[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNITED STATES-MEXICO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 29, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-155
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
66-877 WASHINGTON : 2000
______
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Sharon Pinkerton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gilbert A. Macklin, Professional Staff Member
Carson A. Nightwine, Jr., Professional Staff Member
Lisa Wandler, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on February 29, 2000................................ 1
Statement of:
Jordan, Phillip, DEA (Retired), former Director of EPIC...... 69
Ledwith, William, Director of International Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration; Mary Lee Warren, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department
of Justice; and John Montoya, U.S. Border Patrol Sector
Chief, Laredo.............................................. 18
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Ledwith, William, Director of International Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration, prepared statement of.......... 22
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida:
Articler dated February 29, 2000......................... 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 8
Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Hawaii, prepared statement of..................... 14
Montoya, John, U.S. Border Patrol Sector Chief, Laredo,
prepared statement of...................................... 47
Warren, Mary Lee, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice, prepared statement of..... 37
UNITED STATES-MEXICO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Mica, Hutchinson, Mink, Cummings,
Kucinich, and Tierney.
Also present: Representatives Gilman and Towns.
Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief
counsel; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Gilbert A. Macklin and Carson A.
Nightwine, Jr., professional staff members; Charley Diaz,
congressional fellow; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; Jean
Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Chris Traci, minority staff
assistant.
Mr. Mica. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing
of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources to order.
This morning's hearing will focus on the oversight of the
United States and Mexico's counternarcotics efforts. We will be
joined by our ranking member in just a few minutes and we do
have Mr. Gilman here. I will proceed first with an opening
statement and then yield to Members, and then we will hear from
two panels today.
International drug trafficking continues to be a growing
threat to security in the United States. According to the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
almost 16,000 Americans lose their lives each year as a direct
result of illegal narcotics. At a recent hearing we conducted,
the drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey, estimated that the
number of deaths could be as high as 52,000 each year. The
social, economic and criminal justice costs associated with
drugs is a staggering $110 billion a year and climbing; and if
we take everything into consideration, there have been
estimates that it could be as much as a quarter of a trillion
dollars a year in costs to our society.
Today, our subcommittee will again examine the United
States and Mexican counternarcotics efforts. It is important
that we do so for several reasons: first, because we have such
an incredible supply of hard narcotics flooding across our
borders; second, under the drug certification law that Congress
must annually review, the decision of the administration and
the certification process which is just around the corner here.
Our concern is the increasing role that Mexico plays in
drug trafficking activities. Our relationship with our
neighborhood to the south is critical, and it is hard to
imagine an issue which impacts both countries more deeply than
illegal drugs. In fact, at a hearing on Mexico last year, our
former DEA Administrator, Tom Constantine, stated, ``In my
lifetime, I have never witnessed any group of criminals that
has had such a terrible impact on so many individuals and
communities in our nation.'' That was his quote a year ago.
This statement is from a man who spent 40 years in law
enforcement.
He went on to say in a November 26, 1999, New York Times
article, ``We were not adequately protecting the citizens of
the United States from these organized crime figures.'' The
``we'' he refers to is the Clinton administration, and I guess
it would also have to refer to Congress as the guilty parties.
Every year the President decides which of the major drug-
producing or transiting countries he will certify, and the law
has a phrase which says ``fully cooperating''--that is the
terminology; so the law determines and evaluates full
cooperation with the United States to end the scourge of
illegal drugs. And that is part of the criteria by which we
judge these nations.
Last year, and probably this year, the President will
certify that Mexico is fully cooperating. This decision made,
despite what I believe, is very disturbing evidence that our
neighbors to the south have not made sufficient efforts to stop
the flow of drugs into our country. Every year the subcommittee
asks what progress is being made to combat the flow of illegal
drugs into the United States from Mexico.
Specifically, we will ask the following questions today:
Why hasn't the U.S. Government been able to reach an agreement
with Mexico on adequate safety measures for United States
agents assigned to the Border Task Forces?
Why hasn't Mexico extradited a single major Mexican drug
trafficker to the United States?
Why has Mexico refused to allow forward basing of United
States ships or planes in Mexican territory in accordance with
domestic legislation?
And why does Mexico refuse to allow United States law
enforcement agents to carry firearms for self-defense?
In light of the answers to these questions, on what basis
would this administration certify Mexico again under the law as
fully cooperating?
While there has been a long and productive relationship
between our two countries, the growing amount of illegal drugs
that are ending up on America's streets and coming across the
border should make us pause. Not only is Mexico the leading
transit country for cocaine entering the United States, the
DEA's heroin signature program indicates that in 1 year Mexico
jumped from being the source of 14 percent of heroin in this
country to its current status of providing 17 percent of all
the heroin seized in the United States. That is just in a 1-
year period, and is probably a 20 percent increase in
production, which should be startling to everyone.
Today, approximately 60 percent of the cocaine on America's
streets comes from across our Southwest border. A recent
article from the Washington Post indicates that the heavier
flow of drugs has exacerbated ongoing problems of trust and
cooperation between the United States and Mexican authorities,
and is particularly troubling to law enforcement in light of
new statistics showing rising marijuana use among American
teenagers. Additionally, Mexico serves as the major source of
foreign methamphetamine that is ravaging our communities across
the Midwest and our Western States.
We have had previous testimony relating to the meth
epidemic across our country in places like Iowa and Minnesota;
other Western and Midwestern States are ravaged by
methamphetamines coming from Mexico. Methamphetamine has
supplanted cocaine as the primary drug threat in most Western
States and many Midwestern States, and has emerged as a major
concern in the Southeast. The report goes on to say, ``The
threat posed by methamphetamine is due to its increasing
popularity and rapidly addictive properties, and the violent
behavior sometimes associated with its use.''
In previous years, this administration has testified that
Mexico deserved to be certified because Mexico is taking
``significant actions'' and making ``substantial commitments''
to address the drug trade. A year later, these commitments
appear to be only words and misplaced hope by the Clinton
administration.
The GAO's July 1999 report entitled ``Update on U.S.-
Mexican Counternarcotics Activities'' served as an important
midpoint check on progress being made. The report paints a
bleak picture of cooperation by the Government of Mexico and
states that Mexico continues to be the primary haven for money
laundering in Latin America. And furthermore, the report
states, ``There remains no single binational plan to address
border problems.''
The United States and Mexico share a common 2,000-mile
border. Sadly, the border has become the stage for violence and
drug trafficking. Consider the discovery of mass graves along
the border with Texas. This tells a clear and convincing story
of the brutality of the Mexican drug cartels and their
complicity with government officials.
It is interesting to note, too, that they did find bodies.
We did give notice, and suddenly initial cooperation evaporated
and Mexican officials, I am told, tried to get us off the scene
as soon as possible; and we may never know what bodies or
evidence was removed or what the situation was, but we do know
that there have been in fact hundreds and in fact dozens of
Americans and Mexicans who have been slaughtered and buried or
missing.
Again, on our border with Mexico, yesterday it was reported
in the New York Times that the police chief of Tijuana was
assassinated by four gunmen who put at least 100 shots into his
vehicle as he drove home from mass. I read this morning's
article in the Washington Post--maybe some of you read it--and
it appears that he is not the only recent Mexican law
enforcement official to have died in this manner.
This article, which I ask unanimous consent to be made part
of the record, without objection, details that brutal killing
and the history of killings in Tijuana and the Baja Peninsula,
which has become a center of violence, not to mention the
Yucatan Peninsula and Quintana Roo, which was run by
narcotraffickers and other states within Mexico which have now
been taken over by drug traffickers.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.001
Mr. Mica. Today, the challenges faced by United States law
enforcement officials along the Southwest border with Mexico
are multiplying every day. The GAO report indicates that
between September 1996 and February 1999, DEA recorded 141
threats or violent incidents against United States law
enforcement personnel, their Mexican counterparts and public
officials. Additionally, in Mexico, drug enforcement agents are
not allowed to adequately protect or defend themselves.
It is also interesting to note that we have a cap on DEA
agents, that has been placed by Mexico. It is not a public
number, but it is a very limited number of agents that are even
allowed to operate in that country; and despite a resolution
passed several years ago by Congress both to allow our
enforcement agents to protect themselves and to work in that
setting, we still have not had a response on this issue from
Mexico.
Now we hear that $200,000 bounties have been placed on the
heads of United States law enforcement officers by Mexican drug
traffickers. These brazen and arrogant criminal organizations
have amassed tremendous power and influence in the day-to-day
lives of not only the Mexican people, but in the lives of
American citizens and law enforcement representatives.
In reality, our law enforcement officers are indeed
involved in a war. An example of this was the cold-blooded
murder of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Alexander Kirpnick on June
3, 1998. Unfortunately, these actions and threats may be
repeated in the future by those who amass the power and money
involved in drug trafficking. We can see how brazen they have
gotten now, to publicly declare that we have $200,000 bounties
on the heads of U.S. law enforcement officials.
There exists today a clear and present danger to our men
and women of law enforcement along the Southwest border. My
concern is that by not demanding more of our Mexican
colleagues, we allow these tragedies to continue.
Tomorrow, we expect the administration to release its
annual certification determinations. I have a difficult time
believing that this administration would certify Mexico as
fully cooperating with the law enforcement efforts of the
United States in stopping drugs. It troubles me to think that
we have set a standard, and Mexico has failed to meet that
standard again and again, and yet the administration turns a
blind eye to the obvious: There is no satisfactory cooperation
with the Government of Mexico on the narcotics issues.
I am sensitive to the fact that our trading relationship
with Mexico is vital. However, we must not forget the thousands
of lives that are lost each year to drugs, the cost to our
society, the impact and devastation to so many American
families. As representatives of the people, we owe them this
effort. We owe them this oversight hearing and we owe them the
truth. It is more than our job, it is our duty, and I don't
think that we should shrink from it.
