Iran. These are not new
issues, and there's a lot of issues on the agendas of these
countries. But one thing we can do is act, the United States
can. And we need to do that.
I want to mention a second front in which we can act, and
that is in the war crimes tribunal. We have not gotten much
help internationally on using the International Criminal
Courts. But for the action of this Congress in standing up to
Serbia and other countries, I doubt if we would have had the
type of cooperation in regards to the indictments against those
involved in the former Yugoslavia.
I think this Congress is prepared to help in regards to the
International Criminal Courts. Clearly, two indictments have
been issued, as I understand. The investigations continue. And
I don't think you can compromise these issues. I understand the
nervousness of the Sudanese Government. They should be nervous.
But this is something that cannot be compromised, because if
you compromise now, we're just going to have another problem
down the road.
So, I would just ask--we haven't had much discussion here
at this hearing on the war crimes issue. I hope that's not
being compromised, as far as our position in that regard. Those
that are culpable should be held accountable. And that we have
lost--we've run out of time on plan B. It's time to move
forward with it.
Ambassador Natsios. Well, with respect to the ICC, I--there
are people who think we should use the ICC investigation and
process as a diplomatic tool with respect to the Sudanese
Government. I don't think we should. I think we need to
separate the diplomacy of this from justice. The ICC is a
judicial process to determine whether or not people committed
acts of genocide or violations--massive violations of human
rights, and they need to prosecute people as they're going to
prosecute them.
Senator Cardin. Let me just point out, the prosecutors, if
they don't have the support of the State Department, if they
don't have the support of the diplomatic efforts, they will not
get access to the material that they need, the witnesses they
need, the preservation of the evidence that they need, and they
will not be able to do their work. So, they need your help, or
it won't happen.
Ambassador Natsios. There is a report, that was
commissioned by Colin Powell when he was Secretary of State,
that I executed for him when I was the Administrator of AID,
and we sent a team of--through an NGO associated with the
American Bar Association--of police prosecutors, lawyers, and
district attorneys, who went to Darfur--I mean, not to Darfur--
to Chad and interviewed 1,300 people who had been the victims
of these atrocities, and whose family members had been murdered
in the massive atrocities of 2003 and 2004. That report is on
the State Department Web site. I'm very--we took a lot of risk
doing it, because some of the--there are 28 officers from--this
is done through, again, a associate organization of the Bar
Association. We did it deliberately to have people with legal
degrees and prosecutorial backgrounds to do this. That evidence
is available.
Senator Cardin. I guess my frustration is that, having gone
through this in the debates with the State Department on the
issues of the--in Yugoslavia, unless we are raising these
issues directly with the Sudanese Government through whatever
sources we can--unless we let them know that the preservation
of evidence is going to be required--I understand they're
nervous about those things, but it will make it extremely
difficult to follow through on this, giving the impression to
the Sudanese that this is an issue that can be negotiated away.
Ambassador Natsios. Well, I'm--what I--that's what I argued
earlier, is, we should disentangle those war crimes tribunals
from any diplomacy, because diplomacy is where you compromise.
You shouldn't be compromising on justice. I don't think we
should have that in the--as part of the negotiation.
Senator Cardin. I agree with you on that, but you've got to
preserve the record, you've got to be--you've got to have
access in Sudan. I understand it's important to interview, in
Chad, the victims, but you also have to be on the ground in the
Sudan----
Ambassador Natsios. And you obviously have----
Senator Cardin [continuing]. In order to gather----
Ambassador Natsios. Right. I am aware of that. I've met
with people--in fact, when I was in Abeche to meet with the
rebels in January, some members of the ICC staff were there,
also searching for evidence. And so, we--I know they're there,
but, you know, again, I don't want--I don't want to get into a
position where the United States--and it's not our business,
anyway, to negotiate with the Sudanese Government over whether
these war crimes trials should go forward. That's not a
negotiable issue, as far as I'm concerned.
Senator Cardin. It is--should be on our agenda, the
cooperation with the ICC.
Ambassador Natsios. Different matter.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, this hearing, to me, sounds eerily like a
hearing that took place 14 years ago about Bosnia. And the
temporizing, the number of times you've pointed out how the--
which is no doubt, it occurs--that the rebels are engaging in
atrocities themselves. I heard that for 3 years, the last year
of the Bush administration and the first 2 years of the Clinton
administration. And yet, there is--and the question I asked
then, and I'm going to ask you now: Is the--are the atrocities
that are being carried out sanctioned by, cooperated with, or a
blind eye being turned by Khartoum, not significantly greater
than the atrocities that are occurring at the hands of the
rebels?
Ambassador Natsios. There is no equivalency whatsoever,
Senator.
The Chairman. Well, I wish you'd stop talking about it----
Ambassador Natsios. Well, I'm talking about it, Senator,
because the rebels think they can get away with this.
The Chairman. Well, I'm----
Ambassador Natsios. And it's----
The Chairman. Look, I'm----
Ambassador Natsios [continuing]. Getting worse. And what's
happening is, no one's saying anything about it, because it's
politically sensitive. We can't let any civilian----
The Chairman. No, no; it's not politically sensitive. I
mean, we went through this exercise a couple of years ago, in
coaxing out of the administration the word ``genocide.'' Why
won't you just say? Is ``genocide'' still the operative word?
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
The Chairman. It is. So, genocide is being----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Committed in Darfur.
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. All right, now----
Ambassador Natsios. Let me just add something--not a
qualification, but just the reality of what I'm trying to get
to here. We want the current lull in fighting--because there
are peaks and--you can see the casualty rates, from month to
month; they're higher; they're lower--we want ``no
casualties.'' And if you don't make a distinction between ``no
casualties'' and ``a lot of casualties,'' if everything's the
same all the time, then how do you tell people that they're
supposed to, you know, extend a period of relative stability?
We don't want, between now and the beginning of the rainy
season, any more civilian casualties on either side of the
border, both for humanitarian and human rights reasons, but
also because we believe a absence of hostilities could
facilitate the peace process between the rebels and the
government. We had that happen in the south. We want it to
happen again.
The Chairman. Well, it seems to me that the need for an
agreement between the rebels and the government gets trumped by
the attitude of Khartoum, that has virtually nothing to do with
the rebels, by Khartoum's supporting and engaging in a
systematic effort to engage in genocide. Notwithstanding the
fact you may not be able to get an agreement between the rebels
and the government, there are things we could do now that could
significantly----
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Reduce the number of casualties
that are occasioned by the Janjaweed receiving support from
Khartoum. They are distinguishable. And I am at a loss as to
why we aren't engaging in everything, including the use of
military force, to stop it. I met with the NATO commanders in
Europe. I then spent time with the Supreme Allied Commander of
Europe, prior to General Jones leaving. I was told that we had
the physical capability of essentially shutting down the
Janjaweed now, that it would take somewhere around 2,500
troops, that if we were to argue strenuously, within the
confines of NATO, for such a force and the imposition of a no-
fly zone, we could radically change the situation on the
ground. That does not get you a settlement, but it does have
the ancillary benefit of stopping thousands upon thousands of
people of being slaughtered and/or left to be slaughtered.
So, I find the desire to have a comprehensive settlement--
or, it kind of reminds me, if I can use a terrible metaphor--
it's kind of like someone is on the table, bleeding to death,
and they have incurable cancer, and the doctors stand there and
say, ``Now, unless we can come up with a holistic approach to
this and figure out how to not only stop the bleeding, but cure
this patient of cancer, we should hang on and wait until we get
an overall plan here.''
People are bleeding to death now. There are--the camps that
I visited, you could see it. When I walked into the camp in
Chad on the Darfur border of the northernmost camp at the time,
I stunned, I later learned--I didn't realize I stunned
anybody--but I stunned the U.N. personnel there by insisting I
meet with only the women. And the men did not like that at all.
And I insisted that happen. And once I got a group of, I don't
know how many, women in one of the tents, it took a while, but
then they started talking about what was happening to them.
It's happening as we speak right now. Nothing has fundamentally
changed.
And so, you know, it's kind of like--the analogy I'd make
is, the patient's bleeding on the table, and we talk about
making sure that everything's going to be OK, not just--let's
stop the bleeding. Let's stop the bleeding, or do everything in
our power to stop the bleeding unilaterally.
And I must tell you--well, I won't tell you. I think it's a
moral imperative to do that. But I got the same arguments. You
know, it's interesting, when we acted--finally acted in Bosnia,
and we finally acted in Kosovo, we did it unilaterally first.
Everybody talks about how this is--well, that's a bunch of
malarkey. It was finally unilaterally we did it. We acted
responsibly and morally, and the rest of the civilized world
had to respond. I would argue the same thing would happen here.
I think we could embarrass our European allies into acting more
responsibly. And I think it's not only time not to take force
off the table, I think it's time to put force on the table and
use it, and use it now.
But--and I acknowledge, that will not solve the situation,
but it will mean there will be 10, 100, 500, 1,000, 2,000,
5,000, 15,000 women who will not be raped, children who will
not die, and people who will not be just murdered, just
indiscriminately.
But you don't need to hear that--I think you do need to
hear that from me, but I don't expect that it will have much
impact. But I just want to be clear. I think it is genocide, we
can act now, and we should act now. If the President were
asking me, if I were Secretary of State, I would use American
force now. But that's me.
Anyone have anything they'd like to say before--or would
you? I'd invite you, if you want to make any--I don't expect
you to make a closing comment, but you're welcome to, if you'd
like.
Ambassador Natsios. Well, I would just comment on what you
just said, Senator.
I went through Bosnia, myself, because, at the beginning of
it, I ran the relief effort there for the U.S. Government, and
then I worked in the NGO community there.
The Chairman. Remember the arguments--if I--don't mind me
interrupting--I remember sitting with Lord Owen, saying, ``You
know, we can't use force, because--guess what? We may
jeopardize the British forces on the ground. We may jeopardize
those forces on the ground.'' We were talking about
jeopardizing military force by using force. And now, we're
using an adjunct to that. It is true, the use of force will
jeopardize the NGOs on the ground. But the NGOs are already
jeopardized. They're in tough shape right now. And I'm anxious
to hear the other witnesses, but I don't get as--I won't say
``rosy,'' that wouldn't be fair--as optimistic a picture of
what's happening on the ground today, and the last month, and
hopefully the next month, as you seem to think exists. But--you
have more access to information than I do, but it's not my
impression.
But, anyway, go--I'm sorry to interrupt you, but----
Ambassador Natsios. The atrocities stopped in Bosnia when
we had Dayton. We need a Dayton Accord for Darfur and----
The Chairman. You know how we got Dayton? We got Dayton
because we used force.
Ambassador Natsios. Yes.
The Chairman. That's why we got Dayton. This malarkey of--
this whole notion about how we're rewriting history--we got
Dayton because we used force and we killed bad guys. That's
what we did. And we got Kosovo because we were prepared and
made it clear to Milosevic we were ready to kill him. That's
how we got it.
I'm not big on killing people, but, I tell you what, this
is incredible, what's happening. And I promise you--I promise
you, we're all going to sit here, 5 and 10 years from now, and
we're going to be saying, ``Why didn't we do the things that we
can do?'' There's risk involved, but the risk is relatively low
compared to the absolute devastation that's taking place, and
continuing to.
Anyway, I apologize. I just think we're temporizing
everything much too much.
I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Natsios. Thank you.
The Chairman. Our next witnesses will come, as a panel,
please. The Honorable Susan E. Rice, senior fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies and Global Economy and Development
Programs, at the Brookings Institution--it's good to see Susan
again, I've worked with her in another incarnation; and the
Honorable Lawrence G. Rossin, senior international coordinator,
Save Darfur Coalition. I thank you both for being here. And--
oh, I'm sorry, it's not--where's my list here? I'm about to
leave off the third witness. Sorry. I beg your pardon, Doctor.
Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa Program, Center
for Strategic International Studies, Washington, DC. I thank
you all. I apologize, Doctor. I didn't--couldn't find my second
page here.
If the witnesses will make their statements in the order in
which they were called, we'd appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN E. RICE, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES AND GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be
back before this committee.
And I want to begin by thanking you and your colleagues for
the opportunity to testify, but also, more importantly, for
your leadership, on a bipartisan and bicameral basis, to call
attention to the genocide in Darfur and to make your leadership
felt in the effort to try to end this.
I would like to submit my entire testimony for the record
and summarize it here.
The Chairman. Without objection, the entire statement will
be made part of the record.
Dr. Rice. In spite of repeated threats, the so-called plan
B, the Government of Sudan, as you pointed out, and as your
colleagues pointed out, continues to kill with impunity.
Khartoum still has not accepted U.N. troops as part of a hybrid
force. The sad truth is, the United States continues to be
taunted, and our conditions continue to be flaunted, by the
Sudanese Government. Plan B is long past its sell-by date, and
it's getting staler by the day.
Why do you suppose, as you asked, that the administration
is equivocating, it is temporizing? Why would it, yet again,
issue threats to the Sudanese regime, and then fail to follow
through on them? Well, I think we got a clue here this morning.
I think there's real equivocation inside the administration as
to whether or not we are witnessing a continuing genocide. It
took nearly 2 hours for Mr. Natsios to acknowledge, under
pressure, that, in fact, genocide continues to occur in Darfur.
If you go back and look at the President's State of the Union
Address when he mentioned Darfur, the word ``genocide'' was
conspicuously absent.
A related explanation is that the administration views
what's going on in Darfur primarily as another civil conflict
in Africa, and one that requires, principally, a political
solution. As you pointed out, it's obvious that there are rebel
groups operating in Darfur, that these groups have attacked
civilians and peacekeepers, and that the splintering and
disunity among these groups hampers political negotiations.
It's also obvious that a long-term solution in Darfur will
require political accommodation and reconciliation.
But negotiations cannot end a genocide. Genocide is not a
mere counterinsurgency tactic. Genocide results from the
conscious decision of one party to a conflict to seek to
eliminate, in whole or part, another group. This is the choice
that the Sudanese Government has made in the context of Darfur,
and there are only two ways to end a genocide, either to apply
powerful enough pressures or incentives to persuade the
perpetrators of genocide to stop, which we have not done, or to
protect those who are the potential victims of genocide,
physically protect them. A negotiated solution would do
neither, though it's necessary, ultimately, to resolve the
underlying conflict.
Another explanation is that the administration simply does
not have a coherent Darfur policy. In fact, the U.S. approach
to the genocide in Darfur can be characterized as
simultaneously anemic and constipated. The coming and going of
deadlines, the shifting of personnel assignments, are all
indicative of the fact that we have no comprehensive strategy
for stopping the killing.
