[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF IMPORTED CONTAMINATED FOOD AND FEED
INGREDIENTS AND OF RECENT FOOD SAFETY EMERGENCIES ON FOOD
SAFETY AND ANIMAL HEALTH SYSTEMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 9, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-19
Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture
agriculture.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota, Chairman
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
Vice Chairman Ranking Minority Member
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa JERRY MORAN, Kansas
JOE BACA, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia JO BONNER, Alabama
STEPHANIE HERSETH SANDLIN, South MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Dakota STEVE KING, Iowa
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas MARILYN N. MUSGRAVE, Colorado
JIM COSTA, California RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana Louisiana
NANCY E. BOYDA, Kansas JOHN R. ``RANDY'' KUHL, Jr., New
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio York
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
EARL POMEROY, North Dakota JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
JOHN BARROW, Georgia KEVIN McCARTHY, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas TIM WALBERG, Michigan
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
TIM MAHONEY, Florida
Professional Staff
Robert L. Larew, Chief of Staff
Andrew W. Baker, Chief Counsel
William E. O'Conner, Jr., Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Peterson, Hon. Collin C., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Minnesota, opening statement.......................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Goodlatte, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Virginia, opening statement.................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Lampson, Hon. Nick, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas, prepared statement................................... 38
Donnelly, Hon. Joe, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana, prepared statement................................. 39
Witnesses
Acheson, Dr. David, M.D., F.R.C.P., Assistant Commissioner for
Food Protection, United States Food and Drug Administration,
Rockville, Maryland............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Petersen, Dr. Kenneth E., Food Safety Inspection Service, United
States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.............. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Submitted Material
Safe Food Coalition, Washington, D.C............................. 63
Wiley, Mr. Ladd, Executive Director, Coalition for a Stronger
FDA, Washington, D.C........................................... 67
Carter, Ms. Brandy, Executive Director/CEO, Kansas Cattlemen's
Association, Manhattan, Kansas................................. 69
Mason, Mr. Stephen R., Acting Assistant Commissioner for
Legislation, Department of Health & Human Services, Food and
Drug Administration, Rockville, Maryland....................... 71
Becker, Mr. Geoffrey S., Specialist in Agricultural Policy,
Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C.............................. 60
HEARING TO REVIEW THE IMPACT OF IMPORTED CONTAMINATED FOOD AND FEED
INGREDIENTS AND OF RECENT FOOD SAFETY EMERGENCIES ON FOOD SAFETY AND
ANIMAL HEALTH SYSTEMS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Agriculture,
Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in Room
1300 of the Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Collin C.
Peterson [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Peterson, Holden,
Etheridge, Boswell, Baca, Scott, Pomeroy, Kagen, Donnelly,
Musgrave, Neugebauer, Boustany and Goodlatte.
Staff present: Rob Larew, Chandler Goule, Craig Jagger,
Tyler Jameson, John Riley, Sharon Rusnak, April Slayton, Debbie
Smith, Kristin Sosanie, Lindsey Correa, John Goldberg, Alise
Kowalski, Kevin Kramp, Pam Miller, Pete Thomson, and Jamie
Weyer.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Welcome
everybody. Good morning and welcome to today's hearing of the
House Agriculture Committee. I will start by acknowledging our
witnesses; Dr. Kenneth Petersen, with the USDA's Food Safety
Inspection Service and Dr. David Acheson with the Food and Drug
Administration. I want to thank you both for joining us today
to update the committee about the current situation surrounding
melamine tainted products from China that have been used in pet
food and animal feed.
Based on what I have heard from USDA and FDA, I am relieved
that contaminated feed does not pose a risk to the health of
poultry, swine and farm fish that ate it, nor do the products
from these animals pose a threat to the food supply or human
health. However, the explanations from USDA and FDA leave me
with the uncomfortable feeling that maybe we just got lucky
this time. The next time tainted food or feed products slip
through the very large cracks in our import inspection system,
we may be forced to confront a much more serious situation in
terms of animal or human health.
As food and feed imports from countries around the world
continue to rise, the rate of inspection of those products
entering this country has declined. According to recent
newspaper reports, in the past five years, as food imports have
grown by almost 50 percent. FDA has lost about 20 percent of
its food inspectors. Today, FDA is inspecting only 1 percent of
the products that enter the U.S. food supply that it is
responsible for monitoring. This is a recipe for major problems
down the road and the recalls and quarantines we have seen in
response to mislabeled melamine tainted products are minor
compared to what we could see in the future if this problem is
not addressed.
There are many questions we need to answer as we move
forward. First, I am interested to hear if USDA and FDA feel
confident about the existing inspection procedures that are in
place now. Are those procedures adequate to ensure the safety
of imported foods and feed products? If changes need to be made
or if additional resources are needed to make those changes, I
think the committee should be aware of that.
Second, I am interested in the issue of who bears the
ultimate responsibility for the safety and integrity of
imported products. Who will ultimately be held responsible for
the melamine tainted products? According to news reports, it
was common knowledge amongst Chinese manufacturers that
melamine was routinely used as an additive to spike protein
levels, yet no company or government entity in the U.S. seemed
to be aware of it.
For meat and poultry products, we only accept imports from
countries with food safety systems that are equivalent to our
own, giving consumers here a certain level of assurance about
the integrity of those goods. With FDA-regulated food and feed
products, however, we have no such assurance that producers in
foreign countries are held to any safety standards, whatsoever,
much less the kind of standards we expect from our domestic
producers.
I hope that the seriousness of the recent risk assessment
efforts undertaken by multiple government agencies in the wake
of the melamine incidents are not lost on our trade
negotiators. Advocates of free trade have done consumers a
disservice by failing to address the simple fact that expanding
trade with countries that fail to enforce food and safety and
environmental standards make our domestic food supply less
safe.
I do appreciate the efforts by USDA and FDA to keep the
members of this committee and the public informed about the
ongoing investigation related to contaminated food and feed
products. However, moving forward, I am interested to hear not
only how the agencies that reacted to and investigated the
current situation, but also what lessons have been learned and
what we can do to better detect and protect against
adulterated, mislabeled and unsafe imports.
I look forward to hearing more about the current situation
today and to addressing some of these serious questions about
the safety of products that we are feeding our pets, our
livestock and our families. And I would advise members that
their opening statements will be made part of the record with
the exception of one person, that is my good friend and the
ranking member, Mr. Goodlatte from Virginia. I will recognize
him for an opening statement and then we will proceed to the
witnesses.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GOODLATTE A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
you for calling this hearing. While the committee has been
correctly focusing its efforts on the Farm Bill, the recent
contamination of pet and livestock feed warrants our attention
and continued oversight. It is important to note however, that
the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture are still conducting their investigations and there
are still many unanswered questions. I appreciate the efforts
of both departments to keep the members of the committee
updated with the most recent information and look forward to
learning the conclusions of their findings once the entire
investigation is complete.
As the representative of a district that is heavily
oriented towards animal agriculture, I am always interested in
any issue that affects livestock feed. And like the rest of my
colleagues, I have been approached by family and friends who
are quite concerned about the health and safety of their pets.
We all sympathize with those who have lost their pets or who
have pets that have been adversely affected. As we continue to
learn more about this matter, we have discovered that in
addition to pets, some hogs and poultry may have also received
contaminated feed.
As part of the pet food manufacturing process, there is a
certain amount of excess product or ingredients that are sold
into the livestock feed processing sector. As far as we know at
this point, no one involved in the animal feed business
knowingly sold or bought contaminated salvage material. Based
on what we know so far, the livestock feed that had been
contaminated was sold and consumed before anyone in the United
States was aware of the problem. The fact and extent of this
occurrence suggests that some attention to the food safety
systems of our trading partners may be warranted.
I appreciate the actions thus far by the administration to
resolve this issue, specifically the FDA's recent decision to
take the extraordinary action of detaining all vegetable
protein products imported from China. During the course of
sampling various vegetable proteins and products made with
vegetable proteins, the FDA has linked all of the samples
testing positive for contamination to imports from China. As
part of the FDA's investigation, they will identify the actual
manufacturer or manufacturers of the contaminated products
imported from China.
While the source of the contamination in China is currently
unknown, I hope the FDA's detention order will send a strong
signal to the Chinese industry and government that we are
serious about this issue and will not tolerate violations of
our food import standards. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses and any light that they can shed on this issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and again want to thank
our witnesses for being with us today. Your statements will be
made part of the record in their entirety, so we would
appreciate it if you could summarize the main points in 5
minutes and welcome to the Committee. Mr. Acheson.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ACHESON, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR FOOD
PROTECTION, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Acheson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am Dr. David Acheson, Assistant Commissioner for
Food Protection at FDA. I am joined here today with my
colleagues, Dr. Sundloff from Center for Veterinary Medicine,
Dr. Solomon from the Office of Regulatory Affairs and Walter
Batts from our Office of International Programs.
