[House Report 110-665]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 110-665
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
_______
May 21, 2008.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 5959]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5959) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
H.R. 5959, as reported to House.................................. 1
Purpose.......................................................... 30
Overall Perspective on the Classified Annex and Committee Intent. 31
Scope of Committee Review........................................ 31
Committee Statement and Views.................................... 31
Overview..................................................... 31
Committee Review............................................. 32
The Legislation.............................................. 32
Areas of Special Interest.................................... 34
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.......... 34
Overreliance on Supplemental Funding..................... 35
Human Intelligence Capability Throughout the World....... 35
Issues Regarding Committee Notification of Syria's
Nuclear Program........................................ 36
Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.......... 36
Diversity in the Intelligence Community.................. 37
Committee Investigation into the Destruction of
Interrogation Videotapes by the Central Intelligence
Agency................................................. 37
Creation of a National Applications Office in the
Department of Homeland Security........................ 38
Major Systems Acquisitions............................... 38
Acquisition Program Performance Notification............. 39
Advanced Research and Development........................ 39
Future Course for Overhead Architecture.................. 40
Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity
into the Defense Intelligence Agency................... 40
FBI's Use of National Security Letters................... 41
Global Climate Change.................................... 42
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes...................... 42
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment..... 46
Title I--Intelligence........................................ 46
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations............. 46
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 46
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments............... 46
Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account... 46
Section 105--Limitation on the use of covert action funds 47
Section 106--Prohibition on use of funds to implement
``Five and Out'' program of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.......................................... 47
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 47
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations............. 47
Section 202--Technical modification to mandatory
retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act......................................... 47
Title III--General Provisions................................ 47
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and
benefits authorized by law............................. 47
Section 302--Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable
details to elements of the Intelligence Community...... 47
Section 303--Multi-level security clearances............. 48
Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common
carriers for intelligence collection personnel......... 48
Section 305--Annual personnel level assessments for the
Intelligence Community................................. 48
Section 306--Comprehensive report on intelligence
community contractors.................................. 49
Section 307--Report on proposed pay-for-performance
intelligence community personnel management system..... 50
Section 308--Report on plan to increase diversity within
the Intelligence Community............................. 50
Section 309--Report on security clearance determinations. 51
Section 311--Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities............................................. 51
Section 312--Clarification of definition of Intelligence
Community under the National Security Act of 1947...... 51
Section 313--Modification of availability of funds for
different intelligence activities...................... 51
Section 314--Protection of certain national security
information............................................ 52
Section 315--Extension of authority to delete information
about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and
decorations............................................ 52
Section 316--Report on compliance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006....................... 53
Section 317--Incorporation of reporting requirements..... 54
Section 318--Repeal of certain reporting requirements.... 54
Section 319--Enhancement of critical skills training
program................................................ 54
Section 320--Comprehensive national cybersecurity
initiative advisory panel.............................. 54
Title IV--Matters Relating To Elements of the Intelligence
Community.................................................. 54
Section 401--Clarification of limitation on co-location
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 54
Section 402--Membership of the Director of National
Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight
Board.................................................. 55
Section 403--Additional duties of the Director of Science
and Technology......................................... 55
Section 404--Leadership and location of certain offices
and officials.......................................... 55
Section 405--Plan to implement recommendations of the
data center energy efficiency reports.................. 55
Section 406--Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs
of Iran, Syria, and North Korea........................ 56
Section 407--Title of Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community................................. 56
Section 408--Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.............................................. 56
Section 409--Annual report on foreign language
proficiency in the Intelligence Community.............. 58
Section 410--Repeal of certain authorities relating to
the office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive.............................................. 58
Section 411--National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of
mass destruction in Syria.............................. 58
Section 412--Annual report on intelligence resources
dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan...................... 59
Section 413--Ombudsman for intelligence community
security clearances.................................... 59
Section 414--Security clearance reciprocity.............. 59
Section 415--Report on international traffic in arms
regulations............................................ 59
Section 416--Report on nuclear trafficking............... 59
Section 417--Study on revoking pensions of persons who
commit unauthorized disclosures of classified
information............................................ 60
Section 421--Review of covert action programs by
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency... 60
Section 422--Inapplicability to the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual
report on progress in auditable financial statements... 60
Section 423--Technical amendments relating to titles of
certain CIA positions.................................. 61
Section 424--Clarifying amendments relating to Section
105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004.............................................. 61
Section 425--Prohibition on the use of private
contractors for interrogations involving person in the
custody or control of the Central Intelligence Agency.. 61
Section 431--Integration of the Counterintelligence Field
Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency.......... 61
Section 441--Clarification of inclusion of the Coast
Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements
of the Intelligence Community.......................... 62
Section 442--Report on transformation of the intelligence
capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.... 62
Title V--Other Matters....................................... 63
Section 501--Extension of National Commission for Review
of Research and Development Programs of the United
States Intelligence Community.......................... 63
Section 502--Amendments to the National Security Act of
1947................................................... 63
Section 503--Report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets....................................... 63
Section 504--Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea
and China.............................................. 63
Section 505--Sense of Congress regarding use of
intelligence resources................................. 64
Section 511--Technical amendments to the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949........................ 64
Section 512--Technical amendments to the multi-year
National Intelligence Program.......................... 64
Section 513--Technical clarifications of certain
references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities........... 64
Section 514--Technical Amendments to the National
Security Act of 1947................................... 64
Section 515--Technical amendments to the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004............ 64
Section 516--Technical amendments to the Executive
Schedule............................................... 64
Section 517--Technical amendments relating to the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency................ 65
Correspondence with Other Committees Regarding Particular
Provisions..................................................... 65
Letter from Chairman Berman to Chairman Reyes................ 65
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Berman................ 65
Letter from Chairman Skelton to Chairman Reyes............... 66
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Skelton............... 67
Letter from Chairman Thompson to Chairman Reyes.............. 67
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Thompson.............. 68
Letter from Chairman Conyers to Chairman Reyes............... 68
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Conyers............... 69
Letter from Chairman Waxman to Chairman Reyes................ 69
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Waxman................ 70
Correspondence with Congressional Budget Office.................. 71
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Mr. Peter Orszag, Director..... 71
Letter from Mr. Orszag to Chairman Reyes..................... 71
Congressional Budget Office Estimate......................... 71
Changes to Existing Law.......................................... 73
Minority Views................................................... 114
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement ``5 and out''
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence
community.
Sec. 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community
personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 309. Report on security clearance determinations.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Sec. 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 312. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 313. Modification of availability of funds for different
intelligence activities.
Sec. 314. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Sec. 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program.
Sec. 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory
panel.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy
efficiency reports.
Sec. 406. Semiannual reports on nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and
North Korea.
Sec. 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community.
Sec. 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 411. National intelligence estimate on weapons of mass destruction
in Syria.
Sec. 412. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Sec. 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 414. Security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 416. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. Inapplicability to Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable
financial statements.
Sec. 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central
Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 424. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for
interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
Sec. 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community.
Sec. 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China.
Sec. 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 513. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2009
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section
103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2009, for
the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in
paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the
conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred Tenth
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a)
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for
suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of
the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(c) Earmarks.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, the joint explanatory statement to accompany
the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred
Tenth Congress, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be
construed to authorize or require the expenditure of funds for
an earmarked purpose.
(2) Earmarked purpose defined.--In this subsection, the term
``earmarked purpose'' means a provision or report language
included primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate,
Resident Commissioner of the House of Representatives or a
Senator providing, authorizing, or recommending a specific
amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or
other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee,
grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an
entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality, or
Congressional district, other than through a statutory or
administrative formula-driven or competitive award process.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2009 by the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the
Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.
(b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an
authority described in subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2009 the sum of
$648,842,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2010.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence are authorized 772 full-time or full-time equivalent
personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
(c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the
Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available
to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the
Intelligence Community Management Account.
(d) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to
be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal
year 2009 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2010.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2009, there
are authorized such additional personnel for the Community
Management Account as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a).
SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF COVERT ACTION FUNDS.
(a) In General.--Not more than 25 percent of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act for the National Intelligence Program for
covert actions may be obligated or expended until the date on which
each member of the congressional intelligence committees has been fully
and currently briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in
effect on April 24, 2008.
(b) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term ``covert
action'' has the meaning given the term in section 503(g) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)).
SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT ``5 AND OUT''
PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act may be
used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau
after such supervisor serves in a management position for 5 years
(commonly known as the ``5 and out'' program).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2009 the sum of
$279,200,000.
SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.
Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by striking
``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay
schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior
Intelligence Service rank''.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C.
402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any
fiscal year after fiscal year 2008 an officer or employee of the United
States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an
element of the intelligence community funded through the Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the
Director of National Intelligence and the head of the detailing element
(or the designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 2
years.
SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that the elements of the
intelligence community adopt a multi-level security clearance approach
in order to enable the intelligence community to make more effective
and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with
cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is
critical to national security.''.
(b) Implementation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the implementation of
subsection (s) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a), not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
(2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this
subsection, by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that
follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in
subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the
intelligence community.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom
the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1)
may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such
element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of
National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
(b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 6 months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a).
SEC. 305. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the
following new section:
``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community
``Sec. 506B. (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of the element of the
intelligence community concerned, prepare an annual personnel level
assessment for such element of the intelligence community that assesses
the personnel levels for each such element for the fiscal year
following the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted.
``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year along
with the budget submitted by the President under section 1105 of title
31, United States Code.
``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) submitted
during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the following
information for the element of the intelligence community concerned:
``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the
upcoming fiscal year.
``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such
costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal
year.
``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such
costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5
fiscal years.
``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for the
upcoming fiscal year.
``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of
the current fiscal year.
``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions
during the prior 5 fiscal years.
``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of
contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal
year.
``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of
the costs of contractors of the current fiscal year.
``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, during the prior 5
fiscal years.
``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel
and contractor levels.
``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts
employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence
community.
``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject
of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any
element of the intelligence community during the preceding
fiscal year, or are or have been the subject of an
investigation by such an Inspector General during the current
fiscal year.
``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence
that, based on current and projected funding, the element
concerned will have sufficient--
``(A) internal infrastructure to support the
requested personnel and contractor levels;
``(B) training resources to support the requested
personnel levels; and
``(C) funding to support the administrative and
operational activities of the requested personnel
levels.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
506A the following new item:
``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 306. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing the use of personal
services contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of
such contractors on the intelligence community workforce, plans for
conversion of contractor employment into government employment, and the
accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such
contractors.
(b) Content.--
(1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a description of any relevant regulations or
guidance issued by the Director of National
Intelligence or the head of an element of the
intelligence community relating to minimum standards
required regarding the hiring, training, security
clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how
those standards may differ from those for government
employees performing substantially similar functions;
(B) an identification of contracts where the
contractor is performing a substantially similar
functions to a government employee;
(C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings
achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of
such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead
of using full-time employees of the elements of the
intelligence community to perform such functions;
(D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using
contractors to perform the activities described in
paragraph (2);
(E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the
number of personnel working under such contracts,
related to the performance of activities described in
paragraph (2);
(F) a comparison of the compensation of contract
employees and government employees performing
substantially similar functions;
(G) an analysis of the attrition of government
personnel for contractor positions that provide
substantially similar functions;
(H) a description of positions that will be converted
from contractor employment to government employment;
(I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability
mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts
awarded for intelligence activities by each element of
the intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and
2007;
(J) an analysis of procedures in use in the
intelligence community for conducting oversight of
contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of
criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other
abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel;
and
(K) an identification of best practices for oversight
and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal
services contracts.
(2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Intelligence collection.
(B) Intelligence analysis.
(C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention,
and interrogation activities.
SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
(a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of
National Intelligence and the head of an element of the intelligence
community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to
personnel of that element of the intelligence community based on
performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the
Director of National Intelligence submits a report for that element
under subsection (b).
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress a report on performance-based compensation for each element of
the intelligence community, including, with respect to each such
element--
(1) a description of a proposed employee advisory group to
advise management on the implementation and management of a pay
for performance system in that element, including the scope of
responsibility of the group and the plan for the element for
ensuring diversity in the selection of members of the advisory
group;
(2) a certification that all managers who will participate in
setting performance standards and pay pool administration have
been trained on the implementing guidance of the system and the
criteria upon which the certification is granted; and
(3) a description of an external appeals mechanism for
employees who wish to appeal pay decisions to someone outside
the management chain of the element employing such employee.
SEC. 308. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each
element to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
(b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element
of the intelligence community, including--
(1) specific implementation plans for each such element
designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan
of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment
opportunity and diversity;
(2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
(3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior,
midgrade, senior, and management levels;
(4) a description of specific diversity awareness training
and education programs for senior officials and managers of
each such element; and
(5) a description of performance metrics to measure the
success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
SEC. 309. REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``report on security clearance determinations
``Sec. 508. Not later than February 1 of each year, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to Congress a report
on security clearance determinations completed or ongoing during the
preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than one year to complete.
Such report shall include--
``(1) the number of security clearance determinations for
positions as employees of the Federal Government that required
more than one year to complete;
``(2) the number of security clearance determinations for
contractors that required more than one year to complete;
``(3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such
determinations; and
``(4) the cause of significant delays in such
determinations.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 507 the
following new item:
``Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.''.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
SEC. 311. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 312. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place
it appears.
SEC. 313. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases
efficiency; and''.
SEC. 314. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.
(a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence
Officers and Agents.--
(1) Disclosure of agent after access to information
identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by
striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
(2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified
information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by
striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
(b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence
Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting
``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this
title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert
agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert
agents,''.
SEC. 315. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT
AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS.
Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element
certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States intelligence
sources or methods.
``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant
to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the
Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such
information.
``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the
meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
SEC. 316. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005
AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
ACT OF 2006.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any,
of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply
with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of
division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2739) and related
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366;
120 Stat. 2600).
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) A description of the detention or interrogation methods,
if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42
U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) (including the
amendments made by such section 6), and, with respect to each
such method--
(A) an identification of the official making such
determination; and
(B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
(2) A description of the detention or interrogation methods,
if any, the use of which has been discontinued pursuant to the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the Military Commission Act
of 2006, and, with respect to each such method--
(A) an identification of the official making the
determination to discontinue such method; and
(B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
(3) A description of any actions that have been taken to
implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each
such action--
(A) an identification of the official taking such
action; and
(B) a statement of the basis for such action.
(4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary
to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence
committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006.
(5) An appendix containing--
(A) all guidelines for the application of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to the
detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any
element of the intelligence community; and
(B) all legal justifications of the Department of
Justice, including any office thereof, about the
meaning or application of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 with respect to the detention or
interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the
intelligence community.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in classified form.
(d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services Committees.--To
the extent that the report required by subsection (a) addresses an
element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense,
that portion of the report, and any associated material that is
necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted
by the Director of National Intelligence to the congressional armed
services committees.
(e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined.--In this section,
the term ``congressional armed services committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 317. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is
hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in
law.
SEC. 318. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section
1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``(1)''; and
(2) by striking paragraph (2).
(b) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification
Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as
subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
(c) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--Section 826
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed.
(d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a)(2) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(2)) is amended by striking
subparagraph (D).
SEC. 319. ENHANCEMENT OF CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM.
(a) National Security Agency.--Subsection (e) of section 16 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by
striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2)
Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''.
(b) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--The National Security Act of 1947 is amended
by inserting after section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 441m) the following
new section:
``intelligence community acquisition of critical skills
``Sec. 1022. (a) In General.--The head of an appropriate department
may assign civilian employees of an element of the intelligence
community that is a component of such appropriate department as
students at accredited professional, technical, and other institutions
of higher learning for training at the undergraduate level in skills
critical to effective performance of the mission of such element of the
intelligence community.
``(b) Payment of Expenses.--The head of an appropriate department may
pay, directly or by reimbursement to employees, expenses incident to
assignments under subsection (a), in any fiscal year only to the extent
that appropriated funds are available for such purpose.
``(c) Eligibility.--
``(1) In general.--To be eligible for assignment under
subsection (a), an employee of an element of the intelligence
community must agree in writing--
``(A) to continue in the service of such element for
the period of the assignment and to complete the
educational course of training for which the employee
is assigned;
``(B) to continue in the service of such element
following completion of the assignment for a period of
one-and-a-half years for each year of the assignment or
part thereof;
``(C) to reimburse the United States for the total
cost of education (excluding the employee's pay and
allowances) provided under this section to the employee
if, prior to the employee's completing the educational
course of training for which the employee is assigned,
the assignment or the employee's employment with such
element is terminated either by such element due to
misconduct by the employee or by the employee
voluntarily; and
``(D) to reimburse the United States if, after
completing the educational course of training for which
the employee is assigned, the employee's employment
with such element is terminated either by such element
due to misconduct by the employee or by the employee
voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion of the
service obligation period described in subparagraph
(B), in an amount that bears the same ratio to the
total cost of the education (excluding the employee's
pay and allowances) provided to the employee as the
unserved portion of the service obligation period
described in subparagraph (B) bears to the total period
of the service obligation described in subparagraph
(B).
``(2) Debt owing the united states.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an
agreement described in paragraph (1), including interest due on
such obligation, is for all purposes a debt owing the United
States.
``(3) Reimbursement.--
``(A) Bankruptcy.--A discharge in bankruptcy under
title 11, United States Code, shall not release a
person from an obligation to reimburse the United
States required under an agreement described in
paragraph (1) if the final decree of the discharge in
bankruptcy is issued within five years after the last
day of the combined period of service obligation
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph
(1).
``(B) Release.--The head of an appropriate department
may release a person, in whole or in part, from the
obligation to reimburse the United States under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) when, in the
discretion of such head of an appropriate department,
such head of an appropriate department determines that
equity or the interests of the United States so
require.
``(C) Monthly payments.--The head of an appropriate
department shall permit an employee assigned under this
section who, prior to commencing a second academic year
of such assignment, voluntarily terminates the
assignment or the employee's employment with the
element of the intelligence community that is a
component of such appropriate department, to satisfy
the employee's obligation under an agreement described
in paragraph (1) to reimburse the United States by
reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly
payments which results in completion of reimbursement
by a date five years after the date of termination of
the assignment or employment or earlier at the option
of the employee.
``(d) Recruitment.--Efforts by an element of the intelligence
community to recruit individuals at educational institutions for
participation in the undergraduate training program established by this
section shall be made openly and according to the common practices of
universities and employers recruiting at such institutions.
``(e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training.--Chapter 41 of title 5
and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of title 31, United States
Code, shall not apply with respect to this section.
