[House Report 106-1035]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Rept. 106-1035
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
NUCLEAR SECRETS SAFETY ACT OF 2000
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 4737
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
December 15, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-006 WASHINGTON : 2000
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona IKE SKELTON, Missouri
DUNCAN HUNTER, California NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia Carolina
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado LANE EVANS, Illinois
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
STEVE BUYER, Indiana NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JAMES TALENT, Missouri PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California TOM ALLEN, Maine
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JIM TURNER, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ADAM SMITH, Washington
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
Carolina CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
JIM RYUN, Kansas ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania
BOB RILEY, Alabama ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada BARON P. HILL, Indiana
MARY BONO, California MIKE THOMPSON, California
JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
STEVEN KUYKENDALL, California
DONALD SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania
Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Purpose and Background........................................... 2
Legislative History.............................................. 4
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 4
Section 1--Short Title......................................... 4
Section 2--Inventory of Restricted Data at National Security
Laboratories................................................. 4
Section 3--Increased Security for Vaults at National Security
Laboratories................................................. 4
Section 4--Use of Electronic Locks for Classified Areas and
Classified Information of National Security Administration... 5
Committee Position............................................... 5
Fiscal Data...................................................... 5
Congressional Budget Office Estimate........................... 5
Committee Cost Estimate........................................ 7
Oversight Findings............................................... 7
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 7
Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 7
Record Vote...................................................... 7
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 9
106th Congress Rept. 106-1035
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 1
======================================================================
NUCLEAR SECRETS SAFETY ACT OF 2000
_______
December 15, 2000.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Spence, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 4737]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 4737) to require an inventory of documents and
devices containing Restricted Data at the national security
laboratories of the Department of Energy, to improve security
procedures for access to the vaults containing Restricted Data
at those laboratories, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments
and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendments are as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Secrets Safety Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. INVENTORY OF RESTRICTED DATA AT NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES.
(a) Inventory Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall
conduct an inventory of each document or device at each national
security laboratory that contains Restricted Data and shall submit to
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report containing the
results of that inventory.
(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``national security laboratory'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3281 of the National Nuclear
Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2471).
(2) The term ``Restricted Data'' has the meaning given such
term in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 11 y. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)).
SEC. 3. INCREASED SECURITY FOR VAULTS AT NATIONAL SECURITY
LABORATORIES.
(a) Access to Vaults.--(1) Section 3234 of the National Nuclear
Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2424) is amended--
(A) by striking ``The Administrator'' and inserting ``(a)
Procedures Required.--The Administrator''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(b) Access to Vaults at National Security Laboratories.--With
respect to any vault containing Restricted Data at any national
security laboratory, the procedures shall, at a minimum, provide that
an individual shall not have unrestricted access to any such vault
except in accordance with the following requirements:
``(1) Before each such access, the identity of the individual
is verified by--
``(A) an attendant through direct visual observation;
``(B) biometric technology; or
``(C) other means providing a high confidence level
in verifying the identity of the individual.
``(2) For each such access, a permanent record of such access
is maintained.
``(c) Change of Lock Combinations to Vaults at National Security
Laboratories.--The Administrator shall ensure, for each vault
containing Restricted Data at each national security laboratory, that
the combination of each lock to such vault is changed not later than--
``(1) one week after each removal of an individual from the
list of individuals permitted access to such vault; and
``(2) 12 months after the date on which the combination was
last changed.''.
(2) The requirements of subsection (b) of section 3234 of such Act
(as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to each access referred to in
that subsection that occurs after the expiration of the 24-hour period
beginning upon the enactment of this Act.
(3) The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall ensure, for each
vault containing Restricted Data at each national security laboratory,
that the combination of each lock to such vault is changed not later
than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Report on NNSA Polygraph Policy.--(1) Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for
Nuclear Security shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a report on the policy recommendations of the
Adminstrator regarding the use of counterintelligence polygraph
examinations within the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
report shall contain the recommendations of the Administrator as to
what the policy of the Administration should be regarding--
(A) the use of such examinations generally as a prerequisite
to access (restricted or unrestricted) to Restricted Data; and
(B) the use of such examinations as a prerequisite to access
(restricted or unrestricted) to vaults containing Restricted
Data.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term ``Restricted Data'' has
the meaning given such term in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 11 y.
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)).
SEC. 4. USE OF ELECTRONIC LOCKS FOR CLASSIFIED AREAS AND CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION.
Section 3234 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50
U.S.C. 2424), as amended by section 3 of this Act, is further amended
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Electronic Locks Required.--The Administrator shall ensure
that, after October 1, 2002, each lock used by the Administration to
secure any vault, safe, or other container used to store Restricted
Data is an electronic lock that meets or exceeds the FF-L-2740A lock
standard of the General Services Administration, as in effect on the
date of the enactment of the Nuclear Secrets Safety Act of 2000.''.
Amend the title so as to read:
A bill to require an inventory of documents and devices containing
Restricted Data at the national security laboratories of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, to improve security procedures for
access to the vaults containing Restricted Data at those laboratories,
and for other purposes.
