[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R&D PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-168
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-312 WASHINGTON : 2000
______
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent)
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Kristine McElroy, Professional Staff Member
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 22, 2000................................... 1
Statement of:
Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office, accompanied by Sushil K. Sharma,
Associate Director, Special Studies and Evaluations,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office; and Weihsueh Chiu, Evaluator,
Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and
International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office..................................................... 4
Spencer, Carmen, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense
Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Page
Stoutland, Director, Chemical and Biological
Nonproliferation Program, U.S. Department of Energy; Donald
M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and Robert M. Burnham, Section Chief,
Domestic Terrorism-Counterterrorism Planning Section,
Federal Bureau of Investigation............................ 26
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office, prepared statement of........... 7
Kerr, Donald M., Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, prepared statement of....................... 60
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Spencer, Carmen, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense
Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, prepared
statement of............................................... 29
Stoutland, Page, Director, Chemical and Biological
Nonproliferation Program, U.S. Department of Energy,
prepared statement of...................................... 51
Watson, Dale, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of..... 72
COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R & D PROGRAMS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays and Blagojevich.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R. Nicholas
Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert Newman, Kristine
McElroy, and Thomas Costa, professional staff members; Jason M.
Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Earley
Green, minority staff assistant.
Mr. Shays. I would like to call this committee meeting to
order and to say that I have a great job being able to serve in
this capacity, and I really appreciate the witnesses that are
going to be participating today. It is a very important issue
and we appreciate the good work of everyone involved. The
purpose of this hearing is just to help us sort out where we
are at and where we need to go and where we can improve, and
that is ultimately the objective of everyone here.
This Friday, in Connecticut, municipal, State and Federal
emergency management officials will conduct a tabletop exercise
to plan their response to a fictional but all too plausible
incident of terrorism involving the use of chemical and
biological weapons.
Much of the technology they will discuss--detectors,
protective gear, and decontamination equipment--is the producte
of research and development [R&D], begun 10 to 15 years ago.
Today, we ask how effectively today's Federal R&D efforts are
focused on the needs of local first responders to meet
tomorrow's terrorism threats.
According to the General Accounting Office [GAO], research
and development of non-medical technologies to meet chemical
and biological threats is being conducted by several military
and civilian agencies. In looking at four major R&D programs,
GAO found all four are working on biological agent detectors,
three are developing chemical detection and identification
capability, and three are pursuing modeling and dispersal
simulation. GAO found efforts to avoid duplication in these R&D
programs informal and inconsistent.
As we learned in our previous hearings, terrorism may know
no boundaries, but bureaucratic barriers can be impervious to
the need for interagency coordination and cooperation. The risk
of overlap, waste, or missed opportunities to fill
technological gaps is compounded by faulty or dated threat
assessments. According to GAO, ``Several programs do not
formally incorporate existing information on chemical and
biological threats or needed capabilities in deciding what
research and development projects to fund.''
If the threat doesn't drive R&D commitments, what does?
Critical decisions are being made today that will determine
whether local police, firefighters, and emergency medical
personnel will have the technology they need to confront the
next generation of terrorism. Our witnesses this morning make
many of those decisions, or are in a position to influence
those who do. We look to them for assurances that Federal
research and development programs will be effectively
coordinated and efficiently run.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Our first panel is members of the GAO: Kwai-
Cheung Chan, Director, National Security and International
Affairs Division; Dr. Sushil K. Sharma, Associate Director,
National Security and International Affairs Division; and
Weihsueh Chiu, also from GAO.
I believe we have just one testimony and that is from you,
Mr. Chan.
Mr. Chan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. We are happy to have you here, as always.
Mr. Chan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Pardon me. I need to administer the oath. I wish
I could just swear you in at the beginning of the year and just
call it quits from then on.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record all three witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
So we welcome your testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF KWAI-CHEUNG CHAN, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND
EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL
K. SHARMA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND WEIHSUEH CHIU, EVALUATOR,
SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Chan. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our
report on the coordination of Federal non-medical research and
development programs addressing chemical and biological
threats. We examined four programs which conduct non-medical
R&D. These programs focus on developing systems and
technologies for detecting, identifying, protecting, and
decontaminating against chemical and biological agents.
These programs are, one, DOD's Chemical and Biological
Defense Program which was established under the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994; the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense
Program, established in 1996; three, the Department of Energy's
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, established
in 1997 in response to the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act passed by Congress in 1996; and, four, the
Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by an
interagency Technical Support Working Group [TSWG].
I will discuss the following three issues. First, what
processes are used to decide how to invest funds in R&D
activities? Second, what similarities exist among Federal
programs that conduct R&D in this area? Finally, I will present
how these programs are coordinated in the activities.
Before I discuss the results, let me briefly describe the
context. Subsequent to the gulf war, concerns about the
possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both
military and civilian settings led Congress and Federal
agencies to implement several new or expanded programs. Overall
funding in this area has increased significantly in recent
years.
In addition, today several civilian and military agencies
are conducting R&D designed to develop equipment to counter
these threats. Total non-medical R&D funding in this area has
increased from $76.5 million in fiscal year 1996 to a projected
amount of nearly $190 million for fiscal year 2001, an increase
of over 140 percent in 6 years.
Let me turn to our findings. First, it is important to note
that developing technology through R&D can be a lengthy
process, sometimes extending to 10 years or more. Hence, it
often does not offer a solution to immediate needs. To
effectively plan and implement chemical and biological defense
R&D, three key steps are to, one, identify, validate and
prioritize chemical and biological threats; delineate the
capabilities needed to address these threats; and allocate
program resources to activities that develop those
capabilities.
Assessing threats may involve multiple dimensions, such as
which particular chemical or biological agent might be used,
how they may be delivered, and who might be the perpetrators.
Delineating capability requires risk-based assessment of what
specific capabilities are needed to address the threat.
Before allocating program resources to R&D, one must
evaluate the extent to which existing technology can address
immediate needs and then identify gaps. R&D activities that are
conducted outside this framework can carry the risk of
developing a system that is technology-driven and not threat-
driven, or one that users do not want or need. We have
previously reported that civilian programs to combat terrorism
do not follow these steps. Specifically, we recommended that a
national level comprehensive threat and risk assessment to
combat terrorism be done.
Second, we found that these programs have several
similarities. For instance, all of them conduct applied
research and develop prototype equipment to demonstrate the
practical utility of proposed technologies. Two of the programs
focus on threats to the military, and the other two focus on
threats to civilians.
However, the military and civilian user communities are
concerned about many of the same chemical and biological
agents, such as nerve agents, and possible perpetrators, such
as terrorists. In addition, we found that these programs are
seeking to develop many of the same capabilities, such as
detection and identification of biological agents.
Furthermore, in some instances the technologies they are
pursuing are similar. Examples of this include mass
spectroscopy and flow cytometry for detecting bio agents. We
also found that in some cases these programs contract with the
same laboratories to perform the same research and development
work.
Finally, I will discuss the extent of coordination among
these programs. Although the four programs we examined
currently use both formal and informal mechanisms for
coordination, we found several problems that may hamper their
coordination efforts.
First, participation in coordination meetings is
inconsistent. For instance, sometimes they do not include
representatives of the civilian user community. Second, program
officials cite a lack of comprehensive information on which
chemical and biological threats to the civilian population are
most important and what capabilities for responding to these
threats are most needed.
Third, programs which are growing rapidly, such as the
Department of Energy's program, do not formally incorporate
existing information on chemical and biological threats or
needed capabilities in deciding which R&D projects to fund.
Without effective coordination among these agencies, R&D
efforts might be duplicative, resulting in waste, and important
capability gaps might not be addressed.
In summary, basic information is needed to compare the
goals and objectives of the various program activities to
better assess whether overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for
collaboration exist. Much of this basic information, beginning
with a comprehensive assessment of the threat and the risk,
does not yet exist.
This concludes my formal statement, and we will be happy to
answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chan follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I would like to just ask you if the solutions
are administrative or legislative to improving the
coordination? And my second followup question is have we
legislatively kind of reinforced the lack of coordination?
Mr. Chan. I think over the years, since 1993, beginning
with the bottom-up review, Secretary Aspin had noted this as
one of those four major threats that is to be recognized. And
there are a number of laws that have been passed over the years
to encourage such activities, not only to provide threat and
risk assessment as in the case that is directed, I believe, as
Public Law 105-261, that the FBI does go and demonstrate the
methodology in assessing threats and risk assessment, as well
as the formulation of a number of these programs, as I stated
in my oral statement, that are encouraged by Congress over the
years to really develop these programs and try to, in fact,
encourage them to address this threat.
Mr. Shays. But my sense is that you are not seeing the
coordination you want to see, correct?
Mr. Sharma. If I could just expand on to this, I think on
paper the----
Mr. Shays. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chan, you sounded to
me like Alan Greenspan then. I was trying to figure out what
the answer was to my question there.
Mr. Chan. I hope I am much younger.
I believe that, in fact, legislatively there has been a lot
of action taken. Congress had encouraged them to do that, but
nevertheless I think we are still finding problems out there.
Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
Yes?
Mr. Sharma. I think the coordination mechanisms on pieces
of paper do exist. However, one of the problems we are seeing
here is that no one is specifically responsible for ensuring
that duplication would not occur, or in cases where duplication
has occurred, nobody has the responsibility for saying no, or
nobody is in charge of ensuring that if there are some specific
gaps that exist, they do get addressed through the R&D
programs.
Mr. Shays. Well, that is a pretty serious comment. It is
helpful. I think we all experience this, but in my own office
if three people are responsible for it, no one is responsible.
So I always in the end say if this doesn't turn out the way it
should, it is your fault, and I will point to one person. I
might put it in the positive, but the bottom line is I always
have one person ultimately responsible.
Your point is we don't have one person ultimately
responsible, which begs the next question. Is that because no
one wants to have to choose who ultimately is responsible or it
is difficult to decide who should be?
Mr. Chan. Well, I think in the past they believed there is
a demarcation between the military needs versus the civilian
terrorism needs.
Mr. Shays. Say that again.
Mr. Chan. There seems to be in the past, I think, that each
organization pursued their area according to their expertise.
What I am trying to say is that the military traditionally had
concentrated on the battlefield threat from nation states.
However, over time, the concern about terrorism against the
military are also increasing.