``(f) Regulations.--A head of the appropriate department assigning
employees in accordance with this section may issue such regulations as
such head of the appropriate department considers necessary to carry
out this section.
``(g) Rules of Construction.--
``(1) Component.--For purposes of this section--
``(A) the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence shall be considered a component of such
Office; and
``(B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be
considered a component of such Agency.
``(2) Required education programs.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to modify, affect, or supercede any
provision of law requiring or otherwise authorizing or
providing for a training program described in this section.
``(h) Appropriate Department Defined.--In this section, the term
`appropriate department' means--
``(1) with respect to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence;
``(2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency; and
``(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence
community other than the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the
department of the Federal Government of which such element of
the intelligence community is a component.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 1021 the following new item:
``Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.''.
SEC. 320. COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE ADVISORY
PANEL.
Not later than February 1, 2009, the President shall submit to
Congress a report on options for creating an advisory panel comprised
of representatives of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the private
sector to make policy and procedural recommendations for--
(1) information security for the Federal Government;
(2) critical infrastructure;
(3) the authorities, roles, responsibilities of the
intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, and
Department of Defense for purposes of supporting the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative as described in
National Security Policy Directive 54/Homeland Security Policy
Directive 23 entitled ``Cybersecurity Policy'' signed by the
President on January 8, 2008; and
(4) other matters related to paragraphs (1) through (3) as
the President considers appropriate.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(e)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With
Headquarters of'';
(2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the
Office''; and
(3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the
headquarters of any other element''.
SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic,
applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of
the intelligence community;
``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an
annual report on the science and technology strategy of the
Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the
intelligence community; and''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after
``coordinate''; and
(ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting
``;'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph
(C); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following
new subparagraph:
``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research
programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence
community; and''.
SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.
(a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18
months after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the
following:
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center
shall be located within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
(b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraphs:
``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.''.
SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY
EFFICIENCY REPORTS.
(a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan
to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress
under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the
use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public
Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later then November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 406. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND
NORTH KOREA.
(a) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of iran, syria, and north
korea
``Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently than
every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the intentions
and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to
the nuclear programs of each such country.
``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each such
country;
``(2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in
paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources
and an assessment of the reliability of each such source;
``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such
program gathered or developed since the previous report was
submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence
collected from both open and clandestine sources for each such
country; and
``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in
the assessment described in paragraph (1).
``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian
Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in lieu of
a report required by subsection (a) for that country.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.''.
(2) Applicability date.--The first report required to be
submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by paragraph (1), shall be submitted not later
than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 508 the following new
item:
``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria,
and North Korea.''.
SEC. 407. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
(4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.
SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
103G the following new section:
``inspector general of the intelligence community
``Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community is to--
``(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately
accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently
investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence;
``(2) recommend policies designed--
``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and implementation
of matters within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence; and
``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such
matters;
``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National
Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director
of National Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly
informed of--
``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating
to matters within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There is an
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector
General shall be made--
``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
``(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the
security standards of the intelligence community, and prior
experience in the field of intelligence or national security;
and
``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting,
financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing.
``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the
general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.
``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the
President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal
of any individual from the position of Inspector General.
``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) and
(h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community--
``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations,
inspections, and audits relating to matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in
accordance with applicable law and regulations;
``(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully and
currently informed concerning violations of law and
regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud
and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may
occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director, and to report the progress made in implementing
corrective action;
``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by
the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the
purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as
may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence
sources and methods described in such reports; and
``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities
under this section, to comply with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any
investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that
such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1),
the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the
reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 days to the
congressional intelligence committees.
``(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a
report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the
Inspector General with a copy of such report.
``(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector
General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General
considers appropriate.
``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of
National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or
any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence
community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records,
reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other
material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section.
``(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information
shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying
the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B).
``(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee of a
contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to cooperate
with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate
administrative actions by the Director or, on the recommendation of the
Director, other appropriate officials of the intelligence community,
including loss of employment or the termination of an existing
contractual relationship.
``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate
complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of
an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once
such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the
Federal Government--
``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the
Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice
responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be
undertaken; and
``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the
knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its
truth or falsity.
``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or
take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever
necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General,
which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or
before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community designated by the Inspector General shall have
the same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an
officer having a seal.
``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers,
and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the
United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers,
and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph
(A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community, including
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued
under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any
appropriate district court of the United States.
``(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence
Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject
to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General, whether
statutory or administrative, with oversight responsibility for an
element or elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or
Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the question of which
Inspector General shall conduct such investigation, inspection, or
audit.
``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the
Inspectors General concerned may request the assistance of the
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under
subparagraph (C). In the event of a dispute between an Inspector
General within an agency or department of the United States Government
and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has not
been resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the Inspectors General
shall submit the question to the Director of National Intelligence and
the head of the agency or department for resolution.
``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors
General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or administrative
Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an element or
elements of the intelligence community. The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum
shall have no administrative authority over any Inspector General, but
shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of
individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest and
discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to employees,
employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents,
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of
assistance to more than 1 of its members.
``(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation, inspection,
or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results of such
investigation, inspection, or audit to any other Inspector General,
including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with
jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit who
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit.
``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate and adequate
office space at central and field office locations, together with such
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications
facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such
offices.
``(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director
of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint,
and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out
the functions of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall
ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed
has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such
officer or employee.
``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the
requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to
carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector
General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide
appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector
General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary
for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector
General from any department, agency, or other element of the United
States Government.
``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency,
or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in
contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of
the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General,
or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon
reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence
community, conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation,
inspection, or audit of such element and may enter into any place
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year,
prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a
classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month
period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department
of the United States Government to the head of that department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of
National Intelligence.
``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum,
the following:
``(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation,
inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by
such report, including a summary of the progress of each
particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the
preceding report of the Inspector General under this paragraph.
``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and
deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation
of programs and operations of the intelligence community, and
in the relationships between elements of the intelligence
community, identified by the Inspector General during the
period covered by such report.
``(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective
or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during the
period covered by such report with respect to significant
problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
``(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or disciplinary
action has been completed on each significant recommendation
described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where
corrective action has been completed, a description of such
corrective action.
``(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector General
has had full and direct access to all information relevant to
the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
``(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to
detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
``(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report
to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments
the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the
committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any
portion of the report involving a component of such department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence.
``(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence
committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of
receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director
considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of each report
under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency
related to a component of such department simultaneously with
transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(3) In the event that--
``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the
duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General focuses on any current or former
intelligence community official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community that is subject to appointment
by the President, whether or not by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, including such a position
held on an acting basis;
``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community, including a position held on an
acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence; or
``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a position
covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to
the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a
current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a report on
such matter to the congressional intelligence committees.
``(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit conducted by
the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or
Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
``(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an
employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence
community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with
respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information
to the Inspector General.
``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning
on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information
under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether
the complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a
determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a
notice of that determination, together with the complaint or
information.
``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under
subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar days of such
receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence
committees, together with any comments the Director considers
appropriate.
``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to
the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee
(subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to
Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence
committees directly.
``(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees directly
as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly; and
``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence
committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
``(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional intelligence
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (i)
does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or
employee of such committee.
``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a
complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph
of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days
after any such action is taken.
``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under
this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
``(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the
following:
``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law
or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence activity
involving classified information, but does not include
differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity.
``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in
section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under
subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an
employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this
paragraph.
``(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the findings set
forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of the
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (title VII
of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note).
``(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code,
the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General any
information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General
relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program
or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the
relationships between the elements of the intelligence community,
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney
General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director in
consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in
the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the
Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of
any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the
intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or effect the
duties and responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether
statutory or administrative, having duties and responsibilities
relating to such element.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following
new item:
``Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
(b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--Section 8K
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is repealed.
(c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
SEC. 409. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of this Act,
is further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
``Sec. 510. Not later than February 1 of each year, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, if
appropriate, in foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence
community, including--
``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each
element will require during the 5-year period beginning on the
date of the submission of the report;
``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
``(A) military personnel; and
``(B) civilian personnel;
``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such element
in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language
proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the
proficiency level;
``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider of
such training;
``(7) a description of such element's efforts to recruit,
hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a
foreign language;
``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
``(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate,
dialect of a foreign language--
``(A) the number of positions of such element that
require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
``(B) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that requires proficiency in
the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary
duty of the position;
``(C) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that does not require
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to
perform the primary duty of the position;
``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated
at each level of proficiency of the Interagency
Language Roundtable;
``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level
of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable
meets the requirements of such element;
``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to
serve as linguists for such element that are not
qualified as linguists under the standards of the
Interagency Language Roundtable;
``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as
linguists for such element during the preceding
calendar year;
``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists
that discontinued serving such element during the
preceding calendar year;
``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United
States; and
``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by contractors;
``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer
relevant.''.
(2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
415b(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph
(J); and
(B) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in
the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 509 the following new item:
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 410. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and
(m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively; and
(3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection
(e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection
(e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection
(e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 411. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
IN SYRIA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate on the history,
status, and projected development of any weapons of mass destruction
development program undertaken by the Government of Syria, or by any
person on behalf of the Government of Syria.
(b) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate required under
subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 412. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on intelligence collection resources
dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
Such report shall include detailed information on fiscal, human,
technical, and other intelligence collection resources.
SEC. 413. OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103H, as
added by section 409 of this Act, the following new section:
``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
``Sec. 103I. (a) Appointment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances.
``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a security
clearance through or in coordination with such element with contact
information for the ombudsman appointed under subsection (a).
``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the ombudsman
appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing--
``(1) the number of persons applying for a security clearance
who have contacted the ombudsman during the preceding 12
months; and
``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions
received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security
clearances.''.
(b) Appointment Date.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
under section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a), not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 103H the following new item:
``Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances.''.
SEC. 414. SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.
(a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security clearances in the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing
the results of the audit conducted under subsection (a). Such report
shall include an assessment of the time required to obtain a reciprocal
security clearance for--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
(2) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
seeking permanent employment with another element of the
intelligence community and;
(3) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an element
of the intelligence community.
SEC. 415. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report assessing--
(1) the threat to national security presented by the efforts
of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion,
or other means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the
degree to which United States export controls (including the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to
defeat such efforts; and
(2) the extent to which United States export controls are
well matched to the scope of the foreign threat such controls
are designed to defeat and whether other means could more
successfully defeat such threats.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The term
``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means those regulations
contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 22, Code of Federal
Regulations (or successor regulations).
SEC. 416. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and
equipment.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include, for a period of time including at least the preceding three
years--
(1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit
sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of nuclear or
radiological material or equipment useful for the production of
nuclear or radiological material or nuclear explosive devices;
(2) an assessment of the countries that represent the
greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
(3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge,
or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.
SEC. 417. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a
study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the
intelligence community who commit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information, including whether revoking such pensions is
feasible under existing law or under the administrative authority of
the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of an element
of the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results
of the study conducted under subsection (a).
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 421. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and
transferring such subsection to the end; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits
shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3)
and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General
of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct
an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been
terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or
suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action
conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted
after the date on which such audit was completed.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of
an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
results of such audit.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
(2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
(3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.
SEC. 422. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS
IN AUDITABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1)
is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency,''.
SEC. 423. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.
Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
(1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and
inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
(2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National
Clandestine Service'';
(3) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
(4) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and
(5) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science
and Technology''.
SEC. 424. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
SEC. 425. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR
INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OR
CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not expend or
obligate funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the
interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in custody or under the
effective control of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Exception.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence
may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under subsection
(a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
determines that--
(A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
(i) capable of performing such interrogation;
and
(ii) available to perform such interrogation;
and
(B) such interrogation is in the national interest of
the United States and requires the use of a contractor.
(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any
contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the conduct
of interrogations that would apply if an employee of the
Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
SEC. 431. INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY INTO
THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
and armed services committees a report outlining the process by which
the Counterintelligence Field Activity is to be integrated into the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Such report shall include--
(1) a description of the nature of any law enforcement
authorities to be delegated to the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(2) the authority under which the delegation of authority
referred to in paragraph (1) would occur; and
(3) the guidelines for the implementation of such law
enforcement authorities.
(b) Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services Committees.--In
this section, the term ``congressional intelligence and armed services
committees'' means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(3) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H)--
(A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the
Marine Corps,''; and
(B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement
Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office
of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.
SEC. 442. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the
Director's long term vision for transforming the intelligence
capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of
the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such report shall include--
(1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the
intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
(2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence
and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
(3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms at
the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau
towards achieving the goals of the Director for the
intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; and
(4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks that
are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau as an
intelligence agency, including--
(A) identifying new intelligence targets within the
scope of the national security functions of the Bureau,
outside the parameters of an existing case file or
ongoing investigation;
(B) collecting intelligence domestically, including
collection through human and technical sources;
(C) recruiting human sources;
(D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit,
and handle human sources;
(E) working collaboratively with other Federal
departments and agencies to jointly collect
intelligence on domestic counterterrorism and
counterintelligence targets;
(F) producing a common intelligence picture of
domestic threats to the national security of the United
States;
(G) producing high quality and timely intelligence
analysis;
(H) integrating intelligence analysts into its
intelligence collection operations; and
(I) sharing intelligence information with
intelligence community partners.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Extension.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1,
2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2009''.
(2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment
made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the
enactment of such section 1007.
(3) Commission membership.--
(A) In general.--The membership of the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community established under subsection (a) of section
1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438)
(referred to in this section as the ``Commission'')
shall be considered vacant and new members shall be
appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as
amended by subparagraph (B).
(B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section
1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.''.
(4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking
``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and
development programs and activities. Such review shall
include--''.
(b) Funding.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated
by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000
available to the Commission to carry out title X of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
(2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until
expended.
SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
(a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall provide to
the congressional intelligence committees all information necessary to
assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain,
budgetary authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence
activity is being or was conducted;
``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in
carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views;
``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the
intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods;
``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other
resources; and
``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
fail.''.
(b) Reporting on Activities Other Than Covert Actions.--Section 502
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(d) Distribution of Information.--
``(1) Request.--Information or material provided in
accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available to each
member of the congressional intelligence committees, unless the
President requests that access to the information or material
be limited after determining that limiting such access is
essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital
interests of the United States. A request under this paragraph
and the extraordinary circumstances referred to in this
paragraph shall be detailed in writing to the Chair and ranking
minority member of the congressional intelligence committees.
``(2) Distribution.--If the President submits a request under
paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority member of each
congressional intelligence committee may jointly determine
whether and how to limit access to the information or material
within such committee. If the Chair and ranking minority member
of such committee are unable to agree on whether or how to
limit such access, access to the information or material will
be limited. Any information or material to which access is
limited shall subsequently be made available to each member of
the congressional intelligence communities at the earliest
possible time and shall include a detailed statement of the
reasons for not providing prior access.''.
(c) Approval of Covert Actions.--Section 503(d) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(d)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting ``(d)(1)
The President''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a
`significant undertaking' if the activity--
``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research, development, or
operations;
``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or
other resources;
``(D) requires notification under section 504;
``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic relations
of the United States if such activity were disclosed without
authorization.''.
SEC. 503. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.
(a) Annual Reports.--Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting
``annual''; and
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and
inserting ``Annual'';
(B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and
inserting ``annual basis''; and
(ii) by striking ``preceding six-month
period'' and inserting ``preceding year'';
(C) by striking paragraph (2); and
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as
paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the following
new subparagraph:
``(L) The annual report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets required by section 118.''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).
SEC. 504. NOTICE OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING NORTH KOREA AND CHINA.
Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new
subsection:
``(f) A notification to the congressional intelligence committees
regarding intelligence information relating to North Korea or China
after all or part of the information has been communicated to the
governments of North Korea or China, respectively, shall not be
construed to fulfill the duty under this title to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
the intelligence activities of the United States.''.
SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING USE OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES.
It is the sense of Congress that the resources authorized under this
Act should not be diverted from human intelligence collection and other
intelligence programs designed to combat al Qaeda in order to study
global climate change.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF
1949.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs
(2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section
103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section
104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.
SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
(2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
(b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.--That
section is further amended--
(1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National
Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to
read as follows:
``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.
SEC. 513. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for
the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs''.
SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended
as follows:
(1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
(A) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking
``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph
(1)(A)'';
(ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or
personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i);
and
(iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or
agency involved'' in the second sentence and
inserting ``involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency)'';
(B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section''
and inserting ``paragraph''; and
(C) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other''
after ``Acquisition''.
(2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
(3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)),
by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''.
SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
(a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I
of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice''.
(2) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
(3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by
inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''.
(b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before
``an institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with
section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with
applicable law''; and
(C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
(2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific''
and inserting ``specific''.
SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy
Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and
inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Title 5.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and
inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(b) Title 44.--Title 44, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1336--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``National Imagery
and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''; and
(B) by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping
Agency'' each place it appears and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''; and
(2) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13,
by striking the item relating to section 1336 and inserting the
following new item:
``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications.''.
(c) Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section
201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and
inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 5959 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for fiscal year 2009 in order to enhance the
national security of the United States, to support and assist
the armed forces of the United States, and to facilitate and
oversee the execution of the foreign policy of the United
States. The bill also clarifies certain intelligence community
authorities and makes technical corrections to existing
statutes.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of
Section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. In addition, Section 317 of the bill incorporates
reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint
Explanatory Statement into the Act.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security
Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as intelligence and intelligence-
related activities conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense;
(2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;
(5) the Coast Guard; (6) the Department of State; (7) the
Department of the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9)
the Department of Justice; (10) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; (11) the Drug Enforcement Administration; (12)
the National Reconnaissance Office; (13) the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (14) the Department of
Homeland Security. The Committee has legislative, authorizing,
and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.
Committee Statement and Views
A. OVERVIEW
In an era of asymmetric threats, intelligence continues to
be one of the nation's most fundamental national security
tools. A well-resourced, well-managed, and well-trained
Intelligence Community is the nation's first line of defense
against terrorists, proliferators of weapons of mass
destruction, and other global actors who would do America harm.
The Committee strongly supports the brave women and men of
America's intelligence agencies and appreciates the personal
sacrifices, overseas deployments, and enormous risks they and
their families undertake to preserve our freedom.
Most of the nation's intelligence successes, of which there
are many, cannot be discussed in an unclassified report. So,
too, some of the biggest intelligence gaps cannot be written
about publicly. The Committee has conducted dozens of
classified hearings, briefings, and site visits to understand
the threats, assess our capabilities, and realign resources to
match the threats properly.
