[Senate Hearing 106-770]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-770
THE FUTURE OF LEBANON
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-981 WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Barakat, Colonel Charbel, South Lebanon Army; coordinator of the
Civilian Committees, South Lebanon Refugees in Israel.......... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Lebanese Information Center, prepared statement submitted for the
record......................................................... 31
Pipes, Dr. Daniel, director, Middle East Forum; editor, Middle
East Quarterly, Philadelphia, PA............................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Walker, Hon. Edward S., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC...... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF LEBANON
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all for joining us today. Secretary Walker,
welcome. Glad to have you back again.
I would like to say that with my crystal ball, I was able
to predict a timely hearing and exciting time in the Middle
East. Unfortunately, we are just lucky to have you here at the
very moment the succession was taking place in the last bastion
of the old Middle East and of Syria.
Although this is a hearing about Lebanon, the death of
Hafiz al-Asad makes it all the more important that we hold this
hearing today. We cannot speak about the future of Lebanon
without discussing Syria's continuing occupation.
Recent weeks have seen the Israeli withdrawal from Southern
Lebanon in accordance with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 425. I expected to see the administration put
strong, serious pressure on Syria to removes its 30,000 troops
from Lebanon as well. I am disappointed to see that that has
not occurred.
I hope you can enlighten me on the administration's efforts
to put pressure on Syria to remove those troops from Lebanon.
It is time that this administration looks at the reality of
what has been going on in Lebanon for decades.
Syria has turned Lebanon into a satellite state, with a
puppet government so demoralized that its leaders will not even
appeal for their own independence. Syria and its allies in
Tehran manipulate the Lebanese people with weapons and with
threats. They pit Christians against Sunni, Sunni against
Shiite. They sponsor and finance terrorist groups that attack
Israel and others, operating like parasites on Lebanese soil.
And that all continues to take place.
There is no reason the United States should be subjugating
our national principles again and again in the desperate hope
for a page in the history books. We do need to stand up for
democracy for the people of Lebanon and for the people of
Syria; for an end to occupation for Lebanon; and above all, we
need to stand for the disarmament of terrorist groups like
Hizbollah, who do nothing more than exploit the people of
Lebanon for the benefit of extremists in Damascus and in
Tehran.
With all that is going on, our administration witness has a
quite difficult job, and a difficult time as well. I am happy
to welcome you here, Assistant Secretary of State Edward
Walker. It is a pleasure to have you come before the
subcommittee.
It almost always seems like we are talking about very
difficult circumstances. It is a difficult part of the world.
We look forward to your testimony.
And we also have two additional witnesses, private
witnesses: Dr. Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum,
and Colonel Charbel Barakat of the South Lebanon Army who will
also be testifying later on.
Secretary Walker, thank you for joining us, and I look
forward to your testimony and our questions and exchange.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD S. WALKER, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Walker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
agree this is a very timely time to consider our policy toward
Lebanon and Syria, and toward the region as a whole.
But, actually while difficulties arise from events that
have taken place, there are also opportunities that arise in
such occurrences, and we look forward to efforts to try to
exploit those opportunities in the future.
I am very pleased to appear before you. After 22 years of
occupation, during which both Israel and Lebanon suffered many
casualties and endured constant disruptions of civilian life,
Israeli forces have withdrawn from Lebanon.
The United Nations expects to formally confirm the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, in accordance with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 this week, and we expect
the Security Council will expeditiously issue a Presidential
statement endorsing the withdrawal.
The withdrawal and its aftermath have been relatively
peaceful. Apart from some sporadic looting and some stone-
throwing by Lebanese youths at the border, South Lebanon has
remained calm. It will take an active effort from all of the
players to ensure that calm prevails.
Hizbollah fighters are in close proximity with Israeli
forces on the border. This arrangement is clearly not desirable
now or in the future, and it is critical, but they are not
the--across the Israel/Lebanon border.
We do not envision that the death of Syrian President Asad
will adversely affect the implementation of 425 or the calm
that now exists in the south, at least in the short-term.
Security Council Resolution 425 outlines three tasks for
UNIFIL: To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces; to restore
international peace and security in the south; and to assist
the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its
effective authority to the area. With the withdrawal virtually
complete, the focus now is on the second and third tasks.
UNIFIL is currently in the process of deploying using its
present level of forces augmented by several battalions drawn
primarily from current contributors. UNIFIL units are actively
patrolling the Lebanon/Israel border area along with military
observers from the U.N. Troops Supervisory Organization. UNIFIL
will continue to occupy key points to help maintain stability.
UNIFIL is working to establish a joint operations center
with the Government of Lebanon that will coordinate the smooth
deployment of Lebanese forces. Clearly, Lebanese leadership and
UNIFIL must work together to ensure that security returns to
the south.
We, the United Nations, the French, and indeed many
Lebanese, have specifically called on Lebanon to deploy its
Armed Forces in areas vacated by the Israelis. We are pleased
by the government's recent announcement that it will deploy
more than 1,000 security and army officers to the south.
We in the international community believe a strong military
presence, Lebanese military presence, is crucial to the
government's re-establishment of its sovereignty and order.
Lebanon needs to return its effective authority in the area
to fulfill its responsibilities under Security Council
Resolution 425. Secretary Albright has been in direct contact
with Lebanese President Lahoud and Secretary General Annan to
stress this point.
The Lebanese Government's ability to consolidate peace and
security in South Lebanon will depend in large part on its
success in developing the infrastructure of the area. Economic
assistance will help Lebanon rebuild after two decades of
conflict. We believe the United States and the international
community should support this effort which will benefit the
region. We will need to work with Congress as we look at ways
to be helpful.
As Resolution 425 moves forward, we will continue to press
ahead with our bilateral agenda with the Government of Lebanon:
Comprehensive regional peace; stronger business and commercial
ties; and greater cooperation on counter-terrorism and law
enforcement issues.
In the meantime, we continue to support the resumption of
negotiations on both the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. This
effort remains a priority of our foreign policy of the Middle
East. Peace is the best vehicle for change in Syria and in
Lebanon. We also believe that the Lebanese people, through
their own democratic process, can make important decisions
about their future relationship with Syria.
The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is a momentous
development in the Middle East and a very positive one. The
border between Lebanon and Israel is quiet for now. We must
continue to exert every effort to ensure that it remains so,
first by supporting the U.N.'s efforts to implement Resolution
425 in a peaceful and orderly manner; second, by garnering
international support to assist in reconstructing the south;
and third, by keeping the door open for a comprehensive peace
settlement between Israel and Syria and between Israel and
Lebanon. That, ultimately, is our best chance for achieving
lasting regional peace and stability.
Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to take your questions.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Secretary Walker.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss
U.S. policy toward Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal, a key
foreign policy issue.
After 22 years of occupation, during which both Israel and Lebanon
suffered losses and endured constant disruptions of civilian life,
Israeli forces have withdrawn from Lebanon. Prime Minister Barak
pledged during his election campaign to withdraw Israeli troops before
July 7, 2000, and he has carried out that pledge. The U.N. expects to
formally confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, in
accordance with UNSCR 425, this week.
The withdrawal and its immediate aftermath leading up to U.N.
verification this week have been much more peaceful than many
anticipated. Our greatest concern was that there would be cross-border
attacks that would trigger a dangerous escalation of violence affecting
civilians on both sides. This has not been the case. Apart from some
sporadic looting that took place immediately following the withdrawal,
and some stone-throwing by Lebanese youths at the border, south Lebanon
has remained calm.
There are several reasons why calm has prevailed thus far. First,
there was strong international consensus behind Israel's decision to
implement UNSCR 425, including within the Arab world. U.N. Special
Envoy Larsen traveled to the region twice for extensive consultations
with Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. Larsen and his technical team have
worked assiduously to identify a line, based on the best possible
cartographic and historical data, for the purposes of confirming the
Israeli withdrawal. Larsen has done a tremendous job grappling with
some very difficult issues, and we have urged the international
community to support his and the U.N.'s efforts.
Second, both the Syrians and Hizballah have not disrupted the
U.N.'s efforts to implement 425. Third, the Israelis made it very clear
that they would retaliate forcefully in the event of cross-border
attacks, and fourth, the Government of Lebanon dispatched more than
1,000 police and gendarmes and set up checkpoints throughout the south
to provide security at the village level.
We do not believe that the death of Syrian President Asad will
adversely affect or delay the implementation of Resolution 425 or upset
the calm in south Lebanon, at least in the short-term.
There is no guarantee, however, that calm will prevail in the
future. It will take an active effort from a variety of players to
ensure that it does. Hizballah fighters are in close proximity with
Israeli forces on the border. This arrangement is clearly not desirable
now or in the future.
UNIFIL deployment into areas vacated by the Israeli's will be a
keypart of ensuring that calm prevails and that the Lebanese Government
is able to re-establish its authority there. UNSCR 425 outlines three
tasks for UNIFIL: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to
restore international peace and security in the south, and to assist
the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective
authority to the area. With the withdrawal nearing completion the focus
now is on the second and third tasks.
Once the U.N. confirms the withdrawal of Israeli forces in
accordance with Resolution 425, UNIFIL can begin to deploy in earnest.
UNIFIL has already established a limited presence in the mission area
through active reconnaissance and mobile patrols, and some units are
patrolling the border along with military observers from the United
Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO).
UNIFIL has approximately 4,600 troops deployed in a 1,000 square
kilometer area in south Lebanon and is organized into six national
battalions from Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, and Nepal.
France, Italy, and Poland also provide personnel to assist UNIFIL
headquarters operations. As UNIFIL meets its responsibilities under
425, the force may expand to 5,500 troops, to be drawn primarily from
existing UNIFIL contributors.
Clearly, UNIFIL must work closely with the Government of Lebanon to
implement its responsibilities. UNIFIL will continue to occupy key
points to help maintain stability. These tasks require active
coordination with the Lebanese army. UNIFIL is working to establish a
joint operations center with the LAF that will ensure the smooth
deployment of GOL forces.
In spite of its expanded presence in the south thus far, the
Government of Lebanon will need to do more to re-establish its
effective authority there. Secretary Albright has stressed this point
with Lebanese President Lahoud and Secretary-General Annan, and we will
continue to do so. The recent announcement by the Government of Lebanon
that it would deploy a strike force to the south consisting of 1,000
security and army personnel is a positive step.
The Lebanese Government's ability to consolidate peace and security
in south Lebanon will depend in large part on its success in developing
the infrastructure of the area and creating jobs for young men who
heretofore have carried arms. Economic assistance will be critical in
helping Lebanon rebuild after two decades of conflict. We believe the
international community should support this effort, which will benefit
the region as a whole. We will work with Congress as we look at ways to
be helpful.
As Resolution 425 moves forward, we will continue to press ahead
with our bilateral agenda with the Government of Lebanon: comprehensive
regional peace, stronger business and commercial ties, and greater
cooperation on counter-terrorism and law enforcement issues. In
pursuing these goals, we hope to promote greater democratization as a
means of giving the Lebanese a stronger role in managing their own
affairs.
In the meantime, we continue to support the resumption of
negotiations on both the Syria and Lebanon tracks. This effort remains
a priority of our foreign policy in the Middle East. Peace is the best
vehicle for change in Syria and Lebanon. We also believe that the
Lebanese people, through their own democratic process, can make
important decisions about their future relationship with Syria.
The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is a momentous development in
the Middle East and a very positive one. The border between Lebanon and
Israeli is now quiet. We must continue to exert every effort to ensure
that it remains so, first by supporting the U.N.'s efforts to implement
Resolution 425 in a peaceful and orderly manner, second by garnering
international support to assist in reconstructing the south, and
finally by keeping the door open for a comprehensive peace settlement
between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon. That,
ultimately, is our best chance for achieving lasting regional peace and
stability.
Senator Brownback. The United States granted military
equipment to the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], with the
understanding that the LAF would secure Southern Lebanon after
Israeli withdrawal. Now, you noted some promise in the future
of moving 1,000 soldiers into that region. However, what
happened right after the Israeli pullout, Hizbollah fighters
filled the vacuum.
Will military sales to Lebanon cease if the Lebanese Armed
Forces do not secure the south?
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, I think that the key here
is to get the Lebanese Armed Forces to move south in greater
numbers. Both U.N. Security Council Resolutions in the past
have called for the Lebanese Army to move to the border, and to
secure it.
The Secretary has been pressing the Lebanese, along with
other members of the international community, particularly the
French, to move the army south. We think it is a good first
step to have those strike forces established which have those
elements of the army in it.
The Lebanese Security Forces and the army combined should
be able to do a reasonable job of filling the vacuum, but it is
not enough. We are going to continue to press to do so, so
that, indeed, organizations like Hizbollah will not be able to
fill this vacuum.