So while the threat itself is similar and overlap, the
priority in addressing them might be different. There are
common threats now.
Mr. Shays. Is this the concept of the stovepipe view of
their mission?
Mr. Chan. Well, that is a good way to put it, yes.
Mr. Shays. But I still need an answer to that question, and
then I am going to turn to staff to ask some questions and I
would like to listen to your responses and then I may jump back
in. But, ultimately, I am assuming, Mr. Chan, that you agree
with Dr. Sharma's assessment.
Given what Dr. Sharma said, do you think one person or one
agency should be held accountable for the coordination of this
effort?
Mr. Chiu. The National Academy of Sciences in looking at
coordination of R&D has recommended that in cases where
multiple agencies are conducting R&D, there should be a lead
agency who is responsible for leading that coordination effort.
Mr. Shays. And have they suggested who it should be?
Mr. Chiu. They haven't addressed it in this particular
arena. They addressed it on a broader level.
Mr. Shays. That is helpful. Thank you very much.
I am going to have both Larry Halloran, the majority staff
counsel, and David Rapallo, the minority staff counsel, as some
questions.
Larry.
Mr. Halloran. In your statement, you mentioned an
alternative to a threat-driven R&D system was a technology-
driven one. Did you come across an example of a technology that
was kind of driving its own development process that had no
user at the other end, a gizmo nobody asked for?
Mr. Chan. Well, I I can approach it from the view that in
the Department of Energy, when the program was in place the
approach that was taken was looking at ways to maximize the
utility and capability of the scientists that are there, how
best to use them. And so in defining what the threat is and
then see what the needs are, it went in a different direction,
which is to optimize the utility of the people and their
expertise.
Now, it may eventually converge to the same point, but
nevertheless I think----
Mr. Halloran. With a lot of luck.
Mr. Chan [continuing]. Our view is that it should start
from a threat-driven approach, and then you assess the risk,
then you prioritize the capability you need to achieve, and
then ultimately decide where to go. It is a process issue that
we are raising here.
Mr. Halloran. Right, and let's stay with the process. I
know you didn't make formal recommendations in the report, but
here you can. What would you see as a mechanism that might be
used to develop requirements on the civilian side? I know DOD
has a fairly complex requirements iteration process, and the
civilian R&D side doesn't seem to have that. Is there a
paradigm out there for coordination and for the requirements
development process that they might look to?
Mr. Chan. Well, I think the first observation one would
make is that in DOD such a process is pretty well in place over
time. I mean, this is something that they are used to, not only
in addressing threats, but also developing a strategy by which
you set requirements and the mission needs, as well as
examining near-term, mid-term and far-term capability that
might be needed, and then ultimately come out with so-called
science and technology objectives, and so on. So the process
itself within DOD is pretty well established.
With the civilian side, this is a very different demand to
really try to figure out where to go. First of all, in the
national response system under EPA in addressing chemical
accidents both on the mobile and stationary side--that means
transportation where you have accidents with chemicals--you do
have the local emergency planning team there, and first
responders, and so on.
Now, there is sort of an infrastructure available
organizationally. Whether they are well trained to address not
only chemical accidents, but all the way to the chemical
agents, which is like warfare, and biological agents, that is
clearly something new. And it is done in such a way that has
always been with multiple-agency involvement, from the
Department of Justice, involving the FBI, to EPA, to the
cleanup problems, to even national labs doing analysis to
figure out to what degree the civilian population might be
affected if this happens. But it is not a very top-down way to
approach the issue. So I think, you know, they are beginning to
try to figure out how to do that better.
Mr. Halloran. One final question. You noted in your
statement and in the report that you didn't see much success,
maybe some effort in involving civil users in the coordination
process. What was the reluctance or what, in your view, caused
that to not work? They just didn't think of it, or they tried
and failed?
Mr. Sharma. One of the things that DOE officials told us
the reason that, you know--I mean, they gave us two reasons,
essentially, that nobody has done the threat assessment, and as
far as the users are concerned they really don't know what they
want, unlike DOD users.
I think it is partially true, but not correct in the sense
that when you think about the civilian and military threats,
there are artificially created boundaries. You do need some
common things, such as detectors to detect what agents
individuals have been exposed to, collective and individual
protection systems, and decontamination systems. So these are
sort of generic kinds of things, and DOD has years of
experience.
Now, users, are very different. They are coming from
different States, you know. They are first responders, police,
firemen, and so on and so forth. But, basically, everybody has
awareness within those three categories of what do they need.
What DOE has not done is to make an effort to go beyond what
their jurisdiction, which is, you know, they are supposed to do
R&D and, you know, they are independent, instead of making an
effort to try to reach them and try to do a systematic need
assessment, as well as recognizing that R&D does not offer any
immediate solution. So you must do an assessment of the
available technology and say to the users, look, for specific
threats for the time being you could use ``x,'' ``y'' and
``z,'' and here are some of the gaps that none of these
currently available technologies could offer. Therefore, we are
going to do the R&D.
So what I am saying is that DOE has to do two things. They
have to do an outreach to the users and do some education at
the same time in terms of what is available and what is not
available, what they can use and work on, and go from there.
Mr. Halloran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
I will turn to Dave Rapallo.
Mr. Rapallo. With the varied types of end users on the
civilian side, what are some ways that agencies could solicit
requirement information and other types of information from the
end users?
Mr. Sharma. I think one of the processes is followed by
TSWG, and they have a process whereby they invite responders
from each State and it is an open meeting. That is one such
area where DOE can expand on. I mean, it is not that there are
no mechanisms available or it is impossible to do.
Mr. Chan. But I think before you do that, you need to
provide what are the likely threats to those people so that
they can understand what they are. And, second, what are the
priorities which ones are the most important ones. And, three,
what kind of capability gaps do they have now in addressing
those possible threats, and the likelihood of these threats and
the lethality of these threats, and ultimately how best to be
informed.
That way, they can say, hey, we don't have anything to do
this, OK? So either you go out and say, OK, do we have current
capability to address that or do we need to develop some kind
of R&D program for a system or develop a technology by doing
so.
I think the reason why we keep raising the question about
the threats assessment is that we are seeing a tremendous
overlap between the military side and the civilian side. There
is no way to distinguish pretty soon, particularly in the
chemical and biological arena. So in that case, the only real
difference you find is the selection of the agents that might
be of concern to the domestic side, and the priorities might be
quite different than the military use of such weapons of mass
destruction.
So they are different, except the threats are similar. And
then I think with the knowledge the users have, that way at
least they can sort of react to it, because if you go out there
and ask them now, most likely they would just look at the
current stuff based on the experience they have with chemical
accidents.
Mr. Rapallo. I just have one followup. Do you know the
status of ongoing efforts for threat assessment at the civilian
agencies, at FBI and other agencies?
Mr. Chan. Yes. I think Public Law 105-261 which I commented
on before directed the FBI to do a risk and threat assessment,
and do some demonstrations. I think that is sort of the
beginning of it. What we are looking for is ways to prioritize
and then ultimately determine the capability and needs, and
then develop future R&D programs out of that effort.
Mr. Sharma. But we don't know whether or not they have
actually done that.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. I am not hearing you. Could you
speak a little more into the mic?
Mr. Sharma. Although the public act requires them to do it,
our understanding is that they have not done that, and perhaps
you can ask the FBI when they come next what their road map is
with regard to the threat assessment.
Mr. Rapallo. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. What will be the effect on chemical and
biological defense projects if DOD and DOE merge their R&D road
maps? What will be the effect?
Mr. Sharma. I think if they do merge, one of the things
will be that you will identify right away what are some of the
projects that are duplicative, and you could then minimize or
eliminate the duplication, especially if it is not planned
duplication. And you could then curtail waste and use those
resources to address more important questions that are not
currently being addressed.
Mr. Shays. Did any of you look at how civilians view the
technology, versus the military, the users? Do the civilians,
for instance, have a lower tolerance for equipment functioning
a certain way versus the military?
Mr. Chan. Well, we did a study about 4 years ago. You are
taxing my memory now. What we found, of course, is that on the
civilian side they are less aware of the possible agents that
could be used. And, second, they really have to rely on
expertise that is in EPA, such as to identify agents. And often
they are not really trained to know what to do. I am talking
about, given the incident occurs, what follows. That is where
it is wanting often.
Mr. Shays. What would be the most important question I
could ask each of the next panelists?
Mr. Chan. The most important question?
Mr. Shays. Yes. I am trying to get to the bottom line.
Mr. Chan. I think the most important one is really ask them
not to look from the agency's perspective what they are doing,
but rather have them address it from the people's perspective
in terms of the community; given these kinds of threats, what
kinds of concerns they may have and what kinds of things they
might need.
Instead of looking at it from the agency perspective, I
think you have to sort of look at it from the user perspective
because it is affecting the community and I think that needs to
be represented in some form. But before they can respond to
that, they need to understand what potential threat there might
be. So you need to lay that out first and say, hey, this is
what happens to you if this happens, then what would your needs
be.
I think you get a lot of statements about this is my agency
and this is how we are addressing that issue rather than----
Mr. Shays. So, in one sense, it is asking each of them who
their customer is?
Mr. Chan. Exactly.
Mr. Shays. And have them define to me who their customer
is.
Mr. Chan. That is the quick and short answer.
Mr. Shays. That is helpful.
Is there any comment that any of the three of you would
like to make before we get on to the next panel?
Mr. Sharma. One of the questions I would ask is how is the
nature of the threat different between the military and
civilian. An agent is an agent, and while the magnitude of the
effect might be different in a battlefield scenario versus in a
civilian exposure, basically you are dealing with the same
category of agents. And how that threat would impact the R&D
efforts--a second question is while DOD has been doing a lot of
research over the years and has developed many technologies,
and that expertise ought to be utilized and have some effect,
positive contribution, on the civilian side. But maybe civilian
agencies have done some assessment and they find what DOD has
done is good for nothing. I don't know, but you could ask them.
Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
Mr. Chiu. Following up on the customer issue, how they are
going to ensure--once some of this threat assessment and risk
assessment comes out, how will they ensure linkages between the
various elements, between the threat and developing the
capabilities and the R&D, because one of the things that we
found was that there seemed to be some gaps in establishing
those linkages.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
We have been joined by the ranking member, Mr. Blagojevich,
who serves on our Armed Services Committee as well.