This week, Deputy Secretary Negroponte is traveling to
Khartoum and Libya and Chad to take yet another stab at
negotiations with the Sudanese junta. Undoubtedly, Ambassador
Negroponte will discover what Secretary Rice and Bob Zoellick
and Jendayi Frazer and Andrew Natsios and Kofi Annan and
Governor Richardson have all discovered before him, Khartoum's
word means little or nothing. The Sudanese Government cannot be
trusted to keep its promises, nor to take concrete action to
stop the killing. And yet, while U.S. officials relearn old
lessons, Khartoum is using diplomacy as a foil to continue the
genocide.
One has to wonder how the administration can explain to the
dead, the nearly dead, and the soon-to-be dead people of Darfur
that, at the end of the day, even after we declare that
genocide is occurring, even after we repeatedly insist that
we're committed to stopping it, the United States continues to
stand by while the killing persists. This genocide has endured
not for 100 days, not for 1,000 days, but for 4 long years,
and, as has been pointed out, it's destabilizing Chad and the
Central African Republic. The whole region is being enveloped.
What we are witnessing, Mr. Chairman, is, in fact, part of
a 3-year pattern. The administration talks tough, and then does
little more than provide generous humanitarian assistance. It
blusters, and then, in the face of Sudanese intransigence or
empty promises, the administration retreats.
Last August, the United States got U.N. authorization for a
robust chapter 7 force, 22,000 peacekeepers with a mandate to
protect civilians. In September, the President appointed Mr.
Natsios and promised tough consequences if Khartoum didn't
accept the U.N. force mandated by the Security Council. But
then, in November, Mr. Natsios joined the United Nations, the
African Union, and European leaders in preemptively
capitulating to Khartoum. To win Sudan's acquiescence, the
United States and others jettisoned the robust U.N. force and
embraced a fallback, a smaller, weaker Africa Union/United
Nations hybrid force. And then, in December, with us leading
the way, the Security Council backed down and embraced the
hybrid.
Let's be plain about what we have lost in the process. The
hybrid would be 17,000 troops, as opposed to the 22,000 that
the United Nations proposed. The mandate would come from the
African Union, which Khartoum readily manipulates. It would
draw its troops primarily from Africa, but, overstretched by
deployments to hotspots all over the continent, Africa has very
little peacekeeping capacity to spare. The hybrid would have
U.N. funding, but it would suffer from many of the same dual
key problems that plagued the United Nations and NATO in the
Balkans in the 1990s. Unfortunately, this hybrid is an ill-
conceived, shortsighted, and, in fact, failed expedient to
appease, yet again, the perpetrators of genocide.
This is, by any measure, a collective shame, and it's
interesting that the American people know it, and Congress
knows it. By all accounts, nobody likes it.
A December Newsweek poll, as well as a poll released last
week by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the
University of Maryland, found that 65 percent of Americans--65
percent of Americans--support sending U.S. troops as part of an
international force to Darfur.
Mr. Chairman, the time for fruitless negotiations has long
since passed. They're simply buying time for Khartoum to
continue the killing. If the administration were serious about
halting this 4-year-old genocide and protecting civilians in
Darfur, it would act now to show Khartoum that we're done
talking and we're ready to turn the screws.
We should take four steps:
Step one: The President should issue an executive order
now, implementing all of the financial measures in plan B. The
administration should couple these unilateral sanctions with a
sustained push for tough U.N. sanctions, including those that
target Sudan's oil sector. And we should dare China, or any
other permanent member of the Security Council, to accept the
blame for vetoing effective action to halt a genocide.
Step two: The Bush administration should state clearly that
these financial penalties will not be lifted unless, and until,
the Sudanese Government permanently and verifiably stops all
air and ground attacks, and allows the full and unfettered
deployment of the U.N. force authorized in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1706. It's time to tell Khartoum that it has
a simple choice: Accept the U.N. force, as mandated in that
resolution, or face escalating U.S. pressure.
Step three: This Congress should swiftly adopt new
legislation on Darfur. That legislation should authorize the
President to stop the genocide in Darfur, including by imposing
a no-fly zone, bombing aircraft, airfields, and the regime's
military and intelligence assets. It should authorize funds to
upgrade the airfield in Abeche, in Chad, with the agreement of
the Chadian Government, in order to support potential NATO air
operations, facilitate a U.N. deployment to Chad and Darfur,
and for humanitarian relief purposes. The legislation should
urge the administration to press for the deployment of U.N.
peacekeepers to Chad and Central African Republic and their
borders. It should impose capital market sanctions on companies
investing in Sudan. It should freeze Sudanese Government assets
and those of key military, government, and Janjaweed leaders
and their families, and prohibit their travel to the United
States. And the legislation, importantly, should require the
administration to report, every 30 days, in classified and
unclassified form, on the military, financial, and covert steps
it's prepared to take to compel the Government of Sudan to
accept, unconditionally, a robust force.
Step four: If within 15 days of the issuance of the plan B
executive order, the Government of Sudan has failed to meet
these basic conditions, the Bush administration should be
prepared to use force. The purpose of the use of force would be
to compel Khartoum to accept the robust U.N. force and stop
killing civilians.
What I wrote 6 months ago with Anthony Lake and Congressman
Donald Payne in the Washington Post, I'm afraid still applies
today, many lives later. We said it's time, again, to get tough
with Sudan. The United States should press for a chapter 7 U.N.
resolution that issues Sudan an ultimatum: Accept the
unconditional deployment of the U.N. force or face military
consequences. The resolution would authorize enforcement by
U.N. member states, collectively or individually. The United
States, preferably with NATO involvement and African political
support, would strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft, and other
military assets. International military pressure would continue
until Sudan relents. And then the U.N. force would deploy. If
the United States fails to gain U.N. support, we should act
without it, as we did in 1999 in the case of Kosovo, to
confront a far lesser humanitarian crisis, when perhaps about
10,000 people had already died, as opposed to the estimated
450,000 who have died in Darfur.
So, the real question--the moral question--is this: Will we
use force to save Africans in Darfur, as we did to save
Europeans in Kosovo?
Now, I know, Mr. Chairman, that this is a controversial
proposal. There are many good reasons that people have offered
to shy away from the use of force.
Some argue that using force in the current political
context is untenable, particularly against another Islamic
government. Some will reject it, even if the objective of the
use of force is to save innocent Muslim lives.
Others say, ``We can't possibly take on another military
mission, we're overstretched.'' True. But what we're proposing
would involve primarily the Air Force, which has relatively
more capacity than other branches of our services.
Others say that, without the consent of the United Nations
or a relevant regional body, we'd be breaking international
law. But recall that the Security Council, last year, codified
a new international norm on the responsibility to protect,
which committed member states to decisive action, including
enforcement, when peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or
crimes against humanity.
Now, some advocates prefer the imposition of a no-fly zone.
And I want to say that that is a very viable and legitimate
option. Some seem to view it as a less aggressive option than
bombing Sudanese assets. But let's be clear what a no-fly zone
entails. Maintaining a no-fly zone would require an asset-
intensive, 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, open-ended military
commitment in a logistically difficult context. To protect the
no-fly area, the air CAP would have to disable or shoot down
any aircraft that took off in the zone. It would mean shutting
down Sudanese airfields in and near Darfur to all but
humanitarian traffic. In short, it would require, very soon,
many of the same steps that are necessary to conduct the air
strikes we recommend, and then some. So, while I think it's a
fine option, I'm not sure it's a lesser option.
And, finally, humanitarian organizations have expressed the
concern that air strikes could disrupt humanitarian operations
or cause the Sudanese Government to intensify attacks on the
ground against civilians in camps. Now, this is a very
legitimate concern. But there are ways to mitigate these risks.
The targets could be selected to avoid airfields used by
humanitarian agencies in Darfur. To protect civilians at risk,
the United States and other NATO countries could position a
light quick-reaction force in Chad to deter and respond to any
increased attacks on camps in Darfur or Chad. And, while the
risks may be mitigated, we have to acknowledge that they can't
be eliminated.
Yet, we also have to acknowledge the daily cost of the
status quo, of a feckless policy characterized by bluster and
retreat. That cost has been, and will continue to be, thousands
and thousands and thousands more lives each month, and other
thousands more as we wait for 2 to 4 more weeks for Ban Ki-moon
to exhaust his diplomacy. That is a cost--the other cost is a
regime--the Khartoum regime--that has literally gotten away
with murder while the United States merely remonstrates.
I would submit, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, that that cost
is too high. Too many people have already died. Too many more
are soon to die. It leaves one wondering when, if ever, the
Bush administration will decide that enough is finally enough.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Susan E. Rice, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Studies and Global Economy and Development Programs, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the vitally important issue of the
escalating crisis in Darfur. Let me also take this opportunity to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and many of your colleagues in both Houses and on
both sides of the aisle for your committed leadership in trying to halt
the ongoing genocide in Darfur. I commend your efforts to enable all
the people of Sudan to live in peace, free from persecution on the
basis of their race, religion, or ethnicity. You have every reason to
be proud of your record on this issue, and many of us are counting on
you to continue to lead to save innocent lives.
where's plan b?
I feel compelled to begin with a simple observation: Today is the
11th of April, 2007. The genocide in Darfur has lasted 4 years and
counting. An estimated 450,000 people are dead. More than 2.5 million
have been displaced or rendered refugees. Every day, the situation
worsens. One hundred and one days have come and gone since the
expiration of the very public deadline the President's Special Envoy
Andrew Natsios set at my very own Brookings Institution. Last year, on
November 20, Natsios promised that harsh consequences would befall the
Government of Sudan, if by January 1, 2007, it failed to meet two very
clear conditions. First, Khartoum must accept unequivocally the full
deployment of a 17,000 person United Nations-African Union ``hybrid''
force. And, second, it must stop killing innocent civilians.
In spite of this threat--the so-called ``plan B''--the Government
of Sudan continues to kill with impunity. Khartoum still has not
accepted U.N. troops as part of a hybrid force. Bashir sent a letter
late last December to Kofi Annan implying his acquiescence to U.N.
troops--but offering no explicit acceptance. The next day Sudan's
Ambassador to the United Nations ruled out any U.N. forces. Sudan keeps
playing this bait and switch game to its advantage, and the United
States keeps being played. And, still, no plan B.
In early February, the Washington Post reported, and Natsios
confirmed, a leaked story that the President had finally approved
``plan B''--a three-stage punitive package that could begin with the
United States blocking Sudan's oil revenue. This ``plan B'' should have
been implemented swiftly, not leaked. This kind of leak gives Sudan
advance warning, enabling it to try to evade sanctions.
Still, it remains unclear what the ``three tiers'' of the
administration's plan B are. In testimony in February before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Envoy Natsios revealed nothing of
the substance or timing of plan B. One cannot help but wonder: Is there
any beef behind the administration's repeated threats? We have no idea
if the promised penalties will ever be implemented and, if so, whether
they would be powerful enough to change Khartoum's calculus.
The sad truth is: The United States continues to be taunted, and
our conditions continue to be flaunted by the Sudanese Government. Plan
B is long past its sell-by date and getting staler by the day.
In January, a bipartisan group of 26 U.S. Senators wrote to
President Bush saying ``We appreciate your administration's efforts at
aggressive diplomacy and negotiation, but it seems clear that the
Sudanese are not responding to such tactics.'' The Senators insisted
``. . . the time has come to begin implementing more assertive
measures.''
In March, a bipartisan group of 31 Senators reiterated the call for
action in another letter to President Bush urging that the
administration ask the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions on the
Sudanese Government. Many members of this committee correctly argued
that ``a threatened veto should not silence us'' and that we should
``let a country stand before the community of nations and announce that
it is vetoing the best effort we can muster to build the leverage
necessary to end ongoing mass murder.'' Yet, to date, the Bush
administration has failed to press for tough action against the
Sudanese Government at the U.N. Security Council.
Worse still are this administration's diversionary tactics--
recently asserting that Sudan had accepted, in principle, so-called
Phase III--the full deployment of the hybrid force, including its U.N.
elements. In fact, the Sudanese made no such clear commitment, not even
in principle. The State Department's spokesman said some weeks ago that
the administration will defer further consideration of any punitive
measures until after the United Nations is ready to deploy all its
forces for the hybrid mission. In other words, the new due date for
consideration of plan B, may be months away at the earliest, and may
occur only if the Sudanese block deployment of U.N. forces once they
are fully ready to go.
In testimony before the Senate in February, Secretary Rice went
even further in ratcheting down the pressure on Khartoum. In response
to you, Mr, Chairman, when you said ``I think we should use force now
and we should impose [a no-fly zone],'' Secretary Rice took the option
of unilateral U.S. military action off the table, noting its
``considerable downsides.'' She made no mention of the ``considerable
downsides'' of allowing genocide to continue unabated.
Perhaps that is because the administration appears to have reversed
itself and decided that genocide is not happening in Darfur. Quoted in
the Georgetown Voice, Natsios told a student group that: ``The ongoing
crisis in Darfur is no longer a genocide situation'' but that
``genocide had previously occurred in Darfur.'' President Bush
conspicuously failed to use the term ``genocide'' when speaking of
Darfur in his latest State of the Union Address. Such language games
shock the conscience, especially given recent escalating attacks on
civilians and aid workers.
Reflect on what's at stake. If any progress at all has been made on
the subject of Darfur, it is that we in the United States have gotten
past the debate about whether this is, or is not, a genocide. To
regress, to reopen this issue, is to further slow-roll any action, to
reduce any sense of urgency, and to allow more and more people to
continue dying. Make no mistake: Darfur has been a genocide. It
continues to be a genocide. And unless the United States leads the
world in halting the killing, it will remain a genocide.
Why do you suppose the administration is equivocating and
temporizing? Why would it reopen old debates? Why would it, yet again,
issue threats to the Sudanese regime and fail to follow through on
them? What damage is done to our interests, to our credibility, to our
already diminished international standing by the administration's
seemingly empty threats?
One possible explanation is that the administration accepts
Khartoum's line that what is occurring in Darfur is a complex civil
conflict that requires primarily a political solution. It is obvious
that there are rebel groups operating in Darfur, that these groups have
attacked civilians and peacekeepers, and that the splintering and
disunity amongst these groups hampers political negotiations. It is
also obvious that a long-term solution in Darfur will require political
accommodation and reconciliation.
