[Senate Hearing 110-236]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-236
CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE
DARFUR CRISIS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 20, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
40-160 WASHINGTON : 2008
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Bacon, Kenneth H., president, Refugees International, Washington,
DC............................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prendergast, John, senior advisor, International Crisis Group,
Washington, DC................................................. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Swan, James, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State for African Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar. 38
(iii)
CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE
DARFUR CRISIS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D.
Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. The committee will come to order, and I
want to thank everyone for being here. On behalf of the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome
all of you to the second hearing of this subcommittee in the
110th Congress.
I want to especially express my gratitude to my colleague,
Senator Sununu, who I expect will be here at some point, who
has already demonstrated a dedicated commitment to Africa in
his first couple of months as ranking member of this
subcommittee.
By now we are all aware of the tragedy unfolding in the
Darfur region of Sudan. More than 2\1/2\ years ago, my
colleagues and I were among the first to condemn the atrocities
in Darfur as genocide, and since then Congress has appropriated
more than $1.5 billion to ease the suffering of innocent
Darfurians. The U.S. Government and many other concerned
states, acting alone as well as through the United Nations and
the African Union, have intervened with diplomatic,
humanitarian, human rights, and development assistance efforts
driven in large part by effective grassroots activism, to which
I give great credit.
Despite these ongoing and well-intentioned efforts,
however, today in Darfur millions remain displaced and at least
200,000 people are dead. Humanitarian space continues to
shrink, and peacekeepers, aid workers, and human rights actors
are increasingly the target of violent crimes. Perhaps most
worrisome is the Sudanese Government's growing denial of the
crimes and crisis in the west.
This morning I woke up and turned on the Today Show and
watched Sudanese President Bashir claim that rape ``doesn't
exist; we don't have it.'' He went on to allege that the United
States was fabricating evidence of atrocities in Darfur just as
it had before invading Iraq, implying that the Americans have
ulterior motives in seeking to end the violence in Darfur.
In the meantime, we are seeing the brutal tactics of Darfur
and their tragic consequences transferred across the porous
border into eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. Even
before the recent outbreak of hostilities in the north, the
Central African Republic was suffering extreme poverty and
deemed by the U.N.'s Office of Humanitarian Assistance as ``one
of the world's most neglected emergencies.''
Similarly, I visited the Iriba refugee camp in eastern Chad
in January 2005, and was struck even then by the rising inflow
of Darfurian refugees. During that same visit to Chad, I also
noted the growing disillusionment with President Deby's
government and the lack of democratic space for political
change.
My conclusion from this trip was that Chadians outside the
government were preoccupied with the problems of poverty and
rural development, but it worried me that this was not a major
concern of the Government of Chad, nor was it at the top tier
of the United States-Chad bilateral relationship. Political
unrest in Chad has sparked violence that has displaced more
than 100,000 citizens of Chad, adding to refugees from Sudan
and the Central African Republic in crowded camps, and it has
created a downward spiral of security in humanitarian
conditions throughout the region.
Last month Senator Sununu and I introduced a resolution to
highlight the destabilizing impact of the ongoing violence in
the Darfur region of Sudan on neighboring Chad and the Central
African Republic. Each of these countries is struggling to cope
with security and humanitarian challenges of their own, but the
spillover of rebels, weapons, and brutal tactics, along with
the flood of refugees and internally displaced persons that
such violence creates across Sudan's western border, has
exacerbated these emergencies.
As long as these conflicts persist, the crisis in Darfur
will be prolonged, and vice versa. No effort to restore peace
and stability to this bloody region in the heart of Africa can
succeed unless we commit ourselves to a coordinated,
comprehensive approach. Tribal rivalries are not constrained by
national boundaries, so neither should we pursue localized
solutions to what has become in fact a regional conflict.
That was the motivation for our bipartisan resolution
calling on the U.S. Government and the international community
to promptly develop, fund, and implement a comprehensive
regional strategy to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian
operations, contain and reduce violence, and contribute to
conditions for sustainable peace in eastern Chad, the Central
African Republic, and western Sudan. Today this hearing will
explore the need for an integrated approach to peace in this
region.
With that said, let me introduce our two distinguished
panels. On our first panel we have Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, Mr. Jim Swan. In addition to
having previously served as Director of Analysis for Africa in
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Mr. Swan has devoted
most of his professional life as a career Foreign Service
officer to various African countries facing complex political
transitions.
I hope he'll be able to draw upon this experience to give
us some insights into the current situations in Chad and the
Central African Republic. We look forward to a review of recent
developments in U.S. policy in this region, including the
administration's priorities as well as its strategies and
allocated resources toward achieving these ends. Mr. Swan, I
would also appreciate your assessment of the impact you believe
the United States is having in each of these countries in
addressing both the immediate needs and longstanding grievances
of the affected populations.
Following Mr. Swan, on our second panel we will hear
testimony from two respected individuals representing the
humanitarian and academic communities, respectively. Both Ken
Bacon and John Prendergast have firsthand experience with these
conflicts and their victims, and both have written extensively
and even testified before Congress on these and related foreign
policy issues.
Ken Bacon is the president of Refugees International, an
advocacy organization based in Washington, but with operations
that serve forgotten or neglected populations in crisis all
over the world, including Chad and the Central African
Republic. To learn more about the needs of internally displaced
people and what can be done to reduce attacks on civilians in
these areas, Refugees International recently sent an assessment
mission to visit IDP camps in eastern Chad as well as the
extremely isolated and nearly inaccessible conflict zones in
northeast and northwest CAR. We are fortunate to be privy to
this on-the-ground update, and I hope Mr. Bacon will also share
his perspective on both the successes and failures of existing
efforts to ease and resolve the conflicts in this troubled
region and what more needs to be done.
John Prendergast has worked on crisis issues in Africa for
the past two decades, and is currently a senior advisor to the
International Crisis Group and cofounder of the recently
launched ENOUGH campaign that aims to end ongoing crimes
against humanity and prevent future mass atrocities. We look to
you, Mr. Prendergast, for analysis of the internal political
situations in Chad and the Central African Republic, as well as
the regional dynamics that bind these conflicts with the Darfur
crisis. Additionally, the subcommittee would appreciate your
insights into what you believe is needed at the national,
regional, and international levels in the short, medium, and
long term, to ease and resolve the interrelated challenges of
this troubled region.
We're very glad that you're all here today, and we
appreciate your willingness to testify. Thank you and welcome.
The information and insights you share with us this morning
will help my colleagues and myself better understand these
complex conflicts and the role we can play in resolving them
through a coordinated, comprehensive result.
I will now start the testimony of Mr. Swan. When Senator
Sununu arrives, we'll ask him to speak as the ranking member.
Mr. Swan, would you proceed with your testimony?
STATEMENT OF JAMES SWAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Swan. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very
much for the invitation to testify this morning on instability
in Chad and the Central African Republic and their links to
regional instability, particularly the ongoing crisis in
Darfur.
Before I begin, I would like also to acknowledge you,
Senator, as well as your colleagues, Senators Sununu and Levin,
for your introduction of a resolution calling for a
comprehensive strategy to protect civilians, reduce violence,
and contribute to a lasting peace in the region. Your efforts
have brought attention to an oft-forgotten part of the world,
and for this we are appreciative.
I will be restricting my remarks today to Chad and the
Central African Republic, since I understand that the
President's Special Envoy will be addressing you on Sudan in
the coming weeks, but of course I do want to underscore the
regional dimension of the issues that I will be addressing as
well.
I have some prepared testimony which, with your permission,
Senator, I would like to introduce into the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Mr. Swan. Thank you, and I will summarize the key points of
this paper.
Chad and the Central African Republic have a long history
of instability and war that can be attributed to a combination
of domestic and regional factors. Neither country has a record
of good governance, rule of law, or democracy, and this makes
both countries vulnerable to external interference, and it
limits their options for peaceful resolution of internal
problems. Over time, each of these countries has both generated
and hosted substantial numbers of refugees, including from each
other.
U.S. priorities in Chad and CAR include limiting the
regional impact of the Darfur conflict, fostering stability,
protecting civilians, refugees, internally displaced persons,
and humanitarian workers, and promoting political reform and
good governance.
Since you have already in your remarks, Senator, described
briefly the general context of the situation, I'd like to skip
ahead and focus primarily on the U.S. response to current
developments. Thank you, sir.
Overall, the United States Government is taking a holistic
approach to addressing stability and security in Chad and CAR,
an approach that takes into account both regional and domestic
dynamics. I'd like to start first with the issue of regional
stability, and on this our primary focus at this point is in
supporting a robust United Nations peacekeeping operation for
Chad and the Central African Republic that would focus on both
protecting civilians and also deterring cross-border attacks.
We believe that the presence of such a mission, and
particularly the execution of its civilian protection and
monitoring mission, would lead to a reduction in violence. Our
focus on a U.N. mission also underscores our commitment to work
multilaterally and with key Western and African partners as we
try to address the situations in Chad and CAR.
With respect to the proposed U.N. military or police
peacekeeping operation, we have consistently encouraged the
Chadians to accept such a mission, and we were disappointed by
the Chadian Government's recent indications of concern over the
military component of the proposed mission and specifically the
deployment of an advance mission. We are continuing to engage
President Deby to convince him to accept a military force as
part of this package.
We have also consulted with other key allies and
influential players, including France, the United Kingdom, NATO
partners, and others about how to obtain Chadian acceptance for
the peacekeeping operation, and we're going to continue to work
with both our African and our Western partners on this issue.
With respect to the Central African Republic, President
Bozize has already announced his willingness to accept a robust
peacekeeping force in northeastern Chad. With respect to this
force, we are committed to generating the most robust force
possible for the operation, and we have already approached
several governments with requests for troop contributions.
We recognize, however, that with already some 100,000
international peacekeeping troops currently deployed worldwide,
that force generation for the Chad/CAR mission is going to be a
challenge. Therefore, if it becomes necessary, we are willing
to consider alternative options, including those that might
involve a slight decrease in the number of troops in exchange
for greater logistical support and equipment, including
helicopters, that would keep the force agile and still
muscular.
So the core of our focus now in terms of the regional
stability element of our policy is proceeding with the
deployment of this peacekeeping operation. A second key element
of our policy is promotion of democracy and good governance.
This is obviously, and as you indicated, Senator, in your
opening remarks, inextricably linked to the stability questions
because we recognize that poor governance is a major cause of
Chadian instability.
Consequently, we have emphasized the importance of
democratic reform, respect for human rights, dialog, and
transparent governance in our communications with Chadian
officials at all levels. This message has been delivered
directly by Secretary Rice to President Deby in writing. It's
delivered on a near-daily basis in our working level
interactions with Chadian officials in N'Djamena and in our
contacts with their diplomatic representation here. We have
also consulted with our European Union, French, and U.N.
colleagues on their programs to reform the electoral process,
and we look forward to funding a census project that would
complement their efforts.
Overall, our human rights and democracy policy in Chad has
focused on strengthening the institutions that are necessary
for stable democracy, such as effective civil society and a
free, fair, and professional press. Among other programs and
activities designed to protect human rights, the United States
supports legal assistance for victims of human rights abuses
through local human rights NGOs.
With regard to good governance, including transparent
collection and expenditure of the government's oil revenues,
the Treasury Department has provided technical assistance to
Chad's oil revenue management oversight body, and we continue
to urge the Chadian Government to live up to its commitment to
spend 70 percent of its budget on priority sectors for poverty
reduction.
Another program that has cross-cutting regional stability
and democratization impact is the Trans Sahara Counter
Terrorism Partnership. This is an interagency initiative in
which Chad participates, through which we seek not only to
strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and enhance
cooperation among the region's security forces, but also to
promote democratic governance as a means to discredit terrorist
ideology.
Turning to the CAR and its governance challenges, poor
governance here also is at the heart of instability in CAR, and
as in Chad, we engage regularly with Central African Republic
officials about the need for democratic reform, increased
respect for human rights, and good governance. We are
encouraged by the CAR's upcoming political dialog under the
auspices of the Central African Republic's Council of Wise Men,
a group of respected officials tasked with mediating Central
African Republic's political disputes.
Our efforts overall to support democracy and human rights
in the Central African Republic have focused on strengthening
the free media and the Parliament, which is composed largely of
inexperienced legislators and remains susceptible to executive
branch pressure.
Let me turn now to the third key element of our policy, in
addition to regional stability and democracy governance, and
that is responding to the humanitarian situation. The United
Nations estimates there are some 230,000 Sudanese refugees in
Chad, 20,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur/Sudan, and 50,000
Central African Republic refugees in southern Chad. In addition
to that, there are up to approximately 110,000 internally
displaced persons in eastern Chad, and their numbers have
doubled in the last 5 months, and many of them have suffered
secondary displacement after their initial displacement.
With respect to the CAR the United States estimates that a
total of some 280,000 Central Africans have been displaced,
most of these, some 212,000, internally displaced, but some
20,000 refugees in Cameroon, and again the 50,000 refugees now
in southern Chad.
We too are very much concerned with an issue that you
raised, that is, the shrinking humanitarian space for aid
workers, attacks on civilians are widespread in both Chad and
the Central African Republic, and we have had repeated
opportunities to hear from humanitarian organizations of the
difficulties that they are having operating, particularly in
the Chadian environment.
With respect to what the United States is doing on the
humanitarian front, again I would first of all stress the
essential nature of improved security to providing humanitarian
relief to these populations. This is why again we believe that
deployment of this peacekeeping operation will be critical not
only to providing for monitoring of the border, but also and
most essentially to protection of civilians.
We continue to be the largest single humanitarian donor in
the region. In Chad a concerted effort focused on Darfur
refugees in the eastern part of the country in 2004 has brought
conditions in what are now 12 refugee camps close to
international humanitarian standards, despite extremely
difficult logistical challenges in these areas. However, the
assistance provided to some other refugee and displaced
populations have not been as significant as that provided to
these 12 camps.
Overall, our humanitarian funding in fiscal year 2006 for
Chad was approximately $74 million, and among the largest
shares of this total were $45 million in support for refugee
and IDP camps and some $24 million in emergency food
assistance.
In fiscal year 2006 in Central African Republic, the
assistance in the humanitarian sector was approximately
$900,000. We expect these numbers to increase significantly in
fiscal year 2007. We are also very much encouraged that a
number of international humanitarian organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, have begun returning to Central
African Republic and beginning to establish programs there.
To look ahead at what we may be able to do additionally on
the humanitarian side, in January and February of this year
assessment teams from USAID traveled to conflict-affected areas
in both Chad and CAR to assess conditions for IDPs, analyze
humanitarian capacity, and determine potential program areas.
These teams have made a number of recommendations about how to
improve humanitarian assistance, including through improved
donor coordination, prepositioning of essential relief
supplies, expanding emergency water and sanitation
interventions, and bolstering food aid programs, and we are now
in the process of determining how to move ahead in using
available resources to implement these recommendations.
So, to conclude, the United States is committed to doing
our full part to protect civilians in Chad and the Central
African Republic and to mitigating factors that are related to
regional instability. Both the proximate and the institutional
causes of instability are complex, and are going to require
that we work closely with the rest of the international
community as well as with the governments of Chad and CAR
themselves.