I think you wanted me to go on to the next panel.
Mr. Blagojevich. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK, so I thank all of you. As always, you
provide very helpful information to our committee and a nice
introduction to the next panel, so I thank you very much.
Mr. Chan. Thank you.
Mr. Chiu. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Let me just call the next panel and then I am
just going to take care of some housekeeping.
We have Mr. Carmen J. Spencer, Director of Chemical and
Biological Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I might
just point out that I think Mr. Spencer is retiring, and I want
the record to show he is not retiring because he came before
this committee.
Dr. Page Stoutland, Director, Chemical and Biological
Nonproliferation Program, Department of Energy; Dr. Donald M.
Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Mr. Robert M.
Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism-Counterterrorism
Planning Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Before I ask you to stand up--don't stand up quite yet--I
will just ask unanimous consent that all members of the
subcommittee be permitted to place any opening statement in the
record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all Members be
permitted to include their written statement in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
If you gentlemen would stand, I will swear you in, and then
we will get started here.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record that all four witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
I think you are seated the way I called you, and we will
just go right down the line. We are going to turn the lock on
for 5 minutes and then we will roll it over for another 5
minutes, so you have a sense of where we are at. But your
testimony is very important, especially in areas that are
pretty new to us and this is an area that is fairly new to us.
Mr. Spencer.
STATEMENTS OF CARMEN SPENCER, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE DIRECTORATE, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY; PAGE
STOUTLAND, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION
PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DONALD M. KERR, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LABORATORY DIVISION,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ROBERT M. BURNHAM, SECTION
CHIEF, DOMESTIC TERRORISM-COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SECTION,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee
members, I am honored to appear before your committee today to
address your questions regarding the Defense Department's
Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
I am Mr. Carmen Spencer, the Director of the Chemical and
Biological Defense Directorate within the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. In this capacity, I am responsible for
managing, directing and executing the armed forces joint NBC
defense, research, development, and acquisition programs to
ensure all our armed forces can survive, fight and win on a
battlefield contaminated with chemical or biological weapons.
The Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program is
threat-driven; it is not technology-driven. The chemical and
biological weapons threat is potentially increasing in
diversity and frequency. Currently, there are over 20 countries
with known or suspected chemical and biological weapons
programs. Assessing the threat is complicated by several
interrelated changes, including the proliferation of weapons,
technological advances, unstable political regimes, shifting
regional power balances, and the increasing threat of
terrorism.
The continued frequent deployment of U.S. forces worldwide
makes assessing the threat more difficult. Further, because the
countries which are of the greatest concern to the United
States are also in regions in which the United States has well-
defined national security interests, it is of paramount
importance that we continue to maintain a credible, robust
capability to protect our forces and provide them capabilities
to operate effectively in a chemical or a biologically
contaminated environment.
The chemical and biological threat drives warfighting
commanders and CINCs and services requirements. The CINCs and
services identify the capabilities needed to survive, fight and
win. These identified capabilities form the basis for all
requirements for the research and acquisition community. The
Defense Intelligence Agency provides us with continually
updated reports and assessments. These reports assess the
effect of adversaries' weapons systems on how we fight.
The commanders-in-chief identify their priorities which are
supported by our joint NBC defense program. Our joint user
community evaluates materiel, training and doctrinal
improvements to provide the necessary capabilities for our
warfighters. If a materiel solution becomes necessary, the
joint user community generates requirements in the form of
mission needs statements and joint operational requirements
documents. The result is that our programs and technologies are
driven by validated threat assessments and user mission
requirements, not by technologies.
Our Chem-Bio Defense Program coordinates with several
relates efforts, including the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency [DARPA]; the Department of Energy; the
Department of Health and Human Services. And we have many
international cooperative efforts.
DARPA is charged with seeking breakthrough concepts and
technologies. DARPA's biological warfare defense program is
intended to complement the DOD Chem-Bio Defense Program by
anticipating threats and developing novel defenses against
them. The Chem-Bio Defense Program has programmed funding to
facilitate the transition to acquisition of any demonstrated
DARPA technologies that may meet warfighter needs.
The Department of Energy initiated an effort to develop
chemical and biological defensive capabilities for first
responders and protection against terrorism attacks within the
United States. The Department of Defense program has leveraged
the Department of Energy program by funding specific DOE
efforts that may have military applications.
Additionally, coordination is achieved by the Department of
Energy participation as a non-voting member of our Joint NBC
Defense Board, DOE participation in the Chem-Bio Defense
Program science and technology reviews, and regular meetings
with the Department of Energy and visits to their national
laboratories as well.
The Department of Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense
Program and DARPA and the Department of Energy's Chemical and
Biological Nonproliferation Program have worked together to
provide a report to Congress on our cooperative work in
chemical and biological defense science and technology. It is
prepared through an interagency coordination mechanism known as
the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Focus Group,
which involves the Department of Defense, the Department of
Energy, and the intelligence community.
The Department of Defense also participates in the National
Security Council-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness
Group, which coordinates activity in the U.S. Government toward
preventing, detecting and responding to terrorist release of
weapons of mass destruction, and toward more effectively
managing the health, environmental and law enforcement
consequences of such an incident.
This body does not address or oversee the DOD Chem-Bio
Defense Program's mission of providing the warfighter with the
capability to operate effectively in a chemical and biological-
contaminated environment. However, technology development
efforts within the Department of Defense, including the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, that can contribute
directly to the domestic preparedness mission are coordinated
with other agency programs through this R&D subgroup which is
chaired by the White House of Science and Technology Policy.
The Department's fiscal year budget request for the
Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense program is approximately
$836 million. This is an increase of over $100 million from
fiscal year 2000. $362 million is being applied for research,
development, test and evaluation, and $474 million will go
toward providing equipment to our warfighters.
In summation, the Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense
Program responds to the threat-requirements-programs process.
Programs are in place to respond to user needs and shortfalls.
Oversight and management of the Department of Defense Chem-Bio
Defense Program continues to improve and does comply with
Public Law 103-160. The Department is on the right azimuth for
fielding needed, improved chem-bio defense equipment to our
armed forces to meet warfighter needs. The continued support of
Congress and implementation of current plans will continue to
improve joint force readiness.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
We are going to have two votes, so we might as well go
until we have to leave because then we have to wait for the
next vote.
So we are probably going to interrupt you, Dr. Stoutland,
but why don't you start?
Mr. Stoutland. I would like to thank the chairman and the
members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear
before you and describe our efforts to counter the use of
weapons of mass destruction.
My name is Page Stoutland and I am the Director of the
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program. Today, I will
concentrate on the important topic of equipment and operational
requirements and coordination as they relate to chemical and
biological research and development programs.
The Department's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation
Program [CBNP] as we refer to it, was initiated in response to
the fiscal year 1997 Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act. The mission of the program is to develop,
demonstrate and deliver systems and the supporting technologies
that will lead to major improvements in the U.S. capability to
prepare for and respond to chemical or biological attacks.
Technology plays a critical role in defending the U.S.
population against attacks with chemical and biological
weapons. These emerging threats, whether of domestic or foreign
origin, are rooted in science and technology, and any effective
response must draw on similar expertise.
Our program has three principal elements: analytical
studies, technology development, and domestic demonstration
application programs. Analytical studies are used to help guide
the overall program direction, as well as individual technical
areas. One overarching study was initiated last year to examine
alternative system concepts for defending cities against
chemical or biological attack. This was done jointly with the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Technology development is the core program element. The
program targets not incremental improvements, but major
capability enhancements that can be achieved in the 3 to 5-year
timeframe. There are currently four areas of specific focus:
detection, biological foundations, modeling, and
decontamination.
The third program element consists of domestic
demonstration application programs which bring together
individual technologies into more capable systems in the 2 to
3-year timeframe. This integration is important, since it is
usually only at the system level that problems are solved. The
goal of these programs is to integrate current technology into
prototype operational systems directed at specific
applications.
I now turn to the issues central to this hearing: assessing
the chemical and biological threats, defining non-medical R&D
requirements, and more generally determining what we do within
the CBNP.
In a general sense, our R&D investments are guided by a
process that considers the threat and related vulnerabilities,
and the benefit that a particular technology or system would
have were it to be developed. Within this context, we have
undertaken a number of specific activities to identify the
highest impact areas for R&D.
First, characterizing the threat environment is important
for guiding our R&D activities. DOE does not conduct threat
assessments in the chemical and biological areas. Instead, we
rely on the FBI, the defense and intelligence communities, and
public health assessments as appropriate.
These assessments which, for example, consider the agents
most likely to be used, are then used to guide our R&D
activities. Implicit in this process is the recognition of the
uncertainties inherent in estimating the nature and magnitude
of the threat, and that these uncertainties must be factored
into our planning.
Threat assessments as well as other factors are necessary
for the formulation of equipment and operational needs. These
needs will ultimately be the result of a complex process that
involves policymakers, technologists, first responders, the
medical community, and others. As discussed in the GAO report,
today there are no formal requirements for countering the
domestic chemical and biological threat. This is not because we
or others haven't considered the issue, but it is rather
representative of the challenges implicit in arriving at a set
of needs or requirements that would serve a diverse set of
users and act as meaningful targets for R&D programs.
In this environment, one must consider new mechanisms to
identify user needs and to guide R&D programs. Within the CBNP,
we sponsor two sets of activities that, in our view, contribute
to the overall U.S. chemical and biological defense strategy
and identify the corresponding needs or requirements.
These activities buildupon our extensive interactions with
potential technology users, and participation in the numerous
processes designed to more clearly understand their needs. For
example, we participate in the NSC-led Weapons of Mass
Destruction Preparedness Group. Within this group exists an R&D
subgroup chaired by the White House Office of Science and
Technology.
We fully support these processes, but in our view more is
required. Specifically, we use analytical studies to aid in the
development of an overall U.S. strategy to counter the CB
threat. Our Defense of Cities Study aims to develop an
analytical framework by which we can compare the various
chemical and biological defense options available to
policymakers. This will help to identify at a high level which
components--for example, technologies--would have the highest
value in terms of a response system and where further R&D might
be most valuable.
The most important component of our program for
understanding user needs is our demonstration programs, or
DDAPs as we call them. These programs, as I mentioned earlier,
are designed to field and demonstrate complete prototype
systems that use technology developed within the CBNP or
elsewhere. In doing this, we work closely with users who host
the demonstration and in an iterative way determine their
needs.