However, negotiations cannot end a genocide: Genocide is not a mere
counterinsurgency tactic. Genocide results from the conscious decision
of one party to a conflict to seek to eliminate another distinct group
in whole or in part. This is the choice the Sudanese Government made in
the case of Darfur. There are only two ways to end a genocide: To apply
powerful enough pressures or inducements to persuade the perpetrators
of genocide to stop; or to protect those who are the potential victims
of genocide. A negotiated solution would do neither, though it is
necessary, ultimately, to resolve the underlying conflict.
Yet, diplomacy takes time. Political negotiations require patience,
coordinated pressure and energetic diplomacy married with the credible
threat of powerful sanctions and the use of force. While the
administration negotiates without credibly threatening more powerful
action, Khartoum continues the killing at an alarming pace. America's
principal priority in Darfur must be to stop the suffering and killing,
and to do so quickly.
Another explanation for the administration's dithering is that they
simply do not have a coherent Darfur policy. In fact, the U.S. approach
to the genocide in Darfur has been simultaneously anemic and
constipated. The coming and going of deadlines and the shifting
personnel assignments are indicative of the fact that we have no
comprehensive strategy for stopping the killing.
This week, Deputy Secretary Negroponte is traveling to Khartoum to
take yet another stab at negotiations with the Sudanese junta.
Undoubtedly, Ambassador Negroponte will learn for himself what Condi
Rice, Robert Zoellick, Jendayi Frazer, Andrew Natsios, Kofi Annan, and
Bill Richardson have discovered all before him: Khartoum's word means
nothing. The Sudanese Government cannot be trusted to keep its promises
nor to take concrete steps to end the killing. Yet, while U.S.
officials relearn old lessons, Khartoum is using diplomacy as a foil to
continue the genocide.
How can the administration explain to the dead, the nearly dead,
and the soon to be dead people of Darfur that, at the end of the day--
even after we declare that genocide is occurring, even after we insist
repeatedly that we are committed to stopping it--the United States
continues to stand by while killing persists. This genocide has endured
now, not for 100 days, not for 1,000 days, but for 4 long years.
In January, the United Nations reported that the situation in
Darfur was deteriorating rapidly. December 2006 was the worst month in
Darfur in over 2 years. This nadir followed 6 months of escalating
violence--a period which coincided with Khartoum's bid to expel the
African Union force, to block the U.N. deployment and to throw its
killing machine into high gear. Rebel activity has also increased, and
their violence is harming civilians and humanitarian agents. In those 6
months: 30 humanitarian compounds suffered attacks; 12 aid workers were
killed, and over 400 were forced to relocate. On December 18, four aid
organizations were attacked at a massive refugee camp housing 130,000
at Gereida in South Darfur. All humanitarian operations there ceased,
and innocent people went weeks without food shipments. Sudanese
aircraft have attacked rebel-held areas and killed many innocent
civilians.
At the same time, the fighting in Darfur is destabilizing
neighboring Chad and Central African Republic. Khartoum has backed
rebels that seek to overthrow these governments. Indeed, this past
week, 65 people were killed and 70 wounded by Janjaweed militias in
Chad. U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes
reported last week that, since the fall of 2006, the number of
displaced persons in eastern Chad has risen from 50,000 to 140,000; the
number of displaced people in the northeast of the Central African
Republic has grown from 50,000 to 212,000. The UNHCR is now reporting
that refugees from Chad are actually spilling into Darfur. The security
situation along these borders is so bad that the United Nations is
reluctant to deploy forces there without an effective cease-fire.
The administration has been slow to recognize the impending
collapse in Chad and CAR. The administration's FY 2008 budget request
includes a scant $100,000 of assistance for the Central African
Republic, this is a decrease from FY 2006's meager $670,000
appropriation. The requests for Chad are somewhat more robust--totaling
$5.3 million, most of which is food aid; however neither country is
likely to receive the money to avert worsening political, security, and
humanitarian conditions. The U.N.'s John Holmes estimates that the
United Nations will require $174 million for humanitarian assistance in
Chad and $54 million in the Central African Republic. While this will
require a global effort, the United States should be leading efforts to
provide this money.
As the humanitarian situation in these countries worsens, I begin
to worry that, in the absence of swift action to stop the genocide in
Darfur and stabilize the region, we may be forced to change the
advocacy campaigns from ``Save Darfur'' to ``Save Central Africa.'' I
commend Senator Feingold and others who introduced Senate Resolution
76, which calls on the administration to press for a U.N. force on the
Chadian side of the border and to ``develop, fund, and implement a
comprehensive regional strategy in Africa to protect civilians,
facilitate humanitarian operations, contain and reduce violence, and
contribute to conditions for sustainable peace in eastern Chad, the
Central African republic, and Darfur.'' As you recognize, the
disastrous implications of another round of cancerous violence spilling
from one country to another are too numerous to catalog here. At the
same time, we cannot allow the search for a comprehensive political
solution to a complex regional crisis to slow us from stopping the
ongoing genocide in Darfur. Both efforts must proceed in tandem, but
the stopping of mass murder must be the most urgent task.
bluster and retreat
Instead, what we are witnessing is part of a 3-year pattern: The
administration talks tough and then does little more than provide
generous humanitarian assistance. It blusters and, then, in the face of
Sudanese intransigence or empty promises, the administration retreats.
When the rebels started fighting in Darfur in February 2003, the
administration at first chose to ignore it. Despite the rampaging
reprisals of Janjaweed killers and rapists, the torching of whole
villages, the wanton bombing of innocent civilians and massive
humanitarian suffering, the administration was slow to act. It seems to
have calculated that pressing the Government of Sudan to halt its
customary scorched earth tactics in Darfur ran counter to our interests
in getting Khartoum's cooperation on counterterrorism, which began
abruptly after September 11, 2001. Confronting the genocide, the
administration calculated, might also jeopardize U.S. efforts to cajole
the regime to sign a north-south peace agreement with the SPLM.
But by 2004, the human toll was mounting. On the 10th anniversary
of the Rwandan genocide, many noted the contrast between the hollow
pledges in many capitals of ``never again'' and the dying in Darfur.
With, a Presidential campaign underway, Congress and Democratic
candidates went on the record characterizing the atrocities as
genocide. This prompted the administration to decide, belatedly, that
its comparative silence was deafening. Secretary Powell and Kofi Annan
visited Darfur and obtained hollow promises from Bashir that his
Government would disarm the Janjaweed, allow unfettered humanitarian
access and permit an African Union force to deploy.
Yet, predictably, the killing and dying continued. Over the summer
of 2004, Secretary Powell ordered a comprehensive investigation of the
atrocities, drawing upon hundreds of firsthand accounts from victims
and witnesses. Faced with the evidence, Secretary Powell embraced the
investigators conclusions: Genocide was taking place. To his credit, he
testified that effect, and the President in September powerfully
repeated that judgment before the U.N. General Assembly. But then,
again, the administration did nothing effective to stop the killing.
With Western encouragement, the African Union mounted its first
ever peacekeeping mission--in Darfur. To seasoned analysts, this
approach was clearly flawed from the start: The nascent AU could not
hope to secure millions of people at risk in an area the size of
France. Hobbled by a weak mandate, perpetual troop shortages, an
uncertain funding stream, and little institutional backup at a brand
new regional organization, the AU was bound to fall short, despite its
best intentions. It was slow to deploy, but deploy it did--with U.S.
and NATO logistical and financial support.
The African Union has been the target of a lot of criticism for its
shortcomings in Darfur. I think unfairly so. While the United States
blusters, the African Union forces have been the only ones willing to
take bullets to save Darfurians. Just this past month 5 Senegalese
soldiers died guarding a water point in Darfur, this brought the total
number of AU soldiers killed in Darfur since 2004 to 15. These
courageous soldiers are part of a force that has deployed without
adequate international support and under constant restrictions imposed
by Khartoum. They have saved thousands of lives and we owe them our
honor and gratitude. Their presence also provided the United States
with a ready, if cynical, foil for declaring the genocide under
control. It wasn't.
By 2005, the AU finally fielded almost 7,000 troops. It pledged to
add another 6,000 within a year. It couldn't. By then, it was obvious
to all: The African Union was in over its head. Many experts, I among
them, pled for NATO to step in, with U.S. support, to augment the AU
force. Those calls went unheeded. Certain African leaders continued to
insist on ``African solutions to African problems.'' It was a
convenient conspiracy of absolution, which enabled Washington to claim
that further U.S. action was not desired. The Africans were
responsible. But genocide is not and never will be an African
responsibility. It is a human responsibility, requiring the concerted
efforts of all humanity to halt decisively. To date, we have not.
In 2005, Secretary Rice visited Darfur, and Deputy Secretary
Zoellick began took over the U.S. negotiating effort. In early 2006,
the AU itself accepted reality and recommended that the U.N. subsume
its force and take over its mission. In parallel, Mr. Zoellick was
trying to nail a peace agreement before he left the State Department.
His efforts culminated in May 2006, in the signing of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA).
This deal was doomed before the ink on it was dry. It left out two
key rebel groups. The one that signed did so under extreme duress--one
day after its leader's brother was killed by the regime. Moreover,
Khartoum made little in the way of power-sharing concessions to the
rebels; there was no firm requirement that the Government accept a U.N.
peacekeeping force. There were rewards secretly pledged for Khartoum
like the lifting of U.S. sanctions and a White House visit, but no
penalties for noncompliance. As many feared, the cease-fire collapsed
almost immediately. The rebels fractured. The killing intensified, and
the people of Darfur suffered more.
After Zoellick left State, U.S. policy foundered. But, by late
August 2006, it seemed back on track. The United States obtained U.N.
authorization for a robust Chapter VII force for Darfur--22,000
peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians. In September,
President Bush and Secretary Rice visited the U.N. General Assembly.
They appointed Andrew Natsios Special Envoy and promised tough
consequences, if Khartoum did not accept the U.N. force mandated by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706.
Mr. Natsios went to work. By November in Addis Ababa, he had joined
the United Nations, African Union, and European leaders in preemptively
capitulating to Khartoum. In an effort to win Sudan's acquiescence, the
United States and others jettisoned the robust U.N. force and embraced
a fall-back: A smaller, weaker, AU-U.N. ``hybrid'' force. In December,
the U.N. Security Council, with the United States leading the way,
abandoned Resolution 1706 and endorsed the Addis agreement.
This hybrid force is to be 17,000 troops versus the 22,000 called
for in United Nations Resolution 1706. It would derive its mandate from
the African Union, which Khartoum readily manipulates. It is to draw
its troops principally from Africa. But overstretched by deployments to
hotspots all over the continent, Africa has very little peacekeeping
capacity to spare. The hybrid would enjoy U.N. funding but suffer from
the same ``dual-key'' problems that plagued the United Nations and NATO
in the Balkans in the 1990s.
One of the greatest shortcomings of the hybrid force is that each
and every aspect of it must be negotiated by all the parties involved.
As negotiations persist, people in Darfur die. On March 29 at the Arab
League Summit in Riyadh, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon reportedly
won Khartoum's acceptance in principle of phase two of the UN-AU
deployment. On Monday, experts from the United Nations met with
Sudanese officials and appear to have worked out terms for deploying
the U.N. ``heavy support package,'' but not the hybrid force itself.
Secretary Ban plans to meet with AU Chief Executive Alpha Oumar Konare
on April 16 to discuss how to move forward. In the interim, innocent
civilians remain at grave risk without adequate protection. While
Secretary Ban's diplomatic efforts are laudable, they have far fallen
short of delivering what is so urgently needed a robust international
force, led by the United Nations that is capable of stopping the
genocide in Darfur.
In reality, the ``hybrid'' is an ill-conceived, short-sighted and
failed expedient to appease, yet again, the perpetrators of genocide.
How perverse is it that the United States is expending all of its
diplomatic capital politely negotiating the terms of a hybrid force
that falls well short of what is needed to halt the genocide?
As the back and forth with Sudan persists, U.S.-imposed deadlines
have come and gone. Khartoum continues to lead the international
community through a diplomatic dance that defies definition. Darfurians
continue to die. Chadians continue to die. The region is coming
unglued.
This is, by any measure, a collective shame. The American people
know it. And, by all accounts, they don't much like it. A December
Newsweek poll as well as a PIPA poll released last week found that 65
percent of Americans support sending U.S. troops, as part of an
international force, to Darfur.
the way forward
The time for fruitless and feckless negotiations has long since
passed. However well-intentioned the mediators, negotiations only serve
Khartoum's interests--in diverting international attention and delaying
meaningful international action. They buy Khartoum time to continue the
killing.
If the administration were serious about halting this 4-year-old
genocide and protecting civilians in Darfur, it would act now to show
Khartoum that we are done talking and are ready to turn the screws.
We should take the following four steps:
Step One: The President should issue an executive order
implementing the financial measures in plan B immediately. The order
should include safeguards to ensure that revenue flows to the
Government of South Sudan remain unaffected. Given the leak of plan B,
the President should act now or risk squandering the potentially
significant impact of these measures. The administration should couple
unilateral sanctions with a sustained push for tough U.N. sanctions,
including those that target the oil sector. The United States should
then dare China or another permanent member to accept the blame for
vetoing effective action to halt a genocide.
Step Two: The Bush administration should state clearly that these
financial penalties will not be lifted unless and until the Sudanese
Government permanently and verifiably stops all air and ground attacks
and allows the full and unfettered deployment of the U.N. force
authorized under UNSC Resolution 1706. The United States should declare
the so-called ``hybrid'' force dead and take it off the negotiating
table. The hybrid was an unfortunate concession to Khartoum, which
Khartoum has been foolish enough not to embrace. It's time to tell
Khartoum that it has a simple choice: Accept the U.N. force as mandated
by Resolution 1706 or face escalating pressure from the United States.
Step Three: The 110th Congress should swiftly adopt new legislation
on Darfur. It should build upon a bill introduced in the last Congress
by Representative Payne, which garnered the bipartisan support of over
100 cosponsors. The new legislation should:
Authorize the President to stop the genocide in Darfur,
including by imposing a no-fly zone, bombing aircraft,
airfields and the regime's military and intelligence assets.
Authorize funds to upgrade Abeche Airfield in Chad, with the
agreement of the Government of Chad, in order to support
potential NATO air operations, to facilitate a U.N. deployment
to Chad and Darfur, and for humanitarian purposes.
Urge the administration to press for the deployment of U.N.
peacekeepers to the borders of Chad and the Central African
Republic to protect civilians and serve as advance elements for
the U.N. force in Darfur authorized under UNSCR 1706.
Impose capital market sanctions on companies investing in
Sudan.