Finally, in the last year, Mexico hired an army of
Washington lobbyists and slick Madison Avenue types to
influence both Congress and mask the drug rot that is coming
from that nation. In this process, they have even helped
corrupt the decertification process, which dismays me.
Behind closed doors, U.S. officials will tell you how the
corruption has destroyed, and is destroying, that democracy.
And it is rather sad and we see how corruption has now--such as
the brazen killing of this police chief just, in the last few
days, turned to extreme violence in murdering families,
standing men and women up and machine-gunning them down.
So Mexico can hire people to defeat this process. They can
mask the drug rot, as I said, but the plain facts are that the
situation has gotten out of control. Even the United States
Ambassador to Mexico was quoted in the last week, I believe,
Jeffrey Davidow, his quote was that ``Mexico is the world
headquarters of narcotics trafficking.'' I am glad to see that
someone has publicly stood up and called it as it is.
Again, we are back here a year later looking at Mexico's
cooperation in this effort, and I am not pleased to what I see.
I would like to yield at this time to the ranking member
from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.005
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
These hearings are very important, although perhaps
somewhat premature, because the announcement from the State
Department has not been issued, and will not be, until
tomorrow. But given the fact that we have only 30 days in
Congress in order to discuss this issue and to make a decision
as to whether we agree or disagree with the administration, I
believe it is appropriate to begin the hearings today to try to
examine what has happened in the last 12 months.
I think it is important that we rely upon facts that we
have gathered in the last 12 months in making our assessment
and in discussing the issues that are before Congress. What
happened beyond that time, previous, I do not believe is
germane to the issue.
The issue is whether the requirements and standards and
conditions that the United States felt were fair--fairly
imposed upon Mexico have in fact been adhered to, or at least
some measured progress to meet those standards; and that is the
job and task that is before the Congress, to look at the
recommendations of the administration and to make our own
independent judgment.
Much is dependent upon an objective, fair assessment of the
situation because, as you know, the United States and Mexico
share a common border and not only a common border, but a
common economy. The United States is Mexico's most important
customer and we purchase a tremendous, wide array of goods and
services that are necessary for their economy. The United
States also provides about 62 percent of Mexico's imports, so
we are an important trading partner.
Nevertheless, it is not that trading partnership that is
under examination today, nor should it weigh in as a factor in
deciding whether the decertification should be insisted upon or
whatever the administration recommends.
There is no doubt that the country of Mexico is a principal
transit country for 50 to 60 percent of the cocaine and up to
80 percent of the methamphetamine precursor chemicals. It is
also a major producer of marijuana and heroin and may be
responsible for up to 30 percent of heroin and 70 percent of
foreign-grown marijuana entering the United States.
It is highly unusual, in my understanding of international
relations, for our country or any other country to interpose
standards of conduct upon another foreign nation. But that is
not the issue in these examinations. The issue is the impact
upon our citizens of an uncontrolled quantity of drugs coming
across the border.
I have said in numerous hearings that the United States has
an equal obligation to inquire as to the efficacy of our own
law enforcement agencies and the standards that we lay in
examining to what extent we are capable and insistent upon
interdicting and arresting and putting the full force and power
of our law enforcement agencies against these unconscionable
intrusions of drugs into our communities. We have a job to do
to decrease demand, to insist upon prevention and treatment;
and so, as we examine the implications of Mexico's conduct or
failure of conduct, we need to also closely examine our own
situation within the United States.
These are very serious deliberations. I hope that they are
not done in any partisan way to seize political advantage over
the issue. This question is far too serious for that type of
approach. We need to look at the facts. We need to examine the
fairness of our evaluation and to seriously consider all
aspects of this issue.
It is an important question that Congress has laid
appropriately before the people of this country, through the
Congress, and I believe that this subcommittee is fully
prepared to exercise that nonpartisan decisionmaking
responsibility that it undertook several years ago.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6877.007
Mr. Mica. I thank the ranking member and remind members of
the subcommittee, that on Monday we will be in California and
Sacramento at the request of Mr. Ose on narcotics trafficking,
a field hearing; and on Tuesday we will be at the United
States-Mexican border conducting a hearing--I believe it is in
Mr. Bilbray's district in San Diego--on continuation of this
issue. All members are invited to attend and participate.
Mr. Gilman, thank you for being here, and you are
recognized.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Chairman Mica. I want to thank you
for conducting this timely hearing prior to the
administration's acting on certification in Mexico.
Regrettably, the administration for many years has failed
to apply the law faithfully when it comes to its annual March 1
annual certification of Mexico's antidrug cooperation; and
despite our Ambassador to Mexico Jeffrey Davidow's statement
just last week, ``The fact is that the headquarters of the drug
trafficking world are now in Mexico,'' we expect that this year
is not going to be any different.
The State Department's assessment of Mexico's antidrug
performance is simply not objective. Our diplomats are resigned
to writing annual assessments that place Mexico's
unsatisfactory cooperation in the best possible light. Our
Nation is ill-advised and ill-served when the bureaucracy feels
obliged to help our President paint an inaccurate picture of an
issue as important as Mexico's cooperation in our joint fight
against drugs.
Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey has raised the drug
policy to a high art, and after years of high-level
cooperation, including a trumpeted 1997 joint analysis, United
States and Mexican officials do not even agree on how extensive
the drug problem is or whether it is getting any better or
worse. Our governments have yet to agree on how to implement
the highly touted ``performance measures of effectiveness''
which are intended to assess real progress toward our common
strategy for combating drugs.
Moreover, despite the honesty and cooperation of some
senior Mexican antidrug officials, improvements in eradication
and recent maritime seizures, there has been no major progress
in uprooting the drug cartels that are doing business with
virtual impunity in Mexico.
We respectfully call the following salient facts to the
attention of our Secretary of State, including the following.
Mexico's counternarcotics efforts are hamstrung by overly
centralized decisionmaking, by appalling inefficiency and by
rank-and-file law enforcement corruption. A good example of
those problems is found in the Mexican Government's much-
heralded arrest of Amezcua cartel officials in October 1998.
Two lawyers in the Mexican attorney general's office allowed a
corrupt drug informant in that case, Gilberto Garcia, to walk
free in Cancun in exchange for a suspected cash bribe. Mr.
Garcia may be in custody and waiting extradition, but neither
of these officials was prosecuted for their apparent
complicity, confirming the worst suspicions about the
vulnerability of even-handed, vetted units.
The highly touted Special Investigative Unit [SIU], has
virtually been shut down as part of a dispute between Mexico
and United States officials about how we should be screening
SIU members. Mexican authorities, apparently fearing that
wiretaps might snare corrupt officials, are said to have
further rendered the SIU impotent.
Situations in Mexico continue to deteriorate rapidly. Drug
kingpins, few of whom have been extradited to our Nation,
operate with virtual impunity in Matamoros and Ciudad Juarez
and Cali and Tijuana, Baja California and Norte. These drug
traffickers operate as virtual feudal lords in border Sierra
states, corrupting or hand-picking local government officials.
Our own law enforcement agents are in constant mortal
danger from these traffickers. Despite years of our Nation's
pleas, Mexico refuses to authorize our law enforcement agents
to legally carry arms to defend themselves. As if we needed
more evidence of the danger to our good antidrug agents, we now
have the news that Chairman Mica just recited, that Tijuana
Police Chief Alfredo de la Torre was driving to his office this
past Sunday when gunmen using rifles and 9-mm pistols pulled up
along side his black suburban and fired 99 rounds into the car,
killing him.
Mexico's position on this matter defies logic. It is
apparent from all of the facts that we have seen and heard, the
administration is going to have to do more than just talk about
Mexico's cooperation.
Talk is cheap. The cost to our young people for the
increased manufacture and distribution of cocaine and heroin
and methamphetamines, the emergence of Mexican criminal groups
and the intelligence gaps simply are too high a price to pay.
Much is going to have to be done to improve our relationship
with Mexico in our drug war and much more should be done before
we certify Mexico.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
I recognize now Mr. Tierney from Massachusetts.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this
hearing and just associate myself with the remarks of the
ranking member.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
I recognize Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. I will try to be brief.
I thank the witnesses for being here today and I am
grateful for this hearing. I returned from Mexico in January--
very instructive--and I think about two things that really
struck me as I was there.
One, methamphetamine is a serious problem in Arkansas, and
my drug director in Arkansas said 50 percent of our
methamphetamine comes from Mexico. I was in Guadalajara, and I
asked the Mexican officials--I said how many lab seizures did
you have, and the answer was somewhere between 15 and 30. I
said was that just in Guadalajara, and they said, no, that is
the entire country of Mexico. In Arkansas, we had over 500 lab
seizures last year, and that sort of points up the contrast as
to how you measure success, perhaps.
The other thing that struck me was before I went there I
asked the DEA--and I trust Mr. Ledwith will correct me--as to
how much aid we give to Mexico; and I believe it is about $17
million in antinarcotics efforts. In contrast, we are talking
about sending down to Colombia one-point-some billion dollars,
and Mexico is in the $17 million range; and of course the other
thing that is amazing, the Mexican Government didn't ask for
more money.
I think the issue is, how can we improve performance? How
can we improve cooperation? How can we bring Mexico into being
a part of our cooperating countries to a higher level in
working with the United States, working with our DEA, working
with our extradition efforts?
I was just reading the material, and the striking statistic
of the Attorney General, who indicated, I think, 1,400 Mexican
law enforcement officials were dismissed for corruption over a
couple-year period. I was delighted that the report I get is
that the American businesses there are starting to put pressure
and demanding more action by the Mexican Government. American
businesses are used to dealing in a society that has or
respects the rule of law, and we have to be able to develop
that there.