It is important to emphasize here the important difference
between a stated need for a particular piece of hardware and
the requirement for a system with particular performance
specifications.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, I am going to let you summarize
when we get back. I am very sorry, but we are going to go vote.
I am sorry that we have to wait for another vote, so if you
want to get a Coke or something, you probably have 15 minutes
to do it.
So we will stand adjourned.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. In 20 minutes, we are going to have another
vote, so we will see how that unfolds.
Dr. Stoutland, please feel free to conclude.
Mr. Stoutland. OK, I will continue and summarize.
The most important component of our program, as I was
saying, are our demonstration programs. These are designed to
field and demonstrate complete prototype systems that use
technology developed within our program or elsewhere. In doing
so, we work closely with users who host a demonstration and in
an iterative way understand their needs.
In order to provide you with some more insight into one of
these programs, I would like to briefly describe one of our
demonstration programs, PROTECT. With PROTECT, we are working
closely with the Department of Transportation and a number of
major U.S. subway systems to examine systematically and
rigorously the vulnerability of subway systems to chemical or
biological attack. Using computer models, we can estimate not
only what the effects from an attack might be, but how to most
effectively respond by, for example, changing the air flow in a
subway system.
We are now aggressively moving forward both in testing
chemical detectors and improving the computer models and
information systems necessary to realize these goals. Next
year, a demonstration of the complete system will take place
involving one subway station, and the following year a network
of five stations will be demonstrated. This demonstration will
result in the transit authorities being able to assess in their
subway the value of such a system, and provides important
guidance to our R&D program about where further technology
improvements are needed.
Finally, let me address the issue of coordination. The DOE
program is designed to complement other U.S. Government
programs, while relying on the unique capabilities of the DOE
laboratories. We either participate directly or follow the
status of a number of interagency coordination mechanisms.
In addition to these groups, we participate in a number of
formal coordination mechanisms with the defense and
intelligence communities, such as the Counterproliferation
Program Review Committee. Within the last year, the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee has formed a
chemical and biological defense focus group to specifically
help coordination in the chemical and biological area. Informal
coordination occurs routinely via information exchanges between
our program and other agencies, and we sponsor an annual
meeting typically attended by over 200 people to review the
status of our program.
Let me conclude by saying that the DOE program if focused
on addressing the high-leverage areas, particularly detection,
that have been identified as being central to an effective
response to chemical and biological attacks. Our program builds
upon existing capabilities of the DOE laboratories and has
begun to reach out to the industrial and academic communities.
The chemical and biological threat presents enormous
challenges. We are committed to fully utilizing the
capabilities of the DOE and its laboratories in order to meet
these challenges. In carrying out this commitment, we will
continue to work closely with others to understand the evolving
threat, to better appreciate the needs of technology users, and
to coordinate our program with those in other agencies.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stoutland follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Dr. Stoutland.
Dr. Kerr.
Mr. Kerr. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the FBI.
I am Assistant Director in charge of the FBI Laboratory
Division, and while we have the word ``laboratory'' in our
name, we are a little different from what you might expect, in
that while we do forensic examinations of evidence, we also
provide a great deal of operational support, particularly in
the counterterrorism area.
We work for the FBI field offices, of whom there are 56, so
they are a principal customer, if you will. We work for other
law enforcement agencies in providing training and equipment,
which I will come to, particularly again in the
counterterrorism area. And we work with those who manage our
investigative programs in the FBI, of whom Bob Burnham, to my
left, is one.
The kind of support that we provide and where our needs are
made clear can be exemplified by what happened over the
millennium weekend, where all eight of the sections of our
division were involved, and some 1,100 people in those
sections. Of our 43 units, 20 were directly involved, including
those in electronic and physical surveillance, people doing
chemistry, explosives examination and latent prints on Mr.
Rassam's car and what came across the border in it. And we also
deployed our explosives render safe teams here in the national
capital area, the hazardous materials response capability, and
our crisis communications people. So we are, if you will, a
tactical technology organization.
Most recently, we have been operating in Irvine, CA, where
the mayor had to declare an emergency because of a biological
threat. But the biological threat was overlain by explosives
and weapons. You may have read about that case where, in fact,
the doctor who had all those materials was killed. We ran the
crime scenes at the embassy bombings in Africa two summers ago,
and of particular moment for this committee the Larry Wayne
Harris case with the anthrax samples in Las Vegas was one that
we had to respond to. So we learn by our casework.
The counterterrorism activities and the support today
underlie the five rapid deployment teams that the FBI has stood
up around the country. They are based on our largest field
offices; two of them are here in Washington. And there is a
technical component now to each of those teams, with the
equipment to go with it. We also have the disaster squad
responsibility that deals with aircraft crashes, investigations
like TWA 800, more recently Egyptair and the Alaska Airlines
crash.
The kinds of capabilities we offer more broadly are things
like the EXPRESS data base, which is the explosive Reference
search system, and that is funded by the Technical Support
Working Group in conjunction with the FBI, and it is to provide
data to all that might confront an explosive device in order to
deal with it properly.
We operate the Hazardous Device School in Huntsville, AL.
That is the school that trains all of the State and local bomb
techs today across the country, as well as the FBI's own.
Mr. Shays. That is a very popular school, I might add.
Mr. Kerr. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I mean, there is a long waiting list, as I
understand it.
Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir, and we are hoping that, in fact, we are
going to be able to increase the capacity of it in the next few
years. That school now includes a module of training on weapons
of mass destruction threats, and so all of the people going
through that school or recertified by it are being exposed to
the current generation of capability that there is.
In terms of R&D highlights, I should point out that we
don't have the resources or the ambition to replicate what
other agencies of the Government have in place. So through
memoranda of understanding with the Department of Energy, with
the Army Fort Dietrick people, with Edgewood Arsenal and others
across the country, we have the opportunity to use their
specialized facilities and people in many of our programs. So,
for example, in the Larry Wayne Harris case we brought the
suspected anthrax samples back here to Fort Dietrick for
analysis because they have the containment facilities and the
expertise to do that quickly.
SBCCOM at Edgewood has developed a fly away laboratory for
us. It was deployed, for example, to the World Trade
Organization meeting in Seattle. It will be here in Washington
for the IMF meeting. But, in fact, it is a replica of the
treaty lab that that command had developed for treaty
monitoring purposes, with modifications to make it suitable for
law enforcement.
The Department of Energy interaction, starting in 1998, has
led to 10 projects at the national labs and a number of other
more specialized tasks that we fund out of counterterrorism
budget. In 1999, we took advantage of expertise at MIT's
Lincoln Lab, which is a Department of Defense laboratory where
they are developing a simplified DNA extraction capability for
field use.
This current year, the large vehicle bomb disablement
project is underway jointly with the Department of Defense and
Department of Energy. The improvised explosive device data base
is being put together this year, and the advanced render safe
capabilities that we are doing jointly with the Department of
Defense and DOE are well underway, including foreign
participation from the United Kingdom.
We, in fact, should point out, in the statement I have
given you for the record there is a table that displays some of
the specific projects we work on. And for those who serve on
the Armed Service Committee or others like them, I should point
out that the letter after the number is ``k,'' not ``m.'' It is
a way of making a point to you.
Law enforcement and the Justice Department have not had a
history of sustained R&D programs. We have tended, to support
our casework, to buy off the shelf when we can to support
current needs. So these relationships with the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy are particularly valuable
to us because they are, in fact, in a mode of sustaining R&D
programs over a number of years. They have stability in their
technical staffing to provide it, and they don't have to go out
and do casework everyday as we do, which takes people away from
the R&D projects.
To further support our relationships with the other
agencies, one of my Deputies is presently seconded to the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and heads the Advanced System
Concepts Office there, providing us real glue in terms of joint
planning and thinking about some of the BW and CW problems.
One of my unit chiefs is stationed at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory to tie very closely into the work
they do in dealing with weapons of mass destruction detection,
planning, and other things that Dr. Stoutland briefed you on.
We have four or five people exchanged with counterparts in the
intelligence community, not for liaison, but, in fact, to fill
real responsible operating jobs. It is a way of cross-
pollinating the tools and techniques that we have.
Last, we think while the funding for it is small, the
Technical Support Working Group plays a very significant role
in bringing the agencies to the table to talk about their joint
requirements. It is led, of course, at the executive level by
State, Defense, Energy, and now the FBI. But it reaches across
the entire law enforcement and national security communities,
and it has been an excellent place to fund projects that deal,
for example, with explosives detection, some of the biological
detection programs. And I think it is a good model for
Government cooperation.
We are going to continue to expand these relationships with
the other agencies, but the most important thing is that we
exercise them almost every month. One of the ways we have had
to exercise them is that anthrax threat letters have become, of
course, a favorite thing for some people. They come to the
Congress, they come to the hospitals, they are everywhere
around the country.
We couldn't put people in the position of saying we are
going to fly out and pick it up and in 48 hours we will tell
you whether you were exposed to a pathogen. That is not
satisfactory for the public that we protect. So with the help
of the Centers for Disease Control and the public health
laboratories across the country, there is now a network in
place.
So if we get a call from Cincinnati about a threat letter,
we can advise them, first of all, how to package it
successfully for their own safety and those around them, and
who to take it to so that they can get an answer in a few hours
rather than wait for the time it takes to transport it back
here to Washington and analyze it. So it is a notable success.
I think it is the kind of thing that clearly we benefit from,
and hence want to encourage. Congressional interest helps a
great deal in that area as well.
Last, with respect to the State and local first responders,
I mentioned the HDS school. We also in the past year have been
buying and equipping State and local responders with sort of
first-level capability, and that has, I think, been a good
program. It has not put the most sophisticated equipment in
their hands, and there is a reason for that.
One of the things that we have to do is not take the best
laboratory equipment to the field; we have to worry about shelf
life, maintenance, calibration. We don't want to inflict an
added overhead burden on the first responders if we can design
around it.
Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kerr follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burnham, my understanding is you are going to be coming
up to Connecticut.
Mr. Burnham. Sir, I will be coming up on Friday for the
tabletop, as well as on Monday for the hearing.
Mr. Shays. It will be great to have you there. Why don't
you give us your testimony and we will try to get your
testimony done before I go and vote.