Freeze the Sudanese Government assets and those of key
Sudanese military, government, and Janjaweed leaders and their
families. Prohibit their travel to the United States.
And, require the administration to report every 30 days (in
unclassified and classified form) on the financial, military,
and covert steps it is prepared to take to compel the GOS to
accept unconditionally a robust U.N. force and halt attacks on
civilians.
Step Four: If within 15 days of the issuance of the ``plan B''
executive order, the Government of Sudan has failed to meet these
conditions, the Bush administration should use force to compel Khartoum
to admit a robust U.N. force and stop killing civilians.
What I wrote with Anthony Lake and Donald Payne in the Washington
Post on October 2, 2006, still applies 6 months, and thousands of lives
later:
History demonstrates there is one language Khartoum
understands: The credible threat or use of force. It's time
again to get tough with Sudan. The United States should press
for a Chapter VII U.N. resolution that issues Sudan an
ultimatum: Accept the unconditional deployment of the U.N.
force within 1 week, or face military consequences. The
resolution would authorize enforcement by U.N. member states,
collectively or individually. International military pressure
would continue until Sudan relents. The United States,
preferably with NATO involvement and African political support,
would strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft, and other military
assets. They could blockade Port Sudan, through which Sudan's
oil exports flow. Then, the U.N. force would deploy--by force,
if necessary, with U.S. and NATO backing.
If the United States fails to gain U.N. support, we should
act without it as it did in 1999 in Kosovo--to confront a
lesser humanitarian crisis (perhaps 10,000 killed) and a much
more formidable adversary. The real question is this: Will we
use force to save Africans in Darfur as we did to save
Europeans in Kosovo?
Not surprisingly, our proposal has been controversial.
Some argue that it is unthinkable in the current context. True, the
international climate is less forgiving than it was in 1999 when we
acted in Kosovo. Iraq and torture scandals have left many abroad
doubting our motives and legitimacy. Some will reject any future U.S.
military action, especially against an Islamic regime, even if purely
to halt genocide against Muslim civilians. Sudan has also threatened
that al-Qaeda will attack non-African forces in Darfur--a possibility
since Sudan long hosted bin Laden and his businesses. Yet, to allow
another state to deter the United States by threatening terrorism would
set a terrible precedent. It would also be cowardly and, in the face of
genocide, immoral.
Others argue the U.S. military cannot take on another mission.
Indeed, our ground forces are stretched thin. But a bombing campaign or
a naval blockade would tax the Air Force and Navy, which have
relatively more capacity, and could utilize the 1,500 U.S. military
personnel already in nearby Djibouti.
Still others insist that, without the consent of the United Nations
or a relevant regional body, we would be breaking international law.
But the Security Council last year codified a new international norm
prescribing ``the responsibility to protect.'' It commits U.N. members
to decisive action, including enforcement, when peaceful measures fail
to halt genocide or crimes against humanity.
Some advocates prefer the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur.
They seem to view it as a less aggressive option than bombing Sudanese
assets. It is a fine option, but let's be clear what it likely entails.
Rather than stand-off air strikes against defined targets, maintaining
a no-fly zone would require an asset-intensive, 24 hours per day, 7 day
per week, open-ended military commitment in a logistically difficult
context. To protect the no-fly area, the air cap would have to disable
or shoot down any aircraft that took off in the zone. It would mean
shutting down Sudanese airfields in and near Darfur to all but
humanitarian traffic. In short, it would soon require many of the same
steps that are necessary to conduct the air strikes we recommend, plus
much more.
Finally, humanitarian organizations express concern that air
strikes could disrupt humanitarian operations or cause the Government
of Sudan to intensify ground attacks against civilians in camps. These
are legitimate concerns.
Yet, there are ways to mitigate these risks. Targets could be
selected to avoid airfields used by humanitarian agencies operating in
Darfur. To protect civilians at risk, the United States, France, or
other NATO countries could position a light quick reaction force in
nearby Chad to deter and respond to any increased attacks against camps
in Darfur or Chad. While the risks may be mitigated, we must
acknowledge they cannot be eliminated.
Yet, we must also acknowledge the daily cost of the status quo--of
a feckless policy characterized by bluster and retreat. That cost has
been and will continue to be thousands and thousands and thousands more
lives each month. That cost is an emboldened Khartoum government that
continues to kill with impunity. That cost is a regime that literally
has gotten away with murder, while the United States merely
remonstrates.
I would submit that this cost is too high. Too many have already
died. Too many more are soon to die. When, if ever, will the Bush
administration decide that enough is finally enough?
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I'm embarrassed, I forget who I--excuse me--next, if you
would, Dr. Rossin.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATOR, SAVE DARFUR COALITION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Rossin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
having invited me to testify today. And I want to thank you and
Senator Lugar and all the members of the committee, as did
Susan, for your determined oversight on Darfur.
With your permission, I'll make brief oral remarks, and
I'll submit my longer statement for the record.
The Save Darfur Coalition groups over 180 faith-based,
human-rights, and community organizations from all over the
United States, from Indiana and everywhere. Together, we have
worked for nearly 3 years toward one overriding goal: To end
the genocide in Darfur. That commitment inspires my engagement.
But I also speak today from professional experience as an
American diplomat, a career ambassador, with a career in
conflict resolution in Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq,
and Afghanistan, and as a former deputy head of U.N.
peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and in Haiti.
Regrettably, while our coalition has made great strides in
building awareness and mobilizing activism--Susan just cited
the polling evidence of that--our efforts has had very little
effect on the ground, where it counts, for the people of
Darfur. After 4 years, after 1,200 destroyed villages, after
400,000 people dead, after 2.5 million internally displaced,
after $1.4 million out of the reach of humanitarian assistance,
and another 200,000-plus driven into Chad as refugees, the
regime in Khartoum continues to pursue a scorched-earth
campaign of death and displacement against the people of
Darfur, and it enjoys near total impunity as it does that.
Today, President al-Bashir is more adamant than ever. U.N.
peacekeepers will not ever set boots on the ground in Darfur,
and I'm very, very skeptical of this ``heavy support package''
deal that Mr. Natsios described to us today. The U.N. agencies
continue to raise the alarm about their shrinking ability to
maintain the aid that sustains those hundreds of thousands of
Darfurians that are living in misery. Hardly a day goes by now
without a reiterated warning of looming humanitarian collapse,
repeated defiance from President al-Bashir and his officials, a
new report of atrocity, another Janjaweed incursion in Chad.
Diplomacy alone patently has failed. For 4 years, a
seemingly endless parade of envoys has visited Khartoum, each
carrying a message, rarely coordinated with others, many
wielding threats, others wielding assurances of protection
against those threats, some proffering rewards for good
behavior. It's total incoherence, and it's completely
ineffective.
The Sudanese regime has used these visits and differences
to buy time for its genocide. Envoys have been played off
against each other while their threats have gone unfulfilled.
The regime has concluded that it can act as it wishes, and who
of us can argue otherwise, with the evidence to hand?
Mr. Natsios really described, today, no substantive
progress on any of the key issues that dog this issue. The past
4 years are a graveyard of failed persuasive diplomacy, as much
as they're a graveyard of 400,000 innocent Darfurians.
We were really hopeful, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, when
we learned, from administration contacts, several weeks ago
now, that the President had finally had it, and that some
really tough new targeted sanctions, this plan B, were actually
coming. We were told it was just a matter of scheduling the
announcement. We were encouraged when, after having been
stiffed again by President
al-Bashir a few weeks ago, Special Envoy Natsios told many of
us, in conference calls, that these sanctions were imminent. We
were even more pleased when we learned that one foreign
ambassador had been told that the President had actually signed
the documents.
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, we thought that today's hearing
would be taking place in the context of just announced plan B
sanctions, and we would be discussing how to ensure their
effective implementation. Everything we heard gave us cause to
expect that. But not now.
I just listened to Mr. Natsios's testimony, but I have to
note that, only last week, he was quoted in the press as
publicly rejecting Secretary General Ban's call for more time
for deferral of mandatory sanctions so that his diplomacy could
have more time. I heard him talk about the CODEL that went to
Khartoum.
But I think what we're seeing here is that the U.S.
Government itself has decided, for its own reasons, to defer
its own sanctions plan so that it, itself, can make yet another
diplomatic try. We respect that effort. We don't question the
sincerity of those undertaking it. But, after years of Sudanese
evasion and genocide, we have to say we are profoundly
disappointed by this.
The people of Darfur need our strong support now. The stark
mismatch between tough talk and weak action has to end now,
before more die and more are displaced. We are very skeptical
that the limited plan B sanctions that we've heard about would
be enough to end the genocide, but at least they'd be
something, and we'd like to see them announced now. And we'd
urge that this committee ride the administration hard to get
going.
Experience from the Balkans, from Iran and North Korea, and
even from Sudan itself on earlier issues before today, teach us
that diplomacy must be coupled with strong coercive measures,
enough to change calculations so that ending a policy of mass
murder in Darfur becomes cheaper for Khartoum than pursuing
that policy. Otherwise, this tragedy, Mr. Chairman, will surely
worsen.
Were we today discussing newly announced plan B sanctions,
then I would be making the following points:
Above all, the President--the President of the United
States, President Bush himself--would have to exercise strong
personal leadership to ensure full and prompt sanctions
enforcement by the bureaucracy. It won't happen with anything
less.
Second, with regard to the unilateral U.S. sanctions, which
we understand primarily would be aimed to choke off dollar-
denominated transactions that benefit the government, that
would mean several things. The President himself would have to
direct the Secretary of Treasury to have the Office of Foreign
Assets Control beef up its staff devoted to Sudan sanctioned
enforcement. There's hardly anybody doing it now. He would have
to order the intelligence community actively to support the
enforcement of those sanctions. There's no task force in the
intelligence community on this now. He would have to instruct
his Cabinet to create and empower interagency task forces to
manage this enforcement. And he would have to appoint a Sudan
sanctions enforcement chief, one that had a very, very short
communications chain to him personally, to drive the
interagency process, because it won't work otherwise.
And, frankly, I just say, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I
found it stunning to hear Mr. Natsios, in his testimony just
now, talk about part of plan B being actually setting up
mechanisms to enforcing--implement sanctions that have been on
the books for more than 2 years now. That's ridiculous.
For the multilateral U.N. measures, that would mean the
President instructing his foreign policy team first to obtain a
strong Security Council resolution mandating global sanctions,
and then to build an international coalition for their
enforcement, with a dedicated envoy to lead that process.
That's what happened on Yugoslavia. That's what would be needed
for Sudan. None of it exists now.
Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves still at the
stage of calling for meaningful measures at all. After the
latest rounds of diplomacy have failed--I hope I'm too
pessimistic, but somehow I doubt it--we must demand that such
sanctions finally be imposed. Presuming your intense oversight
to ensure vigorous enforcement of such sanctions, then time
will be needed to assess their effectiveness. But, we would
urge, not too much time. The people of Darfur cannot survive
new months and months of, ``Now let's see what happens.''
I also must stress, Mr. Chairman, that there are other
measures available now to this administration. Plan B would
have more prospect of success were the administration to heed
your and our repeated calls for a full suite of coercive steps,
including a no-fly zone and denying ships that carry Sudanese
oil entry into U.S. ports, as the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act authorized last fall. We don't see why these
and other measures are not being included in plan B from the
outset, just as we don't see why plan B sanctions purportedly
only target three persons, and, to boot, one of those being a
rebel leader, or why the administration's overall global
diplomacy regarding Darfur is so intermittent. As has been
noted already, China, Egypt, the European Union, the Arab
League, South Africa, the African Union, all of these players
have key roles in this, and none of them are doing what they
need to do right now.
In fact, we just wrote to President Bush urging that he
launch a sustained diplomatic coalition-building effort now.
That's also long overdue.
Administration support for the Durbin divestment bill would
also have a strong impact.
We urge that the administration prepare now to take these
steps rapidly, should a first round of sharper sanctions not
quickly end Khartoum's killing in Darfur. The only result that
counts is lives saved or lost. And, shamefully, they've been
lost, and that's been something that's been measured in the
tens of thousands in Darfur.
Action--tough, wide-ranging action, is needed now to match
the President's deep concern and tough words if the people of
Darfur are to obtain any relief from their epic suffering. The
Save Darfur Coalition's hundreds of thousands of activists will
press that demand ceaselessly until the genocide stops. In
fact, they'll be gathering, in 2 weeks, in nearly 150 cities
across our country, during Global Days for Darfur, to demand
effective international protection for the people of Darfur and
strong action from our administration.
But it's this body which can, and must, ensure that the
administration follows through on plan B, is prepared, fast,
with a plan C, if necessary, and, in the end, does whatever it
takes to make this new century's genocide--first genocide its
last genocide.
We urge you to press hard for that level of sustained
administration engagement, and we thank you for the forthright
approach, indeed, you took in the hearing today.
And I thank you very much. And I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Rossin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lawrence G. Rossin, Senior International
Coordinator of the Save Darfur Coalition, Washington, DC
Thank you, Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and members of the
committee, for inviting me to testify today. With your permission, I
will make brief oral remarks and submit a longer statement for the
record.
My name is Larry Rossin. I am the Senior International Coordinator
for the Save Darfur Coalition, grouping over 180 faith-based, human
rights, and community organizations which together have worked for
nearly 3 years toward one overriding goal: To end the genocide in
Darfur.
Beginning in February 2003, the Sudanese Government-sponsored
campaign of violence and forced starvation in Darfur has claimed as
many as 400,000 dead, 2.5 million displaced, and an additional 1
million still in their villages but severely affected. The U.S.
Congress, two Secretaries of State, and President Bush have all labeled
Darfur a genocide, the first time in U.S. history that a conflict has
been so labeled while still ongoing. Congress and the President have
followed up on their initial declarations by making countless speeches,
passing numerous pieces of legislation, and devoting significant--
though still insufficient--funds for humanitarian aid and peacekeeping.
For its part, the U.N. Security Council has issued a litany of
resolutions, including Resolution 1706 which authorized 22,500 as-yet
undeployed U.N. peacekeepers for Darfur, and two Secretaries General
have declared resolving the crisis a top priority.
Civil society in the United States and abroad has done its part as
well, including the formation of a broad coalition of hundreds of
local, national, and international faith-based, human rights, and
community organizations, which have in turn organized thousands of
events, involving millions of citizen-activists, and delivering in turn
millions of urgent calls to the United States and other governments to
take the actions necessary to end the genocide. Unfortunately, none of
the above accomplishments have changed the basic truth that for the
people of Darfur, life continues to grow more difficult and more
dangerous.
