

GLOBAL TERRORISM: SOUTH ASIA—THE NEW LOCUS

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GLOBAL TERRORISM: SOUTH ASIA—THE NEW LOCUS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. I am pleased to call to order today's hearing on global terrorism. In particular, we will focus on the most recent shift in the patterns of international terrorism to South Asia. This move away from the more traditional Middle East-based terrorist activity clearly deserves our attention and careful policy analysis.

Earlier this year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that the shift of the center of gravity for international terrorism has been eastward, toward Afghanistan in Southwest Asia.

Each spring, under congressional mandate since the mid-1980's, the Administration publishes a report called Patterns of Global Terrorism. This report provides the Congress and the public with the latest trends and developments in international terrorism.

The report for 1999 establishes that South Asia is the new locus of international terrorism, presenting both a regional threat and a growing threat to our nation. We will examine what this new trend means for our nation.

Afghanistan has emerged as a safe haven for master terrorists like Usama bin Laden and his radical supporters. We have on display today the State Department's wanted posters for bin Laden, offering a \$5 million reward for his capture.

Neighboring Pakistan, which has long supported the Taliban to its west and those bent on violence in Kashmir to its east, also contributes to the emergence of South Asia as the new locus of international terrorism.

Recent press reports indicate that the Russian intelligence services believed that the Taliban in Afghanistan promised to help Chechen rebels with weapons, training, and possibly even with trained fighters from Taliban camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban vehemently denied those serious Russian charges. We will examine that issue today as well.

Through a coordinated law enforcement approach, many terrorist threats emanating from South Asia were thwarted last year. As a result, American deaths from terrorism were down to five in 1999, one of the lowest levels in several years, and for that we are grate-

ful. It is a sad but undeniable fact that Americans are often the most frequent terrorist targets around the globe.

The 1999 annual terrorism report notes that we have repeatedly asked Pakistan to end their support to elements that conduct terrorist training in nearby Afghanistan. We also asked that Pakistan interdict travel of all militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block financial and logistical support for the camps.

In addition, the State Department's latest terrorism report notes that Pakistan officially supports Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism.

The recent report from the congressionally mandated National Commission on Terrorism noted Pakistan's occasionally excellent cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism. However, the Commission also pointed out the consistent Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir. The Commission's report also called for naming Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism so that all the sanctions against such a terrorist nation could be applied.

The new threat of radical Islamic terrorism emanating from the region can often be found in a loosely knit group of terrorists once trained and hardened in the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Today on the new battlefields in Chechnya and Kosovo, where war-making and fighting skills are honed and perfected, some of these radical Islamic elements have been learning skills that later can be used against our nation and others in radical terrorist acts.

South Asian also presents new concerns for the war on drugs. By taxing rather than fighting the drug trade, the Taliban has effectively sided with the heroin producers and against innocent people, particularly our young people. The drug trade is also proving to be a lucrative resource for bin Laden's terrorist network.

We are fortunate to have with us today the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Secretary of State's Office, who helps prepare the annual report on global terrorism and can help us sort out what this new shift means.

We are also joined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. Both of these witnesses will bring their expertise to our inquiry today.

Ambassador Sheehan, who, of course, oversees the preparation of the global terrorism report, is prepared to answer any questions on terrorism, and of course, no member is limited on what area of the globe he would like to address.

Before we start with our witnesses, I welcome any comment from our Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Gejdenson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I commend you for calling this hearing. Both the State Department report and the Bremmer Commission report point out what we have suspected for some time, that global terrorism is increasingly a collaboration and a coordinated effort.

As you have indicated, it has moved from its home in the Middle East and North Africa now into South Asia, and certain factors, the disintegration of Afghanistan in the post-Soviet era, the situation

in Pakistan, a country that is now once again in military rule with a weakened civil society, and increased influence of religious clerics and their schools makes for a dangerous situation.

Usama bin Laden, seen often as the primary enemy of the United States or one who has chosen the United States as his primary enemy, seems to make his home in that region.

We in this country need to work with our allies globally. We have had some cooperation from Pakistan through the years, but reading this last June 25 New York Times magazine article on the education at religious schools leaves one with a very uneasy feeling. The authors go on to talk about these jihad factories where young men are educated in a way that seems to direct them to take on the West.

We have had cooperation from Pakistan, but we also have challenges coming from there, and we certainly feel that the reestablishment of democracy and a civil society is critical to make progress in that country.

The Afghanistan situation is much more complicated. A country that has seen war for so long, its political situation has disintegrated. The economic situation has left many in despair, and it now seems to be a country that processes drugs and terrorists more than almost any other activity.

We need to pull and work with our allies and friends to contain and end this threat, which as you pointed out, often targets Americans first.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Any other Member seeking recognition?

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank you very much for holding this hearing.

As we discuss terrorism in South Asia, I think it is important to renew the Members of this Committee and the public's acquaintance with the request that I have made for the last 3 years concerning American policy toward the Taliban because, as we examine terrorism in South Asia, one cannot help but recognize that if it were not for the fact that the Taliban are in power, there would be a different equation going on. There would be a whole different situation in South Asia.

After a year of requesting to see State Department documents on Afghan policy, and I would remind the Committee that I have stated that I believe there is a covert policy by this Administration, a shameful covert policy of supporting the Taliban, the State Department after many, many months—actually years of prodding—finally began giving me documents, Mr. Chairman. In the assessment of those documents, I have found nothing to persuade me that I was wrong in my criticism.

I might add, however, that there have been no documents provided to me even after all of these years of requesting it. There have been no documents concerning the time period of the formation of the Taliban. Again, I would hope the State Department gets the message that I expect to see all of those documents.

The documents that I have read, Mr. Chairman, indicate that the State Department time and again has had as its position that they have no quarrel or that it would give them no heartburn to have

the Taliban in power, this during the time period when the Taliban was struggling to take over Afghanistan.

Although the Administration has denied supporting the Taliban, it is clear that they discouraged all of the anti-Taliban supporters from supporting the efforts in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban, even so much as when the Taliban was ripe for being defeated on the ground in Afghanistan. Bill Richardson and Karl Inderfurth, high ranking members of this Administration, personally visited the region in order to discourage the Taliban's opposition from attacking the Taliban when they were vulnerable, and then going to neighboring countries to cutoff any type of military assistance to the Taliban, this at a time when Pakistan was heavily resupplying and rearming the Taliban.

What did this lead to? It led to the defeat of all the Taliban's major enemies except for one, Commander Masood in the north, and left the Taliban the supreme power in Afghanistan.

So when we hear today about terrorism and crocodile tears from this Administration, let us remember this Administration is responsible for the Taliban. This Administration has acted in a way that has kept the Taliban in power.

One last note. Many people here understand that I have been in Afghanistan on numerous occasions and have close ties to people there, and let me just say that some of my sources of information inform me of where bin Laden was. They told me they knew and could tell people where bin Laden could be located, and it took me three tries before this Administration responded to someone who obviously has personal contacts in Afghanistan to even investigate that there might be someone who could give them the information.

And when my informant was actually contacted, he said that the people who contacted him were half hearted and did not follow through, did not appear to be all that interested, appeared to be forced to be talking to him.

Mr. Chairman, we are concerned about terrorism. We are concerned about the Taliban because we believe in human life and human dignity. The worst terrorist acts of the Taliban are committed against the women of their own society, and let us not forget that.

But none of the terrorism which we will hear about today by Mr. bin Laden or others would be taking place with Afghanistan as their home base if it were not for the policies of this Administration. This Administration has had a policy concerning the Taliban which has created this terrorist mess, which I predicted in this body on numerous occasions 3 and 4 years ago.

So I think I am pleased that you have called this hearing today, but let's keep this testimony in perspective.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

I am pleased to recognize the Minority Whip, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bonior.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your indulgence and your courtesies for letting me say a few words this morning.

I want to thank you and all the Members of the Committee for the opportunity to be with you today. I look forward to the testi-

mony that Ambassador Sheehan and Deputy Assistant Secretary Eastham will be presenting.

On earlier occasions, the Administration has expressed the importance of working with Pakistan in addressing terrorism in South Asia. I also believe that cooperation with Pakistan continues to be very much in our national interest.

Combating and preventing global terrorism is one of the most serious challenges facing America's foreign policy in this new era. It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that Pakistan, as a longstanding ally of the United States, is committed to cooperating with the United States on terrorism. Its record shows that.

Sanctioning Pakistan would serve no purpose other than to isolate them and aggravate the social and economic and political challenges in the region.

I also strongly believe that the Taliban support for terrorism and its harboring of Usama bin Laden must be condemned in the strongest possible terms.

We must also respond to the threat, and I believe that is where Pakistan plays a very critical role. We must remember that it is not in Pakistan's interest to have the Taliban on its border. It is also not in Pakistan's interest to have terrorist groups operating within its borders, and it is clearly not in India's interest to have Pakistan isolated, thereby producing a greater threat to peace and stability in South Asia.

While it is undeniable that some terrorist groups operate in Pakistan, Pakistanis themselves are often the victim of terrorism.

Moreover, Pakistan has been cooperating with the international community and the United States in counterterrorism efforts. In 1995, Pakistan turned over Ramzi Yousef, involved in the World Trade Center bombing, to the United States. In 1997, Pakistan helped apprehend Miur Amal Kanzi, who shot several people outside the CIA headquarters, and in 1998 and 1998, Pakistan handed over two suspects involved in the bombing of our embassies in Africa.

I know from my talks with General Musharraf when I visited Pakistan and India in April that he is committed to dealing with the Taliban. He has met with one leader of the Taliban and is prepared to meet with others in Afghanistan.

Throughout my trip I gained a new appreciation of the unique challenges facing the region. I also came away more convinced than ever that the United States must play a proactive role in helping to meet those challenges. There are serious challenges and threats which exist in Pakistan, but I also know that General Musharraf and General Aziz in Pakistan are well aware of what needs to be done.

Pakistan has a responsibility to address terrorism in South Asia, but I believe we do, as well. The United States bears special responsibility in South Asia. During the war in Afghanistan, the United States armed Pakistan's neighbors and militants. Then, in my view, we callously abandoned the region.

The result of that neglect has been disturbing: the Taliban, taking control in Afghanistan; the critical economic conditions in India and Pakistan, not to mention the nuclear weapons development that has taken place.

Now we have an obligation to do our part to help establish stability in South Asia, and it is in our interest to do so. The threat of nuclear conflict and terrorism in South Asia is very real. We must reduce this threat and halt the arms race in South Asia, but I believe that unless Kashmir is addressed, Mr. Chairman, no real progress can be made.

If we turn our attention away from the region as we did after the war in Afghanistan, we risk further erosion, violence, and disillusionment.

We are uniquely positioned as a longstanding ally of Pakistan and as an emerging friend of India to bring the parties together. Given the stake in South Asia, punitive economic sanctions are clearly counterproductive. Democracy will be strengthened not by economic sanctions, but by economic aid.

Funds for cooperative counterterrorism efforts, economic development, civil society building, and respect for the rule of law are needed. The answer is not to further sanction Pakistan or India, but to open up possibilities for cooperation.

I look forward to working with the Members of this Committee and the Administration as we respond to this serious issue and develop an approach to South Asia that recognizes our responsibilities in the region and strengthens our cooperation with our friends and allies.

I thank you for your time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bonior.

I am going to ask our Members to please be brief so that we can get on with the hearing.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I want to fully associate myself with the statements made previously by the gentleman from Michigan. I think the statement was cogent, precise, and right to the point.

It is really a sad commentary, at least in my experience serving as a Member of this Committee, how we have applied such a double standard toward our relationship with Pakistan.

I think this country has been a friend of ours, through thick or thin, and it seems that we have been kicking this country. Every time we always need a whipping boy, we seem to always have Pakistan, which is where we always do this. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for the statement to that effect. We should not limit whatever seems to be the support for friends who support the issues affecting India, but we also have to be mindful of the fact that Pakistan is just as much a friend of ours as is India, and I want to commend the gentleman from Michigan for that statement.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling this hearing.

As my colleague from Southern California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who I know has worked with you in the past and myself on his request for documentation, I share his frustration with the Administration's lack of cooperation in providing this documentation.

Let me also say that I think that there has been a lack of purpose on the mayhem and anarchy coming out of Afghanistan. For

many years now, we have held hearings to try to get the Administration to focus on the lack of policy, the lack of a strategy to try to bring resolution to what has happened there in Afghanistan.

It seems to me that we are not dealing with the terror that is coming out of the region, given the fact that there has been a great call for a policy to try to do something about resolving the underlying problems that have given rise now to Afghanistan offering Usama bin Laden and others a place to do business, a place to prepare for the next round of terrorist activity.

But this is a result of a lack of focus in our foreign policy in South Asia, and I hope that we can muster some attention and resolve in the future to develop a strategy to deal with Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Royce.

I am going to have to ask unanimous consent that the statements by Congressman Peter King, Congressman Joseph Pitts, and Congressman Jim Saxton, in charge of the special oversight panel on terrorism of the Armed Services Committee, be included at this point in the record.

[The prepared statements of Representatives King, Pitts, and Saxton appear in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Without further delay we will proceed with the witnesses. Our first witness today is the Honorable—

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. I would like to make an opening statement.

Chairman GILMAN. Please make it brief so that we can get on with our witnesses.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate any attempt to understand and thwart the presence of terrorism anywhere it appears in the world. But I hope this hearing provides the critical analysis that is much required.

Last October I wanted to take a family who are my constituents to the White House to observe the arrival ceremony of the then leader of Italy. Because I have had such a miserable experience with White House security, I phoned ahead of time and told them what gate I was arriving at and, of course, reporting the requirement of name, Social Security number, etc., for myself and informed the White House that we would be arriving in separate cars. We were told fine and everything would be OK.

I was driven to the White House by a young, 20-year-old white staffer of mine, and my guests were driven in a separate car by another staffer of mine, a young woman of color. Before I could get into the White House, I was insulted at the White House gates because the Secret Service representatives mistook my young black staffer for the Congresswoman of 6 years and asked me to prove my identity. After getting inside the White House, I was challenged at every checkpoint by the Secret Service yet again.

That was nothing compared to the experience of my guests who had been invited by me and who were being escorted by my staffer. They had been vetted by the Secret Service and by White House protocol, but when they showed up, I guess all of the Secret Service anti-profiling lessons just flew out the window as they had with me earlier. The family consisted of a 16-year-old child in her silk Paki-

stani cultural dress and her father, whose hair is beautiful, thick, black, and curly. He also sports a beard.

And so despite all of the correct procedure of communicating with White House protocol, despite the added precaution of calling the White House to let them know the specific gate that we would be arriving at, none of the precaution and preparation on our part worked. I almost did not get inside, and unfortunately my guests did not get inside.

I have to admit that I was angry. I was angry that my guests were denied admission for an event that their Congresswoman had invited them to. I was angry that they had been ordered by Secret Service to get out of the car being driven by my staff person of color who had never ever been treated before in such a manner.

They were dog sniffed at the White House gates as if they were common criminals, and then they were never admitted to the event to which they had been invited, and I was tired. I was tired of being humiliated every time I tried to exercise my very existence as a Congresswoman, tired of people who looked like me and who think like me being persecuted just because we exist.

I have to admit that I shed a tear on that day for the humiliation of my constituents and of myself. But the 16-year-old girl put her arms around me, and she said, "That's OK. I'm used to it."

After much publicity, the First Lady graciously invited the entire family back and gave them a personal apology.

Now, I am sure you are wondering what does this have to do with the subject at hand. I think it has everything to do with the subject matter of today.

Unintended consequences of our own policies and hasty disengagement from those consequences. It is far easier to blame the victim than to solve the problem.

A few months after my White House experience with my guests, the country awoke to news that the Secret Service was being sued by a few courageous black Secret Service agents who had the guts to say that something was rotten inside the Secret Service, and immediately it became clear how that grotesque mistreatment of me and my guests on that day flowed logically from the systemic mistreatment of minorities within the very organization itself and, indeed, our American community at large.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that today this Congress is not going to do to Pakistan what the Secret Service did to my Pakistani American constituents. We need a comprehensive approach to the problem of terrorism, and I will support that. But we also need to be balanced, and we need to get to the root problem and not deal with just the symptoms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. McKinney.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This hearing on global terrorism addresses a subject of great concern not only to the people of this nation, but to people from nations all over the world. We have been the unfortunate witnesses of numerous terrorist attacks all over the world that have destroyed or altered the lives of individuals on nearly every continent.

Whether it is in embassy bombings in Africa, government and commercial office buildings in Oklahoma and New York, car bombs in Ireland, mosque shootings and school bus bombings in Israel, kidnappings in South America, or plane hijackings in Asia, terrorism is a misguided and hateful method of addressing discontent with governments and other groups by targeting random, innocent people.

It is essential that the United States and all nations of good conscience work together on the best methods of combating global terrorism.

The U.S. Government, beginning with this Congress, has a special responsibility as the world's only super power to set an example of even handedness and just dealings when it comes to fighting terrorism. Too often this nation's government and its peoples have chosen to unfairly target ethnic, racial, and religious groups, domestically or overseas, who are different from the majority of Americans when trying to address a social ill or increase our national security.

Throughout American history, these scapegoat groups have included Native Americans, African Americans, Italian and Japanese Americans, Jews, and most recently Arabs and Muslims. Policies based on the misguided targeting of ethnic groups when trying to address our domestic or national security has led to unconstitutional practices, such as indicated by my colleague Cynthia McKinney, racial profiling and the use of secret evidence.