Mr. Burnham. OK, I think we can get it done, Mr. Chairman.
Again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a
pleasure to be here. I will be brief because, in the first
place, I am a last-minute replacement here. Mr. Watson, my
boss, the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division,
was unable to make it. His written statement has been
submitted.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:]
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Mr. Burnham. I do work for Mr. Watson. I have got one of
the section; I have got the Domestic Terrorism Section, which
is part of the Counterterrorism Division. And most of what is
in Mr. Watson's statement are areas that are under my
responsibility.
Mr. Shays. So feel free to talk about them.
Mr. Burnham. OK, so I am going to talk about a couple of
things. Again, he regrets he couldn't be here.
I guess the overriding theme here is probably defining a
threat and risk, and I am going to touch upon a couple of
things on that, particularly because it was brought up in the
first panel here.
Mention was made of the FBI's--and this is also material
that is in Mr. Watson's statement--mention was made by the
first panel of a threat and risk assessment that is being done
by the FBI. Specifically, that is being done now and it is
being done as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1998. In that, the FBI was tasked with doing
a threat and risk assessment for chem-bio or radiological,
whatever the threat may be in the WMD area.
After we started that, pursuant to the fiscal year 1999
State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program, which is
administered by OJP, that was rolled then into an overall grant
package which is being administered by OJP. We finished the
actual threat and risk package, gave that OJP, worked with to
OJP. And by the way, the actual threat package itself, the
threat and risk package, was also piloted in two cities.
After completing that, we did give that to OJP. OJP has
since rolled that into their entire grant package. And starting
on March 28, next week, there are five particular locations,
and I don't have the locations now, where they are actually
going to start--five localities around the country where they
will actually start to demonstrate that and get that working.
Now, there are some limitations in that threat and risk
package that we did with the locals, in that it was not your
typical FBI crime survey; it was not like a lot of intelligence
estimates we did. There were inherent limitations on that
because of the fact that it was going to be going out to
individuals who may not be in law enforcement or the
intelligence community. So it did have certain limitations on
it and I can discuss that more later.
The other area that was mentioned by the first panel was
the General Accounting Office last fall did a study in which
they pointed out, and Mr. Spencer has also pointed out, that
there are intelligence estimates done for State actors and
possible overseas development in the area of WMD or chem-bio.
What GAO's assessment or study pointed out was there is nothing
really that is done domestically as far as what is out there in
the area of chem-bio.
One of the tasks that they did recommend, although we
haven't been tasked with it yet, was that there should be a
study or a threat and risk assessment done domestically as to
what is specifically out there. The GAO report did note that
over the last several years a lot of money has been spent in
the area of R&D, and a lot of money in first responder
training. But what were they training for? Are they training
for any particular element? And that hasn't been done and we
haven't been tasked with it yet, although on a daily basis we
are dealing with what I would say would be the domestic threat.
Now, we rely heavily, as Mr. Kerr has stated, on the
laboratory. I have got an operational section, most of whom are
not scientists, most of whom don't have the technical
expertise. So we do have to rely heavily on our laboratory. And
if I can give you just an example of how we work not only with
our Laboratory Division but with our Federal partners, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, CDC, typically
what we would do on our threat assessment process--and Dr. Kerr
had mentioned the fact of an anthrax threat. We could get an
anthrax threat in from one of our field offices. Our weapons of
mass destruction coordinator may call in and say a particular
hospital or doctor's office had received an anthrax threat that
day.
Part of the threat assessment process on what we do is we
analyze the threat from three viewpoints. We analyze it from a
behavioral, a technical, and an operational standpoint. What we
will do is we will contact first our National Center for the
Analysis of Violent Crime, our behavioral science people, and
get them involved. This is all on a conference call. We will
also get possibly HMRU and NBDC involved. We will also get the
Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta and do a behavioral, a
technical and an operational assessment for the local field
office.
In most instances, it is done for the first responder
because for all intents and purposes, it is going to be the
local police department or fire department that is going to
receive the message. And if we have been doing our job over the
last couple of years, they will contact us. We will do that, we
will d a threat assessment, and we do this two to three times a
week. So I think from all these threat assessments we are
doing, get back to the field office.
Dr. Kerr had mentioned we did just recently have a case out
in California where we did exactly that. The call came in on
Friday night, indicating possible biological agents. HMRU, the
Hazardous Materials Response Unit, for Dr. Kerr, were
dispatched out there. We worked with the Office of Emergency
Management and the local public health officials out in
California. That is typically how we respond. We have been
doing it in the local community, and from these I think we have
a sense of exactly what is out there now, at least
domestically.
I can go through figures and the actual number of cases
that we have had in the last year. Predominantly, most of them
have been anthrax and most of them have been hoaxes.
Mr. Shays. Most or all?
Mr. Burnham. I would say about 80 percent of our cases have
been anthrax threats, hoaxes.
Mr. Shays. Right, and of the 80 percent that are anthrax,
have all of them been hoaxes?
Mr. Burnham. Yes. We haven't actually--we have not had an
actual case, right.
Mr. Shays. I just didn't want to misread your statement.
Mr. Burnham. No.
Mr. Shays. Otherwise, you have got my attention.
Mr. Burnham. No, no. I am sorry, no. Let me just spell out
we have not had actual cases of anthrax.
Mr. Shays. Yet.
Mr. Burnham. But, again, that is part of the process and we
are going through it on a daily basis, fully expecting that in
the next couple of months the FBI, my section, will be tasked
with doing an actual threat and risk assessment.
Those are the highlights of Mr. Watson's statement. Again,
I would entertain any questions that you may have.
Mr. Shays. It is kind of embarrassing to have you gentlemen
have to wait around. I apologize for that, but I only have one
vote so I can vote and come right back and then we will do the
questions. It is very important that we have this hearing, so I
really appreciate you being here.
So we will adjourn for a bit and I will be back.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. I would like to call this hearing to order.
I have a number of questions I want to ask, but I think the
first question is I just want to talk about what kinds of
equipment we are talking about. I want each of you to describe
one or two pieces of equipment that you would be dealing with.
Let's start with you, Mr. Spencer.
Mr. Spencer. OK, I will lead off. Of course, DOD is
concentrating on warfighting, and our No. 1----
Mr. Shays. Concentrating on?
Mr. Spencer. On warfighting requirements, meaning
warfighting needs for the commanders-in-chief.
Our No. 1 priority is in the area of detection,
identification and early warning. So when we talk detection, we
are talking a detection capability that provides us early
warning. We need to be able to detect and identify chemical
agents, toxic industrial materials, biological agents, prior to
them having an impact on exposed personnel so that exposed
personnel can then take adequate individual protective
measures.
And that leads us into the next area, which is individual
protection--clothes, boots, gloves, masks. The detectors
themselves range from everything from airborne platform
systems, which are basically lidar technology in nature that
can send out a beam and scan the horizon to determine if there
is a cloud that is not naturally occurring in nature.
We have biological detention devices, something like our
portal shield device that is deployed in southwest Asia and the
Korean peninsula. Those are point biological detection devices
that are for fixed sites that, should they be exposed to a
biological aerosol, they will alarm, they will provide an early
detection capability.
In collective protection, collective protection is
required--and most of us speak the same language when it comes
to equipment. For example, a mash unit, emergency medical
procedures. You do not want surgeons wearing protective masks,
suits and gloves. They need to be in a clean environment, so
you have a filtered environmental system that is self-contained
so that surgeons can perform those types of operations. And
that is also a valuable tool for command and control
facilities, maintenance facilities, anywhere you have long-
duration facilities. A good example also is the Army. All of
their Abrahms armored systems have collective protection. We
have collective protection on citadels, on ships. Some aircraft
have collective protection as well.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Spencer. The last thing was decontamination, and
obviously those are chemical substances that will decontaminate
all known chemical and biological agents.
Mr. Shays. So you basically mentioned three: the detection
and identification, the protective gear, and the
decontamination.
Mr. Spencer. Correct, and collective protection.
Mr. Shays. And what?
Mr. Spencer. Collective protection, which are the shelters
for the mash units, for example.
Mr. Shays. OK, so individual protection gear and collective
protection gear?
Mr. Spencer. Correct.
Mr. Shays. And I am going to come back to you because of
the emphasis on the military. I would love to know what the
implications are for civilians of what you do.
Mr. Spencer. Certainly.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland.
Mr. Stoutland. Let me give you two specific examples, one
being equipment and the other being a capability. With respect
to equipment, one of our detector projects is one that we call
micro chem lab CB, short for chem-bio. This will be a handheld
unit able to detect many chemical agents, as well as biological
toxins, including industrial chemicals as well.
Mr. Shays. Will it be a sophisticated, calibrated piece of
equipment or is it going to be--we had the problem when we did
the gulf war illnesses where we had the military people in the
field hearing alarms going off all the time, and then finally
they just discounted it because they were being told to
discount it. And then the more sensitive equipment would come
in and discount most of the readings.
So my point, I guess, is that in the end the handheld
stuff, the stuff on the trucks, the jeeps, and so on, were
almost useless because if they detected something, we ignored
it.
Mr. Stoutland. Our goal is to overcome those shortfalls by
using a variety of techniques. I can go into them if you want.
Basically, what we are doing is we are putting the power of an
analytical laboratory, for example, a gas chromatograph which
is the size of a microwave oven, into a chip format. So we are
moving things literally to micro chips. So something that used
to be a meter in length can now be put into a 1-centimeter-
squared chip. So you can then put the power on to a chip and
you can do things in redundant fashion so that you can
eliminate the false alarm problem.
Our goal for this particular device is one false alarm in
every 10,000 measurements. Obviously, it is an R&D program.
This year, we have the first prototype that will be tested this
summer with live agents to see how close we are to that
performance goal.
Mr. Shays. You wouldn't ignore an alarm like that then,
would you?
Mr. Stoutland. That is the hope. And, again, getting back
to the domestic use, what we hear from the first response
personnel and others is that false alarms really are not
tolerated domestically. In the military, of course, you have
got some flexibility. You can bring in other units, you can don
masks while you are trying to figure out whether the alarm was
real or not.
Mr. Shays. So are you mostly focused on civilian use
protection?
Mr. Stoutland. Yes. Well, I will give you two examples. Our
program targets civilian use. The first example is detection.