The Committee's principal concern continues to be that al-
Qaeda is stronger today than at any time since September 11,
2001. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large,
likely in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist group to grow in strength
over the past seven years. Hezbollah and Hamas have become more
capable and more determined. Dangerous states, including Syria,
continue to pursue nuclear capabilities. There is the
possibility that one of these states could transfer fissile
material to a terrorist group. The Committee is convinced that
this must remain our foremost worry.
B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2009 budget request, carrying out its annual
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close
examination of the U.S. Government's intelligence programs and
proposed expenditures.
Over the past two months, the Committee conducted 14 full
committee-level budget hearings and briefings on numerous
topics, including the following:
National Intelligence Program
Military Intelligence Program
Advanced Research and Development
Overhead Architecture
Human Intelligence
Covert Action
Human Capital
Cybersecurity
In addition to these events, committee members and staff
have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all
intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program,
the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information System
Security Program.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community throughout the year. This oversight
activity includes scores of committee and subcommittee hearings
and briefings; site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of
congressionally-directed reports; and studies of intelligence
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges.
C. THE LEGISLATION
The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended
authorizations for the Intelligence Community for fiscal year
2009. This includes an authorization for the intelligence
portion of the fiscal year 2009 bridge supplemental request to
fund counterterrorism operations as well as operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. At the time of consideration of H.R. 5959, the
Committee had not received the Administration's full emergency
supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2009. The
Committee will consider that proposal at a later time.
H.R. 5959 improves U.S. intelligence capabilities in
several important respects.
First, the bill invests in people, our most important
resource. It adds funding to enhance human intelligence
(HUMINT) collection and provides much-needed funds for other
enduring and emerging global security issues, such as
challenges faced in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The bill continues the Committee's longstanding commitment
to improving language capabilities in the Intelligence
Community, adding both funding and reporting requirements in
order to improve oversight of this perennial problem area.
The bill mandates implementation of security clearance
reform to allow first and second generation Americans, many of
whom may have critical language skills, to serve in the
Intelligence Community with proper clearances. In many
instances, the cumbersome security clearance process has
delayed the entry of highly-skilled applicants, or dissuaded
them from even seeking employment in the Intelligence
Community. The Committee has addressed a number of these
concerns to encourage the Community to hire the most qualified
people.
Second, the bill enhances congressional oversight by
ensuring that the Committee receives the information it needs
to conduct its inherent oversight function. The Committee has
borne witness to repeated failures by the Administration to
comply with the National Security Act of 1947, which mandates
that the Committee be ``fully and currently informed'' of all
intelligence activities. These failures prompted the Committee
to adopt two provisions to enhance reporting on intelligence
activities to the full membership of the congressional
intelligence committees. One provision would limit the use of
covert action funds until the full membership of the
intelligence committees are briefed on all covert actions in
effect as of April 24, 2008. Another provision would restrict
the Administration's attempts to limit information to only the
Chairman and Ranking Member, and clarifies the information that
must be reported to the full Committee.
Third, the bill authorizes much of the request for the
foundational activities of the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), while expressing the
Committee's concern about potential policy, implementation, and
governance issues. To that end, the bill also includes a
legislative provision requesting a presidential report on
creating a senior advisory panel composed of representatives
from the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the
private sector for the purposes of providing a vehicle to
address issues of concern. The Committee has performed an
extensive review of the proposed CNCI, which included holding
three hearings and numerous briefings and roundtables.
Fourth, the Committee is also concerned that Congress does
not have a full understanding of the magnitude of human and
fiscal intelligence resources that have been devoted to Iraq,
the expenditure of which often comes at the expense of fighting
the war on terror. H.R. 5959 requires a detailed report to the
Committee on this topic.
Fifth, the bill addresses a number of long-term technical
challenges in the Intelligence Community. It does so by adding
significant resources in both the National Intelligence Program
and the Military Intelligence Program to modernize signals
intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities and integrate them into a
global SIGINT Enterprise.
Finally, despite the size of the budget request, the
Administration did not include funds adequate to keep the U.S.
Intelligence Community competitive in advanced technologies.
Research and development funding is the nation's investment in
retaining state of the art technologies. The bill adds funds to
four agencies specifically for that purpose; and the Committee
urges the executive branch to sustain, if not increase, this
level of funding in future year requests.
The Committee adopted a number of amendments to H.R. 5959
offered by majority and minority members. The Committee is
pleased that this bill passed with bipartisan support.
D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative
The single largest request and the most important
initiative of the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request
was the CNCI. Since the announcement of the CNCI and the
issuance of the National Security Presidential Directive 54/
Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 23 in January 2008, the
Committee has focused much time and effort on understanding the CNCI
and its components.
At present, it would be fair to characterize the
Committee's response to the CNCI as one of conditional support.
The Committee finds a cybersecurity initiative worthwhile in
principle, but the details of the CNCI remain vague and, thus,
open to question. Until some of the governance, implementation,
and policy issues are identified, debated, and resolved, the
Committee believes that the funding request is excessive. Our
conclusions are summarized in the following five points:
A comprehensive, national initiative is long
overdue. The threat has continued to grow in scale and
sophistication, and our countermeasures have stagnated;
The Administration's near-term approach of
securing federal government systems appears reasonable,
although the Committee remains concerned about program
management and systems engineering capabilities;
There is consensus that an effective
cybersecurity initiative should be based on a ``defense
in depth'' approach that synchronizes the activities of
different elements of the government. However, the
various components of the CNCI do not seem very well-
connected, nor is it clear there are adequate
governance mechanisms to achieve the necessary
coordination;
The Committee understands the prudence of
delaying debate on major policy issues until the next
Administration, given the limited time remaining in the
current one. Nevertheless, the Administration has
addressed some important issues, and we must consider
how best to deal with those issues in order to achieve
progress; and
For the CNCI to work as described in the
Presidential Directive, it will require a partnership
with industry unlike any model that currently exists.
The excessive classification of the CNCI, however,
militates against the collaboration necessary to
achieve that partnership.
The Committee also notes that the federal government is not
presently organized or equipped to negotiate the myriad issues
and challenges presented by the implementation of the CNCI,
especially those that cross organizational and jurisdictional
boundaries. As the CNCI develops, it will be imperative that
the government also take into account the interests and
concerns of private citizens, the U.S. information technology
industry, and other elements of the private sector. Indeed, the
success of the CNCI will depend on the ability to develop and
implement a well-defined, comprehensive model for public sector
and private sector cooperation.
Many of the details of the CNCI are still evolving, and an
endeavor of this magnitude will need to be undertaken over the
course of many years. The Committee believes a mechanism should
be created to review the Intelligence Community's progress
toward refining and implementing the CNCI, as well as make
policy recommendations to the executive and legislative
branches in the areas of governance, privacy and civil
liberties, and regulatory issues. As a result, the Committee
has included a legislative provision requiring a report from
the President on options for creating a high-level advisory
body.
Overreliance on supplemental funding
The Committee wishes to express once again its unequivocal
disapproval of the recurring practice of funding intelligence
activities through emergency supplemental requests rather than
within the parameters of the standard budgeting process. The
supplemental funding process ensures significantly less
scrutiny of funding requests, both within the executive branch
and in Congress, and invites waste. It prevents authorizing
committees from performing their functions of oversight and
evaluation, often resulting in investment in ill-advised and
unvetted programs. Many of these programs have out-year funding
``tails'' that, in an era of declining budgets, will
necessitate funding within base appropriations once
supplemental requests cease.
The practice of budgeting by supplemental is particularly
egregious in the arena of intelligence activities, which by
statute are supposed to receive a higher level of scrutiny than
other federal funding. The Committee hopes that one of the
first orders of business for the new Administration is to stop
this fiscally irresponsible practice and to work with Congress
to find funding solutions that do not bring the Department of
Defense and the Intelligence Community to a stand-still.
Human intelligence capability throughout the world
The maintenance of a robust HUMINT capability on a global
basis is as much a mission priority as countering terrorism and
supporting activity in the war theater. As world events
continue to demonstrate, some of the greatest threats to the
strategic interests of the United States emanate from sovereign
nations, not from terrorist organizations or other non-state
actors. The need for the National HUMINT Manager and other
senior leadership in the Intelligence Community to devote
sufficient personnel and financial resources to fulfill the
global HUMINT mission has been a significant priority of
Congress for many years.
The Committee remains concerned that identified,
meritorious HUMINT initiatives are not being funded or
adequately supported by the Administration. Accordingly, this
bill provides additional, targeted HUMINT funding to enhance
the nation's capability to ascertain the plans and intentions
of those seeking to undermine the interests and security of the
United States.
Issues regarding Committee notification of Syria's nuclear program
In April 2008, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
briefed the Committee on the construction of a covert nuclear
facility in Syria and its subsequent destruction in September
2007.
Over the course of the preceding eight months, the Chairman
and Ranking Minority Member had requested that the President
brief the full membership of the Committee about these
developments, which significantly impact U.S. foreign policy
toward the Middle East and North Korea.
Just hours before a highly-orchestrated public roll-out of
the previously classified intelligence, the President finally
sent briefers to the Committee. The delay was inexcusable and
violated the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that
the executive branch keep Congress ``fully and currently
informed'' of all intelligence activities. Congress should be
briefed on the threats to the United States in a timely manner,
not simply when it is politically expedient.
The world is more dangerous today than at any time since 9/
11. There are serious challenges to U.S. national and
international security that require the Administration and
Congress to work together. The Administration's clear disdain
for the legitimate oversight role of Congress makes it
difficult for Congress to do its part in meeting these
challenges and keeping America secure.
Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
The National Security Act of 1947 is the principal
legislative source for the executive's requirement to keep the
congressional intelligence committees informed of the nation's
intelligence activities. As the Committee has noted, this
obligation is absolutely critical to sound congressional
oversight, which in turn is central to a well-functioning and
effective Intelligence Community.
In recent years, the Administration has, on several
occasions, ignored the plain language of the Act. In one case,
the Administration refused, for an extended period of time, to
brief the full Committee membership on the President's
warrantless surveillance program, notwithstanding that it was
not a covert action program. In another case, the
Administration ignored months of requests for a briefing on
Syria's nuclear program, despite the fact that the
Administration was preparing to brief reporters on the same
issue and had already briefed foreign nations on the issue.
This is unacceptable. For this reason, the Committee has
included several amendments to the reporting requirements of
the Act. These amendments are intended to clarify that the
obligation to report to the committees is not negotiable. It is
not an obligation that the President can ignore at his
discretion. It is not an obligation that can be evaded by
claiming that briefing the congressional intelligence
committees will require other committees to be briefed. It is
not an obligation that can be evaded by broad assertions of
executive power.
Diversity in the intelligence community
The Committee is committed to increasing diversity in the
Intelligence Community and notes with approval that the DNI
identified treating ``diversity as a strategic mission
imperative'' in his 100-day and 500-day plans. In particular,
the DNI has stated that one of his goals is to improve the
recruiting, hiring, and retention of first and second
generation Americans. Indeed, across the community, minority
hiring is at a five-year high. Despite this progress, the
Intelligence Community overall is still substantially behind
the civilian labor force and the federal workforce in minority
and female representation. This gap is even more apparent in
core mission areas and management positions, especially at the
highest levels.
The Committee believes that the DNI's stated commitment
should show measurable results. Unfortunately, several
indicators within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) show a lack of attention and commitment to
diversity. For example, the ODNI is below average in the
Intelligence Community for minority representation, and is
significantly below average in the Intelligence Community in
its hiring of minorities. In particular, the DNI's Office of
Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity has suffered
significant budget cuts over the past three years, despite
taking on new mandates. The DNI's commitment to diversity can
be most clearly shown in the composition of his own office. The
Committee hopes that the ODNI will show an improvement in
minority representation in the future, and urges the DNI to
hold his office to the same standards that he expects from the
rest of the Intelligence Community.
Committee investigation into the destruction of interrogation
videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency
On December 10, 2007, the Committee announced an
investigation into the making, retention, and destruction of
interrogation videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). That investigation, initiated as part of the Committee's
oversight of the CIA, is intended to ascertain the facts
regarding the destruction of the videotapes and failure to
notify the Committee regarding the destruction.
The Committee's investigation is ongoing and has made
substantial progress. The Committee has received hundreds of
pages of documents in response to its document requests. The
Committee has also held two hearings to take sworn testimony
and has conducted several staff-level interviews.
While the sensitive nature of the investigation prevents
extensive public discussion of the investigation, the Committee
believes that it is critical to its oversight work. The
Committee looks forward to completion of its investigation and
plans to issue a report documenting its findings.
Creation of a National Applications Office in the Department of
Homeland Security
Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
announced the creation of the National Applications Office
(NAO) under the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to
facilitate access by non-traditional users to national
technical means-derived intelligence. This new office currently
has the authority to process imagery, measurement
andsignatures, and electronic intelligence requests for civil
applications and homeland security purposes.
The Committee notes the apparent care with which the DHS is
approaching the establishment of the NAO. Pursuant to
congressional mandate, the Committee has received several
documents outlining the legal authorities under which NAO will
operate. The Committee, however, remains concerned with the
planned use of national technical means for law enforcement
purposes, as opposed to homeland security purposes. Such use is
unprecedented and raises significant constitutional issues.
Therefore, the Committee looks forward to reviewing the results
of the statutorily-mandated Government Accountability Office
review of the Secretary's certification that NAO activities
comply with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy
and civil liberties standards.
The NAO charter also requires an interagency legal working
group to resolve any privacy, civil liberties, and policy
issues surrounding the use of national technical means for the
purposes of law enforcement. The Committee expects to be kept
apprised of the group's work on these issues and on the
development of legal parameters and guidance on the functioning
of the law enforcement domain within the NAO.
Major systems acquisitions
The Committee notes with concern the continued cost
overruns and schedule delays affecting the acquisition of many
major intelligence community systems. At the same time, the
Committee acknowledges the effort entailed in preparing the
DNI's 2007 Annual Report to Congress on Intelligence Community
Program Management Plans, which compares the performance of all
National Intelligence Program acquisition programs against a
DNI-established baseline. The Committee is also pleased that
one goal of the DNI's 500 Day Plan is to build acquisition
excellence within the Intelligence Community. With Intelligence
Community Directive 105 and Intelligence Community Program
Guidance 105.1, the DNI is requiring practices that will
increase the likelihood of successful acquisitions. Finally,
the Committee applauds the DNI's recommended greater use of
experienced systems engineers during the acquisition process.
The Committee encourages the DNI to issue a formal policy
establishing a procedure by which the Intelligence Community
would be empowered to withhold incentives from companies with
poor contract performance. Such a policy would forcefully
demonstrate the expectations for contractor performance.
Despite coverage of this topic in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, practices are not standard across the Intelligence
Community, even within directorates of individual agencies. The
Committee believes that standardization of policy would restore
meaning to the use of award incentives and benefit the entire
Intelligence Community.
The Committee notes that the continuing consolidation of
industry is impacting the government's ability to contract with
independent companies when conducting major systems
acquisitions. Specifically, the Committee is concerned about
cases in which a single parent company has a contract for
engineering technical assistance in support of a source
selection and also intends to compete for the system
development contract. The Committee urges the Deputy DNI for
Acquisition to consider whether established firewalls are
sufficient to prevent any potential conflict of interest in
such cases.
Acquisition program performance notification
The Committee is concerned that delays in informing
Congress that major acquisition programs for the Intelligence
Community are over cost, behind schedule, or failing to adhere
to milestones serves to undermine good oversight. In many
cases, the Committee has learned of a program failure only
after millions of dollars have been wasted.
To remedy this problem, the Committee urges the DNI to
develop, in consultation with the Committee, a standard for
program notification to keep the Committee fully informed of
program issues. The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment to the Department of
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982 provides an
example of such a standard. The guidance should, for example,
ensure congressional notification at the end of each quarter of
total acquisition costs per unit for each major intelligence
program. It should also require notification if an agency head
has reason to believe a program will exceed the authorized
funding by a specific percentage.
Advanced research and development
Advanced Research and Development (R&D) is critical to the
ability of the Intelligence Community to accomplish its
missions. Intelligence officers must remain several steps ahead
of their targets and adversaries. Technical innovation is often
the key to accomplishing this goal. The Committee believes that
the Intelligence Community's investment in R&D is insufficient
to enable the elements of the Intelligence Community to keep up
with both current and future challenges. The elements of the
Intelligence Community must be encouraged and allowed to invest
more resources in Advanced R&D.
The fiscal year 2009 budget presents an example of the R&D
challenge. As often happens in the Intelligence Community, the
research budgets were held steady, or cut, to fund the higher,
near-term priorities of Intelligence Community. The Committee
feels that these decisions were short-sighted. For this reason,
the Committee has increased funding for Advanced R&D above the
Administration's request. In the future, the Committee
encourages the DNI to ensure the allocation of necessary
funding and personnel resources to enhance the Intelligence
Community's R&D efforts.
The DNI must also provide adequate resources for the newly-
created Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(IARPA). IARPA was created to address long-term research
challenges from the perspective of the greater Intelligence
Community, rather than from an individual agency's more
operationally-focused vantage point. While the Committee had
initial concerns about IARPA's creation and the impact it would
haveon the research programs of the individual elements of the
Intelligence Community, the Committee is pleased that the ODNI has
taken the first required steps for success. IARPA will benefit greatly
from the selection of a Director and the stability of a dedicated
location for its activities. The Committee looks forward to observing
how the ODNI nurtures this organization as it develops new and
innovative long-term research programs.
Future course for overhead architecture
The Committee remains concerned that neither the DNI nor
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)] is
showing an appropriate sense of urgency in charting a viable
future course for the overhead constellation. The classified
annex to the bill contains guidance to the Intelligence
Community to focus on lower-risk and presumably less-expensive
solutions to current architectural problems. The Committee
urges the Intelligence Community to pursue evolutionary
upgrades to existing designs as a way to reduce near-term risk,
while at the same time exhorting the DNI to make more progress
in defining the next-generation designs. The Committee does not
prescribe specific technical solutions, but it does seek to
ensure that all available technologies and existing
capabilities are being given full and careful consideration
before the executive branch embarks on formal acquisitions. The
Committee also seeks to ensure that any acquisition undertaken
is part of a clear path towards a future capability or
architecture.
While there is no clear consensus on the specifics of the
way ahead, there is widespread agreement that the DNI and
USD(I) have yet to deliver an architecture sufficiently
compelling to win the support of Congress. The Committee urges
the DNI and the USD(I) to develop a cohesive and comprehensive
strategy prior to the submission of the fiscal year 2010 budget
request.
Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense
Intelligence Agency
The Committee has recently learned that the Secretary of
Defense approved the dissolution of the Counterintelligence
Field Activity (CIFA) and the integration of its functional
elements into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As part of
this integration, the USD(I) is seeking to amend DIA's charter
in order to, among other things, designate DIA as a law
enforcement activity.
The Committee is concerned about DIA's suitability to
engage in law enforcement activities that are designed to
investigate non-DIA personnel. DIA's stated mission is to
collect, analyze, and manage foreign military intelligence for
war fighters. The Agency has no experience with managing,
overseeing, and leading criminal investigations of non-DIA
personnel, even investigations that have a counterintelligence
nexus.
The Committee will continue to follow this issue closely,
including through reports required elsewhere in this Act.
FBI's use of national security letters
The Committee has been, and remains, extremely concerned by
the reports from the Department of Justice Inspector General
(DOJ/IG), which found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) abused its statutory authority with respect to National
Security Letters (NSLs) from 2003 through 2006.
An NSL is a demand letter used by the FBI to obtain,
usually from businesses, the records and data related to
telephone and electronic communications, financial
transactions, and credit reports. Unlike search warrants, they
require no probable cause and involve no judicial oversight
unless challenged, which is difficult to do, as 97 percent of
NSLs impose non-disclosure and confidentiality restraints on
the recipients.
In a March 2007 report examining FBI activities from 2003
through 2005 and a March 2008 report examining activities in
2006, the DOJ/IG detailed a complete breakdown in FBI oversight
and internal controls over these intrusive investigative tools,
including:
inaccurate reporting to Congress of the
number of NSLs issued;
poor training on Attorney General guidelines
on the balance of privacy interests and legitimate
investigative requirements;
the use of more than 700 ``exigent letters''
that circumvented the requirements of the NSL statute;
an absence of FBI guidelines, reliable
record-keeping, or effective management controls
regarding the use of NSLs; and
significant problems with the FBI's process
for identifying and reporting to the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board known statutory violations
and policy with regard to its use of NSLs, as required
by law.
These abuses are made more worrisome because of the
enormous growth in the FBI's requests to use NSLs, including
those which seek information related to U.S. persons.
Committee members and staff have been provided information
about a series of corrective measures that the FBI has put in
place since the release of the March 2007 report. The Committee
agrees with the DOJ/IG that the FBI has made significant
progress toward rectifying its many failures; and the Committee
commends the Bureau's senior leaders for their personal
involvement in these improvements. Among the changes are (1)
new comprehensive guidance on the proper use of NSLs,
accompanied by detailed training for agents nationwide; (2) the
establishment of a new Office of Integrity and Compliance; and
(3) the establishment of an NSL-tracking database to ensure
proper authorizations are received and accurate reports are
provided to Congress.
In spite of these measures, the Committee is concerned that
no one has been held accountable for the myriad failures of
leadership, oversight, training, or quality control,
particularly regarding the egregious issuance of ``exigent
letters'' that demanded information by inaccurately promising
that an NSL or grand jury subpoena would be forthcoming.
Furthermore, the Committee agrees with the DOJ/IG's
conclusion that it is too early to see if these corrective
measures will mitigate the full range of problems and abuses.
In particular, the Committee notes the DOJ/IG's finding that
mechanisms established by the FBI still inadequately guarantee
appropriate privacy safeguards or minimize the FBI's retention
of NSL-derived information. The Committee urges the FBI to
ensure that a proper balance is reached between protecting the
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons and the FBI's
genuine investigative needs. The Committee intends to remain
fully engaged in future NSL-related developments and attentive
to any accountability reviews conducted by the Department of
Justice.
Global climate change
The Committee continues to acknowledge the critical impact
of climate change on our national security and the inherent
intelligence challenges of developing analytically-sound
indicators with which to gauge the rates and types of global
change and the likely impact on migrations, ethnic and
international tensions, and the capacities and intentions of
nations.
Several reports in 2007 and 2008 projected the security
implications of various rates of climate change, and some also
called for more robust intelligence capacities to address these
scenarios. For example, a report by eleven retired U.S.
generals and admirals, published by the Center for Naval
Analysis in April 2007, found that ``projected climate change
poses a serious threat to America's national security'' and
recommended that ``the national security consequences of
climate change should be fully integrated into national
security and national defense strategies.''
In the near term, the prospect of a catastrophic climate-
related national security crisis may seem remote. However, the
Committee recalls a time when people thought that the prospect
of a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil was remote.
To better ensure that the nation is well-positioned to deal
with such a crisis, the Committee has authorized additional
funds for the purpose of enhancing the Intelligence Community's
collaboration efforts with the scientific community to address
these challenges and to build relationships with international
and national sources of expertise. The Committee urges the
executive branch to use these resources as a catalyst for
innovative, forward-looking efforts to build the capacity of
the Intelligence Community to provide warning and strategic
analysis in the context of global climate change.
The Committee is pleased that the National Intelligence
Council (NIC) is addressing the security implications of
climate change through a National Intelligence Assessment
(NIA). The Committee is optimistic that publication of the NIA
and its associated research will encourage intelligence
analysts and managers to take climate change-related factors
into account in their ongoing assessment of many intelligence
issues.
Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes
On May 8, 2008, the Committee met in open and closed
session and ordered the bill H.R. 5959 favorably reported, as
amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 5959.
Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 5959. The contents of the amendment in the
nature of a substitute, as amended, are described in the
Section-by-Section analysis and the Explanation of Amendment.
The Committee considered the following amendments to the
amendment in the nature of a substitute:
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to limit the use of funds
authorized by the bill for purposes of prohibiting or
discouraging the use of certain words or phrases within the
Intelligence Community or the Federal Government. It was not
agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the DNI to
produce a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the
Iranian nuclear program, to include a reassessment of past
intelligence relating to the program. Mr. Hoekstra's amendment
failed on voice vote.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
private contractors for interrogation of persons in the custody
or control of the Federal Government. Mr. Rogers offered a
second degree amendment to Ms. Schakowsky's amendment,
authorizing the DNI to issue waivers to the prohibition. Ms.
Schakowsky withdrew her amendment.
Mr. Holt offered an amendment to require the video
recording of interrogations of persons in the custody of or
under the effective control of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Holt withdrew his amendment.
Mr. Hoekstra requested unanimous consent to offer three
amendments en bloc: (1) an amendment to require the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to complete a report on
transformation of the Agency; (2) an amendment to require
theDirector of National Intelligence to complete a feasibility study on
revoking the pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information; and (3) an amendment stating that it is the
sense of Congress that resources authorized by the bill should not be
diverted from human intelligence collection or other intelligence
programs designed to combat al-Qaeda in order to study global climate
change.
Each amendment en bloc was agreed to by voice vote.
The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and
reconvened in open session for business two hours later.
OPEN SESSION
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
private contractors for interrogations involving persons in the
custody or control of the CIA unless a written waiver is
granted by the DNI. It was agreed to by voice vote.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate all earmarks
from H.R. 5959 and to strike the provision authorizing the
transfer of $39 million to the Department of Justice for the
operation of the National Drug Intelligence Center. The
amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes to 4 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett,
Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Cramer, Mr. Holt, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate the
provision establishing an independent Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. The amendment was not agreed to by voice
vote.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to limit interrogation
techniques to those proscribed by the United States Army Field
Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Discussion
of the amendment was deferred because national security would
be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed.
Later, the amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9
ayes to 12 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney,
Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr.
Schiff.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr.
Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Ms. Wilson of New Mexico offered an amendment to amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The amendment was not
agreed to by a record vote of 10 ayes to 11 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr.
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt,
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to prohibit the
use of funds authorized in the bill for purposes of
implementing the FBI's mandatory reassignment of a supervisor
after serving in a management position for 5 years. The
amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 21 ayes to 0 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra,
Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
Mr. McHugh offered an amendment to the National Security
Act of 1947 to clarify that reporting regarding North Korea and
China must be provided to the Committee before being provided
to those nations. The amendment was agreed to by a record vote
of 17 ayes and 4 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Mr.
Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff,
Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr.
Tierney.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to establish rules for
rendition by elements of the Intelligence Community in order to
prevent harsh treatment by third nations, and to encourage
timely legal proceedings against the rendered party.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Everett moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 19
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Everett, Mr.
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt,
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The
Schakowsky amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 10
ayes to 11 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr.
Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh,
Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
By voice vote, the Committee then adopted the Chairman's
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra,
Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
Ms. Wilson offered an amendment to modify the classified
annex to accompany the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to reduce the
number of positions and funding for the Community Management
Account.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The
Wilson amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes
to 12 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
The Rogers amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted the Schedule of
Authorizations, as amended.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the
Chairman to favorably report the bill to the House, as amended,
including by reference the classified schedule of
authorizations.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 of the Committee report authorizes
appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of a list of United States
Government departments, agencies, and other elements.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated under Section 101 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal
year 2009, and (subject to Section 103) the personnel ceilings
authorized for fiscal year 2009, are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of
Authorizations will be made available to the committees on
appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, and
to the President.
Section 102 also contains language indicating that no
earmarks are authorized in this Act.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility
of the DNI to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence
Community.
This section allows the DNI, with the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the
number authorized under Section 102 by an amount not to exceed
three percent of the total limit applicable to each element of
the Intelligence Community. The DNI must determine that the
action is necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions and must notify the congressional
intelligence committees prior to the increase.
It also requires the DNI to notify the congressional
intelligence committees of the exercise of authority under this
section.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes the sum of $648,842,000 in fiscal
year 2009 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of
the DNI. The Intelligence Community Management Account is part
of the Community Management Account. The section authorizes 772
full-time, or full-time equivalent, personnel for the
Intelligence Community Management Account, who may be either
permanent employees or individuals detailed from other elements
of the United States Government. Section 104 also authorizes
additional funds and personnel in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations for the Community Management Account.
Under Section 104, the DNI may use the authorities in
Section 103 to adjust personnel levels in elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account, subject to the
limitations in that section.
Section 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds
Section 105 limits the obligation or expenditure of covert
action funds to no more than 25 percent until such time as each
member of the congressional intelligence committees has been
briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in effect on
April 24, 2008.
Section 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement ``Five and Out''
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 106 bars the use of funds authorized under the Act
to implement a program (commonly referred to as the ``Five and
Out'' program) requiring the mandatory reassignment of a
supervisor of the FBI after such supervisor serves in a
management position for five years.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $279,200,000 for
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision
of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the
Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by
the CIA.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--PERSONNEL MATTERS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to
elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 302 expands from one year to two years the maximum
length of time that United States Government personnel may be
detailed to the ODNI on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable
basis, in which case, the employee continues to be paid by the
home agency. To utilize this authority, the joint agreement of
the DNI and head of the detailing element is required. The DNI
had requested authority to expand the permitted duration of
details from one year to three years. The Committee believes
that two years strikes an appropriate balance between the needs
of the DNI and the needs of the elements of the Intelligence
Community.
Section 303. Multi-level security clearances
Section 303 amends section 102A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), which sets forth the
responsibilities and authorities of the DNI, to require the DNI
to ensure that the elements of the Intelligence Community adopt
a multi-level approach to security clearances. This approach
will help ensure that the security clearance system is flexible
enough to allow the elements of the Intelligence Community to
leverage the skills and expertise of persons with cultural,
linguistic or other subject matter expertise critical to
national security.
Section 303 also requires the DNI to establish guidelines
implementing the requirements of this section.
Section 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel
Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404k(b)) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common
carrier when it is consistent with Intelligence Community
mission requirements or, more specifically, is required for
cover purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional
circumstances. Currently, the DNI may only delegate this
authority to the Principal Deputy DNI or, with respect to CIA
employees, to the Director of the CIA.
Section 304 provides that the DNI may delegate the
authority in section 116(b) of the National Security Act of
1947 to the head of any element. This expansion is consistent
with the view that the DNI should be able to delegate authority
throughout the Intelligence Community when such delegation
serves the overall interests of the Intelligence Community.
Section 304 also provides that the head of an element of
the Intelligence Community, to which travel authority has been
delegated, is empowered to assign such authority to senior
officials within the element, as specified in guidelines issued
by the DNI. This allows for administrative flexibility
consistent with the guidance of the DNIfor the entire
Intelligence Community. To facilitate oversight, the DNI shall submit
the guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence
Community.
Section 305 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head
of the element of the Intelligence Community concerned, to
prepare an annual assessment of the personnel and contractor
levels for each element of the Intelligence Community for the
subsequent fiscal year. Section 305 is a new mechanism to allow
both the executive branch and Congress to oversee personnel
growth in the Intelligence Community.
The assessment required by Section 305 seeks information
about budgeted personnel and contractor costs and levels, a
comparison of this information to current fiscal year data and
data from the previous five fiscal years, and a justification
for the requested personnel and contractor levels. The
assessment also requires the DNI to state that, based on
current and projected funding, the element will have sufficient
internal infrastructure and training resources to support the
requested personnel and contractor levels, and sufficient
funding to support the administrative and operational
activities of the requested personnel levels.
Section 305 also requires that the assessment contain
information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed
or contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community and
contractors who are the subjects of any Inspector General
investigations. The assessment must be submitted to
congressional intelligence committees concurrent with the
submission of the President's budget request.
The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment
required by Section 305 will provide information necessary for
the executive branch and Congress to understand the
consequences of modifying the Intelligence Community's
personnel levels. Section 305, therefore, recognizes that
personnel growth must be better planned in the future to
accomplish the goals of strengthening intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination. In addition, the Administration
must adequately fund its personnel growth plan and structure
its resources to ensure that personnel growth does not
compromise the implementation and execution of other programs.
With regard to historical contractor levels to be included
in the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that
there was no comprehensive effort, prior to the ODNI's
contractor inventory initiated in June 2006, to capture
information on the number and costs of contractors throughout
the Intelligence Community. In light of the concerns outlined
by the DNI, the Committee understands that information about
contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be reported as
a best estimate.
The Committee is also concerned about the Intelligence
Community's increasing reliance on contractors to meet mission
requirements. The Intelligence Community employs a significant
number of ``core'' contractors who provide direct support to
intelligence mission areas and are generally indistinguishable
from the U.S. Government personnel whose mission they support.
Given the cost disparity between employing a civilian federal
government employee, estimated at an average of $126,500
annually in fiscal year 2006, and a core contractor, estimated
at an average of over $250,000 annually in fiscal year 2006,
the Committee believes that the Intelligence Community should
strive to reduce its dependence on contractors. The personnel
assessment required in Section 305 should assist the DNI and
the congressional intelligence committees in determining the
appropriate balance of contractors and permanent government
employees.
Section 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community
contractors.
Section 306 requires the DNI to provide a one-time report
by November 1, 2008, describing the personnel services
activities performed by contractors across the Intelligence
Community, the impact of contractors on the Intelligence
Community, and the accountability mechanisms governing
contractors.
The reporting requirements of this section are designed to
address three primary concerns. First, leaders in the
Intelligence Community do not have sufficient factual
documentation regarding the size and use of its large
contractor workforce. Second, the Intelligence Community lacks
a clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately
performed by contractors and, as a result, whether contractors
and government employees are duplicating similar functions.
Third, the Intelligence Community does not have procedures for
overseeing contractors and ensuring the recognition of criminal
violations or the prevention and redress of financial waste,
fraud, or other abuses by contractors. The report is intended
to aid both the Intelligence Community and the congressional
intelligence committees in conducting oversight and devising
appropriate policy solutions.
Section 307. Report on proposed pay-for-performance Intelligence
Community personnel management system.
Section 307 prohibits the implementation of pay-for-
performance compensation reform within an element of the
Intelligence Community until 45 days after the DNI submits to
the Congress a report for each element of the Intelligence
Community, that describes, for each element, a proposed
employee advisory group, a plan for ensuring diversity in that
employee advisory group, a certification that all managers
involved in a pay-for-performance system have been sufficiently
trained on the implementing guidance for that system, and a
description of a mechanism for employees to appeal pay
decisions to someone outside the management chain of each
element.
The Committee remains concerned that the DNI is moving
forward with a major overhaul of compensation reform without
seeking sufficient employee input. The employees in the
Intelligence Community should be able to make recommendations
and advise senior managers on the creation and implementation
of such a program. Such advisory groups should also represent
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. In addition, the
transition to this new system will require greater attention
and effort on the part of managers in the intelligence
community. Managers should be trained on the new systemso that
they know what will be expected of them, and how to implement the
system fairly. Finally, because this new system leaves much more to the
discretion of managers in setting performance expectations and rating
their employees than ever before, the system is potentially vulnerable
to arbitrariness, discrimination or abuse. The Committee seeks to
ensure employees are adequately protected from such inappropriate
actions and have adequate mechanisms to contest or appeal adverse
decisions.
Section 308. Report on plan to increase diversity within the
Intelligence Community
Section 308 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community, to submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
plans of each element of the Intelligence Community, including
the ODNI, to increase diversity within that element. The report
shall include the specific implementation plans to increase
diversity.
To ensure that the report is submitted in a timely fashion,
Section 308 requires the DNI to submit the report by no later
than November 1, 2008.
Section 309. Report on security clearance determinations
Section 309 requires the Director of the OMB to submit to
Congress a report on those security clearance determinations
that have taken longer than one year to complete, including the
agencies requesting such determinations and reasons for the
delay. The Committee welcomes improvements that have been made
in improving the timeliness of security clearance processing,
but is concerned that the processing of some security
clearances, particularly for industry, continue to take far too
long. The report will contribute needed data for ongoing
management by the executive branch as well as for congressional
oversight.
SUBTITLE B--OTHER MATTERS
Section 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 311 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution and the laws of
the United States.
Section 312. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community
under the National Security Act of 1947
Section 312 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as
``element of the Intelligence Community'' of elements of
departments and agencies of the United States Government
whether or not those departments and agencies are listed in
Section 3(4).
Section 313. Modification of availability of funds for different
intelligence activities
Section 313 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B)
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004) (``IRTPA'') (governing the
transfer and reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence
funding).
This amendment to the National Security Act replaces the
``unforeseen requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B)
with a more flexible standard to govern reprogramming and
transfers of funds authorized for a different intelligence or
intelligence-related activity. Under the new standard,
reprogramming or transfer authority may be sought if, in
addition to the other requirements of Section 504(a)(3), the
new use of funds ``supports an emergent need, improves program
effectiveness, or increases efficiency.'' This modification
brings the standard for reprogramming and transfers of
intelligence funding into conformity with the standards
applicable to reprogramming and transfers under Section 102A of
the National Security Act of 1947. The modification preserves
congressional oversight of proposed reprogramming and transfers
while enhancing the Intelligence Community's ability to carry
out missions and functions vital to national security.