And I might add that it is also important that the
reconstruction efforts take place under the auspices of the
Lebanese Government, so that it can gain the support and the
loyalty of the people of the south, and the economic
improvement of their conditions as well.
Senator Brownback. Well, Secretary, this is not a surprise,
that the Israelis were pulling out of South Lebanon. It was
announced. It was stated that they were going to do it, ``This
is going to happen.''
Why did not the Lebanese Armed Forces move in immediately
or have the plans to move into the region? Was the
administration pressing them to move into the region
immediately after the Israeli withdrawal?
Secretary Walker. Yes, we were, and we have made that very
clear. I think that, first, there were some doubts in the minds
of both the Lebanese and the Syrians as to whether there was
sincerity on the part of the Israelis. We never had any doubt
of that. We knew the minute that Prime Minister Barak made the
pledge in his election campaign, that he was serious about it
and he would go forward with it.
It took some time for that message to sink in in Lebanon.
We have been pressing the Lebanese Army to prepare for this
eventuality. They, for their own internal political reasons and
for the reasons of their relationship with Syria which you know
very well about, had had doubts about moving an army in in full
measure. We think those doubts have been resolved now, and we
expect that they will fill that vacuum.
Senator Brownback. Why so late? I mean, is this not going
to be much more difficult to do at this point in time rather
than earlier, right after the Israelis pulled out?
Secretary Walker. No question about it, Mr. Chairman. Our
preference would have been to have contact re-employment in
effect, with the UNIFIL actively engaged as well.
But the process came a bit earlier than was expected for
the actual withdrawal. It was not announced in advance
precisely. We knew that it would take place before July 7, but
we did not know precisely when. Contact withdrawal was not
possible.
I think that the situation in the south, however, still
lends itself to full Lebanese Government control and authority
in the south, and that is our objective.
Senator Brownback. Will the U.S. Government stop sales of
military equipment to Lebanese Armed Forces if they do not
fully deploy and secure the south?
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure precisely
what is in the works on the military side of assistance with
the Lebanese. We have a program of economic support. I do know
that the Lebanese Army has improved immensely in the last 3 to
5 years in its ability to enforce its authority in the region.
And assuming that we are able to encourage the army to move
south, and to the extent that the internal security forces are
able to provide the security, I hope and it is our expectation
that this issue will not arise. But I want to stress that it is
not just a question of the army.
There are Lebanese Security Forces which have the precise
mission of providing internal security in Lebanon. Those forces
are also important in providing for government authority, as
well as the movement. And almost as important, is the movement
of the various ministries to the south, and the various
authorities of Lebanon to the south to provide the services
that the Lebanese people should have the right to expect.
Senator Brownback. Well, I agree that Lebanon has the right
to expect it. I think there is a real difference between us
talking and saying, look, you guys ought to be doing this. The
Lebanese Armed Forces should be securing the south, and us
saying, if you do not take these steps aggressively, we are
going to have to take steps to press this issue with you.
Secretary Walker. No question, Mr. Chairman, we will press
the issue. But at this point, we have no reason to believe that
the Lebanese Government will build a vacuum in the south.
Senator Brownback. I would look at it from the other side.
I don't have much confidence that they will, given that the
Hizbollah has taken a position in the south. It seems like that
they missed their grand opportunity to do the right thing, and
what should make me believe now that they will back up and do
it when it is more difficult?
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, I will make it very clear.
You and I have the same concern. We think it is a very
dangerous position to have the Hizbollah cheek-by-jowl against
the border with the Israelis. We think it is very important
that the Hizbollah not be in such a position now or in the
future.
Our efforts will be to engage the Lebanese Government in
changing that situation, and ultimately in disarming all the
factions that are in the area that act as an infringement on
Lebanese sovereignty and on the government's authority in the
region. Those are our objectives, and we share your deep, deep
concern in this matter.
Senator Brownback. I hope as well if Hizbollah strikes
across the border at the Israelis, that the administration--as
I have stated on the floor, if Israel should see fit to respond
as it needs to to protect its sovereignty, to protect its
security, I would hope the administration would have a similar
position.
Secretary Walker. The administration has the precise exact
position, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Well, I am just concerned that this is
not a development going forward the way that either of us would
have hoped. I think we need to put stronger messages with your
words, saying, ``These actions, these consequences will follow
if the Lebanese Armed Forces do not deploy in the region,''
because they are going to have difficulty in turn in dealing
with Hizbollah, a great deal of difficulty.
And without pressure from us, from outside, of real
consequences, I do not know what truly causes them then to act
to overcome those significant domestic pressures that they are
going to have, and significant pressures from the Syrians that
they have.
I am curious to note, turning to the events of the day--in
the future of Syria, the administration's position of whether
they support the ascendency of the second dictatorship of Asad
into Syria, what the administration's view would be there.
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, we are not going to take a
position on who should run Syria. That is up to the Syrian
people to pursue.
However, I can assure you that we do take a position on the
policies of Syria, and whether they are constructive or not
constructive. And it is our hope that a new leadership in Syria
would recognize that terrorism is not in Syria's long-term
interest, that its closed economy is not in Syria's long-term
interest, and that the peace process is in Syria's long-term
interests.
And those, in addition to the questions of human rights,
would be the issues that we would have on the forefront of our
discussions with the new leadership once it comes into
authority.
Senator Brownback. When will those communications take
place? I would presume after some period of time.
Secretary Walker. The constitution, as you know, is amended
in Syria to lower the age of the leadership to 34.
Senator Brownback. I noted earlier, they did that with
quite dispatch.
Secretary Walker. Yes, I understand that. That is very
efficient, Mr. Chairman. I think I prefer our system, though.
Senator Brownback. Well, I think I do, too. It has a few
more safeguards and a few----
Secretary Walker. Yes. But I understand that the parliament
will be meeting on July 25, and at that time, they would be in
a position to nominate a new President. There would then be a
referendum among the people to give authority to that decision,
and at that point, the new leader, whomever that might be--I
think we have a pretty good suspicion--would take over.
And at that point, we would be in a position to engage in a
dialog with a principle emphasis on the subjects I mentioned.
Senator Brownback. And what would the administration be
stating to the new leadership in Syria about Lebanon? What
would be your position? And how will you intend to press this
with the Syrians? What leverage will you intend to use with the
Syrians?
Secretary Walker. Well, our position has been staked out
for a long time on this question, and it goes quite far back in
history. We call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, the
territorial integrity, the unity, the political independence of
Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the
Government of Lebanon. And we continue to press for a
resolution for the problem of Lebanon.
We would urge the Syrians to respect that call, the call
that, I might add, was agreed to in the Taif Accords which were
put into effect, and have never been completely applied to the
situation in Lebanon. And obviously, it was a complicating
factor to have during the period when the Israeli occupation
took place in southern elements of Lebanon. That is no longer
an impediment. So we would like to see the Taif Accords pursued
and fulfilled in all of their aspects.
Senator Brownback. What leverage will you use against the
Syrians to try to implement them pulling out and not supporting
Hizbollah within Lebanon?
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, there are two forms of
leverage. One is positive, and one is negative. We have already
negative leverages in force with sanctions. We have options of
increasing those sanctions if necessary.
But we like to hope that there will be a change in the
attitude and approach of the leadership of Syria toward issues
such as terrorism, particularly; and that they will engage
constructively in the peace process, recognizing they have
national interests; and that indeed, there will be a
modification in attitude toward Lebanon.
Now, it is also a Lebanon issue, the question of Lebanese
and Syrian forces. The Syrians have 30,000 troops in there and
scattered around in a few other places. Regarding the Lebanese,
up till now, the government has said it is not timely for these
troops to leave because of the internal security situation.
With the Israeli departure, we expect that the situation
will be more conducive to the departure of those troops, that
the Lebanese Government will be able to exert its authority in
the south and will control more of its own country. And this
should give it the authority and capability to move forward
with the request that the Syrian forces leave.
Senator Brownback. I guess, Mr. Secretary, if you look at
the overall situation, and for years there has been a huge, if
you would consider it that way, a logjam in Lebanon with the
pieces stuck in place. And the Israelis pulled out in quite a
strong move that did take place, new leadership in Syria, it
would certainly appear to be a moment here that things could
radically change for the better.
It might not, but it would seem that this would be one of
those moments where you apply the maximum leverage that you
can, both positive and negative, to press this on through to
change the dynamic that is occurring, that has been in place in
Lebanon for some period of time, and that this would not be a
moment to be timid about ``We are going to use this sort of
leverage or that sort of force.''
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you on this. I
think there are opportunities, serious opportunities, for some
change, both in the nature of the approach that Syria has taken
toward the world and toward its own internal problems and
toward the question of security and stability and independence
of Lebanon.
I might point out, for example, that the Syrian economy is
in desperate need of change. That change will depend on an
opening to the outside world. That opening will depend on Syria
adopting a different attitude toward questions such as
terrorism.
At this point, the Syrian gross national product is about
$900 per capita. In Lebanon, it is $4,000 per capita. There is
a desperate need for change. We can help in that change. We can
make a positive contribution, but it is going to depend on
other elements of the Syrian behavior. So as I say, there are
both positive and negative levers that are available.
Senator Brownback. Has Israel requested any increased
military assistance from the United States to compensate for
the loss of its buffer zone in Lebanon?
Secretary Walker. Within the existing foreign military
funds that have been available to Israel, we have designated
$50 million to assist them in removing and changing some of the
locations. This is within existing FMF funds. No additional
funds have been requested.
What they have requested is that there be a Corps of
Engineers contract, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contract let
with the $50 million. The Corps will then put contracts up for
bid. Both Israeli and American companies will be eligible to
bid on those contracts. And that would be an element of
assistance to the Israelis, but there is no additional money.
Senator Brownback. This may be a speculation, but if Syria
were offering agreement that would solidify Syrian control over
Lebanon in return for some sort of peace with Israel, what
would the administration's position be? Would they oppose this?
Secretary Walker. Mr. Chairman, we actually think the
opposite is the case. We believe that in the situation of peace
agreements between Syria and Israel, and Lebanon and Israel,
there is the real opportunity for obtaining the full
territorial independence and integrity of Lebanon.
We see that as part of the solution, not part of the
problem. But our position is very clear. We are not in the
business of selling Lebanese sovereignty to anybody for any
purpose.
Senator Brownback. So, the administration would oppose.
Secretary Walker. Absolutely.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Thank you very much,
Secretary Walker, for a timely presentation and discussion, and
responding to my questions. A lot of people use the technique
of, well, OK, I will answer your question over a 3- or 4-minute
time period, so the questioning does not go very fast. I
appreciate your willingness to respond directly and quickly.
And I hope you will press this as you stated here with all
speed, and ability, and all leverage that you have because it
does strike me as a real moment that we have to really change
the dynamic. Best to you.
Secretary Walker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your comments.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
The second panel will be Dr. Daniel Pipes, editor of the
Middle East Quarterly, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. And the
second presentation will be Colonel Charbel Barakat of the
South Lebanon Army, Lebanon.
Dr. Pipes, welcome back to the committee. We are delighted
to have you here again on such a timely issue as the future of
Lebanon when we see the circumstances changing around us. All
of us appreciate your insights and your thoughts, and I
appreciate your coming here to share those with the committee
today.
STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL PIPES, DIRECTOR OF THE MIDDLE EAST
FORUM; EDITOR, MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, PHILADELPHIA, PA
Dr. Pipes. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted
to have this opportunity to discuss Lebanon with you.
My focus will be on the aspect of this subject that I know
best, namely the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. I shall explain
the reason for the occupation, the implications, the dramatic
developments in the last month, and then provide an overview of
U.S. policy and give a couple of policy recommendations--all in
5 minutes, I hope.
First, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Lebanon has
the unhappy distinction today of being the only satellite state
in the world. The origins of the situation go back to 1920 when
the French Government carved out a greater Lebanon that met
with considerable opposition in Syria. That opposition finally
could manifest itself in 1975 when the war broke out in
Lebanon, and the Syrians had between 1975 and 1990, an
opportunity to take over that country, which they did do.
It somewhat resembles the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait that
followed in 1990, but the Iraqi occupation was very fast, very
brutal, very obvious. The Syrian occupation was slow, careful,
and subtle.
The Syrian Government displays many levers of power in
Lebanon. It has troops, intelligence agents, and a significant
number of Syrian nationals living in that country.