Our focus on terrorism in Southeast Asia should not be for the purpose of condemning or casting aspersions on a particular nation or people because their predominant religion or form of government is different from ours. Congress must additionally resist playing favorites between one nation over another, no matter what political forces pressure us to do so.

In one of the background documents prepared by the Committee, Afghanistan and Pakistan were the two countries singled out as concerns in a region where incidents of government and organizational terrorism exist in many nations. Both nations have experienced major government upheavals and instability in their recent past, and certainly the legitimacy of the Afghan Government is in question.

However, the government of Pakistan has demonstrated continued cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism despite certain internal pressures that question U.S. cooperation. Pakistan has arrested and extradited suspects in the murder of CIA agents and in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and our embassies in Africa.

According to the U.S. Government, Pakistan is considered a friendly nation to the United States and has done a good job in providing security for our embassy and has, overall, been an ally of the United States in our counter-terrorist efforts.

While there may be room for improvement, and certainly there is, in Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, that improvement will come from a continued close relationship with the United States, where information and methodologies are shared for the benefit of both nations and the rest of the world.

Undue criticism will only drive a wedge between us and benefit no one. The United States has a responsibility to be a facilitator in Southeast Asia to additionally help reduce terrorist acts between nations, just as we have been doing in the Middle East.

In closing, let me just remind my colleagues that this hearing focuses on Southeast Asian-centered terrorism. Terrorist acts are a worldwide issue targeted toward people of all backgrounds by terrorists of all backgrounds.

The recent report of the National Commission on Terrorism noted that today's terrorists are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations.

So I would just say, let's make sure that we are fair and even handed as we look at this issue and not take sides, because we cannot help if it appears as though we are on one side as opposed to the other. If we are going to be the facilitators, we need to have an even hand so that we can make sure that we can continue communication with all nations, and then we can combat this terrorism that is going on around the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.

We will be continuing our testimony right through the vote on the journal. I have asked one of our Members to go over and return quickly.

We will now call our first witness today, the Honorable Michael Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, where he has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy.

Ambassador Sheehan was confirmed by the Senate in August 1999. His office chairs the Working Group for Counter-Terrorism, which develops and coordinates policy, manages the State Department Task Force that responds to international incidents, and coordinates government efforts to improve cooperation with foreign governments, including the Administration of the anti-terrorism training assistance program.

Ambassador Sheehan's background includes serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs and as a Special Advisor to the representative of the Secretary General of the U.S. mission to the United Nations.

Ambassador Sheehan retired as a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army after a career that included two tours on the National Security Council's staff. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, adjoining my congressional district.

Ambassador Sheehan.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, and thank you for this opportunity to address the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia.

In our annual report to Congress this year, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, we describe the shift in some detail. This was one of the two trends we identified as the most important recent developments in terrorism, the other being the shift from well organized and hierarchical groups supported by state sponsors of terrorism to the loosely organized international networks of terrorism that are often able to raise funds and sustain themselves by smuggling narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other types of fund raising.

Mr. Chairman, I just returned from the Philippines and before that Colombia, where this new type of terrorism is manifesting itself in a very dangerous way. It was very troubling for American interests in both of those countries of longstanding importance to the United States.

I purposely addressed the trends that I alluded to earlier on the very first page of my introduction in this report to show the importance of these trends, and the increased willingness and ability of terrorists to seek refuge in South Asia are disturbing developments. They require us to refocus our diplomatic energies and policy tools as well.

I have a fairly lengthy written statement that I will submit to the record, Mr. Chairman, and I will briefly cover some of the main points of that statement in my oral remarks this morning.

Chairman GILMAN. So ordered without objection.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I will talk about three areas this morning in my oral remarks. No. 1 is why South Asia. What is important about South Asia?

Second, what we are doing right now.

And, third, what we will do next to deal with this evolving threat.

Why has South Asia become the locus for terrorism around the world? Primarily the reason is Afghanistan, and the complete collapse of the state of Afghanistan starting in 1979 with the invasion of the Soviet army. The long and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan attracted fighters from around the world, many of them at our bequest, in the mid-1980's.

The proximity of Afghanistan to other conflicts, such as Kashmir and others in Central Asia, also contributes to making it a hub of this type of activity. In addition, the welcome mat provided by the Taliban to these fighters that are often supporting the Taliban's fight against the Northern Alliance often also find refuge in Afghanistan for other agendas that they have in different parts of the world.

In Afghanistan, the situation is exacerbated by an explosion of narcotics trafficking and finances involved with that, a virtual arms bazaar throughout the country, and religious extremism that is fostered in many of the Madrasses in Afghanistan and nearby Pakistan.

Afghanistan came to the forefront of attention of the United States, although we had known about it. The increasing support for terrorism in the region came to the forefront after the bombings of our embassy in East Africa in August 1988. Also, last year, as Congressman Gilman mentioned in his opening remarks, we had a good year, only five deaths of Americans from international ter-

rorism, the lowest in many, many years, three in Colombia and two in Central Africa.

We did have continuing threats coming from South Asia, including the terrorist threat around the millennial period that manifested itself in Jordan, that wound its way back into Afghanistan; the hijacking of an aircraft from India that wound up on a runway in Kandahar; and various other threats that manifest themselves around the globe and often have tentacles leading back to the leadership in the camps in Afghanistan.

Why is Afghanistan important? Why is South Asia? Let me mention three reasons.

First, the most immediate are the threats that directly affect us around the world today, and as many of you know, recently the State Department has put out an additional warning, a public announcement of warnings as terrorist threats have increased around the world recently, many of those, again, winding their way back to Afghanistan.

Second, the terrorism that emanates out of this part of the world threatens regional stability. As mentioned by some of the Members here in Pakistan itself, Kashmir conflict, other conflicts in Central Asia, reaching into the Caucasus and the Middle East and beyond.

And finally, over the longer term, as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I am concerned about the caldron of terrorism that is bubbling out of Afghanistan and will continue to threaten American interests in the longer term.

What are we doing to confront this threat? We are moving on a lot of different fronts. I will, again, break those into three areas.

First, on the immediate front, we are working 24 hours a day times 7 days a week to disrupt any cells that threaten Americans around the world. Working with our liaisons with law enforcement and intelligence organizations around the world, we are actively involved in disrupting any activities that threaten American interests. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is ongoing continuously, both the threat our count-threats.

Second, we are working very actively to isolate and contain this threat with pressure on the sanctuary of these groups.

Over the longer term, third, is what I refer to in the report and often in many of my remarks. We want to drain the swamp, which is a term I use to deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations that need space in order to organize its leadership, plan its activities, train its fighters, assemble its equipment and arms in order to conduct attacks. And the primary swamp that I am concerned about right now, Mr. Chairman, is in Afghanistan, although there are many others around the world as well.

Let me say a word about resources while I have the opportunity. I thank this Committee particularly, many of the Members of this Committee and the staff, for the support they have given my office over the years. I would like to emphasize we have two important funding requirements in front of the Congress right now, a funding for the anti-terrorism assistance program and for a center for anti-terrorism security training, CAST, that are being requested by the Administration.

Right now, in particular, the funding for the CAST seems to be in great jeopardy. This center will help us train not only our diplo-

matic security personnel, but primarily, it will train those law enforcement and security people that work with us on a day-to-day basis around the world to disrupt those cells I referred to earlier.

We need, in the 21st century, a 21st century terrorist training facility in order to confront the 21st century terrorist threats. I appreciate your support, Mr. Chairman, and others on the Committee as we work forward on this requirement.

In conclusion, I would like to remind that our efforts to combat terrorism in South Asia and around the world start with our support from Capitol Hill and often from this Committee. Carefully calibrated counterterrorism legislation, such as those regarding state sponsorship, the foreign terrorist organizations, and others are very key to our efforts.

Sufficient resources and the public discourse such as the hearings are also key. Your support coupled with the force of our sustained diplomatic and political efforts will help us drain the swamp in Afghanistan and in other states that are not mustering the political will to confront terrorists.

We have had a great deal of success in the past 20 years, Mr. Chairman. This success can be attributed to our commitment to stay the course in a tough counterterrorism policy and to rally international support. Applying diplomatic pressure, raising political will and levying sanctions, these actions have made many corners of the world intolerable for terrorists.

We must continue to stay the course while adjusting to new geographic threats and a changing face of terrorism. We must maintain strong political will within the Administration and in the Congress to be tough on terrorism and push our allies to do the same.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Committee today. I look forward to answering any of your questions or Members of the Committee.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sheehan appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sheehan.

We have with us Alan Eastham, who has a long record of service in the State Department and in the service of his country. He is now a Special Assistant and Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He was involved with the Near East and South East in his responsibilities for a number of years, including Sri Lanka and as the India Desk Officer.

He has been a staff officer in the Office of Combating Terrorism, and he has had a wide range of experience overseas, in South Asia.

You may proceed, Mr. Eastham.

STATEMENT OF ALAN W. EASTHAM, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. EASTHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to you and the Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come here today to talk about an issue of great importance to the United States and its interests in South Asia.

Let me also express the regrets of Assistant Secretary Karl Inderfurth, who was originally invited to attend this hearing. He

is presently on his way back from a visit to China where he consulted on South Asian issues with the Chinese Government, coincidentally on the same day as Ambassador Holbrooke was there to talk about other issues relating to South Asia and other parts of the world.

I would like to begin by talking about some of the events, actions we have taken since the last time we had an opportunity to testify before Congress regarding terrorism in South Asia. I would remind the Committee that in October 1999, the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously passed U.N. Resolution 1267, which calls on the Taliban to hand over Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to justice.

Since October of last year, we have been diligently monitoring the application of the sanctions which were applied in that resolution, which include effects on financial transactions affecting the Taliban and a ban on flights by the Afghan National Airline, which is controlled by the Taliban, outside Afghanistan.

With Russia and other countries we have been talking in recent weeks about the situation in Afghanistan, including terrorism. With India this year we have established a joint working group on counterterrorism which first met in February of this year.

India has also agreed to accept and work closely with a legal attache at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, and a country which has not yet been mentioned in this morning's proceedings. With Sri Lanka, a friendly country which has been fighting an insurgent group that employs the weapon of terrorism, we have enjoyed excellent cooperation in a number of areas related to counterterrorism.

I have a lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, which I will at this point summarize if that would be agreeable to you.

Chairman GILMAN. With unanimous consent, so ordered.

Mr. EASTHAM. Thank you.

Ambassador Sheehan and his colleagues have rightly stressed the shifting locus of international terrorism to South Asia. Though several South Asian countries face terrorist threats of one kind or another, terrorists in Afghanistan pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests, lives, and property in the region, and it will be that country which is largely the subject of my testimony today.

I would also like to take this opportunity to remind the Committee of a number of tragic incidents which have occurred over the past several years in the region for which I bear some responsibility.

Beginning in March 1995, members of the Consulate General staff in Karachi were murdered in transit between their homes and the office. That case remains under active investigation to this day.

A similar incident occurred in late 1997 in which four American businessmen were shot to death, and that case also is under investigation.

In Kashmir in July 1995, several foreign tourists were abducted while hiking in the mountains of that region. I have to say that we have devoted a great deal of time and attention to the case of Mr. Donald Hutchings, the American citizen who is still missing from the incident, and with whose family we are still in touch. We are still very actively pursuing that case.

Ambassador Sheehan has mentioned the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight last December, which had a profound effect and some relation to the earlier kidnapping in Kashmir by the fact that one of the Indian prisoners who was released as a result of the demands of the hijackers was also the subject of demands of the kidnappers of the Americans from 1995.

At present the hijackers were last seen at the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The gentleman who was released from Indian custody is presently in Pakistan. There have been no arrests in that case.

And I would also draw your attention to November 12, 1999, when the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was the subject of a rocket attack from parked vehicles.

The reason I bring these cases up, Mr. Chairman, is to remind you that there is still a clear and present threat from terrorism in the South Asia region. It affects U.S. interests. It affects U.S. personnel. It affects U.S. property, and it is certainly worthy of this Committee's attention and the attention of the Congress.

There have been many other such incidents against Indian interests in Kashmir, bombings in cities in India and Pakistan and attacks, as I mentioned, against the government of Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, which we have designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

These include an assassination attempt in December against Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga, which injured her and killed several other people. It is clear that the trend is toward more and more deadly attacks against targets in South Asia.

We have strongly condemned these attacks in the region, as we do everywhere in the world. It is not acceptable and, indeed, reprehensible for individuals and groups to adopt this tactic as a means of achieving political goals.

With respect to Kashmir, Mr. Chairman, the President, when he visited South Asia in March, set out a number of principles which call for restraint, rejection of violence, respect for the line of control in Kashmir, and for India and Pakistan to renew their dialogue. We believe those principles are eminently practical and that they would, if pursued actively by the parties in South Asia, lead to a reduction in U.S. violence and, indeed, considerable U.S. support in that regard.

It is Afghanistan, however, where the shifting locus of terrorism is most pronounced. I have in my written statement for the record addressed the historical factors in some detail. I know that Mr. Rohrabacher has also addressed more recent history.

I would just note, however, the immense suffering of the Afghan people over the last 20 years since the invasion by the Soviet army of that country in December 1979. One major factor to which Ambassador Sheehan has already alluded is the fact that over the past 20 years an entire generation of young men has grown up who know nothing but war.

There is also an entire generation of young women who have come into mature life during that period who have known nothing but suffering, and it is toward peace in Afghanistan that our efforts are directed.

Sadly for the Afghans, the brutality and ruthlessness that they learned in fighting the Soviets has carried over into fighting other Afghans as the Afghan civil war continued for the past 10 years.

The breakdown of central authority in Afghanistan, the all too easy access to the tools of terrorism in the form of weapons and explosives, and the rise of ideologies in which violence against innocents is considered a legitimate tool, have contributed to an increase in international terrorism emanating from that region.

The rise of the Taliban has also been a contributing factor. The Taliban had no previous experience when they took power in Afghanistan in administering a government. They had little experience with the outside world. They had a strong ideological motivation based in Islam and in the Pushtu-based society from which they derive, and they had a strong need for support from any quarter.

This led them to depend on extremely questionable outside sources of support, including those who advocate violence from outside Afghanistan, and increasingly the financial benefits of the narcotics trade.

They have since demonstrated that they support and sympathize with goals from outside the region, which include the removal of U.S. forces from the region of the Gulf, and they have taken no significant steps to curtail the pursuit of terrorist means to achieve goals emanating from Afghanistan.

Ambassador Sheehan has outlined the steps we are taking to defend ourselves and to push back international terrorism. We have repeatedly demonstrated this over the past several years.

One factor I would also like to note, Mr. Chairman, is the need for governments to realize that support for their groups will backfire. These groups always, and I stress always, pose a threat to the stability, security, and other real national interests of their hosts and patrons, no matter the short term political advantage which might be seen from activities against national adversaries.

The Taliban in Afghanistan have yet to learn this lesson.

At the same time that we have been pressing the Taliban to take action to prevent the use of their territory for international terrorism, we have been careful to continue contributing to humanitarian programs in Afghanistan. We have provided support for schools. We are the major donor of food assistance to Afghans. We provide medical supplies and most recently have just announced a new \$4 million donation for drought relief in Afghanistan, a country which is suffering from a significant drought which may lead to significant suffering and starvation in that country.

We have had, we think, a positive impact on the lives of ordinary Afghans because it is not their fault, and they should not suffer because the people who control that country support international terrorism.

With respect to Pakistan, several members have noted the close relationship we have had over the years with that country. We have also worked together against terrorism. Pakistan has offered its cooperation, as has been noted previously during this hearing.

Pakistan wants to see peace and stability in Afghanistan. After all, Afghanistan is next door to Pakistan. It has considerable influence in Afghanistan and with the Taliban.

Pakistan has made known its view that the presence of Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan is an obstacle to stability, and Pakistan makes the point that it does not control the Taliban.

We will continue and have urged Pakistan to use every aspect of its influence with the Taliban to convince them to deal with this issue in the manner called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267.

We are also very concerned at the problem of terrorism in Pakistan. The country has taken some recent, very welcome steps to address this problem and has arrested a number of persons wanted for terrorist crimes, as has already been noted, and has announced it's taking a close look at foreigners living in Pakistan to insure they're there for lawful and peaceful purposes.

I would note that the Pakistan press today, Mr. Chairman, reports that a senior delegation from the Pakistan Interior Ministry will be going to Afghanistan later this month to talk to the Taliban authorities about matters pertaining to terrorism and narcotics, and we welcome that as a manifestation of Pakistan's intent to deal with this problem as it affects that country.

We are also concerned, as I noted, because both Pakistani and U.S. interests have been attacked in that country. Some terrorists and their supporters certainly continue to live in and move through Pakistan. This includes the organization formally known as Harakat-ul-Ansar, which was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States.

We will continue to urge Pakistan to take action against such groups and to take all steps necessary to see that it does not become a safe haven or a safe transit point.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can take as the example the counter-narcotics cooperation we have enjoyed with Pakistan for the past 20 years. We have come to the point where it is possible to see the end of the road for opium production in Pakistan. We have had exemplary cooperation with that country in this area, and we hope that we can take that as a model for cooperation on counterterrorism.

I thank you very much for the opportunity. I will be happy to take your questions, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eastham appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Eastham and Secretary Sheehan.