I also would like to let you know that I personally will be
traveling to CAR and Chad beginning next week, March 27 to
April 2, and I look forward to following up directly on the
issues that have been raised in this hearing and concerns that
are presented by you, Senator, or by other panelists who
present later today.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swan follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for the
opportunity to discuss instability in Chad and the Central African
Republic, links to regional stability, particularly the ongoing
horrific crisis in Darfur, and the administration's efforts to promote
security in both countries. I want to acknowledge Senators Feingold,
Sununu, and Levin for their introduction of a resolution calling for a
comprehensive strategy to protect civilians, reduce violence, and
contribute to a lasting peace in the region. Your efforts have brought
attention to an oft-forgotten part of the world, and for this we are
appreciative. I will restrict my remarks today to Chad and the Central
African Republic, as I understand that the President's Special Envoy
will be addressing you on Sudan in the next few weeks, but I do want to
underscore the regional nature of many of the challenges we face.
BACKGROUND
Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), like many of their
neighbors, have a long history of instability and war that can be
attributed to a combination of domestic and regional factors. Neither
country has a record of good governance, rule of law, or democracy,
making both vulnerable to external interference and limiting options
for peaceful resolution of internal problems. Over time, each has both
generated and hosted substantial numbers of refugees, including from
each other.
The United States priorities in Chad and CAR include limiting the
regional impact of the Darfur conflict, fostering stability, protecting
civilians, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and
humanitarian workers, and furthering transformational diplomacy by
promoting political reform and good governance.
Since achieving independence in 1960, Chad has been subject to
several power struggles. The country suffered through an almost
continuous civil war from 1965 to 1993, when current President Deby
initiated a national reconciliation process. The current rebel
movements, including the United Front for Change (FUC), the Union of
Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), and the Rally of
Democratic Forces (RAFD) gained strength in late 2005 and 2006, in part
due to defections of high-ranking civil and military officers,
including members of Deby's ethnic group. Many of these groups appear
to enjoy support from the Government of Sudan. In recent months, Chad
has also experienced a rise in intercommunal violence that is not
directly related to the rebellion. However, the various causes of
insecurity tend to become mutually reinforcing--something of a
``perfect storm'' of violence.
CAR also has a history of violence and unrest. It has experienced
four coups, additional failed coup attempts, and many years of
undemocratic rule since its independence in 1960. Rebels, including
some members of the political opposition, emerged in the northwestern
part of the country in late 2005. Still other groups with alleged links
to Sudan took over four northeastern towns in October and November
2006. After being defeated by government forces with French support,
the northeastern rebels attacked again in early March 2007, but were
quickly pushed back.
The recent increase in violence in Chad has endangered the lives of
civilians, who are subject to attack by rebel groups, government
forces, and ethnic militias, and has reduced the number of secure
humanitarian corridors. As a result, international and nongovernmental
organizations (IOs and NGOs) have cut staff by approximately 50
percent, limiting the ability of NGOs to provide non life-saving
support activities, such as education, in refugee camps and to IDPs. At
present staffing levels, the humanitarian community would be hard-
pressed to accommodate new IDP populations or new refugee inflows from
Darfur. In CAR, which up until recently has not garnered much
international attention, insecurity has limited the ability of
humanitarian groups to travel to parts of the northwest and northeast
in order to assess needs. Recent travelers to the region describe a
grave humanitarian crisis.
FACTORS AFFECTING STABILITY
Deficiencies in democracy, good governance, and the rule of law
have contributed greatly to instability in Chad. The country's history
of recurrent conflict has weakened the rule of law and undermined
peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. As a result, Chad is ill-
equipped to remain immune to spillover from regional conflicts.
Chad and Sudan have a complex relationship in which national
loyalties are often subordinate to tribal or clan loyalties or the
competition for resources. In eastern Chad and in western Sudan, which
were once part of the same ``kingdom,'' limited access to water and
arable land leads to conflicts between pastoralists and
agriculturalists on both sides of the border. Familial and ethnic ties
can exacerbate economic tensions.
Chadian rebels have a long history of using Sudan as a base for
attacks into Chad, sometimes with Sudanese Government complicity. Both
Chadian President Deby and his predecessor, Hissene Habre, assumed
power through military campaigns based in Sudan, thus establishing
enduring connections with Sudanese actors. President Deby continues to
accuse the Government of Sudan of providing support to Chadian rebels.
Tribal loyalty appears to be at the heart of Chadian support for
Sudanese rebel groups, including those that have not signed the Darfur
Peace Agreement. President Deby and many members of the Chadian elite
belong to the Zaghawa tribe, which dominates some Darfur rebel groups,
including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). This loyalty appears
to work both ways, with JEM elements reportedly fighting alongside the
Chadian military (ANT) against Chadian rebels.
Interethnic fighting, which is indirectly related to the rebel
activity, has increased considerably as well in eastern Chad. Communal
tensions have grown in recent years due to conflict over land and
natural resources, particularly water, in an area of environmental
extremes. This rise in communal tensions, coupled with a security
vacuum (due to the Chadian military's engagement with the Chadian
rebels), has left local populations vulnerable to attacks by ethnic
militias that engage in violence to settle scores, loot villages, and
raid cattle and livestock. Some of the violence is perpetrated by
Sudanese Janjaweed, but most seems to be conducted by Chadian Arabs. In
response, several ethnic groups have formed self-defense militias,
leading to a proliferation of weapons and exacerbating the cycle of
violence. Even the security and neutrality of refugee camps risk being
compromised.
In Central African Republic, threats to stability include domestic
factors such as a weak central government, widespread impunity amongst
the country's armed forces, and several rebel movements, including the
Popular Army for the Reconstruction of the Republic and Democracy
(APRD), which operates in the northwestern part of the country, and the
Union of Democratic Forces for Rally (UFDR), which has conducted
attacks in the northeast.
CAR President Bozize, who resided in Chad while in exile, has
strong links to Chadian President Deby, who provides Bozize with armed
guards and significant support. Throughout CAR, it appears that the
country's rebels are linked with their Chadian counterparts. The rebels
and general population in northwestern CAR do not appear to have direct
ties to Sudan, while the population in northeastern CAR does have
ethnic, familial, and commercial links to the Sudanese population
residing across the border. While there is no irrefutable evidence that
northeastern CAR rebels enjoy support from the Sudanese Government,
there are reports that these rebels have operated out of, and been
supplied through, Sudan, and President Bozize accuses the Government of
Sudan of fueling instability in CAR. Furthermore, Chadian rebels have
traversed northern CAR to attack N'djamena from bases in Sudan, and may
do so again in the future. Most of CAR's territory is ungoverned space,
which makes it extremely unstable and, therefore, attractive to rebel
groups looking for either refuge or unobserved transit points. For
example, there are reports that the Lord's Resistance Army is planning
on shifting its operations to CAR, especially if it is forced out of
the Democratic Republic of Congo.
U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PROMOTE STABILITY
The U.S. Government has taken a holistic approach to address
stability and security in Chad and CAR, one that takes into account
both regional and domestic dynamics. We have publicly and privately
supported a robust United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operation in Chad
and CAR that will focus on both protecting civilians and deterring
cross-border attacks. While the proposed mission will not have an
express mandate to secure the Chad-Sudan and CAR-Sudan borders, we
believe that its presence and execution of its civilian protection and
monitoring mission will lead to a reduction in violence.
We have consistently encouraged the Chadians to accept a robust
military mission and were disappointed by the Chadian Government's
recent rejection of the military component of the proposed mission and
the deployment of the advance mission. We will continue to engage with
President Deby to convince him to accept a military force. We have also
consulted with other allies, including France, the United Kingdom, NATO
partners, and others about how to obtain Chadian acquiescence to the
operation and will continue to work with both our African and non-
African partners on this issue. President Bozize has announced his
readiness to accept a robust peacekeeping force in northeastern CAR.
We are committed to generating the most robust force possible for
the operation and have approached several governments with requests for
contributions. We understand, however, that with approximately 100,000
international peacekeeping troops currently deployed worldwide, force
generation for the Chad-CAR mission will be a challenge. Therefore, if
necessary, we will urge the Security Council to consider options that
may decrease the number of troops in exchange for greater logistical
support or equipment, such as helicopters, that will keep the force
agile and robust.
There have been a number of efforts, both bilateral and based on
third parties in the region, to either police the Chad-Sudan border or
to commit Presidents Deby and Bashir to avoid interference in the
other's country. None of these have borne fruit, and our position
remains that U.N. peacekeeping forces in Darfur, eastern Chad, and
northeastern CAR remain essential. We will continue to monitor these
alternative efforts, however, and may find opportunities to support
them as complements to U.N. efforts.
To address concerns that the force has been dispatched to bolster
unpopular regimes or could be viewed as belligerent by local
populations and rebels, we anticipate developing a public diplomacy
campaign to explain to the Chadian and Central African people our goals
of protecting civilians and promoting regional stability.
The United States has repeatedly condemned efforts by Chadian
rebels to take power by force and urges both Sudan and Chad not to
engage in support for rebels in the other country.
Because we recognize that poor governance is a major cause of
Chadian instability, we have emphasized the importance of democratic
reform, respect for human rights, dialogue, and transparent governance
in our communications with Chadian officials. This message has been
delivered at every level, from Secretary Rice to President Deby down to
our working-level interactions. We have consulted with our European
Union, French, and U.N. colleagues on their programs to reform the
electoral process, and intend to fund a census project to complement
their efforts. We have also encouraged President Deby to consider how
best to ensure a peaceful and democratic handover of power when his
current term of office expires in 2011. In addition, our human rights
policy in Chad has focused on strengthening the institutions necessary
for a stable democracy such as civil society and a free, fair, and
professional press. Among other programs and activities designed to
protect human rights, the United States supports legal assistance for
victims of human rights abuses through local human rights NGOs.
Good governance includes the transparent collection and expenditure
of the government's oil revenues, and to this end, the Treasury
Department has provided technical assistance to Chad's oil revenue
management oversight body. We continue to encourage the Chadian
Government to fight corruption, spend its revenues transparently, and
to implement poverty reduction programs as recommended by the
International Financial Institutions. We have also urged the Chadian
Government to live up to its commitment to spend 70 percent of its
budget on priority sectors for poverty reduction. Fulfillment of these
conditions is the key to unlocking substantial debt relief under the
Heavily Indebted Poor Country and G-8 (Multilateral Debt Relief)
Initiatives.
Under the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an
interagency initiative to which Chad belongs, the United States seeks
not only to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and
enhance cooperation among the region's security forces, but also to
promote democratic governance as a means to discredit terrorist
ideology. TSCTP activities, which include strengthening of local
governments, conflict management, and small scale infrastructure
projects in targeted regions, not only help deter terrorism, but also
promote domestic stability. In fiscal year (FY) 2006, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) development assistance for
Chad totaled $1.35 million. The Department of Defense contributed
another $501,000 in humanitarian assistance activities in the education
and water sectors.
As in Chad, poor governance is at the heart of instability in CAR.
As in Chad, we engage regularly with CAR officials about the need for
democratic reform, increased respect for human rights, and good
governance. We support CAR's upcoming political dialogue under the
auspices of the CAR's Council of Wise Men, a group of respected
officials tasked with mediating CAR's political disputes. U.S. efforts
to support democracy and human rights in the CAR have focused on
strengthening the media and the Parliament, which is composed of
largely inexperienced legislators and remains susceptible to pressure
from the executive branch, as well as on providing voter education.
In international fora, the United States has announced its support
for the mandates of the U.N. Peace-Building Office in the Central
African Republic (BONUCA) and of the Multinational Force of the Central
African Monetary and Economic Community (also known as FOMUC) in order
to promote stability in CAR. Both BONUCA and FOMUC, while constrained
by their small sizes and budgets, have contributed considerably to the
pursuit of peace in CAR.
Our military training (IMET) programs in Chad and CAR, which are
vital to promote long-term institutional military reform were funded at
$342,000 in FY 2006 for Chad, and at $105,000 in FY 2006 for CAR. The
IMET program focuses on security sector reform, professionalization of
the military, and civil-military relations with the goal of providing
better security for the people of both countries. Our Chad military
assistance is coupled with a demining program, intended to make more of
Chad's arable land available to the population, which concluded earlier
this year.
Force professionalization is badly needed in CAR, particularly in
the northwest where members of the military and presidential guard, in
addition to the rebels, commit human rights violations with impunity
and therefore contribute greatly to instability. We also support
responsible forest management and good governance through the Central
African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). Because CARPE
divides its budget based on transborder biodiversity landscapes instead
of countries, we don't have an exact estimate of CARPE funding for CAR,
however, we estimate that CAR receives several hundred thousand dollars
as part of the program and that CARPE represents our greatest
nonemergency assistance to CAR.
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
The United Nations estimates that there are 230,000 Sudanese
refugees in Chad, 20,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur, and 50,000 CAR
refugees in southern Chad. There are up to 110,000 IDPs in eastern
Chad; their numbers have doubled in the last 5 months and they have
suffered secondary displacement. The United Nations estimates that
approximately 280,000 Central Africans are displaced, of whom 212,000
are IDPs, 20,000 are refugees in Cameroon, and the remaining are
refugees in southern Chad. The majority of these refugees are from the
northwestern part of the country.
Attacks on civilians are widespread in both Chad and CAR and have
left thousands of civilians without livelihood, shelter, or food.
Scorched earth tactics are becoming common. Because of limited staff
and insecure humanitarian corridors, providing services to civilians
has become increasingly difficult.
There are fewer reports of interethnic violence in CAR, though it
should be noted that the northeast part of the country is ethnically
distinct and geographically cut off from the rest of the country. The
bulk of attacks on civilians seem to occur in the northwest part of the
country, and perpetrators include the CAR military, presidential guard,
military deserters, bandits, and rebel groups.
U.S. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
Security is the sine qua non for humanitarian access and adequate
response to the protection and assistance needs of civilian
populations, including refugees and IDPs. The international
peacekeeping force envisioned for Chad and CAR will have the protection
of civilians, including by use of force if necessary, as its primary
mandate. As discussed above, the United States is actively engaged to
make this force a reality.
The United States has continued to facilitate the work of human
rights organizations and NGOs working to protect refugees in Chad.
Through regular meetings with high-level officials in Chad and the CAR,
we also continue to raise concerns about the deteriorating security
situation and human rights abuses committed by government security
forces, particularly abuses against the displaced and other vulnerable
populations.
The USG is the largest single humanitarian donor in the region. A
concerted focus on the Darfur refugees in eastern Chad starting in 2004
brought conditions in what are now 12 camps close to international
humanitarian standards under extremely difficult logistical conditions
in a large area where finding water has been very challenging. The
gains of the last 2 years are threatened by the current instability.
The CAR refugees in southern Chad have not received the same level of
international support. Only within the past year have the needs inside
the CAR begun to gain necessary international attention.
Humanitarian funding for FY 2006 for Chad included $4 million for
emergency supplies, relief commodities, programs to address food
insecurity, water and sanitation programs, income generation
activities, and nutrition assessments for Chadians affected by the
presence of refugees and for IDPs; $23.8 million in emergency food
assistance (in addition to the $2.7 million in nonemergency food
assistance that we provide), $610,000 for humanitarian radio programs,
and $45 million to support refugee and IDP camps and programs and to
provide security for the refugee camps.
Humanitarian funding for FY 2006 for CAR includes $565,000 in
emergency food assistance and $350,000 for programs to respond to the
International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) supplemental 2006
appeal for conflict victims. PRM support for ICRC and UNHCR programs in
Africa will have also benefited those in CAR. We expect these numbers
to increase significantly in FY 2007.