So I am just citing that as a little background and some of
the observations that I had.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses and
addressing how we can improve our cooperation and our success
rate, protect the DEA and really bring them in, the Mexican
Government, bring them in to joining our effort in fighting
drugs.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
Now we will turn to our first panel. The first panel
consists of Mr. William Ledwith. He is the Director of
International Relations for our Drug Enforcement
Administration. We also have Ms. Mary Lee Warren, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the Justice
Department; and Mr. John Montoya, he is with the U.S. Border
Patrol, Sector Chief from Laredo. Welcome to all of our
witnesses.
As you know, this is an investigations and oversight
subcommittee of Congress and of the Government Reform
Committee. We do swear in our witnesses.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative.
We have at least one new witness here today and two
veterans. We try to limit your remarks. We won't run the clock
this morning since we have two short panels, but if you have
lengthy documentation or information you would like to have
made part of the record, we will do that upon unanimous
consent.
At this time, I am pleased to recognize Mr. William
Ledwith, Director of International Operations for DEA.
Welcome and you are recognized, sir.
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM LEDWITH, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; MARY LEE WARREN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND JOHN MONTOYA, U.S. BORDER PATROL
SECTOR CHIEF, LAREDO
Mr. Ledwith. Good morning, Chairman Mica, Congresswoman
Mink, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee
today to discuss the issue of the United States and Mexican
counternarcotics efforts.
I would like first to thank the subcommittee for its
continued support of the Drug Enforcement Administration and
overall support of drug law enforcement. Thank you.
My testimony today will provide you with an objective
assessment of the law enforcement issues and concerns
surrounding the drug threat posed by international drug
trafficking organizations operating from Mexico. As you are
aware, DEA's primary mission is to target the highest, most
sophisticated levels of international drug trafficking
organizations operating today.
Due to the ever-increasing legitimate cross-border traffic
and commerce between the United States and Mexico, several
Mexico-based international organized crime groups have emerged
and flourished. In fact, recent reporting indicates that the
United-States-Mexican border remains a major point of entry for
approximately 70 percent of all illicit drugs smuggled into our
country. These groups have established elaborate smuggling
infrastructures on both sides of the border. Furthermore, these
criminal organizations spawn violence, corruption and
intimidation that threaten the safety and stability of our
cities and towns across America.
Following the dismantling of the Medellin drug cartel
during the late 1980's, the Cali drug cartel formed an alliance
with Mexican trafficking groups in order to stage and transport
drugs through Mexico and across the Southwest border. With the
disruption of the Cali syndicate during the early part of the
1990's, Mexican trafficking groups consolidated their power and
began to control drug trafficking along the United States-
Mexican border. In response to the emergence of these Mexican
drug trafficking organizations, it became apparent that a
coordinated strategy for law enforcement counterdrug activities
be implemented. DEA in concert with other Federal agencies
established the Southwest border initiative, an integrated,
coordinated law enforcement effort designed to attack the
command and control structure of organized criminal operations
associated with the Mexican federation. This strategy focuses
on both intelligence and enforcement efforts which target drug
distribution systems within the United States, and direct
resources toward the disruption of those principal drug
trafficking organizations. A vital component of this strategy
involve the formation of a joint DEA, DOJ, FBI and U.S. Customs
Service project that resides within DEA's Special Operations
Division. Its mission is to coordinate and support regional and
national criminal investigations and prosecutions against the
trafficking organizations that most threaten the United States.
Two sections that are the heart of the Southwest border
project have focused their efforts exclusively on the principal
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. They aim at the command
and control networks of these identified organizations and
their supporting groups.
One such example of the effectiveness of this SOD component
was Operation Impunity, which is a 2-year international
investigation that culminated in the arrest of over 106
individuals linked to the Carrillo-Fuentes drug trafficking
organization headquartered in Cancun, Mexico. The investigation
encompassed 53 DEA, FBI and U.S. Customs Service case
investigations incorporating 14 Federal judicial districts. In
addition to the arrests, this investigation has resulted in 36
seizures, netting some 12,434 kilograms of cocaine, half a kilo
of heroin, 4,800 pounds of marijuana and more than $19 million
in U.S. currency.
Operation Impunity resulted in unparalleled coordinated and
cooperative effort among the law enforcement community of the
United States. Within Mexico, the DEA and the Government of
Mexico's equivalent to the DEA, FEADS, continued to conduct
joint investigative endeavors throughout Mexico. The joint
investigations are being conducted with the two primary
investigative components of the FEADS-vetted units, the
sensitive investigative units and the base intelligence units.
The achievements of the BIU and the SIU, as related to
cases against the major Mexican drug trafficking organizations,
are minimal. The inability of these units to fully employ the
provisions of the organized crime law, to promptly investigate
these major organizations, has been equally disappointing.
As has been discussed and testified to previously, it is no
secret that elements of the Mexican Government have been mired
in corruption for years. In fact, the Federal preventive police
was created in 1999 in response to the existing corruption
within the police ranks. The Government of Mexico reported
since April 1997, more than 1,400 of the 3,500 Federal police
officers have been fired for corruption and 357 of the officers
have been prosecuted.
Perhaps the most alarming incident involving Mexican police
officials occurred on November 9, 1999, when a DEA special
agent and an FBI special agent were debriefing a confidential
source in Matamoras, Mexico. During the course of this
debriefing, the special agents and the confidential source were
surrounded and physically threatened by documented Mexican
trafficker Osiel Cardenas-Guillen and approximately 15 armed
associates. Each of these associates, one of whom was
brandishing a gold-plated automatic assault weapon were either
municipal or state police officers.
Furthermore, despite monitoring the entire incident over
the DEA agent's special cellular telephone, who had called to
request assistance, the state judicial police commander took no
action. Due only to their resourcefulness and ability to
diffuse this potentially fatal encounter were the agents and
the confidential source able to survive unharmed.
Among other issues, this incident highlights the
vulnerability of DEA and FBI special agents working in Mexico.
Recently, however, judicial efforts to stop corruption are
under way. On January 11, 2000, a Mexican Federal judge issued
an arrest warrant for the magistrate who wrongly freed a
methamphetamine trafficker. Then on February 3, 2000, the
Mexican Federal supreme court ruled that the suspended Morelos
Governor, Jorge Carrillo-Olea, could be brought to trial for
protecting drug trafficking and kidnapping activities. Olea, a
retired general and former director of Mexico's civilian
intelligence agency and former antidrug commissioner for the
attorney general's office, was ordered by the Federal supreme
court to be placed under house arrest by the PGR. The PGR,
however, has yet to take him into custody. This is the first
time the Federal supreme court ruled to refer a Governor or
executive branch official to trial.
Although a treaty has been in existence with Mexico since
1978, no extradition requests were signed by the Mexican
foreign relations ministry until 1996. Consistent with this, no
major drug traffickers were extradited to the United States in
1999. The Mexican Government did extradite 10 fugitives on
narcotics-related or money-laundering offenses during 1999,
eight United States citizens and two Mexican citizens. One
Mexican citizen, a low-level drug trafficker, was sought on
drug charges after escaping from a United States prison while
serving a sentence on drug-related crimes. The other Mexican
citizen, who had killed a United States Border Patrol agent,
was sought on murder and marijuana smuggling charges.
In conclusion, Mexico is a country of great strategic
importance to the United States, and counternarcotics is one of
the most critical aspects of that relationship. The
effectiveness of national and bilateral efforts against drug
organizations will depend largely on demonstrable process and
disrupting and dismantling these transnational narcotics
trafficking organizations. This includes apprehending,
prosecuting and convicting major drug traffickers and exposing
and prosecuting individuals and businesses involved in
providing critical support networks such as front companies,
security, transportation and the like. Therefore, it is vital
for the DEA, along with other U.S. Government agencies, to
continue to support the Government of Mexico in the field of
counternarcotics operations. In turn, however, it is hoped that
the Government of Mexico will provide adequate investigative
manpower, financial resources, equipment, and reciprocal drug
intelligence in support of bilateral drug law enforcement.
DEA will continue to promote bilateral cooperation to
improve law enforcement. It is abundantly clear that concerted
law enforcement efforts such as Operation Impunity, will
significantly improve our ability to counter and eliminate
transnational drug trafficking organizations.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify before
the committee today. I will be happy to answer any questions
you have. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ledwith follows:]
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Mr. Mica. We will withhold questions until we have heard
from all of our panelists.
The next witness is Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General with the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department.
You are recognized, and welcome.
Ms. Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member and
esteemed members of this subcommittee. I am pleased to return
as a veteran before the subcommittee on these matters of great
importance. Because the other agencies have been called to
testify, I have tried to focus my remarks today on the United
States-Mexican fugitive relationship, extradition and
deportation; and I ask that my full written statement be
received for the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Warren. I will do my best to respond to other inquiries
on other topics that arise during the proceedings.
First, as to extradition, to put my testimony in context,
prior to 1995, there had only been a handful of extraditions
from Mexico under our 1978 extradition treaty. Since the
beginning of the Zedillo administration and the 5-plus years
after that, there have been enormous improvements in the
bilateral treaty implementation between our two countries that
resulted in the extradition from Mexico of 58 individuals,
including, for the first time in history, seven Mexican
nationals charged with or convicted of crimes in this country;
and over the same period of time, the United States has
extradited 85 fugitives, including 12 United States citizens,
to Mexico.