It is indeed remarkable that millions of innocents in Darfur, and
parts of Chad and the Central African Republic, have survived for this
long, in the face of such overwhelming conditions, and with so little
positive change in the underlying dynamic of their dispossession and
insecurity. As will be echoed at over 200 Darfur-themed events in over
30 nations on April 29, 2007, time is running out for the people of
Darfur.
These innocent victims are essentially on life-support, their
continued existence dependent on U.S. and international humanitarian
aid and the presence of roughly 7,400 African Union peacekeepers.
Despite the best efforts of the underfunded and undermanned African
Union peacekeeping force, attacks have increased in recent months,
leading to tens of thousands of new arrivals at refugee camps in Darfur
and across the border in Chad.
After a promised deescalation of violence failed to materialize
following the signing of the stillborn Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on
May 5, 2006, the situation in Darfur grew worse. The Government of
Sudan began a military offensive in Darfur in late August 2006 which
displaced tens of thousands of additional Darfurians, and the rebel
groups, which had numbered just three at the time of the DPA's signing,
have since splintered into more than a dozen factions, further
complicating any potential political solution. The resulting increase
in violence has put the humanitarian life-support system at great risk,
and the nightmare scenario of a complete security collapse and the
spike in the death rate that will surely follow now appears to be a
very real possibility. U.N. officials have previously said that the
death rate in Darfur could rise as high as 100,000 per month if
security collapses, creating the sobering possibility that future
horrors in Darfur may dwarf all we have seen up to now.
On August 31, 2006, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1706, authorizing a robust peacekeeping force of 22,500 U.N. troops for
Darfur with a strong mandate to protect civilians. While this was a
crucial step, it will remain merely words on paper until there are U.N.
boots on the ground. More than 7 months have passed and only a few
dozen U.N. advisors have actually been deployed. If the United Nations
fails to deploy a force to Darfur, it will be the first time in history
that a U.N. force has completely failed to deploy after being
authorized by the Security Council.
Why then the delay in carrying out the Security Council's order?
Because the U.N. force cannot deploy over Sudan's objections. Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir wants to preserve the status quo, and has been
thwarting the international community's efforts to stop the killing at
every turn. He's managed this by time and again promising to cooperate
with international efforts to end the conflict in order to relieve
mounting diplomatic and economic pressures, and then going back on his
word and once again obstructing those efforts when the pressures have
abated. This bait and switch pattern has allowed a genocidal dictator
to consistently thwart the international community's efforts to end the
conflict in Darfur and promote an inclusive peace process. In fact, he
is doing so again right now.
On November 17, 2006, the international community and the Sudanese
government came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and agreed to allow
a hybrid United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force to deploy to
Darfur in three phases: A light package of advisors to help the AU
peacekeeping force already there; a heavy package of 3,000 military and
police logistics personnel to do the same; and then finally a large-
scale force comprised of at least 10,000 additional U.N. and AU troops.
President al-Bashir immediately went to work on weakening the
agreement, and thus far has allowed only phases I to deploy, demanding
wholesale changes to phase II and flatly denying phase III.
The international community must take stronger action to compel
President al-Bashir's cooperation with international efforts to protect
civilians in Darfur. U.S. Secretary of State Rice put it well when she
said on September 27, 2006, that the Government of Sudan faces a choice
between cooperation and confrontation. As evidenced by his words and
actions since Secretary Rice's speech, President al-Bashir has chosen
confrontation.
Today, President al-Bashir is more adamant than ever in his resolve
to oppose a full U.N. deployment, allowing him virtual carte blanche to
stage attacks in Darfur directly with his troops and air force, or via
his Janjaweed client militia.
Mr. Chairman, this record is well-known. Hardly a news day goes by
without some reiterated warning of looming humanitarian collapse, some
repeated message of defiance from President al-Bashir and his
officials, some new report of atrocity and societal disintegration in
Darfur itself, some cross-border Janjaweed incursion into Chad.
Equally apparent is that diplomacy alone has failed. It has been
pursued for 4 years, by a seemingly endless parade of envoys and
officials from all over the world--from Bob Zoellick and Jendayi Frazer
to Hu Jintao and Thabo Mbeki, from Louis Michel to Andrew Natsios, from
Alpha Oumar Konare to Kofi Annan, from Foreign Ministers of Africa and
the Middle East to U.N. and AU mediators, and now Ban Ki-moon and
Deputy Secretary Negroponte. Each has carried a separate message, too
rarely consistent or coordinated with that of her or his predecessor or
successor; many have wielded threats, others assurances of protection
against those threats, some have proffered promises of reward for good
behavior.
incoherence and ineffectiveness
The Sudanese regime is sophisticated, having long since learned to
play one envoy off against another. Meanwhile the international
community's threats and promises have gone mostly unfulfilled, whether
made on a unilateral basis or enshrined in national law or Security
Council resolution. The past 4 years are a graveyard of failed
persuasive diplomacy as much as they are of 400,000 Darfurians.
Administration talk, at the end of 2006, of enacting tough ``plan B''
measures against Sudan by January 1, 2007, if it did not cooperate on
U.N. peacekeeper deployment seemed but the latest example of tough
words unmatched, in the crunch, by action.
We were therefore encouraged when, weeks ago now, we heard that the
President and his officials had finally had it, and that some really
tough new targeted economic sanctions--``plan B''--were actually
coming--just a matter of scheduling the announcement. We were doubly
hopeful when, stiffed again by al-Bashir, Special Envoy Natsios further
stated last month that these sanctions were imminent. We were even more
excited when we heard that a foreign Ambassador had been told the
President had actually signed the documents.
Well, frankly, Mr. Chairman, we thought that today's hearing would
be taking place in the context of just-announced ``plan B'' sanctions,
and we would be discussing their effective implementation. Every thing
we heard, until late last week, gave cause for that expectation.
But that has, obviously, not come to pass. After rejecting the U.N.
Secretary General's recent call for deferral of Security Council debate
of mandatory U.N. sanctions so that his diplomacy could have more
time--the nth iteration of that failed sequence that has cost lives in
Darfur--the U.S. Government, to our surprise, suddenly appears to have
deferred its own sanctions plan, so that it can make yet another
diplomatic try. We respect the effort, Mr. Chairman, and do not
question the motive; but after years of Sudan's evasions and genocide,
we cannot help but be astonished and disappointed by this further
delay.
lives are at stake every day
As our coalition has argued in private communication and public
messaging, here and overseas, the people of Darfur need strong support
now. Talk alone has failed, whether tough or diplomatic. The stark
mismatch between tough talk and weak or no action has to end, now,
before more die and more are displaced. Al-Bashir is not the first
stubborn dictator to pursue calculated policies of murder that we have
encountered. He will not be the last. Experience shows--we know it from
the Balkans, from Iran and North Korea, from Sudan itself before
today--if diplomacy is to work, it must be coupled to strong coercive
measures, enough to change calculations, so that ending the killing
becomes cheaper for Khartoum than pursuing it, as is clearly not the
case now.
Mr. Chairman, were we discussing today newly announced ``plan B''
sanctions targeted on Sudan's leadership, I would have made the
following points:
If enforced fully, the envisaged ``plan B'' sanctions would
be an important first step to end the violence and suffering in
Darfur, although probably not enough to stop the genocide.
If, on the other hand, ``plan B'' were not fully implemented
and enforced--including both its unilateral U.S. elements and
its multilateral U.N. elements--Khartoum's murderous campaign
would only be reinforced.
We would urge the President and his administration,
therefore, to take all necessary steps to fully implement and
enforce ``plan B'' without delay.
For the expected unilateral U.S. sanctions focused on
stopping transactions directly benefiting the Sudanese
Government, that would mean the President directing Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control to increase dramatically the
number of man-hours allocated to Sudan sanctions enforcement;
directing the intelligence community to provide all information
necessary to investigate and enforce those sanctions, and the
resources to develop that information; directing his Cabinet to
create and obey interagency task forces effective in ensuring
enforcement of the sanctions; and, appointing a high-ranking
Sudan sanctions enforcement lead, with Presidential authority,
to oversee the interagency process. Comparable focused
leadership from the top was the key to success of Yugoslav
sanctions.
For the multilateral U.N. measures, that would mean the
President and his administration directing his foreign policy
leadership--
First, to take all steps needed to obtain a Security Council
resolution mandating global sanctions,
And then, to build an international coalition for their
enforcement, with a dedicated Envoy to lead that process.
Although we do not understand it will, such a resolution
should enact tough targeted sanctions against individuals
and entities complicit in the genocide; expand the existing
arms embargo to include the Sudan Government; and ideally
create the no-fly zone called for in Resolution 1591.
Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves still at the stage of
calling for meaningful measures at all, rather than discussing their
effective implementation. However, if the latest rounds of diplomacy
fail--I hope I am proven too pessimistic, but history gives me reason
to doubt it--we do hope that such sanctions will at long last be
imposed, so that this discussion can have meaning.
If and when that stage is reached, and presuming that the
President's personal determination and this Congress's assertive
oversight ensure that the sanctions are enforced systematically, we can
then take some time to assess their effectiveness. But, if you will
forgive me a brief jump forward, we would urge: Not too much time.
People die and are driven from their homes every day in Darfur;
humanitarian collapse is an insistent threat. We cannot afford, if and
when such limited sanctions go into effect, to have new months and
months of ``now let's see what happens.''
Additionally, there are more measures available to this
administration than its stalled ``plan B'' as envisaged. Heeding
Congress's and our coalition's repeated calls to announce additional
coercive steps--such as leading the international community in imposing
a no-fly zone, and denying ships linked to Sudan entry to U.S. ports--
would make ``plan B'' stronger. We don't see why they are not being
included from the outset, just as we don't see why ``plan B'' sanctions
would reportedly only target three persons when we know the U.K.
recommended more, or why the administration's overall global diplomacy
regarding Darfur is so weak and sporadic. In fact, we have just written
to the President urging him to launch serious, sustained diplomatic
coalition-building efforts which have proven successful in the form of
contact groups in past crises.
In any case, we certainly urge that the U.S. Government prepare to
take these and other additional measures should the long-overdue first
round of tougher targeted sanctions fail quickly to reverse Khartoum's
killing, blockage of credible peacekeepers, and constant disruption of
efforts to renew an inclusive peace process. The success or failure of
``plan B'' should largely be measured by whether or not it swiftly
compels the cooperation of the Sudanese Government on these fronts. The
ultimate gauge of its effectiveness will be lives saved or lost, a
measure that is marked off by the thousands in Darfur.
Action from the administration is needed to match the President's
concern and tough words, if the people of Darfur are to derive any
relief from their epic suffering. With American leadership, the full
weight of the international community must be brought to bear on
Khartoum's leadership and its business partners to end their
obstruction of international efforts to end the crisis in Darfur.
The Save Darfur Coalition will pursue these goals ceaselessly, by
the means we have, until the genocide is ended. But it is this body
which can and must ensure the administration follows through on its
``plan B,'' is prepared with a ``plan C'' if necessary, and in the end,
does what it takes to make this new century's first genocide its last.
Enacting, implementing, and fully enforcing strong plan B measures
is not the only piece of the puzzle, however. Another essential element
to ending the genocide in Darfur and creating a stable and secure
environment for civilians there is a consistent and adequate supply of
funding for peacekeeping operations. The United States has been by far
the most generous international donor to security programs in Darfur,
providing hundreds of millions of dollars for the African Union forces
there and allocating nearly $100 million for an eventual U.N. force.
Despite this seeming generosity, U.S. funding for peacekeeping in
Darfur has been inconsistent and this lack of predictability appears to
be a contributing factor to the low level of effectiveness of the
African Union Force in Darfur.
While only a successful peace process can finally end the genocide,
the United States must do all it can to ensure the presence of a
credible peacekeeping force with dependable, adequate resources and a
robust civilian-protection mandate as the peace process hopefully moves
forward. This peacekeeping force, whether African Union, United
Nations, or a hybrid, will require consistent and adequate U.S. funding
and leadership to be effective in its mission.
Unfortunately, to date, the rhetoric surrounding the genocide has
not been matched by a consistent commitment to request adequate funding
in a transparent and predictable way to get the peacekeeping job done
in Darfur. Since at least 2005, funding for peacekeeping in Darfur has
been inconsistent and in some instances uncertain until the last
minute. This lack of predictability impacts the existing peacekeeping
mission in Darfur and sends a strong message to the Government of
Sudan, our allies, and most importantly, the people of Darfur,
emboldening the perpetrators and draining the hope of the survivors.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the U.S. Government's failure
to provide consistent and predictable funding for peacekeepers is that
it is one of the only issues impacting civilians in Darfur over which
the United States Government has direct control. We cannot control the
actions or responses of the Government of Sudan. We cannot control the
activities of the Janjaweed or rebel forces in Darfur. We cannot
control the response of our allies in this effort. But the
administration and Congress collectively have complete control of the
allocation of U.S. funding to combat the genocide.
As far as I can tell, Congress has provided every dollar ever
formally requested by the administration for Darfur peacekeeping and
has generously added to those requests in several instances. Based on
that fact, I believe that the inescapable conclusion is that the
administration has consistently underestimated the need for funding for
security in Darfur and has not made consistent and predictable requests
through the regular appropriations process to meet future security
needs in Darfur.
Let me give a specific example. The administration's fiscal year
2008 budget request to Congress contains no request for bilateral
peacekeeping for Darfur through the Peacekeeping Operations Account.
This decision is based on the assumption that peacekeeping
responsibilities in Darfur will transition to a U.N. or hybrid United
Nations/African Union force by the beginning of the fiscal year,
October 1, 2007. Putting aside the optimistic nature of this
assumption, it should then be safe to assume that if the administration
plans to fund Darfur security through the United Nations in fiscal year
2008. In turn, it follows that the budget should include an ample
funding request for a U.S. contribution to the projected U.N. force in
Darfur. This is not, however, the case.
The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping estimates that to meet
the peacekeeping needs in Sudan--both for the U.N. force in South Sudan
(UNMIS) and for a Darfur mission--the U.S. contribution should be $675
million in fiscal year 2008 to the U.N. peacekeeping apparatus.
Instead, the total administration request is $391 million, just $10
million more than the previous year, leaving a shortfall for security
in Sudan of about $284 million. Taking into account the $98 million
already provided by Congress for a U.N. force in Darfur, we can
estimate that the shortfall in the administration's request for Darfur
security for fiscal year 2008 is approximately $186 million.