In January and February of 2007, assessment teams from USAID
traveled to conflict-affected areas in Chad and CAR to assess
conditions for IDPs, analyze humanitarian capacity, and determine
potential program areas. The teams made several recommendations on how
to improve humanitarian assistance, including increasing donor
coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors,
prepositioning essential relief stocks, expanding emergency water and
sanitation interventions, and bolstering food aid programs. We are now
determining how best to utilize available resources to implement these
recommendations.
The United States is committed to doing our full part to protect
civilians in Chad and the Central African Republic and to mitigating
factors leading to regional instability. There are no easy solutions.
Both the proximate and institutional causes of instability are complex
and require that we consult closely with the rest of the international
community as well as the governments of Chad and CAR, which we have
committed to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for your
interest and for giving me the opportunity to brief you on this very
important matter.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Swan, very much for your
testimony and your interest in this area. My office and I will
be very interested in your further input and will be very
engaged in this.
Let me ask you some questions. I noted when I was in Chad
in January 2005, the rather small United States Government
presence in Chad, and I understand our presence is similarly
limited in the Central African Republic. What is the size and
nature of the United States Government presence in Chad and the
CAR at this point?
Mr. Swan. Both are relatively small missions, Senator. I
don't have the exact numbers of staff for those missions. I
know that in the case of Central African Republic I believe
it's around five people that we have there.
We have recently assigned a new political economic
reporting officer to the Central African Republic mission, to
our mission in the Central African Republic, and we are looking
forward to some additional coverage of developments in the
country on that basis. We also are looking to expand somewhat
the size of that operation during the course of this summer
with additional staff who will be arriving at post.
With respect to Chad, I do not know the exact numbers of
our staff there. It is significantly higher than the numbers
for the Central African Republic, and staff has, in fact, been
supplemented by some additional personnel who have been sent on
a temporary duty basis to ensure that we have additional
coverage that's necessary.
Senator Feingold. Do you know how many additional people
have joined that mission?
Mr. Swan. I don't know exactly, but we can certainly get
that precise figure for you, Senator.
Senator Feingold. And I take it the addition of the person
in the Central African Republic and the additional staff in
Chad relate to the deteriorating security and humanitarian
conditions, or were there other reasons for this scaling up of
U.S. personnel?
Mr. Swan. It's about all of our interests, obviously, in
those two countries, but certainly, as I have mentioned, the
importance of the humanitarian situation will mean that we're
going to want to have as close coverage of those issues as we
can.
I would like to add, if I might, Senator----
Senator Feingold. Yes; I would like you to follow up with
the specifics on Chad if you----
Mr. Swan. Yes; I will be happy to. And in specific, with
respect specifically to the humanitarian situation, two very
experienced humanitarian assessment teams were dispatched to
Chad in January, and then to Central African Republic in
February, including some of our senior Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance personnel with tremendous experience in the
region. So while we have quite small missions in these two
countries, we are looking for opportunities to bolster their
capability with other assessment teams as needed.
Senator Feingold. You started talking about the funding
levels. I wonder if you could go over again the levels of
United States assistance to eastern Chad and the CAR, and
relative to the resources allocated to Darfur.
Mr. Swan. For fiscal year 2006, on the humanitarian side,
specifically with respect to Chad the total is approximately
$74 million. This includes $4 million--this was for fiscal year
2006--$4 million for emergency supplies, relief commodities,
and programs to address food and security; approximately $24
million in emergency food assistance; $610,000 for humanitarian
radio programs; and $45 million to support refugee and IDP
camps.
In CAR the figure was $565,000 in emergency food assistance
and $350,000 for programming through the International
Committee of the Red Cross. We believe that the totals are, in
fact, somewhat higher than that because there are some regional
programs funded through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration that would likely benefit CAR as well, but we are not
able to break that out, specifically, to know the exact figures
for CAR, but it would probably be slightly higher than the
amount I just cited.
Senator Feingold. Well, what's the Darfur number?
Mr. Swan. I do not know the total Darfur number. We have--I
know that Special Envoy Natsios has repeatedly indicated a
total figure of--I believe it's $2.7 billion.
Senator Feingold. In the last 2 years.
Mr. Swan. That's correct, 2005 and 2006.
Senator Feingold. How do you explain this enormous
disparity in U.S. assistance between these three troubled
areas?
Mr. Swan. I think that, in part, it is a reflection of the
horrific humanitarian tragedy in Darfur, including the perhaps
hundreds of thousands of people killed in that conflict, that
has, of course, led to a heavy focus of attention on that
region and on that area.
With respect to Chad and CAR, certainly in terms of
responding to the humanitarian situation and indeed in terms of
our presence in general in the Central African Republic, this
is a country that's gone through many years of instability.
There has been a small international presence there for a
number of years. And so I think we are at a point, in the
aftermath of the 2005 elections, of beginning now to
reestablish a more normal relationship in terms of our
presence, both on a bilateral level but also in terms of our
response to the humanitarian situation.
Senator Feingold. I would just suggest that this kind of
disparity was, at least, understandable before people
understood the interrelationship between the situation in Sudan
and Darfur and the Central African Republic and Chad, but it
really can't be justified at this point.
When I went to see the refugees, we went to Chad, and I
understand there's an emphasis on Darfur refugees and IDPs,
while displaced Chadians receive far less attention and
assistance. As I said in my opening statement, the national
boundaries really don't matter here. So this is the point of
this hearing: To try to develop a comprehensive approach to
addressing this regional challenge, and our funding will have
to begin to reflect that.
What other countries have been the major providers of
assistance to Chad and the CAR, and what kind of support are
they sending?
Mr. Swan. The European Union is an important provider to
both of those countries. I don't know, specifically, what their
programs involve. And of course both have close relationships
with France and have been historic bilateral partners of the
French.
Senator Feingold. What role do you foresee the United
States playing in motivating, facilitating, and/or enforcing
the peace processes that are going to have to take place within
each of these countries?
Mr. Swan. We already maintain a very active program of
outreach to political opposition groups, civil society
organizations, and others in both the Central African Republic
and Chad, in terms of trying to encourage greater dialog and
contacts between the government and between opposition figures.
I've spoken over the past couple of days with both our
Charge in Bangui and also our Ambassador in N'Djamena. And in
N'Djamena I know that our Ambassador is convening frequently
informal meetings that bring together Chadian Government
officials, opposition figures, to stress the need for a more
active reconciliation process, and we would certainly continue
to do that.
Senator Feingold. That's what we're doing now, but what do
you foresee as our future role? Are we going to be the primary
facilitators of this? Are we going to be doing it in
conjunction with others? How do you foresee the peace process
unfolding?
Mr. Swan. I think we will be doing it in conjunction with
others, as I indicated.
Senator Feingold. And those others in particular would be?
Mr. Swan. I think we would be looking at certainly the U.N.
officials. There is already the U.N. office in the Central
African Republic that convenes regular meetings with both other
members of the diplomatic community and figures within the
Central African Republic leadership, in terms of trying to
encourage greater dialog, and I think we would want to continue
to work with that. If there is a----
Senator Feingold. What about external from the region?
Mr. Swan. Yes, indeed----
Senator Feingold. What other countries would be involved?
Mr. Swan. Well, I think we would want to again work with
our European Union partners, and the French, of course, play a
critical role in both these countries, and it will be important
to ensure that we are on a similar wave length in terms of how
to proceed.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. What's your analysis of the
root causes driving these homegrown insurgencies in both Chad
and the Central African Republic?
Mr. Swan. These are countries that have a long history of
instability. This is not a new phenomenon in these countries.
Neither Chad nor the Central African Republic has an
established history of rotation in office through democratic
change.
Fundamentally, these are deeply insecure and undeveloped
countries in terms of their levels of food insecurity, in terms
of physical insecurity of their populations. They are plagued
by poor governance, and as a consequence, key elements of their
populations feel that they are not receiving benefits from the
central government. They feel they're not receiving,
particularly in the case of Chad, the wealth that is emerging
from their oil sector. And as a consequence some of these
groups have begun to take up arms against the leadership
elements in these countries.
Certainly in the case of Chad there is also a significant
ethnic element to this, inasmuch as you have some splits within
President Deby's own Zaghawa community, with certain elements
even within his own family challenging him for leadership and
power positions within the country. But in addition to that you
have other groups that also believe that they are being
marginalized by the current leadership, and that as a
consequence they need to assert through force of arms their
political interests.
Senator Feingold. I don't know if this is historically
accurate, but the sense I got in January 2005 was that these
external problems, particularly coming over from Sudan and
Darfur, were perhaps heightening the intensity of the
insurgency. Is that accurate, or is that just an impression I
have?
Mr. Swan. Yes; I think your impression is absolutely
correct, Mr. Chairman, that there are both internal factors and
external factors. The internal factors range, frankly, from
traditional intercommunal conflict, oftentimes pitting herders
against cultivators in these resource-strapped areas of
particularly eastern Chad. But in addition to that, you have
politically motivated domestic rebel groups whose interests are
primarily to challenge President Deby for power in N'Djamena.
But they are indeed benefiting from certainly refuge in
Sudan, and I think there are strong indications that some of
these groups have also received direct assistance in terms of
their activities and their military activities in Chad.
I would point out, if I might, sir, that this is a
historical pattern in Chad. Both President Deby and his
predecessor, Hissene Habre, took power in N'Djamena based on an
internal rebellion they developed that benefited extensively
from safe haven and support within Sudan, so there's a certain
repetition of history here. But it's a volatile cocktail that
includes----
Senator Feingold. I'm pleased you brought out the external
aspect as well, because I think that's an important part of the
story.
The Feingold-Sununu resolution also calls for the
appointment of a U.N. regional envoy charged with overseeing
and coordinating humanitarian access and assistance in Darfur,
eastern Chad, and the northern Central African Republic. Does
the administration support the appointment of such an envoy?
And what steps is the administration taking, or will it take,
to support such an appointment?
Mr. Swan. We are at a stage now, with respect to the
upcoming peacekeeping operation for eastern Chad, of consulting
with our Security Council partners. Obviously, a portion of
that peacekeeping operation is going to involve protection of
civilians. It's going to involve support to humanitarian
organizations to improve and ensure humanitarian corridors.
So I think we will be looking at the issue of any new
envoys or new individuals who would be playing a regional role
in the context of looking at both that peacekeeping operation
and, obviously, the ongoing discussion with respect to an
operation for Darfur. But I can't tell you today that we would
specifically support or not support the creation of such an
envoy.
Senator Feingold. I would ask you to put that as high on
your agenda as you can, to give me an idea of what your
position is on it. I do appreciate your testimony today, Mr.
Swan. Thank you.
Mr. Swan. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. I'd like to ask the other panel to come
forward.
Thank you for coming up. I welcome the second panel, and
we'll begin with Mr. Bacon.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH H. BACON, PRESIDENT, REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. I want to
thank you and Senator Sununu and the subcommittee for holding
this important and timely hearing. The central African region
where the borders of Chad, Sudan, and the Central African
Republic intersect is one of the poorest, least stable areas of
the world, and as a result the area is filled with refugees and
displaced people.
You are correct to see security and humanitarian challenges
there in regional terms. I applaud the three-country focus of
Senate Resolution 76, and I appreciate the call for greater
U.S. leadership and international involvement in resolving the
security, human rights, and humanitarian problems in the
region.
My organization, Refugees International, has spent
considerable time in these countries. In fact, two of my
colleagues have just returned from Chad and the CAR, and I
think they're going to meet with your staff later this week or
early next week. Based on our time in the region, I want to
summarize several points at the very beginning.
First, insecurity, poverty, political and ethnic tensions,
and displacement are all interrelated, yet each country has
different problems which must be addressed separately.
Second, the key to resolving the problems is political, not
military. Even if the United States or other countries were
prepared to commit troops, and we are not, or the United
Nations could deploy large peacekeeping forces, troops would be
no more than a palliative until the underlying political
differences are resolved.
Third, as you pointed out, the humanitarian response has
been very uneven. Huge resources are going to help the people
in Darfur, with much less effective responses in the Central
African Republic and Chad. Working bilaterally or through the
United Nations, we need to fix this disparity by increasing aid
to the Central African Republic and Chad. In fact, I believe
that a relatively modest humanitarian investment in the Central
African Republic now could forestall or avoid a much more
costly emergency response later.
Perhaps the fastest way to appreciate the magnitude and
complexity of the problems in the region is to look at the
populations of refugees and displaced people. Mr. Swan touched
on some of this. But while doing this I would also like to
comment on the humanitarian responses to the displacement.
In Sudan, a 4-year civil war in Darfur, characterized by
our Government as genocide, has displaced about 2.2 million
people internally and driven 234,000 refugees to Chad. There
has been a huge humanitarian operation in response to this, and
it has been quite successful. But, sadly, that response is
currently in danger. Stepped-up violence and harsh government
treatment, ranging from harassment to attacks, even including
the rape of humanitarian workers, are driving international
staff from Darfur and complicating the delivery of food and
supplies on which the population now depends.
In addition, there are some 14,000 refugees from Sudan in
the Central African Republic. They went there during the 21-
year civil war between north and south Sudan. That war, which
displaced over 4 million south Sudanese, officially ended 2
years ago with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
which was brokered by your former colleague, Senator John
Danforth.
The Khartoum government has violated significant parts of
the CPA already, with little or no public objection from the
United States. We need to be resolute in pushing for the full
implementation of that agreement. For south Sudan to fall back
into conflict would be devastating for peace in the region, and
a diplomatic setback for the United States.
Chad not only hosts 234,000 refugees from Darfur but also
about 60,000 refugees from the Central African Republic. And in
addition, as Mr. Swan pointed out, fighting in the eastern
region has displaced about 120,000 Chadians, and that number
has increased dramatically in the last half year.
Although the United Nations is working to improve
humanitarian services for refugees from Darfur, aid for the
internally displaced populations in eastern Chad has been
completely inadequate. And I've submitted for the record a
recent report from one of my colleagues on eastern Chad that
goes into this in considerable detail.
In the Central African Republic, the number of people who
have fled their homes to avoid fighting between government and
rebel forces in the northwest corner of the country has reached
212,000, up more than fourfold in the last year. Government
forces are responsible for much of the displacement. Just last
week my colleagues visited a village in northwest Central
African Republic that had been burned by government troops. I
have also submitted that report for the record.
I congratulate the subcommittee for focusing on the CAR.
The growing humanitarian crisis there has received very little
attention. Partially as a result, the response of aid agencies
has been slow and limited. Much more needs to be done. For
example, a $10 million investment in seeds and tools now, a
month or two before the rainy season, would enable displaced
farmers to plant crops this season, reducing the risk of future
starvation.
The porous borders of the three countries make it easy for
refugees to move back and forth. The unmonitored borders also
make it easy for militias and bandits to move at will, and they
do, killing, stealing, destroying, and destabilizing.
Obviously, a U.N. force along the Chad-Darfur border would
help protect civilians and stabilize the region, if the force
had enough manpower, enough mobility, and the proper mandate.
According to recent reports, the President of Chad opposes such
a force. The United Nations, working through France and other
member-states, needs to put pressure on Chad to accept a U.N.
force that can succeed in helping to protect people in a vast,
unruly area.
Even though the key to ending strife and displacement in
the region lies in reaching political settlements in each of
the three countries, the border area needs to be secure. Senate
Resolution 76 addresses the security force issue. Let me list
several other things the United States should do, by country.