Let me first address Ambassador-at-Large Michael Sheehan. At your recent Central Asia terrorism meeting here in Washington, sponsored by the State Department, several of the government representatives from nations in the region impacted by radical Islamic terrorism talked about terrorist camps within Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan.

Are you aware of any terrorist training camps inside of Pakistan?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, our primary concern regarding camps is in Afghanistan, and I talked to those members of all five countries from Central Asia that came to our conference. We had very productive discussions with them. They were all concerned primarily about Afghanistan and the camps there.

The situation in Pakistan is complicated. I may need a closed session to go into some more details on some of the aspects of it. In our annual report, we do mention the movement of terrorist groups through Pakistan. Primarily my concern is the camps are in Afghanistan. Often in order to leave Afghanistan, many terrorists move through Pakistan, particularly through Peshawar and out through the region, but they also move north through the Central Asian states as well.

But I think any other details regarding some activity of those camps we might do in closed session; but I would underscore to you, Mr. Chairman, the major source of camps for the training of those types of groups reside in Afghanistan.

Chairman GILMAN. But my question is: specifically, are there any training camps in Pakistan?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I reviewed that question carefully with my analysts before coming up here. I think I need, based on their advice, to talk to you about that in a closed session.

Chairman GILMAN. A number of the Central Asian countries indicated that there was information of terrorist camps in Pakistan. Are they accurate? Are those statements accurate?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think I would have to discuss that in a closed session.

Chairman GILMAN. All right. With regard to both panelists, what is your candid view of the level of cooperation that we've received from Pakistan in recent years in the fight against international terrorism in the region?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, the Pakistani Government has cooperated with the U.S. Government in counter-terrorist actions over the past many years, and it continues to do so actively as we speak right now regarding helping us deal with specific threats to our security, both those threats that affect us within Pakistan, our embassy, and other points of interest, but also regarding individuals that may be within Pakistan or transiting through Pakistan.

So in that regard, they get fairly good grades on cooperation on specific cases. The other side of the ledger, I must say, is their policies in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Kashmir that contribute to the problem of terrorism that emanates out of Afghanistan. So it's a mixed record. They cooperate, but they also have policies that are very troubling to us, and we have had very frank discussions with them on those policies and urge them to address those issues.

We remain closely engaged at a very high level with the Pakistanis on these issues, and my particular concern is their relationship to the Taliban and how that affects our interest in counterterrorism.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Sheehan.

Secretary Eastham, did you want to comment on that?

Mr. EASTHAM. I would just add that I would second Ambassador Sheehan's remark regarding cooperation on specific cases. The threats to U.S. installations—

Chairman GILMAN. Would you put the mic a little closer to you?

Mr. EASTHAM. Sure. The threats to U.S. installations, facilities, personnel, and interests in Pakistan receive the highest level of co-

operation from the Pakistan Government. As Ambassador Sheehan has noted, the question of the Taliban and on the pursuit of longer term interests with respect to Afghanistan has an effect on Pakistani attitudes with respect to that country.

It would not be inappropriate to mention that policies toward Kashmir also have an effect, but I think that I would endorse Ambassador Sheehan's remarks.

Chairman GILMAN. To both panelists, why has the State Department failed in not designating the Pakistani based LET group [LASHKAR-e TAYYABA], a foreign terrorist organization, especially since the legal threshold is not very high?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, every 2 years, actually by legislation, the Congress requires us to review foreign terrorist organizations. However, this year I have also decided, within the limited resources in my office, to review other groups during the year because we can designate them as terrorist organizations at any time during the year.

We are currently reviewing the LET, the LASHKAR-e TAYYABA, actively for its designation as a foreign terrorist organization. The work has been done at the analytical level within the State Department. It is a very complicated and legal process, the designation of a foreign terrorist organization, and right now we are working with the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury to complete that legal analysis.

We have been challenged twice in the past on our designation of FTOs in the U.S. court system, and we have won both times. So it is incumbent on us to be very well prepared before we designate a group for terrorism, and right now the LET or the LASHKAR-e TAYYABA, I think you are referring to, is under close review right now, and I expect, Mr. Chairman, to have an answer as to whether they will be designated within the next weeks, perhaps months, depending on that legal process.

Chairman GILMAN. We would hope you would keep this Committee informed of your progress in that direction.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think one of the things that we want to make sure people see clearly is that our concerns here are isolated to terrorist activities and threats directed at the United States and our allies, and that what we want to make sure does not happen is that we do not want to create the appearance in any way that there is a conflict here between the West and Islam or, you know, people of the Muslim faith.

These are isolated incidents, and certainly most of Islam, like most religions, focus on peaceful relations with their neighbors. So I just want to make sure that the fact that we happen to focus on this region today does not leave people with any other impression.

My first question is that I am getting the sense, more and more, that it is hard to figure out what comes first, but there is an economic aspect to all of this. You look at Colombia, and you find the drug lords and the terrorists there. You go to Lebanon and you find in the Bekaa Valley they are growing poppies. You come to this area, and again, the drug trade, you can look at it and see that the drug trade is an easy way to make lots of money.

The relationship here seems to be very tightly woven. So this is my first question. How much of the activity here is profit motivated, trying to make money off drugs with a little bit of fervor on the side for your terrorist organization, and how much is terrorism with its own goals associated with that?

The second question is: What are the countries that have relationships and provide assistance to the Taliban and the government in Afghanistan?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I am sorry. What was the second question, again?

Mr. GEJDENSON. The second question is: Which countries have relations with the government in Afghanistan and provide assistance, military, other than humanitarian, of course?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. All right, Mr. Gejdenson. On the first question regarding your question about terrorism and its economic roots, etc., you are absolutely right that most of the terrorism that I see, as the Coordinator when I look around the world, emanates from places where there is a breakdown of state control. The old days of state sponsorship have really waned considerably, although there are a few that I have great concern with, but those are less of my immediate concern.

When you have a complete breakdown of lawlessness in a place like Afghanistan, where you have the confluence of narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, other types of illicit activity, coupled with these other terrorist groups, you find this phenomenon at a high rate.

In Afghanistan there are both types of terrorists, those that seem to be just in the profit business and others that are politically motivated. Some of them are just politically motivated, and those are some of the ones, frankly, that are more troubling.

The ones that get caught up in narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities sort of lose interest in their terrorist goals. They're still of major concern, but not as threatening as the ones that are very focused on their political agenda. So there is a little bit of both in Afghanistan.

Regarding your second question on support for the Taliban, the Taliban finds itself extraordinarily isolated around the world today. Initially they were recognized only by three governments: by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudis and the UAE both have an extraordinarily strange relationship with the Taliban right now, and I have discussed that issue with both of them at very senior levels.

They have put a lot of pressure on the Taliban on a lot of issues regarding terrorism, narcotics traffic, and others, and have been cooperating with us on bringing pressure to bear on the Taliban.

The other country is Pakistan. Its relationship with the Taliban is also longstanding and complicated, and I would not exactly describe it as very warm at this point. I will let Al Eastham respond to this in more detail, but I know that the Pakistani Government is engaging the Taliban right now regarding all of the issues that we are concerned about in trying to get them to turn around their policies. Whether those efforts will bear fruit remains to be seen, but those are the main countries with relations with the Taliban.

Mr. EASTHAM. I would just add that, on your first question regarding the nexus between drugs and terrorism, the Taliban have an ambiguous position on this. They say that the drug trade is un-Islamic, but they seem to permit it to occur and, indeed, to tax it along the way as a source of revenue; and this is a dichotomy in their policy, which is a little bit difficult to deal with because the two policies are completely opposite.

We have been doing a great deal to focus on the problem of interdicting narcotics flowing out of Afghanistan. We have been working with all of Afghanistan's neighbors in this direction and also with the U.N. drug control program.

There is a dilemma in trying to suppress the narcotics traffic in Afghanistan. You have to provide assistance to the country to be able to do that, and that is very hard for us to do with the Taliban.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Under the present restrictions, are we able to do democracy building in, for instance, Pakistan with the present sanctions? The present leadership in Pakistan is arguing it is trying to establish democracy at the grassroots level. Can we participate in that or are we blocked from doing that with our sanctions?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We can, Mr. Gejdenson, and we do.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And if I could indulge my colleagues, one last thing. Are there any countries supplying weapons to the Taliban at this point?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I think I will have to go in closed session on that as well, Mr. Gejdenson. What I know about that is from classified sources. I will be glad to talk to you about it after this.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you.

You might check with Mr. Rohrabacher for any other information you need on Afghanistan. He seems to be very knowledgeable about the military situation there.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This is a joke. I mean, you have to go to closed session to tell us where the weapons are coming from?

Well, how about let's make a choice. There is Pakistan or Pakistan or Pakistan. Where do you think the Taliban—right as we speak—are getting their weapons. I have not read any classified documents. Everybody in the region knows that Pakistan is involved with a massive supply of military weapons and has been since the very beginning of the Taliban.

Let me just state for the record here before I get into my questions that I think there is a—and it is not just you, Mr. Ambassador, but it is this Administration and perhaps other Administrations as well. I do not believe that terrorism flows from a lack of state control. A breakdown of state control, and all of a sudden you have terrorism.

That is not what causes terrorism. What causes terrorism is a lack of freedom and democracy, a lack of a means to solve one's problems through a democratic process.

Afghanistan from the very beginning, when the Reagan Administration was involved with helping the Afghans fight the Russians, which were engaged in trying to put a totalitarian government there; because of Pakistan's insistence, a lion's share of our support

went to a guy named Hek Makti Argulbadin, who had no democratic tendencies whatsoever.

And since the Russians left, the United States has not been supporting any type of somewhat free, somewhat democratic alternatives in Afghanistan, and there are such alternatives, and those of us who have been involved know that.

So there is no democracy or freedom in Afghanistan where people who are good and decent and courageous have a chance to cleanse their society of the drug dealers and the fanatics that torture and repress especially the women of Afghanistan. The men of Afghanistan are not fanatics like the Taliban either. They would like to have a different regime.

Only the United States has given—and I again make this charge—the United States has been part and parcel to supporting the Taliban all along and still is, let me add. You do not have any type of democracy in Afghanistan. You have a military government in Pakistan now that is arming the Taliban to the teeth.

And in Kashmir, what have you got? You have got an Indian Government that supposedly is democratic, steadfastly refusing to permit those people to have an election to solve the problems there democratically. You have got Christians; you have got Seekers throughout India and Pakistan and Jamou where the people's rights are being denied them. It is a breakdown of democracy on the subcontinent, not a breakdown in state control that is causing the violence that threatens the world right now.

Let me note that 3 years ago I tried to arrange support, aid, humanitarian aid to a non-Taliban controlled section of Afghanistan, the Bamiyan area. Mr. Chairman, the State Department did everything they could to thwart these humanitarian medical supplies from going into Bamiyan.

And we have heard today that we are very proud that we are still giving aid to Afghanistan. Let me note that aid has always gone to Taliban areas. So what message does that send the people of Afghanistan? We have been supporting the Taliban because all of our aid goes to the Taliban areas, and when people from the outside try to put aid into areas not controlled by the Taliban, they are thwarted by our own State Department.

Let me just note that that same area, Bamiyan, where I tried to help those people who were opposed to the Taliban, Bamiyan now is the headquarters of Mr. bin Laden. Surprise, surprise.

Everyone in this Committee has heard me time and again over the years say unless we did something Afghanistan was going to become a base for terrorism and drug dealing. Mr. Chairman, how many times did you hear me say that?

This Administration either ignored that or are part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Again, I am sorry Mr. Inderfurth is not here to defend himself, but let me state for the record at a time when the Taliban were vulnerable, the top person in this Administration, Mr. Inderfurth, and Bill Richardson personally went to Afghanistan and convinced the anti-Taliban forces not to go on the offensive. Furthermore, they convinced all of the anti-Taliban forces and their supporters, to disarm and to cease their flow of support for the anti-Taliban forces.

At that same moment, Pakistan initiated a major resupply effort, which eventually caused the defeat of almost all of the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Now, with a history like that, it is very hard, Mr. Ambassador, for me to sit here and listen to someone say our main goal is to drain the swamp—and the swamp is Afghanistan—because the United States created that swamp in Afghanistan, and the United States policies have undercut those efforts to create a freer and more open society in Afghanistan which was consistent with the beliefs of the Afghan people.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield for one statement?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I certainly will.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I was wondering. During the time that the Administration supported the Taliban and created this policy, who was President during those years?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, there were several Presidents, and I would say that George Bush has to accept some of the blame, but I think the current Administration—no, the Taliban did not exist before that, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Gejdenson, one of the other myths is that the Taliban were part and parcel of the Mujahadin. The Taliban, as both of you know, were not part of the Mujahadin. The Taliban basically sat out the war and came on the scene afterward. Mu Omar was not a renowned commander in the Mujahadin.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher, did you want the witnesses to respond?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, one last note. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Muslims are the victims of terrorism just as much as anyone else. In fact, Muslims are suffering more than anyone else, and I agree with my colleagues that we have to be very careful. Mr. Gejdenson was absolutely right in making sure that as we look at this Taliban drug-related terrorism that is now affecting all of us, that we do not do something to send a message that this is something to do with the Islamic faith because it does not. They are victims as well.

And if you have any comments, please feel free. Thank you for giving me 5 minutes.

Chairman GILMAN. Did the panelists want to respond at all?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I would, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Sheehan.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. First of all, Mr. Rohrabacher, I am sorry that you think that it is a joke that I will not respond on the issue of support for the arms for the Taliban. The information that I have, which I cannot respond by public sources, is based on intelligence methods, and I do not have the authority to speak about that in this session, but I will be glad to talk to you or other Members afterward.

Second, regarding the responsibility the U.S. Government has for Afghanistan in the situation there, I do not accept that conclusion at all. The United States did participate in helping the Mujahadin reject the Soviet occupation in the mid-1980's, and that was a policy that I think was a correct one at that time.

The situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of that state since 1979, has primarily to do with the situation in Afghanistan. Certainly there were those responsible, whether it was the Soviet occupiers or those who were involved in the civil war that has waged there for 20 years, but the idea that the U.S. Government is responsible for everything in Afghanistan is not true.

The idea that we support the Taliban I also reject, as well, completely. I have spent 18 months in this job leading the effort within the U.S. Government and around the world to bring pressure on the Taliban. After the bombing of the embassies in East Africa, when I got hired for this job, I have made it my sole effort, my primary effort in this job to bring pressure on that regime.

The U.S. Government leads that effort in providing pressure on that regime. My office leads that effort within the U.S. Government. We started with an executive order in August 1999 that brought sanctions to bear on the Taliban. We led the effort in the United Nations to bring international sanctions against them.

We are also leading the effort internationally right now to look at further measures against the Taliban. It is the U.S. Government that is leading that effort. We are ahead of everybody else to bring pressure on the Taliban, and the Taliban knows it. Those other member states within the United Nations and the other communities know our efforts to bring pressure to bear on that organization because of its support for terrorism.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Eastham, did you want to comment?

Mr. EASTHAM. Yes, sir, I would.

I would be happy to defend Mr. Inderfurth if you would like, Mr. Rohrabacher, even if he is not here in person.

I would just note that I have spent nearly 15 years of my life working on this part of the world. I was with the Mujahadin at Peshawar from 1984 to 1987. I was in the consulate at Peshawar at that time, and I have been back on this account now. I began my 6th year on the South Asia account this time around this week.

I was in Pakistan when you were trying your effort to put air-drop assistance into Bamiyan. So I am quite familiar with the history of the whole episode.

And I can say that at no point, at no point in the last 6 years has the United States of America offered its support to the Taliban. This is why I think that despite the fact we have provided you nearly 1,000 documents in response to the requests of the Chairman that you have not been able to find the support for the Taliban, because it is not there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is incorrect, by the way, and I will state that for the record. That is incorrect. I have found several references and documents that have been kept from me indicating what our policy formation about the Taliban has been. So that it not accurate.

Mr. EASTHAM. Well, we have a fundamental difference of opinion then about the record of what this Administration has done with respect to the Taliban.

But I will say that our goals with respect to the Taliban have shifted over the past 2 years almost since the East Africa bombings. When the Taliban first came into power in Afghanistan, we

had an agenda which addressed terrorism, narcotics, human rights including the rights of women, and bringing peace to Afghanistan. We tried to address all of those at the same time.

After the East Africa bombing, the terrorism problem became much more acute and a much higher priority in terms of what we were doing, but we have been addressing all of these issues since the first day the Taliban came into being, and particularly since they came to power in Kabul.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just had a couple of questions I wanted to ask Mr. Eastham. Is Afghanistan currently a full fledged member of the United Nations?

Mr. EASTHAM. Yes, it is.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And by all standards, 187 members of the United Nations recognized the sovereignty of Afghanistan through the Taliban?

Mr. EASTHAM. I am not an expert on this, but I think I can address it in terms general enough that I do not make a major mistake.

Afghanistan's credentials as a member of the United Nations have never been rejected by the credentials committee, and the Northern Alliance delegation, the delegation representing the entity headed by Burhannudin Rabbani still occupies the seat of Afghanistan at the United Nations.

At the same time the Taliban has a presence in New York as a group, but they do not sit in United Nations councils.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The Taliban group does not sit in the United Nations council?

Mr. EASTHAM. That is correct.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. But by all legitimacy, all other nations do recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan in its bilateral as well as multilateral relations?

Mr. EASTHAM. No, that is not correct. There are only three countries that have formally recognized the Taliban as the governing entity in Afghanistan. Those three are, as Ambassador Sheehan mentioned, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan. No other country has, to my knowledge, established formal diplomatic relations or recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are our closest allies and we committed a tremendous amount of arms and assistance to these two countries to fight Soviet invasion; is that correct?