In my newly created position, Commissioner von Eschenbach
has asked me to provide advice and counsel on strategic and
substantive food safety and food defense matters based on my
knowledge and experience in the science of food safety. I will
discuss FDA's response to the importation of contaminated
animal feed ingredients and the impact of this incident on food
safety and animal health. But first let me share with you some
of the broader complexities and challenges we face in
regulating our Nation's food system.
At FDA, ensuring that products we regulate are safe and
secure is a vital part of our public health mission. The agency
regulates everything Americans eat except for meat, poultry and
processed egg products, which are covered by USDA. FDA's
responsibility extends to live food animals and animal feed.
Through trans-agency cooperation and leveraging FDA public
health resources, we are working to ensure that America's food
supply is among the safest in the world.
However, we face significant challenges in our mission,
such as the increased globalization of the food supply;
changing consumer expectations for all foods; changes in
farming, manufacturing and processing practices; an outdated
infrastructure relative to the increasing complexities; the
increased concern of a deliberate terrorist attack on the food
supply; and challenges in tracking food rapidly when a problem
does arise. The melamine case we are discussing today
illustrates many of these challenges we face and highlights the
need for new scientific and technological approaches to
advanced food protection.
FDA's investigations into contaminated pet food and farm
feed began in March 2007 and are an ongoing priority for the
agency. As we obtain more investigative and scientific
information, our assumptions and knowledge about the problem
are constantly changing. The investigations have revealed that
the underlying cause of the contamination was imported pet food
ingredients which contained the industrial chemical melamine
and melamine analogs.
FDA has identified the source, the importer, the supplier
and other parties involved with the distribution of
contaminated product declared, at entry, as wheat gluten, but
which we now know was wheat flour. In mid-April, FDA became
aware of a suspicious shipment of a product identified in
labeling and import records as rice protein concentrate that
was also used in the manufacture of pet foods. Upon inspection,
FDA detected the presence of melamine and melamine analogs in
the imported protein concentrate and the finished pet food and
began its investigation to track and trace all uses of that
material.
Some of this contaminated pet food was unknowingly sent as
salvage feed to hog producers in several States. Additionally,
FDA learned that pet food salvage containing contaminated wheat
gluten was used in chicken feed on some farms in the States of
Indiana, Missouri and Arkansas. During the past eight weeks we
have aggressively worked to identify the sources and scope of
the contamination, trace the distribution of contaminated
products through the supply chain and assure their removal from
store shelves.
FDA's response has been a team effort in which we have
mobilized more than 400 employees to collect pet food and
animal feed samples, monitor the recall and take consumer
complaints; conduct numerous inspections of manufacturing
facilities and warehouses to trace the contaminated product and
analyze more than 700 pet food and ingredient samples in FDA
field labs and our Forensic Chemistry Center. Additionally, we
have instituted an import alert covering all vegetable protein
products from China in which all entries are detained and
examined. We have dispatched investigatory personnel to China
and worked closely with agricultural and health agencies in all
50 States.
Finally, we have issued a high priority surveillance
assignment for our field staff to examine imported plant
protein ingredients and finished products commonly found in the
United States' food and feed supply. These products include
wheat gluten, corn gluten, corn meal, soy protein, rice bran
and rice protein concentrate. At this time we have no evidence
of harm to humans associated with the processed pork or poultry
products from animals that consumed contaminated feed and we
believe the likelihood of human illness from eating these
products is very low.
This assessment is based on a number of factors, including
dilution of the contaminants in the original protein
concentrate as they move through the food system and the fact
that the pet food is only part of the total feed given to the
chickens and hogs. The assessment also takes into account that
these food products are only a small part of the average
American diet. The human health risk assessment completed with
the input of scientists from FDA, CDC, USDA, EPA and DHS looks
at the potential risk to human health from consuming meat from
hogs and chickens known to have been fed the contaminated
animal feed.
This team is now compiling a scientific assessment of the
risk to animal health associated with ingestion of animal feed
containing melamine in its compounds. As an added precaution,
we have asked CDC to use a surveillance network to monitor for
signs of human illness that could indicate a contamination of
the human food supply. To further evaluate any potential harm
to humans, FDA is developing and implementing additional tests
and risk assessments based on the toxicity of melamine
compounds and the amounts that consumers could be expected to
consume. If any evidence surfaces to indicate there was
potential harm to humans, appropriate and aggressive action
will be taken.
FDA is examining recent incidents, as well as global food
system trends to determine what changes are necessary to
improve the safety of human and animal foods. We are focusing
our food protection review in three key areas; prevention,
intervention and response; preventing contamination through
strong science-based, risk-based preventative controls with key
partners; improved intervention, using modern technology to
establish a comprehensive, integrated food information system
to analyze information and detect potential product
contamination; and rapid response to improve product tracking
and related lab research capacity.
We know that the future will require different resources,
technology and science to effectively enhance the safety of all
human and animal foods. We will continue to work closely with
our food protection partners at each point in the supply chain
to establish the most protective measures. Mr. Chairman, the
animal feed investigation has been a massive effort that will
continue until we are completely satisfied that the underlying
cause has been determined, the scope is identified and full and
complete corrective action has been implemented and found to be
effective.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important
food safety issues with you. I will be glad to answer questions
that you may have.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I would like to
welcome Dr. Petersen. Welcome to the Committee.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH E. PETERSEN, FOOD SAFETY INSPECTION
SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Dr. Petersen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Goodlatte and other members of the committee. I am the
Assistant Administrator for Field Operations for the Food
Safety and Inspection Service of the United States Department
of Agriculture. We do appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss this ongoing investigation of
animal feed supplemented with pet food scraps containing
melamine and melamine related compounds. I also am pleased to
be here today with my colleague, Dr. David Acheson, from the
Food and Drug Administration.
Before I get to the details, let me begin by emphasizing
that FSIS takes very seriously its responsibilities to ensure
the safety of meat, poultry and processed eggs products. We do
not believe the current incident poses a threat to human health
and we are not aware of any human illnesses that ever have been
linked to melamine or melamine related compounds. Our mission
at FSIS is to ensure that meat, poultry and processed egg
products distributed in commerce for use as human food are
safe, secure, wholesome and accurately labeled.
FSIS is charged with administering and enforcing the
Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection
Act, the Egg Products Inspection Act, portions of the
Agricultural Marketing Act and regulations that implement these
laws. FSIS also ensures compliance with the Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, which requires that all livestock be handled and
slaughtered in a humane manner. The agency is responsible for
determining equivalence to Federal standards at the State level
and among our foreign trading partners.
Essentially, our agency is charged with ensuring the safety
of the meat, poultry and processed egg products supply once
animals leave the farms for the slaughter and processing
establishments. We inspect each animal at slaughter before
applying the mark of inspection. We also inspect all processing
establishments on a daily basis to ensure sanitary and other
regulatory requirements are met. Our inspection personnel form
the backbone of FSIS public health infrastructure in
laboratories, plants and import houses throughout the country.
In Fiscal Year 2006, the agency had approximately 7,600
full-time personnel protecting the public health in 6,000
federally inspected establishments nationwide where FSIS
inspection personnel performed antemortem and postmortem
inspection and processing inspection procedures to ensure
public health requirements were met. This included the
processing of over 46 billion pounds of livestock carcasses,
almost 57 billion pounds of poultry carcasses and about 4.4
billion pounds of liquid egg products.
It has been estimated that approximately 60 cents of every
food dollar in the United States is spent on products that FSIS
inspects. In addition, during Fiscal Year 2006, approximately
3.9 billion pounds of meat and poultry and about 5.9 billion
pounds of egg products were presented for import inspection at
U.S. ports and borders. FSIS also has program inspectors
nationwide who conduct food safety, food defense and outbreak
investigators and enforcement.
FSIS has been working cooperatively with FDA on the
investigation into the swine and poultry feed incident
involving melamine and melamine related compounds. We were
first alerted, at the field level, on April 17 and at the
headquarters level on April 19 to the possibility that
contaminated pet food scraps may have been used in animal feed
by producers of food animals. Since that initial contact, FSIS
has been assisting FDA with the investigation, including on-
site visits to farms and daily communication with State and
local officials.
By April 26, investigative results confirmed that a
relatively limited number of hogs had consumed contaminated
feed. At that time, FSIS joined FDA in alerting the public that
this feed had been fed to some hogs and assured the public that
those hogs would not be allowed to enter the food supply until
we could conduct the necessary scientific work to make an
appropriate safety determination. Due to the limited
information available, USDA could not determine whether it was
appropriate to place the mark of inspection on foods derived
from those animals and so we did not do so at that time.