Presumably, Congress will again work to adequately fund this
pressing need, but this will be an unnecessarily difficult task given
the expected tight budget for international affairs and the many
pressing priorities. I say unnecessarily because funding Darfur
security would be immeasurably easier if the administration would
simply request needed funding through the regular appropriations
process.
The administration did request $150 million for bilateral
peacekeeping in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, currently
being considered by Congress. This is very helpful and welcome and
appears to be adequate for the remainder of this fiscal year. If there
is essentially no additional bilateral or multilateral funding being
requested by the administration for Darfur Security for FY08, however,
then in a few short months the source of U.S. funding for Darfur
security will again be uncertain and we may yet again be looking for
additional supplemental funding to bridge the Darfur peacekeeping gap.
To this end, I would encourage the administration to submit a
budget amendment to Congress for fiscal year 2008 requesting an
additional $186 million for Darfur security through the African Union.
I would also encourage the Senate and House to give the administration
the authority to transfer any or all of those funds to the U.N.
Peacekeeping account if deployment of a U.N. or hybrid force supersedes
the need for bilateral funding.
Additional to funding concerns, I hope that this committee will
help ensure that the Senate passes legislation protecting States'
rights to divest their pension funds and other holdings of businesses
whose trade with the Sudanese Government negatively affects the people
of Darfur. Senator Durbin has introduced, and several members of the
committee have cosponsored, S. 831, a bill which would do just that.
The prompt passage of S. 831, which is currently awaiting action in the
Senate Banking Committee, will ensure that States are not barred from
doing their part to fight the genocide in Darfur. I also encourage this
committee to urge Senate leadership to schedule a swift vote for S.
Res. 76, the resolution regarding the regionalization of the Darfur
conflict into Chad and the Central African Republic which was
introduced by Senator Feingold and recently reported by the committee
to the full Senate for consideration.
While there is no silver bullet or easy answer for Darfur, real
progress can be made if substantive action is taken on the issues we've
discussed today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Morrison.
STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Morrison. Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you for
taking the lead, organizing today's hearings, and I'm grateful
for the opportunity to be here to speak.
I'll organize my remarks around a few brief points. I
believe our single goal--single dominant and defensible goal--
still remains to seek a political settlement to end Darfur's
internal war. We need to achieve this through concerted
international means. We need to achieve a political settlement
within Darfur that will replace Darfur's violent internal war
with an interim cease-fire, a new form of governance under fair
and just terms, backed by reliable and verifiable guarantees.
And I believe there are no feasible alternatives. We need a
strategy that is grounded in realism and patience. It is going
to take 3 to 5 years to negotiate a way forward in Darfur.
There are no quick fixes, there are no quick military options.
Military options are a utopian diversion, in terms of grand
interventions that are going to suddenly change the situation.
We require a multilateral approach. We cannot act effectively
without allies. We need the Security Council Perm Rep members.
We need European allies, and we need African allies. And we
need support within the Arab League.
In the current context of the war on Iraq, our standing in
the world is severely compromised. To imagine that we're going
to mobilize any array of support around anything other than a
steady, pragmatic, negotiated peace settlement is simply
unrealistic.
I am in support of continuing to keep our eye on the prize.
The prize is a negotiated political settlement. Using various
forms of sanctions, targeted sanctions, on Khartoum, as many
that--of those sanctions that are, today, on the table, to
service that goal can make a lot of sense if it is tied
strategically toward getting to a settlement. Sanctions need to
be put in force against Khartoum. They need to be put in force
against the spoiler nonsignatory combatants in Darfur, who, as
we've heard, are continuing to carry out atrocities.
Diplomacy has to have primacy in this effort. We have no
choice. There are no close--there are no quick fixes to this.
We need to give primacy to our diplomatic efforts to renew a
Darfur political negotiation. We have an agreement, in the form
of the Annan plan. We have renewed leadership, in the form of
Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim. We have renewed leadership within
the U.S. Government, in the form of Andrew Natsios and John
Negroponte. We should be focusing that effort around what is
realistic to achieve in moving forward a negotiated political
negotiation and settlement for Darfur that builds off of the
May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.
Sustained high-level U.S. leadership has been, for several
years, a strategic element in achieving results in Sudan. The
north-south peace accord, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of
January 2005, only came about over a 3- to 5-year period
through sustained U.S. engagement. Senator John Danforth made
crucial contributions. Similarly, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick, in his role, made pivotal contributions in
getting to the Darfur Peace Agreement of last May. They're hard
lessons to the pattern of U.S. engagement. It has not been
continuous, it has not been sustained, there have been breaks
and lack of continuity, and we've--as we've seen with the May
Darfur Peace Agreement, which, because of a lack of
followthrough, fell apart.
I want to mention, also, while we're talking about the
centrality of U.S. political leadership at a high level, that
what is happening in Somalia does not help us. I know this
hearing is not about Somalia, but our partnering with the
Ethiopians in a counterterrorism campaign in Somalia, which is
now beginning to turn very ugly for us, is widely seen within
the region as anti-Islamic. It's now--we're now under
allegations--perhaps true, perhaps false--of associating
ourselves with a policy of renditions and war crimes. But we
have provided the region--we've provided Khartoum,
inadvertently, with a new angle for arguing about the lack of
moral standing of the United States in putting a focus back on
Darfur. And it's also widening the crisis within the Horn and
focusing a broad--focusing--requiring a focus on a broader
level.
There are scattered and uncoordinated international efforts
today with respect to Darfur. I mentioned, earlier, the United
Nations-
African Union effort, led by Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim,
offers the single best hope for moving this--for moving forward
in this regard, for a renewed political process. It can be
backed by sanctions, or the threat of sanctions.
I want to touch, briefly, on the sensitive issue of
genocide, because that has been the dominant concern of this
hearing. In the United States, there seems to be a broad
consensus that what is happening in Darfur constitutes a
continuous genocide. That view is not necessarily shared among
our key allies in Europe, in Africa, in the Middle East. It is
not necessarily shared by those who are operational on the
ground in Darfur. This is a problem. We have not won the
opinion argument, internationally, around this issue. And it's
a problem. And it gets back to the point that unilateralism
will not work in Sudan. Multilateralism will work. Talking
about genocide may not be the lead argument in getting people
to cooperate in a joint effort. Talking about a negotiated
peace settlement maybe.
On the question of Chinese influence, I agree that there
has been a subtle shift in China's approach to Sudan, a greater
willingness to raise the issue with senior Sudanese leaders,
and that there is an emerging consensus with the United States
on implementing the three-phrase Annan plan as the best way
forward. I agree that the Chinese are more public, and they are
willing to dispatch, as they just did with Zhai Jun, the
assistant secretary, to dispatch senior-level officials to
Darfur, and to have them saying important things publicly that
reinforce our position.
I also believe that, if we move toward sanctions, we're
going to have to be very careful in how we execute them. If,
for example, we begin to impose unilateral smart sanctions
under plan B, focused on select individuals and commercial
entities, and these measures do not directly target Chinese
economic interests, it's conceivable that these pressures could
be raised through sanctions, while action in collaboration with
China continues. However, if we, somewhere, somehow, along the
line, step into an active campaign of vilifying China,
threatening their strategic interests, or threatening, as many
are proposing now, a boycott of the 2008 Olympics, we can
pretty well rely on losing their cooperation in the Security
Council and their cooperation in Khartoum, and, as we've seen
recently, in Darfur. There are many specific things that can be
tabled further with the Chinese as measures that they can move
forward in this period.
Two last points:
Don't forget how important the humanitarian channels are.
Two and a half million people, 13,000 humanitarian workers,
billions invested. This is a U.S.--predominantly a U.S.
achievement of leadership. This is a population that is highly
vulnerable, both the humanitarian workers and those in the
camps, the civilians that are imperiled and remain in the
camps, and remain 100-percent dependent upon international
handouts. We cannot treat this reality in a frivolous manner.
We have to acknowledge that if we take a misstep and kick the
pins out from underneath this operation, it will be
catastrophic.
We also can't forget what is going on in the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between the north and the south, which has been
overshadowed and overlooked in this period. I would argue that
the south is in a period of governance-drift and increased
interethnic tensions and violence. It has ingested over $1
billion of oil earnings. It's not clear to what purposes these
are being placed. This is a nation-building exercise that the
United States has embraced. It's a peace agreement that is
unfolding that we bore central responsibility for. We need to
pay higher attention to this if--in order to ensure that things
go well.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Director, Africa
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar, I thank you for taking the lead
in organizing today's hearing, and am grateful for the chance to
contribute to this timely discussion of the U.S. approach to the Darfur
crisis.
I wish to concentrate my remarks upon a few select points.
1. Our single most important and defensible goal should be a political
settlement to end Darfur's internal war
It is important to be very clear on this core goal of U.S. policy
in Darfur. At times that goal is not clearly stated or understood.
Realistically, our core aim must be to achieve through concerted
international means a political settlement that will replace Darfur's
violent internal war with an interim cease-fire, and create a new form
of governance in Darfur under fair and just terms, backed by reliable
and verifiable guarantees. There are no feasible alternatives. We
cannot ignore Sudan, nor are we in a position to change its government
or to directly enforce our will.
The goal of ending Darfur's war is contained in the Annan plan
agreed to by the parties in Addis Ababa in November 2006. It makes an
enduring peace settlement the key to offering a credible hope that
Darfur's displaced and imperiled civilians can return to a safer, more
stable and self-sustaining life. It offers a framework for coordinated
international action.
Efforts to end impunity and bring to justice those the U.S.
Government has accused of perpetrating genocide should be carefully
disentangled from the core goal of ending Darfur's war.
Ending impunity in the immediate term will be difficult to
reconcile with winning agreement to a negotiated peace settlement,
including deployment of the African Union/United Nations hybrid force
which Khartoum will continue to fear will be an instrument to arrest
suspects in high-level positions of government. Ending impunity in
Sudan can and should be realized in the medium to long term through
action by the International Criminal Court. But more creativity is
needed in the U.N. Security Council to find the means to phase ICC
action so that it is not in conflict with efforts to end Darfur's war.
2. Diplomacy should be the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy
Success will not come from acting alone in an urgent search for
quick fixes. Nor will it come through an overweening unilateral
reliance on threatened punitive measures which are untied to clear
diplomatic goals and which may distance us from our critical allies.
We should give primacy to diplomatic efforts to renew Darfur
political negotiations, based on revisions to the May 2006 Darfur Peace
Agreement. Such a negotiated settlement is the only route to ending
violence against civilians. Smart sanctions and a strengthened African
Union/United Nations operation are important instruments of pressure
and means to protect civilians, but by themselves, in the absence of a
political settlement, they will not stop the violence in Darfur.
Progress requires realism, a predominant reliance on diplomacy backed
at critical moments by focused, tough action, an accurate and timely
assessment of facts on the ground, and patience and stamina.
Sanctions can be effective, if enforced in a strategic and balanced
fashion to move the Government of Sudan and its violent proxies, the
Janjaweed militias, and the nonsignatory Darfur insurgents back to the
negotiating table.
The nonsignatory spoilers continue to fragment, resist reentry into
serious political negotiations, derive lethal and logistical support
from Chad, Eritrea, and likely Libya, and carry out high levels of
violence against civilians. Khartoum is able to take full advantage of
this confusion by playing rebel groups off of one another and co-opting
them individually.
In this next phase, we need a smarter strategy for unifying and
focusing the rebels on a realistic set of negotiating goals, at the
same time that higher targeted pressures are directed at Khartoum. That
requires enhancing the incentives to the scattered rebel groups to
unite, and taking steps to reduce cross-border materiel support.
3. Sustained high-level U.S. leadership remains strategically important
to achieving any results in Sudan
If we take our guidance from the negotiated conclusion to Sudan's
north-south war, signed in January 2005, we can safely predict that
progress will only be achieved over a 3- to 5-year period, driven by a
sustained international diplomatic effort.
From 2001 through the end of 2004, Senator John Danforth, first as
Special Envoy to Sudan and later as U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, made crucial contributions to securing the peace between
Sudan's north and south. While serving as Deputy Secretary of State,
Robert Zoellick was similarly pivotal in moving the parties to the
Darfur Peace Agreement.
Both these instances also generated a hard lesson: When there is a
break in high-level engagement, a lack of continuity and follow-
through, progress achieved can soon begin to unravel. We've seen that
most poignantly in the failure thus far to implement the terms of the
May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.
In this present phase, there is fortunately renewed high-level U.S.
engagement.
The current Special Envoy, Andrew Natsios, has been very active
since the latter part of 2006 in persuading the Chinese to begin to
apply more pressure upon Khartoum, and in reviving a strategy to renew
Darfur peace negotiation, led by U.N. Envoy Jan Eliasson and the
African Union's statesman Salim Salim. He has gained access and
credibility in Khartoum, among Darfur rebels, and in his dealings with
the U.N. Secretary General and his deputies, the Chinese, British, and
other members of the U.N. Security Council, and the African Union. No
less important, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte will visit
Sudan this week and be in a better position to help break the deadlock
over political negotiations and the expansion into Phase II of the
African Union/United Nations peace operation.
4. U.S. leadership should support a unified, robust international
effort
Actions by both Andrew Natsios and John Negroponte can be vital to
moving Khartoum and the Darfur rebels beyond recalcitrance. They can
also be vital in overcoming scattered and uncoordinated international
efforts.
Regional states are vying with different initiatives to convince
rebel leaders to come behind a common agenda. The United Nations/
African Union effort, spearheaded by Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim,
offers the single best hope for a unified effort to promote a renewed
political process and move international efforts beyond the present
disarray. Every effort should be made by the United States, the U.N.
Security Council, and others to strengthen this initiative and
eliminate competition.
Building a robust international effort requires better monitoring
of on-the-ground developments and a better shared estimate of current
trend lines. At present there is no reliable, independent metric on
civilian fatalities and armed violence by the Government of Sudan, its
proxy militias, and the rising number of scattered insurgent groups.
The result is continued confusion and controversy over the actual
levels of violence, by which parties, and how accurately to
characterize trend lines: e.g. whether what is unfolding in Darfur
constitutes genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or random violence at the hands of brigands. Downstream, this
uncertainty complicates efforts to judge whether individual agencies or
movements are increasing or decreasing violence against civilians.
Atrocities are committed by all sides, but different parties are at
different times responsive to pressures to honor cease-fires. Claims
are made frequently by advocacy groups, many based in the United
States, that genocide at the hands of the GOS and the Janjaweed militia
persists. At the same time, confidential sources within the
humanitarian community that is operational inside Darfur often claim
that fatalities are far below levels that would constitute genocide but
above the 1,000 fatalities per annum level that signals an ongoing
internal war. At present, it is difficult to square these divergent
estimates.