Mr. EASTHAM. That's correct.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And what was the approximate amount in value of what we gave in terms of armaments and everything to these two countries to fight Soviet invasion?

Mr. EASTHAM. I cannot characterize any amounts which might have been provided under programs other than the assistance provided Pakistan. With respect to Pakistan, we provided something

in the neighborhood of \$3 billion, \$3.2 billion in official assistance from 1982 until the imposition of sanctions in 1990.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I wanted to ask Secretary Sheehan. You mentioned that you still have concerns about the policies that the Pakistani Government has concerning terrorism, and I want to know what specific policies does the Pakistani Government have that is of concern to the Administration.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We have concerns on both fronts, the east and the west. In the east, starting with Kashmir, we have concerns about the Pakistani Government, particularly their intelligence service support to groups that we have designated as foreign terrorist organizations and support for those groups that are operating in Kashmir in that situation there.

Second, and of more immediate concern to me, is Pakistan's long relationship with the Taliban, which started in late 1994 when the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan and continues to this day. They are the primary relationship, the Taliban, that Pakistan has.

But as I mentioned in my remarks, it is a complicated one. The Pakistanis increasingly understand, I believe, they increasingly understand the threat that the Taliban and its policies have and the backwash back into Pakistan itself.

So we have concerns with the Pakistanis on both of those issues that we have talked to them about at the highest levels.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As you know, the political situation in Pakistan has also been very serious. We have a military general who felt very strongly that he had to take control of the government because of the problems. Do you think that maybe it is not because that they are not anti-terrorist but because they just do not have the proper resources to properly control their borders when these terrorists go through its territories?

What are we doing to give assistance to the Pakistani Government to alleviate this problem perhaps? Are we assisting them accordingly?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I think the chief executive, Mucharev, definitely has his hands full, and as he has said many times before, his primary concern is turning around the economy in Pakistan, which is truly in tough shape.

We do support Pakistan in a variety of different ways, and perhaps Al Eastham is better equipped to answer that question. We have had long ranging consultations with them on how to help them move in the proper directions in terms of democratic reform, in terms of economic reform, which will give them the strength politically to make some of the tough decisions they have to make regarding terrorism.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You know, there is a sense of hesitancy. If I were a Pakistani leader, I remember a couple of years ago, and my good friend from California will recall, Pakistan paid \$600 million up front for the aircraft that we were supposed to deliver, and we never did.

How are we to deal with other countries if we do not keep our promises in that respect?

Mr. EASTHAM. Well, we reached an understanding with the Pakistan Government which settled that claim a year ago, and we are

in the process of implementing a settlement which is satisfactory to both sides regarding the question of the aircraft.

The aircraft delivery was denied, however, I would note, because of legislation which required a Presidential certification relating to the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. We were constrained by the legislative factor.

We also have a considerable burden of sanctions relating to Pakistan in the nuclear field, potentially in the terrorism, religious freedom, and narcotics fields, and the ultimate sanction which exists now, which is the sanction against U.S. assistance—

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My point—

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time has, but I just want to make my point here, which the fact that this government or this country paid \$600 million, and all of a sudden we have all kinds of restrictions, and then we hung onto their money for years until just now we made this settlement, and to me that is very unfair. It is one sided.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. We will be continuing right through the vote.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I am particularly concerned about the social stability of Pakistan. Regional security is at risk of being seriously undermined if the troubling social trends we have seen continue. I am especially concerned about the Madras schools whose curriculum encourages radicalism, and as you recognized, Ambassador Sheehan, in your testimony, you mentioned anti-Americanism as well.

This is the same style education which gave rise to the Taliban and its militarism and the Taliban's horrible human rights practices, especially with respect to women. I think there's a direct cause and effect between this type of propaganda that occurs in the schools.

Now, Pakistan, in my view, is on dangerous ground with the operations of these schools, and I believe that the continuation of this education threatens the very foundation of the Pakistani state, and I think it threatens India, and I think it threatens the entire region.

I have spoken with Pakistani Government officials and have been told that General Musharraf is working very hard to emphasize the teaching of science and the teaching of technology in these schools and trying to develop a different curriculum, one that would contribute to economic development and lift Pakistanis out of poverty.

I also wanted to recognize your statement in your report, Ambassador, where you say terrorism is a perversion of the teachings of Islam, and I want to commend you for making that observation in your report.

My question, though, is to what extent is the central government of Pakistan having success in modifying what these schools are teaching Pakistan's young people. You discuss in your testimony

their intentions. Have there been effective actions that are occurring there?

As I say, I think this is cause and effect, and I would like to know your observation.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Let me take a first crack, Mr. Congressman. I am sure Mr. Eastham will have some comment as well.

Mr. ROYCE. Sure.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I am glad you asked the question about Madrases. It is an important one, and one that has to be carefully reviewed. This is an issue that has been of concern with me from the first day on the job.

Madrases are nothing more than schools that have filled a vacuum in Pakistan where there are very often no schools or bad schools, and many Madrases are good schools run by legitimate people with the proper purpose in mind, to educate their children.

There is a small percentage of them that are of concern to us. Those are ones that have a radical or extreme underpinning, that promote ideologies that are threatening. In fact, some of the Madrases along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan contributed to the radicalization of many of the fighters that now are of great concern to us.

The issue of education in Pakistan is a fundamental one, and the issue of Madrases is a careful one for the Pakistani Administration to deal with. They have talked to us about wanting to gain control of the small number of those extreme Madrases and shutting them down, and also to have better control of the curriculum of some of the other Madrases that are trying to do the right thing educating the youth of Pakistan.

So it is a complicated question, one that I think the Pakistani Government understands. They understand also the sensitivity of the issue and are working to address it.

The progress will not be measured in the short term, Mr. Congressman. It will take time, and we will have to see what success they have in addressing that issue.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I commend you for your focus on education and propaganda because that question and which direction that takes is going to have a very real consequence in terms of terrorism in very short order.

Let me also make the observation to the extent that we can de-escalate tensions between Pakistan and India and reduce the overall budget dedicated to armaments, those are funds in South Asia that instead can go into public education so that there is not the need for the development, the creation of these alternative sources of education.

Part of the problem in South Asia is the degree of the budgets in these countries that goes toward military armaments.

Now, I would like just for a second to bring up another issue that is a little bit outside the scope of this hearing; but I serve as Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, and in reading your report, it mentions the Revolutionary United Front and Sierra Leone. This is a Libyan trained and Liberian backed organization whose practice has been cutting off the arms and legs of little children in Sierra Leone.

If you go into Freetown, there are several thousand amputees, many of them as young as 2 years old. That organization, known as the RUF, has made war on a democratically-elected government and should be listed as a terrorist organization. I would hope you would consider in your next report doing so.

I say that because many Members of this Committee, including the Ranking Member, including the Chairman of this Committee, have spent considerable time on this issue of Sierra Leone, and this report should reflect the reality of what is happening on the ground. I do not feel that was reflected by the fact that RUF is not mentioned as one of these organizations.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Ms. McKinney.

Mr. ROYCE. Could I have a response to that though, Mr. Chairman, if I could, on the RUF especially?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We will review the RUF during this year, as well as before the end of our 2-year period. I am familiar with that organization. Much of the activity they are involved with falls more in the box of war criminality, which is a heinous crime in either case. Whether they fit into the box of foreign terrorist organization is under review, Mr. Congressman, and I will stay in touch with you on that.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to say to Mr. Sheehan that I think that that is a totally inadequate and insufficient response to that question. I would like Chairman Royce to know that on May 6, 1999, I wrote a letter to the President, to the Secretary of State, and I presume it got down to you as well, asking for the designation of RUF as a terrorist organization, and I can tell you that I got not a single straight answer from this Administration in response to that.

Now, it appears to me that this Administration has cleaved itself, in its policy, to rapists of 12-year-old little girls and of hand choppers. So that response is totally inadequate. You have had it under review for far too long, and you still have not done anything about it, and you are still supporting the RUF.

I would also like to associate myself with the remarks of Congressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher, too. It appears to me that the State Department is excellent at writing revisionist history. In Mr. Sheehan's testimony, you state that this instability can be started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decade-long civil war which followed.

That kind of passive language reminds me about what has been said about Mozambique by the opponents of Frelimo and that civil war that was visited upon Mozambique most unnecessarily; by the opponents of MPLA and the civil war that was visited upon Angola by those who opposed MPLA; about the civil war that was visited upon South Africa by the opponents of the ANC, and in each of those instances it was U.S. policy to support the other guys.

And so now we get to hear these testimonies that include the lack of information in terms of the U.S. role. Congressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher are absolutely right

that the United States did have a role to play in the current situation in Afghanistan. We provided weapons there, and we left those weapons there. And so if there is any instability, we do not need to just point the finger and say that the problem is Afghanistan's, as you have said earlier. The problem is also ours, and we need to deal with that.

Additionally, and I guess finally, on page 6, Mr. Sheehan, of your written testimony you say if there is a criminal in your basement and you aware that he has been conducting criminal activities from your house, even if you are not involved in the crimes you are responsible for them. In fact, your willingness to give him refuge makes you complicit in his actions, past and present.

I would just suggest that that message that you delivered to the Taliban's Foreign Minister is also applicable to the United States itself, and it certainly ought to be applicable to the policies that we have formulated and pursued with respect to Africa. We have supported criminals on that continent, continue to support criminals on that continent, and for some reason seem incapable of making people pay for the crimes that they commit, and of course, we are complicit in those crimes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Would you like to respond, Ambassador?

Ms. MCKINNEY. No need for a response because you will not get anything of any substance.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I will respond, Mr. Congressman.

First of all, on the RUF: Murder, rape, cutting off of arms are heinous crimes. They are not necessarily terrorism. They can be terrorism, but not necessarily international terrorism by the definition that we are required to respond to by the legislation that we are given.

My office reviews the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, and I receive no pressure. If I got pressure from anywhere else in the building, it would have no effect on me. If I determine, if our office determines that the RUF meets the criteria to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the criteria of the legislation that is clearly spelled out, we will do so.

Second, regarding our role in Afghanistan, I have repeatedly said many times and before we have played a role in Afghanistan in the 1980's, one I thought was an appropriate one at that time, and contributed to the situation there. I think we should acknowledge that and be part of the solution in Afghanistan.

But I do not think the U.S. Government is responsible in the entirety for the situation, for the chaos and suffering in Afghanistan, or for the rise of terrorism from that region.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Well, I am the Chairman. So I have a little prerogative. What a miracle this is. I actually have more than 5 minutes.

Before I go on, this Committee will recess as we get into the next vote, and Chairman Gilman will be back. In the meantime I will do my mischief.

First of all, let's talk a little bit about terrorism. Terrorism is not just when someone who is outside government commits an act of violence against unarmed opponents, whether civilians, noncombat-

ants, etc. Terrorism can also be conducted by a government, and there are lots of terrorist examples of what government does at times, for example, in the Kashmir, and let us not forget that when we are discussing South Asia.

To make matters worse, you have terrorism, as I stated before, when there is a lack of democracy, and in the Kashmir and Dramu and other places where not as much, but other terrorist acts against Christians and Seekers and others throughout India, but at least in the Kashmir there has been a denial of the democratic process.

Now, wouldn't the democratic process help solve this situation in Kashmir?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that in all parts of the world where I face the threat of terrorism that democratic processes, the strengthening of state institutions, and particularly democratic state institutions in the long term is the remedy.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Right. Because in Afghanistan if they had a more democratic type government—and I have been pushing as you know for the king to come back and serve as a transition toward a more democratic society—people would have a chance to vote and express themselves and to weed out these evil people who are involved in drug dealing and repressing of their own people, the repressing of the women population in Afghanistan. So that would actually help if we had a more democratically oriented government there as well, wouldn't it?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. All right. Let me just say that in your denials to the charges that I made, you were very good at general denials, but there was no denial of some specific charges. So I would like to address you about them now.

I charged that the aid that the United States has been giving has been going to the Taliban controlled territories, especially during that time period when one-third of Afghanistan was being controlled by non and anti-Taliban forces. Specifically I used the example of the Bamiyan effort in which we tried to help the folks down there who my sources said were in great deprivation and starving, and the State Department undermined that effort.

And we mentioned earlier there is an aid program going on to Afghanistan. Ten percent of Afghanistan is still controlled by anti-Taliban forces. Is any of the aid that we are giving going to this anti-Taliban area?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I think I will defer to Mr. Eastham. I know that since my tenure in this job in the last 18 months or so that I have seen no evidence of that type of policy, but for previous time I will let Al answer.

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer to the question is, yes, there is aid flowing to all areas in Afghanistan. That is a function, however, of accessibility, of how you get it to them. There is assistance which flows through the United Nations, which is the implementers of the program, into the north via Tajikistan and also through the Chitral area of Pakistan, as well as to the 80 percent of the country that—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. So your answer is, yes, that currently that one area in the Panjsher Valley now controlled by Commander Masood, they do receive humanitarian supplies.

Mr. EASTHAM. I cannot take you specifically to the Panjsher Valley because access to the Panjsher Valley is blocked from the south by the Taliban.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But, of course——

Mr. EASTHAM. In order to get——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. It is not blocked from Tajikistan, right.

Mr. EASTHAM. Yes, but there is assistance which flows into all areas of Afghanistan through these U.N. programs that we support.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. You're on the record. Thank you very much. That is not what my source is saying.

Mr. EASTHAM. Now, with respect to Bamiyan, I want to take you back to the period 2 or 3 years ago that you are referring to. In fact, at around that same time I made a trip from Pakistan to Kandahar to talk to the Taliban about the blockade which they had imposed at the time upon assistance to Bamiyan because at the time Bamiyan was controlled by non-Taliban forces from the Hazara people there.

One of the main effects of the trip by Mr. Richardson and Mr. Inderfurth that you have so criticized was to attempt to persuade the Taliban, in fact, to lift that very blockade of Bamiyan, which we followed up with discussion in Islamabad in which the Taliban did, in fact, agree to a partial lifting to enable foodstuffs to go into Bamiyan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see. So we traded it off for the Taliban. They were going to lift their blockade, and we were going to disarm all of their opponents.

Mr. EASTHAM. No, sir, that is not the case.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. Well, go to disarming the Taliban's opponents, and by the way, this has been reconfirmed in everything that I have read, both official and unofficial.

Are you trying to tell us now that the State Department was not at that crucial moment, when the Taliban was vulnerable, disarming the Taliban's opponents? Did not Mr. Inderfurth and the State Department contact all of the support groups that were helping the anti-Taliban forces and ask them to cease their flow of military supplies to the anti-Taliban forces?

Mr. EASTHAM. At that time we were trying to construct a coalition which would cutoff support for all forces in Afghanistan from the outside.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I take it that is a yes to my question——

Mr. EASTHAM. No, sir, you have left out——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the Taliban——

Mr. EASTHAM [continuing]. The cutting off the Taliban part.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the Taliban were not included. What happened right after all of those other support systems to the resistance groups had been dismantled because of Mr. Inderfurth's and Mr. Richardson's appeal and the State Department's appeal? What happened not only immediately after? Even while you were making that appeal, what happened in Pakistan?

Was there an airlift of supplies, military supplies between Pakistan and Kabul and the forward elements of the Taliban forces?

The answer is yes. I know.

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You told me because——

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. It is secret information.

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer is closed session if you would like to dredge up that record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. OK.

Mr. EASTHAM. That would be fine.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do not have to go into closed session because I did not get that information from any classified document. That information is available to anybody watching the scene up there. They know exactly what happened.

Mr. Inderfurth; Mr. Bill Richardson, a good friend of mine, doing the bidding of this Administration, basically convinced the anti-Taliban's mentors to quit providing them the weapons they needed with some scheme that the Taliban were then going to lay down their arms, and immediately thereafter Pakistan started a massive shift of military supplies which resulted in the total defeat of the anti-Taliban forces.

Now, this is either collusion or incompetence on the part of the State Department as far as this Congressman is concerned. The people will have to look at the record and determine that for themselves, and when this Congressman says this Administration has a covert policy of supporting the Taliban, I see examples of what I just described over and over and over again.

I have read the documents you have given me, and the documents over and over again to me indicate that the State Department has been telling the Taliban, "Hand this over, bin Laden, and we can deal with you."

Now, I am not going to quote because it is secret information. None of the documents I have seen, by the way, should have been classified, and let's get to those documents.

Why haven't I been provided any documents about State Department analysis during the formation period of the Taliban and about whether or not the Taliban was a good force or a bad force? Why have none of those documents reached my desk after 2 years?

Mr. EASTHAM. Congressman, we were responding to a specific request dealing with a specific time period, which I believe the commencing period of the request for documents was after the time period you are talking about. We were asked to provide documents by the Chairman of this Committee from 1996 to 1999.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ah, I see. You found a loophole in the Chairman's wording.

Mr. EASTHAM. No, sir. We were responding to the Chairman's request.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You found a loophole in the Chairman's wording of his request so as not to provide me those documents. You know, I am the only one here. I am not the Chairman of the Committee. I would never get the opportunity to have a back-and-forth with you except in times like this.

The State Department has taken full advantage of its use of words in order not to get this information out. I am looking forward to more documents.

I will say this. I have spent hours overlooking those documents, and there has been nothing in those documents to persuade me that my charges that this Administration has been covertly supporting the Taliban is not accurate.