Sudan. There are three urgent challenges: Getting the
government and rebel groups in Darfur to begin comprehensive,
good-faith peace negotiations that will stop what President
Bush and Congress correctly have called genocide. The second
point: Maintaining the humanitarian operation, now the world's
largest, in Darfur with sufficient resources and security, and
as I said, this is becoming increasingly difficult because of
the actions of both the rebels and the government forces. And
three: Bolstering and supplementing the current African Union
force in Sudan so that it can provide greater protection to
civilians, particularly the women, who risk rape every time
they venture out of their camps.
Currently, the United States policy toward Sudan is
failing. Sudanese and government-backed forces continue to
attack civilians and humanitarian workers with impunity in
Darfur, and some fear they may be preparing to do so in the
south again as well.
For several years, United States efforts to change Sudanese
behavior have been all talk and no action. That may be changing
with the imposition of stiffer financial sanctions on Khartoum.
Until it is clear to Sudan that it will pay a painful price for
its state-sponsored death and displacement, the war will
continue unabated.
Moving to Chad. An end to the war in Darfur would enable
refugees to return home and reduce current cross-border
attacks, alleviating some of the pressure on Chad. But
intertribal attacks in eastern Chad and the fighting between
rebel groups and the government would likely continue.
So far, the government has refused to begin good faith
negotiations with rebel groups, some of whom are supported by
Sudan. Until the sides can address their grievances, peace and
stability will be elusive. France, which maintains troops in
Chad and provides crucial support to the government, may be
able to exert more pressure on all sides to start negotiations.
The second major issue in Chad today is the dearth of
humanitarian services in the eastern area, where internal
displacement is growing rapidly. In a report to the U.N.
Security Council just last month, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
admitted that ``direct assistance to internally displaced
persons has thus far been insufficient.'' Insufficient, he
said. He praised the government for doing more to help
internally displaced people in the area, but it's clear that
the United Nations needs to boost its presence and its programs
in the region.
Finally, the Central African Republic. Despite growing
displacement in the northwest region, there is not yet a
humanitarian emergency there. Both the United Nations concludes
that, I think our government concludes it, and my colleagues
have concluded that. But conditions could turn dramatically
worse if the fighting continues and the United Nations doesn't
begin to respond more effectively to growing humanitarian
problems. As I mentioned earlier, quick support packages to
farmers now could fend off a future emergency.
Actions, including the burning of houses, by government
troops are responsible for much of the displacement. So there
has to be more pressure on the government from donors to end
such human rights abuses.
There also has to be greater international involvement in
the peace process. Some of the issues are economic, and it's
possible that these could be resolved in the context of
comprehensive peace negotiations.
Progress toward peace in the central African triangle of
instability has not been and will not be easy. But the key to
progress is increased engagement by the United Nations and by
countries like the United States, France, India, and China,
with an interest in stability in the region.
I want to thank you again for your interest in this and for
the Senate resolution. My only specific comment on that
resolution is, it focuses a lot on the peacekeeping force. I
would like to see a greater focus also on political engagement
and getting peace processes going in each of the countries.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bacon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth H. Bacon, President, Refugees
International, Washington, DC
I want to thank Senator Feingold, Senator Sununu, and the
subcommittee for holding this important and timely hearing. The central
African region where the borders of Chad, Sudan, and the Central
African Republic intersect is one of the poorest, least stable areas of
the world. The region is filled with refugees and displaced people.
The subcommittee is correct to see security and humanitarian
challenges there in regional terms. I applaud the three-country focus
in Senate Resolution 76, and I appreciate the call by its sponsors,
Senators Feingold, Sununu, and Levin, for greater U.S. leadership and
international involvement in resolving the security, human rights, and
humanitarian problems in the region.
Refugees International has spent considerable time in these three
countries. Over the last year we have made two assessment missions to
each country, and two of my colleagues have just returned from Chad and
the Central African Republic. Based on our time in the region, I want
to make several points, which I will summarize at the outset.
First, insecurity, poverty, political and ethnic tensions, and
displacement are all interrelated, yet each country has different
problems which must be addressed separately.
Second, the key to resolving the problems is political, not
military. Even if the United States or other countries were prepared to
commit troops--and we are not--or the United Nations could deploy large
peacekeeping forces, troops would be no more than a palliative until
the underlying political differences are resolved.
Third, the humanitarian response has been uneven. Huge resources
are going to help the people in Darfur, with much less effective
responses in the Central African Republic and Chad. Working bilaterally
or through the United Nations, we need to fix this disparity by
increasing aid to the CAR and Chad. In fact, a relatively modest
humanitarian investment in the Central African Republic now could
forestall or avoid a much more costly emergency response later.
Perhaps the fastest way to appreciate the magnitude and complexity
of the problems in the region is to look at the populations of refugees
and displaced people. While doing this, I will also comment on
humanitarian responses to the displacement.
In Sudan, a 4-year civil war in Darfur, characterized by
government-sponsored militia attacks on civilians, has displaced about
2.2 million people internally and driven 234,000 refugees into Chad.
Now, because of increased fighting in eastern Chad, some Chadians are
seeking refuge in Darfur, so the refugees are beginning to move both
ways. The internally displaced population in Darfur is sustained by a
huge international aid operation that has been so successful that the
nutritional condition of camp residents is often better than the
population as a whole. Sadly, that successful response is currently in
danger. Stepped up violence and harsh government treatment--ranging
from harassment to attacks--of aid workers is driving international
staff from Darfur and complicating the delivery of food and supplies on
which the population depends.
In addition, there are some 14,000 refugees from south Sudan in the
Central African Republic. They went there during the 21-year civil war
between north and south Sudan. That war, which displaced over 4 million
south Sudanese, officially ended 2 years ago with the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was brokered by your former
colleague, John Danforth. While the focus of this hearing is mainly on
the intersection of Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic, it
is important to keep an eye on the implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement. The Khartoum government has violated significant parts
of the CPA already, with little or no public objection from the United
States. We need to be resolute and aggressive in pushing for full
implementation of that important agreement. For south Sudan to fall
back into conflict would be devastating for peace in the region and a
diplomatic setback for the United States.
Chad, not only hosts the 234,000 thousand refugees from Darfur, but
also about 60,000 refugees from the Central African Republic. In
addition, fighting in eastern Chad--some tribal and some the
depredations of militias from Darfur--has recently displaced about
120,000 Chadians. They are, essentially, internal refugees. Although
the United Nations has worked hard to improve humanitarian services and
security for the refugees from Darfur, aid for the internally displaced
populations in eastern Chad has been completely inadequate. I would
like to submit for the record a recent Refugees International
assessment of conditions in eastern Chad.
In the Central African Republic, the number of people who have fled
their homes to avoid fighting between government and rebel forces in
the northwest corner of the country has reached 212,000, up more than
four-fold in the last year. In addition, as I mentioned earlier,
another 60,000 are seeking refuge in Chad. Government forces are
responsible for much of the displacement. Just last week, my colleagues
visited a village in northwest CAR that had been burned by government
troops. I would also like to submit that report for the record.
I congratulate the subcommittee for focusing on the Central African
Republic. The growing humanitarian crisis there has received very
little attention. Partially as a result the response of aid agencies
has been slow and limited. Much more needs to be done. For example, a
$10 million investment in seeds and tools now, a month or two before
the rainy season, would enable displaced farmers to plant crops this
season, reducing the risk of future starvation.
The porous borders of the three countries make it easy for refugees
to move back and forth. The unmonitored borders also make it easy for
militias and bandits to move at will, and they do--killing, stealing,
destroying, and destabilizing. Late last year, then-Secretary General
Kofi Annan gave this description to the U.N. Security Council: ``The
Darfur conflict has already spilled over into Chad with serious
consequences for the country and beyond, while in the Central African
Republic, the government asserts that Sudan is backing the rebels in
the northeast. At the same time, it is clear that the northeast of the
Central African Republic has been used by Chadian rebel groups as a
route to bypass the Darfur-Chad border. . . . The porosity of the
borders is attested to by the numerous reports of infiltrations,
incursions and cross-border activities by tribal and Janjaweed
militias, as well as the regular forces and rebels of each of the three
countries, except the Central African Armed Forces.
Obviously, a U.N. force along the Chad-Darfur border could help
protect civilians and stabilize the region--if the force had enough
manpower, enough mobility, and the proper mandate. According to recent
reports, the President of Chad opposes such a force, even though it
would help protect his own people as well as refugees in Chad. The
United Nations, working through member states, particularly France,
needs to put pressure on Chad to accept a robust U.N. force that can
succeed in helping to protect people in a vast, unruly area.
Even though the key to ending strife and displacement in the region
lies in reaching political settlements in each of the three countries,
the border area needs to be secure. Senate Resolution 76 addresses the
security force issue. Let me just list several other things the United
States should do, by country.
Sudan. There are three urgent challenges:
Getting the government and the rebel groups in Darfur to
begin comprehensive, good-faith negotiations toward a political
settlement that will stop what President Bush and the Congress
correctly have called genocide.
Maintaining the humanitarian operation--now the world's
largest in Darfur with sufficient resources and security.
Bolstering and supplementing the current African Union force
in Sudan so that it can provide greater protection to
civilians--particularly the women who risk rape every time they
venture out of the camps for the displaced.
Currently, the U.S. policy toward Sudan is failing. Sudanese and
government-backed forces continue to attack civilians and humanitarian
workers with impunity in Darfur, and, some fear, may be preparing to do
so in south Sudan again as well. For several years, U.S. efforts to
change Sudanese behavior have been all talk and no action. That may be
changing with the imposition of stiffer financial sanctions on
Khartoum. Until it is clear to Sudan that it will pay a painful price
for its state-sponsored death and displacement, the war will continue
unabated.
Chad. An end to the war in Darfur would enable refugees to return
home and reduce current cross-border attacks, alleviating some of the
pressure on Chad. But intertribal attacks in eastern Chad--and the
fighting between rebel groups and the government would likely continue.
So far the government has refused to begin good-faith negotiations with
rebel groups, some of whom are supported by Sudan. Until the sides can
address their grievances, peace and stability will be illusive. France,
which maintains troops in Chad and provides crucial support to the
government, may be able to exert more pressure on all sides to start
negotiations.
The second major issue in Chad today is the dearth of humanitarian
services in the eastern area, where internal displacement is growing
rapidly. In a report to the U.N. Security Council last month, Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon admitted that ``direct assistance to internally
displaced persons has thus far been insufficient.'' He praised the
government for doing more to help internally displaced people in the
area, but it's clear that the United Nations needs to boost its
presence and its programs in the region.
Central African Republic. Despite growing displacement in the
northwest region, where government and rebel forces are fighting, there
is not yet a humanitarian emergency. But conditions could turn
dramatically worse if the fighting continues and the United Nations
doesn't begin to respond more effectively to growing humanitarian
problems. As I mentioned earlier, quick support packages to farmers now
could help fend off a future emergency.
Actions, including the burning of houses, by government troops are
responsible for much of the displacement, so there has to be more
pressure on the government from donors to end such human rights abuses.
There also has to be greater international involvement in the peace
process. Some of the issues are economic, and it's possible that these
could be resolved in the context of comprehensive negotiations.
Progress toward peace in the central African triangle of
instability has not been and will not be easy, but the key to progress
is increased engagement by the United Nations and by countries--like
the United States, France, India, and China--with an interest in
stability in the region.
______
Report From Refugees International by Rick Neal and Joel Charny
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: ARMY HOUSE BURNINGS CONTINUE IN TENSE
NORTHWEST
On Sunday afternoon, March 11, Central African regular army troops
burned at least 20 houses along a stretch of Regional Route 6 between
Lia and Voh, approximately 30 kilometers south of Paoua in the tense
northwest region of the country. Three civilians, including a baby,
were killed in the crossfire and another one was seriously wounded in
an encounter between the army and the rebel Armee Populaire pour la
restauration de la republique et la democratie (APRD).
The violence belies assurances given to Refugees International by
senior Central African military personnel that house burnings would
cease under direct orders from the President and their commander in
Bangui, the capital.
House burning, a tactic first used by the notorious Garde
Presidentiel, has been rampant in the northwest as the Central African
army, the FACA, confronts the APRD. On an extensive visit to the
prefectures of Ouham and Ouham-Pende, Refugees International confirmed
that tens of burned villages remain empty, their residents having fled
to safety in rough settlements in the scrub land near their fields.
Approximately 250,000 Central Africans have been displaced in
successive waves of violence since 2003.
Eyewitnesses to the March 11 attacks told Refugees International
that the violence started as a confrontation in Lia between a small
contingent of rebels, who move easily among the population, and a
Central African army contingent moving up to Paoua from Bangui as part
of a normal troop rotation. During an exchange with the rebels, Central
African soldiers began shooting indiscriminately, and two civilians
were killed in the crossfire, with one other individual seriously
wounded.
The FACA troops got down from their vehicles and began walking
through the village, setting fire to two houses using lighters. Rural
houses in the CAR almost all have thatch roofs, and in the dry season
they burn in a matter of minutes when the thatch catches fire.
The troops then continued up the road through four additional
villages, setting fire to more houses. In Leourou, a stray bullet
killed a baby on its mother's back. The mother survived.
The rampage ended in Voh, where at least 10 houses were burned.
Several civilians tried to shelter their bicycles and motorcycles in
the church, but the soldiers removed them from the church and burned
them.
Refugees International was able to visit Voh and assess the damage
to the village. While the walls of the mud brick houses were no longer
hot to the touch, up to three inches of fine ash remained in the burned
houses, suggesting that the burning occurred recently. Metal cooking
pots were randomly strewn among the ashes. The RI team also saw the
charred remains of a bicycle and a motorbike. Further fighting along
the road to Voh on March 14 prevented the RI team from going as far as
Lia to assess the damage where the fighting started.
House burning is a clear violation of international humanitarian
law, as it targets the assets of civilian noncombatants. It is an
especially devastating tactic in Central Africa because poor villagers
keep almost all their worldly possessions in their homes. When asked to
cite their losses, the few residents of Voh who had not fled into the
bush listed their stores of peanuts, corn, and cassava, as well as
money, hand tools, plates, and other basic household items. They now
face the coming planting season with virtually no resources.
House burning produces displacement by driving the occupants of the
village into the fields to find shelter and escape the depredations of
the FACA. But they have an additional ripple effect in neighboring
villages, as people gather their belongings and head to the bush as a
preventive measure. During its assessment of the northwest, RI saw many
villages that were abandoned without any evidence of burning.
The house burnings are especially disturbing because under
increasing international awareness and scrutiny, the Central African
authorities maintained that they were prepared to reduce the harshness
of their counter-insurgency tactics in the northwest. Two high-ranking
Central African military officials based in the region had told RI
unequivocally that house burnings were forbidden.
Just before learning of the incident, the RI team was having lunch
in the market in Paoua and discussing the overall situation with local
residents. They were aware that a new group of soldiers was rotating
in, replacing the previous contingent that had been there for 18 months
during some of the most extensive violence and attacks on civilians.
They expressed optimism that the presence of new soldiers would
represent a new era in relations between the FACA and residents of the
region. These hopes appear to be misplaced.
Refugees International was unable to see the regional commander in
Paoua to present its findings on this incident as he was out of the
regional center. The commander must investigate this incident,
discipline the perpetrators, and confirm the illegality of this tactic
with the troops under his command.