FSIS worked with States and producers to quarantine or hold
animals until further notice. We also announced that if
identified animals needed to be depopulated, producers would be
appropriately compensated for any costs. On April 30, USDA and
FDA announced that the agencies had learned the pet food scraps
from pet food manufactured with the wheat flour contaminated
with melamine and melamine compounds had been sold to a limited
number of farms for use as supplements in chicken feed. As with
the pork products, we believe that humans were highly unlikely
to become ill from consuming products from poultry that had
consumed this feed.
Likewise, as in the case of swine, we initiated appropriate
controls in coordination with our Federal and State partners at
the farm level. As with the hogs, affected chickens on the
affected farms were voluntarily held while we further assessed
the situation. This past Monday, May 7, FSIS determined that
the mark of inspection could now be placed on meat and poultry
products when the animals were from farms where the feed that
was fed to those animals tested negative for melamine and the
melamine compounds. This determination was made after a risk
assessment was conducted by scientists from FSIS, FDA, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, EPA and the
Department of Homeland Security.
The risk assessment found that consuming meat from hogs and
chickens known to have been fed the animal feed supplemented
contaminated pet food scraps, represented a very low risk to
human health. In the most extreme risk assessment scenario, the
scientists assumed the unlikely event that all the solid food a
person consumed in an entire day was contaminated with
melamine. Even given that extreme assumption, the potential
exposure was about 2500 times lower than the dose considered
safe, well below any level of public health concern.
As I have already mentioned, FDA and USDA have confirmed
that scraps of contaminated pet food that contained only low
levels of melamine were distributed to farms in a limited
number of States and added to the swine and poultry feed. These
scraps constituted a small percentage of the farm animal
rations. In addition, melamine is known to be rapidly excreted
in the urine of the animal. When exposure levels are much
higher, as was the case with cats and dogs, the melamine and
its compounds appeared to cause the formation of crystals
resulting in kidney damage. There is no such indication of
kidney damage in hogs.
Both hogs and chickens known to have consumed the
contaminated feed appear to be healthy. The assessment that the
risk to human health is very low is based on several factors,
including the dilution of contaminated feed from the original
concentrate as it moved through the food system. First, it was
a small component of the pet food. Second, that pet food was a
small component of any of the feed given to hogs and poultry.
Third, it is not known to accumulate in the body of animals and
even if it was present in pork or chicken. Fourth, pork and
poultry make a relatively small portion of a balanced American
diet.
Neither FDA nor FSIS has uncovered any evidence of harm to
swine or poultry that were fed the contaminated feed. This
dilution factor was an important piece of data considered in
the multi-agency science-based risk assessment and helped
support the conclusion of a very low risk to human health from
eating the animals.
As the investigation proceeded, we now know that in several
cases, on-farm feed samples tested negative for melamine and
melamine related compounds. Those tests were conducted in
Federal and State laboratories.
USDA has concluded, based on the human health risk
assessment and the inability to detect melamine in the feed
sample, that those animals, where there is a negative feed
test, no longer need to be quarantined or withheld from
processing. In other cases, feed samples have tested positive
or we simply do not have a feed sample available. Those animals
continue to be withheld from processing but are not yet being
culled, pending the results of an animal exposure risk
assessment. That new information is expected shortly, likely
this week.
USDA and FDA continue to work together in conducting a full
and comprehensive investigation. As additional information is
confirmed, updates will be provided and decisions will be made
using the best available science with the singular goal of
protecting the public health. We will also make the risk
assessment available for public comment. The scientists that
worked on the risk assessment are compiling scientific
assessment of the risks to animals associated with the
ingestion of this potentially contaminated feed.
We do recognize how important it is to communicate with all
of our stakeholders, our partners and the general public in an
open and transparent manner. Throughout the ongoing
investigation with FDA, we have been sharing information with
State Departments of Agriculture and State veterinarians. We
continue to keep trading partners informed through the Foreign
Agriculture Service. We have been updating our stakeholders
from industry and consumer organizations. We have been working
with FDA to keep the general public informed. We will continue
to reach out to our stakeholders, our partners and the general
public to keep them informed as the investigation continues. We
will continue to keep Congress informed of our ongoing
investigation, as well.
Thank you for providing us the opportunity to make these
comments and we look forward to any questions you may have.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and thank both of the
witnesses for their testimony. Now we will have a round of
questions that I will start off. I think you folks have done a
pretty good job since you discovered the situation, but if
these pets not been affected, you wouldn't have even known
about this contamination. We also saw this with the spinach
situation, where until people got sick, we didn't know about
it. So Mr. Acheson, you have been put in a new position, is
that correct?
Dr. Acheson. That is correct, yes.
The Chairman. So what are you, Assistant----
Dr. Acheson. Assistant Commissioner of Food Protection at
FDA.
The Chairman. Okay. And in your testimony, I don't believe
you asked for any more inspectors or resources, am I right?
Dr. Acheson. With regard to resources, part of my mission
is to develop a strategic plan around food safety and food
defense and a piece of that is going to be looking at what
further resources we will need to get the job done.
The Chairman. Well, I would hope so, because I hope the
response is not to create another level of bureaucracy, which
is what we seem to do in government a lot of the time, instead
of focusing on putting more people on the ground. So that leads
me to my main question for Mr. Acheson. The imports that you
folks regulate have gone up 213 percent from 1996 through 2005.
We used to inspect 1.7 percent of those shipments, in 2005, it
was 1.27 percent and now it is down to 1 percent.
There has been some increase in field employees, a 41
percent increase, but we can't even find out how many of them
are involved in inspecting imported food. In 1995, we know
there were 595 people and we can't find out how many there are
now. But even if you took all of the new employees and put them
into inspecting imported food, you still wouldn't even come
close to keeping up with the increase in imports that has
happened here.
We have a similar situation in FSIS, although it is not
quite as pronounced and, at least in the case of FSIS, I think
they have changed the way they operate in terms of using
methods that may require fewer employees. How do you respond to
that lack of additional resources and people to deal with this
big increase in imports that we have seen?
Dr. Acheson. I think you asked a lot of questions in there
and let me try to sort of phrase it around part of it, which is
directed as 1 percent of imports are being inspected and is
that enough? What the agency has done is to use a risk-based
approach to focus inspections based on where the risk lies. We
would never have the resources to be able to inspect and test
100 percent of imported food.
So it is clearly important that we use a risk-based
strategy and that is what we have done. Over the years, we have
moved away from testing foods that are considered to be lower
risk and focused on areas that are higher risk. Food defense is
a classic example of that, where through the Prior Notice
Center, we have set up a system which is specifically designed
to identify and target foods that are considered to be of
higher risk.
As I develop this strategic plan with my colleagues at FDA,
one of the things that we need to do, quite clearly, apart from
building the scientific infrastructure for the agency, is to
develop a sound, risk-based strategy that is going to focus
both on imports and domestic foods to ensure their safety and
security.
The Chairman. So how would you do that in China? I mean,
are you going to go over there and inspect plants like we do
with USDA, is that what you are considering?
Dr. Acheson. Well, again, it is not resource feasible, with
the best will in the world, to get an FDA inspector in every
manufacturing facility in every part of the world. We have
approximately 150,000 manufacturers registered as part of our
registration database throughout the world. That is aside from
the domestic, that is just foreign. So what we clearly need to
do is to strategize on how to ensure that what the industry is
doing and what the countries are doing is maintaining a level
of food safety and security standard that is acceptable to the
United States.
The Chairman. Just one last thing. I had a gentleman in my
office who claims that he has got some kind of system where
they can test the molecules and this would have identified the
spinach problem. Are you familiar with this technology where
they claim that they can actually find this stuff immediately?
Do you know anything about that?
Dr. Acheson. You are referring to melamine or are you
referring to----
The Chairman. This is any kind of substance. This gentleman
claimed that this would be a big help to us in trying to
identify these problems and apparently he must be having some
problem getting people to look at it but----Are you aware of
anything available in the technology area that would help us
with this?
Dr. Acheson. One of the reasons that we need and try to
maintain a sound scientific research infrastructure is to get
at exactly that. Our scientists and researchers need to stay
ahead of the curve on the modern technology. They need to
understand what is up and coming through attending scientific
meetings, interacting with scientists around the world. We are
very open to new detection methodologies and in principle, you
are exactly right, if we could develop a detection method that
was rapid, sensitive, specific and could be operated at a
simple level by an inspector in a field situation, that is
heading towards the perfect type of methodology. But it has got
to be validated. It has got to be shown to work, so that is all
part of building and ensuring that this scientific
infrastructure--because what you are talking about there is the
basic science components which are the underpinnings for sound
detection and then response.
The Chairman. Well, thank you and we will be very much
interested in monitoring and being informed about your progress
and hopefully, we will get something going here sooner rather
than later, so thank you very much.