Control of Lebanon brings the Syrian Government many
benefits. As you can imagine, and as you yourself pointed out
and also Secretary Walker pointed out, Lebanon has a much
higher per capita income than Syria. There are economic
opportunities. There is drug trafficking. The lively press that
existed in Lebanon has been closed down. It is a place where
the Syrian Government can tangle with its adversary Israel
without the stakes being too high. It is a place for terrorist
proxies to work out of.
Curiously, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon is by its own
lights, illegal, for the Syrian Government has on three
occasions concurred with decisions that required them to leave
Lebanon, and yet it is still there.
The occupation has taken a toll on Lebanon. What had been
the most open of the Arabic-speaking countries, boasting
decentralized power, real democracy, rule of law, unimpeded
movement in a Hong Kong-style free market, independent schools,
and an unfettered press has turned into something like a minor
version of the totalitarian state of Syria, with a more
powerful central government, increasing lack of the rule of
law, less and less freedom of movement, imposed school
curricula, and a declining economy.
The Lebanese population has responded with very negative
attitudes toward this Syrian occupation. All of our data
suggests that across the board, all the communities of Lebanon,
despite the many other differences, agree on the undesirability
of continued Syrian occupation. However, because of the strong-
arm of the Syrian occupiers, they have, in general, not been
able to express these views, although from time to time there
has been an eruption of violence against the occupiers.
The timeliness of our discussion today is due to the two
major changes that took place within the last few weeks: First,
the Israeli pullback from Southern Lebanon, and second, the
death of President Hafiz al-Asad on Saturday, just 4 days ago.
But even before these developments took place, they have
been in the making. As you noted earlier, Senator, the Israelis
already announced a year ago they would be leaving, and the
President of Syria's health has been declining for some time.
Accordingly, there has been movement in Lebanon that
preceded the last few weeks. Perhaps the opening salvo of this
was on March 23 of this year when a prominent editorialist and
journalist in Lebanon wrote, an open letter to the son of the
Syrian President, in which he said, ``We do not want you
here.''
There have also been some acts of violence against Syrians
in Lebanon. There have been some protests, street protests,
which led to labor unions and university students taking to the
street. The Syrian troops abandoned some of the more obvious
checkpoints and other deployments and moved back, and became a
little more subtle. Some of the leading religious figures of
the country spoke out, both Christian and Muslim.
So it has been already even before the last few days, a
process in movement. I predict that there will be a hot summer
in Lebanon, and far more important than that, I anticipate a
day when Lebanon will again be a free country without the
Syrian yoke on it, and a sovereign government will rule.
The international responses have been interesting. The
Clinton administration has never specifically called for Syrian
troops to withdraw from the country of Lebanon. It has instead
contented itself with a vague appeal for ``all foreign forces''
to leave the country.
This has been the case even most recently. Perhaps the most
dramatic conversation was just a week ago when Secretary
Albright met with the Syrian Foreign Minister in Cairo.
According to press reports, she did not raise the issue of
Syria's occupation of Lebanon. In public, she actually praised
it: ``Syria has played a constructive role as far as Lebanon is
concerned. We hope that they will continue to do so.'' The best
she could do was to avoid mentioning the Syrian troops by name,
and instead resort to the tired old formulation that ``all
foreign forces must depart.''
The Syrian authorities, not surprisingly, responded to this
weak advisory by saying they had every right to be there. They
were invited in by the Lebanese Government, and they do not
need the blessing of the United States.
In contrast with this record of collusion that the
administration has compounded, Congress has been forthright and
repeated in its condemnation. In 1993, 1995, 1997, over and
over, the Congress has been one of the few major voices to
condemn the Syrian occupation.
It has also been good to see that, of late, other
organizations have spoken up: human rights groups, major media,
and the United States, and I might add that my own organization
just last week published a study group report calling for the
end of Syrian occupation. I am pleased to note that Chairman
Helms was a signatory to that report. It is available to anyone
in this room after the hearing.
The U.S. Government faces a fundamental choice vis-a-vis
Lebanon: To accept or contest the Syrian domination there.
Operationally, that means either working with the constituted
government or ignoring it. I think there is, in the end, no
choice. We must stand in solidarity with the oppressed against
the oppressors, as we have done so many times around the world.
Beyond the moral position, this stance is also very
important, practically speaking. The people who would take
action against the Syrians are much emboldened when they feel
they have the U.S. Government's support.
Finally, I urge you, the Congress, to do all that you can
do to condemn and repulse the Syrian occupiers. Toward this
end, you can take several steps.
First, you can use your bully pulpit and simply say, ``All
Syrian forces must leave Lebanon.'' Second, you can pressure
the executive branch to show some spine as you have done in the
past. Third, you can close the national interest loopholes that
permit the executive branch to waive various regulations, which
it has done frequently. Fourth, you can take initiatives such
as funding a Radio Free Lebanon.
And finally, so long as the Syrian occupation continues, do
not fund the Government of Lebanon including its Armed Forces,
because that money--money is fungible, and it in the end
supports the Syrian occupation. You should appropriate funds
only to credible private organizations and institutions.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Dr. Pipes. As
usual, that was a good, quick, clear analysis, and clear policy
recommendations are always very helpful to have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pipes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Pipes
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for this
opportunity to discuss Lebanon. My focus will be on the aspect of this
subject that I know best, namely the Syrian occupation of that country.
I shall explain the reason for the occupation, its implications, and
the dramatic impact of two recent developments (the Israeli force
withdrawal and the death of Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad). I will
conclude with an overview of past U.S. policy and some policy
recommendations.
the syrian occupation
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Lebanon has the unhappy
distinction of being the world's only remaining satellite state. Its
government boasts the trappings of sovereignty--a flag, an independence
day, a constitution, membership in the United Nations--but little or
none of its substance. In fact, all the country's major decisions are
made in Damascus, Syria.
The origins of this situation go back to the beginning of the
century now ending. In 1920, when the French government carved modern
Lebanon out of Syria, this met with considerable opposition in Syria,
where Lebanon was seen as provinces of Syria. That opposition persisted
through the next two generations. Only with the outbreak of Lebanon's
civil war in 1975, however, did the Syrian authorities find an
opportunity to act on their intention to get Lebanon back. Their
takeover of the country occurred step by step, climaxing in 1990 with
the domination of some 90 percent of the country.
Though achieved with far greater subtlety and skill, Hafiz al-
Asad's takeover of Lebanon closely resembled Saddam Husayn's occupation
of Kuwait. In both cases, the dictator of a powerful totalitarian state
exploited an old irredentist claim to justify the subjugation of a
small, free, and Western-oriented neighbor. The major difference is one
of finesse: in contrast to Saddam's crude and brutal invasion, Asad
prepared the way by sponsoring a range of Lebanese dissident groups,
had himself invited in by bona fide Lebanese leaders, and then over a
fifteen-year period gradually incorporated portions of the country.
Asad disposed of many levers of power in Lebanon. An estimated
40,000 Syrian troops and uncounted political and intelligence agents
maintained a formidable presence throughout the country, plus hundreds
of thousands of Syrians moved there.
Control of Lebanon brought Asad many benefits. It marked a
significant step toward bringing all of ``Greater Syria'' under
Damascus's direct control, one of his long-term aims. It permitted him
to stamp out the press criticism and political intrigue that once came
out of Beirut. Lebanon provided his officials with an annual income
from drug trafficking estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
maybe more. It provided employment for as many as a million Syrian
workers and offered a protected market for Syrian products. It gave
Asad control of a second voice in Arab councils and the peace process.
It presented a way for him to tangle with Israel without endangering
his regime; the two sides have tacitly agreed to reserve total war for
the Golan Heights and engage in lesser skirmishes in Lebanon. More
ominously, control of Lebanon also provided a convenient venue for
housing terrorist proxies by keeping them under Syrian control but
outside of direct Syrian responsibility.
Curiously, by the Syrian government's own lights, its occupation of
Lebanon is illegal. Damascus has on three occasions concurred with
decisions made by other bodies that Syrian troops should leave Lebanon.
It first agreed to withdraw the troops in October 1976 as part of the
Riyadh-Cairo accords.\1\ In September 1982, it signed the Fez
Declaration that committed it to ``start negotiations'' with the
Lebanese government about ``an end to the mission of the Arab deterrent
forces in Lebanon [i.e., the Syria troops].'' \2\ Finally, in October
1989, Asad accepted an agreement hammered out by the Lebanese
parliament (the Taif Accord); Christians supported a revision of the
Lebanese government structure and in return he said that Syrian troops,
within two years of some conditions being met, would be redeployed from
their positions in Beirut to the Bekaa Valley.\3\ Those conditions were
all fulfilled in September 1990; but September 1992 came and went
without any change. Theodor Hanf, a leading German scholar of Lebanon,
dubs this a ``blatant violation'' of the Taif Agreement.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Specifically, Damascus agreed to ``the withdrawal of armed
elements to the places they occupied before April 13, 1975, and to
remove all armed manifestations.'' For the text of the document in
English, see Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, The Search for Peace in
the Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967-79 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 336-37.
\2\ For the text of the declaration in English, see John Norton
Moore, ed., The Arab-Israeli Conflict, vol. 4, The Difficult Search for
Peace (1975-1988), part 2, pp. 1154-56.
\3\ For the text of the accord in English, see Dilip Hiro, Lebanon
Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War (New York: St.
Martin's, 1993), pp. 231-40.
\4\ Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a
State and Rise of a Nation, trans. from German by John Richardson
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 636.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
implications for lebanon
Occupation has had many consequences for Lebanon. Until 1975, it
was the most open of all the Arabic-speaking countries, boasting
decentralized power, real democracy, rule of law, unimpeded movement, a
Hong Kong-style free market, independent schools, and an unfettered
press.
Under Syrian control, however, the central government in Beirut has
gained in authority, rendering recent parliaments, according to Hanf,
``the least representative in Lebanese history.'' \5\ Syrian operatives
function almost entirely outside the rule of law (for example, they
routinely make arrests without warrants) leading Human Rights Watch to
conclude that ``the record of violations in Syrian-controlled Lebanon
has been worse than in Syria.'' \6\ Freedom of movement ended when
Syrians decided who comes into the country and who goes out. Asad's
regime has sought to impose Syrian-style standards on the school
curricula, including the requirement that Arabic and Islam be taught.
It brought the free-wheeling Lebanese economy more in line with that of
statist Syria and created organic links between the two countries (for
example, in the electricity grid and in roads), sometimes with an eye
to their permanent connection (why else was Lebanon forced to convert
its power stations from petroleum to liquefied natural gas, which
happens to be imported from Syria?). Cheap Syrian goods are dumped in
Lebanon. As for the press, Human Rights Watch states that it ``has been
forced to toe a Syrian-drawn line, leave Syrian-controlled Lebanon, or
cease functioning.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid., p. 632.
\6\ Human Rights Watch, World Report 1991, p. 604.
\7\ Human Rights Watch, World Report 1991, p. 605.567
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps most significant for the long-range future, the Asad regime
has opened the doors for Syrians to move to Lebanon, seek work there,
settle there, and sometimes bring other family members to join them
there. With time, this emigration may profoundly alter Lebanon's
population by increasing the proportion of peasants and Muslims. Such
changes have the additional virtue, from the Damascene point of view,
of making the Christian population, and especially the Maronites who
are the heart of independent Lebanon, feel less welcome in their own
homeland. (Nasrallah Sfeir, the Maronite patriarch, has accused the
Syrians of attempting precisely this.) Lebanese Christians already have
a century's legacy of emigration; continued Syrianization of their
country makes them prone to leave their ancestral home in ever-
increasing numbers. Should they do so, Damascus will have cleared the
major obstacle to its permanent colonization of Lebanon.
So subservient are Lebanese politicians to their suzerain in
Damascus, they routinely visit the Syrian capital before making any
major decision or even to resolve problems among themselves. On some
occasions, the prime minister surrounded himself with most of his
cabinet to travel the very 70 miles to Damascus.\8\ Speaking candidly,
former president Ilyas al-Hirawi once confessed his shame at this
pattern of behavior: ``We now disagree on the appointment of a doorman
and go to Damascus to submit the problem to the brothers [there].'' \9\
Prime Minister Salim al-Huss sees no end date to the Syria's occupation
but states that it will last ``as long as the government sees their
presence necessary.'' \10\ As a former Lebanese diplomat puts it,
``Everyone knows that Syria controls everything in Lebanon, totally.''
\11\ Or, as Uri Sagie, then head of Israeli military intelligence, put
it, ``Lebanon's dependence on Syria is absolute.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ For example, 11 of the 16 ministers joined Salim al-Huss in
October 1999 as a sign of respect when he went to sign accords on farm
produce and tourism with Hafiz al-Asad.
\9\ Ad-Diyar (Beirut), 3 December 1994.
\10\ United Press International, 6 September 1999.