International presence in Paoua is extremely thin, with only the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins sans Frontieres, and
COOPI, an Italian NGO, based in this important regional center with
large numbers of people in distress. The absence of the United Nations
in Paoua is painfully obvious. It is essential that the United Nations
push forward with its previously announced plans to establish a U.N.
regional office in Paoua, which would bring together key humanitarian
response agencies of the U.N. system, including the Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the
Food and Agriculture Organization.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Bacon, for that suggestion
which we'll take seriously, for your leadership on this issue,
and for your testimony. We do appreciate it.
Now I'm pleased to turn to Mr. Prendergast, who has been
before this committee many, many times. Its good to see you
again.
STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, SENIOR ADVISOR, INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman,
especially for the invite to dig a little deeper into what I
think is the deadliest conflict cluster in the world today. And
thank you, adding my thanks to Mr. Bacon's, for your ongoing
commitment to these issues. Without you, and without a few of
your colleagues, nothing. The pulse would simply be dead in
Washington on these issues.
I would like to add just a couple of footnotes to what Mr.
Bacon has said in his excellent testimony and provide a policy
framework, a conceptual framework, for how we can move forward
more effectively.
The dynamic between the three countries is multifaceted,
but there are three drivers--since I think I'm the academic on
the panel, so we always use ``drivers'' in our terminology--at
the core of the violence.
The first driver is cross-border attacks sponsored by the
Government of Sudan, using the Janjaweed, into southeastern
Chad and across the border into the CAR. These forces have
joined--these Janjaweed forces have joined forces with Chadian
militias, as we know, and are pursuing the same scorched earth
policies that lit up Darfur from 2003 to late 2004, pursuing
those same policies in Chad against non-Arab villages. We've
seen, of course, intercommunal fighting, interethnic fighting,
as a result of this, which is precisely the intention of
Khartoum's divide and destroy policy.
The second driver is cross-border support for insurgent
groups. The Government of Sudan has openly admitted to
supporting the Chadian rebels opposed to President Deby, and
Deby is fairly transparent in his support for rebels going back
across the border, the Darfurian rebels, into Darfur. The level
of Sudanese support for rebels in the CAR, in the northeastern
part of CAR, is less clear, but there are Sudanese fighters
amongst their ranks, and some have actually received military
training inside Sudan.
The third driver is noninclusive governance in all three
countries. And to be more specific, we all know the Sudan case,
but Chad and CAR, just to reinforce what both Mr. Swan and Mr.
Bacon have said, each has an internal political crisis
independent of all the violence that we are seeing emanating
from Darfur. Both governments in Chad and CAR came to power
militarily, they pay lip service to democracy, and they fail to
provide basic services to their citizens.
Again reinforcing Mr. Bacon, there must be political
solutions in Chad, Darfur, and CAR, but I think these solutions
will require unraveling the cross-border nature of the
conflicts and putting negotiations back within their domestic
contexts.
In Darfur you've got disunity among the rebels,
uncoordinated and infrequent international diplomacy, and a
failure to effectively pressure the Government of Sudan--
effectively pressure the Government of Sudan--which has led to
this status quo which we've seen dragging on and on for the
last year and a half now, unless the international community,
led by the United States, agrees on a plan, a much more robust
plan of action, and pursues it aggressively.
In Chad you've got rampant corruption and mismanagement,
causing wages to go unpaid for months. These are the kind of
things you see in so many countries which are precursors to
serious coup attempts. And we have seen the collapse of the few
social services that had existed. In the absence of any
international pressure--particularly from the French, which are
sitting on the sidelines on these internal issues--on Deby's
government to crack down on corruption and really share power
with rivals, the root causes of insurrection in Chad will
simply continue unabated.
In the Central African Republic, divisive ethnic politics
has been the norm, mixing with poverty and underdevelopment, a
proliferation of small arms. I think Jim Swan called it a
cocktail, a deadly cocktail. It's a combustible mix. I think
we've only seen the tip of the iceberg of conflict in the CAR.
Neighboring countries will continue to exploit these structural
weaknesses in CAR, and even the LRA, as you might have heard,
has sent forces into CAR, a couple hundred of them recently, to
explore whether that might be a better safe haven than the
Garamba National Park has been for them for the last year in
Congo. So we've got a serious problem, obviously, continuing to
brew in the CAR.
Now, going straight to solutions. U.S. policy to contain
and end, U.S. policy focused on ending this spiraling crisis I
think needs to pursue a three-track policy. We call it the
three Ps of crisis response: Peacemaking, protection, and
punishment.
Very quickly in each one of them. Peacemaking is obvious.
Your subcommittee, you and the ranking member particularly have
been strong on solutions beginning with regional diplomacy, and
that is absolutely correct. While U.S. diplomats like Deputy
Assistant Secretary Swan and military officials and
humanitarian assessment teams all have made trips to Chad and
CAR in recent months, the level of U.S. engagement has to be
expanded, I think exponentially, and coordinated much more
multilaterally to achieve any headway in ending the violence.
The United States should establish a conflict resolution
cell in the region that focuses not only on this conflict
cluster but the other one, damaging one that involves the Congo
and northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. And thankfully Mr.
Bacon has brought up the implications of Darfur for Southern
Sudan, which, of course, has cost five times as many lives as
have been lost in Darfur during that war, so we have to keep an
eye on that and do much more on that. So we think that, and
we're trying to put numbers together, how much would it really
cost, and it isn't that much, to deploy such a cell to really
do the work that we need to do. We need to lead diplomatically
in the region.
So that's the peacemaking P. The second P is protection,
and we've heard a lot about it. It's what we've seen a lot of
action on. Of course we've got to get those 20,000 forces into
Darfur under their hybrid. Work is intensive, I think,
internationally on that. But I think we need to look at a
couple other things.
The first one is, we've got to more transparently begin to
plan militarily for nonconsensual options for deploying a force
to Darfur. And in the absence of that kind of nonconsensual
planning, Khartoum is not going to take us seriously. We have
to be seen to be moving forward on an agenda that would
actually provide serious sticks if compliance is not
forthcoming eventually. Yes; continue the diplomacy. Yes; ramp
up the economic measures. But I think putting some work in
NATO, and again transparently sending senior officials and
generals to NATO to talk about these kinds of things, would
actually send a message to Khartoum that would help affect
calculations.
The third P--so we've got peacemaking, we've got
protection--the third P is punishment, and this is really the
key. If we're going to get protection deployed to the region,
if we're going to have a chance of securing peace deals that
will address the fundamentals of conflict in Darfur and Chad
and CAR, there has got to be accountability.
We've got to start ramping up the tools that we have at our
disposal, the financial and economic tools we have at our
disposal, and those include--we know what they are--increased
targeted sanctions. My understanding is, the Bush
administration is going to announce three new people to be
sanctioned within the Darfur context--three. There are so many
officials that we know, we have reams of evidence, have been
directly implicated in crimes against humanity.
These people at the very least should be prohibited from
traveling internationally, and their accounts should be frozen.
We can do that tomorrow if we want to, at no cost. There are
other economic and financial instruments that we need to be
ramping up, and there again has to be a demonstrable intent to
upgrade and expand these measures if we're going to have any
chance of influencing the calculations of Khartoum and the
regimes in the other two countries.
In some, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Swan already
indicated, the United States does indeed have a holistic
approach to dealing with these three things: Protection,
peacemaking, and punishment. The problem is, the administration
isn't doing enough in each of these three policy baskets to
really get a change in the situation on the ground. We need to
ramp up our diplomatic involvement. We need to accelerate
military planning for nonconsensual options. And we need to
expand and implement the sticks that we already have at our
disposal, to increase leverage for achieving our peace and
protection objectives.
Hundreds of thousands of lives, in conclusion, hang in the
balance in this subregion this year. I've been there six times
now in the last 4 years, into Chad and across the border into
rebel-held areas of Darfur. There's no question, with the
access eroding as rapidly as it is, we're getting to a
situation--genocide is bad enough. Adding famine to genocide,
watch out. That's when we really start to see mortality jump.
And you have more and more populations who are not
receiving assistance, whose access has been restricted because
of the actions of the militias out in the field and because of
government's, the Sudan's restrictions of humanitarian access.
We're going to see famine in pockets and then expand, and then
we're going to see a real situation develop there that we don't
want to see.
If the United States, though, leads regional efforts,
multilateral efforts to deal with this regional contagion whose
primary cause is in the Presidential palace in Khartoum, then
the escalating crisis can be reversed. And it's going to
require, I think, fairly aggressive advocacy on the part of
this committee and citizen activists to get the attention of
the Bush administration to actually do what's necessary to end
the crisis.
Thanks very much for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Prendergast, Senior Adviser to the
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Senator Sununu, and
members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to discuss the U.S.
strategy for ending the crisis in Darfur which is now spilling over
into Chad and the Central African Republic.
In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, my colleague Colin Thomas-
Jensen and I argue that the interlocking conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and
the Central African Republic (CAR) represent a conflict cluster that is
tearing the region apart. The evidence for this assertion is clear.
Violence in Darfur, eastern Chad, and CAR has escalated dramatically in
recent months. Armed groups commit mass atrocities against civilian
populations with grim regularity, and the increased displacement of
civilians is stretching relief operations to the limit. Just yesterday
(March 19, 2007), the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
Darfur are almost at full capacity, and at least 700,000 conflict-
affected civilians in Darfur are beyond the reach of relief agencies.
The dynamic between Sudan, Chad, and CAR is multifaceted, but there
are three drivers at the core of the violence:
Cross-border attacks against civilians in southeastern Chad
by Sudan-backed Janjaweed militias--Sudanese Janjaweed have
joined forces with Chadian militias and are pursuing the same
scorched-earth policies against non-Arab villages as in Darfur.
Intercommunal and interethnic fighting is then a product of
this, which is precisely the intention of the Khartoum regime's
divide and destroy policy.
Cross-border support for insurgent groups--The government of
Sudan has openly admitted to supporting Chadian rebels opposed
to President Idriss Deby in response to Deby's fairly
transparent support for rebels in Darfur. The level of Sudanese
support for insurgents in northeastern CAR is less clear, but
there are Sudanese fighters among their ranks and some have
received military training inside Sudan.
Noninclusive governance in Sudan, Chad, and CAR--Chad and
CAR each has an internal political crisis independent of the
violence emanating from Darfur. Both governments came to power
militarily, pay lip-service to democracy, and fail to provide
basic services to their citizens.
While this conflict is certainly a full blown regional crisis--
fomented principally by the Sudanese Government--the fulcrum for
conflict in the Chad basin remains Darfur. Without a political
settlement and an effective peacekeeping force to protect civilians in
Darfur, Chad, and CAR will continue to burn.
U.S. policy to contain and end this spiraling regional crisis must
pursue a three-track approach following the ``3Ps'' of peacemaking,
protection, and punishment.
Peacemaking: Any solution must begin with aggressive
regional diplomacy. While U.S. diplomats, military officials,
and humanitarian assessment teams have made trips to Chad and
CAR in recent months, the level of U.S. engagement must be
increased exponentially and coordinated multilaterally to
achieve any headway in ending the violence. The United States
should establish a conflict resolution cell in the region
staffed by full-time senior diplomats to work toward a
comprehensive agreement to end violence in Darfur and political
processes in Chad and CAR to address the lack of political
inclusiveness that fuels internal unrest. Most important is
striking a deal between the Sudanese regime and Darfur rebels,
which will require much more sustained and concerted efforts by
the United States and broader international community than is
presently being expended.
Protection: The United Nations must work in close
coordination with the African Union to line up the forces
necessary to reach the 20,300 troops for Darfur agreed upon by
the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and
international donor countries. The international community must
also accelerate its planning and increase its preparedness for
military action without Khartoum's consent. Concurrently, the
United Nations should deploy a peacekeeping force under chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter to protect civilians and relief
operations in eastern Chad and CAR and to monitor and deter
cross-border attacks and arms flows. This force must be closely
linked to the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, as authorized
by the Security Council in Resolution 1706. Troop generation
will be a major problem, so the primary emphasis must remain on
deploying the hybrid force with a protection mandate to Darfur.
Punishment: As the International Crisis Group has long
argued, the Government of Sudan will continue to reject a
durable peace deal and a robust peacekeeping force until the
international community changes the cost-benefit analysis of
the regime. The international community, with strong U.S.
leadership, must alter the calculations of Sudan's ruling
National Congress Party (NCP--formerly the National Islamic
Front (NIF)) by working multilaterally to impose punitive
measures--such as targeted sanctions and economic pressures--
against senior NCP officials and the companies they control.
The United States must also share declassified intelligence
with the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the
preparation of indictments against more senior Sudanese regime
officials implicated in the perpetration of mass atrocities.
The ENOUGH campaign, an initiative that Crisis Group has recently
launched with the Center for American Progress, applies this 3P
approach to crises in Darfur, northern Uganda, and Congo, and
encourages activists to press this agenda with policymakers.
CHAD AND SUDAN--BAD NEIGHBORS
As the Darfur situation has deteriorated, hostilities between Chad
and Sudan have increased. Chadian rebels and Janjaweed militias
operating out of Sudan have launched increasingly frequent incursions
into eastern Chad since October 2005. President Idriss Deby has blamed
Khartoum for supporting these armed groups, declared a ``state of
belligerence'' with Sudan and sought to strengthen his ties to the
Darfurian rebels, who are spending increasing amounts of time in
N'Djamena. Chad's last two Presidents came to power in military
campaigns launched from Darfur, so Deby has reason to watch his eastern
border. But the Darfur crisis has also exacerbated Chad's domestic
political woes.
Over the 4 years of the Darfur conflict, Chad and its people have
seen their humanitarian, economic, political, and security situations
decline. The country shares many of the same political and cultural
fault lines as Sudan--Arab/non-Arab, Christian/Muslim, farmer/nomad,
north/south--and hosts many of the same tribes affected by the fighting
in Darfur. Bilateral relations have gradually worsened since 2003.
Though President Deby historically enjoyed good relations with
Khartoum, the heavy presence of his Zaghawa tribesmen in the Darfur
rebel groups placed him in a difficult situation. He initially tried to
strike a balance by formally cooperating with Khartoum while turning a
blind eye as Zaghawa within his army helped the two main rebel groups:
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM). The balance proved unsustainable, particularly as Deby came
under fire from key constituents for not doing enough to support the
Darfur rebels, and Chadian rebels organized inside Sudan. As Deby has
strengthened his ties with the Darfur rebels, relations between the
neighbors degenerated into proxy war.
The most obvious consequence of the Darfur war has been the influx
of more than 220,000 refugees into eastern Chad and cross-border
Janjaweed incursions that have displaced some 100,000 Chadians. I have
traveled to eastern Chad and rebel-held areas of Darfur six times since
2003, and it is one of the poorest regions of one of the world's
poorest countries. Although many border region inhabitants are from the
same tribes as the refugees, the latter receive more support and
services than the internally displaced Chadians. Unlike Darfur,
displaced Chadians are not congregating in large numbers and,
therefore, difficult to assist. Relief workers on the ground have told
us that they are struggling to cope with the growing numbers of
displaced.
A second consequence has been an increase in insecurity in eastern
Chad and a weakening of the army, which has lost both men and weapons
to the Darfur rebels as well as to other armed groups in Darfur. JEM in
particular recruited heavily among Chadian soldiers early in the
conflict, buying mercenaries as well as weapons. Informal Chadian
support has also flowed to the Zaghawa elements of the SLA and JEM in
North Darfur.