The 1999 figures, as reviewed by Mr. Ledwith, 14
individuals from Mexico to the United States, including 2
Mexican nationals; from the United States to Mexico, 16
individuals including 1 United States citizen. A fact that has
not gone unnoticed, Mexico has still not extradited a major
drug trafficker of Mexican nationality. Accused methamphetamine
kingpins Jesus and Luis Amezcua and Tijuana cartel lieutenant
Arturo ``Kitti'' Paez Martinez remain in custody in Mexico as
their extradition cases wind through the extradition process.
Others whose extraditions we sought and, unfortunately, the
courts rejected either have been released, such as Jaime Ladino
Avila, an Amezcua brother methamphetamine lieutenant, and
Florentino Blanco Mesa, an Arellano Felix organization
enforcer. Or others who are being prosecuted by the Mexican
authorities domestically, such as Jaime Gonzalez Castro, a
Sonoran trafficker who brought enormous quantities of drugs
into Arizona; and Oscar Malherbe, who was arrested in 1998 and
the court decided in 1998 he would not be extradited--he was
No. 2 in the Gulf cartel--they are proceeding against him
domestically.
We are not optimistic about the outcomes of those domestic
prosecutions. Our evidence, such as court-authorized wiretaps
and coconspirator testimony, are not given the same persuasive
weight in the Mexican courts as they are here where that
evidence was collected. The Mexican attorney general's office
and their foreign ministry have taken a vigorous stance in the
``Kitti'' Paez Martinez case before the Mexican supreme court,
asking their highest court to reject the intermediate court's
flawed rationale seen in the Jaime Gonzalez Castro case and the
Oscar Malherbe case that Mexican nationals must be prosecuted
domestically and not extradited.
We and the Mexican authorities remain hopeful that the
Mexican supreme court will decide the ``Kitti'' Paez Martinez
case in favor of extradition and resolve this issue once and
for all. But for now, the extradition results in the Mexican
courts are disappointing to the Justice Department, a sentiment
that I know is shared by the Mexican authorities and by the
members of this subcommittee.
In an attempt to clarify a lingering issue which has been
raised before this subcommittee and by other Members of
Congress, we have been asked on several occasions to give the
total number of fugitives that are pending in each country's
file cabinets. This number is somewhere in the several hundred
range for each side. However, I suggest this is not a
meaningful number. Both the United States and Mexico have
backlogs of extradition requests that are so old that either
our location information about the fugitive is no longer of use
or, for others, the cases may no longer be prosecutable, either
due to loss of witnesses or the like.
To address this problem, Mexico and the United States
initiated a joint program to reconcile and prioritize our
outstanding extradition requests and to exchange lists of our
active and priority cases.
Those cases that still logically and realistically can and
should be prosecuted by the other government and those that may
be older, but are nonetheless of such significance to the
requesting country to demand continuing attention and pursuit.
For example, the fugitive sought for the murder of the DEA
agent and a fugitive sought for the murder of a Phoenix police
officer.
As a result of this cooperative undertaking, both Mexico
and the United States can now accurately report to this
subcommittee that we each have approximately 125 active and
priority extradition cases pending before one another at any
given time.
Let me raise with this subcommittee some recent court
decisions in Mexico that cause us great concern. The first is
Florentino Blanco Mesa, whose extradition we sought for the
Southern District of California for his involvement with the
Arrellano Felix organization. He was released in Mexico on the
grounds that the SRE, their foreign ministry, had not fully
explained its reasons for finding the case exceptional enough
to warrant the extradition of a Mexican national, and had not
sufficiently reviewed the extradition package to correct what
we believe were hypertechnical flaws, such as the absence of
the translation on the seal of the package--extraordinary
things that have never been asked for before and are certainly
not part of their extradition requests to us. It seemed to be
an occasion of a court reaching to find a decision.
In another case, that of Jaime Ladino Avila, an Amezcua
brother lieutenant whom we are seeking to face methamphetamine
trafficking charges, extradition was denied because the court
in his case found that the potential imposition of a life
sentence in the United States would violate the Mexican
constitution and Mexican extradition law, and that the SRE
should have requested an assurance from us that no such
sentence would be imposed.
The United States-Mexican extradition treaty allows the
parties to request assurances against the imposition of the
death penalty, but contains no similar provision as to life
imprisonment. If other courts in Mexico should find the Ladino
court's reasoning persuasive, we will face enormous and perhaps
insurmountable difficulties in securing the extradition from
Mexico of the full range of serious criminals that we seek.
Major traffickers are facing life imprisonment under our
sentencing schedule here in the United States and the State
crime violators, those who have committed murder, are certainly
facing up to life in State prison.
Moreover, this ruling in the Ladino case is not limited to
Mexican nationals and therefore could be applied to United
States citizens or to third-country nationals, even though such
individuals could not be prosecuted domestically under their
article 4. Under that particular provision that allows them to
prosecute Mexican nationals, it is that nationality that grants
jurisdiction to the Mexican courts. There would be no
jurisdiction for the U.S. citizens or third-country nationals.
These decisions are profoundly disturbing to us and our
Mexican colleagues alike. They understand the vital
significance of a vigorous and reciprocal extradition
relationship in our efforts against drug trafficking and
violence.
Once more, I can give this subcommittee assurances that
these concerns have been and will continue to be raised at the
highest levels of our government with our Mexican counterparts,
for example, through upcoming consultations between Attorneys
General Reno and Madrazo in the next few days and during the
Binational Commission meetings involving several Cabinet
officers from the two countries scheduled for mid-May.
Returning now to the deportation issue in May of last year,
I was pleased to be able to report to this subcommittee that
Mexico, working with the United States Marshals Service and the
FBI, our Embassy in Mexico City, had significantly enhanced its
program for deporting or expelling United States citizens who
were in violation of Mexican immigration laws and who at the
same time were sought as fugitives from United States justice.
These enhanced efforts in 1998 led to the deportation of over
30 such individuals. I advised in my later testimony last year
that we had seen a disturbing trend downward in those
deportation numbers. This negative trend continued and the
Marshals Service reported only nine successful cooperative
deportations from Mexico in 1999, and so far, there have been
no improvements in 2000.
The best we can discern as a reason for the decline in the
deportations and expulsion is an apparent renewed preference
for the use of the extradition treaty to affect the return of
fugitives and the desire by certain officials within the PGR
and the SRE to be the central points for all returns--and the
deportations come through the immigration officials.
As with extradition, the Department of Justice and, in
particular,
Attorneys General Reno and Madrazo are committed to doing
everything possible to reinvigorate the commitment to use
deportation whenever it is the most effective and expeditious
legal mechanism for promoting the interests of justice.
As I noted, I wanted to focus on extradition and
deportation in this oral testimony. I will try to respond to
your questions.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Warren follows:]
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Mr. Mica. We will now hear from Mr. John Montoya. He is
with the U.S. Border Patrol. He is a Sector Chief for Laredo.
Welcome, and you are recognized, sir.
Mr. Montoya. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman
Mink, Congressman Hutchinson and other distinguished members of
the subcommittee.
I am John Montoya, Chief Patrol Agent of the Laredo Sector
of the U.S. Border Patrol. I appreciate the opportunity to give
you an overview of the Laredo Sector and also to thank you for
your concern and support over the years. I want to present to
you the areas where I believe we have been successful and also
give you some insight where I feel there is still a threat to
our operations.
Our agents are diligently performing their duties every day
in an environment that is becoming more dangerous and
threatening because of alien and narcotics smugglers. In
addition, the agents protect our national security by the
arrest of individuals who enter this country illegally and who
may pose a terrorist threat to our communities.
The Laredo Sector covers 171 miles of river border and is
comprised of eight stations. The Laredo Sector has 690 Border
Patrol agents, 12 antismuggling agents, 13 detention
enforcement officers and 131 support positions on duty.
Currently 555 of these agents are assigned in the three
stations immediately and directly adjacent to the river. All
agents receive 20 weeks of intensive training at the Federal
law enforcement training center in Glynco, GA, and at the
Border Patrol Academy in Charleston, SC. The training includes
law, Spanish, physical training and firearms training. They are
equipped with semiautomatic handguns, automatic long guns, body
armor, portable and mounted night vision equipment.
Based on effective operations to control the border in El
Paso and San Diego, the Border Patrol and INS initiated
Operation Rio Grande in South Texas in August 1997. Our
strategy in the Laredo Sector targeted a 4-mile area where
approximately 70 percent of all illegal entries were occurring
within the sector. Within this 4-mile stretch of river, agents
were placed in a high-visibility posture at 16 intensely
trafficked crossing points.
As Operation Rio Grande has continued and additional
resources have been received, the deployment area has been
extended to 14\1/2\ miles. Since the onset of Operation Rio
Grande, apprehensions of illegal aliens have diminished by 66
percent within the deployment area. In addition, narcotics
apprehensions have become almost nonexistent and crime rates
have also been reduced within this area.
Aliens that are turned over to the Border Patrol by other
agencies have also decreased by 33 percent. However, there has
been a definite shift of illegal traffic from the deployment
area to the flanks in both aliens and narcotics. This has been
increasing as the operation continues. Our Laredo North Station
continues to apprehend large groups of 25 and more as smuggling
operations are forced away from the deployment areas.
The Laredo Sector is greatly affected by all criminal
activity in the area, but more so by smuggling activity. This
sector has identified 27 alien smuggling organizations and 25
narcotics smuggling organizations that operate within the
confines of the Laredo Sector. These organizations have the
capability to smuggle in excess of 6,000 aliens and multi-tons
of narcotics per month.
Coordination with Mexican law enforcement agencies is
complicated by both the number of Mexican law enforcement
agencies and frequent turnover within these agencies. To
overcome this, we recently formalized an arrangement whereby
the Laredo Border Patrol has a single point of contact with
Mexican law enforcement agencies through the Mexican
Immigration Service.