\11\ Los Angeles Times, 15 February 1997.
\12\ Davar, 5 September 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of Lebanon's
population--and not just the Christians among them--rejects the Syrian
occupation. Survey research among Lebanese Sunnis in 1989-90 showed
that a mere 3 percent of them favored union with Syria. \13\ Anecdotal
evidence confirms this. As one Lebanese put it a few years ago, ``Syria
is at the top of the hate list in Lebanon today, much more so than
Israel. Israel is perceived of only as a military threat while Syria
threatens Lebanon's very existence.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Hilal Khashan, ``The Lebanese State: Lebanese Unity and the
Sunni Muslim Position,'' International Sociology 7 (1992): 93. In
contrast, 86 percent favored a unitary state, 10 percent a federal
state, and 1 percent chose partition of the country. The survey had 500
respondents.
\14\ Ha'aretz, 19 June 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lebanese opinion might overwhelmingly reject the occupation but it
could do or say little; discussion of this issue within the country is
taboo, so ``most outright opposition is confined to Lebanese abroad,
unsigned Internet postings and quiet conversations.'' \15\ Here is an
Associated Press report from mid-1997:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Baltimore Sun, 10 February 2000.
In private, Lebanese complain about Syria's hold on their
country and their lack of real independence. . . . But few are
publicly demanding that Syria immediately pull out its forces.
Part of it is fear of offending their stronger neighbor, known
as ``sisterly Syria'' in the Arabic tradition. ``Big
brotherly'' Syria would be more accurate.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Associated Press, 29 July 1997.
Nonetheless, Lebanese opinion would spontaneously erupt on
occasion. In the summer of 1997, the Syrian and Lebanese soccer all-
star teams played a semi-final game in Lebanon. In the course of the
game, fans got into fights after the Syrians resident in Lebanon
chanted, ``In spirit and blood we will redeem you Hafiz [al-Asad].''
Lebanese fans responded by calling on the withdrawal of Syrian forces
from Lebanon. As tensions rose, the two sides began fighting until
dispersed by the worried authorities.\17\ Students were arrested in
Beirut in March 1999 for distributing leaflets that called for an end
to the Syrian occupation. Leaders sometimes spoke their mind: ``All
this talk about Syria's presence in Lebanon being a safeguard against
Israeli aggression is a lot of trash,'' asserted Dory Chamoun, leader
of a small Maronite party. ``We don't need Syria here to help us.''
\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Al-Mashhad As-Siyasi, 9 August 1997.
\18\ Inter Press Service, 8 October 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such outspokenness notwithstanding, year after year the Syrian
occupation of Lebanon persisted, almost without change. The situation
was about as completely static as one can find in the contemporary
world.
recent developments
Suddenly, in recent weeks, two major changes have taken place.
Together, these challenge the occupation as nothing has at least since
1984.
First, the abrupt Israeli pullback from south Lebanon changed the
political landscape. The Syrians have since 1978 deflected criticism of
their own occupation by pointing to the need to counter the Israeli
security belt in the south. No matter how flimsy this justification, it
did serve them well. Lebanese politicians, for example, endlessly
repeated the mantra that Syrian troops must stay so long as Israel's
occupation continued. When that later occupation ended in the early
morning of 24 May 2000, so did the catch-all rationale for the Syrian
armed presence. United Nations Resolution 520, which calls for the
``withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,'' these days
refers only to Syrian forces.
Second, Asad's declining health was apparent for months and ended
with his death on June 10. His gradual fade from the scene heartened
those in Lebanon wanting to escape Syrian control. They saw his passing
as the start of a struggle for power in Damascus that would reduce
Syrian force projection, thereby giving the Lebanese more room to
maneuver. They sensed that, absent his sure and ruthless hand, that
control would likely be much reduced, and possibly even ended. Asad's
death gave heart to all those in Lebanon who wish to see their country
out from under the Damascene thumb.
These two changes encouraged Lebanese patriots to speak out and
demonstrate against the Syrian occupation. The opening salvo was on 23
March 2000, when Jibran Tueni, chairman of the board and managing
director of An-Nahar newspaper, wrote ``An Open Letter to Dr. Bashshar
Asad'' in which he frankly informed the heir-apparent in Syria that
``many Lebanese are neither at ease with the Syrian policy in Lebanon,
nor the Syrian `presence' in Lebanon'' and then boldly declared, ``We
are not a Syrian province.'' This unheard-of candor was quickly
followed by a series of acts of resistance. In April, unknown
assailants three times in three weeks threw sticks of dynamite at a
compound housing 1,500 Syrian workers in southern Lebanon, an attack
later claimed by a group calling itself Citizens for a Free and
Independent Lebanon.
In mid-April, small groups of protesters associated with former
prime minister Michel Aoun boldly marched in front of the Justice
Ministry one day and in front of the national museum and university the
next, chanting anti-Syrian slogans such as ``Syria get out of here.''
\19\ On the third day, about one thousand demonstrators gathered at the
Lebanese University and shouted out ``The Israeli army out, the Syrian
army out and Lebanon first.'' \20\ Labor unions then followed with more
demonstrations. Within ten days of these events, Syrian troops became
less visible, redeploying from a dozen high-profile checkpoints--though
of course government spokesmen denied any connection to the
demonstrations. \21\ This appears to be the first-ever retreat by
Syrian forces within Lebanon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Reuters, 17 April 2000.
\20\ Agence France-Presse, 19 April 2000.
\21\ For the fullest account in English of these demonstrations,
see Gary C. Gambill, ``Special Report: Lebanon's Intifada,'' Middle
East Intelligence Bulletin, April 2000, at http://www.meib.org, from
which some of the following information derives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Various religious figures spoke their minds. The Maronite
Patriarch, Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, stated that if Lebanon
``wants to control its future and for the Lebanese to regain their
liberty, the Syrian troops must leave.'' \22\ More surprisingly,
Archbishop Elias Audi of the usually docile Eastern Greek Orthodox
Church spoke up on behalf of the student protestors to his congregation
in a Palm Sunday sermon. Human rights groups in Lebanon got on the
case. Even the Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Din, chairman of Lebanon's
Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council, complained publicly that Lebanon has
``no judicial branch in the full meaning of the word, enjoying full
independence, immune from all other branches, and exercising
autonomy.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ La Croix, 6 June 2000.
\23\ Speech to the Committee for Good Governance in Lebanon (CGGL),
12 May 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Again pushing the outer limits of the possible, just two days
before Hafiz al-Asad's death, Jibran Tueni wrote a scathing and
sarcastic attack in his newspaper repudiating the logic the Syrian
foreign minister used ``to defend the presence of Syrian forces in
Lebanon.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ AnNahar, 8 June 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Looking forward, I predict a hot summer in Lebanon; beyond that, I
can anticipate the day when Lebanon will free itself of the Syrian yoke
and again be a sovereign country.
u.s. responses
Thanks to the Syrian dictator's cleverness, nearly the entire world
acquiesced in his seizure of Lebanon--including our own Executive
Branch. The White House and State Department during the Clinton years
have never specifically called for Syria to withdraw, contenting
themselves with a vague appeal on ``all foreign forces'' to leave the
country.
Though perfectly aware of it (as implied by the oft-repeated
statement that the U.S. government ``remains dedicated to the goal of a
fully sovereign and independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces and
able once more to take its rightful place among the nations of the
world''), they prefer not to confront it.\25\ Their reasoning is
simple: seeing Lebanon almost exclusively in the context of Arab-
Israeli negotiations, where it represents just an irritant, they do
their best to pay it no attention. As a State Department official
frankly explained to me some years ago, ``we constantly urge complete
implementation of the Taif Accord [i.e., a withdrawal of Syrian troops]
but it's not a bilateral priority. We've not condemned this [non-
implementation] very loudly because it needs to be resolved in the
context of a comprehensive peace settlement.'' \26\
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\25\ One example of this relates to a June 25, 1997, hearing of the
House Committee on International Relations on the topic of ``U.S.
Policy Toward Lebanon.'' The committee had invited Michel Aoun, a
particular nemesis of the Syrian authorities, to testify; as late as
the day of the hearing itself, he was expected to appear. The State
Department's refusal to provide him with a visa, however, preventing
him from entering the country. This unusual step--perhaps the only time
the Executive branch prevented a foreign witness from testifying before
Congress--was apparently intended to placate sensibilities in Damascus.
\26\ Telephone interview with Elizabeth Hopkins, desk officer for
Syria, 10 November 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Worse, at times the Clinton Administration has endorsed the Syrian
occupation: a report in December 1999 indicated that it ``appealed to
prominent Lebanese politicians and opinion-makers to allow Syrian
troops to remain in Lebanon'' after Israel pulls its troops out from
the south.\27\ Likewise, a Beirut daily reported that ``U.S. Ambassador
David Satterfield diplomatically `warned' these personalities not to
count on an Israeli request for a Syrian withdrawal.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Middle East Newsline, 26 December 1999.
\28\ Al-Mustaqbal, 22 December 1999. The Israelis, it bears note,
apparently have not once raised the subject of ending the Syrian
occupation of Lebanon in the course of their nearly decade-long
negotiations with Damascus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The turmoil of recent weeks finds the Clinton Administration
responding meekly. After the Israeli troop withdrawal, Martin Indyk,
our ambassador to Israel, blandly called the Israeli troop withdrawal
``a golden opportunity for the government of Lebanon to extend its
authority down here to the border.'' \29\ During a meeting in Cairo
with Syria's foreign minister, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
did not raise the issue of Syria's occupation of Lebanon; in public,
she praised it: ``Syria has played a constructive role as far as
Lebanon is concerned. We hope that they will continue to do so.'' The
best she could do was avoid mentioning the Syrian troops by name and
instead resort to the tired old formulation that ``all foreign forces
should depart.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Ha'aretz, 31 May 2000.
\30\ Reuters and Associated Press, 7 June 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syria's authorities, not surprisingly, responded to this weak
advisory by insisting on their right to stay put. Faruq ash-Shar'a, the
Syrian foreign minister, explained: ``with all due respect, it is not
in the interest of Ms. Albright to raise this issue. We are in Lebanon
at the request of the Lebanese government and people and not with the
blessing of the United States.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Lebanon Foundation for Peace, 7 June 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast to the administration's record of collusion with the
Syrian occupation, even encouragement of it, Congress has forthrightly
and repeatedly condemned it: you voted unanimously in July 1993 to
consider ``the Government of Syria in violation of the Taif
agreement.'' \32\ In June 1995, a second, similar resolution (Sec.
2712) passed the House. In June 1997, Rep. Eliot Engel's Amendment to
H.R. 1986 concerning ``Sanctions against Syria,'' \33\ passed (by a
vote of 410 to 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ U.S. Congress Concurrent Resolution 28, 1 July 1993.
\33\ Unless the government of Syria eliminates ``its dangerous and
destabilizing policies,'' the resolution urges the president to apply
to Syria the same sanctions as those already in force against Iran and
Libya since 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also encouraging to see that of late other voices have spoken
up on behalf of the repressed Lebanese. Human rights groups have
condemned the Syrian presence, as have major media. For example, the
Boston Globe noted in an editorial that ``the freedom of Lebanon will
require not only Israel's retreat from southern Lebanon but also a
subsequent withdrawal of the 40,000 troops of Syria's occupation
force.'' \34\ The Los Angeles Times concurred: ``One foreign army of
occupation has left Lebanon. Now it's time for the second to do the
same.'' \35\ My own organization, the Middle East Forum, has just
published a study group report calling for an end to the Syrian
occupation; \36\ I am pleased to report that Chairman Helms is a
signatory of that report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ 8 March 2000.
\35\ 1 June 2000.
\36\ Daniel Pipes and Ziad Abdelnour, co-chairs, Ending Syria's
Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role (Philadelphia: Middle East Forum,
2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
policy choices
The U.S. government faces a fundamental choice vis-a-vis Lebanon:
accept or contest Syrian domination there. Operationally, this
translates into either working with or ignoring the puppet government
of Lebanon.
Work with the government: Recognize Emile Lahud as a real president
and Salim al-Huss as a real prime minister, accept the 1998 municipal
elections as legitimate, and acquiesce to rules established by the
Syrian regime. Such a policy has the advantage of winning favor in
Damascus and just possibly encouraging it to sign a peace treaty with
Israel. But it disheartens natural allies of the United States in
Lebanon and abroad; and it signals the world that while a blatant
invasion such as Saddam's into Kuwait is not acceptable, a subtle one
such as Asad's into Lebanon is tolerable.