The third and most dangerous repercussion has been the division
within the Chadian Zaghawa community over Deby's Darfur policy. Deby, a
Zaghawa, came to power in 1990 by overthrowing Hissene Habre in a
military campaign emanating from Darfur, where he was supported by the
Sudanese Zaghawa. At the outset of the Darfur war, Deby worked closely
with Khartoum, even ordering 800 troops into Darfur to fight the rebels
in April 2003. This discouraged but did not stop support flowing to the
rebels from Zaghawa in the Chadian military. Though his policy was
divisive, Deby understood the danger of protracted war in Darfur and
the threat from Khartoum if he did not cooperate. In August 2003 he
organized the first negotiations, culminating in the ill-fated
September 2003 Abeche cease-fire, which collapsed 3 months later, just
before a massive government offensive.
The May 2004 coup attempt by senior Zaghawa military commanders was
primarily driven by discontent over Deby's lack of support to the
Darfurian Zaghawa and his cooperation with Khartoum. The affair was
managed peacefully, in part to avoid exposing divisions within the
tribe to the rest of the country. Yet, those divisions have continued
to grow, encouraged by Deby's decision to alter the constitution so he
could run for a third term and grumblings over domestic issues such as
unpaid salaries.
Bilateral relations worsened dramatically in the second half of
2005 as Khartoum welcomed all opponents of Deby, who dropped his veneer
of neutrality to support the Zaghawa-based rebel groups in Darfur.
Sudan's ruling National Congress Party and its military and security
structures appear determined to topple Deby's regime and thereby weaken
the Darfur rebels. A wave of defections of high-level Zaghawa, a spate
of hit-and-run attacks by Sudan-backed rebels in eastern Chad, and an
attack on an armory in N'djamena all occurred in the last 3 months of
2005.
The situation exploded in December 2005 when the Sudan-backed RDL
(Rally for Democracy and Liberty), led by Khartoum's hand-picked
Chadian dissident Mahamat Nour, attacked the town of Adre. The core of
the RDL included elements which had been fighting beside Khartoum-
supported Arab militias in West Darfur, where the Chadian Arab presence
is particularly high thanks to a history of displacement from Chad's
civil wars and Arab migration and settlement since the 1970s. With
Sudanese support, Nour pulled together an array of smaller rebel groups
under a larger umbrella called the FUCD (United Front for Democracy and
Liberty). While other rebel groups included dissidents from the inner
circles of power and Deby's Zaghawa people who seek to distance
themselves from Deby's costly failures and to maintain their prominence
in the country's leadership, the FUCD appears determined to remove
Zaghawa influence in Chad altogether.
The RDL was defeated badly at Adre, but even more embarrassing than
the loss was the exposure of Khartoum's direct involvement. Chad went
public with its allegations reportedly because it had captured and
killed Sudanese Army personnel. It is said to have presented the
evidence to Libya, which led President Qaddafi to convene a summit in
Tripoli on 10 February 2006 that brokered an accord between Presidents
Deby and Bashir to halt support to each other's rebels. Although the
agreement laid the foundation for a peacekeeping force to monitor the
border, neither side took the accord seriously.
In April 2006, FUC forces led an offensive against N'Djamena that
was beaten back from the city's outskirts with heavy losses. The French
Government provided intelligence and airlift capabilities to help Deby
fend off the attack, and JEM fought side by side with Deby's forces.
Crisis Group's interviews with Sudanese Government officials indicated
that the coup attempt was backed strongly by members of Sudanese
military intelligence.
Hard-liners in the Sudanese Army, other security forces, and the
ruling National Congress Party (NCP) share the FUC objective of
undermining Zaghawa power because of Chadian support for the Darfur
rebels. Khartoum, therefore, allowed FUCD to build its forces in West
Darfur during the months before the April attack. In turn, Deby and his
entourage encouraged the SLA faction of Minni Minawi and JEM, in which
Sudanese Zaghawa dominate, to coordinate military and political action
under an alliance launched in January 2006. Several serving and former
Sudanese Government officials are involved in stoking a virulent hate
campaign, alleging the Zaghawa are responsible for the war in Darfur
and suggesting their goal is to establish a Greater Zaghawa State over
large swathes of Darfur, Chad, and Libya.
Since repelling the attack on N'Djamena, President Deby has focused
on defeating or buying off the numerous internal threats to his regime.
The Chadian military has consolidated its positions in main towns,
leaving civilians in the countryside vulnerable to increasing attacks
by rebel groups and the predations of the Janjaweed and other Khartoum-
backed militias. Moreover, the Chadian military has been guilty of
human rights abuses against civilians it accuses of supporting Chadian
rebels.
Chad's relationship with Darfur rebels--particularly JEM and other
groups under the umbrella National Redemption Front (NRF) formed by
groups that refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement--has deepened
considerably in recent months. Before late 2005 Deby had worked with
Khartoum to undermine JEM, believing them a rival Zaghawa group and a
threat to his regime. However, on a recent trip to the strategic town
of Abeche in eastern Chad, Crisis Group researchers described the
Chadian military and JEM rebels as ``indistinguishable.'' The NRF
relies on Chad for sanctuary and support, and in return they assist
Deby with internal security issues.
In January 2007, Deby reconciled with Mahamat Nour, reportedly
through large cash payments, and in early March Nour became Defense
Minister. With the RDL now largely in his pocket, President Deby's
principal concern right now is the Union of Forces for Democracy
(UFDD), led by Khartoum's latest proxies Mahamat Nouri and Acheikh Ibn
Omer. While not strong enough to threaten N'Djamena, the UFDD took
control of Abeche for 24 hours in November 2006. Humanitarian
operations for eastern Chad are based in Abeche, and the attack
prompted a withdrawal of many international staff. Since the attack,
humanitarian access has been severely limited by insecurity along the
roads and the threat of rebel attacks.
The risks of an outright war between Chad and Sudan would be high
for both countries but it is likely that relations will deteriorate
further regardless, as both governments position themselves for an
expanded proxy conflict. Sudan wants to cut NRF supply lines and end
Chadian support but it is unlikely it could decisively defeat the
Chadian Army when it has been struggling with the Darfur rebels for
years. Consequently, it will likely content itself with the current
chaos in Darfur and not risk a dramatic change by open war with its
neighbor.
Deby benefits from highlighting the external threat and Sudan's
support for Chadian rebels because that distracts attention from the
domestic issues which are driving opposition to his regime. Full-scale
war would seem suicidal for his smaller army, which already faces major
challenges at home. And while Deby focuses on shoring up his military
strength to fend off internal enemies, he rejects international calls
for a robust U.N. peacekeeping force and Chadian citizens bear the
brunt of escalating violence.
THE DARFUR-CHAD-CAR AXIS
The instability in Darfur has fostered linkages between armed
groups in Darfur, Chad, and CAR. The movements of CAR and Chadian rebel
groups in the region are interrelated, and weapons flow easily across
porous borders.
Impoverished, conflict-prone, and poorly governed, CAR is easily
affected by violence in the region. CAR was a safe haven for the Sudan
People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA) during its 22-year civil war
with successive governments in Khartoum, while Sudanese Armed Forces
used CAR as a staging ground for attacks against the SPLA in Southern
Sudan. At least 36,000 Southern Sudanese refugees fled to CAR, and
repatriation of these refugees back to Sudan is ongoing.
Outside the capital Bangui, CAR is largely ungoverned. CAR
President Francois Bozize took control of CAR in a 2003 military coup
with strong support from Deby, and, like Deby, his government is
focused principally on remaining in power. Bozize retains a personal
Chadian security force and enjoys strong support from the French
Government, which participates in attacks against CAR rebels who move
too close to Bangui. In addition, 380 peacekeepers from the regional
organization CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)
provide additional security for the regime.
Rebel groups in CAR are fighting on two fronts, in the northwest
and the northeast. In the northwest of the country, clashes between
rebel groups and the CAR Armed Forces have forced 150,000 civilians to
flee their homes. Some 50,000 refugees have crossed into Chad and
another 30,000 into Cameroon. Atrocities have been committed by both
sides and the CAR Armed Forces has systematically burned the homes of
villagers it accuses of sheltering the rebels.
The situation in northeastern CAR is more closely linked to
violence in Darfur and eastern Chad. The principal rebel group in the
northeast is the UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity), a
recently formed alliance of smaller rebel factions that decry Bozize's
corruption, allege state discrimination against Muslims, and demand
that Bozize step down or share power.
The dangerous axis between northeastern CAR, eastern Chad, and
Darfur was fully exposed in April 2006, when the Chadian FUC rebels led
by Mahamat Nour launched their attack on N'Djamena through CAR's
ungoverned northeast. Following the failed coup, reports surfaced that
aircraft crossing from Sudan into northeastern CAR landed and offloaded
military hardware and some 50 uniformed fighters. In October 2006, UFDR
rebels captured several towns, stealing supplies from CAR Armed Forces
caught off guard by the well-planned attacks. In late November, CAR
forces, with strong support from the French military, retook the towns
in late November. Bozize insists that the UDFR is backed by Sudan. Both
UDFR and Sudan deny such claims, but cross-border support for armed
groups in CAR furthers Khartoum's agenda to regionalize the crisis to
stifle a coherent international response.
CONTAINING AND ENDING THE CRISIS
There must be political solutions in Chad, Darfur, and CAR, but
these solutions will require unraveling the cross-border nature of the
conflicts and putting negotiations back within their domestic contexts.
In Darfur, disunity among the rebels, uncoordinated and
infrequent international diplomacy, and a failure to
effectively pressure the Government of Sudan have led to a
dangerous status quo that will drag on indefinitely unless the
international community agrees on a plan of action and pursues
it aggressively.
In Chad, rampant corruption and mismanagement caused wages
to go unpaid for months and led to the collapse of the few
social services that existed. In the absence of international
pressure--particularly by the French--on Deby's government to
crack down on corruption and share power with rivals, the root
causes of insurrection in Chad will continue.
In CAR, divisive ethnic politics, poverty, underdevelopment,
and a proliferation of small arms has created a combustible
mix. Neighboring countries will continue to exploit structural
weaknesses in CAR until the international community invests
more heavily in extending state control beyond Bangui and
establishing a more inclusive government.
As argued above, the way forward demands a coordinated and
multilateral effort to implement the 3Ps: Building peace through
diplomacy; protecting civilians through military deployment; and
creating leverage through punitive action.
Peacemaking: Bringing the Darfur rebel groups and the Government of
Sudan back to the negotiating table will not be easy: The rebels are
too divided right now to negotiate effectively, and the Khartoum regime
has demonstrated no interest in stabilizing Darfur or in negotiating a
fair political agreement, preferring to pursue its policies of divide
and destroy. Since the conflict began in 2003, the two original rebel
movements have splintered into at least eight different factions.
International efforts to help forge rebel unity have been
uncoordinated, sporadic, and are unlikely to work until the United
States and its partners aggressively pursue a joint strategy.
The formation late last year of a new U.N./AU mediation team is an
important development. Newly appointed U.N. Special Envoy Jan Eliasson
and AU Chief Mediator Salim Ahmed Salim are spearheading an effort to
restart negotiations, but the peace process will not move forward until
the rebels agree on a common negotiating position and the international
community applies significant pressure on the government to return to
the table. Despite the Sudanese Government's promises to allow rebel
unification conferences to go forward, Sudanese bombers have attacked
the locations of the last two planned meetings.
Chadian President Deby and CAR President Bozize have demonstrated
no commitment to addressing the root causes of instability in their
respective countries, and they are unlikely to do so until they are
compelled by their allies.
The United States and European Union should assemble a team of
diplomats based in the region to work intensively on unifying the
Darfur rebel groups. The United Nations and African Union must
immediately begin to build their capacity to reconvene negotiations
between the government and the rebels. Concurrently, governments with
leverage over Deby and Bozize--particularly the United States and
France--should press them to begin an internationally supported
political process to deal with internal rebel groups.
Protection: The international community has agreed on a three-phase
process to deploy a hybrid AU/U.N. peacekeeping force to Darfur, which
Khartoum had initially agreed to. It is essential that the eventual
hybrid force have the mandate and equipment necessary to protect
civilians. The Sudanese Government now resists elements of the hybrid
force related to the deployment of U.N. troops to Darfur. Consistent
pressure on the Sudanese Government is necessary to compel Khartoum to
accept such a force.
The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations must work in close
coordination with the African Union to line up the forces necessary to
reach the 20,300-troop level agreed upon by the African Union, the
United Nations, the Arab League, and international donor countries. The
international community must also accelerate its planning and increase
its preparedness for military action without consent from Khartoum.
The United Nations should also begin planning for deployment of
peacekeepers to protect civilians and humanitarian operations in
eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, but the deployment of protection
forces should occur in conjunction with genuine political dialogue
between the governments of these countries and their internal
opposition groups. Concerted multilateral pressure is needed to
convince Deby that a robust force is necessary to protect civilians.
This force should be mandated to protect the camps and humanitarian
convoys, and monitor and deter cross-border attacks and arms flows.
This will require air capability (attack helicopters and aircraft) and
satellite imagery. The French are well placed to help with such a
mission, though they've been resistant thus far.
The second benefit of such a force will be on the situation inside
Darfur. A force in Chad should be linked to a Darfur mission. A U.N.
presence in Chad and CAR was first authorized in U.N. Security
Resolution 1706, and that link should remain. A large force in Chad can
act as a deterrent to further forces in Darfur, and should operate as a
partner force to African Union forces and the AU/U.N. hybrid force that
is supposed to be deployed.
The international community must also accelerate its planning and
increase its preparedness for military action even in the absence of
consent from Khartoum. If the situation continues to deteriorate in
Darfur, the Security Council should authorize NATO to enforce a no-fly
zone over Darfur and have plans in place to deploy ground forces to the
region with a mandate to stop the killing. Although the international
community's appetite for this type of military action is small, the
Sudanese Government must understand that all options remain on the
table. A credible planning process will in itself be a point of
leverage in pressing primary objectives forward.
Punishment: Specific to Darfur, immediate multilateral punitive
action is needed to change the cost benefit analysis of the Sudanese
Government.
Until the international community rebuilds its leverage over the
Sudanese Government by enacting punitive measures, both the government
and the rebels will continue to fight it out in the sands of Darfur,
while the Janjaweed and other armed groups continue to kill, rape,
maim, and loot with impunity. The United States must back up its
rhetoric by demonstrating leadership in forging multilateral consensus.
First, the United States should lead the international community in
imposing targeted sanctions through the United Nations Security Council
against senior regime officials, as authorized in previous Security
Council resolutions, and called for in multiple reports from the
Council's Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts. Currently the United
States and United Kingdom have different lists of officials that should
be sanctioned. One list should be produced and broadened so that the
Security Council can rapidly expand targeted sanctions to demonstrate
international seriousness.
Second, the United States should take the lead in passing a U.N.
Security Council resolution establishing a Panel of Experts to quickly
ascertain where the assets of the largest Sudanese companies owned by
ruling party officials are located, and quickly move to freeze the
assets of those companies, as well as build a coalition of states
willing to impose measures that the United States is contemplating as
part of its ``Plan B'' threats referenced above, and implement these
measures multilaterally with as wide an international support base as
possible. Ideally, these measures would be implemented through the U.N.
Security Council.