A unified international effort needs also to place Darfur in the
context of a widening set of interlocking conflicts in the Horn of
Africa, encompassing Chad, the Central African Republic, northern
Uganda, and Somalia and Ethiopia. In important ways, the Horn has crept
back toward the dark era of the 1980s when there were multiple tit-for-
tat cross-border proxy wars that fed the Horn's endemic instability.
One important implication for Darfur: There needs to be a higher
priority attached to building effective firewalls, potentially through
small focused U.N. border operations as well as through intensified
diplomatic initiatives, that can separate Darfur's internal war from
the surrounding region.
5. The United States should continue to give priority to leveraging
Chinese influence
Notwithstanding China's important economic ties with Sudan and
public adherence to the principle of noninterference, the last year has
seen a subtle shift in China's approach to Sudan, a greater willingness
to raise the issue of Darfur with senior Sudanese leaders, and an
emerging consensus with the United States that implementation of the
three-phase Annan plan is the best way forward to achieving peace and
stability in Darfur. This shift has been driven in part by China's wish
to promote itself as an ethical global power, in part by discussions
with other African leaders invested in seeing the Darfur issue
resolved, and in part by the threat of increasing international
pressures and tensions. While the United States and China will continue
to differ on respective assessments of the situation in Darfur and on
appropriate tactics in its resolution, the United States should seek to
build on China's emerging openness to play a constructive role in
ending the crisis in Darfur.
International sanctions on Sudan could take different forms, and it
is difficult to predict with precision how different sanctions might
impact Chinese behavior and the ongoing dialog between the United
States and China on Darfur.
If, for example, the United States were to begin soon to impose
unilateral ``smart'' sanctions, under ``plan B,'' focused on select
individuals and commercial entities, and these measures did not
directly or indirectly target Chinese economic interests, it is
conceivable that pressures upon Khartoum could be raised through
sanctions while action was taken to preserve the existing United
States-Chinese consensus and pursue more robust United States-Chinese
collaborative pressures upon Khartoum.
If, on the other end of the spectrum, actions were taken that
overtly vilify China, directly target its economic stakes in Sudan, and
threaten broader interests such as the 2008 Olympics, that would risk
undermining the present United States-China dialog.
In between these two scenarios are intermediate options where
sanctions might be put in place that do directly impact Chinese
economic interests in Sudan and where the impact on Chinese behavior
and the United States-China dialog might be mixed.
Looking forward, we should continue to give high priority in our
evolving dialog with China in seeking greater Chinese commitments that
support in concrete terms the consensus on Darfur that has been forged
between the United States and China. The Chinese can and should press
for deployment of special Chinese military units to strengthen the
African Union/United Nations force. China can and should use its
leadership and public voice in the U.N. Security Council to hold
Khartoum to account. China can and should further adjust its economic
policies and instruments to signal that it is systematically distancing
itself from Khartoum and deliberately lowering the priority of Sudan in
its overall expansive engagement in Africa.
6. Higher attention is needed to protect fragile humanitarian channels
The United States has been the lead donor in creating on a crash
basis an elaborate humanitarian operation in Darfur that sustains the
lives of over 2.5 million and today relies on the courage and
commitment of over 13,000 humanitarian workers. Since 2003, the United
States has invested $2.7 billion in humanitarian support to Darfur.
Programs now reach over 90 percent of those in need of assistance. This
achievement, and its continued fragility, are often lost in the heated
debate over Darfur.
High-value humanitarian commodities increasingly invite assault
from the full range of armed actors inside Darfur: Violent attacks upon
humanitarian convoys and workers, widespread theft of vehicles, and
administrative harassment by the GOS. This is a dangerous trend.
If humanitarian operations become significantly more insecure, they
will be at risk of a major sudden retrenchment which would have dire
consequences for Darfur's vulnerable displaced population, the
viability of the international humanitarian infrastructure, and the
Darfur region's overall stability.
John Holmes, the new U.N. Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs,
recently visited Sudan and negotiated with the GOS new terms for
humanitarian access. Sustained followup will be needed to ensure
compliance.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Morrison, can you recall whether any of our allies
thought that what Slobodan Milosevic was doing was genocide? I
don't recall any of them thinking it was genocide. Matter of
fact, I was in, I think, every capital in Europe, and I was
told by each of them, particularly the British, that this was a
civil war, it wasn't genocide. Am I missing something here? I
mean, can you think of any time where Europe has declared
genocide in play recently? Any nation. Pick one for me.
Dr. Morrison. I mean, this is a question of whether you
feel that European opinion leaders or intellectuals are more--
less----
The Chairman. No; it's not anything. I'm asking a simple
question. It's a simple question. You made the point----
Dr. Morrison. I don't think I'm really qualified to answer
the question----
The Chairman. Sure you are. You know whether or not----
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. With respect to----
The Chairman. You're a very bright guy----
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. Kosovo----
The Chairman [continuing]. You're very well informed. Can
you recall any government, during the late eighties, early
nineties, in Europe, saying what Slobodan Milosevic was engaged
in was genocide? Name me one. Now, you were around as long as I
am. This is your full-time day job. You know, I mean, you know,
you do it all day. Can you think of a--the point I'm making is
that you point out that there is not a consensus that there's
genocide going on in Darfur, among our allies and others, as if
that carries any weight, other than whether or not we'll get
their cooperation. You offer it as it might go to the facts as
whether or not genocide has occurred. I'm just giving you the
last recent example of genocide. I remember, for 3 years, if
not being the lone voice, one of the lone voices out there
saying genocide is being conducted by a guy named Slobodan
Milosevic out of Belgrade, and I remember being lectured by the
British, the French, the Germans, everyone, ``No, it was not
genocide,'' including many here in this country.
And so, I guess all I'm saying is, the fact that our
friends don't recognize what's going on is genocide doesn't
lend any credibility or weight, to me, that there is or is not
genocide. I just wondered if you had heard anybody reference
genocide.
And I would respectfully suggest one of the reasons why our
European friends and others don't want to recognize this as
genocide is that it is a trump card. Once a nation engages in
genocide--a government--there is an implicit understanding that
they have forfeited their sovereignty. There's no legal
understanding of that. There should be, in my view. But there
is no legal understanding of that, under international law. But
that changes the whole dynamic.
The reason why guys like me have been pushing for 4 years
to say this is genocide is to create that exact atmosphere, to
make it impossible for people to argue--not impossible--
difficult for them to argue that somehow Khartoum has
legitimacy. I believe they have no legitimacy. I believe they
have forfeited their sovereignty because of their concerted
engagement in a policy of genocide. That's just me.
So, I just--I find the argument that none others say this
is genocide--I don't remember anybody else in 1989, 1990, 1991,
1992, 1993, 1994, saying genocide existed in the Balkans, in
Bosnia. That's the only point I want to make.
I used to have a friend----
Dr. Morrison. Mr. Chairman, may I make----
The Chairman. Please.
Dr. Morrison. May I just make----
The Chairman. I'd invite----
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. One comment?
The Chairman [continuing]. Your comment.
Dr. Morrison. I mean, the--what I'm trying to put a focus
on is the practical political problem of attempting to enlist
support for the kind of actions you're talking about.
The Chairman. Well, I'm not asking for support. I think the
only way you're going to get support is act. The only way we
got support in the Balkans is, we acted, we shamed the French
Government into acting. Their public thought, in overwhelming
numbers, it was genocide. The French Government said it was
not. I remember, my detailed discussion with the President and
then-Secretary of State in the Oval Office, and asking, ``Well,
if we act, who will follow?''; said, ``They will follow,
because they cannot fail to follow.'' Do you think that anybody
in the European populations think what's not going on is
genocide, notwithstanding what their governments think?
So, I guess what I'm saying to you is, we come at this from
a different perspective. I agree with Mr. Rossin, when he said
that he--I don't know his exact quote--he said that diplomacy
without stiff sanctions to back it up has--is not likely to
work. I don't know that he ever--I don't know that he used the
phrase ``never work,'' but is not likely to work. And so, I
approach this from a completely different perspective than you.
I respect your point of view. You're a very learned fellow. But
I just think that if you start off with the proposition that
Khartoum has no interest in a political settlement--it has no
interest--what is their interest in a political settlement?--
and then you would argue, ``Well, if they have an interest in
the political--they have no interest, then you have to sanction
them.'' Well, what sanctions are going to be sufficient enough
for them to conclude that changing a fundamental policy is in
their interest?
And you point out: We lack moral standing. I agree. This
administration has squandered our ability to be able to lead
the world in a positive direction. But if we lack moral
standing in the use of force, we clearly lack it in diplomacy.
I mean, if we lack it one place, we lack it both places. Matter
of fact, the only place we're--at any rate, I apologize for--I
just--we just start off with a fundamentally different premise,
and I think in 5 years there'll be another 500,000 or million
people dead, maybe more.
And I would say, to Susan--excuse me--I would say to the
Honorable--that, you know, it is true, there weren't that many
who had died in Kosovo, but 300,000 had already died in the
Balkans--300,000. So, I don't want to--you know, I happen to
agree with you about Darfur. But I think these comparisons--
I'd--we acted, in Bosnia, under much less--much less
consequence to the people. There was a gigantic consequence in
our failure to act. It ended up with 300,000 women and children
being dead. And when we acted--when we acted, finally, thank
God, in Kosovo, there were 295,000 women and children in the
mountains waiting for the winter to come, about to be starved
to death. And so, I think they're--in that sense, they're
comparable. What is not comparable is Presidential leadership,
in my view.
But my time is up. I'm 33 seconds beyond it. I don't want
to, in any way, curtail any response to what I had to say, but
let me yield to my friend, and then invite any response you'd
have to anything I said.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say that I've really come to this question
period without wanting to argue with any of the witnesses, and
I think this has been a very important educational experience,
for each Senator and for those who are with us in the audience
today, to consider a number of options, some of which have been
argued, but, I think, none so persuasively.
I appreciate, in a personal way, the reunion with Susan
Rice. I think her service was remarkable in a previous
administration, and we once, Mr. Chairman, served on a
selection committee for Rhodes Scholars, and I learned of her
brilliance and analytical ability at that time.
But let me just say that, as I listened to courses we might
take--for example, you mentioned, Dr. Morrison, that we've
embarked on nation-building. And--maybe--but this worries me.
Not that we should not do this. I'm one who has argued, for
some time, along with the chairman, that nation-building is
probably very important. We've even argued with the State
Department to try to employ persons, in some numbers, who might
be helpful in this respect, given the number of failed states,
broken nations around the world. But we're not really at that
point, as a government. Our capabilities are still very
limited.
So, for instance, when the chairman conducted hearings
prior to the invasion of Iraq, and we tried to think through
what it would mean if Saddam fell, if the Government of Iraq
was no longer functional, the amount of testimony we had was
pretty sparse on the part of the administration and with regard
to the rest of the intellectual community, not measured--better
informed. This is very tough stuff, but important.
And the reason I pursued the questions I did with Andrew
Natsios, is that, at the end of the day, we're trying to think,
obviously, not only how to save people from being killed, but
how they're going to live successfully, how 2\1/2\ million
people are going to regain stature, their livestock, their
lands. And we have, at least with Sudan, if we were to look at
it from the nation-building standpoint, a revenue stream of
oil, which is sometimes not available even after humanitarian
crises are solved.
Now, in this particular case, it seems to me there is a
further thought, and that is, with 13,000 humanitarian workers,
which you've mentioned are on the ground, their safety is of
substantial importance for us. I've listened carefully to Dr.
Rice and her comments--but to get into a military action at
this point, enticing as this might be, would perhaps stimulate
countermeasures--counteractivity against those humanitarian
workers. So, the question is: How do we protect the process of
feeding 2\1/2\ million people while military action occurs?
Now, you could argue that the military action is very limited,
that the bombing of airfields or strikes against aircraft, the
knocking out of various equipment, really just shows more that
we're serious, I suspect, rather than to overthrow the
Government of Sudan. But I'm not certain what the consequences
are of that. It may be important to do, ultimately. This is one
option I would want to walk around a good bit before we have
commitment of military force on the part of the United States,
and especially unilaterally.
Now, mention has been made that our forces are stretched,
at this point. Well, this could lead to another debate about
Iraq, whether we should have devoted as much there, with all
the crises that go on in the world. An important point. But the
fact is, even as we speak today, the problems of recruitment
for our Armed Forces, the issue of re-upping Reserves who would
not expected to be called back, is crucial. Now, maybe you
believe we can segregate the Air Force from all of this. I'm
not certain it ever works that neatly.
So, these ruminations that I have, listening to all of
this, lead me to--still to believe that probably the diplomatic
track is the important one; that if the sanctions are
especially brilliant, they may be helpful. It turns out, I
think, in the North Korean situation, that sanctions imposed by
the U.S. Treasury with regard to the Macao Bank were peculiarly
effective in ways that a whole raft of sanctions against North
Koreans for years were not particularly effective.
Now, there's not equivalence between those two states, nor
specifically what we're looking for. But I would want to think
through, with all of you, as the expert panel, what combination
is likely to be effective, and how do we avoid, as you've
suggested, alienating the Chinese--who have been very effective
with us in the North Korean negotiations; also, potentially,
with the Europeans, an effective combination of states and
activities, if we are able to bring about such a coalition,
with regard to Darfur and Sudan.
So, let me just simply ask this question. What kind of
preparation do you believe our Government must have before we
can be effective, in terms of a Sudan? Leave aside whether we
build it or not. What can, in fact, offer the possibilities of
economic security for its population, north and south, and
interact with the rest of the world? If we become involved in
that question, it seems to me, we may have a business plan that
works so that, finally, we come to the end of the day with some
long- and short-term humanitarian benefit for everybody. Now,
does anybody want to comment about any of this?
Yes, sir.
Ambassador Rossin. Thank you, Senator. That's a complicated
package, obviously, and I'd just like to make a couple of
observations, because I think there is an answer to it.
I think, first of all, the points you've raised raise
questions of prioritization. And, as you noted, we have all
these people out there living in these extremely dire situation
in camps, lots and lots of people beyond the reach of any
humanitarian assistance at all, and no real security for any of
the people inside or outside the camps. We have the situation
where, never mind the threat of military action, even the kind
of diplomacy that goes on now that occasionally may have some
little saber-rattling--never fulfilled, but some saber-rattling
associated with it, reportedly has consequences, in terms of
Sudanese obstruction of, and attacks on, humanitarian workers
in the field. So, that situation is very tenuous, in any case.