Ignore the government: The alternative is to denounce the Syrian
occupation and ignore the governmental pseudo-structure in Beirut. This
has the advantage of sticking with our friends and our principles; and
of having bet on the winning side when the Lebanese do regain control
of their country. It raises the danger of the U.S. government throwing
its weight behind a force that today is on the losing side.
To my mind, there is really no choice: our government must stand in
solidarity with the oppressed and against the oppressors. Just as we
supported Estonians and Czechs through their decades of Soviet
domination, even when the prospect of their independence seemed
impossibly remote, so we must stand by the Lebanese people in their
hour of need. Nor is this only a matter of principle: Baltic leaders
all agree on the importance of the U.S. government refusing to accept
the Soviet occupation of their countries. Lebanese patriots one day
will similarly thank us for standing with their people even as they
faced the seemingly invincible might of the Syrian sword.
There is also a practical reason for taking this step: as Gary
Gambill (of the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin) notes, American
support is vital if the Lebanese are to challenge their Syrian
overlords. ``Whenever it appears that U.S. appeasement of Syria is
waning, Lebanese civil society rises to the occasion to challenge
Syrian hegemony. On the other hand, when the U.S. shows lack of resolve
vis-a-vis Syria, the Lebanese refrain from open expressions of
dissent.'' \37\ We are not just bystanders but, willy-nilly, we are
actors in an important drama: public disapproval of the Syrian
occupation will inspire Lebanese impatience and thereby help end it.
Accordingly, I urge you to do all within your power to condemn and
repulse the Syrian occupiers. Toward this end, Congress can take
several steps.
First, you can use your bully pulpit by sending a direct message to
the tyrants in Damascus. Prior congressional resolutions, I can assure
you, were much noted in Damascus. My favorite would be a six-word
statement: All Syrian forces must leave Lebanon.
Second, you can pressure the Executive branch to show some spine.
In 1994, for example, Congress had a critical role in assuring that
functionaries did not take Syria off the terrorism and narcotics lists.
Third, Congress can close the ``national interest'' loopholes that
permit the Executive branch to waive regulations, and which it seems to
do disproportionately for Damascus. For example, you can extend to
Syria the sanctions in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (which prohibits
any investment of over $20 million a year in the petrochemicals
sectors).
Fourth, you can take initiatives such as funding a Radio Free
Lebanon.
Finally, so long as the Syrian occupation continues, turn away
appeals for money for Lebanon that would go to the Syrian-controlled
government (this includes the army) and appropriate funds only to
credible private organizations and institutions.
--------------
\37\ Private communication, 9 June 2000.
Senator Brownback. Colonel, welcome back to the committee.
We are happy to have you here as well a second time, and look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL CHARBEL BARAKAT, SOUTH LEBANON ARMY;
COORDINATOR OF THE CIVILIAN COMMITTEES, SOUTH LEBANON REFUGEES
IN ISRAEL
Colonel Barakat. Thank you. Honorable Senator, I want to
thank you for inviting me as a witness today, and I want to
thank you also for the statement you have made on May 24 about
us, Lebanon. I have prepared a written statement which I would
like to insert in the record. I will then make shorter remarks
that will reflect the written testimony.
Senator Brownback. We will accept your written statement
into the record.
Colonel Barakat Thank you.
I, Colonel Charbel Barakat from Ain Ebel in South Lebanon,
appear before your subcommittee for the second time in 3 years
to address the dramatic developments which have taken place in
my country as a result of the Israeli withdrawal of May 23,
2000.
On June 7, 1997, I appeared before this subcommittee to
raise the issue of persecution of the southern Lebanese by
Hizbollah, and the pro-Syrian regime. During that hearing, I
warned against the dangerous consequences of what would happen
to our community after Israeli withdrawal, if a solution is not
found.
Let me just note that as a result of that testimony back in
1997, the regime in Beirut punished me by depriving me from my
past wages and pensions which I had a right to as an officer of
the Lebanese Army. That was the personal price I had to pay for
testifying to the Senate.
And today, as I come back to you as an exile, I do not know
what will be my fate in the future if I testify to the truth.
Many among the South Lebanese people went to exile after
May 22, and they are refugees into Israel. Most of them remain
in their villages and towns facing oppression which is slowly
but surely developing into a systematic persecution.
Over the past few months, in the media and in diplomatic
circles, we wrongly described--this media and the diplomatic
circles have wrongly described the history of South Lebanon.
And I want to say that, first of all, the South Lebanese Army
and our community were not the mercenaries of Israel, but
allied to Israel.
We are not traitors, but the defenders of a free Lebanon.
We were not--we are the natives. The Syrian Army is a foreign
occupation. We were the freedom fighters, and Hizbollah are the
terrorists.
Yet we, the Lebanese people, were crucified, and Hizbollah
became the hero, and Syria a stabilizing power. Our land was
occupied by pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian, and they called it
liberation. Liberation from whom? Liberation from the Lebanese
communities who worked 23 years defending their rights? But
worse than the physical tragedy, was assassination of the
truth.
Mr. Senator, uprooting us from our land is a crime against
us, but hiding the truth is a crime against you, and against
humanity.
I do not want to tell you more about the history of the
South Lebanese area and South Lebanese Army because I am short
of time, but I will focus on some points.
From 1976 to 1982, we were isolated and bombarded. No
country in the world assisted us, not even the United Nation's
forces which were sent to monitor the Israeli withdrawal
according to the U.N. Resolution 425.
When Israel moved into Lebanon in 1982, we finally were
able to travel to our capital and communicate with the rest of
our country. Unfortunately, peace between Israel and Lebanon
was assassinated. With the killing of President Ashir-Shunited,
the killing of the U.S. Marines, and the massacre of the
Christians in 1983-1984, and the consolation of the 17th of May
agreement between Lebanon and Israel.
In 1990, Syria invaded East Beirut. It was based on what
they had called the Taif Agreement. This Taif Agreement, you
have to know, and everybody has to know, that was--it never
invited us as South Lebanese to be part of the Taif Agreement.
While Syria invaded Lebanon, invaded East Beirut in 1990,
and imposed the new regime, many Lebanese who opposed Syria
including Prime Minister Sharonne, were forced into exile, and
a new national reconciliation government was illegally formed.
The government was supposed to end the war in Lebanon, and
include all Lebanese, but we, the southern Lebanese were not
invited.
Moreover, that same reconciliation regime disbanded another
major Christian party who opposed Syria, the Lebanese Forces,
jailed its leader, and persecuted its followers as of 1994.
Hizbollah became the only group allowed to keep its weapons.
Since then, our community became the only enclave escaping
the Syrian occupation and Hizbollah power. The war was being
waged against us by the way of terrorism, killing, and
kidnaping, under the slogan of fighting Israel.
We fought for our land and our people, but we were fighting
for the free world, as well. We were taking the--it is those
who in the end are destroying Israel, and who belong to the
same school as those who planted the bomb in the skies of
Lockerbie and in Europe, and in Buenos Aires, and Dhahran, Dar
es Salaam, and Nairobi.
Our people in South Lebanon, Christian, Shiite, and Druse,
the South Lebanon Army and the civilians decided to stay and
resist, but there were few survivors.
We asked the United Nations to talk with us, to mediate
with Beirut, to send its troops to protect our enclave. We
asked for us less than what they gave for Muslims of Kosovar.
They turned a blind eye on our people. Whereas, you can avoid--
pressure Israel to dismantle the SLA, washing the U.N. hands
from our blood.
Mr. Senator, the SLA did not collapse. It was dismantled as
a part of a political deal.
On May 22 about 8,000 civilians, mostly children, fled into
Israel. Those Lebanese citizens will not return into Hizbollah
terrorism. Inside our villages, human rights groups have
documented mass arrests, harassment, burning of houses,
looting, destruction of socio-economic infrastructure, cutting
off the world's supplies, alienation of national shrines, and
psychologic terror. In some cases, abductions and killings
occur.
More than 1,500 were arrested. Instead of an amnesty,
though, in the national reconciliation process, they are tried
for high treason and sentenced to years in prison. In addition
to their terms, those Lebanese villagers will be barred from
returning to their homes for another 15 years.
Now, Israel is inside its international borders. Hizbollah
is in our villages. SLA controls all of Lebanon. Our community
is under persecution. The Lebanese regime refuses to protect
us, and the Palestinian army organizations are getting ready
for a confrontation.
Mr. Senator, injustice was done to the people of Lebanon,
and we, the last free enclave were sacrificed to satisfy Syria
and accommodate Hizbollah. But despite the tragedy we have been
through, we still believe that the American people want justice
for all other nations, particularly the smallest and the
weakest.
We strongly believe that the American people represented by
the U.S. Congress will not accept that stability means the
exodus of our community from its own land; that terrorists such
as Hizbollah will be rewarded and our children will become
refugees; that Kuwait should be freed from Saddam's army and
Lebanon must remain occupied by Asad's army.
We strongly believe that the U.S. Government must
reevaluate the development in our area and initiate a new
policy based on human values and human rights.
Therefore, we strongly recommend the following: That the
congressional delegation would form a fact-finding mission to
the region, and meet with the refugees in Israel; that it will
send representatives to investigate the situation inside our
villages and towns in South Lebanon independent from Beirut's
supervision; that the U.S. Congress will grant the exile
population in Israel an emergency aid package to help them
regather and cope with the difficult conditions; that the U.S.
Government will use its influence with the various governments
in the region to ensure the safe return of the refugees from
South Lebanon to their homes, and to ensure a protected safe
haven under U.N. auspices and the withdrawal of the Syrian Army
from Lebanon; and that the U.N. will deny that area of
Hizbollah, which must be disarmed as all other militias were;
that the U.S. Government will use influence with the Lebanese
regime to stop the persecution of the South Lebanese
communities, issue an amnesty for all SLA members, release the
political prisoners, repatriate the political exiles, and
initiate a new and real reconciliation process in Lebanon; that
the U.S. Government will use its influence to initiate the
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, particularly that a new
President is about to take over in Damascus; and at the end,
that the U.S. Congress which has passed legislations in
protection of religious minorities around the world over the
past few years, will invite spiritual leaders, exiled
politicians and those from the Lebanese Christian community to
testify about the particular oppression this community has been
under for over 10 years.
I thank you again for the opportunity you offered me to
express my point of view and to present the views of the exiled
population of South Lebanon.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Barakat follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Charbel Barakat
Honorable Senator Sam Brownback, dear members of the subcommittee:
I, Colonel Charbel Barakat from Ain Ebel in South Lebanon appear
before your subcommittee for the second time in three years to address
the dramatic developments which have taken place in my country as a
result of the Israeli withdrawal of May 23, 2000.
On June 7, 1997 I appeared before this subcommittee to raise the
issue of persecution of civilian populations in the southern Lebanese
enclave which was then known as the ``Security Zone''--during that
hearing, I testified about the situation of the Christian communities
in that enclave, warning of potential existing and future threats. I
also warned against the dangerous consequences of a combination of a
unilateral Israeli withdrawal, a non-intervention by the United Nations
and the deployment of Hizbollah forces in that area: Consequences which
would affect the security and freedom of the local population,
particularly the Christians, as well as the future of peace between the
two nations of Israel and Lebanon.
Let me just note that as a result of that testimony back in 1997,
the regime in Beirut punished me by depriving me from my past wages and
pensions I had right to. That was a personal price I had to pay for
testifying to the U.S. Senate. A contribution to the cause of truth
which testifies to the determination by the pro-Syrian regime in
Lebanon to deny that same truth to the American people.
And today, three years later, I report to you the developments that
took place as of May 22, 2000 in South Lebanon and have affected the
future of thousands of civilians. Many among them went into an exodus
across the borders into Israel, and most of them remained in their
villages and towns facing escalating oppression, which is slowly but
surely developing into a systematic persecution.
In order to offer my insight and my live testimony, I will have to
correct some of the misperceptions and facts about the South Lebanon
enclave, the will of its population, the reality of its self-defense
force, and its future aspirations. Then I will make a few suggestions
and recommendation for the United States policy in that area.
i.--historical background of the south lebanon enclave
Over the past few months and weeks, many in the media and in
diplomatic circles have wrongly described the history of the South
Lebanon enclave known as the ``Security Zone''--and erroneously
portrayed the South Lebanon Army (SLA). That portrayal of the local
population and its self defense force has not only legitimized the
assault on that area, but also the abandoning of its population by all
those responsible for its security and future on both sides of the
borders. In sum, the people of South Lebanon, who for 23 years, have
defended their identity and rights within the confines of their
enclave, were forced to either flee or submit to an authoritarian
regime and a new occupation. But worse than the physical tragedy was
the assassination of the truth, a fact which is increasing the chances
of transforming the ongoing persecution into a change in and so threat
to the ethnic makeup of that area.