Dr. Acheson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Dr. Petersen, the USDA has made the decision
not to recall the meat and poultry products from hogs and
chickens that have been fed this questionable feed, but that
has already entered commerce and I have listened to your
statement regarding your analysis of that and your conclusion
that it is safe. What level of assurance would you give the
American consumer that these products are safe?
Dr. Petersen. Thank you for the question. First of all, we
made that decision after carefully considering the facts and we
do consider the food supply to be safe. The facts we looked at,
and I think it is important to understand them, are that on the
first day, when we made the announcement that we were aware
that some of the contaminated feed had gone to several swine
producers, that is about all we knew, that there was some
exposure to swine and so we took a very cautious approach on
that day, which was April 26. With that limited set of facts
and we took the cautious approach of not applying the mark of
inspection to any of those animals, should they have come to
slaughter.
On that day, we were not certain that any of the animals
had already gone into commerce. It was over the course of the
next two days, over the course of that weekend, April 28, where
we did become aware that there were swine that had gone to the
marketplace. And during that intervening two days, we did get
some additional facts and they were facts such as the melamine
is a very small component of the pet food and the pet food is a
very small----
Mr. Goodlatte. I don't want you to--I heard your testimony
and I understand the analysis. What is your level of confidence
that the decision not to recall the products assures the public
of the safety of the products?
Dr. Petersen. Well, we are quite confident now----
Mr. Goodlatte. Is it a high level of assurance or is it a
low level of assurance? Is it, I think it is safe? What is your
level of assurance?
Dr. Petersen. It is a high level of assurance, particularly
in light of the human risk assessment that was completed the
other day.
Mr. Goodlatte. Great, great. Thank you. Now, my next
question relates to what I think is the wider public concern
which is, if this got into our food system from China, then the
Chinese are not doing a very good job with their own food
safety. And so I want to know what message the administration
is sending to the Chinese government that exporting
contaminated products of any kind to the United States will not
be tolerated?
Dr. Petersen. Well, I will start and no doubt my colleague
from FDA may want to mention their approach. Our message would
be we are taking this extremely seriously and as we uncover the
facts, the facts will lead where they lead. But the mere fact
that this occurred and we are in this position of responding,
shows we take this quite seriously and we are dealing with it
through our equivalency system, which is a very rigorous
approach before any country gets even approved to have the
possibility of exporting any products to the U.S. China does
not export meat or poultry products to the U.S. at this time.
So that is our message as far as the approach with engagement
on China on this particular issue. I would defer to my
colleague.
Mr. Goodlatte. Yes, let me ask Dr. Acheson about that. You
have put a halt to all vegetable proteins being imported from
China, is that correct? What are the terms and conditions of
that halt? Is it contingent upon their making certain changes
or is that subject to future negotiation? What is the status of
that?
Dr. Acheson. Thanks for the question. The status is that,
as you point out, all vegetable-based protein concentrates
imported from China are not allowed to enter the United States
until we, at FDA, have evidence that it is safe to proceed.
That evidence can be varied. It can be validated testing
undertaken by the industry. It can be a number of factors. That
will continue and we will continue to do that until we have
assurance from a particular importer working with the Chinese
authorities, AQSIQ, to ensure that the products that are being
imported into the United States are, indeed, safe.
Mr. Goodlatte. But at this stage in the investigation, do
you have confidence that the Chinese government's food safety
system is sufficient to assure U.S. consumers that Chinese
products are safe for export?
Dr. Acheson. At this point, that is part of what we are
trying to seek. We are working very closely with AQSIQ on this.
With regard specifically to the melamine, the Chinese
authorities have made changes since this has occurred, with
regard to making sure that all imports or exports from China to
the United States and other parts of the world, I believe, go
through AQSIQ to ensure that safety. Our team is over in China
right now, working very closely with AQSIQ. The job is not
done. We need to continue to work with AQSIQ and the Chinese
authorities to further ensure the safety of imported food from
China.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. The chairman has given me leave
to ask you another question to follow up on that. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture established equivalency agreements
with nations that export meat and poultry products to the
United States to ensure that the exporting country is meeting
our food safety standards. Does the FDA have the capability of
using a similar approach?
Dr. Acheson. In theory, yes. FDA does have the capability
of using equivalence, in theory. But I would like to point out
that for FDA, the situation is significantly more complex than
for USDA. We are having to deal with multiple products. It is
not just meat, poultry and egg products. There is a huge
spectrum of products that are under the control of a vast array
of agencies, very often in different countries. I think, as we
go down this road, an equivalence-type thinking or an
equivalence-type approach is one aspect of what could be in the
toolbox that we can use to ensure that imported goods, not just
from China but from all parts of the world, are safe and
secure.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. I recognize the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Holden.
Mr. Holden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Acheson, I realize
you have limited resources, but I have a few questions about
dairy imports and particularly on India. I understand that the
imports from India are averaging about $47 million over the
last 3 years and their level of pesticide approval is much
higher than that of the U.S. I am just wondering what specific
steps are you taking to monitor imports from India? It has come
to my attention that the domestic dairy industry brought this
to FDA's attention, but there has not even been any sampling
that has been done so far.
Dr. Acheson. There is an ongoing pesticide testing program
in FDA. It is part of the total diet study and part of a
separate assignment that we have, looking for pesticides.
Frequently, when we find them, we issue import alerts and we
have a number in place right now related to pesticides. I don't
have specific facts on numbers of tests of pesticides related
to imports of dairy products from India at my fingertips today.
I would be happy to get those for the record.
Mr. Holden. If you get them, Doctor, I would appreciate it.
Dr. Acheson. Sure. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Holden. Okay. And second, Doctor, I understand that the
FDA is trying to accelerate Grade A importation of dairy
products through third party verification, is that true?
Dr. Acheson. With regard to dairy products, I know that FDA
is working closely with a number of other countries to try to
ensure that there is importation of safe and secure dairy
products into the United States. Again, if you want specifics
on the current status of that discussion, I would be happy to
provide that for the record.
Mr. Holden. I would appreciate that, Doctor, and again, I
realize that you have limited resources and you are looking for
ways to crunch the dollars, but I would be concerned about the
integrity of third party inspections and so if you could get
that information to me, I would appreciate it.
Dr. Acheson. Thank you. I understand.
Mr. Holden. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Neugebauer.
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the
chairman in that we don't need to create any new bureaucracy
here. We need to make sure that we have food safety in our
country. I think one of the things I want to follow up on is
that other countries have been very punitive on the U.S. when
there has been a question about the quality and the health
safety of our products. For example, Japan with American beef.
Are we taking a hard line with China for example, right now to
make sure that they understand that if we can't satisfy
ourselves that we are getting safe food products from them,
then that could have some long-term ramifications?
Dr. Acheson. Is that question directed to me?
Mr. Neugebauer. Both of you.
Dr. Acheson. Okay. Well, let me start out. First of all, I
want to say that our focus is not solely on China with regard
to imported foods. We cannot ignore the rest of the world. But
right now, that is the current focus, on China. But whatever
strategies we put in place have to be applicable globally and,
as I said in my statement, we have got an increasingly global
food supply and I suspect it is only going to get more global
and diverse as time continues.
We do already have systems in place so that when
situations, or problems, are identified, we can put import
alerts out there which essentially stop something from coming
into the country. That can be done in a very focused way and
the melamine situation is an example of that. We started that,
as an import alert, on the two companies from China that we
knew for sure were problematic. As we learned more about this
situation as it unfolded, we expanded that to include all
vegetable protein concentrates. In theory, I believe, we could
keep expanding it based on what we find, so we can, basically,
put things in place that will stop the problem.
But I think the key question is how do you get one step
further back? How do you deal with the preventative strategies
in the country itself? Because the overall approach needs to be
prevention Number 1, which needs to involve all stakeholders.
It needs to involve industry participation, understanding
suppliers. Where do you get your material from? What do you
know about your supplier? And that is something we have worked
with the industry on very closely with regard to food defense,
raising awareness about your supplier through our alert
program.
Then the other piece is how do you apply that, locally,
into a country going globally? And that is part of the strategy
that has to be figured out. And clearly, we need to make some
changes.
Mr. Neugebauer. I appreciate that. Mr. Petersen, as you
know, we were put through a fairly rigorous process by the
Japanese on our monitoring process so that they could rely it
when we said U.S. beef was safe and that we have safety
measures in place. I agree with you. It is the preventative
side. We don't need to wait until animals start dying or God
forbid, people start dying or having health issues to determine
how we need to monitor that. So what are we doing, then, on a
proactive basis, of putting a lot of pressure on these various
countries of saying that they are going to have to demonstrate
to us that they have a process in place that we can rely on to
ensure the product is safe when they allow that product out of
their country and it is coming into our country?