Section 314. Protection of certain national security information
Section 314 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for
an individual with authorized access to classified information
who intentionally discloses any information identifying a
covert agent, if that individual knows the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's
intelligence relationship to the United States.
Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone
who has had ``authorized access to classified information that
identifies a covert agent'' is ten years. This provision
increases that maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the
maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who ``as a result of
having authorized access to classified information, learns the
identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any
information identifying such covert agent'' is five years. This
provision increases that maximum sentence to ten years.
Section 314amends Section 603(a) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the annual
report from the President on the protection of identities of
certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents,
informants, and sources, also include an assessment of the need
for any modification for the purpose of improving legal
protections for covert agents.
Section 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires certain federal
employees, spouses, dependents, and others, to file reports
with their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts or
decorations from foreign governments. Following compilation of
these reports, the employing agency is required to file
annually with the Secretary of State detailed information about
the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations by its employees,
including the source of the gift. The Secretary of State is
required to publish a comprehensive list of such agency reports
in the Federal Register.
With respect to intelligence activities, the public
disclosure of gifts or decorations for personnel and certain
contractors in the Intelligence Community has the potential to
compromise intelligence sources or confirm intelligence
relationships with foreign governments and, consequently,
undermine national security. Recognizing this concern, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted a limited
exemption from reporting certain information about such foreign
gifts or decorations where the publication of the information
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources.
Section 1079 of the IRTPA extended a similar exemption to the
DNI and applied the existing exemption to the Director of the
CIA.
Section 315 provides to the heads of each element of the
Intelligence Community the same limited exemption from the
specified public reporting requirements currently authorized
for the DNI and Director of the CIA. The national security
concerns that prompt those exemptions apply equally to other
elements of the Intelligence Community. Section 315 mandates
that information not provided to the Secretary of State be
provided to the DNI to ensure continued independent oversight
of the receipt of foreign gifts or decorations by personnel of
the elements of the Intelligence Community.
Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between
senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and
their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the
provisions of Section 315 unless there is a serious concern
that such contacts and gifts would adversely affect United
States intelligence sources or methods.
Section 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of
2006
Section 316 requires the DNI to submit a classified,
comprehensive report to the congressional intelligence
committees on all measures taken by the ODNI, and by any other
element of the Intelligence Community with relevant
responsibilities, on compliance with the detention and
interrogation provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
and of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The report is to
be submitted no later than 45 days after enactment of this Act.
The Detainee Treatment Act provides that no individual in
the custody or under the physical control of the United States,
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress
reaffirmed this mandate in Section 6 of the Military
Commissions Act, adding an implementation mechanism that
requires the President to take action to ensure compliance,
including through administrative rules and procedures. Section
6 provides not only that grave breaches of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions are war crimes under Title 18 of the
United States Code, but also that the President has authority
for the United States to promulgate higher standards and
administrative regulations for violations of U.S. treaty
obligations. It requires the President to issue those
interpretations by Executive Order published in the Federal
Register.
The report required by Section 316 must include a
description of the detention or interrogation methods that have
been determined to comply with the prohibitions of the Detainee
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act or have been
discontinued pursuant to them.
The Detainee Treatment Act also provides for the protection
against civil or criminal liability for United States
Government personnel who engaged in officially authorized
interrogations that were determined to be lawful at the time.
Section 316 requires the DNI to report on actions taken to
implement that provision.
The report shall also include an appendix containing all
guidelines on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act and
the Military Commissions Act to the detention or interrogation
activities, if any, of all elements of the Intelligence
Community engaging in such activities. The appendix shall also
include the legal justifications of any office of the
Department of Justice about the meaning of the Acts, with
respect to detention or interrogation activities, if any, of
any element of the Intelligence Community.
To the extent that the report required by Section 316
addresses an element of the Intelligence Community within the
DOD, that portion of the report, and associated material that
is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be
submitted by the DNI to the congressional armed services
committees.
Section 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 317 incorporates into the Act, by reference, each
requirement contained in the classified annex of this Act to
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees.
Because the classified information in the annex cannot be
included in the text of the bill, incorporating the reporting
provisions of the classified annex is the only available
mechanism to give these reporting requirements the force of
law. The Committee, therefore, chooses to include Section 317
to reflect the importance of the reporting requirements in the
classified annex.
Section 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 318 eliminates certain reporting requirements that
were considered particularly burdensome to the Intelligence
Community in cases where the usefulness ofthe report, or
section thereof, has diminished either because of changing events or
because the information contained in those reports is duplicative of
information already obtained through other avenues.
Section 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program
Section 319 allows the head of any element of the
Intelligence Community to establish an undergraduate training
program for civilian employees. This is an authority similar to
that granted to the Secretary of Defense under section 16 of
the National Security Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for
civilian employees of the National Security Agency (NSA).
Section 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory
panel
Section 320 requires the President to submit a report to
Congress outlining options for the creation of an advisory
panel to make policy recommendations on the development of the
CNCI. The report is to be submitted to Congress not later than
February 1, 2009.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(e)), as added by the IRTPA, provides that
commencing on October 1, 2008, the ODNI may not be co-located
with any other element of the Intelligence Community. Section
401 clarifies that this ban applies only to the co-location of
the headquarters of the ODNI with the headquarters of any other
element of the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the ODNI
may be co-located with non-headquarters units of elements of
the Intelligence Community.
Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board
Section 402 substitutes the DNI as a member of the
Transportation Security Oversight Board established under
section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States Code, in place of
the Director of the CIA or the Director's designee. The
Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for,
among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and
law enforcement activities relating to transportation and
facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law
enforcement information relating to transportation among
federal agencies.
Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and
Technology
Section 403 clarifies the responsibilities and duties of
the Director of Science and Technology within the ODNI and the
DNI's Science and Technology Committee to ensure that, across
the Intelligence Community, there is uniformity in the
definitions of basic, applied, and advanced research goals and
improved prioritization and coordination of science and
technology. This section further requires the DNI to submit to
Congress an annual report outlining the strategy for the
development and use of technology in the Intelligence
Community, demonstrating how applied resources map to the
outlined goals.
Section 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
Section 404 confirms in statute that certain officers in
the Intelligence Community are established within the ODNI.
These are (1) the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community (as renamed by Section 407); (2) the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community (as created by Section
408); (3) the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC); and (4) the Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center (NCPC). Section 404 also expressly
provides that the DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC.
Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404o-1) previously provided that the President could establish
the NCPC. In doing so, the President delegated to the DNI the
authority to name the Director. Section 404 codifies that
delegation.
Section 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center
energy efficiency reports
Section 405 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement
the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency
(``EPA'') report on data center energy efficiency submitted to
Congress under Section 1 of P.L. 109-431. A brief report
submitted by the DNI in February 2008 failed to address the
recommendations of the EPA report and did not constitute an
actual plan. This requirement is intended to encourage the
Intelligence Community to develop a plan to reduce consumption
of resources such as power and water by community data centers.
Section 406. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria,
and North Korea
Section 406 provides that not less than once during the
remainder of this fiscal year and semiannually thereafter, the
DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
individual classified reports on the nuclear intentions and
capabilities of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. An NIE may count
as one such report for each country. The Committee encourages
the DNI to make these reports available to other congressional
committees with oversight jurisdiction to the extent consistent
with the protection of sources and methods.
Section 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community
Section 407 expressly designates the position of Chief
Information Officer of the ODNI as Chief Information Officer of
the Intelligence Community. The modification to the title is
consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as
outlined in section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-3g).
Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 1078 of the IRTPA authorized the DNI to establish
an Office of Inspector General if the DNI determined that an
Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the
operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. It further provided
that the DNI could grant to the Inspector General any of the
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in the
Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI has appointed an
Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC/IG) and has
granted certain authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No.
2005-10 (Sept. 7, 2005).
A strong IC/IG is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in
the IRTPA, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the
Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the
broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever
they may be found in the Intelligence Community with respect to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the DNI,
especially the manner in which elements of the Intelligence
Community interact with each other in providing access to
information and undertaking joint or cooperative activities.
This section establishes an IC/IG in order to provide to the
DNI and, through reports, to Congress, the benefits of an
Inspector General with full statutory authorities and the
requisite independence.
The IC/IG will keep both the DNI and the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about
problems and deficiencies in programs and operations in the
Intelligence Community and the need for corrective actions. The
IC/IG will be appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and will report directly to the DNI. To
bolster the IC/IG's independence within the Intelligence
Community, the IC/IG may be removed only by the President, who
must communicate the reasons for the removal to the
congressional intelligence committees.
The DNI may prohibit the IC/IG from conducting an
investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that
it is necessary to protect vital national security interests.
If the DNI exercises the authority to prohibit an
investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons to the
congressional intelligence committees within seven days. The
IC/IG may provide a response to the committees, including views
on the denied investigation.
The IC/IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and
any employee of the Intelligence Community or employee of a
contractor whose testimony is needed. The IC/IG will also have
direct and prompt access to all records that relate to programs
and activities for which the IC/IG has oversight
responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for
appropriate administrative action.
The IC/IG will have subpoena authority. However,
information within the possession of the United States
Government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject
to the DNI's concurrence, the IC/IG may request information
from any department, agency, or element of the U.S. Government.
Such information must be provided to the IC/IG insofar as
practicable and not in violation of law or regulation.
The IC/IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that
include a description of significant problems relating to the
programs and operations of the Intelligence Community and to
the relationships between the elements of the Intelligence
Community. The reports must include a description of IC/IG
recommendations and a statement as to whether corrective action
has been completed. The IC/IG shall provide any portion of the
report involving a component of a department of the U.S.
Government to the head of that department simultaneously with
submission of the report to the DNI. Within 30 days of receipt,
the DNI must submit each semiannual report to Congress as
transmitted by the IC/IG.
The IC/IG must report immediately to the DNI particularly
serious or flagrant violations of law. Within seven days, the
DNI must transmit those reports to the congressional
intelligence committees together with any comments. In the
event the IC/IG is unable to resolve differences with the DNI,
the IC/IG is authorized to report a serious or flagrant
violation of law directly to the congressional intelligence
committees. Reports to the congressional intelligence
committees are also required with respect to investigations
concerning high-ranking officials in the Intelligence
Community.
Employees of the Intelligence Community or employees of
contractors who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent
concern,'' such as a violation of law or Executive Order, a
false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from
Congress, may report such complaints and supporting information
to the IC/IG. Following a review by the IC/IG to determine the
credibility of the complaint or information, the IC/IG must
transmit such complaint and information to the DNI. On
receiving the complaints or information from the IC/IG together
with the IC/IG's credibility determination, the DNI must
transmit the complaint or information to the congressional
intelligence committees. If the IC/IG does not find a complaint
or information to be credible, the reporting individual may
submit the matter directly to the congressional intelligence
committees by following appropriate security practices outlined
by the DNI. Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting
individuals constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.''
In providing this channel for whistleblower communications
to Congress, Section 408 does not disturb, and the Committee
intends to retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous
provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272 (October 20, 1998) as set forth in
the findings in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of
that Act, the Senate committee report for the legislation, S.
Rep. No. 105-185, at 25-27, and particularly the conference
report, H.R. Rep. 105-780, at 33-34, which emphasized that a
disclosure to the Inspector General ``is not the exclusive
process by which an intelligence community employee may make a
report to Congress.''
For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IC/IG and
an Inspector General for another intelligence community
element, the Inspectors General (IGs) shall resolve,
expeditiously, who will undertake an investigation, inspection,
or audit. In resolving that question, under an extensive
subsection entitled ``Coordination Among Inspectors General of
Intelligence Community,'' the IGs may request the assistance of
the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, a
presently existing informal body whose existence is codified by
this section. In the event that the IGs are still unable to
resolve the question, they shall submit it for resolution to
the DNI and the head of the department in which an Inspector
General with jurisdiction concurrent to that of the IC/IG is
located. This basic limitation addresses the concern raised by
the DNI about the preservation of the authority of heads of
departments and agencies over their respective departments.
Within Congress, mutuality of oversight is assured by the
requirement that Inspector General reports concerning
intelligence committee elements within departments are shared
with committees that have jurisdiction over those departments.
Section 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
Intelligence Community
Section 409 provides for an annual report by the DNI on the
proficiency of each element of the Intelligence Community in
foreign languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects. The
section also requires the DNI to report on foreign language
training. The Intelligence Community has an increasing need for
fluency in difficult-to-master languages and for expertise in
foreign cultures. The information required by the report will
allow the congressional intelligence committees to better
assess the Intelligence Community's ability to manage language
resources.
Section 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 410 amends the authorities and structures of the
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to eliminate
certain independent administrative authorities that had been
vested in the NCIX when that official was appointed by and
reported to the President. Those authorities are unnecessary
now that the NCIX is appointed by and under the authority of
the DNI.
Section 411. National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass
destruction in Syria
Section 411 provides that the DNI shall submit to Congress
an NIE on the history, status, and projected development of any
weapons of mass destruction program undertaken by Syria. This
requirement is intended to encourage the Intelligence Community
to focus attention on Syria's efforts to develop nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Section 411 also
provides that the NIE be submitted within 180 days after the
enactment of this Act and that it may be submitted in
classified form.
Section 412. Annual report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq
and Afghanistan
Section 412 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual report on the intelligence
resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during the
preceding year.
Section 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
Section 413 requires the DNI to appoint an ombudsman for
security clearances in the Intelligence Community. The
Committee has learned that persons experiencing delays in their
security clearances typically do not know where to turn for
information or help. The lack of communication is especially
frustrating for applicants who may seek other employment in the
absence of notice about the process. A security clearance
ombudsman will ensure that cases such as these will receive
timely attention, and serve as a clearinghouse for customer
concerns in the security clearance process.
The provision requires the heads of each element of the
Intelligence Community to provide contact information for the
ombudsman to those applying for security clearances, and
requires the ombudsman to make an annual report to the
congressional intelligence committees addressing the concerns,
complaints, and questions received over the preceding 12
months. Nothing in the Section 413 prevents the ombudsman from
having other duties.
Section 414. Security clearance reciprocity
Section 414 requires the IC/IG to conduct an audit of the
reciprocity of security clearances in the Intelligence
Community and to report to the congressional intelligence
committees on the results of that audit. The Committee is
concerned that lack of full reciprocity among agencies is an
indicator of concern within the Intelligence Community about
the quality of security clearances. The delay resulting from
``re-clearing'' previously-cleared personnel is disruptive to
the operations of the Intelligence Community, costly to
contractors, and a source of great frustration for the
individuals and organizations involved. In creating a joint,
collaborative, efficient Intelligence Community, people must be
able to transition efficiently between agencies and from
industry to government.
Section 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations
Section 415 requires the DNI to report to the congressional
intelligence committees assessing the threat to national
security presented by the efforts of foreign countries to
acquire sensitive equipment and technology and the sufficiency
of U.S. export controls in preventing such acquisitions.
Section 416. Report on nuclear trafficking
Section 416 requires the DNI to report to certain
congressional committees on the illicit trade of nuclear and
radiological material and equipment. The report must include
details of all cases of illicit sale, transfer, brokering or
transport of nuclear material or nuclear explosive devices, an
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of
nuclear trafficking, and a discussion of any dissents, caveats,
gaps, or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of
nuclear trafficking.
Section 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit
unauthorized disclosures of classified information
Section 417 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the
feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the
Intelligence Community who commit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information and to report the results of that study
to the congressional intelligence committees.
SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled
``Accountability for Intelligence Activities,'' sets forth the
Act's basic requirements on executive branch obligations to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed
about intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is specifically devoted
to presidential findings and congressional notification on
covert actions. Section 421 of this bill augments the oversight
of covert actions by requiring that the CIA Inspector General
(CIA/IG) conduct an audit of each covert action at least once
every three years and submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the audit results within 60 days
of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this
requirement confirms in statute existing practice and assures
its regularity.
The DNI has expressed concern that this audit requirement,
and several other provisions on intelligence community reports,
raises concerns with respect to the President's authority to
control access to national security information. To allay any
such concern regarding the covert action audit requirement, the
Committee has drafted Section 421 to state that the requirement
is subject to the longstanding provisions of section 17(b)(3)
and (4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)) that empower the Director of the CIA
to prohibit the CIA/IG from initiating, carrying out, or
completing an audit if the Director determines that the
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States, provided that the Director
report the reasons to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 422. Inapplicability to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on
progress in auditable financial statements
Section 422 relieves the Director of the CIA from the
requirement in section 114A of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual report describing the
activities being taken to ensure that financial statements of
the CIA can be audited in accordance with applicable law and
the requirements of OMB. Although the Committee remains
concerned that CIA does not expect to be auditable until 2011,
two years later than previously projected, the report required
by Section 114A is unnecessary as CIA is now submitting audited
financial statements. The requirements of Section 114A continue
to apply to the Directors of NSA, DIA, and NGA.
Section 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA
positions
Section 423 replaces out-of-date titles for CIA positions
with the current titles of the successors of those positions in
a provision in section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) that establishes the obligation of
the CIA/IG to notify the congressional intelligence committees
about investigations, inspections, or audits concerning high-
ranking CIA officials.
Section 424. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Section 424 changes the reference to the Director of
Central Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence
to clarify that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury (section 105
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
(Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003)), and its reorganization
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
(section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent
Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005
(Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004)), do not affect
the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the
Intelligence Community.
Section 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for
interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 425 prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any
funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the
interrogation of a detainee in the custody of the CIA. The DNI
may, however, grant a waiver if the Director of the CIA
determines that no employee of the federal government is
capable and available to conduct the interrogation, and that
the interrogation is in the national interest of the United
States. Section 425 also provides that contractors conducting
interrogations pursuant to a waiver by the DNI shall be
governed by the same laws that would apply if the interrogation
were conducted by an employee of the federal government.
SUBTITLE C--DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS
Section 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into
the Defense Intelligence Agency
Section 431 requires the USD(I) to submit to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report
describing the nature of any law enforcement authorities to be
delegated to the DIA; the legal authority under which the
Secretary of Defense is empowered to delegate a law enforcement
function to the DIA; and the guidelines for the implementation
of any law enforcement authorities delegated to the DIA should
such a delegation occur.
The Secretary of Defense recently approved the integration
of CIFA into the DIA. CIFA is, in part, a law enforcement
organization with certain law enforcement authorities. As a
result of this impending integration, the DIA is now
considering a change to its charter in order to absorb CIFA's
law enforcement role. The change would designate the DIA as a
law enforcement agency. Unlike CIFA, which is headed by a
civilian director, the DIA is directed by a military officer.