The second example is a computer modeling capability. For
example, we have developed extensively models to be able to
predict the flow or the transport of chemical or biological
agents within buildings and within subway structures.
So, for example, it lets us predict what the impact would
be of a release at a given subway station, how far away will it
travel, how quickly will it get there, which then aids in
determining what sorts of mitigative measures you might think
of.
Mr. Shays. So you are doing detection and identification.
You are not doing protective gear.
Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. You are not doing collective protection.
Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. And decontamination?
Mr. Stoutland. We do have a decontamination effort.
Mr. Shays. So you are doing both of those, OK.
Mr. Spencer. May I comment on that, please?
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Spencer. Dr. Stoutland used an excellent example of
micro chem lab. That is a technology that we are following
very, very closely. In fact, we have contributed a significant
amount of money and are working collaboratively with the
Department of Energy because we at the Department of Defense
see that as very promising technology for warfighting
application as well.
In the area of modeling and simulation, although we are not
first responders, we realize the Department of Defense will be
called upon in the event of a national emergency involving
chem-bio terrorism to provide assistance to State and local
authorities. In that role, we are looking at modeling and
simulation as well to ensure that the work the Department of
Energy is doing in the domestic arena aligns with the work that
we are doing, as well as we provide support. And we are working
together on modeling and simulation as well.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr.
Mr. Kerr. First of all, I think it is important to
recognize there are three things that the FBI has to be
concerned with in its management of a crisis. The first
responsibility is public safety, which leads to the issue of
where is the same perimeter, do you evacuate, do you not
evacuate, and can you get information quickly to inform those
who might take prophylactic action.
The second thing that we are concerned with is the safety
of our own investigators as they move into this crime scene or
incident scene. So personal protective equipment is, in fact, a
very important component of what we need for our people.
And the third thing, of course, is once on the scene we are
concerned with attribution; that is, the forensics of the
situation, and so more sophisticated and specific
identification capabilities that might lead you back to the
perpetrator.
That being said, we live on the results of the programs in
the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and what
we can buy off the shelf. We are not, in fact, ourselves
developing new techniques or new equipment. So it is very
important for us that there is, in fact, this set of
developments in the other agencies that we can work with.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Burnham.
Mr. Burnham. Yes, to follow one step further on what Dr.
Kerr----
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. So you are not into detection and
you are not into decontamination and you are not--of the three
outlined by Mr. Spencer----
Mr. Kerr. We are very much into detection and
identification, but the kits that we are now using in the field
were developed, for example, by the Naval Medical Research
Institute, in Bethesda.
Mr. Shays. Are you DOD's customer?
Mr. Kerr. What happens is that DOD will in many cases
develop a capability and we will go to the same vendor either
as part of their procurement or as a separate procurement.
There may be a little bit of specialization for us, but in
general we try to use the same capability.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Burnham. To carry one step further what Dr. Kerr was
talking about as far as on the crime scene what they came
across, what the element is, I think the most important thing
that we can do, the FBI, through our WMD coordinators, is
impart that information to State and local responders. I can
give you several examples.
In the last year, we had dispersions of some type of
chemical in a number of movie theaters throughout the Midwest.
Once we saw a pattern where there were three or four of them,
we deemed it to be important enough to get out Bureau-wide
through all of our field offices--to get that information out
to the local responders. As it turned out, it was more of a
labor relations matter, but I think it is important.
We see this in nationwide cases. Be they anthrax threats,
or other patterns, I think it is important that we get that
information out, and we are. From that I think the local
responders as well as the FBI can then gauge what kind of
equipment they need. Again, we would have to rely on Dr. Kerr
and HMRU, but I think the important thing is to get the
information out, which I believe we have successfully through
our WMD coordinators, as well as through the National Domestic
Preparedness Office [NDPO].
Mr. Shays. I am just deciding which level to go. This is a
digression, but I do want to ask now, Dr. Stoutland, I don't
know if you made reference the Europeans or if it was you, Dr.
Kerr.
Mr. Kerr. I did, yes.
Mr. Shays. Is Great Britain ahead of us, is France ahead of
us? I will tell you why I ask this question. When we went to
view how they respond to the whole issue of dealing with gulf
war illnesses and protective gear, and so on, I had a sense
that the Brits and the French believe this kind of attack is
likely to happen, and I think they are more sensitive to it
than I think our general population is. I mean, that is just my
own view.
I am just curious. Are they ahead of us, behind us,
parallel to us?
Mr. Spencer. Dr. Kerr, can I address that? I think Dr.
Stoutland and I can probably do a better job of addressing that
question.
I have a requirement for the Department of Defense to
monitor all the chem-bio science and technology development
programs internationally as well. As part of that
responsibility, we have over 50 data exchange agreements in
science and technology for chem-bio defense throughout the
world. We also have a number of cooperative R&D programs, and
we watch very, very closely and work very, very closely
especially with the Brits and especially with the French, and
the Canadians as well, as part of a memorandum of understanding
that is a formal agreement between us.
I can give you my professional and my personal opinion on
the status of their R&D programs. Generally speaking, the rest
of the world is following the U.S. lead. They are looking at
where we are going, they are looking at the technologies that
we are developing in the basic sciences as well as in the
advanced sciences.
In the area of biological detection, identification and
early warning, and addressing the entire biological threat, I
personally feel we are 3 to 5 years ahead of them. In the
chemical technology arenas and chemical protection arenas, they
are pretty close in some areas.
Mr. Shays. Well, in some ways they are ahead of us. I mean,
the fact is our masks don't work as well as some of theirs. The
fact is they have protective gear that is two-ply, and it
doesn't have charcoal and can be worn as a general uniform. I
am speaking of the French.
Mr. Spencer. Correct. They are very, very proud of their
technology developments. They have been very generous and have
provided us much of their newly developed equipment and the
equipment that they currently have in advanced development. We
have performed similar tests as well.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland.
Mr. Stoutland. I have been personally both to the UK and to
France over the last year to look at the exact issue that you
have addressed. With respect to R&D in particular, I would not
disagree with Carmen. I think there are some things that the
British in particular do very well, and we are in the midst of
signing a memorandum of understanding with them so that we can
more closely share information and proceed jointly.
With respect to public awareness, my observation has been
that they are a bit behind us, in fact.
Mr. Shays. On what?
Mr. Stoutland. With respect to public awareness and concern
over the threat, my personal observation has been that we are a
couple of years ahead of them, if you will. For example, in
France there is a new commission called the Haute Commission
Francais de la Defense Civile, which is sort of the high French
commission for civil defense, and they have just now stood up
and are really starting to move forward. So I think they are a
couple of years behind in terms of awareness of the threat, but
they certainly have some capabilities that we are aware of and
we will be making use of.
Mr. Shays. But when you go through Paris and you see their
police carrying assault weapons, it is not like they are going
after the common criminal.
Mr. Stoutland. Well, I will defer to the FBI for sort of
broad terrorist awareness. But with respect to chemical and
biological threats in particular, my observation has been that
on a national level they are now taking it much more seriously
than they did 2 or 3 years ago.
Mr. Kerr. Let me speak briefly to the question you
initially asked, which is areas----
Mr. Shays. And candidly.
Mr. Kerr. Yes, right. With respect to the United Kingdom,
we work very closely with them in bombing matters because they
have more experience with terrorist bombings than anyone that
we know of. We send U.S. bomb techs to their schools. We adopt
some of their equipment and adapt it to our use. Similarly, in
some of the detection areas they have had activity that for us
has been quite useful.
The partners that work most closely, of course, are the UK,
Canada, Australia, and the United States. And there are, in
fact, working agreements----
Mr. Shays. Say that again. You left out France?
Mr. Kerr. Correct. France is not part of what I will call
the inner close working group. Maybe it is an Anglo-Saxon bias,
maybe it is a harmonization of the legal systems, but there is,
by tradition and past agreements, more of an open interchange
there than with the French.
Mr. Shays. When I was in France talking with personnel who
deal with both chemical and biological and the nuclear threat,
one of their warnings to us was that we can win the traditional
war, but then be exposed to the terrorist threat out of
frustration by our success militarily and just getting us to
have a perception that it only takes a few people.
And so I just found it interesting how sensitive they were
to the reality that there will be a nuclear, biological, or
chemical attack on some Western country sometime. I am also
struck by the fact that when I went to a base in Mississippi, I
saw the finest firefighting equipment for our planes, and I saw
a crew of just outstanding firemen at this airport. And I
thought they may never, ever have to use their equipment, but
they prepare everyday as if they do.
I was thinking as you were talking that if there were such
an attack, you all would be right up there on the firing line
and then there would be people writing articles about who are
these people and what have they been doing for the last so many
years.
I want a handle on what we are spending in this area. I
mean, this isn't classified information, so give me a sense of
what we are devoting in each of your units.
Mr. Spencer. What I will share with you is the fiscal year
2001 President's budget submission for the Department of
Defense in this area.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Spencer. For the joint NBC defense program, which is
the program that I manage, in the area of very basic research--
this is laboratory-level research for chem-bio--about $33.2
million for fiscal year 2001; in the area of applied research,
$73.6 million; for advanced development programs, $46.6
million; for what we call demonstration validation of the
technologies, $83.8 million; for engineering management
development, which is actually putting the technologies into
the widgets and doing the final operational and developmental
testing, $100.8 million; and for overall management of the
program, publication of doctrine, training requirements and the
training base for chem-bio defense, about $23.9 million, for a
total of $361.9 million for research and development.
But probably more importantly, we are going to be spending
$473.9 million to physically procure new equipment and putting
it into the hands of the warfighters in all of those areas I
discussed--detection, identification, early warning.
Mr. Shays. In next year's budget or this year's budget?
Mr. Spencer. I am sorry. This is for fiscal year 2001.
Mr. Shays. 2001, OK.
Mr. Spencer. This is the President's budget, and that total
is $835.8 million.
Mr. Shays. So a little more than half is for procurement?
Mr. Spencer. Correct.
Mr. Shays. And is any of that procurement for non-defense
personnel or is it all for defense?
Mr. Spencer. It is all for defense, but it does include,
for example, procurement for our civil support teams, formerly
known as raid teams, for the domestic mission.
Mr. Shays. These are the National Guard units?