Feel free to respond to that.

Mr. EASTHAM. It is not true. I have to negate the whole thesis that you are operating under.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. OK. Then the other option is the State Department is so incompetent that we have done things that helped the Taliban and put them in a position of having hundreds of millions of dollars of drug money and power in Afghanistan and undercutting the anti-Taliban forces. This is not intent. This is just incompetence.

Mr. EASTHAM. That is a judgment you can make.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. EASTHAM. And if you want to make that judgment, that is up to you, Congressman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.

Mr. EASTHAM. I would just observe that it is considerably more complex than that to deal with people over whom we have so little influence as the Taliban.

I have been myself, by my count six times, into Afghanistan on both the northern side and the southern side, and I have met innumerable times with Taliban officials to attempt to achieve U.S. objectives, and I have to tell you that it is a tough job.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I believe it is.

Mr. EASTHAM. I would like to introduce you to some of them some time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, I have met many Taliban. Thank you. And as you are aware, I have met many Taliban and have talked to them, especially when you disarm their opponents and you participate in an effort to disarm their opponents at a time when they are being resupplied militarily. I guess it is very hard for them to take us seriously when we say we are going to get tough with them.

Mr. EASTHAM. You keep saying that, but it is not true. The effort—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are just saying—

Mr. EASTHAM [continuing]. The effort was to stop the support for all the factions in—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. You did not deny that we disarmed their opponents. You just said we were doing it with the Taliban as well. But as I pointed out, which you did not deny, the Taliban were immediately resupplied, which means that we were part and parcel to disarming a victim against this hostile, totalitarian, anti-Western, drug dealing force in their society. We were part and parcel of disarming the victim, thinking that the aggressor was going to be disarmed as well, but it just did not work out, at the moment when Pakistan was arming them, I might add.

I have got just a couple of minutes, and then we are going to have to recess this. There is a 5-minute vote on. Could I have this on the screen, please? Can we put the vote on the screen?

Two minutes. The Administration is saved again. All right. Let me just say I think that the Administration—Bill Richardson is a wonderful guy, and I think Rick Inderfurth is sincere. I think the record here is abysmal, and again, it is not state power we are talking about.

We abandoned these people in Afghanistan, the wonderful people. The Taliban did not defeat the Russians. You know that. You were there at the time. The Taliban were not even in the field at that time. They did not exist. They were kept back, and we abandoned those wonderful, courageous people in Afghanistan who were not fanatics when they were fighting for their homeland.

We could have come back with an Afghan policy, and this Congressman supports an Afghan policy that would provide a real commitment, \$100 million for de-mining, \$100 million to help set up a democratic process, \$100 million so that we can help them plant other things rather than poppies for narcotics. Let's have a real commitment by this Administration.

We have seen no such policy initiatives from this Administration, just excuses and word games, but I thank you both because you do a good job, and you are both patriots, and I appreciate that.

This Committee is in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. GILMAN [presiding]. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a different line and get off of South Asia for a moment.

On page IV of the State Department's April 2000 Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, there is a paragraph. Let me read the paragraph into the record.

As direct state sponsorship has declined, terrorists increasingly have sought refuge wherever they can. Some countries on the list have reduced dramatically their direct support of terrorism over the past years, and this is an encouraging sign. They still are on the list, however, usually for activity in two categories: harboring of past terrorists, some for more than 20 years, and continuing their linkages to designated foreign terrorist organizations. Cuba is one of the state sponsors that falls in this category.

Could you amplify on that? Am I to conclude that there is evidence that the Castro regime is no longer in the business of exporting terrorism and revolution in this hemisphere? Mr. Sheehan, Ambassador?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, Congressman. I would say regarding Cuba that their support for terrorism has declined dramatically over the years, and right now its active support for terrorism is scant.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Is scant? You said there were some linkages to foreign terrorist organizations. Could you enumerate those organizations?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. The main ones we are concerned with are the two Colombian groups, the FARC and the ELN.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thought that might be the case, and I have a problem with that, and let me tell you what it is. Recently, in fact,

there was a story in the Colombian press, and the headline is "Cuba to play a role in Colombia peace talks."

You are not suggesting that we should leave Cuba on this list because of their involvement in the Colombian peace process, which I understand has been done at the behest of the Colombian Government.

For the record, I think it is important to note that there are four other countries that are involved in this multilateral effort to move the peace process along. Those countries are France, Spain, Norway, and Switzerland, and they are described as the friends of the process with the ELN, and I am aware obviously of the history of the ELN and its historical relationship with the Castro regime.

But I would suggest that this is an occasion where we would welcome, if you will, Cuban involvement in terms of moving a peace process along that I would suggest is the ultimate answer if we are going to do what we hope to do in terms of staunching the flow of cocaine and heroin into the United States.

I would be interested in your response, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think the issue of Cuban involvement with the FARC and the ELN is not really the principal one. I do not think that alone would keep them on the sponsorship list if they were able to assure us that no terrorists of those organizations are there, because those are very violent organizations that threaten American lives in Colombia every day and are responsible for the deaths of many Americans and damage of a lot of material and property.

So their relationship, those groups, is a little different than the Europeans, but I think that one of the—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I interrupt, Ambassador?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is important to note that the FARC has a physical presence and an office in Mexico, and the ELN has a physical presence in Germany, and you know, both the FARC and ELN have a presence in Spain.

You know, these distinctions are very, very subtle that you are making here.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And, you know, these nuances are almost imperceptible to my eye.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Right. The other reason Cuba is on the list of state sponsorship, because it provides safe haven to numerous terrorists that we are interested in from the past, and that is why I mention in here many of them go way back.

Some of them are the Machiteros that were involved in the killings of Americans in Puerto Rico and other places and providing safe haven to those former terrorists. I did, Mr. Delahunt, personally write this introduction, and what I was saying in here, I was signaling to countries like Cuba that there is a difference, their support for terrorism between now and before, and that their record for support for terrorism is very small, but they do have issues.

If they want to address those issues and want to move forward on those issues, we would welcome that, as we would with all seven of the state sponsors. What I was trying to do in my report is sig-

nal to them that, yes, their issues are relatively small, dramatically different from the Cold War Era. That era has passed us, and they could take steps to address these issues and be considered for the list in the future.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If I could indulge the Chair for one more question.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That brings to mind a recommendation that was put forth by Ambassador Bremmer and his bipartisan commission when he suggested that there be an intermediate level or designation in terms of a government as a state sponsor of terrorism.

I am sure you are aware of that. Something less than an officially designated state sponsor or terrorism, but something that would, I believe, give the American people and Members of this institution, as well as Members of the Senate, a more realistic and accurate appraisal of where these particular states are in terms of the hierarchy of supporting terrorism.

Does the Administration have a position? Have you reflected on the recommendation by the commission?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, I have been aware of this issue since I took this job, and that the perception among some around the world is that once you get on the list of state sponsorship, you never get off, and that list is deemed as political by some.

In that regard, I have looked to try to very clearly articulate why countries are on the list and what it would take to get them off of the list.

I studied carefully Jerry Bremmer's proposal. I have discussed it primarily at the staff level here in the Congress, to find more flexible approaches to find another step on or off the list, what might more accurately reflect the real situation of support for terrorism by different states, and we have not come up with a formal position on that yet.

There are some drawbacks that I have heard from Members, staff members of this Committee, as well as on the Senate side, also some concerns within the Administration, but I think we are carefully reviewing it.

I understand the desirability of that, what benefits it could have to us, and we should have a response hopefully soon on whether we have a proposal for you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would urge that because I really think it is very important to recognize that in this particular area there are varying shades of gray, and it is very difficult, as you well know, to describe things in black and white terms without creating a distorted picture.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And we thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here.

I am concerned about terrorism for a lot of reasons. Personally I feel that all terrorists are like all dictators. They are all cowards, and this is their way of overcoming the fact that they are usually

not too well educated, and they are misguided, and they try to inflict some of their misery on other people.

I know that in the past Pakistan has been a friend and an ally, but I am concerned that they perhaps are not ferreting out as many of the terrorist as they should, and I feel like they could really do a lot more to get rid of the terrorists within the limits of their country.

Do you feel the fact that Pakistan is spending so much on their nuclear weapons program could diminish the amount of resources they have to run an effective anti-terrorism program? Could there be a correlation there?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, I am not sure, but I would say this in answering your question, that Pakistan, in order to develop the political space to take on some of these terrorist issues—because it is a political issue for them to take on some of these groups—in order to have the political space in order to do that, they need to take certain steps to reform themselves politically, economically, and socially. Clearly a smaller defense budget would help them, enable them to take on some of this reform.

So if there is a relationship in terms of defense spending and their ability to reform, their defense budget takes a huge chunk of their public sector funding. If they were able to put more of those resources in some of those other issues, it might give the Pakistani Government more space to move in the direction we would like them to go on counterterrorism.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Thank you.

At times I feel that too many Americans and maybe even some Americans in Congress become complacent about the threat of terrorism and will not be concerned about it again until we have some more acts of terrorism like we had a few years ago, both from Americans and from some people from this South Asia area.

Do you feel that today the State Department has adequate resources to conduct surveillance and anti-terrorism activities, and if so, why, and if not, what additional resources would it take to get the State Department up to the level that we would consider a top notch, top drawer type level of anti-terrorism activity?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate that question.

There are two parts of it. The first part is do we have the security funding to do the protection of our embassies. Actually Dave Carpenter, my colleague who does diplomatic security, is best prepared to answer that. I am sure he has laid that out up to Congress, what resources he needs.

But I would say this on the parts that I manage, which overlap with Dave's in a lot of areas. The anti-terrorism assistance program, we have asked for \$38 million this year. We have got the Administration's request. We are hoping to get full funding for that when the appropriations committees come together in conference later on in the year. Right now I believe the House side has given us full funding, but the Senate has not.

We also asked for \$40 million to fund a counterterrorism training center which would help train diplomatic security personnel, as well as provide training for those security officials that we work with overseas. That is really the key. They are the front line of de-

fense for Americans in our battle against counterterrorism. They help protect our embassies. They help protect airports that American people travel through, the borders. There are a lot of Americans overseas. These are the front line of defense. They are our counterparts on the intelligence and law enforcement.

We need a first class facility in order to train those people to build the type of relationships we need. The Administration has asked for funding for that, and we are having treat difficulty in the appropriations process, and we certainly could use your support on that, sir.

Mr. COOKSEY. You say you want to build a facility to do this anti-terrorism training?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. That is correct. Right now we train in seven different locations around the country on a catch-can basis, sort of standing room only types of arrangements with different facilities. It is just not a way to run a railroad.

We would like to create our own training facility where we can bring in these people and establish the long term relationships that are really going to pay dividends for the security not only of our embassies, but for Americans that travel, live, and work abroad.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I bend over backward not to bring up parochial issues into my discussion, but since you raise the issue, the U.S. Marshal's training site is within my district, and I visited it several times. It is at Camp Beauregard. It used to be Fort Beauregard, and they have really a top facility. Do you use that at all?

If I am not mistaken, they do some State Department things.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We do some stuff there, yes, Congressman, a great facility.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I would like to formally invite you to do all of your training there, and I guarantee you we will work to get what you need.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the gentleman would yield for just a moment.

Mr. COOKSEY. Sure, I will yield to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I just wanted to point out that there is a military base on Cape Cod, no swamps, no bugs, the sounds of waves and sands that is 5,000 acres there, Ambassador, and I am sure that you would be warmly welcomed there.

Mr. COOKSEY. I would tell my friend from Massachusetts that after I got out of the Air Force I was in the Guard for a while, and we trained up there one summer. It is a nice facility. That was in the summer of 1970 or 1971, but they had some narrow bridges up there, and it is just not an ideal place to go.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. 1970 to 1971.

Let me, I guess, conclude this hearing by asking a few questions. Mr. Delahunt talked about the connection, I believe, between Cuba and the FARC guerrillas and the ELN. The other committee on which I serve is the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, and we have a subcommittee that deals with national security and terrorism, and we have done some work in that area. There is no question from the information that we have and pictures that we have seen that the Cuban Government has been working with the FARC guerrillas and the ELN.

As a matter of fact, the leaders of the FARC guerrillas, if you look at pictures of them, they are wearing Che Guevara type be-

rets. They use the same basic techniques that he used, and we believe there is a connection there, and I wonder why you folks are not aware of that.

Are you aware of that?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, we are aware of the connections, the long connections of the FARC and the ELN to Cuba.

Let me say this about the FARC and the ELN. The FARC is one of the more violent foreign terrorist organizations that I deal with, responsible for 10 Americans dead and 3 missing since 1980.

Mr. BURTON. Right.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. It is high on my list. They are involved in kidnapping, extortion in Colombia that is of enormous concern to us.

The ELN, although not as deadly in terms of numbers, wreaked tremendous amount of damage to American interests in oil pipelines in Colombia. These are two very serious and dangerous terrorist organizations.

Primarily though I would say this, Congressman, that they do not depend on support from Cuba. They do have links from Cuba, but quite frankly, as you know very well, they are able to generate funding and weapons right there at home.

Mr. BURTON. No, I understand. They are getting as much as \$100 million a month from the drug cartels.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Exactly.

Mr. BURTON. And from kidnappings and everything else, but they do go to Cuba. They do do some training with the Cubans, and they are in concert with one another.

The reason I am concerned about that, and probably Mr. Delahunt and others, is Venezuela is right there. We have got the entire Central American and the Panama Canal and everything that is right in that area, and if that is not handled properly, then that whole area could be in jeopardy.

Cuba has always had an eye toward revolution in South America and Central America. That is why they supported the Sandinistas, the FMLN, and why Che Guevara went into South America in the first place. So there is a connection there, and I hope the State Department pays particular attention to that.

One other thing that I would like to talk about, and I am sorry that I was absent. I had to go to the floor, but there has been a lot of talk about Pakistan, and Pakistan has been an ally of ours for 50 years. They helped us during the problems that we had in Afghanistan. They were a conduit for military equipment and weapons going in there to stop the Russians—the Soviet Union. They worked with us in Somalia. They worked with us during the entire Cold War. They have always been an ally of ours.

Whenever we talk about terrorism involving Pakistan, it seems that there is always a reluctance to talk about the problems right across the border in India. In India, we have half a million troops in Kashmir gang-raping women, going in the middle of the night, taking people out of the houses and killing them and torturing them, and people just disappear.

In Punjab we have had a similar problem over the years. It has gone on for a long time. I have got the statistical data, which I will not go into, but I will submit it for the record.

And I do not understand why we pay so much attention to our friend who has been with us through thick and thin, and we do not say anything about India who was an opponent of ours during the entire Cold War. They were a nonaligned nation that built Soviet MIG's. They built Soviet tanks. They were on the Soviet side when [Flight] 007 was shot down by the Soviets. They were the only nation in the world that did not condemn them.

Yet we continue to kick our friend for 50 years, Pakistan, in the teeth, and we do not pay any attention to the problems that we see in India.

In Pakistan, when you talk about the terrorist activities, they worked with us on Amil Kanzi. He killed a CIA officer in Virginia. He was arrested by the Pakistanis and extradited to the United States. Ramzi Yousef was accused and convicted of involvement in the terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center. He was arrested by Pakistani officials in Pakistan and extradited to the United States.

I am not pronouncing these names right, but I think you know who they are.

Sidque Odey was involved in the bombing of a U.S. embassy in East Africa, was apprehended by Pakistan and turned over to Kenyan authorities. Khalid Deek was implicated in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, was arrested by Pakistan and extradited to Jordan.

You know, Pakistan was picked as a vital area in December 1999. The National Commission on Terrorism report, which was released on June 5, said Pakistan's cooperation was vital in warding off terrorist attacks planned for the millennium.

You know, I just hate to see us have a hearing and attack somebody who does have problems. Do not misunderstand. They have problems, and I would like to see those resolved. I would like to see free and fair elections once again returned. I am sure you would as well.

But the thing that concerns me is we ought to give a little bit of leeway and deference to those who are always there when we need them. They are always there when we need them.

And then, right across the border, you look at India whom we show a great deal of deference to, who has not always been there when we need them, and I just do not understand that double standard, and it bothers me.

If you would care to comment, you can.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, Pakistan is a great friend to the United States for a long time. I served on active duty in Somalia and again in Haiti. In Somalia, I served with the Pakistanis, and they did a great job there, and they were with us. I was on the phone when President Bush called the government of Pakistan to ask for their participation in 1992. I was on the NSC staff. They immediately responded and sent troops into Somalia. They were actually already there before we led the coalition in December 1992.

Again, in 1994, I served on active duty again with the Pakistanis. The Deputy Force Commander in the operation in Haiti was a Pakistani general who was outstanding and a good friend and a professional officer.

These are good friends, and it is difficult for me when I deal with the Pakistani counterparts on some of the tough issues that we have with them.

You mentioned some of the people they have helped arrest over the years, and that is absolutely true, and all of those people are very important. The problem is that too often the terrorists, after they conduct an act, are heading back to Pakistan. Ramzi Yousef, who blew up the World Trade Center, was arrested in Pakistan. Odey, the other guy you mentioned who blew up our embassy in East Africa, hightailed back to Pakistan.

That is a problem. The problem is, and, yes, they helped arrest them, but their policies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir and at home are helping to promote an environment where these folks are being generated out of there and coming back there after they conduct attacks. So it is a mixed record.

They understand the threat. We talk to them about it frankly. I want to stay engaged with Pakistan and help them through this. They are friends.