Furthermore, of major concern are recent incidents
involving Mexican authorities. In one incident, for example, a
Mexican municipal police officer fired shots toward the United
States side following pursuit of an individual. This incident
has been addressed with the Mexican Consul and American Consul
and the relevant Mexican police authorities. However, it
underscores the tensions and the dangers that our agents face
on a daily basis.
Laredo Sector has employed a twofold approach to its
operations to include narcotics interdiction and education in
order to battle the influence of drugs in the sector area.
Interdiction efforts take place along the river with special
response teams, normally outside the deployment area and on
highway checkpoints. The sector has a Drug Demand Reduction
Education Program comprised of agents who visit schools and
organizations that are connected with children. The agents make
presentations on the dangers of drugs and drug use. Agents
assigned to the program made presentations to over 820 children
and 180 adults just in the month of January 2000.
The education of our children against the use of illegal
drugs is important to the entire United States. If we, as a
country, can eliminate the supply and demand of this evil, we
would be able to prevent the decay or death of our youth.
The Laredo Sector has a history of aggressively pursuing
and supporting technology that will help accomplish the mission
in a safer, more efficient manner. The sector has had great
success with night vision technology through scope trucks,
individual agent night vision goggles, and fixed camera sites
which afford agents the advantage of knowing who and how many
individuals they are encountering and if they are armed.
We must never lose sight of the fact that the ultimate
resource in achieving success is the men and women who are on
the line. The ability to continue to phase in an Operation Rio
Grande is paramount to achieving the success that this sector
and service set out to accomplish since the inception of the
strategy.
On behalf of all the men and women of the U.S. Border
Patrol, I thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have
at this time. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Montoya follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Montoya. I will ask the first
question.
We have this headline--I think you are familiar with it; it
says Drug Traffickers Set Bounty on Agents, offering $200,000.
I guess they were after Border Patrol folks.
What is your response to that particular threat?
Mr. Montoya. Well, we became apprised of the threat, or the
information and the intelligence on threat. We immediately
placed our officers, our agents, on alert. We made contact with
all the law enforcement community, not only in the Laredo
Sector, but also with the Mexican authorities.
This was done and accomplished through our liaison officers
and also through our informants.
We take all threats seriously, whether they are directed at
the Border Patrol or any other law enforcement agency.
Mr. Mica. Doesn't this represent a more brazen threat by
drug traffickers to our agents?
Mr. Montoya. Again, it is very serious. Our agents are
confronted with many types of threatening situations on a daily
basis, and when they hear information or are provided
intelligence that there is someone out there specifically
targeting them or another law enforcement officer, we do
respond; we do take the necessary safety precautions to protect
our agents.
Mr. Mica. It doesn't appear that it is routine operating
procedure for them to almost go public with a bounty on our
Border Patrol agents. Is this a new tactic?
Mr. Montoya. During my 24 years, Mr. Chairman, with the
Border Patrol there have been numerous threats made against law
enforcement agents on the U.S. side; obviously all along the
border, the most infamous obviously being DEA agent Enrique
Camarena. During that time period, we were on a high state of
alert.
Mr. Mica. What about with this threat? Is this something to
take seriously or just a media account?
Mr. Montoya. No, sir. Again, we take all the threats and we
try to validate the information through the use of informants,
through our contacts, throughout all agencies both on the
United States side and the Mexican side.
Mr. Mica. Is this a valid threat?
Mr. Montoya. Sir?
Mr. Mica. You said you try to validate. Is this a valid
threat to our agents?
Mr. Montoya. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. It is. OK.
Do we have any recourse? If somebody harms, kills or maims
one of our agents, do we have a reward system for information
leading to them? What is the reciprocity that we have under
law?
Mr. Montoya. As far as the--excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Go
ahead.
Mr. Mica. I said, are you aware of that?
Mr. Montoya. Yes, sir. As to the incident itself, we do
have the ability to pay reward money for information leading to
the disclosure or the arrest, et cetera, of any individual.
Mr. Mica. What range? Is that sufficient and is it set by
law or is it a discretionary amount that you can determine?
Mr. Montoya. Within my authority, I can only approve up to
$5,000. From there, it has to go up the chain of command.
Mr. Mica. How about DEA, Mr. Ledwith? If somebody comes
after a DEA agent, is there an adequate reward system in place?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir. There is literally nothing we would
not do to recover that person who threatened or harmed a DEA
agent. And yes, sir, there is an ability within the Department
of Justice.
Mr. Mica. What are your limits? Mr. Montoya said $5,000 and
then he needed approval of that, which doesn't appear like much
of a reward.
Mr. Ledwith. I am quite convinced, sir, that if there were
an attack upon a Federal U.S. law enforcement official, we
would be able to get a very significant amount of money offered
as a reward. My limits, I can go to the Department of Justice,
I would think in terms of $500,000 or $1 million would not be
too low.
Mr. Mica. Shouldn't that be extended to our border agents
who are under threat?
Mr. Ledwith. Well, sir, I can't comment directly, but I
would imagine by the time a threat or that kind of situation
arrived in Washington, significant resources would be made
available.
Mr. Mica. Do you know if the Department of Justice has a
policy on this? I just want to see if we have in place a
mechanism to reciprocate. Because for me, this is unprecedented
to have our agents publicly threatened in this fashion and a
bounty put on their heads.
Ms. Warren. I don't know the procedure specifically for the
Border Patrol, but I know with the other agencies there is an
application procedure up through the Attorney General for
amounts of $1 million.
Mr. Mica. But we need to make certain that we have adequate
policy and law in place to make certain that our agents are--I
don't know if we can protect them, but if they are going to
threaten them in this fashion and in some way they are put in
harm's way, we need to be able to retaliate.
Mr. Ledwith, you described an incident and one that
concerns me about I believe it was one of our agents,
surrounded by drug traffickers.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir, I did. It was a DEA special agent
and an FBI special agent assigned to our offices in Mexico,
sir, in November 1999, in Matamoros.
Mr. Mica. This also appears to be a little bit more brazen.
They were very fortunate in that they were not harmed. Do you
see a pattern of more threatening situations to our agents in
that area?
Mr. Ledwith. Our men and women that serve overseas, sir,
sadly I am here to tell you that we have a constant situation
with threats against our men and women overseas, as do many
others.
Mr. Mica. I am interested today in the situation in Mexico.
Mr. Ledwith. I would say, sir, yes, that it appears to be
more brazen.
Mr. Mica. The murder of the police chief seems to be one of
the most emboldened acts I have witnessed. Am I correct in that
they also murdered a previous police chief in that area?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir, you are correct.
Mr. Mica. What about cooperation? Was your agency involved
or the FBI in the recovery of the remains from the operation
inside the Mexican border? Your agents were involved?
Mr. Ledwith. No, sir. That was principally an FBI
operation. We provided some support to them.
Mr. Mica. Are you aware of any pressure to close that
operation down from the Mexicans?
Mr. Ledwith. No, sir, I am not personally aware of any.
Mr. Mica. Are you aware of that operation, Ms. Warren?
Ms. Warren. Somewhat, yes.
Mr. Mica. How would you describe the cooperation of the
Mexican officials in that?
Ms. Warren. The cooperation through Attorney General
Madrazo and the PGR was excellent from the very beginning. The
Mexican media made it very difficult for Attorney General
Madrazo, but he stated publicly that this cooperation would
continue. It was such an important effort; and it did continue.
Mr. Mica. Was there any pressure to close that down?
Ms. Warren. I know of the storm in the Mexican press that
was raised against Attorney General Madrazo, but he withstood
that storm.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Ledwith, did you have a specific
recommendation on certification or decertification of Mexico to
any of your superiors?
Mr. Ledwith. Sir, the method by which we make a report is
to the Department of Justice. We do not make recommendations.
We give a recital, if you will, of the results obtained that
year and the cooperation that we enjoyed.
Mr. Mica. Did you review that report as it was presented to
the Department of Justice?
Mr. Ledwith. I reviewed the report before it left DEA, sir,
en route to the Department of Justice.
Mr. Mica. If I had a copy of that report, would it indicate
that Mexico is fully cooperating?
Mr. Ledwith. It would indicate, sir, that Mexico is
cooperating, but that there are substantial problems.
Mr. Mica. Would you like to comment on what the problem
areas are?
Mr. Ledwith. Well, sir, there would be several areas: the
extradition of people that we have asked to have extradited;
the fact that there has not been a major trafficker arrested,
prosecuted, imprisoned in Mexico in some years; the fact that
the polygraph program with the vetted units was shut down in
August of last year due to difficulties with the procedure; and
the fact that we have had--since 1996, we have not been able to
utilize the so-called ``commuter agents'' to go into Mexico
from the border areas and conduct cooperative and bilateral,
multilateral investigations.
Mr. Mica. What about the progress in allowing our agents to
arm themselves?
Mr. Ledwith. There has not been any progress in that area
that I am aware of, sir.
Mr. Mica. You probably wouldn't get into the maritime
agreement area, would you?
Are you aware of the maritime agreement? I understand an
agreement was signed with basically no terms. Are you familiar
with that, Ms. Warren?
Ms. Warren. Not familiar enough to answer your questions on
that. I know we have had some good maritime cooperative success
in this last year and that the Coast Guard has worked
vigorously to try and develop parallel operational procedures
so that they can work together and hand off these cases as best
as possible; but as to the terms of the agreement, I am not
familiar.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Montoya, dealing with Mexican officials in
your border work, would you describe their actions as fully
cooperating with you in the antinarcotics effort?
Mr. Montoya. It has been demonstrated in the short time
that I have been in Laredo, the last 6 months, we have an
outstanding relationship with the head of the Mexican
Immigration Service, who has jurisdiction for crimes committed
along the immediate border. They act as our go-between with the
other agencies.