Mr. Spencer. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Spencer. It also includes some procurement for some of
our specialty units like the Marine Corps CBIRF units, Chemical
and Biological Incident Response Force. It includes procurement
for the Army's technical escort unit which has worldwide
deployment capability in the area of chem-bio defense, and also
for USAMRIID, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases, which responds around the world to
biological incidents as well.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, can you talk about your budget at
all?
Mr. Stoutland. Our budget request for the area that I
described, that being R&D and the demonstration programs, is
$42 million in fiscal year 2001.
Mr. Shays. And that is the extent of your budget?
Mr. Stoutland. Right.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr, you have a little more amorphous area
of activity.
Mr. Kerr. It is more amorphous, but it also pales in
comparison to the numbers that you just heard. The identified
increment for counterterrorism R&D is about $5 million in the
Bureau. That is not the extent of all that we put into the
capabilities that we field because we use some of our base
funding that is accounted for quite differently.
But, you know, one way to think about the FBI is that about
65 percent of our budget pays for agent and support personnel.
The consumables go for the rest, and so we are not an R&D
organization and it is an apples and oranges comparison here.
Mr. Burnham. Sir, I can get you the budget for the
Counterterrorism Division. As Dr. Kerr indicated, some of that
bleeds over from the laboratory. I am going through the process
now for the 2002 budget and the cross-cutting. To give you an
example, in the Counterterrorism Division I have had to meet
with the Investigative Support Division, which is intelligence;
with our Critical Incident Review Group, which is CIRG; with
the laboratory, all of which would go into our counterterrorism
efforts. But we do have that broken out. We are going through
that now and I can get you 2001 budget and it is broken out by
different divisions that contribute to the counterterrorism
effort.
Mr. Shays. We don't have the Technical Support Working
Group here today, a representative from it. How do you all
interface with that Group?
Mr. Spencer. The Department of Defense interfaces with
them. They have a chemical and biological, radiological and
nuclear countermeasures subgroup. We are a member of that
subgroup and work in this arena with them. That includes the
Department of Energy, the FBI, the Department of State, the
Department of Agriculture, EPA, Customs, the Postal Service,
FDA, the Centers for Disease Control, and FEMA.
Mr. Shays. Agriculture because of----
Mr. Spencer. Domestic biological terrorism.
Mr. Shays. Right, OK.
Mr. Stoutland. That is basically true for us as well. We
have a representative. In fact, DOE is one of the co-chairs of
the TSWG, at the working level we have representatives on the
appropriate subgroups, including the chemical and biological,
radiological subgroup.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr.
Mr. Kerr. The FBI is also one of the four executive members
of TSWG, and then our people have served as co-chairs of things
like the chemical and biological, radiological subgroup.
Mr. Burnham. From the Counterterrorism Division, our
representative is the laboratory, Dr. Kerr.
Mr. Shays. How is the nature of the threat, which gets me
to your point--you focused primarily on defense. I am not clear
yet, and maybe we don't have a panelist here that--maybe I
don't have a complete panel to answer this question, but I want
to know the difference between the civilian customer and the
military customer.
Mr. Spencer. My customer is obviously the military
customer, and my threat is basically a compilation from the
intelligence community. The intelligence community--DIA, CIA,
NSA--postulate a threat. That threat then receives what we call
a validated--becomes a validated threat list after review by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
That validated threat list is a prioritized threat list,
and that is the master threat-based list that we use to develop
our research and development programs to counter. And that is
both for chemical threats as well as for biological threats.
Mr. Shays. I guess what I am asking then would be, before I
go on, the need of your customer, the military, is on the
battlefield.
Mr. Spencer. Correct.
Mr. Shays. It is not in the basement of the World Trade
Center.
Mr. Spencer. That is correct. The Department of Defense
does have some units that we know will be responding to a
domestic emergency in the chemical and biological arena, if
requested. We also look to provide them the capability to
provide that desired response. Those are the units like the
TEU, the Technical Escort Unit, the CBIRF, the USAMRIID, and we
look for specialized equipment to enable them to do that. The
basic threat, though, domestically, as well as for worldwide,
although not regionally focused, is primarily the same.
Mr. Shays. I am not sure I agree with that. I mean, it is
the same because?
Mr. Spencer. The same types of toxic chemical substances
and biological pathogens.
Mr. Shays. Right, OK. I just see them being delivered in
different forms and I see them----
Mr. Spencer. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. I would think the exposure would be greater on
the military. I have no way of knowing, but it would strike me
that way.
Dr. Stoutland.
Mr. Stoutland. First of all, there are many obvious
similarities, but I think there are some important differences
and I will just describe those.
Mr. Shays. First off, who is your customer?
Mr. Stoutland. We perceive our customers to be the broad
domestic preparedness community who would be involved in
protecting a city, and within that it would include some
Federal agencies. For example, we consider the FBI to be a
customer, but also local entities, and that changes depending
on what the city looks like.
For example, in the city of Washington it would involve a
mixture of people who own facilities that need to be prepared;
for example, subway systems. It would involve first responders,
be they firemen in some cities or policemen in other cities. So
it is a mix, but broadly it is those type of people who would
either be involved in preparing for, meaning continually
monitoring because they have a building or a facility they
consider to be at risk, or people who would rush to the scene
should there be an incident.
Mr. Shays. Well, before you go on, given that, you said
your budget was basically 42?
Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. But that is basically research and development?
Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. Someone else is procuring from you? This
isn't procurement. You didn't give me any figure on
procurement.
Mr. Stoutland. Our budget does not have procurement.
Mr. Shays. So is that kind of like with the anti-missile
defense system? I mean, we are still in research and
development, not into procurement?
Mr. Stoutland. No. I think there are two issues here. There
certainly is procurement going on, and within cities it goes on
in a number of different ways. It goes on in local budgets, be
they local fire departments having money to procure items.
Mr. Shays. But they are not buying from you?
Mr. Stoutland. They are not buying from us, no. Our model
is to first of all do development until it gets to a stage
where we think it is ready for use, and then to move these
things into what we call the demonstration phase. So, for
example, our demonstration program that I highlighted which
looks at subways will put in place chemical detectors, computer
models, and so on. Some of those things will be from our
program, some of them will be whatever is required to fill out
the entire system.
Mr. Shays. But we haven't yet perfected those models, have
we?
Mr. Stoutland. Sorry?
Mr. Shays. Have we perfected the equipment that you are
researching yet? Are we in a stage to develop them?
Mr. Stoutland. There are things in different stages. Let me
give you two examples. Some things will never be fielded
operationally with a first responder. For example, computer
models will be run that will then result in guidance that they
will use on a day-to-day basis. Those things are ready.
In other cases we have built, for example, a handheld
biological detector where we have built several units, and this
year we will be giving those to responders and various people
around the country as a beta test. If that beta test pans out
and people perceive this to be a valuable piece of equipment,
then it will be transferred to the commercial sector and they
will produce them. DOE is not in the business of producing many
copies.
Mr. Shays. I am getting the sense, before I go to the FBI,
that we are at a stage where DOD has developed some equipment
and is starting to procure, obviously. So it is still going to
be in the hands of DOD. You are in the process of researching
and testing and getting out in the field some test.
But it leads me to believe that right now the only groups
that would really have this equipment at any level would be
responders from the Federal Government, not necessarily from
the local and State. That is kind of the sense I am getting.
Mr. Stoutland. That is not entirely true. The examples I
gave you, both the subway, where we are working not with the
Federal Government but with transit agencies, which I would
consider to be local people--our capabilities are getting into
their hands, first, in the form of improving their preparedness
plans. The second example, the handheld bio detector, will
involve some Federal people, but the majority of people
receiving that will be State or primarily local responders.
Mr. Shays. But it is ``will be.''
Mr. Stoutland. Excuse me?
Mr. Shays. It is a ``will be,'' it is not ``already have.''
Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. The bio detector, in
particular, will be----
Mr. Shays. That is my point. Right now, I feel like we are
kind of vulnerable, that we have not yet reached the point
where we are out there yet.
Dr. Kerr, is that accurate? Particularly with a $5 million
budget, that is pretty pathetic.
Mr. Kerr. Well, our model is a little different. As you
know, we have 56 field offices around the country, and so the
first thing we have been doing as we have gained new equipment
and capability is push it into our field offices because that
way it gets tested on the street.
Mr. Shays. Yes, but you don't have that equipment yet.
Mr. Kerr. Oh, yes, we have first-generation equipment. We
have, in fact, trained up full HAZMAT teams at the 15 largest
field offices. They have a first-generation biological
detection capability that is what the Navy had developed some
years ago. They have radiation detectors of two different types
and they have personal protective gear.
In turn, those people then are training their counterparts
in the State and local agencies, and for them we have been
procuring personal protective gear, a simpler form of radiation
detection. We do not yet have a biological detection capability
to share with them.
Mr. Shays. Yes, and I would just emphasize it is first
generation.
Mr. Kerr. Correct.
Mr. Shays. And you all are working on what generation?
Mr. Spencer. We are in the process of fielding an improved
first-generation bio detector now, and we will be fielding in
about 2 years our next generation.
Mr. Stoutland. Our program, I would say, is a combination
of first and second generation. We are seeing some of the
first-generation things now coming out. We have given a number
of things to response personnel, first responders rules of
thumb for what they should do based on extensive calculations,
and so on. But really the bulk of our program is going to be
delivering things in the next couple of years. The program is 3
years old. We have set our program targets for programs or
projects that are 3 to 5 years out that will make major
capability enhancements, and so things are now just beginning
to get out of the R&D pipeline.
Mr. Shays. So let me ask you and Dr. Kerr again, because I
didn't really pursue it enough, how is the nature of the threat
different to the civilian versus the military?
Mr. Stoutland. I would divide it into three areas and maybe
give a couple of specific examples. One is ``what?'' I mean, I
think the list of agents--particularly in the chemical area,
one can imagine a much broader set of agents that could have
very dramatic effects in confined urban spaces. Obviously
included in those would be industrial chemicals, and so the
detection capabilities, for example, need to not only do the
conventional CW threat agents, but a broader set of agents.
The other point would be where things are going to be used.
If they are going to be used in confined urban areas, be they
inside of buildings or inside of subways, that requires a
different set of capabilities both in terms of detection,
because false alarms is a problem inside of buildings with
outgasing of materials, and so on, as well as with the various
modeling calculations that would help you to characterize the
threat.