Third, the United States should work with its international
partners to freeze the assets of the Government of Sudan and related
commercial entities of the government--such as the main oil
consortium--that pass through their banking systems. The U.S.
Department of Treasury has compiled such a list, and the administration
should work assiduously to ensure that these assets are frozen
domestically and by our allies, which would require significant
additional staff and resources.
Fourth, the United States should work with other countries to
develop a coalition that would notify international banking
institutions that if they choose to continue conducting business with
the Government of Sudan or companies affiliated with the ruling party,
by a predetermined date, they will be cut off from the financial
systems of participating countries. The United States has recently
imposed similar unilateral measures on banks doing business with the
regimes in North Korea and Iran, and they have had a direct impact.
Finally, the United States and other concerned nations should
provide information and declassified intelligence to the International
Criminal Court to expedite arrest warrants for the principal architects
of the Sudanese Government's scorched-earth campaign against its own
citizens.
Hundreds of thousands of lives in the subregion hang in the
balance. If the United States leads multilateral efforts to address
this regional contagion, whose primary root is in the Presidential
Palace in Khartoum, then the escalating crisis can be reversed. But
such a forward leaning, robust, proactive policy will require
significant congressional pressure and advocacy and continuing citizen
activism. Without these critical ingredients, I fear the drift in the
Bush administration's engagement will continue, with hope and
rhetorical demands being the main instruments of a failing policy.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast. As I
suspected, this was a very good panel, which is precisely why I
wanted to hold this hearing--so people could hear what these
experts have to say.
In a minute I'd like to start asking you some questions,
but I'm just delighted that Senator Obama has joined us. He had
been very active on this subcommittee, and I'd ask him if he
has any remarks he'd like to make.
Senator Obama. I just want to thank both of you for the
good work that you are doing on this issue. I had the
opportunity to visit one of the refugee camps in Chad after the
Sudanese Government had been reluctant to give me a visa last
summer. You know, I think at this point anybody who is paying
attention recognizes the urgency of the situation, Mr.
Chairman, and the question is: What forceful actions are we
willing to take?
I have said publicly, and I'll repeat, that the
administration has actually been better on this issue than some
other countries, including the Europeans, but that's a very low
bar. And I think it's unfortunate that we have used so much
political capital in other areas of the world, that it seems as
if we don't have the time to stick with this issue, and we have
very little leverage internationally to mount the kinds of
efforts that are needed.
Nevertheless, I'd like to see us make additional efforts. I
hope that this committee becomes activated around this issue
during the course of this year, and I'm looking forward to
additional guidance from this panel in terms of how we should
proceed.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator. Yes; the efforts in
the last few years have been many. But I would like to
acknowledge that Senator Obama's activity on the Darfur crisis,
both on the committee and publicly, has really helped keep a
focus on this issue, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Bacon, we have all seen horrifying images of the
refugee and IDP camps in Darfur, so I was a little surprised to
hear you say that the nutritional condition of camp residents
is often better than the population as a whole, although I did
hear that concern raised when I was at the refugee camp in
January 2005. We didn't just visit the camp, we went and
visited a townhall down the road, and there was a little bit of
concern about that.
Could you compare the living standards of residents in the
refugee and IDP camps in Chad and the CAR to those in Sudan, as
well as to the general population?
Mr. Bacon. Sure. Starting with Darfur, the only advantage
of moving 2 million people into camps--or close to that number,
because not all of the internally displaced live in camps--but
moving people into huge camps, the largest one has 135,000
people in it, is that it's easy to mobilize humanitarian
response and get food and medical care there and focus it. And
that's, in fact, what has happened in Darfur.
But I want to stress again what John Prendergast said. This
is very fragile now. It's increasingly fragile, the
humanitarian lifeline in Darfur, and we could see a tragedy of
unprecedented proportions if the humanitarian lifeline stops.
If the World Food Programme can't get food in, if humanitarian
workers pull out because it's too unsafe, we could start seeing
tens of thousands of people starve in relatively small amounts
of time. Because the aid has been focused in the camps, the
mortality rate has fallen quite dramatically. It's lower than
it is for the population as a whole now in Darfur.
In Chad, it took a while for the United Nations to build up
its humanitarian response in the camps, but as you pointed out
and I think Mr. Swan also pointed out, the humanitarian
conditions have improved in Chad in the camps in recent times.
But there is still this growing number of internally displaced
people, and one of the things my colleagues found over the last
couple of weeks is that humanitarian response has been really
light, inexcusably light, in eastern Chad.
In fact, there was a reluctance to begin a significant
humanitarian response for fear that it would attract more
displaced people. Now I think the United Nations has gotten
over that, and they have begun to orchestrate more of a
response, but they need better management there than they have.
And in the CAR it's not an emergency yet. There has been a
lot of displacement and it's increasing dramatically. It could
become an emergency but it isn't yet, and there isn't the type
of starvation that we saw several years ago in Darfur, so there
is time to work there, and I think time to respond to the
problems.
Senator Feingold. And on your third point, that the
humanitarian response to these three conflicts has been uneven,
have the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic
appealed for more humanitarian assistance? What steps have they
taken to facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the security
of aid workers in those two places?
Mr. Bacon. Well, Chad has actually made some contribution
of $8 million itself recently, which doesn't sound like a lot
of money, but is money to help the 120,000 displaced people in
the eastern area. So Chad is responding, and yes; they have
been appealing for more funds, Chad and the CAR.
The Government of Sudan makes episodic responses to help
the internally displaced, but I don't think they are living up
to what President Bashir said on the ``Today Show'' today. You
were probably as stunned as I was, that he said he felt every
death personally. He hasn't been acting that way, so there's a
lot more that the government could do in Darfur to protect its
own people.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Mr. Prendergast, could you summarize the interests of
Libya, France, China, and other countries that are key players
in the region, and discuss how they are contributing to the
resolution of these conflicts, and what more could they do?
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks very much. If I can parenthetically
begin by just addressing something that Senator Obama said in
his introduction about leverage, he's absolutely right, we've
lost so much internationally, but we still have all this
potential leverage with the Sudanese Government, and it's the
scarlet letter and the wallet.
Imagine the incredible leverage we would have if all of the
intelligence that we have collected over the last 4 years about
who has been responsible at the highest levels of the Sudanese
Government for authorizing the atrocities that have been
committed in Darfur, that are being discussed in The Hague, if
we brought portfolios to the senior officials in Khartoum in
question and said, ``It's your choice. We turn these things in,
we declassify and turn these things in, and you're going to be
hunted for the rest of your life. Yes; we won't catch you right
away. There aren't enforcement mechanisms for the ICC. But if
you want to live the rest of your life like Milosevic and some
of these other guys in the former Yugoslavia, running and
hiding, or in a hole like Saddam Hussein, if your government
ever changes power, it's your choice. We've got the information
here. Do you want to play ball or not?'' That's the scarlet
letter.
And the wallet, if we furiously worked with our allies to
go after the assets, these guys have made so much money over
the last decade since the advent of oil exploitation in
Southern Sudan, and they have put money into companies that are
invested all over Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Of course
they're not in the United States because the Clinton and now
the Bush administration have restricted bilateral trade. So we
have enormous leverage if we choose to build it and use it, and
we're not doing that, and that's what I think is at the crux of
what I would say.
On the question of the three countries you mentioned,
Libya, regional influence is its objective. It has always been
an influence peddler, and it switches sides so often, its
schizophrenic regional policy undermines its credibility. Of
course they can bring people together. Of course people will
show up for meetings because they pay them to come. They
provide money and arms. ``If you come and show up, we'll have
these wonderful meetings, press and photo opportunities.''
People agree to all kinds of wonderful things about
stopping cross-border insurgencies and support for
insurgencies, et cetera, et cetera. Not one iota of
implementation ever, have we ever seen, so it's almost a
nonfactor. They can throw a little gasoline on the fire in
occasional places by throwing arms into the mix, but they then
change sides, so it's neutralized.
France supports Deby and Bozize, as we know, very well, not
only just economic aid, not only military, but military action
through the provision of intelligence and actual military
support on the ground when rebels in both countries were
advancing last year. So they're willing to do what it takes to
protect the two regimes in their two client states there in
central Africa, but they're very divided about what to do about
Darfur. France is all over the place. One day they're
supporting the ICC resolution in the Security Council. The next
day they're obstructing further measures. They have, of course,
fairly significant economic interests in Southern Sudan, and
that complicates their policy.
They are doing nothing to address the internal political
problems in CAR and Chad, and I think you were asking Mr. Swan,
you know, what are we going to do? Who is the key external
actor? It's France. We've got to be working very closely with
them at the highest level of government, not at these working
levels. It doesn't mean anything to them.
OK; and on China, of course, that's the big elephant in the
living room. Now a small factor, a new factor, has crept into
the picture. They have invested now in Chad's oil sector, so
they have a new reason to want better relations between Chad
and Sudan so they can exploit this oil, so they will be a
partner with us in support for that kind of reduction in cross-
border tensions. We need to use that. Again, high level
engagement is going to be key.
But to expect them to ever be a positive player in Sudan
with the depth of their commercial relationship, it is almost
an ideal scenario right now for China. They have a
dictatorship, basically a commercial partner in Sudan that's
willing to maintain that exploitation of resources by any means
necessary, including genocide in the west and ethnic cleansing
in the south, and that's a pretty good deal for them right now.
That pretty much assures that they will get that oil for now,
and so they're not going to be a positive player. We just have
to engage them heavily to neutralize their being a negative
actor on the scene, particularly in the Security Council.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. In terms of us applying leverage, there was
a Washington Post article that appeared in February, in which
the Bush administration leaked to the media that they were
going to implement a plan for the Treasury Department to
aggressively block U.S. commercial bank transactions connected
to the Government of Sudan, including oil revenues. According
to the press, this plan was supposed to start in the first of
January. We're in April. We haven't seen any movement.
Do people have any comments about the potential
effectiveness of the so-called plan B approach? Is it your
estimation that a legislative approach should be tried?
Mr. Prendergast. I think the Post leak was overstated. I
think there was a bit of bluff involved. You know, you use
these kind of tools in foreign policy to try to influence your
adversary across the table. They were trying to do that with
the Sudanese.
It seems not to have yet been decided to undertake as
robust an effort as was described in that Post article. They
have decided on expanding targeted sanctions against certain
companies, but the way it was described in the Post goes beyond
what was decided, I think, by the Principals Committee and by
the President.
Now, if they did what they said in that article, I think it
would have an impact, but it would have to be very clearly tied
to a series of actions. In other words, this wouldn't be the
one-time thing. Plan B wouldn't be, ``Here's our one thing
we're going to do, and that's it.'' Because the Sudanese can
weather this one. I mean, they can find alternative uses for
their money and stuff like that, and ways of undertaking their
commercial transactions. There has to be a series of actions
that brings to bear pressure and, probably more importantly, we
have to work multilaterally.
Up until now, much of what the United States has done has
been internal, within the Government, while we determine what
unilateral measures we're going to take. And as you know,
around the world this kind of unilateral push just leaves us
open to a number of negative repercussions and doesn't have the
full effect that if we work together, either through the
Security Council or with a group of allies and interested
countries, we could have much more influence.
So I think plan B has a tremendous potential because it
would shift, possibly, a move of our policy from constructive
engagement, which simply has failed in the last 4 years in
Darfur, to one of harder, pressure-based strategy that looks to
try to influence the calculations of the government through
punitive measures. That's the right direction we need to go.
It's just that we have got to have enough sticks in that basket
for the Sudanese to take us seriously enough to change their
calculations and thus their behavior.
Mr. Bacon. If I could just add two things, first of all, no
one has done more work on this than John Prendergast in the
International Crisis Group and his colleagues there, in sort of
examining the mix of financial and other sanctions that could
hurt the government. And the point he made about releasing
intelligence is a very profound point. I think it would have a
huge impact on the government.
But, second, your committee might ask in another hearing
for government officials to come up and talk about what
financial options are available. For example, we've seen in the
last several months that the application of section 311 under
the U.S. Patriot Act has had a big impact on North Korea. For
years we have thought North Korea was impervious to this type
of pressure, but, in fact, the financial pressure put on
through the banking system had a relatively rapid impact on the
North Korean regime.
Could that section be applied to Sudan? It's a money-
laundering section, but it has been interpreted very broadly
and it has been used quite aggressively by our Treasury. So I
would ask if maybe this committee would look into that and try
to put a little pressure on the administration to look more
imaginatively at the tools it already has at its disposal to
put more pressure on Sudan.
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman, just a quick followup, if you
don't mind.
Obviously a lot of this has to do with how we can structure
the application of any of these sticks in a way that's not
deemed one more unilateral action by the United States. And so,
you know, when I was referring to leverage earlier, the problem
is that right now we've got a bad reputation around the world
in terms of our capacity to pull together a multilateral
effort.
So I'm wondering, from your vantage point--you are both
following the issue closely, you are, I'm sure, privy to
conversations that are taking place in the United Nations and
around the world--I'm wondering whether we have seen any
improvement--progress--in terms of our potential European
allies showing concern on this issue. Has the African Union
been clear in terms of these concerns? We talked about Libya,
but I guess I'm also interested in sort of more broadly Arab
nations.
The question I have is: Setting China aside, what capacity
do we have at this point to actually forge an international
coalition that would leave China isolated and force them to
take action or support action? Or is this predominantly a
phenomenon that's of interest to the grassroots and some
legislators in the United States? It's getting a little bit of
attention in Europe, not much elsewhere, and so it's hard to
muster the kind of international coalition that might be
necessary for punitive actions to be effective.
Mr. Prendergast. I would just say, Senator, that the United
Nations Security Council is the key. The Brits are going to
table a resolution that will put forward a few of these
financial measures. I believe, and I think many of us in the
activist community believe and the NGO community believe that
they could do a lot more in that first resolution that signals
the break from constructive engagement to more punitive
measures.
The French will probably go along. They have indicated
pretty much that they don't want to act through the EU but they
will act through the Security Council. And I believe China and
Russia, when you play chicken with them on this issue, they
will ride off the road. They don't want to be isolated.
They don't want to, particularly China does not want to use
its veto. Unless we're talking about an embargo of Port Sudan
or something that directly attacks their economic--their vital
economic interests--they will abstain, and they have
demonstrated that when the referral of the case of Darfur to
the ICC, when the Sudanese Government was sure that Beijing was
going to veto, and they stepped aside and said, ``We just don't
want to stand up on behalf of this regime in that way.''
The EU is totally divided. Many of the countries in the EU,
in their lowest common denominator foreign policy, have
deferred to the diplomatic effort and said, ``We've just got to
give it more time.'' Particularly the Secretary General of the
United Nations has said the same thing, unfortunately.
The AU, I wouldn't rely on the AU to take the lead on this
kind of thing because they have put the soldiers on the line
and they are undertaking, they are effectively in the lead on
the diplomatic track. We're not going to see them, I think,
take the aggressive track that needs to give leverage to the
peace and protection initiatives.
So the engine really is right here in Washington. If the
United States decides, ``Let's push forward, let's work as
multilaterally as possible, but push forward through the United
Nations Security Council,'' I think we can create a set of
punitive measures that will influence the Government of Sudan
in its calculations and to change its policy in Darfur.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Obama.
Mr. Bacon, thank you for raising the point about the
measure that was effective vis-a-vis North Korea. I think
there's some talk about this among some Senators, but I think
your push on that may be helpful at a critical time.