The Committee has several concerns regarding the Department
of Defense's pursuit of this course of action. First, the DIA's
stated mission is to collect, analyze, and manage foreign
military intelligence for war fighters; it has no experience
with managing, overseeing, and leading criminal investigations,
even those investigations that have a counterintelligence
nexus. Second, while there are operational efficiencies
associated with absorbing CIFA's law enforcement capabilities
into the DIA, those operational efficiencies must be balanced
properly against the concerns associated with military services
conducting law enforcement activities that could implicate
civilians. The Committee seeks to ensure that the decision to
absorb CIFA's law enforcement authorities into the DIA
undergoes a thorough and exhaustive legal review and that,
should the DIA's charter be amended to absorb the authorities,
the amendments include important boundaries to ensure that
civil liberties are adequately protected.
SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS
Section 441. Clarification of inclusion of the Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence
Community
Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community''
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that
service, See (50 U.S.C. 401a). Section 1073 of the IRTPA
modified the definition of ``intelligence community,''
inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion in the
Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or those
portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of
intelligence. Section 441 clarifies that all of the Coast
Guard's intelligence elements are included within the
definition of the ``intelligence community.''
Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and
Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
should be within the Intelligence Community.
Section 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 442 requires the Director of the FBI to report to
the congressional intelligence committees on the Director's
long-term vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities
of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of the
Bureau intended to achieve that vision.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Section 501. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research
and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community
The National Commission for Review of Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 and lapsed on September 1, 2004. Section
501 renews authority for this Commission by extending the
reporting deadline to December 31, 2009, and requiring that new
members be appointed to the Commission. This section also
authorizes $2 million for the Commission from the Intelligence
Community Management Account.
Section 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 502 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413) in three ways to clarify the executive branch's
obligations to notify Congress of intelligence activities.
First, Section 502 requires that, in meeting the
President's statutory obligation to keep the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities of the United States, the President
must provide to the congressional intelligence committees all
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness,
cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk
of intelligence activities.
Second, Section 502 clarifies that for all intelligence
activities other than covert actions, the DNI's obligation to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed is an obligation to keep the entire
membership of the congressional intelligence committees
informed, rather than a subset of members of the committees.
Section 502 allows reporting to less than the full membership
of the congressional intelligence committees where the Chair
and Ranking Minority Member of acongressional intelligence
committee jointly determine to agree to a written request by the
President for reporting to less than the full membership of the
committees.
Third, Section 502 defines ``significant undertaking,'' as
that term is used in 50 U.S.C. 413b(d) to clarify when the
President is required to ensure that the congressional
intelligence committees are notified with respect to covert
action.
Section 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
Section 503 amends a reporting requirement for the United
States Department of the Treasury. Section 503 makes annual a
report which had previously been required semiannually and
eliminates certain data requirements from that report.
Section 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China
Section 504 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413) to clarify that notification to the congressional
intelligence committees of intelligence information relating to
North Korea or China after all or part of the information has
been communicated to the governments of North Korea or China
does not fulfill the National Security Act's requirement to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United
States.
Section 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources
Section 505 expresses the sense of Congress that resources
under the Act shall not be directed from human intelligence
collection and other programs intended to combat al-Qaeda to
study global climate change.
SUBTITLE B--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
Section 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949
Section 511 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of
1947 to reflect amendments made by the IRTPA.
Section 512. Technical amendments to the multi-year National
Intelligence Program
Section 512 updates the ``multiyear national intelligence
program'' to incorporate organizational and nomenclatural
changes made by the IRTPA.
Section 513. Technical clarifications of certain references to Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities
Section 513 makes technical clarifications to the National
Security Act of 1947 to reflect the consolidation of the Joint
Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities program into the Military Intelligence
Program. This section preserves the requirement that the DNI
participate in the development of the annual budget and be
consulted prior to the transfer or reprogramming of funds for
the Military Intelligence Program.
Section 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 514 makes a number of technical corrections to the
National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the
IRTPA.
Section 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 515 makes a number of technical and conforming
amendments to the IRTPA.
Section 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
Section 516 makes technical amendments to the Executive
Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to
``Director of Central Intelligence,'' ``Deputy Directors of
Central Intelligence,'' and ``General Counsel to the National
Intelligence Director.''
Section 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency
Section 517 makes technical amendments to Titles 5 and 44
of the United States Code, and Section 201 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, by replacing references to ``National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' with ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.''
Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the bill
H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009. There are certain provisions in the legislation which
fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
In the interest of permitting your committee to proceed
expeditiously to floor consideration of this important bill, I
am willing to waive this committee's right to sequential
referral. I do so with the understanding that, by waiving
consideration of the bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
does not waive any future jurisdictional claim over the subject
matters contained in the bill which fall within its Rule X
jurisdiction. I request that you urge the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to appoint members of this committee to any
conference committee which is named to consider such
provisions.
Please place this letter into the committee report on H.R.
5959 and into the Congressional Record during consideration of
the measure on the House floor. Thank you for the cooperative
spirit in which you have worked regarding this matter and
others between our respective committees.
Sincerely,
Howard L. Berman,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Howard L. Berman,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that tall within the Title
X jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In
addition. I acknowledge that the Committee on Foreign Affairs
will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and
that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill
does not waive any future jurisdictional claim of the subject
matters which fall under your committee's Rule X jurisdiction.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to
support such a request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional
Record during floor consideration of this measure on the House
floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation
and other matters of great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
----------
House Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Capitol, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to confirm our mutual
understanding regarding H.R. 5959, authorizing appropriations
for fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. This
legislation contains subject matter within the jurisdiction of
the House Committee on Armed Services.
Our Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 5959 and
the need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore,
while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over this
legislation, the Committee on Armed Services will waive further
consideration of H.R. 5959. I do so with the understanding that
by waiving further consideration of the bill, the Committee
does not waive any future jurisdictional claims over similar
measures. In the event of a conference with the Senate on this
bill, the Committee on Armed Services reserves the right to
seek the appointment of conferees.
I would appreciate the inclusion of this letter and a copy
of the response in your Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in
the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on
the House floor.
Very truly yours,
Ike Skelton,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Ike Skelton,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall under the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services. In addition. I
acknowledge that the Committee on Armed Services will not seek
a sequential referral of this legislation and that your
decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not
waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Armed Services.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to
support such a request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional
Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward
to working with you on this legislation and other matters of
great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, House Select Committee on Intelligence,
The Capitol, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Reyes: I am writing to you regarding H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,
a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government.
H.R. 5959 contains provisions that fall within the House
Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. I
recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this bill to the
full House expeditiously. Accordingly, I will not seek a
sequential referral of the bill. However, this decision to
waive consideration of H.R. 5959 should not be construed as the
Committee on Homeland Security waiving, altering, or
diminishing its jurisdiction over this or similar legislation.
Additionally, the Committee on Homeland Security reserves
the right to seek the appointment of conferees during any
House-Senate conference convened on this legislation or on
similar legislation that is within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Homeland Security. I ask for your commitment to
support any such request by the Committee on Homeland Security
for the appointment of conferees on H.R. 5959 or similar
legislation. Finally, I respectfully ask that you place a copy
of your letter and this letter in the Committee Report on H.R.
5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration
of H.R. 5959.
Thank you for your timely consideration of my request. I
look forward to working with you as we prepare to pass this
important national security legislation.
Sincerely,
Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall under the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. In
addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on Homeland Security
will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and
that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill
does not waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of
the Committee on Homeland Security.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction. and I agree to
support such a request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional
Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward
to working with you on this legislation and other matters of
great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Reyes: In recognition of the desire to
expedite consideration of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Committee on the
Judiciary agrees to waive formal consideration of the bill as
to provisions that fall within the Committee's rule X
jurisdiction.
The Committee takes this action with the mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5959 at
this time, the Committee on the Judiciary does not waive any
jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar
legislation. The Committee also reserves the right to seek
appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-
Senate conference involving this legislation, and requests your
support if such a request is made.
I would appreciate your including this letter in the
committee report on the bill, or in the Congressional Record
during consideration of the bill on the House floor.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
John Conyers, Jr.,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 20, 2008.
Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act tier Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall within the rule
X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. In addition,
I acknowledge that the Committee on the Judiciary will not seek
a sequential referral of this legislation and that your
decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not
waive any future jurisdictional claim of the subject matters
which fall under your committee's rule X jurisdiction.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to
support such a request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional
Record during floor consideration of this measure on the House
floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation
and other matters of great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC, May 13, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Reyes: I am writing about H.R. 5959, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which the
Select Committee on Intelligence plans to markup on May 15,
2008.
I appreciate your effort to consult with the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform regarding those provisions of
H.R. 5959 that fall within the Oversight Committee's
jurisdiction. These provisions include Inspectors General,
federal civil service and personnel matters, and the disclosure
of certain information regarding the receipt and disposition of
foreign gifts and decorations.
In the interest of expediting consideration of H.R. 5959,
the Oversight Committee will not request a sequential referral
of this bill. I would, however, request your support for the
appointment of conferees from the Oversight Committee should
H.R. 5959 or a similar Senate bill be considered in conference
with the Senate.
This letter should not be construed as a waiver of the
Oversight Committee's legislative jurisdiction over subjects
addressed in H.R. 5959 that fall within the jurisdiction of the
Oversight Committee.
Finally, I request that you include our exchange of letters
on this matter in the Intelligence Committee Report on H.R.
5959 and in the Congressional Record during consideration of
this legislation on the House floor.
Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman.
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform. In addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform will not seek a sequential
referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a
sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future
jurisdictional claim over the subjects which fall under your
committee's jurisdiction.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to
support such a request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional
Record during consideration of this measure on the House floor.
I look forward to working with you on this legislation and
other matters of great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
Correspondence With Congressional Budget Office
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.
Mr. Peter R. Orszag,
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Orszag: In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, I am writing to
request a cost estimate of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, pursuant to sections
308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have
attached a copy of the bill as approved by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor as soon
as possible, and I would very much appreciate an expedited
response to this request. Should you have any questions related
to this request, please contact Caryn Wagner, the Committee's
Budget Director, at 202-225-7690.
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
----------
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5959, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason
Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 5959--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
Summary: H.R. 5959 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2009 for intelligence activities of the U.S.
government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $325
million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period,
assuming appropriation of the authorized funds. Enacting H.R.
5959 would not affect direct spending or revenues.
The bill includes new subpoena authority that would impose
intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO expects the cost
of complying with those mandates would be small and well below
the annual thresholds established in that act ($68 million for
intergovernmental mandates and $136 million for private-sector
mandates in 2008, adjusted annually for inflation.)
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 5959 is shown in the following table.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
--------------------------------------------
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level............................................ 649 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 325 292 19 6 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basis of estimate: Section 104 would authorize the
appropriation of $649 million for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, which provides the principal source of
funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget
oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $325
million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $279
million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the
authorization under this bill would be the same as the amount
assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not
ascribe any additional cost to that provision.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The bill
contains intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA. Section 408 would establish an Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community with subpoena authority.
Section 501 would extend the National Commission for the Review
of Research and Development Programs of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, and the subpoena authority of that commission.
Entities in the public and private sectors, if subpoenaed,
would be required to provide testimony, documents, or other
evidence. CBO expects that the Inspector General and the
commission would likely issue subpoenas sparingly, and that the
costs to comply with a subpoena would not be significant. Thus,
CBO estimates that the total costs of the mandates would be
small and well below the annual thresholds established in UMRA
($68 million for intergovernmental mandates and $136 million
for private-sector mandates in 2008, adjusted annual for
inflation).
The remaining unclassified provisions of the bill contain
no mandates as defined in UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact
on state, local, and tribal governments: Neil Hood; Impact on
the private sector: Dan Frisk.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
* * * * * * *
Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants
* * * * * * *
SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.
(a) * * *
(b) Mandatory Retirement for Age.--
(1) In general.--A participant in the system shall be
automatically retired from the Agency--
(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system [receiving
compensation under the Senior Intelligence
Service pay schedule at the rate] who is at the
Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or
above; and
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence
community.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.
Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and
North Korea.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the
following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the
Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Energy.
* * * * * * *
(K) The elements of the Department of
Homeland Security concerned with the analysis
of intelligence information[, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard].
(L) Such other elements of any [other]
department or agency as may be designated by
the President, or designated jointly by the
Director of National Intelligence and the head
of the department or agency concerned, as an
element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 102A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs.
* * * * * * *
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor program
or programs.
* * * * * * *
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph
(1)(A)--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel]
may be made under this subsection only if--
(i) the funds are being transferred to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
* * * * * * *
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
* * * * * * *
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
[section] paragraph.
* * * * * * *
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that
the elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi-level
security clearance approach in order to enable the intelligence
community to make more effective and efficient use of persons
proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic,
or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national
security.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 103. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is composed of the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
(12) The Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center.
[(9)] (13) Such other offices and officials as may be
established by law or the Director may establish or
designate in the Office, including national
intelligence centers.
* * * * * * *
(e) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters with
Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--
Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-
located with [any other element] the headquarters of any other
element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 103E. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology
elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; [and]
(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for
basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the
technology needs of the intelligence community;
(6) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an annual report on the science and
technology strategy of the Director that shows
resources mapped to the goals of the intelligence
community; and
[(5)] (7) perform other such duties as may be
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or
specified by law.
(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The Committee shall--
(A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research
and development related to intelligence[; and];
(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research
programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence
community; and
[(B)] (C) perform such other functions as the
Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.
* * * * * * *
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
(b) Chief Information Officer of Intelligence Community.--The
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence
community.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the
United States Government.-
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is to--
(1) create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independently investigations, inspections, and
audits on matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence;
(2) recommend policies designed--
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in
such matters;
(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of
National Intelligence fully and currently informed
about--
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority
of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure
that the congressional intelligence committees are kept
similarly informed of--
(A) significant problems and deficiencies
relating to matters within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There
is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who
shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with
the security standards of the intelligence community,
and prior experience in the field of intelligence or
national security; and
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or auditing.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall immediately communicate in
writing to the congressional intelligence committees the
reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of
Inspector General.
(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g)
and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
investigations, inspections, and audits relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence to ensure they are
conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable
law and regulations;
(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence
fully and currently informed concerning violations of
law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and
privacy, fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and
deficiencies that may occur in matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director, and to
report the progress made in implementing corrective
action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to
the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of
such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate
to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, to comply with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the
Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph
(1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified
statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority
within 7 days to the congressional intelligence committees.
(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such
report.
(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of
the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs
and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has
responsibilities under this section.
(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (B).
(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee of a
contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to
cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for
appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the
recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials of
the intelligence community, including loss of employment or the
termination of an existing contractual relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such
complaint or information has been received from an employee of
the Federal Government--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken;
and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer
to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit,
whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated
by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect
as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a
seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence
necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities
of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community,
including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence
Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the
jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection,
or audit by both the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community and an Inspector General, whether statutory or
administrative, with oversight responsibility for an element or
elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or
Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the question of
which Inspector General shall conduct such investigation,
inspection, or audit.
(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph
(A), the Inspectors General concerned may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General
Forum established under subparagraph (C). In the event of a
dispute between an Inspector General within an agency or
department of the United States Government and the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been
resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the Inspectors
General shall submit the question to the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the agency or department for
resolution.
(C) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative Inspectors General with oversight
responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence
community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no
administrative authority over any Inspector General, but shall
serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of
individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest
and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to
employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews,
documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve
or be of assistance to more than 1 of its members.
(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation,
inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the
results of such investigation, inspection, or audit to any
other Inspector General, including the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such
investigation, inspection, or audit who did not conduct such
investigation, inspection, or audit.
(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate
and adequate office space at central and field office
locations, together with such equipment, office supplies,
maintenance services, and communications facilities and
services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may
be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector
General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or
employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security
clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer
or employee.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees
have the requisite training and experience to enable the
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector
General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the
Inspector General may request such information or assistance as
may be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department,
agency, or other element of the United States Government.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to
the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such
information or assistance.
(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may,
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this section,
an investigation, inspection, or audit of such element and may
enter into any place occupied by such element for purposes of
the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and
July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate,
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period
ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a
component of a department of the United States Government to
the head of that department simultaneously with submission of
the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(i) A list of the title or subject of each
investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during
the period covered by such report, including a summary
of the progress of each particular investigation,
inspection, or audit since the preceding report of the
Inspector General under this paragraph.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration and
implementation of programs and operations of the
intelligence community, and in the relationships
between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period
covered by such report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for
corrective or disciplinary action made by the Inspector
General during the period covered by such report with
respect to significant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each
significant recommendation described in previous
semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective
action has been completed, a description of such
corrective action.
(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all
information relevant to the performance of the
functions of the Inspector General.
(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector
General during the period covered by such report.
(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration and implementation of matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate
fraud and abuse in such matters.
(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of the
report involving a component of such department simultaneously
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of each
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse,
or deficiency related to a component of such department
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the
congressional intelligence committees.
(3) In the event that--
(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution
of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector
General;
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or
former intelligence community official who--
(i) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community that is subject to
appointment by the President, whether or not by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
including such a position held on an acting
basis;
(ii) holds or held a position in an element
of the intelligence community, including a
position held on an acting basis, that is
appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(iii) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a
position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of
section 106;
(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former official
described in subparagraph (B);
(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current
or former official described in subparagraph (B); or
(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of an
investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any report or findings
and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit
conducted by the office which has been requested by the
Chairman or Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either
committee.
(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of
that determination, together with the complaint or information.
(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of
the employee's complaint or information and notice of
the employee's intent to contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information
under clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official
capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
(G) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any
of the following:
(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation
of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity involving classified information,
but does not include differences of opinions concerning
public policy matters.
(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation
of an intelligence activity.
(iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United
States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of
reprisal prohibited under subsection (f)(3)(B) of this
section in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the findings
set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of
the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998
(title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note).
(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal
criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element
of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between
the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with
such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued
by the Director in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to
modify or effect the duties and responsibilities of any other
Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, having
duties and responsibilities relating to such element.
OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 103I. (a) Appointment.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence
community security clearances.
(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a
security clearance through or in coordination with such element
with contact information for the ombudsman appointed under
subsection (a).
(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
(1) the number of persons applying for a security
clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the
preceding 12 months; and
(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and
questions received by the ombudsman from persons
applying for security clearances.
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING
PURPOSES
Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence, [the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,] the Director of
the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing the activities
being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial
statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with
applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and
Budget.
* * * * * * *
TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
PERSONNEL
Sec. 116. (a) * * *
(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence [may only delegate the authority granted
by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.] may delegate the authority in subsection
(a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence
community.
(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to
whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such
senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for
purposes of this paragraph.