And, finally, the differences with who is going to use the
capability. First responders and others have very different
training in many cases than those in the military, and we must
develop equipment that is suitable for their level of training
and expertise.
Mr. Shays. So one of your points would be that the
civilians will not have the same capability of training?
Mr. Stoutland. No, no. It could be better. My only point is
that it is different.
Mr. Shays. OK, fair enough.
Mr. Kerr. Having participated in the Defense Science Board
for a number of years before I came back to Government, I was
involved with many studies of urban warfare and what the
military has called operations other than war. And I would
argue that their thinking about the role of chemical and
biological threats in that environment is virtually identical
to the civilian issue that you are asking about.
The difference in detail is that they are thinking about it
in terms of a conflict situation. In law enforcement, we have
to think about it in terms of it being embedded within the
larger civilian population whose safety we have to assure
first. So there is some difference in the amount of equipment
you would need for, if you will, the first crude detection in
order to set up a perimeter for safe access. But the specific
threats, the so-called threat list, whether it be biological or
chemical, is virtually the same, augmented in the chemical area
by some of the industrial chemicals like chlorine. With respect
to radiological dispersal, the ability to detect radioactive
materials on the battlefield or in a city is no different. The
same laws of physics apply.
And the other thing I should point out is that we also have
to deal with some of these things in conjunction with one
another. We have had threats where we have responded which have
been a combination of explosives and suspected biological
material. We do have some 2,500 bombings a year in the United
States, which is part of our backdrop in the counterterrorism
program.
So one way we look at this problem of high consequence and
so far low probability event is that we ought to be
incrementally adding capability, but we should not be
withdrawing capability from the threats that we are facing
everyday.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Let me ask this question, and we are getting to a close
here. Who in the U.S. Government is in charge of ensuring the
coordination of R&D efforts for the military and the civilian
requirements?
We will start again with you, Mr. Spencer.
Mr. Spencer. Under the National Security Council----
Mr. Shays. Let me just say the pregnant pause is very
telling. It is, it is, and it is not a criticism of anyone; it
is just telling.
Mr. Spencer. If you are looking for one individual to be in
charge to ensure that the Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, and the Department of Justice are all working toward
the same common goal, and that common goal is domestic
preparedness, I believe that would come under the National
Security Council. And they have established seven working
groups that are looking at all aspects of this particular
issue. But, again, that is one body. They have visibility. They
do not have decisionmaking authority, nor do they probably have
the resources to do what is actually required.
Mr. Shays. It sounds to me like you are just saying the
President has the responsibility.
Mr. Spencer. No. There is an individual that has been
designated, and that is Mr. Dick Clark.
Mr. Shays. Right, but does Mr. Clark have this
responsibility?
Mr. Spencer. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Do you think he knows he has the responsibility?
Mr. Spencer. Yes, I do. I think if you take a good external
look at the programs, I think at the scientific level when you
talk about the science and technology, the scientists working
for the Department of Defense are working very closely with the
scientists in the Department of Energy, and the FBI is a
customer for both of us.
As you work your way up in the bureaucracies, there are
bureaucratic mechanisms that are in place that physically look
and attempt to assure that the proper coordination is taking
place. But the bottom line to really the whole effort is--and a
good example of this and probably the best example occurred in
the last 30 days.
In the last 30 days, we had what we call a technical area
review and assessment, where I had my principal scientists for
every one of our programs brief a scientific panel of non-DOD,
non-Government personnel. And the panel also had a
representative from the Department of Energy on it, from
academia, as well as from industry.
The scientists briefed, are we going in the right
direction? They briefed their program and they looked for
opportunities to improve leveraging what is going on in
academia and industry and internationally. Also presenting at
that week-long effort was the TSWG. The Department of Energy
briefed their programs, and at the scientific level that
exchange is taking place and it is a very positive exchange.
Redundancy in all cases is not bad, especially when you look at
high-risk technologies, and there are high-risk technologies
involved in biological defense.
That is an excellent example, but if you look above that
level within the Federal Government, I think there is probably
a void.
Mr. Shays. Probably what?
Mr. Spencer. Probably a void.
Mr. Shays. And that void again is where? I know you used
the word ``probably.''
Mr. Spencer. I am going to qualify my statement.
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Spencer. We have the Counterproliferation Review
Committee with the senior executive levels of the Department of
Energy and the Department of Defense that they participate on,
and that coordination is working well.
What is really lacking, and I think what you are really
looking for is what we are all striving toward, and that is
there is no national architecture. What is the national
capability for domestic preparedness that is desired by this
Nation for chemical and biological antiterrorism and
counterterrorism activities? To what capability should the
Department of Energy, under Presidential Decision Directives 39
and 63, be developing a defensive capability for the United
States? That national architecture does not exist.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. That is very helpful.
Dr. Stoutland, do you want to respond in any way?
Mr. Stoutland. I will agree, first of all, with what Mr.
Spencer said and maybe add just a couple of things. My
observation is that at the working level coordination is
working very well. People are not duplicating projects.
Scientists talk regularly, whether they be from Justice,
Energy, or Defense-sponsored programs.
What we are lacking, as was pointed out, is a high-level
architecture for where we are going so that we know what the
targets are, and that is exactly the purpose of the study that
is now being jointly funded within my program and within the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a study that call the Defense
of Cities Study, to try to develop a framework so that we can
compare in a rigorous analytical manner various high-level
policy options to present to policymakers to then make
decisions as to what our level of preparedness should be, which
then feeds back into my R&D program and others so that we know
where we are going.
In addition to that, the Counterproliferation Review
Committee group was mentioned. This year, at the urging of my
Under Secretary Moniz and Under Secretary Gansler, of the
Department of Defense, we formed a chemical and biological
defense focus group. The purpose of this group is really to
focus specifically on chemical and biological areas, with the
goal over the next year of developing integrated R&D road maps
in a number of areas where we both have programs going on with
different missions, different technologies, but to look, in
fact, at where there are intersection points where we can
benefit to a greater extent from the other agency's programs.
So I think that is a very positive step that has now been
approved at the highest levels of Defense and Energy. And, of
course, we will be vetting that with the NSC-led Weapons of
Mass Destruction Preparedness Group, including the Office of
Science and Technology Policy which chairs the R&D subgroup.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr or Mr. Burnham, either one of you?
Mr. Kerr. I think I will take it and I will do it on a
slightly different tack, not to disagree with those who
preceded me, but there are a couple of people who have made a
difference in this area. One is the present Deputy Secretary of
Defense John Hamre. Another, working with him, has been the
Attorney General, and they have had now two Saturdays this past
month a major WMD exercise bringing Justice and Defense and
other agencies together, thinking about not just technology and
R&D, but thinking perhaps beyond that, how will it be used,
what are the operational and policy implications of what is
being discussed.
They have been meeting regularly about every 6 weeks for
the past year in order to try to harmonize the needs of the law
enforcement community and the tremendous capabilities resident
in the Department of Defense.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I read that, though, differently. I read
that as a very sensible thing to do because there is somewhat
of a void.
Mr. Kerr. Right, and what I was trying to do was point out
that some individuals, by name, have tried to fill that void.
Mr. Shays. I have got you, I have got you.
Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Then let me ask you who should do it. That will
probably be my last question, but the issue is who should be
doing that? It is not going to be the Technical Support Working
Group. It is not going to be that. Who should it be, in your
judgment?
Mr. Kerr. I think the voice that has been missing in the
discussions that have gone on between the Department of Energy
and the Department of Defense has been, in fact, the voice of
those charged with the crisis management responsibility. We
have to find a way to bring the Department of Justice into that
discussion, recognizing that unlike the other two, it is not an
acquisition agency, it is not an R&D agency. Yet it is, in
fact, desperately dependent on what can be produced by those
who do it so well. And we have to get that coupling not just at
the working level, which is the TSWG, but at the policy level
where people like the DOE and DOD Under Secretaries have an
effective relationship today.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, who do you think it should be?
Mr. Stoutland. I am sorry. Who should coordinate this?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Stoutland. I think it needs to be led at the level that
it is being led at, that is the President's coordinator for
counterterrorism, Richard Clark.
Mr. Shays. And let me just say I realize that Mr. Clark is
working hard, but chooses to have a low profile. He is not
looking to be called the terrorist czar, but it may make sense
for our committee to ask him this same question and really get
a sense of how he weighs in on this.
This is a question that I would love answered ultimately,
and it is too serious a question and too important a question
not to feel certain about it. But I just think this is a very
telling conversation, in a way, because you are all kind of
wrestling with it, but nothing comes quickly to mind.
Mr. Stoutland. Well, that is right, and what I won't do is
suggest maybe a particular mechanism that would solve all of
our problems because if we knew that, obviously we would be
more than willing to put it forward.
Mr. Shays. And I realize that you all work for bosses who
may have a different opinion.
Mr. Stoutland. I think what this is more telling of is the
complexity of this problem. We have presently got a number of
coordinating groups, some of which are quite effective. I think
the Counterproliferation Review Committee is an effective
group, but focused not on the domestic problem. I think the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness R&D Subgroup is also
an effective group which builds upon the CPRC.
But I think ultimately the fundamental challenge and one
that we have not grappled with as well as we could have is
trying to figure out how to make the lash-up between those
organizations with scientific and technical capabilities,
represented to the most extent here by DOE and DOD, with those
organizations with operational responsibility, which would
include the FBI as well as State and local responders. That is
hard thing to do. I think we are working toward it and we are
making progress, but we are going to continue to struggle with
that.
Mr. Shays. This is a nice lead-in to what I will see on
Friday and Monday when we have our hearing. We are going to be
seeing how the fire departments and the police departments all
interact in this effort to deal with a terrorist threat.
What is helpful for me is to know that if I were on the
outside looking in and saying, well, the Technical Support
Working Group, there is someone in charge and they should be
doing that, I think there is consensus that it is not that
organization that I should be looking at. So this is something
the committee will do, and I think we will have further dialog.
I am prepared to close the hearing, but as is my practice,
I am very happy to have you make any closing comments, if there
is any question that we should have asked that you were primed
to answer or just feel you need to answer. Is there anything?
[No response.]
Mr. Shays. Well, I thank you very much. I think we are all
hungry, and you were a wonderful panel. Thank you for your
patience.
[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]