Dr. Acheson. Well, again, to take the micro example of
melamine, we have that in place through the import alert. We
will not allow importation or take people off that import alert
until we have assurances from the country that product is safe.
And again, it is broader than that. I think, possibly, one way
to take that question is, which will be part of my analysis,
strategically as we move forward, is do we need new
authorities? Do we need to tweak current authorities to make
sure that we meet that goal of prevention and ensuring
prevention and pushing it back onto the countries who want to
import food into the United States and the industries that want
to do that. Because there is no way in the world we would ever
get an FDA inspector in every manufacturing facility throughout
the world. We just couldn't do it. And I don't think we should.
Mr. Neugebauer. Does that also include some kind of
verification of types of chemicals that are being used on
agricultural products in those countries? Because one of the
things I hear from fruit and vegetable people is that some of
the vegetables and fruit that may be coming into our country,
in fact, have chemicals being used in those countries that are
prohibited in the U.S.?
Dr. Acheson. It happens and that is why we have monitoring
systems in place, to try to pick that up. The worse case is
when you get human illness. That is the point at which you have
got to respond, or animal illness. And then you backtrack and
you figure out okay, we have got a problem. Our goal is to
never get to that point and as I said, push it back on
prevention; make sure that there is something in place that
would prevent a product coming in which has been exposed to a
pesticide which we don't consider safe. Then on top of that,
there has got to be an intervention, inspectional testing,
detection level to basically trust and verify in terms of the
prevention. But there has got to be enough teeth in this to
make sure that the rest of the world will pay attention to our
standards.
Mr. Neugebauer. After you have had a chance to analyze
that, do you anticipate bringing something to this committee?
If you need additional authority, do you think that is going to
be necessary that legislatively? Do we need to look at some
ways to give your agency broader powers to be able to interact
in that way?
Dr. Acheson. I would be happy to come back and report to
you once we have made that assessment. Part of where we are
trying to go strategically is to look at exactly those
questions. And I want to phrase that in two ways; one is
tweaking current authorities and the other is seeking new
authorities. Frankly, we are not there yet, in terms of what
that would look like, but I would be happy to report back to
this committee once we have reached that point.
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing. I think it is important. Gentlemen, let
me quickly go to some questions. My first is for both of you.
Frankly, this entire incident is troubling. I think this will
remind people of the importance of our nation not being totally
reliant on foreign sources of food. We have said many times
that our food supply here in the United States is the safest
and most abundant in the world and I hope this incident will
sound something of a clear call for more diligent food
inspection, as well as better lines of communication when an
incident occurs.
I believe the lag time between when these animals first
started dying and the official disclosure of tainted feed going
to the farm, was entirely too long. My understanding is that we
first knew about it in February. It took a month for anyone to
acknowledge it. So my question is this, wheat gluten and some
of the other products that have been put on hold and the test
lists such as ryes and corn gluten go into far more products
than pet food. Can either of you tell me within a degree of
certainty that this product has not entered into the human food
supply chain?
Dr. Acheson. Let me first respond to that.
Mr. Etheridge. Yes or no?
Dr. Acheson. Yes, I can give you assurance that the wheat
gluten and the rice protein concentrate that we now know was
wheat flour that was used to make the contaminated pet food,
has not, to date, to our awareness, entered the food supply
chain. I want to also emphasize, though, that this is an
ongoing investigation and I cannot predict where it is going to
go. That is part of what we need to do, is to continue to trace
out the tentacles. And I also want to point out, in that
context, that we----
Mr. Etheridge. I have a very limited amount of time and you
have answered that one, so I don't want to take all my time
filibustering.
Dr. Petersen. FDA, would of course, have the lead on how
the contamination is moving on the wheat protein side of the
spectrum. Everything we have seen as far as their investigation
supports the statement that was just made. There is no direct
information that we have seen that supports that it went into
the human chain directly.
Mr. Etheridge. All right. Thank you. USDA and FDA have both
issued press releases that state that the risk to human health
is very low. What does very low mean? And the reason I ask this
question, I have a grandson who is two and a half years old and
weighs about 27 pounds. How does that compare, that child, to
say, a grown adult weighing 200 pounds? How does that compare?
When you say very low, I think the American people want to know
what does very low really mean?
Dr. Acheson. Based on the risk assessment, one of the
things that we look for is what is the margin of safety, as it
is called, between the level that we see in the food and the
level which we might expect anybody, infant or whatever, on a
per kilogram basis, of body weight, to have a problem. And that
risk assessment, worse case indicated that there was about a
2500-fold margin of safety between the level that we were
seeing in the meat and the likelihood of an illness.
Mr. Etheridge. Do you agree?
Dr. Petersen. Yes, we worked jointly on the risk assessment
and that was using the most extreme assumptions that could
theoretically happen, but are not expected to happen in the
real world. A 2500-fold margin of safety is rather large.
Mr. Etheridge. See, the reason I ask this, it is troubling
because if you go back to the question the Chairman asked
earlier, at the percentage of increase of feedstock coming into
this country since 1996, with the reduction in the amount of
inspections in that period of time, this is the first time it
has shown up and it didn't show up until we had a death that we
recognized in animals. I think I am understanding you now.
We really don't know what else is out there and yet, we
have increased the amount of imports substantially with a
reduction in the amount of inspections. So my next question is
this, is it true that Menu Foods, the first company to notify
USDA that there was a problem, first discovered the problem at
the end of February? And why was the first hold on these
imported products put in place, it took a month to take the
action to put it in place, to put a hold on the imports?
Dr. Acheson. The hold on the import was, as I said earlier,
expanded from the companies that we first identified and once
we had identified who the company was, what the problem was,
the hold was put in place and that has expanded now. Part of
what you are getting at is the need for, in terms of response,
is what do we need within the system to be able to get a handle
on an illness, whether it be human or animal, earlier? And that
is public health infrastructure, to get to where we can take
action faster.
Mr. Etheridge. I hope you will share back with us that
need. My final question, with the Chairman's indulgence, I have
a stack of material I have been reading and obviously, a lot of
it is from newspapers, the Washington Post, the New York Times,
with the latest one out this morning about the number of the
pigs that are dying in southeast China by the thousands,
outside Hong Kong. And they started dying the first of the
year. Have you had any input on that, any response with USDA or
FDA? Because the question is that it is about the same time the
tainted food started showing up.
Dr. Petersen. We don't have any direct information on that,
but another agency within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, remains vigilant on any animal diseases
that could come into this country and so even if we were to
receive product from that part of the world, which I am not
aware that we do, their animal protection measures would
immediately come into play with their is animal disease
surveillance networks.
Mr. Etheridge. The reason I follow that up is because it is
from the region of China where SARS was, which refused to issue
information then. Now we have got the same problem and I would
hope you would follow that up and I would appreciate a response
back to the committee on that.
Dr. Petersen. For equivalency with meat and poultry, if we
have a country that is equivalent, if an issue arises where
there is some animal disease that occurs, we can suspend any
exports until that issue is mitigated and we have done so in
the past.
Mr. Etheridge. Are you telling me we have no equivalency
with China?
Dr. Petersen. On China for equivalency on the meat and
poultry side, it is strictly related to cooked product and they
are not bringing any into this country at this time. It must be
cooked, because that was the determination made by the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, that it needed to be
cooked before it came in, so they are eligible, but nothing is
coming in.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay. I would like to follow it up later,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Boustany.
Mr. Boustany. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your thoughtful testimony. First question, given
that the investigation is still ongoing, are the Chinese
cooperating?
Dr. Acheson. Very much so, yes.
Mr. Boustany. So you are satisfied with the level of
cooperation?
Dr. Acheson. Yes, AQSIQ has been very helpful. As you are
probably aware, when our investigators first went over there,
there was a holiday in China. They basically came in from their
vacations to support us and assist us in the investigation.
Mr. Boustany. Thank you. Dr. Acheson. I appreciate your
strategic approach to this, because obviously, it would be very
impracticable and costly to provide inspectors across the board
for 100 percent inspection, so the strategic approach that you
outlined was good. I am curious to know whether or not there is
a very vigorous, broad interagency process involved in this
strategic planning. In other words, beyond the two agencies
represented here today, is the State Department, our
intelligence community involved in this? Department of Defense,
perhaps? Commerce, Treasury, involved in looking at formulating
a very strong and vigorous strategic approach to this problem?
There are many, many ramifications, obviously, but if you could
give me a straightforward answer on that, I would appreciate
it.
Dr. Acheson. At this stage, no. It is early days, but
clearly, this goes beyond just FDA and it involves many of the
agencies that you have just outlined and there is going to be a
need to interact with them, share the information with them,
share the approach with them, get their support and get their
help to put it in place.