We have, as I mentioned in my oral testimony, some
incidents which caused us major concern. With the assistance of
Mr. Gabriel Cortez, who is the director of Mexican immigration
in Nuevo Laredo and the Mexican consul, we were able to go to
the table with these agencies and discuss our concerns in a
mutual arrangement to prevent future incidents.
Mr. Mica. You have only been there 6 months?
Mr. Montoya. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Is the situation over the border getting better
or worse as far as trafficking and violence, in your
observation?
Mr. Montoya. I can speak to our narcotic seizures within
the Laredo Sector. The volume of marijuana in the Laredo Sector
has increased almost 100 percent in just the 4 months of this
fiscal year.
Mr. Mica. Your observation of the situation relating to
trafficking and violence, so the volume has had a 100 percent
increase in a short period of time. What about violence?
Mr. Montoya. We have not had any, at least directed at our
agents, et cetera. However, on the Mexican side there have been
at least two incidents within the last month that caused us
this concern.
Mr. Mica. One final question, Mr. Ledwith. There is a cap
put on DEA agents in Mexico, which I guess is not public
information. Do you think the agency would support a resolution
by Congress or request by Congress to have that cap lifted?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir. There is a cap on the amount of
agents we are allowed to have in Mexico.
Mr. Mica. Given the statement of our United States
Ambassador and appointing a very qualified man, whom we all
know, who basically said the headquarters of world narcotics
trafficking is Mexico; and they imposed a cap a number of years
ago--I am not sure when that was, but at least since I have
been on this subcommittee--is it time to lift that cap?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir, I would say that it would be.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mrs. Mink.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ledwith, we have a burden to try to look at both sides
of this equation, the things that have gone well and are
effective, and weigh it against those things where there have
been major failures; the same thing that a jury would have to
do in finding a preponderance of the evidence, we have to make
that same examination.
In reading some of the materials that have been forwarded
to us, which undoubtedly will be covered by the administration
in explaining whatever decision they arrive at, my question
goes to what if the Congress insists upon decertification, or
what if the administration recommends decertification, what
impact would that have on the ability of your agency to
continue the work that it is now doing in Mexico?
Mr. Ledwith. That's an exceptionally interesting question,
ma'am. It might be presumptuous of me to answer it. On the one
hand, I would hope that this would be a message to the
Government of Mexico to redouble their efforts in many areas. I
would also be concerned that it might adversely impact on DEA's
ability to work within that country due to the reaction of the
Mexican Government.
Mrs. Mink. Is there any intelligence within your agency,
that is examining this issue, and was it included in your
agency's analysis of this problem when it forwarded its
comments to the administration for decisionmaking?
Mr. Ledwith. I do not believe in the comments that we
forward to the Department of Justice on the certification
issue, that that particular issue was addressed. It certainly
is the subject of some debate within DEA.
Mrs. Mink. So the issue is one that has not been weighed in
in terms of impact? We have to take into consideration that it
could go either way? It could assist us in insisting upon
greater cooperation and greater enforcement efforts, or it
could go the other way; there is no real way that we can
determine that in advance?
Mr. Ledwith. I would not be able to advise you as to what
the ultimate reaction of the Mexican Government would be, no,
ma'am.
Mrs. Mink. The next question then is, in one of your
criticisms of the Mexican Government's failures is that they
have not apprehended, arrested, tried or convicted any major
drug trafficker within their country. Is that a true statement,
what you responded to the chairman's inquiry?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir, with the possible exception of the
Amezcua brothers who have been awaiting extradition to the
United States, the Mexican Government has not captured, tried--
--
Mrs. Mink. They have extradited certain individuals to the
United States or allowed their extradition, but they have not,
on their own, tried a major drug trafficker; is that your
answer to the question?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, ma'am. The Mexican nationals who were
extradited to the United States would not be classified as
major drug traffickers. Saying that, the Mexican Government has
not arrested--certainly not tried or convicted--any major drug
traffickers in any way.
Mrs. Mink. How would you explain that and how does that add
to this quantum of mystery of what would happen if we
decertified them? If they are not, even under the optimum
circumstances now of being a major trade partner and having the
protection of NAFTA and all of these other benefits of a
renewed interest of collaboration, how do you explain their
failure to understand the urgency of this issue? And if we did
decertify, isn't it fair to assume that the failure would be
even greater and that this situation would be even more
exacerbated?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, ma'am, I suppose that it might well be.
It would be difficult to arrest less than none.
Mrs. Mink. I get your point.
Now, on the other hand, there is this demonstrated activity
with regard to the eradication of marijuana plants and all of
those efforts with respect to cultivation and activities in
that area, and the report goes on to say that these activities
have greatly enhanced over the past 12 months. Is that your
observation as well?
Mr. Ledwith. I would say that the eradication efforts are
promising, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Mink. As against what occurred in 1998, there has been
vast improvement over the past 12 months?
Mr. Ledwith. There appears to be an improvement in
eradication efforts, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Mink. So it would be fair to say that this is Mexico's
answer to our concerns about drug trafficking, that they are
taking stepped-up measures to eradicate the cultivation,
production and distribution systems of the drugs within their
own country, but that that is about it?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, ma'am, that certainly would be an
effective response to the problem of Mexican marijuana and
Mexican heroin. It in no way impacts on the flow of Colombian
cocaine through Mexico.
Mrs. Mink. Now, that's another issue. I don't think it is
fair to weigh in on Mexico what we have as a separate problem
with Colombia, that we are now trying to deal with separately,
as a separate issue.
While that is true, it travels through Mexico, I think we
have to look at their own individual situation in making an
assessment whether to go forward with decertification or not.
This is an extremely complex issue.
Now, how many DEA and FBI agents are there in Mexico, or
are you not allowed to say?
Mr. Ledwith. I would be able to say that we currently have
almost 45 DEA agents and six FBI agents.
Mrs. Mink. Total? That's all total?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Mink. That's the cap that the chairman referred to?
Mr. Ledwith. We currently have no more than 45 DEA agents
and 6 FBI agents, ma'am.
Mrs. Mink. That sounds like a very minuscule number of
people----
Mr. Ledwith. I should say the six FBI agents----
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. To deal with such an enormous
problem like this.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, ma'am, I would agree with you.
The six FBI agents I referred to are FBI agents involved
working in DEA offices against drugs. There are other FBI
agents in Mexico who work nondrug cases, though.
Mrs. Mink. Given the very limited number of people you have
there, if we decertified, isn't it a reasonable assumption that
none would be allowed in?
Mr. Ledwith. I think that might very well be a reasonable
assumption.
Mrs. Mink. Ms. Warren, on the whole matter of extradition,
I am very much confused. In your testimony you said article 4
of the Mexican penal code has been interpreted to mean that it
was mandatory for the Mexican Government to try its own
citizens.
Ms. Warren. Those were decisions by intermediate level
appellate courts. The issue is now before their highest court,
the Mexican supreme court, for decision; and we hope for a
favorable resolution of that, a resolution that would say that
article 4 does not bar the extradition of the Mexican
nationals, and that should proceed according to the treaty.
Mrs. Mink. Now, if they haven't had any trials, arrests or
trials of any significant drug traffickers within their own
country, to what extent is article 4 a real impediment?
Ms. Warren. They have had and they continue to have
prosecutions under article 4 and under their regular criminal
prosecutions. I agree with Mr. Ledwith, they just haven't had
any prosecutions of any high-level traffickers or of the
leaders of the major organizations.
Mrs. Mink. Do you have an explanation of why that has not
occurred? That is a very troubling point which has been raised
in many hearings last year, in meetings that we had with
leaders in Mexico; and to this date, there has been no
reasonable explanation, and one has to assume that it is
because of political pressures, corruption, whatever other kind
of explanation comes to mind, because no one seems to be able
to pinpoint this difficulty.
Ms. Warren. I am not able to find the one answer to it.
They do have some major traffickers now held for extradition to
the United States. We remain hopeful that those will work and
those will appear in our courtrooms, the Amezcua brothers.
Mrs. Mink. But then they argue that they won't do this
because of our death penalty.
Ms. Warren. No, they are not facing the death penalty.
Mrs. Mink. These individuals are not?
Ms. Warren. No, they are not, but they are facing
substantial time for their trafficking offenses as violations
of U.S. law.
It has been very difficult for the Mexican law enforcement
authorities to locate and arrest the major traffickers. They
receive a great deal of support and assistance from DEA, but
the primary force, of course, is Mexican law enforcement.
President Zedillo and Attorney General Madrazo inherited a very
difficult situation in the level of corruption in law
enforcement in Mexico. It is something that we cannot
understand in the United States.
We go after one bad apple in a giant barrel and we are
outraged that there was one bad apple.
Think of the numbers that they have had to dismiss and how
many more are within their ranks. It makes law enforcement very
difficult.
Mrs. Mink. Would you put on the plus side of the ledger the
fact that they have fired these thousands of individuals that
they have found to be corrupt?
Ms. Warren. Absolutely. It has been an enormous and
courageous undertaking for them to go after that.
Mrs. Mink. Is that a process that has now come to an end
and is subsiding, or are they continuing to go forward with
this internal investigation?
Ms. Warren. No, that is a continuing, ongoing effort, both
in an administrative way to remove them from employment as well
as identifying criminal violations to prosecute those
individuals. It is a commitment that the President and the
Attorney General have made and make publicly again and again.
Mrs. Mink. Do the President and the Attorney General of
Mexico have the power and authority to bring a prosecution
against a major trafficker on their own? And has that been
explored as one way to overcome this inertia?