Again, thank you. Let me just ask one more question; I want
to get this on the record. The resolution that Senator Sununu
and I introduced last month calls for the appointment of a U.N.
regional envoy, as you heard, charged with overseeing and
coordinating humanitarian access and assistance in Darfur,
eastern Chad, and northern CAR. Could each of you offer your
opinion of this proposition?
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. I think that would be a step up. I would, to the
extent possible, expand this mandate to include political
negotiations working toward a peace agreement. There is now a
U.N. deployment--diplomatic deployment in the CAR, trying to
work toward a peace negotiation. I don't think it has had much
success yet, but there is much more that we can do there. And
by combining it with humanitarian assistance, I think it gives
it more clout.
Senator Feingold. Very good. Mr. Prendergast.
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks. I agree, it has got to be expanded
to peacemaking. Having just the humanitarian brief is not
enough. There has to be a division of labor, then, if we're
going to press for that, and I think you should, between
current Special Envoy Natsios and the new person, so one is
focused like a laser beam on a peace deal for Darfur and the
other looks at the wider regional dimensions.
And again it's an argument for a regional cell. We need
more diplomats out there. In this transformational diplomacy or
whatever we want to call it, we've got to have more people in
the region working these cases full time. We can't have part-
time professors going out when they can, when their schedule
permits. We've got to have full-time people, professionals who
work this account 24/7, because the Sudanese are working it 24/
7 to destabilize the region.
Thanks.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. That's exactly the note I
wanted to end this hearing on. I thank both of you and all our
witnesses, and that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary James Swan to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. A nearly $1 billion windfall will come to the Chadian
Government from oil sector tax revenues this year, in addition to
normal oil royalty payments (estimated at $254 million for 2007).
What is being done to ensure these funds are not used to
fuel the growing conflict in eastern Chad/Darfur, or to
increase arms purchases and Chadian military spending above
their current levels?
What mechanisms are in place to track arms traffic in Chad,
the Central African Republic and Sudan?
Are there any measures being taken to monitor the
relationship between the precipitous growth in Chad's budget
(due to oil production) and arms sales to/flows into Chad?
Answer. Years of civil and external conflict have led to the
proliferation of traffic in small arms across Chad, Central African
Republic (CAR), and Sudan. Many organizations, including the United
Nations and the African Union, attempt to assess small arms and light
weapons flows in this region of Africa. Our embassies in the region
also report on observable trends. The illicit nature of this traffic
makes it difficult to track with precision.
The U.S. Department of State through the Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement (WRA) has been engaged in Sudan with Small Arms and Light
Weapons
(SA/LW) destruction to eliminate illicit SA/LW from circulation. Since
FY05, the State Department through WRA has funded the destruction of at
least 21,959 weapons at a cost of $1,900,000.
The United States (through WRA) has begun a dialogue with the
Government of the Central African Republic with the goal of
establishing a bilateral NADR-funded program to strengthen the
governments physical security and stockpile management practices and to
destroy any surplus and obsolete SA/LW.
The United States supports World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) efforts to ensure that Chad's increased oil revenues are
focused on priority social sectors instead of on the military. This
includes supporting the preparation of the Government's new Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which will provide the framework for
government spending over the next several years to promote broad-based
growth and poverty reduction. The United States engages regularly with
the Chadian Government to reinforce the message that Chad's oil
revenues would best promote stability if used to address some of the
long-term drivers of instability. We also engage with Chadian
Government officials at all levels to urge them to cease any support of
Sudanese rebel groups.
Question. The influx of refugees from the Darfur region is placing
pressure on social infrastructure and on local populations.
What are the nonsecurity priorities of the Chad Government
as exhibited by their expenditures?
Does the Chadian public budget reflect increased expenditure
on health and social services in the east and south of Chad?
Have any donors prioritized funds for Chadian communities
impacted by the growing crisis on the border?
Answer. Under the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of Chad and the World Bank, the Chadian Government pledged
to spend 70 percent of its entire budget on health, education, rural
development, and other social sector programming in fiscal year 2007.
The government also pledged to pay particular attention to Chad's
southern oil-producing region.
While official data on Chad's spending has not yet been released,
it appears that the Chadian Government will not meet its 70 percent
target this year. Social sector spending, however, seems to have
increased significantly since 2005. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
much of this funding has been spent on infrastructure, health, and
education.
As a result of oil receipts, Chad's national budget has increased
significantly from previous years. Consequently, there has been
increased spending throughout the country. While Chad does not publish
its budget annually, it is not clear whether there is greater emphasis
on projects in the south and eastern regions. In January, the Chadian
Government publicly committed to fund 44 percent of a joint urban
development project with the World Bank. Of the five cities selected
for the project (N'djamena, Abeche, Doba, Sarh, and Moundou), four are
in the southern and eastern parts of the country. We continue to press
for greater social investment throughout the country.
Going forward, the Government, in consultation with civil society,
the World Bank, the IMF and other development partners, is preparing a
new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to promote broad-based
growth, reduce poverty, and provide the framework for government
spending over the next several years.
Donor assistance for the eastern Chadian population is provided
mostly through international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Those segments of the population that are internally displaced receive
humanitarian assistance from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), United Nations agencies, and NGOs. As in other parts of
the world, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and its partner organizations provide assistance for host communities
affected by the presence of refugees.
In Chad, activities for host communities include projects to
improve coordination, increase access to clean water, improve food
security through agricultural support, and provide informal education
and conflict resolution training through radio programming for Chadians
and refugees. In addition to U.S. Government support for UNHCR and
partner organizations ($43 million in FY06) in Chad, the United States,
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
State Department, will provide food and nonfood assistance for
internally displaced persons and for host communities. Other donors,
including the European Community and the United Kingdom, have also
provided funding specifically for affected Chadians.
Question. What are the amounts of assistance provided to Chad, and
to CAR, from the international community, broken out by country and
international organization?
Answer. According to the United Nations (U.N.), the Central African
Republic (CAR) received $25 million in humanitarian assistance in 2006.
The largest portion of this assistance, approximately $5.5 million, or
21.3 percent, was granted by the United Nations Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF). Other U.N. funds contributed at least an
additional 10 percent of the total. The United States was the largest
bilateral donor, contributing approximately $3.6 million in
humanitarian assistance, or 14.1 percent of the total. France
contributed approximately $2.9 million dollars, while Japan, Ireland,
and Sweden each contributed over $1 million dollars.
In 2007, the international community has already pledged over $10
million in humanitarian assistance to CAR. One-third of this assistance
is funded by the CERF, while Ireland and the United States have each
provided approximately one-fourth. We expect that funding levels will
increase significantly throughout 2007. The United Nations has
requested approximately $50 million in humanitarian funding in its
Consolidated 2007 Appeal for CAR.
The international community provided $186.77 million in
humanitarian assistance to Chad in 2006. The United States was by far
the largest donor, providing nearly $70 million, including $63.4
million toward the U.N. appeal. The European Commission was the second
largest donor, providing approximately $20 million, followed by the
U.N., which provided $9.4 million through the CERF and $9.9 million via
general accounts. Much of the assistance provided to Chad in 2006 was
to support Sudanese and CAR refugees.
The United Nations has requested $170 million in humanitarian
funding in its Consolidated 2007 Appeal for Chad. Of this, almost $50
million have been provided thus far. The United States continues to be
the largest contributor of humanitarian funding, having provided $40
million, including $30.1 million toward the appeal. The U.N. has
contributed $7.3 million via the CERF mechanism.
While statistics for overall development assistance (ODA) for 2006
have not yet been released, statistics indicate that CAR received $95
million in ODA in 2005. This assistance equaled approximately 7.1
percent of CAR's gross national income (GNI). France was by far the
largest contributor, providing approximately 40 percent of all
assistance in 2004-05. The European Commission provided approximately
22 percent during the same time period, while the United States
provided approximately 14 percent.
Chad received approximately $380 million in ODA in 2005. 2004-05
averages indicate that the International Development Association of the
World Bank provided approximately 23 percent of assistance, followed by
the European Commission (20 percent), the United States (16 percent),
and France (15 percent). Overall development assistance includes
emergency assistance as well as debt relief and other forms of
assistance.
Question. What foreign assistance is intended to be provided to
Chad, and to CAR, by the United States in FY 2007, broken out by
purpose/category?
Answer. While the nature of emergency humanitarian funding, which
is the bulk of the funding that we provide to Chad and the Central
African Republic (CAR), makes it difficult to predict precise funding
levels, we expect that overall humanitarian assistance to both Chad and
CAR will increase significantly from 2006 levels.
In CAR, we anticipate providing the following assistance (all
amounts in U.S. dollars):
Cancellation of bilateral debt with an approximate face
value of $3,600,000 and rescheduling of remaining $1,800,000 of
debt, in keeping with the terms of the multilateral agreement
CAR is expected to negotiate with the Paris Club in mid-April
2007. These estimates for fiscal year 2007 are based on the
initial debt treatment normally offered to countries advancing
toward full participation in the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative;
$4,200,000 in Public Law 480 Title II (P.L. 480) emergency
food assistance;
$1,314,215 in International Disaster and Famine Assistance
(IDFA) funding for emergency supplies and nutrition and for
food security, water, and sanitation projects;
$500,000 in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for a pilot land
tenure project that will help to bring alluvial-mined diamonds
into the Kimberley Process chain of custody;
$500,000 in Development Assistance (DA) funding for
biodiversity/sustainable use projects as part of the Central
African Regional Program for the Environment;
$96,000 in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) for civil-military relations, human rights, and
professionalization training for members of the CAR military;
and
Unearmarked contributions to the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) for their Africa-wide budgets that are used to
assist conflict victims, refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in CAR, as well as to assist CAR refugees in
Chad and Cameroon.
In Chad, we anticipate providing the following assistance:
$37,500,000 in Refugee and Migration Assistance (RMA) to
support refugees and IDPs;
$27,500,000 in Public Law 480 emergency food assistance
(including contributions to the World Food Program) for
refugees and IDPs;
$10,062,000 in Department of Defense Title 10 assistance to
support Operation Enduring Freedom--Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), the
military component of the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP);
$5,000,000 in IDFA funding for relief commodities, food
security, protection, humanitarian coordination, water and
sanitation projects;
$1,802,000 in DA and ESF for development projects to support
TSCTP;
$1,798,000 in Public Law 480 Title II nonemergency food
assistance;
$595,000 in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) assistance for antiterrorism training
as part of TSCTP;
$283,000 in IMET for civil-military relations, human rights,
and professionalization training;
$272,000 in Department of Defense European Command (EUCOM)
funding to support Exercise Related Construction (ERC);
$207,000 in Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention
Program funding (DHAPP) for HIV/AIDS activities in Chad;
$200,000 in NADR for demining activities;
$179,000 in Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance
(HA) activities; and
$121,000 in Department of Defense general operation funds
for the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).
Question. France is a former colonial power and still occupies an
important role in the region.
Characterize the French role in the region and specifically
in Chad and CAR. (A classified response is acceptable if
necessary.)
What are France's goals and how does it work to achieve
them?
How does the United States engage France in achieving its
objectives in the region?
Answer. As the former regional colonial power, France has a unique
relationship with both Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), as well
as with most of their neighbors. French President Jacques Chirac has a
close personal relationship with Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno.
CAR President Francois Bozize also enjoys a good relationship with the
French Government, likely developed while he lived in France in exile.
In both Chad and CAR, France's primary goals are achieving domestic
and regional stability. As part of the European Union, France is
engaged in long-term civil reconstruction and democratic reform
projects in both countries. These projects have been formulated to
address long-term drivers of instability.
France plays a significant role in the security sector in both Chad
and CAR. There are approximately 1,200 French troops in Chad as part of
Operation Epervier. The troops are stationed in Chad to protect French
nationals and to provide logistical support to the Chadian forces. In
Central African Republic, there are approximately 300 troops as part of
Operation Boali, an operation charged with helping to restructure the
local armed forces and supporting FOMUC, a regional peacekeeping force
led by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)
and funded by the European Union.
The roles of the two forces are quite distinct. France and CAR have
entered into a defense agreement that allows the French forces to
provide operational assistance and air support in internal and external
conflicts. French aircraft have directly engaged Central African rebels
and have helped the Bozize government maintain its tenuous hold on the
northeastern parts of the country, particularly those near the Sudan
border.
France's agreement with Chad, however, is a military cooperation
agreement and only allows the French to provide logistical support to
the Chadian Government.
United States and French Governments discuss our initiatives in the
region regularly in Washington, DC, and in Paris, as well as in Bangui,
N'djamena, and at the United Nations. Our Ambassador in Chad and our
Charge d'affaires in CAR both enjoy good relations with their
counterparts. We have also supported many French initiatives vis-a-vis
Chad and CAR in international fora.
Question. The World Bank has had a significant impact on the
prospects of Chad oil resource flows. What role does the World Bank
play, and are they capable of being a positive influence, upon the Chad
and CAR governments actions in the region?
Answer. In January 2006, the Chadian Government changed the law
governing use of oil revenues for priority social sectors in order to
cover an increasing need for military expenditures. Because this action
violated the 1999 agreement with the World Bank, the Bank suspended all
loans to Chad in protest of the decision. The suspension and
international pressure compelled the Government of Chad (GOC) to sign a
July 2006 agreement with the World Bank in which the government agreed
to spend 70 percent of its total budget, not just oil revenues, on
priority sectors, such as health education, and infrastructure. While
critics of the agreement note that it does not address the GOC's
elimination of a future generations fund and that an increased portion
of direct oil revenues could be used for military spending, proponents
note that projected priority sector spending would increase. The
agreement also signals that the World Bank can still be a positive
influence in Chad. Although it does not appear as though the government
will meet the 70-percent target outlined for this year, spending on
priority poverty-reduction sectors has increased significantly since
2005. The government has also made progress on strengthening public
financial management, as also agreed with the World Bank.
In Central African Republic (CAR), the World Bank and other
international financial institutions have played a very positive role
as the country attempts to undertake fiscal and monetary reforms. Prime
Minister Elie Dote, himself a veteran of the African Development Bank,
is implementing reforms of the customs service and has begun a campaign
to eliminate ghost workers from the civil service.
In addition to providing the impetus for fiscal reform, the World
Bank can provide much-needed technical assistance to two countries
where the financial management capacity is very low.
Question. What has the United States done to consolidate the
diplomatic effort in this region and through what organizations has the
USG engaged to leverage its influence for positive effect?
Answer. The United States has engaged on the issue of the regional
impact of the Darfur crisis, particularly on Chad and the Central
African Republic, at every level. In the field, our missions enjoy good
working relationships with their bilateral and multilateral colleagues
and participate in donor meetings where they impress upon both
governments the importance of democratic reforms and respect for human
rights to address the long-term drivers of the conflict.
In New York, we have worked with other United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council members and with U.N. officials to ensure that the
regional impact of the Darfur crisis is part of the international
agenda. As a result, U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706
instructed the U.N. to address regional security issues, particularly
in Chad and the Central African Republic. We also expect these issues
to be addressed in the context of the deployment of a U.N.-African
Union hybrid force in Darfur. Moreover, we have pressed for the
deployment of a separate peacekeeping mission in Chad and CAR. We
regularly consult with our international partners on the deployment of
such a mission.
Finally, the United States continues to support the mandates of the
U.N. Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and
of FOMUC, the regional peacekeeping force of the Central African
Monetary and Economic Community. Both organizations have contributed to
security in CAR.