Mr. Boustany. I would submit that if you need a push from
Congress, I would certainly be willing to work with you on that
issue. I think, clearly, it is going to require a vigorous and
broad interagency approach to deal with this problem, because
you outlined the challenges very succinctly with globalization,
terrorism, the rapidity of change in production and so forth,
and to deal with those kinds of challenges, I think clearly a
broad approach is going to be necessary. One final question,
what has been the budgetary impact of this particular
investigation? And could both of you comment on ongoing
budgetary needs as we look forward to dealing with these kinds
of problems and particularly, with regard to enhancing your
research capabilities?
Dr. Acheson. Well, as I have said, there is a need to
ensure the infrastructure is there. There needs to be a strong
science base behind the decisions. We use science on a daily
basis. The risk assessment is a classic example of that, which
to get to your earlier question, involved multiple agencies. We
brought all of those folk in there and in fact, every day we
have a call at 9:30 that involves many of the players that you
asked me about.
In terms of resources, though, specifically, we have got to
determine what we need to get that job done in terms of the
infrastructure. It is not just research and science, it needs
information technology infrastructure, as well. A lot of what
we have got to do is data handling, data analysis, vast amounts
of information. If we are going to make this work, we have got
to use modern IT to drive it, as opposed to old-fashioned piles
of paper and pencils.
Mr. Boustany. And I trust you will come back to us with a
more detailed assessment of what those needs will be as time
goes forward. But what has been the budgetary impact to your
respective agencies with regard to this particular
investigation? Could you comment on that? Could either of you
comment?
Dr. Petersen. For FSIS, we are appropriated to do a certain
number of investigations of some nature because we know various
investigatory needs are going to come up during the year.
Approximately to date, and we have been involved for the last
several weeks now, about a thousand man hours have been
employed with the associated travel costs, so that is well
within our system and so at this point, we are able to deal
with the situation.
Mr. Boustany. Thank you. I see that my time is about up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Iowa,
Mr. Boswell.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to kind
of pick up on what Mr. Holden was talking about on the dairy
situation, Dr. Acheson. I appreciate what you have said, so I
will try not to repeat that, but do I understand that you are
trying to accelerate the dairy products from several countries
by giving testing and verification to third parties? Is that
correct?
Dr. Acheson. I am not intimately familiar with the current
status of those interactions with regard to dairy products. I
didn't come to this hearing prepared to address that in depth.
Mr. Boswell. I understand, but it does kind of fit into
what we are discussing here, so would you give us that
information?
Dr. Acheson. I would be happy to and I apologize that I
don't have it today.
Mr. Boswell. No, that is okay. We would like to know. And I
am not sure, if I could, how do you plan to ensure a third
party in a country with corruption problems can meet all the
guidelines? And I say that because, to use the example that Mr.
Holden did, the Indian standards for levels of pesticide are
higher than the U.S. and I would like, as you report back to
us, if you would, that you give us an indication of what kind
of a sampling you have done over the last six months, to give
us a feel for just what is actually going on there,
understanding that you didn't come prepared for that today, but
would you give that information to us?
Dr. Acheson. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Boswell. Okay. Well, I think that would add on to what
Mr. Holden has already requested, say I appreciate it, and I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Let us see here. The
gentlelady from Colorado.
Ms. Musgrave. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for not being here
earlier and I will pass on the questions. Thank you.
The Chairman. Okay. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman
from Georgia, Mr. Scott. You are on the list.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that what this
hearing points out, and this issue with China points out, is
that our food safety protection operation is dangerously
inadequate. I think there should be a greater sense of urgency
than what I am hearing from you gentlemen today. There was a
motion picture that came out a while back and it was called,
Outbreak. I think that was the name of it. Dustin Hoffman was
in this movie. And it had to do with this monkey who came into
this country and caused an outbreak.
My concern is two-fold. Here we have got China, that you
seem to think has it under control now. But this isn't the
first time. China is notorious for contaminated food products.
We have had all kinds of history, news reports, on its honey,
for example; on its catfish, for example. So it is repeat after
repeat. My fundamental question to you, first of all, is can
China be trusted to deal with this problem or in fact, do you
and FDA need new authority to deal with it?
Dr. Acheson. First of all, to answer your specific
question, I think we have to approach this in the context of
trust and verifying. We have got to set up systems where we
have to push back on manufacturers, importers, wherever they
be, to put sound, safe systems in place to ensure the safety,
yet we have to verify and inspect to make sure that they meet
that standard. With regard to your comment of urgency, I can
assure you, there is a great deal of urgency about this. One of
the reasons that my position was created, just a week ago, was
a reflection in FDA of that urgency and the need to take a new,
strategic approach to determine what needs to be done to
further protect the American food supply.
Mr. Scott. Here is what concerned me, and why I say I don't
think you are urgent enough. In your reference to a question
from one of my previous colleagues who asked you has this
outbreak from the pet food gotten into our food supplies,
threatening our food supply. You said no, when in fact,
according to reports, the contaminant has made it into our
human food supply when scraps from pet food production were fed
to hogs and chickens in the United States. Now, Mr. Acheson,
those hogs and chickens are going to make it onto somebody's
table and whether or not we know exactly where those hogs are
and which those hogs are.
Dr. Acheson. Let me clarify that statement so that you
understand where I was coming from with that. My answer to that
statement and perhaps it was my misunderstanding of the
question, was whether the wheat gluten and rice protein
concentrate had been used directly as an ingredient in a human
food and to date, we have found no hard evidence to support
that. You are absolutely correct, and we have said in many
press releases, that it has gone, via the pet food, into the
animal feed, there is no question about that.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Do you feel our food supply is safe?
Dr. Acheson. I feel that our food supply is one of the
safest in the world. My mission is to make it safer and more
secure.
Mr. Scott. Right now we are getting about 14 percent of our
food that we consume in this country from other countries and I
think you alluded to the fact that percentage is going to
increase in the future. Do you see a threat there? Do you see a
need for us to do one of two things, either begin to put up
other safety and soundness measures to protect us or do you see
a greater need for us to become more independent and less
dependent on foreign sources for our food and begin to put more
things in place to produce more of our own foodstuff in this
country? For example, what I am saying, about 90 percent of the
tomatoes, for example, are brought in to this country. That is
a huge percentage.
Dr. Acheson. Part of the complexities of this is the
consumer demand for all kinds of food 24/7, 365 days a year,
which puts a lot of pressure on American agriculture to provide
that and that is a big part of what is driving the importation
of food. It is consumer demand for readily available, lots of
types, inexpensive, year round. That is a fact and short of
changing consumer behavior, that isn't going to change. So we
have got to accept that as the fact. Now, clearly your point as
to whether we could grow more domestically, that is a separate
issue and I am certainly not opposed to that in any way, shape
or form. We have to accept the fact that we have got this
global food supply and what are we going to do to protect the
American consumer from not just imported foods, but clearly,
within the last few months, we have had concerns with
domestically grown fresh produce, as well as peanut butter,
amongst other things. So this approach shouldn't just focus on
imports, it needs to encompass both.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much for your answers. I
appreciate it very much. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from North
Dakota, Mr. Pomeroy.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it,
then, when the pets started dying, the investigation was
triggered and the two agencies working together and as you
indicated in your testimony, did some very good work to retrace
back the problems causing the illnesses in the pets consuming
this tainted pet food. But it was the illnesses and the deaths
of these animals that caused the investigation to begin, is
that correct?
Dr. Acheson. That is correct.
Mr. Pomeroy. Now, obviously we are talking about matters
related to the Nation's food supply; that is a little late. We
want something a little more proactive than when the pets start
dying. So let us talk about that one. I saw some film footage
on television, it was a big old factory where they were putting
melamine in as a substitute for wheat gluten because it was
cheaper, has no nutritional value and indeed, has very adverse
health consequences to these animals. Were you surprised at the
commercial scale by which this product was being put into this
commercial pet food as basically a cost savings technique, yet
resulting in tainted food?
Dr. Acheson. Well, clearly FDA was not aware that this was
going on, otherwise we would have been more preventive and
proactive.
Mr. Pomeroy. Do you have a capacity, people on the ground
over there running around looking at these places where the
food is manufactured?
Dr. Acheson. Well, as I said, we currently do not have the
resources and the manpower to get an FDA inspector----
Mr. Pomeroy. How about the U.S. Department of Agriculture?
Dr. Petersen. The pet food issue is not directly under our
jurisdiction, so it is when those animals come to slaughter
that FSIS becomes directly involved.
Mr. Pomeroy. Now, that is a good point because probably
this technique of adulterating food supply fed to animals, also
available to domestic livestock and such in China. Do we have
food imported from China?