Purpose and Background
The purpose of H.R. 4737 is to enhance security controls
over the handling of classified nuclear weapons information at
the national security laboratories of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy
(DOE). As amended by the committee, the bill would require the
Administrator for Nuclear Security to conduct an inventory of
each document or device containing classified nuclear weapons
information and to assess the use of polygraphic examinations
as a prerequisite to access to such information. H.R. 4737
would also specify the procedures required to gain access to
document storage vaults at the national security laboratories
and would establish minimum standards for electronic locks for
use in the safeguarding of classified nuclear weapons
information.
On June 9, 2000, the Committee on Armed Services was
notified by the Department of Energy that two computer hard
drives containing classified Restricted Data were missing from
a classified document storage vault located in the weapons
design ``X Division'' at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The committee notes that Restricted Data is classified
information concerning the development, design, manufacture,
and use of nuclear weapons. The committee further notes that
such information can only be accessed by individuals with
specific and appropriate security clearances.
The hard drives were designed for use with a portable
computer by the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) for
emergency deployments to locate and disarm lost nuclear devices
of the United States or other nations, or to disarm potential
terrorist-produced nuclear devices. The hard drive contained
classified nuclear weapon information to aid the NEST team in
these emergency situations. The Department of Energy and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted searches to
locate the hard drives and to determine which laboratory staff
members had access to the devices. The FBI also began to
administer polygraphic examinations to members of the NEST team
to determine the disposition of the hard drives.
On June 14, 2000 the Committee on Armed Services held a
hearing to examine the security failure at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and to assess security policies and procedures of
the national security laboratories in the handling of
classified nuclear weapons information. The committee
determined that 26 members of the NEST team had unrestricted,
24-hour access to the document storage vault where the hard
drives and their computers were stored. Information supplied by
the Department of Energy indicated that the hard drives could
be removed by cleared individuals without a ``sign out''
because the hard drives were classified as Secret-level
Restricted Data and that existing DOE security policies and
procedures did not require specific accountability over
individual Secret-level documents or devices, including for
those documents or devices containing Restricted Data relating
to nuclear weapons. As a result of these security policies and
procedures, there was no record of when, or by whom, the hard
drives were removed from the classified storage vaults. In
addition, the committee further determined that Secret-level
Restricted Data held by the Department of Energy is not subject
to regular inventory procedures and that changes in lock
combinations and other routine security procedures for the
handling of classified information had not been effectively
implemented.
Notwithstanding the recovery of the two hard drives by
staff of the Department of Energy from behind a photocopier
within the ``X Division'' on June 16, 2000, the committee
believes that significant enhancements of basic security
policies and procedures in the handling of classified nuclear
weapons information by the Department of Energy is warranted.
Legislative History
H.R. 4737 was introduced on June 23, 2000 and referred to
the Committee on Armed Services.
On June 28, 2000, the Committee held a markup session to
consider H.R. 4737. The committee adopted an amendment in the
nature of a substitute by a voice vote. The amended version of
the bill was reported favorably by a voice vote.
Section-by-Section Analysis
The following is a section-by-section analysis of the
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the
committee.
SECTION 1--SHORT TITLE
This section would cite the Act as the ``Nuclear Secrets
Safety Act of 2000.''
SECTION 2--INVENTORY OF RESTRICTED DATA AT NATIONAL SECURITY
LABORATORIES
This section would require the Administrator for Nuclear
Security to conduct an inventory of each document or device at
each national security laboratory that contains Restricted Data
not later than ninety days after the date of enactment of this
Act. This section would also require the Administrator to
submit a report containing the results of that inventory to the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services
Committee.
SECTION 3--INCREASED SECURITY FOR VAULTS AT NATIONAL SECURITY
LABORATORIES
This section would amend section 2424 of title 50, United
States Code, to require the Administrator for Nuclear Security
to ensure that procedures governing access to any vault
containing Restricted Data at any national security laboratory
shall require that the identity of an individual with
unrestricted access to any such vault be verified by an
attendant through direct visual observation, biometric
technology, or other means that would provide a high confidence
level in verifying the identity of the individual and thata
permanent record of such access be maintained. This section would also
require the Administrator to ensure that changes of lock combinations
to vaults at national security laboratories are changed within certain
specified time limits. This section would further require the
Administrator to assess the use of polygraphic examinations as a
prerequisite to restricted or unrestricted access to Restricted Data or
vaults containing such data. The Administrator shall submit his report,
and any recommendation, to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
House Armed Services Committee not later than ninety days after the
date of enactment of this Act.
SECTION 4--USE OF ELECTRONIC LOCKS FOR CLASSIFIED AREAS AND CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
This section would amend section 2424 of title 50, United
States Code, to require the Administrator for Nuclear Security
to ensure that, after October 1, 2002, each lock used by the
National Nuclear Security Administration to secure any vault,
safe, or other container used to store Restricted Data is an
electronic lock that meets or exceeds certain specified lock
standards of the General Services Administration.
Committee Position
On June 28, 2000, the Committee on Armed Services, a quorum
being present, approved H.R. 4737, as amended, by a voice vote.