The threat actually, Congressman, as you know, not only affects us. It affects them as well, and that is why we have to stay working with them to address the problem.

Mr. BURTON. Let's talk about this double standard again, and then I will summarize and we can get on with this and let somebody else have the last question or two.

You know, we have penalized Pakistan because of their nuclear development program, and yet India has not been penalized. India has a nuclear program, and we put severe limitations on military exports to Pakistan because they decided to do something that they thought was necessary to protect themselves in the event that there was an attack by India, and there have been a number of wars, as you know, between the two.

And so, this double standard does exist, and I think it is something that the State Department and other agencies of our government ought to take a real hard look at. I will not belabor the point because my time has run out and I am going to yield to Mr. Delahunt, or whoever wants to finalize because you have to leave in about 3 minutes, and that is that Kashmir and Punjab continue to be real terrible tragedies in human rights violations. We just do not talk about that enough.

There are 500,000 troops in Kashmir, a like number in Punjab. The atrocities continue. We do not do anything to put pressure on India to stop that, and we should because they go on year after year after year, and people are suffering and they are being tortured. Women are being gang-raped by Indian troops, and Amnesty International has reported on that.

I mean it is reported on, but our State Department and our government seems to want to keep this on a low profile basis. Why, I do not understand, because we jump all over Pakistan, but we do not say anything about India, and when we do it is very, very low key.

Mr. EASTHAM. I think you can take as your guide, Mr. Chairman, what the President of the United States did in going out to South Asia. We have been very clear that the desire to buildup a relationship with a country that has a billion people and that will rep-

resent a significant force in world affairs in the coming century is not at the expense of our old friend and ally Pakistan.

I have personally lived for 5 years of my life in Pakistan, have significantly pleasant memories of that time. I have also spent a couple of years in India, and I can tell you that it is possible to pursue a good relationship with each of these countries at the same time and simultaneously. I am convinced of that.

With respect to the Punjab and Kashmir situations that you mentioned, I had the opportunity to accompany your colleague, Mr. Ackerman, up to Kashmir on his trip there several years ago, if you will recall that. I have been working on the problem of Kashmir. I know the leadership both of the government in Kashmir as well as the opposition in the form of the All Parties Conference; I can tell you that we do not sweep that under the rug or ignore it, while at the same time pushing on Pakistan for different reasons.

We are trying to address all of them at once, and I hope you will take that as a sincere commitment.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I will take you at your word, but I hope you will make it a little higher profile because we have some of our Seek friends here. We have friends from Kashmir who are in the audience and from Pakistan, and they know very well first hand the problems that are existing over there, and year after year after year we listen to them. Our heart bleeds for them, and yet the conditions continue.

We are the greatest power on earth supposedly right now, and we ought to be doing everything we can to end that tragedy over there.

With that, Mr. Delahunt, do you have any more comments?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand they must leave.

Mr. BURTON. If not, well, then we appreciate your being here, and the Committee stands adjourned.

[At 12:38 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 12, 2000

Full Committee Hearing
Statement of Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Global Terrorism: The New South Asia Threat
July 12, 2000

I am pleased to call to order today's hearing on Global Terrorism. In particular, we will focus on the most recent shift in the patterns of international terrorism to South Asia. This move away from the more traditional Middle East-based terrorist activity clearly deserves our attention and careful policy analysis.

Earlier this year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that the shift of the center of gravity for international terrorism has been eastward, toward Afghanistan in Southwest Asia.

Each spring, under congressional mandate since the mid-1980's, the Administration publishes a report called Patterns of Global Terrorism. This report provides the Congress and the public with the latest trends and developments in international terrorism.

The report for 1999 establishes that south Asia is the new locus of international terrorism, presenting both a regional threat and a growing threat to our nation. We will examine what this new trend means for our nation.

Afghanistan has emerged as a safe haven for master terrorists like Osama bin Ladin and his radical supporters. We have on display today the State Department's Wanted Posters for bin Ladin--offering a \$5 million reward for his capture.

Neighboring Pakistan, which has long supported the Taliban to its west and those bent on violence in Kashmir to its east, also contributes to the emergence of South Asia as the new locus of international terrorism.

Recent press reports indicate that the Russian intelligence services believed that the Taliban in Afghanistan promised to help Chechen rebels with weapons, training, and possibly even with trained fighters from Taliban camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban vehemently denied those serious Russian charges. We will examine that issue today as well.

Through a coordinated law enforcement approach, many terrorist threats emanating from South Asia were thwarted last year. As a result, American deaths from terrorism were down to five in 1999, one of the lowest levels in several years. It is a sad but undeniable fact that Americans are often the most frequent terrorist targets around the globe.

The 1999 annual terrorism report notes that we have repeatedly asked Pakistan to end support to elements that conduct terrorist training in nearby Afghanistan. We also asked that Pakistan interdict travel of all militants to and from camps in Afghanistan,

prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons, and block financial and logistical support for the camps.

In addition, the State Department's latest terrorism report notes Pakistan officially supports Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism.

The recent report from the Congressionally-mandated National Commission on Terrorism noted Pakistan's occasionally excellent cooperation with the U.S. in fighting terrorism. However, the Commission also pointed out consistent Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir. The Commission's report also called for naming Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism so that all the sanctions against such a terrorist nation may be applied.


The new threat of radical Islamic terrorism emanating from the region can often be found in a loosely knit group of terrorists once trained and hardened in the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Today, on the new battlefields of Chechnya and Kosovo, where war-making and fighting skills are honed and perfected, some of these radical Islamic elements learn skills that later can be used against our nation and others in radical terrorist acts.

South Asia also presents new concerns for the war on drugs. By taxing rather than fighting the drug trade, the Taliban has effectively sided with the heroin producers and against innocent people, particularly young people. The drug trade is also proving to be a lucrative resource for bin Ladin's terrorist network.

We are fortunate to have with us today the Coordinator For Counter-Terrorism in the Secretary of State's Office, who helps prepare the annual report on Global Terrorism and can help us sort out what this new shift means. We are also joined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. Both of these witnesses bring their expertise to our inquiry.

Ambassador Sheehan, who, of course, oversees the preparation of the Global Terrorism Report, is prepared to answer any questions on terrorism and, of course, no Member is limited on what area of the globe he wants to address.

First, I welcome any comment from our Ranking Democratic member, Mr. Gejendensen.



**Statement of Rep. Peter T. King
Committee on International Relations
July 12, 2000**

Mr. Chairman, while I commend you for holding this hearing on the issue of terrorism, I believe that to limit this hearing to one region neglects our global responsibility to combat a worldwide problem. The Committee's focus should be global and emphasize those terrorists that commit acts against Americans. As you know, the recently published report of the National Commission on Terrorism noted that today's terrorists "are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United States." In fact, in a comparative analysis of anti-american terrorist attacks that occurred in 1999, the State Department reported that only North America experienced fewer attacks than the six that took place in all of Asia. Certainly other regions, notably Latin America and Western Europe, have exceeded South Asia in these type of attacks. However, if the Committee is to review terrorism in South Asia then in the interests of fairness, this review must include India, which perpetrates and sponsors terrorism against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition to a detailed and published report by the State Department, two Indian commissions, the Punjab Human rights Organization and the Movement Against State Repression, all concluded that India's security forces contributed and were responsible for numerous killings and human rights violations. Additionally, India not only supports and acquiesces but perpetrates in the persecution and murder of its Christian minority. On July 3rd of this year, the Washington Post reported that there have been over 30 incidents of persecution of Christians in India during the last few months and that not only are the attackers rarely caught but the Indian government is unresponsive to the problem. An investigation by the All-India Christian Conference concluded that the Sangh Parivar, a branch of the Fascist RSS, the parent organization of India's ruling BJP party, carried out the May 21st bombing of a Christian women's prayer meeting. Lastly, neither the State Department, nor the National Commission on Terrorism alleged that Pakistan's government participated in or supported any terrorist activities resulting in harm to the United States, its interests or citizens. Any threat of further sanctions against Pakistan risks alienating not only a crucial and proven ally but the ability of the United States to remain a neutral mediator in resolving the status of Kashmir.

JOSEPH R. PITTS
18TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

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Thank you Mr. Chairman, for your permission to submit my statement for the record.

Today's hearing on Global Terrorism in South Asia reflects the reality of the increase in terrorism in Asia, particularly Central Asia, namely Afghanistan. It is vital that we work cooperatively with governments throughout the region to partner in stopping terrorists before they implement their plans and in bringing individuals and groups to justice who commit terrorist activities. The international focus and cooperation that has assisted in bringing further stability in Northern Ireland and the Middle East is one approach that might help curb terrorism in South Asia – an approach that focuses on cooperation and mutual respect.

In light of the importance of our government working with other governments, I would like to extend my appreciation to the government of Pakistan for its cooperation with the international community and the United States.

I recently traveled to Pakistan to meet with government officials and the current military government to talk with them about democracy, human rights, economic, terrorism and other important issues to both our countries. I was greatly impressed by General Musharraf and his desire to assist in establishing a stable democratic foundation for the Pakistani people. In addition, the General clearly stated his desire to cooperate with the international community on terrorism issues. The proximity of Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries to Pakistan means that the Pakistani people and government also have experienced suffering at the hands of terrorists.

Despite the fact that there are areas of concern in discussions between our government and the government of Pakistan, it is important that we recognize that the government of Pakistan has cooperated and handed over key terrorists such as Ramzy Ahmad Yousaf of the World Trade Center bombing, Mir Aimal Kansi wanted in the CIA shootings in 1997, Siddique Odeh from the East Africa bombing case, and Khalil Al-Deek also from the East Africa bombing case.

The fact that Pakistan and the United States have a long-standing friendship has laid a foundation for increased and continued cooperation in areas of great concern to both nations and for increased discussions about areas about which the two countries differ. It is important, therefore, that our policy continue to stress the importance of cooperation with Pakistan so that our goals and theirs can be achieved in relation to combating terrorism around the world.

JIM SAXTON
THIRD DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY
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U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
July 12, 2000

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman
House International Relations Committee
2170 Rayburn H.O.B.
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I send my compliments to you for holding a full House International Relations Committee (HIRC) hearing on the subject of global terrorism and to thank you for the invitation to attend.

Although my schedule does not permit me to attend, my interest in the subject of global terrorism, and particularly terrorism in South Asia, is especially strong as you well know. Let me just say that the focus of your hearing—Global Terrorism: South Asia, The New Locus-- is entirely appropriate and timely.

The State Department, in its recent report *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, has finally begun to acknowledge what my studies have long led me to understand: namely, there is a serious and emerging trend in international terrorism — a new hotbed of activity that resides in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region.

Like you, Mr. Chairman, I have many questions and concerns about the terrorist activity in this region, and specifically how this affects our allies in the area, such as India. Through the Armed Services Committee's Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, I have held a closed briefing on this subject, and the Terrorism Panel intends to hold an open hearing on the region later this year. Nevertheless, I am pleased by your leadership in holding a full committee hearing on this extremely difficult and obviously sensitive subject matter.

I hope this hearing provides Congress with information and insights that will help us craft a "Terrorism Policy" for the 21st Century, and that this will help guide this Administration's foreign policy. In the meantime, please feel free to call on me if I can assist you or the HIRC in any way.

Sincerely,


JIM SAXTON
Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism
House Armed Services Committee

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STATEMENT OF REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN
 HEARING ON TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA
 JULY 12, 2000

Mr. Chairman, South Asia is a critical area for us in the United States. After President Clinton's historic visit to the region in March of this year, a new and positive approach toward the area is hopefully evolving in our nation's policy circles that recognizes the changed realities and emerging opportunities of the Indian subcontinent.

However, the peace and stability that we seek to promote in the region is being endangered by the blazing fire of the phenomenon called terrorism. In South Asia today, the real and immediate threat to regional and global peace is state-sponsored, cross-border terrorism. India, a long-time victim of cross-border terrorism, is bound to lose its patience and perhaps abandon its policy of restraint. Continued acts of terrorism against New Delhi from across its western border could well trigger a tit-for-tat and hot-pursuit response, which, in turn, can snowball into a major conflict. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, if the region faces the dangerous possibility of a nuclear conflagration, the real culprits are those powers that cavalierly propagate and proliferate terrorism.

In South Asia today, the two crucibles of global terrorism are Pakistan and its vassal state, Afghanistan. It's from these two nations that fanatic forces of fundamentalist faith are spreading wanton mayhem and murder not only against India, a bastion of democracy, but also against Western democracies, values and interests.

These forces of chaos, who make no distinction between civilian and military targets, cannot thrive and function in both Pakistan and Afghanistan without the cooperation and tacit blessings of the authoritarian regimes that have usurped power in Islamabad and Kabul.

The repressive Taliban regime in Kabul and the military dictatorship in Islamabad repeatedly deny playing any role in promoting terrorism. The Pakistani junta's leader, Gen. Pervez Musharaff, has even tried to ingeniously redefine the meaning of terrorism by saying that 'jihad,' or Holy War, was not terrorism. But the international community knows better. And it won't be hoodwinked. It knows that these assertions are lies because the facts on the ground in both countries show that terrorism, in its various forms, is nurtured and promoted with the sole purpose waging an undeclared war.

It is pretty clear that the governments in Kabul and Islamabad are using terrorist tactics, employing terrorist groups or exploiting terrorist incidents as a means of surrogate warfare. These governments view terrorism as a useful asset --- as a cheap means of waging war. Unable to mount an overt conventional military exercise, terrorism is seen as an attractive alternative --- an equalizer. Pakistan, I believe, looks upon terrorism as a political tool to frustrate India's aspirations of emerging as a major and respected military, technological and economic power. It apparently sees it as an equalizer to neutralize the numerical and technological advantages of the Indian defense forces.

In effect, for Pakistan, terrorism in various forms is a para-military option, or a weapon if you will, to bleed the Indian defense forces and keep them tied up with internal security operations. The ultimate hope is that this would somehow induce an over-all weakening of New Delhi's resolve and lead to the break-up of India. It is apparently the Pakistani military's unstated calculation that such a devious policy could ultimately erode the unity and integrity of India just as the bleeding of the Red Army in Afghanistan contributed to the break-up of the Soviet Union.

The international community has a moral responsibility to see through this diabolical game and realize that the Kashmir issue can never be - and must never be - allowed to be resolved by military means. It should only be resolved by mutual dialogue between India and Pakistan within the framework of the Shimla Accord of 1972. The issue has to be resolved bilaterally, by the parties themselves.

And before the two sides can resume a meaningful dialogue, the junta in Pakistan must initiate credible efforts to restore trust with the government and people of India. It is imperative that we also insist that the junta in Islamabad undertake verifiable steps to stop its proxy terror war against New Delhi, especially in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. This means, in effect, that terrorist organizations such as the Harkat ul-Mujaheddin and Lashkar e-Toiba must be outlawed by Pakistan. This means that the regime in Islamabad must shut down all the training camps and 'madrasas,' or religious schools, that produce these terror outfits. This means that Pakistan cannot be fully recognized among the world's decent nations until it takes real and serious steps to halt its role in supporting the 'jihad' against India over Kashmir.

Pakistan must take back the doormat that says: "Terrorists Welcome." Repeated assertions by officials from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency that they have less knowledge or control over these groups than they would like, is neither sufficient nor acceptable, nor plausible.

Kashmir is a victim of cross-border terrorism --- pure and simple. In Kashmir, the elected government is under continuous assault from secessionist terrorists who are responsible for numerous serious abuses, including extrajudicial executions, torture, kidnaping, and extortion. Mr. Chairman, the fountainhead of human rights violations in Kashmir is state-sponsored terrorism from across the border.

The peace-loving people of Jammu and Kashmir, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs alike, are victims of terrorism for the last several years. It's the terror and unbridled violence let loose by the so-called Mujahiddin members - many of them from overseas - from across the border that is the real cause for human rights violations in Kashmir.

The real violators of human rights in Kashmir are the numerous terrorist outfits owing allegiance to fundamentalist religious groups. It's religious fanatics belonging to such groups as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar e-Toiba, recruited, trained and unleashed by Osama Bin Laden and his terror network who are fanning the flames of human rights violations in Kashmir. It is these terror groups and training camps that we

have to target - and not democratic India - as violators of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, acts of terror have no place in a civilized world. The U.S. and India, as the torch bearers of democratic values, have a moral duty to firmly confront and combat this menace to international peace and put an end to cross-border terrorism and acts of religious hate and bigotry. The establishment of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Terrorism is one of most promising developments in the relations between India and the U.S. Both the U.S. and India must evolve a common strategy to roll back and stop this global problem.

Undiluted resolve and clear-headed realism are essential ingredients in facing up to the problem posed by international terrorism. Those who abet and sponsor terrorism and allow their territory to be breeding grounds for terrorism must be put on notice. They must be told in no uncertain terms that unless they put an end to cross-border terrorism, they will be put on the List of Nations that Promote Terrorism.

It's time for our Administration to turn up the heat against Islamabad and Kabul to bring to a close the two nations' continued abetment and promotion of terrorism. It's time for real action - Some definitive action that will clearly send a message across to the recalcitrant forces that control Pakistan's military that enough is enough; That this is not the way a responsible nuclear power behaves endangering international peace and security; And that if Pakistan does not change its behavior, it must recognize that there will be severe consequences for violating global peace and security.