A. South Lebanese Defense Force 1976-1979
In order to validate Hizbollah's takeover of the southern enclave
of Lebanon, it was said that the SLA was a proxy militia of Israel
created to assist the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Not only the
Hizbollah and the pro-Syrian regime in Beirut have stressed this
equation, but also the United Nations.
However the facts contradict this theory. The SLA was organized by
local Lebanese officers and soldiers of the Lebanese Army and a handful
of armed civilians as of 1976 in order to defend their villages against
the PLO and the various radical groups who attempted to dominate the
area during the Lebanese civil war. Those mostly officers and
civilians, with the knowledge of the Lebanese Government, then formed
the Lebanese Defense Forces in South Lebanon, one of the multiple
militias of the Lebanon war. Note that on August 14, 1976, Lebanese
Army Commander General Hanna Said issued ordinance number 3860 ordering
the Lebanese officers and soldiers in that enclave to form military
units to defend that area from the PLO and other militias. Short of any
ideological or regional agenda, their aim was simple: To defend their
villages and towns until the Lebanese Army would come to their rescue.
They were headed by Major Saad Haddad who was officially in contact
with the Lebanese Ministry of Defense until 1979. The Lebanese
Government, not yet under Syrian control, paid the salaries of this
force until the 1980s. Since 1976, this free enclave was continuously
under PLO and pro-Syrian assaults. All routes of communications to
Beirut, and to the main hospitals and socio-economic centers were cut
off. The civilian population, abandoned by the central government was
in jeopardy. As of 1977, the local militia established contacts with
the Israeli military across the border to insure medical and logistical
support. Therefore, the SLA was initially launched as a native
paramilitary force made up by Lebanese officers and local villagers,
mostly Christians, to resist the takeover by foreign forces mainly
Palestinians and Syrians.
B. The Free Lebanon Army 1979-1985
In 1978, the Christian enclaves were able to link up with each
other as a result of the withdrawal of the PLO and allied forces in
front of the Israeli Litani operation. During its withdrawal, the IDF
remitted a number of ex-PLO positions to their Lebanese allies. In
1979, that local militia was named the ``Free Lebanon Army.'' The
Lebanese State severed its relationship with its command. For another
four years, the FLA operated as a local militia formed by native
villagers and aiming at defending their area against PLO, pro-Syrian
and Islamist militias. Such as did the Lebanese Forces and other
militias in central and northern Lebanon, and such as did the Lebanese
Army brigades during the Lebanese war, the FLA was struggling for the
defense and the survival of its enclave. While dozens of other militias
and Army units became the allies of Syria, Iran and the PLO, the FLA
chose to become the ally of the State of Israel. From 1976 and until
1985, the South Lebanon enclave was not an extension of Israel's
military, although it acted as and believed in the alliance with the
Jewish and democratic state. It faced forces such as the Hizbollah and
Syrian Nationalists, which acted as allies of Syria.
C. The South Lebanon Army
During the Israeli invasion of June 1982, the FLA moved further
north toward the areas evacuated by its opponents (Sidon), as did the
Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army in the center of the country. In
1984, after the death of Major Haddad, General Antoine Lahad, a high
ranking officer of the Lebanese Army was appointed at the suggestion of
former President Camille Chamoun as commander of the FLA. At the
request of the Israelis, the name of the militia was changed to South
Lebanon Army (SLA) and it started receiving direct military training
from the IDF. The future of that force was to be negotiated with the
Lebanese government. When Israel withdrew southwards in 1985, the SLA
made its own decision to remain in the Christian district of Jezzine.
It made that decision in the aftermath of anti-Christian massacres,
which took place after previous Israeli withdrawals from the Shuf,
Iqlim al-Kharrub, and East Sidon districts (1983-1984). Here again, the
deployment in the Jezzine district was a national decision made by the
SLA command to protect the native population from massacres and not an
Israeli decision.
As of 1995, the South Lebanon enclave was called the ``Security
Zone'' by the Israelis. That area fell under a dual control. On the one
hand, the IDF and SLA controlled a band of territory stretching from
the Port of Nakura as far as the Syrian borders. In Jezzine, only the
SLA was in control.
Therefore, it appears clearly from the historical background that
the SLA and its predecessors the FLA and the LDF, were not other than
(Christian-led) Lebanese organizations, which fought in the defense of
their enclaves. Furthermore, the SLA-FLA were founded by on-duty
Lebanese Army officers as of 1976, paid by the Lebanese government
then, and their rank and file were local and native Lebanese citizens
from the villages and towns of that area.
ii.--the political rights of the south lebanon enclave
At a time when the various militias and groups in Lebanon were
invited to national political reconciliation and while Hizbollah was
left armed after the end of the war in 1990, the pro-Syrian regime in
Beirut continued to wage a war against the enclave under the slogan of
``elimination of pro-Israeli militias.'' And while pro-Syrian and pro-
Iranian organizations were armed and protected by the Beirut regime and
by Syria, the SLA was considered as an enemy and was never invited to
any negotiations with the government. Even those Christian forces,
which were associated with the national reconciliation process known as
the Taif Agreement, (such as the Lebanese Forces), were gradually
eliminated from the political scene between 1991 and 1995.
It is important to note that neither the SLA nor the people of
South Lebanon were invited to participate in the Taif agreement process
in 1989, hence were never consulted as to the future of their country.
Note also that neither the SLA nor the people of the enclave were ever
invited to any form of dialogue or discussion of the future of their
area with the Lebanese government or the United Nations.
Therefore, it is a fact that the communities of the southern
enclave in Lebanon were never consulted as to their fears, demands or
future aspirations. It is also a fact that while the pro-Syrian regime
and its allies from Hizbollah engaged in a decade-long war against the
SLA and the Christian population of South Lebanon, most Western
Governments and the United Nations did not attempt to mediate in the
conflict, and sided with the oppressive pro-Syrian regime in Beirut
against the enclave.
In contrast with the populations of Kosovo, East Timor and the
Palestinians, the population of the southern enclave was never given
the opportunity to express their will and aspirations. For although in
alliance with the State of Israel, the SLA had never been allowed or
able to produce political representation and the various world
governments refused to grant them that opportunity. When the Israeli
unilateral withdrawal took place, those populations were at the mercy
of Hizbollah and the pro-Syrian regime in Beirut.
iii.--how did the enclave fall?
The American people were allowed to hear two versions of the fall
of South Lebanon. The first version is the one of Hizbollah and the
pro-Syrian regime. According to their claim, they compelled the
Israelis to pullout from the security zone by way of force. And because
of Israel's withdrawal, the SLA had no choice but to collapse.
According to the Western version, Israel decided to withdraw
unilaterally but had to hasten its pull out because of a sudden
collapse of the SLA. But according to the young men and women of the
SLA and the people of that region, the enclave fell because the local
population was never given the right to express themselves or the right
to defend themselves.
A. South Lebanon's Options
Last July, Israel's government decided to withdraw from our area
even in the absence of state agreements or international arrangements.
The unilateral withdrawal was a decision made by the Israeli
government, which assumed sole responsibility for its decisions.
However the fate of our enclave facing the threats by Hizbollah and the
regime, as well as the future of this community were disregarded by all
parties. To the Beirut regime and the radical Islamists, the southern
enclave community was nothing but ``agents and collaborators.'' To the
Israeli government the SLA was a military force ``hired'' among locals
to serve their security interests. To the Western world this community
was made up of Lebanese citizens who had to be ``returned'' to their
government irrespective of their fears.
No guarantees were negotiated by any party on behalf of the
endangered community, Hizbollah threatened to butcher the
``collaborators,'' the Lebanese Government issued 20,000 warrants for
arrest, and the United Nations asked for the dismantlement of the SLA
as a main condition for intervention after Israel's withdrawal. Israel
stated it would extend political asylum to SLA personnel. It is
dramatic to realize that no party offered to mediate between the local
community and the regime in Beirut. Our population had two options:
Either surrender to Hizbollah and the pro-Syrian regime or flee in an
exodus into Israel.
B. South Lebanon's Real Decision
However, I am here today to inform the U.S. Congress and the world,
that our community had decided to resist and remain on its own soil,
while calling on the international community for assistance. In April,
the SLA's commander, after consultation with his officers, declared his
intention to remain after Israel's withdrawal. During the same month,
the Civilian Committees which represent the people of the villages and
towns, from Christian, Druse and Shiite backgrounds, also declared
their intention to defend themselves while calling on the international
community to help mediate.
During the month of May 2000 our people remitted a memorandum to
the office of the United Nations in Nakura in south Lebanon offering
suggestions to avoid bloodshed and exodus. During the same month
delegations representing our community met with diplomats of the U.S.,
U.K., and French embassies in Israel and at the United Nations. And on
May 18, our representatives met with the office of the Secretary
General of the United Nations in New York. We warned against offering
our villages and towns to Hizbollah and the pro-Syrian militias after
Israel's withdrawal due to take place before July 7.
We offered to transform the SLA into a local municipal police to
operate under U.N. auspices as are the cases in Kosovo and East Timor.
We offered to establish a local municipal authority to be
democratically elected and which would manage the daily lives of the
citizens of that zone until a comprehensive solution could be reached
with the several governments of the region. And we committed to
transfer the area gradually to the Beirut authorities as progress was
being made in alleviating the Syrian presence in the capital and in
disarming Hizbollah, the two sources of our fears.
C. Rejection of Our Rights and Fears
Instead of taking our demands for protection on our land seriously,
the United Nations declined to assist us, acting against all
international law, and particularly in contradiction with Chapter seven
of the Charter. The United States, U.K. and France dismissed our fears
and insisted on guarantees, which were allegedly granted by the Beirut
regime. The State of Israel only prepared for our potential exodus,
ruling out our determination to remain on our land and defend
ourselves. The Beirut pro-Syrian regime rejected national
reconciliation with our people, rejected amnesty and committed to
eliminate our political freedoms. Hizbollah's leaders made public
statements about killings, even if the SLA were to flee into Israel and
beyond.
D. The Last Days
Despite the abandonment by the international community and against
all odds, our people decided to remain and fight for their land and
rights while calling endlessly on the U.N. to deploy its units around
our villages. On May 22, 2000, and as Israeli units were implementing
their own withdrawal and the commander of the SLA was absent in France,
the mostly Shiite sector of the security zone collapsed. It appeared
that Shiite officers were told by the Israelis that they must leave
before the borders closed. Even after the invasion of Hizbollah of this
area, the mostly Christian-Druse eastern enclave and the Christian
western enclave, decided to defend themselves and protect their
citizens after Israel's withdrawal.
On May 23, 2000, at 8 p.m., SLA officers in the western sector
received orders from the Israelis to leave their posts as Hizbollah was
advancing toward their villages. Thus, the SLA was imploded from the
inside and was dismantled without any battle. The main reason why the
SLA did not remain and fight was the fact that the border was closed
behind its back. Without access to medical and logistical supplies, our
people were condemned either to surrender to its enemy or flee across
the border. Our community was not allowed to defend itself or to be
protected by the U.N. on its own land. The only choices, which were
left, were the exodus toward Israel's refugee camps or the exodus
towards Beirut's jails.
iv.--consequences
A. Consequences of the Abandonment on our Community
As a result of the collapse of the enclave, major consequences
pertaining to the security, freedom and future of an entire community
unfolded.
(1) More then seven thousand civilians, including hundreds of SLA
officers and soldiers fled through the Lebanese-Israeli borders into an
exodus toward the unknown. Inside Israel they were joined by hundreds,
maybe thousands of Southern Lebanese who were working in Israel. In our
estimates, more then ten thousand residents of the enclave have fled
either to Israel or to other destinations. To those refugees, who left
their homes, belongings and properties behind, this is a cataclysmic
dimension. Not only were they abandoned by the international community,
but also they have no official cause recognized as such.
(2) More then 1,700 members of the SLA surrendered to the Lebanese
authorities and to Hizbollah. Many of those who surrendered to
Hizbollah haven't been identified yet. As for those who surrendered to
the Beirut regime, they were sent to military courts, which are
identifying them as ``collaborators'' and not as militiamen or as a
resistance group which belonged to a war faction, as was the case with
other groups in Lebanon. Lebanese human rights groups are criticizing
the poor standards of human rights used by the Beirut authorities while
dealing with these political prisoners.
(3) As for the civilians who remained in their villages, they were
and are still submitted to all sorts of harassment, oppression,
arbitrary arrests, and ultimately in some documented cases, to murder
and physical harm. Lebanese and other human rights groups have reported
clearly that systematic suppression and oppression are taking place in
the Christian areas of the former security zone.