Ms. Warren. Their legal system is not the same as ours. To
file charges, they have to meet a standard of proof that their
courts judge is an appropriate threshold in order to issue
arrest warrants. They have gotten arrest warrants issued
against some, for instance, the former Governor of the Yucatan
in Quintana Roo. That was a courageous step. They had the
evidence to support it and the arrest warrant issued. He
escaped before they were able to capture him. So they have
tried.
Mrs. Mink. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
You know, Ms. Warren, you sound a little bit depressed.
Last year, I gave a very depressing account of extradition, and
you don't sound like you are getting all that much cooperation.
You outlined again, and it was confirmed by DEA, still we have
not had one major trafficker, Mexican national extradited,
correct?
Ms. Warren. It is discouraging and there were times that we
were on more of an upward trend in our extradition
relationship, and it has certainly flattened out at the moment.
Mr. Mica. We got one about 2 or 3 weeks ago because
extradition was coming up. It was a minor--wasn't it----
Ms. Warren. We have gotten a few recently, correct; but we
are looking for the major cases, and the important ones. The
Mexican authorities and the United States have suffered from
the Mexican court decisions. Both countries are committed to an
independent judiciary and both countries suffer when the courts
don't go exactly our ways.
Mr. Mica. Unfortunately--and I have talked about this
corruption and the corruption has now led to violence--we are
seeing unprecedented violence just in the last year of public
officials, entertainers, law enforcement people slaughtered on
the streets. Unfortunately, this may have to take the route of
what happened in the Mafia in Italy. They became so brazen that
the public took to the streets and demanded--I think you may
have met Pino Arlacchi, the head of the ONDCP, who headed that
effort, and I feel sorry for the Mexicans. This is predictable,
that the corruption would lead to violence and slaughter of
their people; and now that is taking place in great numbers. So
maybe only an outcry from Mexico will make something happen.
The other thing, too, is decertification merely asks
whether the country is fully cooperating to receive U.S. trade,
financial assistance and other benefits that are given by this
country to other countries. That's why it is so important and
that's why I agree with--Senator Helms has said that the
process has not been properly followed by the administration.
Having helped draft it, I think that they have
misinterpreted the intent of that, and it is to get their
attention. I think if you do get their attention on suspending
some support in international financial organizations, then
very quickly we will begin to take action. Unfortunately, it is
taking another route and the violence is now spawning hopefully
some action. Even Mexicans have to be appalled by what has
taken place just recently.
Finally, the ranking member and I, in November, sent to the
President a letter requesting that we have a border coordinator
for the Southwest border. That was based on our visit to the
Southwest border a year ago, when we met with officials, and it
didn't appear like--there were many people trying to do good
jobs, but it didn't appear that we had the coordination. Then
we held a hearing in Washington and then we signed this joint
request.
We haven't had a response back from this request. Has
anyone heard anything about such a proposal and where it is in
the administration? Have you heard anything, Ms. Warren?
Ms. Warren. I am not exactly certain where that proposal
is. I do know that the Department of Justice and the Department
of Treasury together believe that our response, in general, to
the need for greater coordination comes through the Border
Coordination Initiative.
Mr. Mica. Even our Director of ONDCP stated to us, let me
quote, there is no one entity responsible for the coordination
of overall drug efforts along the Southwest border; the primary
factor contributing to the lack of accountability and
coordination of drug control efforts along the Southwest
border. That's what General McCaffrey said to us.
We reviewed the situation out there. We held a hearing
here. We came to this conclusion. We asked for action.
So is there anything you could do with the Attorney
General, with any of your departments, to try to move this
along?
The Border Patrol, I know you are doing the best you think
you can, but we have reviewed this. It has been reviewed by the
national drug czar and others, and I still don't see anybody in
control.
Ms. Warren. Again, the Departments of Justice and Treasury
believe that the Border Coordination Initiative is the
response, and I would like to be able to provide you with those
materials that explain that initiative and how it responds.
Mr. Mica. What I may do then, if you will tell them, is
when their appropriations measure comes up, I am going to see
what I can do to block their appropriations this year until we
get some action on that.
So we will convey that by messenger and letter, because
this is long overdue.
We are going to go back to the Southwest border. We were in
El Paso. We are going to San Diego and that border crossing on
Tuesday. We don't have votes on Monday and Tuesday. We will
review the situation again, but it still appears that we have
not had action where we have requested that.
Mrs. Mink, did you have anything further?
Mrs. Mink. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The best solution, I think,
in the appropriations process is to direct that part of the
money being allocated for the initiative be used for the
establishment of a coordinator.
Mr. Mica. Well, whatever it takes, and I am willing to work
with you. I always like to just stop the train and see if that
gets their attention.
Mrs. Mink. I am not for stopping the train. I am for taking
my slice out of it.
Mr. Mica. Well, we will do whatever it takes. I thank the
three witnesses for being with us this morning and also for
your efforts on behalf of the citizens in trying to bring some
of this situation relating to Mexico's drug trafficking and
border control, the whole problem we face.
We thank you for your efforts and excuse you at this time.
The next panel is Mr. Philip Jordan. He is a DEA, Drug
Enforcement Administration, former director of EPIC, the El
Paso Intelligence Center. He is now retired, and we have asked
him to come and give us his observations; sometimes those in
official capacity are a little bit constrained.
And we also have some new players in this effort, so today
we will hear from someone who is a veteran and a retired EPIC
Intelligence Center director.
Mr. Jordan, maybe you could just stay standing. If you
don't mind, I will swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Mica. The gentlemen has answered in the affirmative.
Welcome to our subcommittee.
We won't run a clock on you. If you have anything you would
like, as far as data, information, background, to submit for
the record, we will be glad to do that upon request.
Mr. Jordan, you are recognized. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP JORDAN, DEA (RETIRED), FORMER DIRECTOR OF
EPIC
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Distinguished Congressmen, I want to thank you for inviting
and allowing me the opportunity to speak before this
distinguished subcommittee. My remarks will be brief and from
the heart.
I was born in El Paso, TX, and raised approximately five
blocks from the United States-Mexican border. I do want to
state something for the record. I am not here representing DEA.
I have a high respect for the men and women of DEA, for which I
worked for 31\1/2\ years.
I gave over 30 years of service to the DEA, and Mexico has
been part of the fabric of my very being. And by the way, with
the political atmosphere that's out there today in regards to
religion, I am a Catholic.
I am very familiar with the Juarez-El Paso drug
transhipment corridor, but rather than being here and
representing DEA, which I am not, I would like to believe that
I am here representing my neighbors in Plano, TX, of which we
have had over 50 heroin overdose deaths in the Metroplex,
including about 20 in Plano, where I presently reside. These
are overdose deaths from black tar heroin, coming from the
country of Mexico.
My testimony today is not based on abstractions, nor is it
based on racism or hatred of Mexico. I speak from experience,
and this experience is of a Mexico looted by a corrupt ruling
class that is addicted to drug money, an antidemocratic elite
that has for years oppressed, murdered and terrorized its own
citizens, including Kiki Camarena, who was born in Mexico.
The question before this committee should not be whether
Mexico has earned the right to be certified this year for
cooperation in the war on drugs. The question is: Why, given
its record, has Mexico ever been certified?
You saw my former associate walk the edges when you asked
him, Mr. Chairman, what does DEA recommend? Of course, DEA does
not recommend certification, but we cannot say it for the
record, or they cannot say it for the record.
I am talking about the real agents that work with the DEA.
In this matter, I can speak from my 30 years of experience in
Federal drug law enforcement. Before my retirement, I was the
Director of the El Paso Intelligence Center, the very core of
our government's intelligence and knowledge about the drug
world. In that capacity, I knew a lot of what our government
knew as it related to drug intelligence. I helped brief our
leading officials on our intelligence information, information
that wasn't acknowledged. In fact, the very unit that assembled
this type of intelligence and was responsible for the
briefings, from the latest intelligence that I have it has now
been disbanded, because it was continuing to expose corruption
in Mexico.
I witnessed Mexico being recertified year after year, while
the drug cartels grew in power and wealth until they finally
seemed to dwarf the very Government of Mexico.
It is useful to keep in mind that Mexico earns
approximately $8 billion a year from oil production, its major
single legal export. Yet Mexico earns approximately $30 billion
a year from drugs.
To put this in perspective, our 1995 bailout of the Mexican
economy could have been financed by the Mexican Government,
without borrowing from the United States, by simply dipping
into the Nation's drug revenues. I firmly believe that a strong
possibility exists that the Mexican economy would probably
collapse without the infusion of drug money. I do not doubt
that the leaders of our government are cognizant of this
prospect.
The drug black market is no longer a marginal part of
Mexico, but has become the very foundation which supports the
Mexican Government. The rulers of Mexico survive and profit by
selling the United States death on the installment plan. This
time each year, as Congress debates whether to certify Mexico,
events are staged by the United States and Mexican Governments
to prove cooperation in the drug wars.
Several years ago, the Mexican Government gave us a bone,
an expendable Juan Garcia Abrego, an individual that while I
was head of the DEA in Dallas, we had him indicted from a Fort
Worth police investigation. He was the head of the Gulf cartel,
who, I firmly believe, failed to leave his government bribe
payments at the highest levels, and this was mainly due to the
increased pressure that he was receiving from the Juarez
cartel.
The following year, Mexico arrested the general, Jesus
Rebollo, their drug czar and also a paid employee of the Juarez
cartel, a man whose corrupt past was known to DEA, at least our
DEA officers in Mexico.
This year it was the joint FBI-Mexican Government mass
grave excavation in Juarez that resulted in uncovering the
remains of nine men and two dogs. Eight of these victims were
allegedly murdered by the FBI's own Mexican federal police
informant.