* * * * * * *
[SEMIANNUAL] ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST
ASSETS
Sec. 118. (a) [Semiannual] Annual Report.--On a [semiannual
basis] annual basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (acting
through the head of the Office of Intelligence Support) shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that fully informs the committees concerning operations against
terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall include
with respect to the preceding [six-month period] year--
(1) * * *
[(2) the total number of applications for asset
seizure and designations of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support of
terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or
denied;]
[(3)] (2) the total number of physical searches of
offices, residences, or financial records of
individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in
financial support for terrorist activity; and
[(4)] (3) whether the financial intelligence
information seized in these cases has been shared on a
full and timely basis with the all departments,
agencies, and other entities of the United States
Government involved in intelligence activities
participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking
Center.
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Sec. 119. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
(2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
(B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence
of the National Counterterrorism Center under
[subsection (h)] subsection (i).
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER
Sec. 119A. [(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the]
(a) In General.--
(1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a
National Counter Proliferation Center, taking into
account all appropriate government tools to prevent and
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
their delivery systems, and related materials and
technologies.
(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the
National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be
appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be located within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. (a)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness,
cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk
of an intelligence activity, including--
(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence
activity is being or was conducted;
(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought
in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity,
including dissenting legal views;
(C) any specific operational concerns arising from
the intelligence activity, including the risk of
disclosing intelligence sources or methods;
(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity
will exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of
funds or other resources; and
(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity
will fail.
* * * * * * *
(f) A notification to the congressional intelligence
committees regarding intelligence information relating to North
Korea or China after all or part of the information has been
communicated to the governments of North Korea or China,
respectively, shall not be construed to fulfill the duty under
this title to keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of
the United States.
[(f)] (g) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section
[503(e)] 503(g), and includes financial intelligence
activities.
REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS
Sec. 502. (a) In General.--To the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters,
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States
Government involved in intelligence activities shall--
(1) keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities, other than a covert action (as defined in
section [503(e)] 503(g)), which are the responsibility
of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on
behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the
United States Government, including any significant
anticipated intelligence activity and any significant
intelligence failure; and
* * * * * * *
(d) Distribution of Information.--
(1) Request.--Information or material provided in
accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available
to each member of the congressional intelligence
committees, unless the President requests that access
to the information or material be limited after
determining that limiting such access is essential to
meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital
interests of the United States. A request under this
paragraph and the extraordinary circumstances referred
to in this paragraph shall be detailed in writing to
the Chair and ranking minority member of the
congressional intelligence committees.
(2) Distribution.--If the President submits a request
under paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority
member of each congressional intelligence committee may
jointly determine whether and how to limit access to
the information or material within such committee. If
the Chair and ranking minority member of such committee
are unable to agree on whether or how to limit such
access, access to the information or material will be
limited. Any information or material to which access is
limited shall subsequently be made available to each
member of the congressional intelligence communities at
the earliest possible time and shall include a detailed
statement of the reasons for not providing prior
access.
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS
Sec. 503. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) The President] (d)(1) The President shall ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable,
the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(2), are
notified of any significant change in a previously approved
covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a
previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are
reported pursuant to subsection (c).
(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall
constitute a ``significant undertaking'' if the activity--
(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research,
development, or operations;
(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds
or other resources;
(D) requires notification under section 504;
(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic
relations of the United States if such activity were
disclosed without authorization.
(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least
every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject
to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of
subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not
required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a
covert action that has been terminated or suspended if
such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to
the last audit of such covert action conducted by the
Inspector General and has not been restarted after the
date on which such audit was completed.
(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph
(1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the results of such
audit.
* * * * * * *
[(e)] (g) As used in this title, the term ``covert action''
means an activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but
does not include--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity only if--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the
Congress for a different activity--
(A) * * *
[(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on
unforseen requirements; and]
(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports
an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or
increases efficiency; and
* * * * * * *
(c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any
covert action, as defined in section [503(e)] 503(g), unless
and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance
with that subsection.
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 506B. (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of
the element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an
annual personnel level assessment for such element of the
intelligence community that assesses the personnel levels for
each such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year
in which the assessment is submitted.
(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees
each year along with the budget submitted by the President
under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the
following information for the element of the intelligence
community concerned:
(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the
upcoming fiscal year.
(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the
current fiscal year.
(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs during
the prior 5 fiscal years.
(4) The number of personnel positions requested for
the upcoming fiscal year.
(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such number as compared to the number of personnel
positions of the current fiscal year.
(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such number as compared to the number of personnel
positions during the prior 5 fiscal years.
(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of
contractors to be funded by the element for the
upcoming fiscal year.
(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs of contractors as compared to the best
estimate of the costs of contractors of the current
fiscal year.
(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, during the
prior 5 fiscal years.
(10) A written justification for the requested
personnel and contractor levels.
(11) The number of intelligence collectors and
analysts employed or contracted by each element of the
intelligence community.
(12) A list of all contractors that have been the
subject of an investigation completed by the Inspector
General of any element of the intelligence community
during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have been
the subject of an investigation by such an Inspector
General during the current fiscal year.
(13) A statement by the Director of National
Intelligence that, based on current and projected
funding, the element concerned will have sufficient--
(A) internal infrastructure to support the
requested personnel and contractor levels;
(B) training resources to support the
requested personnel levels; and
(C) funding to support the administrative and
operational activities of the requested
personnel levels.
DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
Sec. 507. (a) Annual Reports.--(1) The date for the submittal
to the congressional intelligence committees of the following
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in
subsection (c)(1)(A):
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(N)] (J) The annual report on hiring and retention
of minority employees in the intelligence community
required by section 114(c).
(K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency
in the intelligence community required by section 510.
(L) The annual report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets required by section 118.
(2) The date for the submittal to the congressional
intelligence committees of the following annual reports shall
be the date each year provided in subsection (c)(1)(B):
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(D) The annual report on counterdrug intelligence
matters required by section 826 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.]
(b) Semiannual Reports.--The dates for the submittal to the
congressional intelligence committees of the following
semiannual reports shall be the dates each year provided in
subsection (c)(2):
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(6) The semiannual report on financial intelligence
on terrorist assets required by section 118.]
* * * * * * *
-
REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS
Sec. 508. Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to
Congress a report on security clearance determinations
completed or ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that have
taken longer than one year to complete. Such report shall
include--
(1) the number of security clearance determinations
for positions as employees of the Federal Government
that required more than one year to complete;
(2) the number of security clearance determinations
for contractors that required more than one year to
complete;
(3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated
such determinations; and
(4) the cause of significant delays in such
determinations.-
SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH
KOREA
Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently
than every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the nuclear programs
of each such country.
(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea--
(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each
such country;
(2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment described
in paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such
sources and an assessment of the reliability of each
such source;
(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such
program gathered or developed since the previous report
was submitted under subsection (a), including
intelligence collected from both open and clandestine
sources for each such country; and
(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce
confidence in the assessment described in paragraph
(1).
(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea in lieu of a report required by subsection (a) for
that country.
(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.-
REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 510. Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
proficiency in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in
foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence community,
including--
(1) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency and
the level of proficiency required;
(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that
each element will require during the 5-year period
beginning on the date of the submission of the report;
(3) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency that
are filled by--
(A) military personnel; and
(B) civilian personnel;
(4) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign
language indicated and the proficiency level;
(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign
language and proficiency level;
(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the
provider of such training;
(7) a description of such element's efforts to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are
proficient in a foreign language;
(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate,
dialect of a foreign language--
(A) the number of positions of such element
that require proficiency in the foreign
language or dialect;
(B) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that requires
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect
to perform the primary duty of the position;
(C) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that does not
require proficiency in the foreign language or
dialect to perform the primary duty of the
position;
(D) the number of personnel of such element
rated at each level of proficiency of the
Interagency Language Roundtable;
(E) whether the number of personnel at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency
Language Roundtable meets the requirements of
such element;
(F) the number of personnel serving or hired
to serve as linguists for such element that are
not qualified as linguists under the standards
of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as
linguists for such element during the preceding
calendar year;
(H) the number of personnel serving as
linguists that discontinued serving such
element during the preceding calendar year;
(I) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally
of the United States; and
(J) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by
contractors;
(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity
and capabilities of the intelligence community as a
whole; and
(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the
Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or
no longer relevant.-
TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES
Sec. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access
to classified information that identifies a covert agent,
intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert
agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information, knowing that the information disclosed so
identifies such covert agent and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than
[ten years] 15 years, or both.
(b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to
classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent
and intentionally discloses any information identifying such
covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive
classified information, knowing that the information disclosed
so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than
[five years] 10 years, or both.
* * * * * * *
REPORT
Sec. 603. (a) The President, after receiving information from
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on
measures to protect the identities of covert agents, including
an assessment of the need for any modification of this title
for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert
agents, and on any other matter relevant to the protection of
the identities of covert agents. The date for the submittal of
the report shall be the date provided in section 507.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES
* * * * * * *
OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 705. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Allegation; Improper Withholding of Records; Judicial
Review.--(1) * * *
(2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner
provided under paragraph (1) as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested
records were improperly withheld because of improper
exemption of operational files, the Defense
Intelligence Agency shall meet its burden under section
552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by
demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission
that exempted operational files likely to contain
[responsible] responsive records currently perform the
functions set forth in subsection (b).
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL SKILLS
Sec. 1022. (a) In General.--The head of an appropriate
department may assign civilian employees of an element of the
intelligence community that is a component of such appropriate
department as students at accredited professional, technical,
and other institutions of higher learning for training at the
undergraduate level in skills critical to effective performance
of the mission of such element of the intelligence community.
(b) Payment of Expenses.--The head of an appropriate
department may pay, directly or by reimbursement to employees,
expenses incident to assignments under subsection (a), in any
fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated funds are
available for such purpose.
(c) Eligibility.--
(1) In general.--To be eligible for assignment under
subsection (a), an employee of an element of the
intelligence community must agree in writing--
(A) to continue in the service of such
element for the period of the assignment and to
complete the educational course of training for
which the employee is assigned;
(B) to continue in the service of such
element following completion of the assignment
for a period of one-and-a-half years for each
year of the assignment or part thereof;
(C) to reimburse the United States for the
total cost of education (excluding the
employee's pay and allowances) provided under
this section to the employee if, prior to the
employee's completing the educational course of
training for which the employee is assigned,
the assignment or the employee's employment
with such element is terminated either by such
element due to misconduct by the employee or by
the employee voluntarily; and
(D) to reimburse the United States if, after
completing the educational course of training
for which the employee is assigned, the
employee's employment with such element is
terminated either by such element due to
misconduct by the employee or by the employee
voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion
of the service obligation period described in
subparagraph (B), in an amount that bears the
same ratio to the total cost of the education
(excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided to the employee as the unserved
portion of the service obligation period
described in subparagraph (B) bears to the
total period of the service obligation
described in subparagraph (B).
(2) Debt owing the united states.--Subject to
paragraph (3), the obligation to reimburse the United
States under an agreement described in paragraph (1),
including interest due on such obligation, is for all
purposes a debt owing the United States.
(3) Reimbursement.--
(A) Bankruptcy.--A discharge in bankruptcy
under title 11, United States Code, shall not
release a person from an obligation to
reimburse the United States required under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) if the
final decree of the discharge in bankruptcy is
issued within five years after the last day of
the combined period of service obligation
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (1).
(B) Release.--The head of an appropriate
department may release a person, in whole or in
part, from the obligation to reimburse the
United States under an agreement described in
paragraph (1) when, in the discretion of such
head of an appropriate department, such head of
an appropriate department determines that
equity or the interests of the United States so
require.
(C) Monthly payments.--The head of an
appropriate department shall permit an employee
assigned under this section who, prior to
commencing a second academic year of such
assignment, voluntarily terminates the
assignment or the employee's employment with
the element of the intelligence community that
is a component of such appropriate department,
to satisfy the employee's obligation under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) to
reimburse the United States by reimbursement
according to a schedule of monthly payments
which results in completion of reimbursement by
a date five years after the date of termination
of the assignment or employment or earlier at
the option of the employee.
(d) Recruitment.--Efforts by an element of the intelligence
community to recruit individuals at educational institutions
for participation in the undergraduate training program
established by this section shall be made openly and according
to the common practices of universities and employers
recruiting at such institutions.
(e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training.--Chapter 41 of
title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of title
31, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to this
section.
(f) Regulations.--A head of the appropriate department
assigning employees in accordance with this section may issue
such regulations as such head of the appropriate department
considers necessary to carry out this section.
(g) Rules of Construction.--
(1) Component.--For purposes of this section--
(A) the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence shall be considered a component of
such Office; and
(B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be
considered a component of such Agency.
(2) Required education programs.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to modify, affect, or
supercede any provision of law requiring or otherwise
authorizing or providing for a training program
described in this section.
(h) Appropriate Department Defined.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate department'' means--
(1) with respect to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency; and
(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence
community other than the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence
Agency, the department of the Federal Government of
which such element of the intelligence community is a
component.
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES
Sec. 1102. (a) * * *
(b) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--[(1)] The Director
of National Intelligence shall establish and implement a
process for all elements of the intelligence community to
review, on an annual basis, individuals included on
distribution lists for access to classified information. Such
process shall ensure that only individuals who have a
particularized ``need to know'' (as determined by the Director)
are continued on such distribution lists.
[(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director
shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees that
the review required under paragraph (1) has been conducted in
all elements of the intelligence community during the preceding
fiscal year.]
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices
(a)(1) * * *
(2) For the purpose of this section--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the
Government Printing Office, but does not include--
(i) * * *
(ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and, as determined by the President,
any Executive agency or unit thereof the
principal function of which is the conduct of
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 4301. Definitions
For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means--
(A) * * *
but does not include--
(i) a Government corporation;
(ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, or any Executive agency or
unit thereof which is designated by the
President and the principal function of which
is the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities; or
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4701. Definitions
(a) For the purpose of this chapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the
Government Printing Office, but does not include--
(A) * * *
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and, as determined by the President,
any Executive agency or unit thereof which is
designated by the President and which has as
its principal function the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5102. Definitions; application
(a) For the purpose of this chapter--
(1) ``agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(F) the government of the District of
Columbia;
but does not include--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(x) the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, Department of
Defense.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5313. Positions at level II
Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
[Director of Central Intelligence.]
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5314. Positions at level III
Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Solicitor General of the United States.
* * * * * * *
[Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2).]
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV
Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Administrator of General Services.
* * * * * * *
[General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director.]
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5342. Definitions; application
(a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency; but does
not include--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(K) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense;
* * * * * * *
SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 63--LEAVE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs
(a) For the purpose of this section--
(1) the term ``excepted agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
* * * * * * *
(2) the term ``head of an excepted agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) with respect to the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
* * * * * * *
SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions
(a) * * *
(b)(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
(i) an employee of--
(I) * * *
* * * * * * *
(XIII) the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency; or
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may delete the information described in subparagraphs
(A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States
intelligence sources.
[(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence may delete the information described in
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that
the publication of such information could adversely affect
United States intelligence sources.]
(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph
(2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head
of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State
that the publication of such information could adversely affect
United States intelligence sources or methods.
(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State
pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall
keep a record of such information.
(C) In this paragraph, the term ``intelligence community''
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle E--Terrorism
* * * * * * *
SEC. 343. TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) Reporting and Certification.--(1) The Director shall
review on an annual basis the information provided by various
departments and agencies for purposes of the list under
subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the
information so provided is derived from the widest possible
range of intelligence available to such departments and
agencies.
[(2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under
paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the
intelligence community responsible for the collection of
intelligence related to the list have provided information for
purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible
range of intelligence available to such department and
agencies.]
[(e)] (d) Report on Criteria for Information Sharing.--(1) *
* *
* * * * * * *
[(f)] (e) System Administration Requirements.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(g)] (f) Report on Status of System.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(h)] (g) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In
this section, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
[(a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence
Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug
intelligence matters. The report shall include the
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of
detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
[(b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of
the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date
provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by section 811 of this Act.
[(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
[(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives; and
[(2) the congressional intelligence committees (as
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)).]
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) * * *
(b) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of 12
members, as follows:
(1) [The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management.] The Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
(i) Review.--The Commission shall review the status of
research and development programs and activities within the
intelligence community, [including--] including advanced
research and development programs and activities. Such review
shall include--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.
(a) Final Report.--Not later than [September 1, 2004]
December 31, 2009, the Commission shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as
required by section 1002(h)(2).
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
* * * * * * *
Sec. 16. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e)[(1) When an employee is assigned under this section to an
institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to
which the employee is assigned that the Agency employs the
employee and that the Agency funds the employee's education.
[(2) Agency efforts] Agency efforts to recruit individuals at
educational institutions for participation in the undergraduate
training program established by this section shall be made
openly and according to the common practices of universities
and employers recruiting at such institutions.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 115 OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board
(a) * * *
(b) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be
composed of 7 members as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, or the Director's designee.]
(F) The Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
----------
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
[AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
[Sec. 8K. If the Director of National Intelligence determines
that an Office of Inspector General would be beneficial to
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence is authorized to establish, with any of the
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in this
Act, an Office of Inspector General.]
* * * * * * *
----------
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National
Counterintelligence Executive.
[(2) The general counsel shall--
[(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the
Executive on matters relating to functions of the
Office;
[(B) ensure that the Office complies with all
applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and
guidelines; and
[(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may
specify.]
[(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall
be as follows:
(1) National threat identification and prioritization
assessment.--Subject to [subsection (f)] subsection
(e), in consultation with appropriate department and
agencies of the United States Government, and private
sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a
strategic planning assessment of the
counterintelligence requirements of the United States
to be known as the National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment.
(2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject
to [subsection (f)] subsection (e), in consultation
with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, and
based on the most current National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under
paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy
for the counterintelligence programs and activities of
the United States Government to be known as the
National Counterintelligence Strategy.
* * * * * * *
[(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under [subsection
(e)(1)] subsection (d)(1), and any modification of such
assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the
President.
(2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under [subsection
(e)(2)] subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such
strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the
President.
* * * * * * *
[(g)] (f) Personnel.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be
treated as the head of the Office.
[(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.]
* * * * * * *
[(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out
its functions under this section.
[(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of
the official providing such support.
[(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
[(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract,
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under
this section.
[(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative
agreements, and other transactions.]
[(k)] (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as
operational files of an element of the Agency.