If we in the U.S. indeed want to prevent nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia, and also accomplish our stated goals of nuclear non-proliferation, we must first pay urgent attention to the proliferation and propagation of terrorism in the area. We have to take firm and decisive steps against nations that engage in it. We have to demonstrate to both Pakistan and its surrogate, Afghanistan, that terrorism does not pay.

Mr. Chairman, we in Congress should send a clear and unambiguous message that, besides the terrorist outfits themselves, those nations that provide sanctuary to terrorist organizations or assist them with technical, financial, political or any other support will also be held accountable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing today's witnesses.

July 12, 2000

Wexler Highlights International Terrorism Shift

South Asia is "New Epicenter" for Terrorist Activity

Washington (July 12) - U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL), Member of the International Relations Committee, issued the following statement today at a full committee hearing on "Global Terrorism: The New South Asia Threat." :

I want to thank Chairman Gilman and Mr. Gejdenson for holding this hearing on global terrorism and the increasing threat of terrorist activities emanating from South Asia. This hearing is both timely and appropriate considering the growing threat of international terrorism aimed at Americans at home and abroad.

Mr. Chairman, we live in increasingly dangerous times as international terrorist organizations threaten and target the United States and our allies. Over the past several years, Congress and the Clinton Administration have focused on the Middle East as the epicenter of international terrorists activities. We should not be fooled by the gradual shift of terrorist activities from the Middle East to South Asia. The Middle East remains a hotbed for extremists and terrorists organizations and the governments of Iran and Syria are still leading sponsors of terrorism. Although this hearing will focus on terrorism in South Asia, I urge the Clinton administration to keep Iran and Syria on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Well all must be particularly concerned about increased terrorist activities originating from South Asia, in particular Afghanistan and Pakistan as highlighted in the State Department's 1999 report on "Patterns of Global Terrorism" and the National Commission on Terrorism's report, "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism."

Over the past several years, Afghanistan has become the training ground and base of operations for terrorists from all over the world. According to the annual State Department report on terrorism, the Taliban, which controls most of Afghan territory, has given permission to and provided logistical support for non-Afghan terrorist organizations which are waging jihads in Chechnya, Lebanon, Kosovo, Kashmir, and elsewhere.

Afghanistan also harbors Usama bin Laden who has been indicted for his role in the November, 1998, bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and continues to coordinate terrorist operations that threaten Americans and our allies abroad.

I am also increasingly concerned about developments in Pakistan, including the proliferation of terrorist organizations that threaten the United States, India, and our allies in the region. Although I believe that it is in the best interest of the United States to engage in bilateral talks with Pakistan, it is troubling that the government of Pakistan still allows terrorist organizations to operate training camps and bases unhindered in its territory and provides political and logistical support for several of these rogue groups. According to the National Commission on Terrorism, "Pakistan provides safehaven, transit, and moral, political, and diplomatic support to several groups engaged in terrorism."

I support President Clinton's efforts to convey our growing concerns with respect to terrorist organizations operating on Pakistani soil to the Pakistani government. During his historic trip to South Asia, President Clinton urged Pakistani leader, General Musharraf, to crack down on terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan. Pakistan has signaled they are willing to work with the United States to combat terrorism. Its effort to date, however, has been inconsistent and does not address the international communities' concerns about terrorism originating in Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, America must be prepared to deal with a new terrorist threat that according to the State Department, is not state-sponsored, but rather originates from a loose network of individuals and groups driven more by religion or ideology than by politics, and financed increasingly through private sponsorship, drug trafficking, crime, and illegal trade.

I am hopeful that Congress and the Administration will adopt several recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorism to improve our overall counter-terrorism policies. I also urge the Clinton administration to continue to work with our allies to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts and apprehend terrorists who threaten the world's democracies.

Statement for the Record
Amb. Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State
House International Relations Committee
July 12, 2000

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our counterterrorism efforts with you. Ongoing consultations with Congress are key to our efforts to protect American lives and interests abroad.

Today I want to respond to your request for a detailed description of a significant trend in international terrorism - namely, the geographical shift of the locus of terror from the Middle East to South Asia. In our annual report to Congress, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 (Patterns)*, we described this shift in some detail. In fact, this was one of the two trends we identified as the most important recent developments in terrorism, the other being the shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists.

I purposely addressed these trends on the very first page of my introduction to the report. The increased willingness and ability of terrorists to seek refuge in South Asia are disturbing developments, and they require us to refocus our diplomatic energies and policy tools as well.

I. Why South Asia?

Let me begin by outlining why South Asia has become a new locus for terrorism. Understanding the causal factors at play is a fundamental step in developing an effective counterterrorism policy for the region.

Regional instability

To examine the role of regional instability in fostering terrorism, we can start with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decade-long civil war which followed. This war destroyed the government and civil society of Afghanistan, at the same time bringing arms, fighters from around the world, and narcotics traffickers to the region. The Soviet withdrawal left a power vacuum, leaving the country in the hands of warring groups of mujahidin as well as outsiders seeking to further their own interests. Many of the current leaders of Afghanistan

came of age in training camps designed to create a generation of combatants to fight wars inside and outside Afghanistan. These camps in turn fostered relationships with Afghan Arabs and others fighting wars or involved with terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. Eventually, the Taliban, a radical group with a world-view informed by the experience of war, gained power over much of the country.

Fierce conflicts still flare up in South Asia. The Taliban continues to fight the Northern Alliance, and the border conflict over Kashmir causes instability and bloodshed. South Asia also finds itself serving as a support area for conflicts further afield, such as those in the Caucasus and in the Middle East. The proximity of terrorists to such sources of regional instability is a mutually reinforcing relationship. Terrorists can contribute to such instability by lending a hand to other terrorist groups intent on destroying peace processes. Conversely, instability draws more weapons into the region, increasing the chances that terrorists will get their hands on them. In addition, governments otherwise occupied with wars are less likely to root out terrorists operating within their borders.

Improvements in the Middle East

Another factor in the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia is the progress we have made in reducing terrorism in the Middle East. In the Middle East, by designating state sponsors of terrorism, by criminalizing support to groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), and through intense bilateral discussions with various states, we have stimulated other countries to confront terrorism within and across their borders. And even though terrorism remains a threat in the region, our efforts have brought results. Many Middle Eastern governments - with some notable exceptions - have strengthened their counterterrorist policy and improved international cooperation.

Jordan and Egypt are examples of Middle Eastern countries that took positive steps last year. Jordan remained particularly intolerant of terrorism on its soil, arresting extremists reportedly planning attacks against U.S. interests, closing HAMAS offices and arresting some of its members, and responding vigorously to a variety of other terrorist threats. Egypt continued carrying out counterterrorism measures in 1999 by arresting, trying, and convicting a number of terrorists threatening its own interests and those of the U.S. and our allies. Also in the Middle East, the Palestinian Authority

mounted counterterrorist operations last year designed to undermine the capabilities of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to use terrorism to disrupt the peace process.

We cannot take credit for all improvements in the counterterrorism sphere in the Middle East, but our diplomacy played a major role. Make no mistake, I do not mean to suggest we can let down our guard in the Middle East. Recent threats in Jordan both during the millennium and a few weeks ago demonstrate that continued vigilance is warranted. Of course, Iran remains an active state sponsor, and Syria, Libya, and Iraq remain on our list because they provide safehaven and material support to terrorist groups. But their direct sponsorship of terrorist acts has diminished. Unfortunately, as we work to neutralize terrorism in the Middle East, terrorists and their organizations seek safehaven in other areas where they can operate with impunity. South Asia is one of them.

Ideological extremism

There is unfortunately a misperception among some people that terrorism is driven by belief in Islam. In fact, terrorism is a perversion of the teachings of Islam. That being said, another factor contributing to the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia is the intersection of regional instability and weak political and economic systems with ideological and militant extremism. For instance, the Taliban practices an austere, extreme brand of Islam. While this is not threatening in and of itself, the Taliban has proven sympathetic to other radical groups, some of which distort religious ideas and principles to justify terrorist acts.

In addition, Pakistan's political and economic difficulties and the resultant damage to Pakistan's institutions have provided fertile ground for terrorism. One of the great failures has been in education. Pakistan's government-sponsored educational system has been unable to meet the needs of Pakistan's people. As a result, many poor Pakistanis are drawn to free education provided by *madrassas*, or religious schools. Many of these schools perform a needed service in imparting such education. Some schools, however, inculcate extremism and a violent anti-Americanism in their students. In these schools, a rigid condemnation of Western culture, coupled with the local conditions of failing societies, produces young men inclined to support the same causes championed by Usama Bin Ladin and other terrorists. The Government of Pakistan is aware of this problem and has stated that it intends to ensure that *madrassas* provide a proper education for their students.

Financing terrorism

When discussing the various causes of increased terrorist activity in South Asia, we must address the ability of terrorists to raise funds to support their activities. One of the most important ways to combat terrorism is to disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. We have already made this a priority and are working hard - with unilateral and multilateral sanctions, bilateral diplomacy, and through the UN and G-8 - to disrupt the financing of terrorism in South Asia. One notable success was the adoption by the UN General Assembly in December 1999 of the G-8 initiated International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Full implementation of this important new counterterrorism treaty by the largest number of governments is essential, and we hope to submit it to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification shortly.

But we must keep up the pressure. The ability of terrorists operating in Afghanistan, for example, to obtain funds and other material support is a symptom of the other primary trend in terrorism that I described in *Patterns*: the shift from terrorist groups sponsored by states to international networks of terrorists not affiliated with particular governments.

This shift has profound implications for our policies in South Asia. The capabilities of Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida network, which has centered itself within Afghanistan, demonstrate why this is the case. Bin Ladin's organization operates on its own, without having to depend on a state sponsor for material support. He has financial resources and means of raising funds, often through narcotrafficking or the use of legitimate "front" companies. He enjoys international financial support. Bin Ladin and other non-state terrorists also benefit from the globalization of communication, using e-mail and Internet websites to spread their message, recruit new members, and raise funds.

These capabilities allow Bin Ladin and other terrorists to extend their tentacles around the world. Terrorist networks outside the context of the international state system provide everything that is needed for groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) to survive and become stronger - even when they are based in friendly states with vigorous counterterrorism policies. The threat posed by this group, a faction of which is

closely allied to Bin Ladin, illustrates the challenges we face as non-state terrorism becomes more prevalent.

The role of the Taliban

The ability of groups such as al-Qa'ida to plan and carry out terrorist attacks with impunity brings us to the final causal factor in the shift of terrorism to South Asia: the Taliban's refusal to crack down on terrorists. Afghanistan has become the primary swamp of terrorism, harboring terrorists from the region and around the world. The Taliban, which controls most Afghan territory, provides safehaven for Usama Bin Ladin and his network. Because of the room which the Taliban gives him to operate, Bin Ladin has created a truly transnational terrorist enterprise, drawing on recruits from across Asia, Africa, and Europe, as well as the Middle East. The Taliban has also given logistic support to members of other terrorist organizations, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic group, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of militant organizations from Central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

II. Foundations for progress

I reiterate that the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia has serious implications, not only for the work that I do as Coordinator for Counterterrorism, but for our foreign policy towards South Asia in general. Because of the growing momentum behind this trend, and the threat that it poses to Americans and others in the region, terrorism is a top priority on the agenda whenever the President, Secretary Albright, or other officials sit down with their South Asian counterparts.

But when engaging other nations on these issues, we do not rely solely on periodic reminders of the threat of terrorism. We actively pursue - using a number of tools - our counterterrorism policy goals with all of the key countries in the region. And by no means do we believe it inevitable that the U.S. make enemies in the region, despite the spread of religious extremism. Most religious conservatives, despite a profound distrust of Western values and culture, are not involved in violent activities in general, much less specific anti-American violence.

The good news is that we believe we are laying solid foundations for progress on counterterrorism in South Asia. Unlike previous (and some ongoing) efforts to counter terrorism elsewhere, the primary countries we are concerned with in the

region are not hostile to the United States, and they do not sponsor terrorism directly. Allow me to describe for you our current bilateral, regional, and multilateral efforts to counter terrorism in South Asia, beginning with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan

We have taken a number of steps to address the Afghan Taliban's dangerous conduct. Last year the President issued Executive Order 13129, imposing sanctions on the Taliban. This action deepened the international isolation of the Taliban and limited its ability to support terrorist groups and activities. We also designated al-Qa'ida, based in territory controlled by the Taliban, as an FTO for the first time last year. In addition, in October 1999 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267, deploring the Taliban's continued provision of safehaven to Usama Bin Ladin and imposing mandatory sanctions prohibiting Taliban-controlled airline flights and freezing Taliban-controlled assets. These international sanctions will remain in place until the Taliban turns Bin Ladin over to a country where he can be brought to justice. Unfortunately, despite the increasing pressure, the Taliban has taken no positive steps towards this end. We will continue the pressure, and we are also exploring ways to exert further multilateral pressure on the Taliban.

When I spoke with the Taliban's Foreign Minister, I used this analogy to describe our approach: "If there's a criminal in your basement and you are aware that he has been conducting criminal activities from your house, even if you are not involved in the crimes you are responsible for them. In fact, your willingness to give him refuge makes you complicit in his actions, past and present." For this reason, we support sanctions on the Taliban, and we will hold them directly responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken by Bin Ladin while he is in Afghanistan.

We have tried to engage the Taliban in a serious dialogue, and some members of the Taliban have told us that they would like to improve relations with the U.S. They have even taken a few somewhat feeble measures to demonstrate their willingness to work with us, including cutting off Usama Bin Ladin's links with foreign media. However, we have seen no indication that they are ready to take the actions - on Bin Ladin and other issues - that would be necessary for normalization of U.S.-Afghan relations.

Pakistan

Any discussion of counterterrorism in South Asia must take Pakistan's role into account. As we stated in *Patterns*, Pakistan has a mixed record on terrorism. The Government of Pakistan has cooperated in some areas, particularly in arrests and renditions of terrorists and supporters of terrorism. In recent weeks, Pakistan has arrested a number of foreigners suspected of connections with terrorism, and the Government is expelling them.

Nevertheless, Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory. Numerous Kashmiri separatist groups and sectarian groups involved in terrorism use Pakistan as a base. Pakistan has also frequently acknowledged what it calls "moral and diplomatic support" for militants in Kashmir who employ violence and terrorism. Additionally, the U.S. has received continuing reports of Pakistani material support for some of these militants, including the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), a group that we have designated as an FTO. We have repeatedly asked Islamabad to pressure the Taliban to end terrorist training in Afghanistan, to interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons, and to block financial and logistical support to camps in Afghanistan. We have also urged Islamabad to address the issue of misuse of religious schools, and the Pakistanis have told us that they will attempt to reform and modernize these schools.

We are looking hard at current developments and continue to be intensively engaged with Pakistan on improving cooperation. President Clinton and, most recently, Under Secretary Pickering both traveled to Pakistan to reinforce tough messages on terrorism and other key concerns. Again, Afghanistan is not our enemy, and neither is Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan is a long-time friend and ally, albeit one that bears some responsibility for the current growth of terrorism in South Asia. That we are allies makes it all the more important that we cooperate to rid the area of terrorism.

Pakistan itself is also a victim of terrorism and understands that this threat undermines its own security. Aside from the people of Afghanistan, the citizens of Pakistan suffer the most because of the terrorism problem in South Asia. The Government of Pakistan also understands that the "Talibanization" - or radicalization - of their country and of the region is something to avoid. Pakistan seeks to build political and economic bridges with other Central Asian nations,

and the Pakistanis realize that the presence of terrorists in Afghanistan and South Asia is a serious obstacle to regional cooperation and stability.

While Pakistan's leaders understand these things, and our engagement is beginning to yield progress, there is a lot more to do. Our efforts must reflect our desire to help Pakistan confront this problem directly. To the extent that our policies help Pakistan keep the pressure on terrorists, and enable Pakistan to counter this threat in South Asia, then we will continue to move forward.

III. Building an international coalition

While we are focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are a number of other countries that have much at stake in our counterterrorism efforts in South Asia. These are the "front-line" states: the countries of Central Asia, as well as India, Russia, and China. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation with these states is crucial to the effort to rid South Asia of terrorism. We must make this a collective effort: after all, even if we are tough on terrorism, if other countries are not, we remain at risk. I envision the U.S. building an international coalition to confront terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. The foundations for such a coalition, including front-line states and others, are already in place.

Central Asia

The U.S. and Central Asian countries took a positive, tangible step last month when we hosted a Central Asia counterterrorism conference here in Washington. This conference yielded significant progress, and I can say with confidence that all the attendees left convinced that terrorism represents a growing challenge and a potential threat to all of Central and South Asia.

Specifically, participants agreed that to combat terrorism, individual nations and the international community must block financial, logistical, and moral support for organizations and people engaged in international terrorism. Representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the importance of increasing multilateral, regional, and bilateral cooperation and fostering political will in the international community to deny sanctuary and support to terrorists. The participants specifically denounced the Taliban for allowing terrorists to destabilize the region.

The conference also gave us the opportunity to stress to our partners in Central Asia that countering terrorism and protecting human rights and civil liberties are not inconsistent goals. In fact, the development of a healthy civil society and the strict preservation of the rule of law for all citizens are essential elements of a successful counterterrorism campaign. We look forward to following up on all of these issues in further consultations with Central Asian countries.

Other front-line states

Our bilateral relationships with India, Russia, and China are also crucial elements of our South Asia counterterrorism strategy. In February, the U.S.-India Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) met for the first time. This initiative reflects the shared interest of the U.S. and India in enhancing our joint efforts to counter international terrorism.