(4) Widespread looting and destruction of infrastructure, including
water supplies, have been and are still reported. Many villages have
witnessed the exodus of the majority of their residents.
By our standards, that is for a population of 100,000 people, the
exodus of about 10,000, the arrest and military trial of 2,000, the
issuing of warrants for the arrest of 20,000, and the ongoing
persecution of our villages and towns are considered a catastrophe.
B. Consequences of the Abandonment to a Radical Force on our Area
As a result of the Israeli withdrawal and of the dismantling of the
SLA, Hizbollah and pro-Syrian forces invaded the area and occupied it.
The ex-enclave, which was free from radical forces and Syrian influence
until last month, is now under their military occupation. This will
have serious consequences aside from the humanitarian and national
tragedies affecting our community.
(1) Hizbollah is a ``radical militia with a long record of hostage
taking, assassination of diplomats, killing of U.S. forces, bombings
domestically and internationally, and above all the massacre of
Christian civilians in Jezzine, Qolaia and the rest of the enclave over
almost two decades. A group which is cited by the U.S. State Department
as a terror organization. Its leadership has repeatedly and openly
threatened killings and massacres of whomsoever would obstruct their
agenda. Hizbollah has vowed to destroy Israel, in alliance with Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, and has pledged to Islamize Lebanon, which would be
at the expense of its Christian communities and other moderate Muslims.
Offering the Southern area of Lebanon to Hizbollah is a grave mistake.
(2) For 23 years the borders between Lebanon and Israel were open,
and economic, social, and educational, as well as other ties were
established between our people and the people of Israel. As soon as the
Israelis withdrew and the SLA was dismantled, and after the refugees
crossed the border, both Israelis and Hizbollah shut down all gates.
Instead of open borders, closed frontiers. Instead of exchange and
trade, enmity and isolation. It is hard to believe that shutting down
gates, and closing borders will help peace in the region. Instead of
seeing Lebanese workers crossing into northern Israel to their daily
jobs, we see Hizbollah's partisans exploding their hate of the Jews and
throwing rocks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. That is not a
step forward toward peace.
(3) Furthermore, by dismantling the Lebanese-Israeli peaceful
border and replacing it with Hizbollah's supporters, radical
Palestinians are moving toward the area from the various camps in
Lebanon, threatening to re-ignite the armed struggle against Israel.
Let us note that the conflict started in Lebanon 25 years ago, when
Palestinian militias attempted to occupy that border area in order to
attack Israel. Surrendering this enclave to Hizbollah will bring back
the most radical Palestinian forces and therefore will be responsible
for a new conflict in the area.
v.--reactions
A. The Lebanese Government Reaction
The Lebanese regime, which is under Syrian control, acts from pro-
Syrian perspectives. Up until this present date it has not sent the
regular army to replace Hizbollah and to disarm it. Our population is
at the mercy of Hizbollah and of pro-Syrian militias. Under such
circumstances, the refugees will not go back to their homes, and the
local residents will remain under terror and repression from radical
militias. Moreover, in the absence of regular troops, militias may
perform mass abuse. The situation is extremely critical.
B. The United Nations
Despite our repetitive calls and memorandums to the United Nations
to deploy in our areas, the organization's top offices and its envoys
refused to acknowledge the existence of a ``crisis.'' To U.N. envoy
Teri Larsen, it is perfectly normal that Hizbollah occupies the area
and terrorizes its population, and that the SLA was dismantled. It
seems normal that about 10,000 residents including women, children and
the elderly went into exile. The U.N. officials have acted against
their mandate to preserve peace, protect civilian populations, and have
breached international law by not assisting an endangered community.
The U.N. has a force of about 6,000 soldiers in South Lebanon. It
prefers using them in administrative missions such as painting yellow
lines to mark the international border, instead of posting units within
and around the areas at the mercy of a radical militia.
C. Radical Forces
Hizbollah and its pro-Syrian allies have pledged to punish all
those who have ``cooperated'' with the Israelis, i.e., the majority of
the population in that enclave. This was clearly illustrated by a
speech of Hizbollahs leader who said his militia will ``slaughter the
SLA men and women in their beds.'' In addition to terrorizing them,
Hizbollah forces are disrupting vital socio-economic infrastructure,
such as water supplies, schools, and medical centers, under the pretext
of dismantling what was built with the help of Israel. Hizbollah
leaders have even called on their associates of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
to assassinate members of the ex-SLA within Israel itself.
vi.--conclusions and recommendations
In view of the above facts we cannot but conclude that the South
Lebanon community, which was isolated because of a civil war and denied
its political rights by the current pro-Syrian regime in Beirut, was
punished for defending itself and for believing in popular and cultural
peace across the border for the last quarter of a century.
This community was never heard, its aspirations never legitimized
and its security and freedom never guaranteed. The international
community did not listen to its fears prior to the Israeli withdrawal,
and did not recognize its tragedy after it unfolded.
Moreover, the native SLA was demonized as ``collaborators'' and
``mercenaries'' while Hizbollah was upgraded and rewarded.
In sum our people in South Lebanon lives out a human tragedy today.
Thousands of its youth, including young children, have gone into exile,
the remaining residents live in fear and under oppression. Our socio-
economic infrastructure is being dismantled. The Lebanese government
and the United Nations have so far refused to protect our community
inside our villages. And we fear that the worse has yet to occur.
Mr. Senator, Dear Members:
Practically the South Lebanon community moved from under one
occupation to another. What was portrayed as ``the liberation of South
Lebanon from Israeli occupation by resistance movements,'' was also the
extension into South Lebanon's enclaves of pro-Syrian pro-Iranian
forces. In sum we, the native population of South Lebanon, were not
liberated, but forced to leave. Those who stayed behind are not free
but under oppression. And worse, our cause as refugees and oppressed is
not even recognized by the international community.
recommendations
In view of my testimony, and on behalf of the refugee population in
Israel and abroad and the oppressed communities inside our area, I
would like to suggest the following recommendations to the U.S.
Congress:
(1) We urge the U.S. Congress in particular and the American
government in general to investigate the fate of the population of
South Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal and the invasion by
Hizbollah. We call on you to send representatives to inquire about
their situation, to interview them, to listen to their concerns and to
establish those facts personally. I urge the U.S. Senators and invite
them to visit the refugee centers in Israel and to visit our villages
in South Lebanon. That visit must be objective and neutral and not
altered by local officials.
(2) We urge the U.S. Government to grant a special humanitarian aid
to the refugees in Israel to enable them to be absorbed momentarily
until conditions change in Lebanon, enabling them to return. That
special aid must include funds for schools, social aid and creation of
jobs.
(3) We urge the U.S. government formally to ask the United Nations
to use its already existing units, the UNIFIL, to deploy within and
around the towns and villages, which were targeted by Hizbollah and
persecuted by pro-Syrian forces.
(4) We urge the U.S. Government to pressure the Lebanese regime to
stop persecuting the South Lebanon community and to engage in a
dialogue for national reconciliation. We ask the U.S. Government to
intervene directly in that process, as it has done in several areas in
the world.
(5) We urge the U.S. Government to assist the Lebanese people in
general to free their country from Syrian occupation, which by all
standards is responsible for most of the country's tragedies. We call
on the U.S. Government to ask Syria to initiate its full withdrawal
from all of Lebanon and to ensure that free and new elections occur in
Lebanon, under U.N. sponsorship, which would help Lebanon's society
express its will and aspirations.
(6) We particularly call on the U.S. Congress to hold hearings
about the fate of the Lebanese Christians in particular, as an
endangered community in the Middle East and assess ways and means to
enable this community to survive as the international community did for
the Bosnian Muslims, the Kosovar Muslims and the Palestinians. I urge
you to call on this community's spiritual leaders, political exiles and
intellectuals to testify about the oppression of their community.
I thank you again for the opportunity you offered me to express my
point of view and represent the views of the refugee population from
South Lebanon,
Senator Brownback. Well, thank you, Colonel, for taking us
up on this opportunity at a great personal sacrifice to
yourself, financially at first, and in other ways that you are
suffering as well. So I deeply appreciate your willingness to
put yourself on the line in doing this and being here to share
your thoughts. They are very good, thoughtful, concise, and
specific of what we can do.
Dr. Pipes, let me start with some questions for you. What
is your assessment of the future of Hizbollah at this point in
time? Do you think they will recreate themselves into a
political party? Do you think they will continue down that
terrorist road? What is your view? What is Hizbollah moving
toward and to do?
Dr. Pipes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hizbollah aspires to
rule in Lebanon, either through violence or through the
political process.
What began as a fairly marginal operation depending on the
use of violence has grown over the past two decades to the
point that it can rely less on violence and more on the
political process.
Hizbollah has had considerable success in the political
arena and has shown intelligent flexibility. For example, just
in the last few days since the occupation of South Lebanon, it
has not engaged in out-and-out ethnic cleansing, but it has
done something much more subtle, which is to ruin the
infrastructure so that the people of South Lebanon have to
leave.
This approach has served Hizbollah well. It is the victor
now over the Israeli forces. It claims victory, though the
Israelis dispute it. I agree with Hizbollah. It won; Israel
lost. Its prestige has soared in the last month, and I believe
that Hizbollah is going to become a yet greater force.
As that happens, its interests and those of the Syrian
overlords will clash. There could be room at that point for
others to maneuver. But until now, the Syrians and the
Hizbollah movement have worked quite well together.
Senator Brownback. So do you anticipate a clash between
those two in the near term?
Dr. Pipes. I do, yes, Mr. Chairman, thought I do not know
about the near term. As the Hizbollah increases in force and in
ambition, its interests could well be on a collision course
with the Syrian occupying forces.
Senator Brownback. What do we know about Bashshar Asad?
What is his potential for turning Syria into a more democratic
modern state?
Dr. Pipes. Before answering your question directly, it is
worth noting that the developments in Syria are very unusual.
What we have here is a revolutionary regime merged with a
monarchy. That does not happen often. The only precedent I know
of is North Korea. Romania was heading down that track, but it
did not happen. In North Korea very interestingly, in just the
last few days, we saw real flexibility resulting from this
peculiar marriage of revolution and monarchy.
There is a fundamental illegitimacy to the process; a
revolutionary regime is not supposed to use monarchical means.
One simply does not know what the consequences will be, but I
venture to suppose the chances are much greater for radical
change.
Had it been another revolutionary apparatchik who has taken
over in Damascus, things likely would have stayed on the same
track. But Bashshar is a prince--someone from a different
generation, a very different path to power, a different life
experience--and I think the chances of change are therefore
much greater.
Bashshar Asad is, as was noted earlier, 34 years old. Until
just 6 years ago, he was a student in London studying eye
surgery. Apparently, he decided he was not going into the
family business, but with the death of his elder brother in
January 1994, he was recruited into that business.
He has been a fast study. He has had military training and
political training. He is apparently, from what we can tell,
doing a rather good job. He was to be given an important
position just a week after his father's death intervened.
Bashshar has taken several audacious steps, and nothing
less is necessary, for he has been thrust into the maelstrom of
Syrian political life. It is not something for the faint-
hearted. Bashshar is a rookie; we do not know his capabilities.
Overall, I am hopeful that within the context of Syrian
political life--which has long been totalitarian, brutalized,
and impoverished--that the fresh face and fresh approach of
Bashshar Asad could lead to good things.
If he fails to control the government, if the rivalries
among the grandees of the old regime explode, it could also
lead to dangers. There could be violence within Syria and even
outside it.
So this is a dangerous time, but overall I am optimistic
that things could go well.
Senator Brownback. Because we did not have much chance that
things were going to go well under the father, I mean that he
ruled with such an iron hand for so long a period of time, you
are basically betting on that the son is just of a different
generation, and the mind set might be something more open
minded toward growing Syria economically and less of the
militaristic rule.
Dr. Pipes. Right. Under the father, one found a situation
of stasis, ossification in the extreme. I mean, rarely in human
affairs does one see a country that simply has stopped in the
way Syria did in the last decade.
And that is due to the father's very narrow assessment of
what his concerns were, which were to stay in power and to pass
on that power as, in fact, he has quite well done so far in the
last few days. Everything was seen through the prism of regime
maintenance, staying in power. Nothing else mattered.
Senator Brownback. Passing the estate onto the next
generation.
Dr. Pipes. Exactly. Now that that seems to be happening,
the next generation is not quite so focused on the same narrow
scope of concerns. This is pure speculation--we only have wisps
and rumors of information about Bashshar--but he appears more
willing to take chances, to lessen the regime's grip on the
country that his father needed.