But I think our certain--certainly, our view would be that
the first priority has to be to save the people of Darfur
before we can really talk about either a political settlement
that will be sustainable in the long run or, indeed, economic
reconstruction for their return home, and so forth. They've got
to be alive in order to do those things. And right now, that's
an issue that's up in the air.
There is a real challenge here in balancing the
humanitarian imperative of keeping these people alive now, and
the diplomatic imperative of moving to a situation where they
won't need to be refugees anymore, and where they can go home
and live in a self-sustaining peace. I don't think any of us
has a clear answer to that, how you balance that off.
I would also submit, however, that, in our contacts with
the administration officials, and, indeed, in our contacts with
foreign government officials, we haven't found them devoting
particular attention to trying to resolve that conflict
themselves. And I think that that's their duty. They have to
really walk and chew gum on this issue, and they have not been
doing either of those things, in our assessment.
The diplomatic track--sanctions, plan B, no-fly zone,
whatever you want to call these things--may have some important
immediate effects, but really no-fly zone or other actions that
would help secure the people of Darfur from violence. But all
of that stuff really does need to lead back to plan A, which is
a diplomatic process that leads us away from a Sudan that is
killing its own people and that should be, anyway, a pariah in
the international community. And we think that it's possible to
do that with more intensive diplomacy, with more leadership on
the part of our Government, working in partnership with other
governments, to build a coherent and a sustained diplomatic
approach toward Sudan. This was done when Sudan was harboring
terrorists in the 1990s. It was done in order to reach the
solution in south Sudan. We're just not seeing it happening
here on Darfur. We're puzzled why. We're puzzled why plan B
keeps getting kicked down the road, and all the other things
that were discussed in this hearing.
I think that what needs to be done, in essence, Senator, is
to identify the pieces of a formula for a long-term
reconstruction of Darfur, the pieces of a coherent Sudan policy
that balances off considerations of progress in the south
against the needs of Darfur, and then, finally, preparation,
which will take time to identify both the resources and the
strategy, for a reconstruction in Sudan, as a whole--not just
Darfur, but south Sudan. But first, people have to be kept
alive, and the genocide has to be ended.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Rice.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you for your kind
words, in particular.
And I'd like to respond to your very important and complex
question. I also want to address, briefly, Senator Biden's
point.
And just to say, Senator Biden, I certainly agree with you,
we did the right thing, be it belatedly, in Bosnia. The toll
there was enormous. And I don't mean to suggest that we didn't.
I absolutely agree. All I'm suggesting is, we did the right
thing there, and it's past time to do the right thing in
Darfur.
I think, as Ambassador Rossin pointed out, it's important
to recall we're dealing with multiple complex crises
simultaneously in Sudan. We have the nation-building endeavor
of implementing the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
which is falling behind. We have genocide overlaid on a civil
conflict in Darfur. We have another conflict, in fact, in the
east of Sudan. We have a repressive regime that is a serious
abuser of human rights. And we have a wider regional
conflagration.
So, ultimately, ideally, we'd be addressing all of those
things. But I think Ambassador Rossin makes a critical point,
that we have to prioritize, and that stopping the genocide and
the threat to civilians is the first priority.
I want to be clear. I didn't come to the conclusion that we
ought to use military force, even limited strikes, casually or
quickly. I, like you, Senator Biden, am not crazy about killing
people. But I do think that at a certain point we have to ask
when enough is enough.
This genocide, as many have pointed out, has been going on
4 long years. For the first year, the United States essentially
ignored it, because we had other priorities, we didn't want to
upset the applecart with Khartoum. And then, frankly, it was
Congress that made it impossible for the administration to
continue to ignore it. And you all recall well what happened in
2004 with Congress leading the way, calling it genocide, the
administration eventually agreeing, and the President and
Secretary Powell making that declaration.
In the interim, we have pursued negotiations as the
principal vehicle of trying to end the genocide. Three years
later, we're still essentially at square one. We don't have a
sustained negotiated settlement. The genocide continues. And we
have issued threat after threat after threat, and never
implemented it. So, as Senator Menendez suggested, we're really
sending the message to the Sudanese Government that, ``We're
going to blow smoke in your face and scream and yell, but, at
the end of the day, we're not going to do anything.'' And if
that's the message that this government takes, then there's
nothing to persuade it not to continue the genocide.
And so, as you suggested, yes; in part, the rationale for
our proposal is to show the Sudanese Government that we are, in
fact, finally serious.
This is not a major military power that we're talking
about, the Government of Khartoum. It is not even the Milosevic
government, which was rather formidable, and which we took care
of rather handily. This is an overstretched, torn-in-three-
directions, still-third-rate military. And what is lacking from
us is a demonstration, a credible demonstration, of resolve. If
you know the history of U.S. dealings with Sudan--and, indeed,
Sudan itself, as I know you both do--you'll recall that the
Sundanese Government responds almost only when the credible
threat or the use of force is applied, or meaningful economic
pressure.
And that's why I advocate, and wish it had happened
earlier, the full implementation of all the aspects of plan B
as quickly as possible. Let's hope that works. Second, the
issuance of an ultimatum, preferably from the Security Council,
that signals to Khartoum that, in fact, the game is up, and, if
they don't admit a U.N. force unconditionally, then they face
the threat of the use of force. And then, finally, a limited
and targeted use of force, with the aim of, as we did very
effectively in Kosovo, keeping the pressure on the regime to
admit a credible international force to protect civilians.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. I have one question, if I may. Ambassador
Rossin, you talked about the mechanisms that need to be set up
even to implement plan B. Do you have any indication as to how
far down the road the administration is in equipping the
administration to actually implement plan B, if it were signed
by the President tomorrow?
Ambassador Rossin. The short answer to your question,
Senator Biden, is no; I have no actual information. However, we
did a lot of research on these issues, once we heard what plan
B was likely to entail, in order to understand better what it
does take, building on the experience from Yugoslavia
sanctions, for example, at the end of the nineties. And all of
the pieces that were described to us that made the Yugoslavia
sanctions as effective as they were, do not appear to be in
place at all. We're told that they may be being set up now, but
I didn't get very much assurance of that, I have to say, from
Mr. Natsios's testimony today. Neither--certainly, there's not
adequate staff resources being utilized, being made available
for this issue right now in the Office of Foreign Assets
Control. We know that; we've talked to people there. We know
that there is no task force on Sudan, on Darfur, in the
intelligence community, which would be required to identify,
substantiate, meet the legal standards for, and then enforce,
sanctions against Sudanese entities that might be designated.
That's something that's not in existence now in the intel
community.
There clearly is no very, very senior sanctions czar in
existence now, nor do we know of one being considered for
appointment, on the order of the Vice President's National
Security Advisor, Leon Fuerth, who filled that role on the
Yugoslavia sanctions at the end of the 1990s, somebody who was
very close, very short communication chain to the President,
and, when the bureaucracy, as they always do on these things,
started making it difficult on very technical and very labor-
intensive issues, could go in there and really knock heads and
say, ``Get to work. The President has given a direction. You
work for the President. Stop quibbling.''
Finally, of course, sanctions, to be effective, do need to
be, or at least to the extent possible they need to be,
multilateralized and international. And, again, here I've spent
a lot of time over the last 2 months in Europe--in Germany, in
Brussels, in Paris, in the United Kingdom--talking about, and
pushing for, EU sanctions action. And not only has there been
no such action, and there's none pending, the quotes that Mr.
Natsios gave, I'm familiar with, because I was in Germany when
they were made by Angela Merkel, and they were only as a result
of pressure from EU cultural leaders and others at the time of
the EU 50th anniversary event.
There's no currently existing, nor do we hear anything
about the appointment of, somebody on the order of Ambassador
Victor Comras, who, again, during the Yugoslavia sanctions in
the nineties and early 2000, was, with a large staff,
constantly on the road, constantly harassing countries to
enforce the sanctions on the Danube, to, you know, do all of
the really, really difficult detail work that's needed to make
sanctions effective.
So, the short answer, Senator, is no.
The Chairman. And I know there's no way you can answer with
any great specificity, but if, tomorrow, the President turned
to you and said, ``Set these mechanisms up,'' how long would it
take?
Ambassador Rossin. I think if the President said to do it,
and put somebody in direct charge of it, and said, ``I want
this done,'' I think it could be done in a matter of a couple
of weeks. The resources are there. In many cases, it's a
question of allocating resources. If you don't have a Sudan
task force in the intelligence community, well, you take people
from other less-priority issues, and you assign them to a Sudan
task force. Same thing in Treasury; you appointed yourself an
envoy. It doesn't take that long to do it, if you're
determined.
The Chairman. Dr. Morrison, leaving military option off the
table, and a more aggressively diplomacy, do you agree with the
Ambassador, in terms of the lack of a mechanism in place to
aggressively engage in diplomacy with the potential use of
economic sanctions?
Dr. Morrison. It's--you mean with reference to other
powers, or----
The Chairman. No; with reference to us. With reference to
the United States, not only acting on its own, but seeking
multilateral support for the actions that are contemplated in
plan B. In other words, how prepared are they, if it--if,
tomorrow, the President turned to Ambassador Natsios, and says,
``Go. I'm signing the order,'' how prepared for this vigorous
diplomacy that you very skillfully argue for--how prepared are
we to implement it?
Dr. Morrison. I can--I share Larry's general sense about
this, that much more can, and should, be done to lay the
groundwork for the embrace and advance and multilateralization
of these. It's a little hard to get very precise, because so
much of the preparations have been done in quiet and out of--
you know, out of sight. And so, I haven't been--I haven't been
privy to much of the prior discussions. I think some of the
hesitation in introduction has to do with the lack of buy-in on
the other side, in the sense that it--you might find yourself
alone, or too alone, or too visibly or conspicuously alone. And
so, there's been a tendency, under those circumstances, to be
very cautious and to begin to break them into incremental steps
that perhaps would be more digestible.
The Chairman. From the standpoint of EU members, what
incentive--other than a moral incentive, what incentive is
there to engage in, and participate in, multilateral sanctions?
Is there any economic or political or military or strategy
interest that major EU countries think is at stake for them if
the situation in Sudan continues, and Darfur continues, as it
has the last 4 years?
Dr. Morrison. If we're talking about Sudan, specifically, I
think--you know, Susan's point, earlier, that this is--this is
not a major economic or military or political power we're
talking about. The implications for trade are--and investment
exposure--are relatively modest. Like all of these--like
ourselves and every European government, they're going to look
at this in terms of the implications downstream in other
settings.
The Chairman. And what are those?
Dr. Morrison. And----
The Chairman. What are some of those implications
downstream in other settings for European countries?
Dr. Morrison. Well, I think that the--the fact that the--
these kinds of sanctions have been used to reasonable effect on
North Korea, and are being implemented in Iran, gives a
credibility and----
The Chairman. Yeah, but there's a lot at stake there.
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. And----
The Chairman. I mean, there's the----
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. And----
The Chairman [continuing]. Possibility of a nuclearized
Korean Peninsula, a nuclear Japan, and a response from China.
What similar kinds----
Dr. Morrison. Yes; but what I'm getting at is that it's
proven that these can be--these can have some impact on the
target--the target of the sanctions, without having huge costs
that are----
The Chairman. Yeah.
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. That are sideline costs. That's
what I'm----
The Chairman. I understand. Yeah. That's a valid point.
Yes, Susan.
Dr. Rice. Senator, in part to answer your question, the
French, at least, have a significant stake in the stability of
Chad and the Central African Republic. They have French forces
based in Chad. And when this thing blows up, as it has
intermittently, it's been French forces that have had to
backstop the Chadian Government to prevent the Sudanese rebels
from reaching N'Djamena. So, when you look at the issue in its
regional context, you begin to see many implications for
various of the interests of the European countries.
The Chairman. Last question. Susan, the point made by
Senator Lugar is self-evidently valid, that this is pretty
complicated. And, to use his phrase, it warrants walking around
the problem a little longer. You've walked around it for a
while. If, in fact--is there any--do you have any reason to
believe that if, in fact, we move through the three phases
you're talking about before we get to unilateral use of force,
or even multilateral use of force, is there any reason to
believe that in the circumstance of the use of force--targeted,
as you point out--that there would be the ability of any
significant portion of the 13,000 aid workers to be able to
continue to function in that region, or do you--or do you take
it as a given that, for all intents and purposes, unless the
military action generated a response from Khartoum that was
favorable, in terms of changing their position, that it would
be a price that would have to be paid? How do you calculate it?
Dr. Rice. I think, whether we're talking about the
imposition of a no-fly zone or targeted military strikes----
The Chairman. Targeted military strikes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. That--either one--in either
circumstance, because they're--in practical terms, amount to
more or less the same thing. There are--there's obviously, as
you suggest, a significant risk to humanitarian operations. I
think there are ways, as I suggested in my testimony, to
mitigate those risks. First and foremost, to try to spare
aircraft and airfield that are integral to the humanitarian
operations, having a quick-reaction capacity on the other side
to protect civilians at risk. But, in fact, we would need to
assume that there would likely be an interruption or diminution
in humanitarian activity. And that's a legitimate reason for
concern.
The question then becomes, though--and we faced this
dilemma, in effect, in the Balkans; you referred to British
troops being at risk, and, therefore, them being used as an
excuse not to pursue more robust action to stop the genocide,
in the case of Bosnia--we face the same thing. There is an
understandable and laudable desire on the part of the
humanitarian community to continue to deliver life-saving
assistance. But is our plan to do that in perpetuity, while the
killing continues, or, in effect, putting Band-Aids on the
victims of the genocide, or is it necessary, at a certain
point, to try to stop it? I've come to the conclusion,
gradually and reluctantly, that it is not only necessary to
stop it, but more robust action than we've taken to date will
be required to stop it. I don't rule out the possibility that
serious economic pressure, if it were sharp and severe and
swift, not incremental, as Mr. Natsios laid out, has the
potential to get Khartoum's attention and begin to change their
calculus. But, if it fails, then we face that dilemma of
whether we continue to let this go on forever, and feed the
victims, or whether we, in fact, try to stop it. And then, as
Senator Lugar suggested, get into the complex and important
work of trying to put the entire region back together again,
with the involvement of our European partners and others.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you. I thank you all. This is--
all three of you have made a significant contribution to our
deliberation, and I appreciate it very much. I think we're
going to be asking your assistance again. I doubt whether this
is going to go away.
I thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]