Meanwhile, the volume of drugs crossing the United States-
Mexican border increases. The street value of drugs declines
and the U.S. drug problem continues to grow. If the Mexican
Government continues to cooperate as vigorously as it has in
the past, the price of drugs on our streets may easily drop to
the same price as lettuce.
This claim of cooperation is simply--I don't want to say it
is a lie, but not true. Cartel bosses, the drug lords, thrive
throughout Mexico with impunity; and somebody already stated
that. Recently, a leader of the Guadalajara cartel was
discovered to be renting a mansion from the Mexican Attorney
General's office. Raul Salinas, brother of the previous Mexican
President, was discovered to have funneled hundreds of millions
of dollars from drug profits to a Swiss bank account. These
moneys were laundered through a New York bank that did not even
blink at the large money transactions.
Our government wants the American people to believe that
while he was in office, former President Carlos Salinas was too
busy to notice his brother's illicit activities, and the story
continues.
Why do we go through this annual exercise of futility
called certification? Is this a simple, pious gesture of no
real content because matters of state override enforcement of
our drug laws? Should we abandon it? Maybe we should just face
reality.
We share a 2,000-mile border with a nation where leadership
at the highest level is deeply mixed with the drug business; a
government that oppresses its own citizens, including murdering
countless people because of the lucrative drug business. It is
estimated that each year approximately 1 million of its own
citizens--men, women and children--give their message to
decertify Mexico by fleeing to the United States, partly to
escape the violence associated with the drug business. This is
a clear message from their own people that Mexico should not be
certified.
But if we are going to continue this practice called
``certification,'' let's at least bargain for something
substantial that will help the people of both countries. You
heard testimony here today where Mexico will not extradite any
major drug lord to the United States. They are not going to
extradite the hand that feeds them to the United States.
How about asking for a yearly quota of the drug lords in
payment for certification? This human product will not be hard
to find since they are currently living in mansions in Tijuana,
Mexico City, Guadalajara; and they often carry police
credentials given to them by the Mexican Government.
Let's tell the American people the truth. The Mexican
Government is corrupt and fattened by drug revenues. The
Mexican Government is helping to poison our people and crush
its own people. Our deliberate lying about this is killing
people in both nations; they are victims of a deadly fiction of
our foreign policy, and if we do this one thing, we will
benefit the people of both nations. Americans and Mexicans have
made long strides toward our deepest democratic belief--
government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
I will be happy to answer any questions, and I hope that I
was politically correct.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Jordan. When did you leave DEA?
Mr. Jordan. 1996.
Mr. Mica. You have pretty much followed the situation then
as a retired official since then?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Do you still live along the border?
Mr. Jordan. I was born in El Paso, TX, and I am now in
Plano, TX. Plano, TX, by the way, was where we had that influx
of heroin overdose deaths.
Mr. Mica. Primarily among young people?
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Mica. We have had the same thing, Colombian heroin
coming through the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and into my area, so
I am aware of a bit of the same problem, different routing.
So since 1996 you said you have been a pretty keen
observer, stay in touch and you feel that the corruption has
spread over is it about the same from what you're hearing and
what you're observing with the Mexican officials?
Mr. Jordan. It continues to increase. It continues to
spread like a cancer; it continues to penetrate our borders.
Mr. Mica. You also claim that drug money is a source of a
great deal of income for the government and for officials. What
do you base that on?
Mr. Jordan. Well, the large payments that are documented in
intelligence, the large volume of money that exchanges hands
from the drug traffickers. For example, it was mentioned
earlier, you have to separate the Colombia cocaine coming
through Mexico. The Colombians have to pay the Mexicans to
allow that cocaine to come through Mexico to the United States.
So there is an infusion of money that has to be paid to
government officials in order to allow that transshipment of
the cocaine from Colombia to Mexico to the United States. This
is strictly from 30 years of experience.
Mr. Mica. What do you think that it is going to take to get
Mexico's attention to deal with this problem?
Mr. Jordan. Well, I firmly believe that decertification for
1 year would send a very strong message to Mexico, and they
would get the message that we mean business. You know, one
thing that would happen here is that we would be helping both
countries. It would not just be penalizing Mexico, it would be
helping them.
Mr. Mica. Maybe you heard my comments during my opening
statement that Mexico has even corrupted the decertification
process. They have hired top lobbyist guns in Washington and
Madison Avenue types to gloss over problems and present a good
face, masking the narcotics trafficking problem that they have.
Even as Chair of this subcommittee and with others, we are
fighting a losing battle because they bought off the
opposition.
Mr. Jordan. It is very hard to compete.
Mr. Mica. Even in Washington at this level.
I don't mean that they paid them, but I mean that they have
hired the top guns. They have paraded people down there and
shown them only the good side, and they have done a Madison
Avenue snow job on the rest of the folks. In the meantime, we
have given them incredible trade benefits, unprecedented in any
country. In fact, we have gone from a positive trade balance to
one of the most negative, exceeded by maybe only China, not to
mention loss of jobs and loss of economic opportunity plus
degradation of the environment. They don't care about labor
laws or OSHA or environmental protection, and they take all of
this advantage and give us narcotics in return.
Is that a fair observation?
Mr. Jordan. It is a very fair observation. Very fair, yes,
sir.
Mr. Mica. It is very frustrating because the process
certifies that they are fully cooperating and makes them
eligible for U.S. benefits. They have even so contorted the
process that they have convinced some people that there should
be an international certification, or inter-American
certification process, which is one of the most unbelievable
distortions of denying U.S. sovereignty and who gets these
trade benefits or financial assistance.
Mr. Jordan. One thing, Mr. Chairman, that I am sure you are
aware of is that every year since certification was approved,
Mexico will do a show-and-tell-type thing.
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. Right before February-March.
Mr. Mica. Exactly. We have seen that with one bone thrown
recently, coming up with signing up a maritime agreement, which
has basically no terms, and a couple of other hollow gestures,
which is unfortunate.
I think the only thing that is going to resolve it is more
violence in Mexico and the Mexicans rise up and throw out the
corrupt officials and demand a change because they have even
undermined the process of certification for the United States
of America. That is how bad it has gotten.
Mr. Jordan. That's correct. And I can tell you, sir, that
Mexican comandantes, including one we called him an
untouchable, told Sam Dillon of the New York Times, I believe--
exactly how every year they are supposed to do the right thing
at a certain specific time, and then as soon as certification
is approved, it is business as usual. I know DEA knows it, but
I don't know if the DEA can do anything about it.
Mr. Mica. I am also told that some of the officials that
are removed are replaced with other officials; and we had a
report, a GAO report, that some of the officials that have been
removed are just moved to other positions.
Mr. Jordan. That's correct. I heard a figure of 4,000,
4,100 were fired. What you did not hear was how many were
rehired.
Mr. Mica. Yes. We have a study that confirms exactly that,
and you are saying you've seen the same thing?
Mr. Jordan. That's accurate.
Mr. Mica. It is unfortunate, too, that corruption seems to
continue even at the highest levels--cabinet, even Office of
the President. Would that be your assumption?
Mr. Jordan. Yes. I don't have any knowledge of the current
President of Mexico, but in previous administrations----
Mr. Mica. There has been at least one official implicated
in his office, and I think the investigation was closed down.
Mr. Jordan. Right.
Mr. Mica. Are you aware of the amounts of money that have
been attempted to be laundered? We had a former Customs agent
testify before our subcommittee about a year ago, and he
testified that a Mexican general had attempted to launder $1.1
billion in the United States.
Are you aware of any corruption in the military?
Mr. Jordan. Oh, yes. I am familiar with the corruption in
the military from day one. In past operations, to give an
example, we would call the Mexican Federal judicial police to
assist us in an investigation in Mexico; and if it was a large
operation, we would have to call the military. Well, in a
couple of instances the Mexican military would notify the
principals, and obviously everybody would escape, just like
this Governor escaped. I am sure that the Governor knew that he
was going to be, ``arrested.''
Mr. Mica. We all knew that, and we held a hearing and we
cited evidence that we had from a trip that we made about the
Quintana Roo Governor, Mario Villanueva-Madrid, being involved
up to his eyeballs just before he left office; and because they
have that immunity while in office, he slipped through
everybody's hands and he disappeared.
So you think that is pretty much an inside job, too?
Mr. Jordan. Yes. That is why you never see any of these
officials arrested or tried in Mexico.
Mr. Mica. About the amount, is that farfetched, the billion
dollars? Were you hearing large, significant amounts? I guess
we know that the Salinas brother ran off with in excess of $100
million?
Mr. Jordan. Yes. I am not saying that all of it is drug
related, but there is a close correlation there between the
Garcia organization and the Salinas relationship.
Mr. Mica. You keep current with some of your former
colleagues in DEA and some of the other enforcement agencies?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, I do.
Mr. Mica. Are they reporting back the same type of activity
you have described to us today?
Mr. Jordan. Worse activity in Mexico than ever, including
the violence.
Mr. Mica. It has shifted from corruption to violence and at
unparalleled levels. Just the brazen murder of the police
chief--I guess it was just within hours of the departure of the
President, according to this report in the Washington Post. So
it has gotten pretty much out of hand.
Mr. Jordan. That was a clear message to the President of
Mexico that his antidrug speech was not welcomed in that part
of town because they immediately executed the police chief. I
mean----
Mr. Mica. Well, we appreciate your coming forward today and
providing us with your insight. Sometimes it is difficult to
get people--as you saw, we had government witnesses here--and
we appreciate your stepping forward and also your perception
over a number of decades with the agency. We thank you for your
service. We appreciate your testimony.
Do we have an agreement on leaving the record open for 1
week? By unanimous consent, the record of this hearing will be
left open for additional questions.
There being no further business before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, this
hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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