Senator Brownback. What should the administration--you
listed a number of things that you thought were items that the
Congress should take on. How would you rate what the
administration has done to date given the twin aspects of the
pullout in South Lebanon by the Israelis and the change in
Syria, toward Lebanon?
Dr. Pipes. American policy for some years placed the Arab-
Israel peace process above all else. Everything outside this is
a potential sacrifice. Anything perceived as impinging on that
process, is to be pushed away.
I think that is a mistake. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict is obviously a very important and desirable goal. But
it is not the only goal. We must keep an eye on such other
problems as totalitarian role in Syria, the Syrian threats
until a year and a half ago against Turkey, and the Syrian
occupation of Lebanon. These are legitimate and important
problems as well, and should not be shoved aside simply because
they do not help the peace process.
Our Government has had a very special attitude toward the
Syrian regrime because of its negotiations with Israel. I mean,
it is of a kind with its peers in Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and
Cuba. It is a rogue regime; even U.S. Government documentation
agrees with that.
But our Secretaries of State, even our President, have gone
to Syria. They never go to Tripoli, Tehran, or Baghdad, but
they go to Damascus fairly often because of the attempt to
bring Damascus into the process and encourage it to engage in
diplomacy with Israel. I think that too is a mistake.
Totalitarian governments do not respond to cajoling and
encouragement. They respond to worries and threats, as we saw
in 1998 with Turkey. The Turks for 10 years cajoled the Syrians
in an attempt to resolve their serious problem with Syrian
sponsored terrorism. From 1987 to 1998, they cajoled, saying in
effect, ``Please, pretty please, pay attention to our problem
and stop making trouble for us.'' It did not work.
And finally, in 1998, the Turks threatened the Syrians with
retribution. They said, ``If you do not stop this, you will be
in big trouble.'' And you know what? Within 2 weeks, the
problem was closed down. I think that is the way one deals with
a regime like Hafiz al-Asad's.
One does not send the Secretary of State to the funeral of
a totalitarian thug. We did not send her to Kim Il-Jong's
funeral. She should not have gone to President Asad's funeral.
This is not appropriate for us.
We should take a much tougher stand. We should indicate to
the totalitarian rulers that we do not like what they are
doing, and that engaging in negotiations with Israel is fine
but does not push the other problems aside.
Now all that being said, the situation has changed in the
last few days. There is a potential for more maneuvering and
more subtlety today because of a new regime. But, I still worry
about a mind set that places total priority on Arab-Israeli
negotiations.
Senator Brownback. Colonel, you heard Dr. Pipes talk about
the type of persecution and pushing out of the citizenry taking
place in South Lebanon by Hizbollah that is not the direct, if
I am correctly stating Dr. Pipes, killing of a number of
individuals but more destruction of infrastructure.
Is that your information and what you are receiving from
your people on the ground in South Lebanon of the type of
persecution, the type of destruction, of living conditions that
is occurring?
Colonel Barakat. Yes. Last week, we received information
that they had put some explosives, a bomb, in a pump, water
pump between two villages, and they put some explosives around
the water cisterns for the whole area. About 12 villages take
their water from this big cistern.
It did not explode because there was--you know, we had some
connections where the U.N. came and we had a talk with the
journalists, the television people who came there and they
could not blow it up.
But it is one of their plans to destroy such kinds of
infrastructure. Also, they have threatened to blow up all the
buildings which Israel had built before, such as schools and
clubs and everything, to help the people to stay there.
As I say, it is a sign of the Israeli occupation, so they
have to get rid of, and they want to blow it up. They did the
same thing in Mahajreel, they blew up the place of the
martyrs--we have a place to remember our martyrs--they blew it
up. Those kind of things, they are doing.
Senator Brownback. But they have not actually done that,
confessed to blowing up these facilities; is that what you are
stating?
Colonel Barakat. They blow up the bomb. They could not blow
up the cistern.
Senator Brownback. And the other buildings that have been
threatened----
Colonel Bakarat. The other buildings they threaten to blow
up. As of now, they did not blow them up.
Senator Brownback. I guess that what I hear both of you
saying is that really now is a key time for the world community
to focus on events taking place, particularly in South Lebanon
because of the public pressure, that the Hizbollah will be
watching kind of what their image is internationally at this
point in time.
Would you agree with that, Dr. Pipes?
Dr. Pipes. I certainly would.
Senator Brownback. Then I hope we can take note of that and
that the Congress can call yet again for Syria to pull all of
its occupying troops out of Lebanon. It has been a consistent
position here, and it should be stated clearly and not one that
we will walk away from because time has lapsed and memories are
short, and we just do not continue to remember that here is a
state that is being occupied by a foreign power, and that that
should not continue. The United States should not abet that
occurring.
Thank you both for joining us. Thank you all for attending
the hearing. I think it is instructive and we are at a moment--
but hopefully, better can occur from this point forward.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Lebanese Information Center
This testimony is offered on behalf of the Lebanese Information
Center (LIC), a nonprofit organization, which aspires to raise
international awareness to the plight of the Lebanese people. The
Lebanese Information Center (LIC), which established chapters
nationwide with several hundred members, Americans of Lebanese Descent,
enjoys a large support base and reflects the views of thousands of
Lebanese worldwide. The LIC welcomes the chance to bring before the
Committee on Foreign Relations the concerns of its members and to offer
policy recommendations taking heed of the United States' interest in a
peaceful democratic and sovereign Lebanon. The LIC is willing to
provide all the factual studies the center produced thus far.
The state of affairs in Lebanon today is a matter of great concern
to all Lebanese, in the country and abroad. Occupied, burdened with a
drained economy, and transformed into a satellite state to a
neighboring country Syria, Lebanon, the only democracy amongst the Arab
Nations, is fading away. In this testimony, we will offer you an
overview of the Syrian's hegemony over Lebanon and the ramifications of
this dominance over its political, social, and economic lives. We will
at the end offer policy recommendations that could serve the interest
of both countries, Lebanon and the United States as well as serve the
peace process initiative to ensure a lasting peace in the region.
Syrian troops started to infiltrate Lebanon since 1973 to support
armed Palestinian factions. In 1976, Syria's presence in Lebanon was
legitimized when it became part of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)
established by the Arab League. After the collapse of the ADF and
despite the numerous requests for its departure from Lebanon starting
with the presidency of Elias Sarkis in late 1970's leading to the Taif
Agreement in early 1990's, Syria managed to stay in Lebanon by
installing a puppet government to legitimize its presence. The request
for a Syrian withdrawal started with late President Elias Sarkis who
sent a formal letter to the Arab League in June 1981 requesting the
withdrawal of armed Syrian forces from Lebanon. Late President elect
Bashir Al-Gemayel demanded the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces
from Lebanon prior to his assassination in September 1982. In September
1983 former President Ameen Al-Gemayel sent a formal letter to Syrian
President Hafiz Al-Assad requesting to withdraw Syrian troops from
Lebanese territories. On March 14, 1989 General Michel Aoun, acting
Prime Minister for the Transitional Government in late 1980's formally
demanded a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The last attempt was with
the Taif agreement, which dictated a redeployment of Syrian troops to
the Bekaa Valley within two years as a prelude to a complete withdrawal
from Lebanese territories. None of these requests were respected nor
acknowledged and Syria remained as an occupied force in Lebanon. For 25
years, every aspect of Lebanon's political, economic and social lives
has been altered due to Syrian occupation and Lebanon became a
classical example of a satellite State in a world that came to respect
freedom and value sovereignty.
how is lebanon functioning as a shadow state?
On a political level, Syria holds a firm grip on the Lebanese
decision-making process thus hindering a true representation of
Lebanon's National Interest. Its policy of manipulation is setting the
ground for a perception that Lebanon would fall apart in the event that
Syria withdraws and that civil war would resume. The Syrian Foreign
Minister Farouk al Sharaa made a statement a few days ago while on a
diplomatic visit to Egypt stating that the presence of Syrian armed
forces in Lebanon is to prevent a sectarian war that may erupt in the
event of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Such comments caused uproar
in the Lebanese community and called to question President Emile
Lahoud's declaration of a true coexistence and reconciliation
initiative amongst the Lebanese.
Syria dominated the political process in Lebanon by implanting 35
thousand armed soldiers and several thousand intelligence personnel on
three-quarters of Lebanese territories. They serve to spread fear
amongst the residents and ensure the loyalty of those who chose to
collaborate rather than to resist. Political opposition was disbanded,
leaders were jailed, killed and exiled and a puppet government was
installed to serve its interest and execute its agenda. The
ramifications of this political situation constituted a direct
violation to Lebanon's freedom provided by its constitution. Those
violations varied from political authorities appointed by Syria, to
fraudulent elections, to a Judiciary subjected to political pressures,
to arbitrary arrests, human rights violations and abuses, to self
imposed censorship on media and freedom of expression.
Another political ramification of the Syrian hegemony is present in
the refusal of the Lebanese Government to deal with the armed
Palestinian elements in the camps. According to UNRWA, there are
372,700 Palestinian refugees in the camps, which are the host of
radical armed groups calling for the resumption of the military
struggle for the liberation of Palestine. The Lebanese Government also
refused to send the Lebanese Army to South of Lebanon after Israel
withdrew allowing for armed militias to take control. Hizbollah took
over along with other pro-Syrian militias that were supposed to have
been disarmed in 1991 according to the Taif agreement such as Amal,
Syrian Social Nationalist Party, The Progressive Socialist Party, the
Lebanese Communist Party and others.
On the social level, Lebanon suffered from high emigration,
displacement and demographic alteration. According to official
statistics issued by the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Development
and Construction Dr. Boutros Labaki, the number of Lebanese that
permanently emigrated away from Lebanon between 1991 to 1997 (after the
war ended) is 820,000. Also, quoting a study published by a Lebanese
Newspaper, Al-Safir, 19,000 Lebanese emigrated every month in the
recent year. Those numbers are extremely high given the fact that the
population of Lebanese residents is three and a half million.
Despite the fact that many committees were formed to deal with the
issue of the displaced in Lebanon, a solution to the problem was never
in sight. Just recently, 7,500 southerners fled their villages after
the Israel withdrawal for fear of retribution. Many left to Israel
while others immigrated to various countries around the world.
Lebanon also witnessed a major demographic alteration for political
reasons. In 1994, the government issued a decree (N-5247) allowing the
naturalization of around 450,000 individuals. Of those, 27,000 were
Palestinians and 12,000 were Arab gypsies. (Study prepared by Nemat
Allah Abi Nasr.) This decree increased, in one round, the population of
Lebanon by 10%. The newly naturalized had to pay the favor with their
votes.
On the economic level, Lebanon is on the verge of collapsing.
According to the Economic Release presented by Dr. Marwan Iskandar in
1999, the national debt at the end of 1998 reached $18.3 billions of
which 77% are in Lebanese pounds and 23% in foreign currency. The
State's budget displays a record deficit of 59.3%. The Lebanese economy
also suffers from a freeze in domestic and foreign investment, high
inflation, high unemployment rate and a record high of foreign labor,
over a million Syrian workers in Lebanon are exempted from paying taxes
and the regime has recently provided them with all the benefits of
social security. According to Dr. Mohsen Salim, in his conference at
The Holy Spirit University--Kaslik on 29/11/99, we can describe the
Syrian workforce in Lebanon as ``The Economic Implantation.''
what can the united states do to help lebanon?
Some American officials questioned how can the American Government
ask the Syrians to leave Lebanon when the Lebanese Government calls for
the Syrian presence in Lebanon. There is a truth to this claim but how
can we rely on the statements of a puppet regime that is not elected by
the people nor represent their will? Expecting the Lebanese Government
to ask for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is like expecting the
Government of Babrak Karmal to ask the Soviet Union to withdraw from
Afghanistan in late 1980's.
The United States has been a leading force in assuring the survival
of democracies around the world. It held the torch of liberty and paid
a heavy price to ensure that nations across continents are free.
Lebanon, with its democratic institutions will face a dead end unless
the United States takes the necessary measures to help:
Implement the United Nations Resolution 520, which calls for
the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Lebanon. The
United States can exercise pressure on Syria through
withholding economic aid and other means to force its retreat
from Lebanon.
Find an alternate solution for the Palestinian refugee
problem in order for peace to rein in the region. Lebanon
cannot absorb the large number of Palestinian refugees for
demographic, economic and social reasons.
Implement the provisions afforded by the Taif Accord
pertaining to national Reconciliation. This process would be
realized through maintaining free elections, providing for a
healthy and democratic political life, and allowing political
leaders to return to the political arena either from jail or
from exile.
Lebanon deserves to be free, sovereign and independent in a world
that has confirmed its commitment to such principles. Lebanon, an
entity in this New World Order, expects nothing less but an equal
chance.