Fiscal Data
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to
ascertain annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal
year 2001 and the four following fiscal years. The results of
such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in
this report pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the
Rules of the House.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to
section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as
follows:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, July 10, 2000.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4737, the Nuclear
Secrets Safety Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew A.
Schmit.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen, Director.
H.R. 4737--Nuclear Secrets Safety Act
H.R. 4737 would require the Department of Energy to take an
inventory of all restricted material at its national security
laboratories (Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore) and
would require measures to further control access to this
material. These measures include biological identification
devices for restricted vaults and electronic locks for all
safes. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
about $28 million over the 2001-2003 period, assuming
appropriation of the necessary funds. Because H.R. 4737 would
not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go
procedures would not apply.
H.R. 4737 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).
Public universities that contract with the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) would incur additional costs as
a result of this legislation, but those costs would be covered
through their contractual agreements with the federal
government.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 4737 is shown in the following table.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
Basis of estimate: CBO estimates that implementing H.R.
4737 would cost $28 million, assuming appropriation of the
necessary amounts. Of that total, $25 million would stem from
the inventory of restricted material and $3 million would
result from the purchase and installation of biological
identification devices on restricted vaults. CBO estimates no
incremental cost from installing electronic locks because that
is being done under current law.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars
-----------------------------------------------------
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending under current law for NNSA weapons activities:
Estimated authorization level \1\..................... 4,427 4,427 4,427 4,427 4,427 4,427
Estimated outlays..................................... 4,250 4,506 4,427 4,427 4,427 4,427
Proposed changes:
Estimated authorization level......................... 0 28 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 0 18 9 1 0 0
Spending under H.R. 4737 for NNSA weapons activities:
Estimated authorization level......................... 4,427 4,455 4,427 4,427 4,427 4,427
Estimated outlays..................................... 4,250 4,524 4,436 4,428 4,427 4,427
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year. The current-law amounts for 2001 through 2005
assume that appropriations remain at the 2000 level. If they are adjusted for inflation the base amounts would
rise by about $110 million a year, but the estimated changes would remain as shown under ``Proposed Changes.''
The estimated cost of taking an inventory of restricted
material is based on information from the three national
security laboratories. An inventory of this scope is not a
routine procedure at the national security laboratories, and
extra personnel would be required to complete it. The inventory
would cover approximately 8.5 million documents in 4,300
repositories. Information from the labs indicate that costs
would range from $4,500 to $8,000 to inventory each repository.
CBO assumes the average cost per repository would be about
$6,000.
CBO expects that installing biological identification
devices on restricted vaults would cost--on average--
approximately $5,000 per vault, based on information from the
laboratories and the General Services Administration. This cost
might vary widely depending on the need for integration into
existing security systems and the total size of the network.
CBO expects that such devices would be installed on about 540
vaults.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 4737
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA. Public universities that contract with the
NNSA would incur additional costs as a result of this
legislation, but those costs would be covered through their
contractual agreements with the federal government.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Matthew A. Schmit.
Impact on State, local, and tribal governments: Leo Lex. Impact
on the private sector: R. William Thomas.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with
the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a
report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 4737.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for
this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution.
Statement of Federal Mandates
Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this
legislation contains no Federal mandates with respect to state,
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded Federal
intergovernmental mandates.
Record Vote
In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, a record vote was taken with
respect to the committee's consideration of an amendment
offered by Mr. Abercrombie. The record of this vote can be
found on the following page.
The committee ordered H.R. 4737, as amended, reported to
the House with a favorable recommendation by a voice vote, a
quorum being present.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
SECTION 3234 OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT
SEC. 3234. PROCEDURES RELATING TO ACCESS BY INDIVIDUALS TO CLASSIFIED
AREAS AND INFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATION.
[The Administrator] (a) Procedures Required.--The
Administrator shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure
that any individual is not permitted unescorted access to any
classified area, or access to classified information, of the
Administration until that individual has been verified to hold
the appropriate security clearances.
(b) Access to Vaults at National Security Laboratories.--With
respect to any vault containing Restricted Data at any national
security laboratory, the procedures shall, at a minimum,
provide that an individual shall not have unrestricted access
to any such vault except in accordance with the following
requirements:
(1) Before each such access, the identity of the
individual is verified by--
(A) an attendant through direct visual
observation;
(B) biometric technology; or
(C) other means providing a high confidence
level in verifying the identity of the
individual.
(2) For each such access, a permanent record of such
access is maintained.
(c) Change of Lock Combinations to Vaults at National
Security Laboratories.--The Administrator shall ensure, for
each vault containing Restricted Data at each national security
laboratory, that the combination of each lock to such vault is
changed not later than--
(1) one week after each removal of an individual from
the list of individuals permitted access to such vault;
and
(2) 12 months after the date on which the combination
was last changed.
(d) Electronic Locks Required.--The Administrator shall
ensure that, after October 1, 2002, each lock used by the
Administration to secure any vault, safe, or other container
used to store Restricted Data is an electronic lock that meets
or exceeds the FF-L-2740A lock standard of the General Services
Administration, as in effect on the date of the enactment of
the Nuclear Secrets Safety Act of 2000.