[(l)] (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress,
to--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(m)] (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions,
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government
agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of
Management and Budget, for the performance of any of
the functions or activities [authorized under
paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections
(c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g)
of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-
3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)] authorized under
section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-4a), and any other Government agency is
authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency
such sums without regard to any provisions of law
limiting or prohibiting transfers between
appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in
accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the
purposes and under the authority of this Act without
regard to limitations of appropriations from which
transferred;
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) In the event that--
(A) * * *
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General should focus on any
current or former Agency official who--
(i) * * *
(ii) holds or held the position in the
Agency, including such a position held on an
acting basis, of--
(I) [Executive Director] Associate
Deputy Director;
(II) [Deputy Director for Operations]
Director of the National Clandestine
Service;
(III) [Deputy Director for
Intelligence] Director of Intelligence;
(IV) [Deputy Director for
Administration] Director of Support; or
(V) [Deputy Director for Science and
Technology] Director of Science and
Technology;
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY.
(a) * * *
(b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1991
[SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM]
SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign]
Intelligence Program.--The Director of [Central Intelligence]
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
committees specified in subsection (d) each year a multiyear
national [foreign] intelligence program plan reflecting the
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations required to
support that program. Any such multiyear national [foreign]
intelligence program plan shall cover the fiscal year with
respect to which the budget is submitted and at least four
succeeding fiscal years.
(b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a)
each year at or about the same time that the budget is
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code.
(c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The Director of
[Central Intelligence] National Intelligence and the Secretary
of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred to in
subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of
title 10, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence
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SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) * * *
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(e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the
ISE. The report shall include the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal
departments and agencies that will participate in the
ISE, including an identification of the agencies that
will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and
manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department
or agency components that are part of the ISE), with
such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
(A) * * *
(B) the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and
the role of the Department of Homeland Security
and the [Attorney General] Department of
Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and
tribal officials and the private sector.
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Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments
SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
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(e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--[(1)] The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director
of National Intelligence''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) * * *
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting
``section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947''.
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INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
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TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) * * *
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(c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall,
develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts,
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited,
trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional
culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the
intelligence mission of the Bureau.
* * * * * * *
(e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable
law.
(f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
(1) * * *
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SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each
preceding 12-month period--
(1) * * *
(2) any legal or practical impediments to using
translators employed by [the Federal] Federal, State,
or local agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared
basis;
(3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for [the specific] specific translation services in
certain languages, and recommendations for meeting
those needs;
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CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE
CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS
Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
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[1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications.]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.
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Sec. 1336. [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency: special publications
The Director of the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may authorize the
printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government
and of the public may require.
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HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
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TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection;
Access to Information
SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Detail of Personnel.--
(1) * * *
(2) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in
this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) The [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the
most important bills that the House passes each year. It
provides and allocates resources to critical national security
programs that are the front lines of America's defense and
foreign policies and, most critically, work to detect, prevent,
and disrupt potential terrorist attacks on the American people.
The bill also is essential to ensure close and effective
congressional oversight of the intelligence community.
Although we have concerns with issues that we believe must
continue to be addressed and resolved as the legislative
process continues, we are encouraged that this bill avoids many
of the contentious items that have recently prevented the
enactment of an intelligence authorization bill and that it
reflects areas of bipartisan consensus on critical national
security issues. We also believe that the bill was
significantly improved by seven Republican amendments that were
adopted on a bipartisan basis to address important issues
facing the intelligence community.
Our views follow with respect to a number of important
issues. We are pleased that many of them have been addressed in
the bill, and disappointed that others remain unresolved. We
look forward to continuing the Committee's efforts to move a
bipartisan, consensus bill to enactment.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT MODERNIZATION
This bill is still missing the most significant and most
critically needed consensus legislation on intelligence
currently pending before Congress--the bipartisan compromise
legislation to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act that passed the Senate by a vote of 68-29 and is supported
by a majority of the House. With the expiration of the Protect
America Act on February 17, 2008, the Intelligence Community
lost critical authorities to react with speed and agility to
potential terrorist threats around the world. The problem will
soon be even further compounded when authority under existing
certifications expires.
It is irresponsible for the Democratic leadership of the
House to continue to abuse its power to block vital national
security legislation that the Senate passed on an overwhelming
bipartisan basis, that a majority of the House has indicated
that it will support on a bipartisan basis, and that the
President has indicated that he will sign. Congresswoman
Heather Wilson offered an amendment to include this vitally
needed legislation in the bill. The amendment received
bipartisan support but was not adopted by a vote of 10-11.
The remarks of two Democratic members of the Committee
during the markup recognizing the importance of FISA
modernization to our national security and the urgency of
completing action only reinforce the consensus that this issue
must be dealt with immediately. We will continue to work with
our colleagues on a bipartisan basis to enact the compromise
legislation passed by the Senate at the earliest opportunity.
EARMARKS
Last year, the House adopted a motion by Ranking Republican
Pete Hoekstra to instruct House conferees on the Fiscal Year
2008 Intelligence Authorization to remove all earmarks from the
bill by a bipartisan vote of 249-160. Those instructions were
nonetheless disregarded by House conferees. This year, the
Committee--by a bipartisan vote of 17-4--adopted an amendment
by Congressman Hoekstra to remove all earmarks, including an
earmark in the bill text for the National Drug Intelligence
Center.
As a number of incidents have illustrated in previous years
up to last year, our intelligence programs should be based on
only one primary consideration--what best ensures that the
intelligence community is able to do its job in the interest of
the national security of the United States. Our priority should
be those programs that the members of this Committee have
collectively taken a careful look at, debated, and determined
where money should be spent with input from the intelligence
community--not member projects which all too often can be
directed to parochial interests or wasteful spending rather
than the national interest.
The Committee's bipartisan vote to remove earmarks from
this year's bill is an unprecedented step that we hope will set
an example for this Committee as well as other legislation
moving forward.
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS
It is likely that there is no single current issue on which
there is a stronger bipartisan consensus than our shared deep
concern that the Administration is not fulfilling its statutory
duty to keep each member of the Committee fully and currently
informed with respect to certain intelligence matters. In the
past year alone, Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra
jointly called on the President to brief the Members of the
Committee with respect to intelligence regarding the al Kibar
facility in Syria, which was subsequently disclosed to the
public on the same afternoon that Committee members were
finally briefed, several months later. With respect to another
matter, the Administration refuses to brief all Members of the
Committee even though it has briefed five members of the
Committee staff. This follows other incidents in which no
member of the Committee was briefed in a timely fashion, if at
all, with respect to critical and sensitive matters within the
scope of the statutory duty to report. It is clear that reforms
are necessary.
Section 502 of the bill makes amendments to certain
congressional notification procedures of the National Security
Act of 1947. It is the product of bipartisan discussion and
agreement between Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra
and includes language suggested by both. The provision
expressly provides that information briefed to the Committee
reporting on activities other than covert actions shall be made
available toeach member of the Committee, unless the President
requests in writing that access to the information be limited and
details extraordinary circumstances justifying the request. In the
event of such a request to limit access, the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Committee may jointly determine whether and how to limit
access to the material within the Committee. Absent such an agreement,
access to the information or material will be limited.
In our view, this provision does two critical things.
First, it sets forth a statutory presumption that information
briefed to the Committee should be made available to each
member of the Committee rather than restricted to the Chairman
and Ranking Member. Second, it provides a mechanism to permit
exceptions when legitimate extraordinary circumstances arise
impacting national security. We believe that this provision
reflects a better balance than the current practice. It
respects the Constitutional duty of the President to protect
national security information by providing a mechanism to
request that access to the information be limited. It also
respects the Constitutional authority of the House to organize
itself and to determine how to share information within the
Committee. Ultimately, these interests are balanced and
resolved by requiring a clear bipartisan consensus to override
any request by the President to limit access to information.
We are concerned that the new enhanced reporting
requirements provided for in paragraph (a) of Section 502 of
the bill are too prescriptive and burdensome and may not be
practically workable. We hope that these provisions can be
perfected as the bill moves forward in the legislative process.
On the whole, however, this provision is a significant step
forward to strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence
activities in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
Additionally, the Committee adopted by a bipartisan vote of
17-4 an amendment by Congressman John McHugh clarifying that
the statutory duty to ``fully and currently'' inform the
intelligence committees with respect to intelligence
information relating to North Korea or China is not fulfilled
if a Committee is briefed after the information has been
communicated to the governments of those countries. We are
extremely disappointed that this clarification is necessary.
It should be emphasized that this amendment is not intended
to apply outside the scope of notifications understood to be
required under Section 501 of the National Security Act of
1947, and is not intended to preclude communicating information
to the Governments of North Korea or China in emergency or
exigent circumstances.
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE SYSTEMS
We are disappointed with certain provisions of the
classified annex with respect to national security space
systems. National security space systems have been and will
continue to be a cornerstone of the nation's intelligence
collection capability. However, the current bill lacks a sense
of urgency with regard to making decisions on overhead
architecture and fails to address critical architectural
shortfalls. It does not adequately fund critical national
security space systems and is overly prescriptive in certain
areas mandating technical solutions without complete analysis.
Despite these shortcomings, however, we believe the bill
authorizes a minimally acceptable level of funding for these
systems.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MATTERS
The Intelligence Community continues to move forward with a
number of reform initiatives in the wake of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Perhaps none of
these initiatives is more important than the transformation of
the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation from a culture of law enforcement and prosecution
to one directed at detecting and preventing potential terrorist
attacks in the United States. While the FBI has a number of
initiatives in place underway with respect to its intelligence
components, we remain significantly concerned at the Bureau's
failure to communicate a high-level strategic vision for its
transformation, and that the process simply isn't moving fast
enough to implement fundamental change. In addition, the
Committee remains concerned--without determining
responsibility--with respect to specific instances where the
working relationship between the Bureau, other elements of the
intelligence community, and state and local governments has
been strained. At the same time, however, the Committee's
oversight efforts have repeatedly suggested that the FBI is the
most appropriate federal agency to lead domestic
counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters, and that the
Bureau should be given time to make its reforms work before
more radical alternatives are considered.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by
Congressman Mike Rogers to require the Director of the FBI to
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees
describing his long term, strategic, vision for transforming
the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of
the internal reforms intended to achieve that vision. It is
important to stress that this report is intended to be a high-
level strategic report in which the Director describes the
fundamental principles underlying his view of the
transformation, the desired FBI capabilities and doctrinal
approach at the end of the transformation, and the way to get
there. The Committee has already received numerous reports and
briefings detailing specific organizational changes and
initiatives, but none have satisfactorily communicated a
comprehensive, cohesive strategic vision for the overall
transformation.
In addition, the Committee adopted, by a unanimous vote of
21-0, an amendment by Congressman Rogers to prohibit any funds
authorized in the bill from being used to implement the
mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after five
years of service in a management position, commonly known as
the ``five and out'' policy. We believe that this policy has
hampered optimum counterterrorism capability, just as similar
mandatory reassignment and rotation policies have adversely
impacted other elements of the Intelligence Community. A
substantial portion of FBI funding is authorized in this bill.
We believe this personnel policy is counterproductive and
unwise and do not support authorizing funds to further
implement it.
SIZE OF THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The Committee shares a bipartisan consensus that the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, just three years old,
has already grown in size and scope well beyond the intentions
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that
created it. By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment
to the classified Schedule of Authorizations by Congressman
Mike Rogers to stop further growth and limit the size of the
ODNI. In particular, we are dismayed at efforts by the ODNI to
justify further growth by attempting to omit personnel from the
National Counterterrorism Center from its personnel count,
despite the express statutory provision that the NCTC is part
of the ODNI.
The Committee on a bipartisan basis had made clear that it
views the ODNI as a coordinator, not a doer of functions. Our
effort is about making ODNI an effective coordinator, not
another layer of bureaucracy that stifles the speed, agility
and creativity necessary in today's intelligence environment.
During the Committee's oversight efforts, intelligence
community personnel have indicated that they are spending
increasing amounts of time responding to taskings and requests
from the ODNI bureaucracy with little apparent benefit. Rather
than attempt to rationalize further bureaucratic growth, we
hope that the ODNI will carefully revisit how to accomplish its
core coordinating goals within the authorized personnel
strength.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
As we have emphasized repeatedly in the past, the problem
of unauthorized disclosure remains a grave one. Such
disclosures harm national security, place American citizens and
intelligence community personnel at increased risk, and
inevitably result in substantial consequences to the United
States--both tangible and intangible. We are disappointed that
the Committee has held no hearings and conducted little to no
substantial oversight on this issue during this Congress. In
addition, we are concerned that the issue is becoming
increasingly politicized, sometimes under the false premise
that there are ``good leaks'' and ``bad leaks''. The Committee
should take a firm and clear position that no unauthorized
disclosures of classified information should be tolerated.
Oversight efforts during the previous Congress clearly
established that prosecution under current laws relating to
unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent
tool. The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered
by Congressman Mac Thornberry that requires the DNI to review
whether current law or administrative authorities enable the
revocation of pensions of intelligence community personnel who
commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This
provision is identical to one included by the House in the
Fiscal Year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act. We hope that
it will be enacted and that the DNI will carefully review this
matter and other options in an effort to provide a more
effective deterrent to unauthorized disclosures of classified
information.
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
We have significant concerns with Section 408 of the bill,
which would create a new Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community. While we do not oppose either enhanced oversight of
the Intelligence Community or a capability to review cross-
cutting issues within the Intelligence Community, we are
concerned that this provision--which is almost a quarter of the
entire bill--duplicates efforts of Department and Agency
inspectors general, is unnecessarily complex and unwieldy, and
threatens to further grow the size and bureaucracy of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Committee
Republicans offered an amendment to strike this provision,
which failed by a voice vote. We hope to work with our
colleagues toward a more limited and rational resolution of
this issue.
JIHADISTS
Over the last few months, the National Counterterrorism
Center, the State Department, and the Department of Homeland
Security issued memos instructing their employees to not use
several terms related to Islam and radical Jihadism, including
``jihadist,'' ``jihad,'' ``Mujahadeen,'' ``caliphate,''
``Islamist,'' ``Islamo-fascist,'' and ``Wahhabi.'' These memos
also recommend using the term ``mainstream Muslims'' instead of
``moderate Muslims.'' This new policy reportedly reflected
advice from unnamed American Muslim leaders on avoiding
rhetoric that could offend Muslim audiences or bolster the
cause of radical Jihadist groups like al Qaeda.
During Committee consideration of the bill, Ranking Member
Hoekstra offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any funds
authorized by the bill from being used to prohibit or
discourage the use of those terms. The amendment should not
have been controversial, yet it was defeated by a party-line
vote. We do not believe that free speech should be
controversial, nor should candid, accurate, and fair discussion
of the self-professed nature and goals of enemies who have
attacked the United States, sworn to kill more Americans, and
regularly seek to violently stifle the slightest criticism of
their activities and intentions. It is more than ironic that
some who have complained about alleged politicization of the
Intelligence Community opposed this amendment, which simply
would have ensured free speech and open, objective analysis,
and it is unfortunate that they refuse to acknowledge the
nature of the threats posed by our enemies.
It is important to emphasize that we do not support any
form of religious discrimination, bigotry, or hatred, or U.S.
officials making statements that insult Muslims or any other
religious or ethnic group. However, this new ``speech code'' is
in line with other efforts by U.S. Muslim leaders sympathetic
to radical Jihadist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to stifle
open debate about radical Islam by banning important terms that
describe their efforts. For example, since Hizballah, Hamas,
and al Qaeda routinely describe their terrorist activities as a
``Jihad'' against the West, one cannot sensibly discuss their
activities without using this word. Similarly, Osama bin Ladin
claims his terrorist efforts are intended to recreate a
``caliphate,'' in an area stretching from Moroccoto Indonesia
that was under Muslim rule in medieval times. It is impossible to have
an honest discussion of bin Laden's philosophy without using the word
caliphate.
We hope that common sense and free speech will prevail with
respect to this issue, and will continue to pursue solutions
through close and continuing oversight efforts.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN
Recent revelations with respect to the al Kibar facility in
Syria have suggested the need for close and careful
reassessment of previous intelligence and assessments with
respect to other nations. Ranking Member Hoekstra offered an
amendment to require a revised and updated National
Intelligence Estimate with regard to the Iranian nuclear
program, which would have specifically required a reassessment
of prior estimates in light of the experience with al Kibar, as
well as a review of how that incident affects the confidence
level of the Director of National Intelligence in current
assessments of the Iran nuclear program. The amendment failed
by voice vote.
We continue to believe, however, that the November 2007
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran was so poorly drafted
and so seriously undermined by subsequent developments and
intelligence--especially the Syrian nuclear facility--that it
is necessary for the DNI to go back to the drawing board and
start over. We will continue to monitor this issue closely and
seek the necessary review and reassessment through the
oversight process.
DIVERSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESOURCES TO STUDY GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE
The Committee adopted by voice vote a Republican amendment
making clear the sense of Congress that resources should not be
diverted from human intelligence collection and other
intelligence programs designed to combat al Qaeda in order to
study global climate change. Despite the existence of numerous
more appropriate government programs and initiatives to study
this issue, pressure to use intelligence resources in
inappropriate and nonproductive ways relative to global climate
change continues. This provision makes clear that intelligence
resources should not be diverted from al Qaeda for this
purpose.
LIMITATION ON INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
The Committee defeated--by a bipartisan vote of 9-12--an
amendment that would have limited all elements of the
intelligence community to the interrogation techniques
authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human
Intelligence Collector Operations. We think it is important to
highlight this vote by the Committee. Despite vigorous debate
and comment by other Members of Congress and the public at
large (often based on inaccurate information or supposition) we
want to reiterate our strong view that the congressional
intelligence committees continue to be in the best position to
review this issue.
The Committee's bipartisan vote emphasizes some critical
points. First, the United States does not torture, and the
intelligence community conducts itself in accordance with the
law, including the treaty obligations of the United States. The
Committee has been briefed on the interrogation techniques
currently being used by the Intelligence Community, and has
conducted intensive oversight of both the underlying policy and
its application. Second, it is critical not to provide al Qaeda
or other potential adversaries with an enumeration and
explanation of those techniques. To do so would severely
undermine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to
collect information, sometimes in critical circumstances, and
accordingly the security of the United States.
While we fully recognize the importance of the underlying
issues, we believe the better solution for the substantially
more limited programs of the intelligence community is
continued close and careful oversight, as provided for in the
amendment adopted by the Committee on a bipartisan basis to
prohibit the use of contractors in interrogations by the
intelligence community, and several provisions of the
classified annex to the bill.
Peter Hoekstra.
Terry Everett.
Elton Gallegly.
Mac Thornberry.
John M. McHugh.
Todd Tiahrt.
Mike Rogers.
Darrell Issa.