Dr. Petersen. We have food imported, but at this point,
there is no meat or poultry that is imported, although China is
eligible to export cooked poultry, provided the poultry comes
from a country eligible to export raw poultry to the U.S.
Mr. Pomeroy. How about fish?
Dr. Acheson. FDA regulates fish and the answer is yes.
Mr. Pomeroy. I understand, a couple of States, Alabama and
Mississippi, have actually taken steps to stop the import of
Chinese catfish in light of concerns that these fish may have
been fed tainted food supply over in China.
Dr. Acheson. That is correct. We have had concerns about
catfish particularly being contaminated with antibiotics and
other fish products contaminated with a fungicide, malachite
green. We at FDA have been working with those states to
implement a testing program.
Mr. Pomeroy. Are there Chinese catfish coming into other
states?
Dr. Acheson. Yes, I am sure there are.
Mr. Pomeroy. Well, who is right in that one? Are Alabama
and Mississippi right or are the other states lax? Should there
be a national response?
Dr. Acheson. What we have done is put an import alert out
for eel in relation to malachite green.
Mr. Pomeroy. If there is an evolving state of play relative
to regulations and some states have one thing, some states have
done nothing; FDA is looking at it, thinking about it. Do you
think it would be helpful to have a label so at least consumers
would know what is U.S. catfish, what is China catfish?
Dr. Acheson. I would ask my colleague, Steve Solomon, to
answer your question.
Mr. Pomeroy. Why can't you answer it?
Dr. Acheson. That is why I brought some other experts from
our Office of Regulatory Affairs along, because I think your
question is what is the current regulation.
Mr. Pomeroy. My question is what do you think about
consumers having notice of where their food comes from? What do
you think about that?
Dr. Acheson. Personally, I think the more information the
consumer has to make informed choices, the better.
Mr. Pomeroy. I think so, too. What does U.S. Department of
Agriculture think about that?
Dr. Petersen. Well, of course, we regulate the labeling of
meat and poultry and eggs products and our view is that the
current labeling system is sufficient to inform the consumer.
Mr. Pomeroy. Now, does the current labeling system, sir,
allow a person to find out what country their food comes from,
where the steak comes from?
Dr. Petersen. Well, what it does have----
Mr. Pomeroy. No, wait a minute. I have got about 30 seconds
left. I would like you to answer my question. Does the current
system you think so highly of, allow a consumer looking at a
grocery store shelf, to find out where their food comes from?
Dr. Petersen. Well, for meat and poultry products, what it
will show is for domestically slaughtered animals it will have
the USDA mark of inspection on it, which means that we
inspected it before it went into commerce and we think that is
sufficient for those products.
Mr. Pomeroy. Is this a little code? Is this a little code
that consumers got to know? There is a little label that says
USDA Inspected and that means ah, that was an Iowa steak, not a
Chinese steak, or they don't come in from China so it's not a
Canadian steak. Is that it?
Dr. Petersen. It means that their Federal tax dollars
inspected that product and found it to be safe and wholesome.
Mr. Pomeroy. Where does it say, sir, this is a U.S.
product, not a foreign product? Where does it say that?
Dr. Petersen. It would say, on a little inspection label,
U.S. Department of Agriculture inspected and passed for meat
and poultry products.
Mr. Pomeroy. And so you have got to look for that U.S.
inspected sticker and then understand, as a consumer, that
Canadian steaks don't have that sticker on there, is that
right?
Dr. Petersen. Yes, and it is required----
Mr. Pomeroy. Wouldn't it just be a whole lot clearer to say
Canadian steak, U.S. steak, wherever steak? What is the matter
with that?
Dr. Petersen. That is the system we have. We think it
informs the public. It has been out there for a hundred years
and it is available for them to view.
Mr. Pomeroy. Well, I buy steaks. I don't even know what
sticker you are talking about. I can't tell if they are U.S., I
can't tell if they are Canadian, I can't tell where they are
from. I think we can do a heck of a lot better than what we
have got now. In fact, I believe Congress has passed a
directive in the last Farm Bill saying we would label where the
meat comes from and the U.S. Department of Agriculture has done
its very best to delay implementing this country of origin
specificity. It continues to be, even in light of this
incident, showing clearly that we don't have a handle on the
quality of food coming into this country from other places.
Even now you take the position of U.S. Department of
Agriculture that consumers should not have clear labeling so
they know where their food comes from?
Dr. Petersen. The status of where we are vis-a-vis the farm
bill and the country of origin labeling, I will simply have to
get back to you with the response from the department.
Mr. Pomeroy. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and I just would note,
as far as I understand, there is boxed beef from Canada that is
slaughtered in Canada that gets the USDA stamp. So there are
situations where you have got product that is from another
country, slaughtered in another country that has the USDA
stamp.
Dr. Petersen. Yes, when they are fabricated in a federal
establishment.
The Chairman. Yes. I just put that out there. Gentleman
from Wisconsin, Mr. Kagen.
Mr. Kagen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. I really appreciate it. I have learned a great deal.
But it wasn't clear, Dr. Acheson, have you practiced medicine,
as well?
Dr. Acheson. Yes, I have.
Mr. Kagen. So you understand what it is like to write a
prescription and have a patient fill it, and on the label of
that prescription it says the name of the medication and its
expiration date and the manufacturer?
Dr. Acheson. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Kagen. Wouldn't you like to see the same thing with the
food that you buy and your family purchases and people across
America?
Dr. Acheson. I think that is a complex answer. We know,
from consumer surveys, that most American consumers do not read
labels.
Mr. Kagen. That may be true, but what people really want,
not just in this room, but across the country, people want
reassurance that the food they are eating is safe and it won't
harm them. The USDA has some interesting statistics that in the
year 2000, over 1200 people died from food borne illnesses: 499
died from listeria; 553 from salmonella; 99 from campylobacter.
You are aware of these numbers?
Dr. Acheson. Yes.
Mr. Kagen. So food is good for you. But it is healthy food
that keeps people healthy, so along those lines, what have you
got in place now to survey the many foods that we have coming
into the country for the safety of these foods for human
consumption, because as I understand it, only about 0.7 percent
of the imported food is now being inspected. Bearing in mind
that it was February of 2006 when we became a net importer of
food, what systems do you have in place now to reassure the
American public that the food that they are eating is safe?
Dr. Acheson. Well, as I said earlier, the current systems
are based on where we see the risk, both in terms of the
products that are of greater concern and the agents, the
pathogens or the chemicals or the pesticides that are of
greater concern. That is what the focus is at the border, in
terms of what you put the energies into. If we see a problem
with a particular food, we will concentrate on it. An example
recently was cantaloupes from Mexico. We had some problems
before with salmonella. We continued to test them, they were
fine for several years. Then, just recently, several months
ago, there was a problem again. We picked it up. So that is
what I mean by it is a risk-based strategy.
Mr. Kagen. Well, I would like to know that the medicines my
patients put in their mouths are safe. I would like to know
that the food that mothers put into their children's mouths is
safe, as well, and along those lines, I have been very
outspoken in being an advocate for country of origin labeling
and maybe we can get to that at another time. Would you agree
that it might be time for people in this country to begin to
think about the idea of eating locally grown foods? Would you
agree with that concept?
Dr. Acheson. I am all about people eating safe and secure
food, whether it is grown locally or 5,000 miles away is moot
so long as we can ensure the safety of it.
Mr. Kagen. Well, can you reassure me that any milk products
or milk protein concentrates coming from India or elsewhere are
free of any pesticides? Have you done any tests? Has anyone
surveyed it?
Dr. Acheson. As I said, there are assignments that are
underway, looking for pesticide residues from various places,
but I don't have the specific numbers in terms of how much we
are doing. But in that context, I would point out that you can
get illness from local problems just as you can from global, so
whatever strategies you put in place, it needs to apply to the
farm down to the street as well as the farm in another country.
Mr. Kagen. Well, along those lines, perhaps instead of
repeating a phrase from a former Republican president about
trust but verify, perhaps a better phrase is a more ancient one
and that is caveat emptor and buyer beware. So you are working
closely with the FSIS, is that correct?
Dr. Acheson. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Kagen. And what further plans have you got to wrap up
the melamine investigation?
Dr. Acheson. We are working very closely with the hog and
poultry issue, primarily, with FSIS. Multiple calls every day,
right through the weekend, as this moves forward and that is
continuing and it will continue until that part of the melamine
investigation is completed.
Mr. Kagen. Have you looked system-wide at the FSIS, USDA
and FDA to determine if your budgets are adequate to meet these
needs?
Dr. Acheson. I certainly have not looked at USDA's budget,
but as I have said, part of the strategic approach that we need
to undertake at FDA, for which I have been given leadership, is
to ask that very question. Where are we strategically? Where do
we want to go with prevention, intervention and response? What
resources do we need to get there?
Mr. Kagen. I look forward to working with you in the 110th
Congress to reassure the public that the food they are eating
is safe and especially, as I am going to be looking at the
nutritional needs of children for lunch programs and breakfast
programs on our subcommittees. Thank you for your testimony and
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Indiana, Mr. Donnelly.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In regards to food
products coming in from China, such as fish products, what
inspection has been done to determine what foods were used to
feed those fish in China?
Dr. Acheson. At this point, we don't have the resources to
determine what those fish have been fed. When the melamine
situation arose, we did not have an assay, a method to detect
melamine in fish. In the last couple of weeks, our scientists
have developed one, they validated it and it is now in place in
our labs.
As we were discussing earlier, we are already obtaining
samples, looking for fluoroquinolones and other residues in
fish and those same fish are now going to be tested for
melamine and melamine related compounds when we have those
assays. Right now it is just melamine, to get the beginnings of
a surveillance assignment for fish. Now, once we have done
that, that is going to give us an idea of what we are dealing
with and we are going to have to then react appropriately to
that. But we couldn't get the resources, the individuals into
every fish farm in China.
Mr. Donnelly. For fish products coming to this country now
that are coming in, we don't know what they have been fed and
they are still going into the supermarkets. Would that be a
fair statement?
Dr. Acheson. That is correct.
Mr. Donnelly. So these fish products that are coming into
our supermarkets now, there could well be melamine in those
fish?
Dr. Acheson. We cannot rule it out. That is part of what
the assignment will tell us.
Mr. Donnelly. Well, let me ask you this. In so many cases,
other countries are so quick to ban our food products and shut
the door on our food products. Why do we continue to let these
products come into our country when this possibility exists?
Dr. Acheson. Clearly, in order to, as I understand it with
our current authorities, we have to demonstrate there is a
problem. Your questioning has gone down the line of we believe
or speculate there could be a problem with fish. We don't have
any evidence of that at this point.
Mr. Donnelly. Did you happen to see the article in the New
York Times that discussed how animal feed producers have used
this ingredient with fish farms time after time after time in
China?
Dr. Acheson. Understood. And clearly, if we reacted to
everything that we read in the New York Times in terms of what
we did, we would be in trouble.
Mr. Donnelly. I am not using just the Times. I am using the
fact that we found hogs and poultry in this country. I mean, at
what time do we put the benefit of the doubt on behalf of the
consumer where this product is coming in, instead of trying to
cover these things over? When do we stand up for our consumers?
As Mr. Etheridge was mentioning, his 27-pound grandchild might
be eating this fish tonight. How do we let this continue?
Dr. Acheson. Without some specific evidence that there is a
problem with it, we don't have the authority to ban it based on
the sorts of information that you are describing to me.
Mr. Donnelly. Well, then that brings me to my next
question, which is are we finding out who in China knew? How
are we tracing back the steps? Have we found the different
facilities? Obviously, we have located some of them, but have
we found if any government officials in China knew, and who
have we talked to on the government level?
Dr. Acheson. We are working very closely with the Chinese
food safety authority, AQSIQ, on this whole issue around
melamine. Clearly, they are aware of this problem. We have
assisted them in setting up assays to measure melamine, which
they didn't previously have. I think you are asking a very good
question. At this stage of the investigation, we just simply
don't have all the answers.
Mr. Donnelly. So we don't have the answers, but the
products keep coming in at this point.
Dr. Acheson. They are coming in, they are being tested and
if they test positive, clearly, we are not going to ignore that
and we will take appropriate action, which could potentially,
at the far end of the spectrum, be an import alert on fish.
Mr. Donnelly. Okay.
Dr. Acheson. But we are not there yet.
Mr. Donnelly. But at this time, these products are still
landing in Seattle or somewhere else and being distributed?
Dr. Acheson. Correct. At this point, we do not have the
authority to prevent that.
Mr. Donnelly. Do you have a list of your most likely
potential problems other than melamine? Do you have an active
list of scenarios of what areas we are concerned about?
Dr. Acheson. Absolutely. Both on a food safety front and a
food defense front, we have created risk-based lists in terms
of what pathogen or chemical or radiological agent might be
intentionally or unintentionally put in a food product, what
type of food might it go into, and this is particularly true of
food defense, where we have applied this very assiduously.
Mr. Donnelly. Was melamine on any of these lists?
Dr. Acheson. It wasn't.
Mr. Donnelly. Okay. Could you share those lists with the
Chairman, who would then share them with us?
Dr. Acheson. I would be happy to. Those lists are
classified, so within those confines, sure.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I was wondering if
there have been different discussions about how to deal with
this and apparently, you have added an new position at FDA.
What are your reactions to these folks that want to create a
new food agency that is separate where that they set up some
separate agency and I guess put all you guys in there or
something. What is your reaction to that?
Dr. Acheson. Are you asking me?
The Chairman. Both of you.
Dr. Acheson. Well, let me start. I think whenever one is
looking to make change, you need to be very careful that in the
process you don't actually make matters worse. Whether that is
a big reorganization or a small one, and the one that you are
alluding to would be big. Simply moving boxes around seldom
solves a problem. However this is approached, it needs to be
approached strategically; it needs to be approached with
adequate resources and it needs to be done carefully.
Ultimately, with your suggestion, could it work, potentially,
at some point? Sure, perhaps. But it would need to be done in
the way I have described. Right now, the system, with the
communication that we have between the various agencies, is
working remarkably well. We have constant interaction, constant
communication. And I would worry that simply embarking on a
strategy like that could, in fact, put us back and not bring us
forward.
The Chairman. Yes, that has been my concern too, given the
experience we had with Homeland Security. Hopefully we learned
our lesson, but we could actually put ourselves in a situation
that seems like we are, in my opinion, not doing anywhere near
what we should in terms of all this imported food coming in. If
we try to do something like this, we would basically be out of
commission for two years. It would probably make sense to just
stop importing food while we are going through this, because we
couldn't guarantee anything, during all the commotion that
happens. So it seems you have some of the same concerns I do.
Mr. Petersen?
Dr. Petersen. I would agree. Certainly we need to have a
notion of what the solution is going to do as far as addressing
the problem you think you are trying to solve. I think the
agencies, the FDA and USDA, in this situation, certainly have
complementary authorities. I don't see a lot of duplicative
authorities and so this current situation, I think is an
example of how the agencies can leverage their individual
resources and get their arms around a particular problem. Are
there always better ways to do things? Certainly. And I think
we will always try to find those better ways, but our work
seems to be complementary with FDA at this point.
The Chairman. We have a vote. But the other thing I am
wondering about is that I am sure that whatever you guys come
up with is going to take extra resources. When I look at the
huge increase of volume and the fact that we haven't had any
new resources, I think that is going to be pretty apparent. My
concern is with rules now and us trying to finally get a handle
on this budget deficit. How are we going to pay for this? I
know the administration has proposed user fees, which has been
dead on arrival in Congress. Has there been any thought or will
there be any thought to how in the world we will finance this?
One question I have is, under the trade agreements, could we
put this cost on the countries where we are trying to get the
food supply certified? Is it possible to actually add the cost
on to what is being imported into the country to pay for this
or is that in violation of the WTO agreements? Do you know?
Dr. Acheson. I don't specifically know the answer to your
question, but all of those different complexities would have to
be examined and you are correct, finding a way to pay for this
is a key question. But you can't do that until you figure out
what it is that you want to do and we need to do it quickly.
The Chairman. Anybody else? We got a couple of minutes. Ms.
Musgrave or Mr. Boustany, anything else for the good of the
order here?
Ms. Musgrave. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say,
that as I talked to my constituents, their main concern is food
that comes from other countries. Although you have pointed out
very appropriately that we also have problems with food grown
in the United States, people have talked to me especially about
the vulnerability of young children and how they react to E.
coli and Listeria and many of those things that are so very
dangerous to small children.
It is not only the food consumed in homes of course, it is
in restaurants too. Sometimes it is the way the food is
handled. But we do make the assumption in this country that our
food is safe, for the most part. What a horrific job you have
in front of you, but this issue with the pet food has certainly
illustrated our vulnerability and when we do make those
assumptions that this is safe and we are going to be able to
feed it to our children, we may be very wrong.
I also worry about the consequences of people that would do
harm to citizens in our nation. Now that this has happened,
they are now very aware of how vulnerable we are. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady. Mr. Boustany?
Mr. Boustany. I would just say thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. Gentlemen, your testimony and your
answers to the questions were very informative. I certainly
appreciate it and we look forward to working with you as we go
forward. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and we will look
forward to the information that was requested by the committee
members being forwarded to us. Again, thank you for being with
us today and I am sure we will be discussing this more often as
time goes along. Thank you very much. The Committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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