The working group is already playing an important role in reducing the terrorist threat in South Asia. For example, the group facilitated renewed opportunities for antiterrorism training of Indian officials and the establishment of a Legal Attache Office at Embassy New Delhi. These efforts will make cooperation in a future crisis much easier, while at the same time helping to prevent and deter the further spread of terrorism in South Asia.

Just as we are moving forward with India on counterterrorism issues, we have taken positive steps with regard to Russia. President Clinton and Russian President Putin recently agreed to form a bilateral working group on Afghanistan. The new working group should serve to improve diplomatic cooperation with Russia through multilateral and regional channels. This initiative will also complement ongoing efforts with Russia on counterterrorism objectives in South Asia. The first meeting of the working group will take place in the very near future and will focus on joint means to counter the threat emanating from Afghanistan.

Russia continues to confront terrorism on its own. Russia has legitimate interests in fighting terrorism, especially with regard to Islamist mujahidin movements in Central Asia. The Russians understand the destabilizing threat of terrorism, and therefore have come together with other governments in the region in joint efforts to combat terrorism. These include the recent announcement of the establishment of a CIS Counterterrorist Center based in Moscow with members from most of the former Soviet Union states, joint military exercises with

terrorist incident scenarios, and terrorism discussions among Central Asian countries and Shanghai Five members. To the extent that these initiatives reduce the terrorist threat in Central and South Asia, they will complement our policies in the region.

With regard to China, I look forward to developing a dialogue with Chinese officials on counterterrorism issues. The initial foundations for such a dialogue have already been established. We fully expect that the Chinese will be willing to work with us to eliminate the threat of terrorism from South Asia, especially in light of their continued interest in a secure and stable subcontinent. As long as Bin Ladin and other terrorists put such stability at risk, the Chinese will join with us in countering this threat.

IV. What next?

Now that I have described the causes of the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia, as well as what we are doing currently to counter this threat, let me address what I see as the next steps in U.S. counterterrorism policy in the region. Of course, in the short-term, the protection of American lives and interests remains our top priority. Also, we will continue to work to bring to justice those terrorists who have perpetrated terrorist acts, including Bin Ladin.

Political will

With regard to long-term goals in South Asia, I would like to reiterate that it ultimately takes political will on the part of other governments to confront terrorism. Our overarching approach to countering terrorism is to drain the "swamps" where terrorists are hiding. These swamps, where governments either are unable or unwilling to crack down on terrorists operating or living within their borders, are places where terrorists have room to move, plan, and raise funds. We use a variety of tools to drain these swamps, including international agreements, domestic legislation, vigorous law enforcement, designation of terrorist groups, and diplomatic isolation.

But in the long run - and we must think in terms of the long run when considering efforts to combat terrorism - it will be our political and diplomatic efforts that reduce the space in which terrorists can operate. When terrorists see that terrorism is not a legitimate means of expression, that it will not be tolerated by any country, and that perpetrators of terrorist acts will be punished, then they will think twice

about using it as their voice. But to demonstrate this to terrorists requires sustained political will on the part of our allies.

This is why our efforts to build an international coalition will be important. Sustained engagement with Pakistan and pressure on the Taliban must be geared towards neutralizing the terrorist threat in the region. And for this effort to be effective, our policy has to include consideration of what needs to happen more generally in the region. I am aware that overall U.S. policy in South Asia is not my responsibility; however, the broader political context affects my work directly.

Specifically, neutralizing terrorism in South Asia will necessitate lasting peace in Afghanistan as well as radical reform in Pakistan. With regard to the former, the most important counterterrorism policy in the Middle East has been the peace process and the progress made in bringing parties to the table. The Administration is not suggesting we have the will or national interest to make a comparable effort in Afghanistan, but we need to find a way forward. With regard to Pakistan, a country in deep political and financial crisis, continued emphasis on democratization and economic and social development will give Pakistan the tools it needs to counter terrorism effectively.

Resources

Along with political will on the part of South Asian countries, success is also contingent on the U.S. devoting sufficient resources towards our objectives. Support for the counterterrorism elements of the President's budget request is crucial to our efforts. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and the members of this committee for their continued support for these programs, especially the training and rewards programs.

One example is our Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which gives us access to other governments and improves their counterterrorism capabilities. Training foreign officials in bomb detection, hostage negotiation, and crisis management protects American lives overseas. In addition, as part of our ATA program we are completing a training curriculum for foreign judicial and financial officials designed to help these officials disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. The Administration requested \$38 million for ATA in FY 2001. I seek your support for full funding of the ATA program.

Another important counterterrorism initiative is the new Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which would hinder terrorists from easily crossing international borders. TIP would provide databases, communications equipment and training to help vulnerable nations identify terrorists trying to enter their territory or transit through their airports. We hope the Congress will approve the full \$4 million requested for TIP in FY 2001.

A final component of the President's counterterrorism budget request is funding for a Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST). Such a center would allow us to consolidate ATA and other security training at a location near Washington. At this facility, foreign officials could work more effectively with U.S. Government officials and security specialists, including Diplomatic Security agents and Capitol Hill police. Also, we would be able to eliminate long delays in providing such training, currently due to a shortage of time slots at facilities contracted to us by other agencies.

We need this 21st century facility for meeting 21st century terrorist threats. We need your support to make sure funding is included for CAST - as well as the President's full FY 2001 Foreign Operations request - when the Congress considers the final versions of FY 2001 appropriations bills.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, I remind you that our efforts to combat terrorism in South Asia and around the world start with support from Capitol Hill. Carefully calibrated counterterrorism legislation, sufficient resources, and public discourse in hearings such as these are key. Your support, coupled with the force of our sustained diplomatic and political efforts, will help us drain swamps in Afghanistan and wherever else states are not mustering the political will to confront terrorists.

We have had success over the last 20 years. This success can be attributed to our commitment to stay the course on a tough counterterrorism policy, and to rally international support. Applying diplomatic pressure, raising political will, levying sanctions - these actions have made many corners of this world intolerable for terrorists.

We must continue to stay the course, while adjusting to new geographic threats and the changing face of terrorism. We must maintain strong political will here on the Hill and in the

Administration to be tough on terrorism and push our allies to do the same.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your committee today. I look forward to answering any questions members of the committee may have.

Testimony of Alan W. Eastham
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
South Asia Bureau
U.S. Department of State
House International Relations Committee
July 12, 2000

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your committee today to discuss an issue of great significance to the United States: the new locus of global terrorism in South Asia. It is an honor to be appearing here today with my colleague the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Ambassador Sheehan, with whom the Bureau of South Asian Affairs has a close working relationship.

New Initiatives in Countering Terrorism

I'd like to begin my testimony on this subject by citing some of the more significant new initiatives that have been recently launched and which represent forward progress in our fight against terrorism:

- On Afghanistan, the UN Security Council in October 1999 unanimously passed Resolution 1267 which calls upon the Taliban to hand over Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to justice. As a result of this resolution, all flights of the Afghan national airline Ariana outside of Afghanistan have been halted, and Taliban financial assets frozen.
- With Russia and other countries, we have held consultations in recent weeks on the situation in Afghanistan.
- With India, we established a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. This Working Group first met in February of this year, and was given added impetus when President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee endorsed it in March. It brings together U.S. and Indian officials from all relevant agencies for discussion and action on the problem of terrorism.
- India has agreed to accept and work closely with a Legal Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi.

This will facilitate bilateral cooperation in law enforcement matters, including counter-terrorism.

- With Sri Lanka, a friendly government that has been fighting an insurgent group that employs the deadly weapon of terrorism, we have enjoyed excellent cooperation in a number of areas related to counter-terrorism. We designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997 and renewed that designation last year, and we have been providing ATA assistance to the Sri Lankan government since 1994. Following the December assassination attempt against President Kumaratunga, this assistance has included offers of training in VIP protection and post-blast investigation.

Ambassador Sheehan and his colleagues, who analyze and fight this problem every day, have rightly stressed the shifting locus of international terrorism to the South Asia region, as noted in this year's report on Patterns of International Terrorism. Though several of the South Asian countries face terrorist threats of one form or another, terrorists in Afghanistan pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests, lives, and property, and it is that country which will occupy the bulk of my testimony today. As Ambassador Sheehan has noted, this move did not happen overnight. It is, unfortunately, also a problem that will not go away overnight. I am confident, however, that actions we are taking and which we will take will have an impact over time, to reduce the human and economic costs of terrorism and to enable this part of the world eventually to recover.

I would like to begin by recalling several events over the past five years, which have had a direct effect on U.S. interests in the region. In March of 1995, two members of the staff of the U.S. Consulate General in Karachi were shot to death in an ambush in that city. Two and a half years later, in November 1997, four American businessmen and a Pakistani associate were killed in the same city in a similar incident. Both these murders continue to be under active investigation. These murders contributed to a climate of insecurity in Pakistan's largest city, certainly affecting U.S. investment and the business atmosphere, and the uncertainty persists with the murderers still at large.

In July of 1995, in Kashmir, several foreign tourists, including two Americans, were abducted while hiking in the mountains of that region. A Norwegian was murdered, and four others have been missing ever since, including one American. The group which kidnapped them demanded the release of a number of prisoners in Indian jails, one of who was Masood Azhar, formerly General Secretary of the group Harakat-ul-Ansar. As a result of the kidnapping and other information, the Secretary of State designated that organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997. And we continue to pursue this case vigorously on behalf of the spouse of the missing American, Donald Hutchings.

Subsequently, an Indian Airlines flight on its way from Kathmandu to New Delhi was hijacked in December 1999. The flight eventually landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where Azhar and two other prisoners were released from Indian detention on the demand of the hijackers. Azhar is currently in Pakistan. The whereabouts of the two other released prisoners is not known. The hijackers, who were last sighted by the press at the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan, have not been arrested.

On November 12, 1999, the U.S. Embassy and the American Center in Islamabad were attacked with rockets fired from parked vehicles. Fortunately only one person was injured in what could have been a very deadly attack.

I mention these events because they describe a pattern of terrorist attacks, which center on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir. There have been many others, against Indian interests in Kashmir, bombings in cities in India and Pakistan, and attacks against the Government of Sri Lanka by the LTTE (another designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). These include an LTTE assassination attempt in December against President Kumaratunga, which injured her eye and killed several other people. Without engaging in detailed analysis of the statistics and the patterns, it is clearly true that the trend is toward more, and more deadly, attacks against targets in South Asia.

With respect to Kashmir, and terrorism and violence in that region, we have strongly condemned acts of terrorism there, as we do everywhere in the world. It is unacceptable and reprehensible to engage in acts of terrorism such as the recent assassination of a member of the Kashmir State government, to cite one example. Nothing

can justify such deliberate and calculated murder, and those who commit such crimes should be brought to justice under the law. With respect to the larger political question of Kashmir, President Clinton, during his visit to South Asia in March, set out several principles, which he recommended to those, affected by the dispute. He called for restraint on all sides and respect for the line of control, to avoid dangerous military confrontations such as occurred in Kashmir last year. He called on the parties to reject violence. And, he urged India and Pakistan to renew their dialogue. These principles recognize that there is no military solution to the Kashmir problem, and that the Kashmiri people deserve to have their concerns addressed. These principles are, in our view, a sensible and practical prescription for addressing the dangerous Kashmir situation.

We hope the parties will recognize how eminently practical these principles are and that they will devote themselves to pursuing them. If they do, they will have the support and encouragement of the U.S., particularly toward a reduction of violence in the region.

But it is Afghanistan where the shifting locus of terrorism is most pronounced. This is a phenomenon, which has developed gradually over the past two decades, consequent to a twenty-year conflict, which largely began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Beginning in 1979, Afghans fought for almost ten years against the Soviet Army. The Afghan people suffered and sacrificed immensely in that conflict. Thousands took up arms. Up to a million Afghans died. Several million took refuge in Iran and Pakistan. A generation of young men grew up who knew no life but war. A generation of young women grew up who knew no life but suffering. The present generation knows nothing else. Most Afghan institutions were destroyed in a failed attempt to replace that, which was Afghan, with an alien and Soviet-dominated centralized state. Volunteers and other assistance to fight against the Soviet Army came from around the world. Opposition to the invasion of a small country by a large neighbor motivated some that came forward. Others opposed imposition of the communist system of the former Soviet Union. Still others came in the name of religion, supporting the faith of Islam against the atheistic, anti-religious policies of the USSR. Most brought with them ideas and tactics learned elsewhere, and in some cases that included hatred and terrorism.

Once the Red Army left Afghanistan, in early 1989, Afghans began what has been a 10-year civil war, which continues today. Sadly for the Afghans, the brutality and ruthlessness, which had been learned in fighting the Soviets, was easily applied to fighting other Afghans. So over these twenty years, the Afghan people, their country, their institutions, and their traditions have been devastated. Non-Afghan ideologies of conflict have been introduced. It is in the ashes of this conflict that terrorism has taken root.

What we are here to discuss today, Mr. Chairman, is one of the most dangerous effects of this generation of conflict. Several factors -- the breakdown of central authority in Afghanistan, the all-too-easy access to the tools of terrorism in the form of weapons and explosives, and the rise of ideologies in which violence against innocents is considered a legitimate tool -- have contributed to an increase in international terrorism. Centered in Afghanistan, this terrorism stretches its reach first to the region and second around the world.

The rise of Afghanistan's Taliban, and their rapid movement to assume de facto control over 80 percent of the land area of the country, was also a contributing factor. The Taliban had no previous experience in day-to-day administration and little experience with the outside world, with a strong ideological motivation based in Islam and the prevailing Pushtu-speaking society from which they derive, and with a strong need for support from any quarter. This made them dependent on extremely questionable outside sources of support, including elements such as Usama Bin Laden and, increasingly, the financial benefits of the narcotics trade. They have since demonstrated that they support and sympathize with bin Laden's goals, which include the removal of U.S. forces from the Gulf region. Despite our frequent requests, they have taken no significant steps to curtail his pursuit of those goals or his group's use of terrorist means to achieve them.

Twenty years of war has obviously not brought peace to Afghanistan. What is needed, in our view, is a sincere negotiating process among the Afghan parties toward a broad-based, inclusive government in that country which the United States and the rest of the international community

can accept and which can take up the cause of rebuilding it.

But until that happens - and it will -- we must take steps to defend ourselves, to stop the spread of terrorism, and to reverse the trends which have brought this hateful practice into being. Our policy is, broadly speaking, a combination of strong defense, diplomatic engagement, and positive inducements.

We have used all the resources at our disposal to defend ourselves. We demonstrated in August of 1998 that we were willing to use military force, and we continue to reserve the right to act in self-defense when appropriate. A year ago, the President imposed unilateral economic sanctions on the Taliban through an executive order. We actively supported the UN sanctions adopted in October and implemented in November of last year. We have engaged with the leaders in the sub-continent to take both practical and political steps against terrorism. We have offered rewards for the arrest of terrorists and appropriate assistance to governments to combat this menace, with the objective of containing and pushing back terrorism. And we have talked directly, repeatedly, with the Taliban leadership over the past four years about this subject.

One key factor in reducing terrorism, which Ambassador Sheehan has addressed, is the need for governments to realize that support for terrorist groups will backfire. These groups always - and I stress always -- pose a threat to stability, security and other real national interests of their hosts and patrons, no matter the short-term political advantage which might be seen from their activities against national adversaries. The Taliban in Afghanistan have yet to learn this lesson, and have allowed terrorists to take refuge there. We have heard from them repeatedly the argument that Usama bin Laden was in Afghanistan before they came and that they are obliged under their traditions to grant him sanctuary. We have heard from them repeatedly that they have denied him communications and otherwise restricted his activities. They have repeatedly suggested ways he might be tried in Afghanistan or in various other fora falling short of the requirements of the Security Council Resolution. And we have replied that those ideas are not good enough, that they do not meet the Security Council requirement, which is clear, concise, and which is in accord with due process of law. We will continue to

address this question through direct talks with Taliban representatives, both on our own part, with Pakistan, and with our other partners in the United Nations.

At the same time that we press the Taliban to take action against bin Laden, we have been careful, despite sanctions, to continue contributing to humanitarian programs of many types (schools, food aid, medical supplies, drought relief) which benefit the Afghan people. It is not their fault, and they should not suffer, because the people who control Afghanistan continue to harbor and support terrorism. The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and it has had a discernible positive impact on the lives of ordinary Afghans, particularly the most vulnerable groups, women and children, that it is intended to support. To further assist them, we have just announced \$4 million for drought relief.

You will ask me, no doubt, about Pakistan. Pakistan and we have worked closely together over the years, first in standing together during the Cold War, which culminated in close cooperation to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. We have also worked together against terrorism. Pakistan has cooperated with the US in arresting and bringing to justice a number of terrorists.

Pakistan wants, as does the US, to see peace and stability in Afghanistan -- after all, Afghanistan is Pakistan's neighbor. Pakistan has considerable influence in Afghanistan and with the Taliban. Pakistan has made known its view that the presence of Usama bin Laden is an obstacle to stability. And Pakistan makes the point that it does not control the Taliban. The goal of our continued diplomacy, is to urge Pakistan to use every aspect of the its influence with the Taliban to convince them to deal with this issue in the manner called for in UN Security Council resolution 1267 -- to render Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to justice. It is not only the American government, which is pursuing this outcome. It is the unanimous will of the international community as reflected in the Security Council. This remains high on our agenda with Pakistan.

We are also concerned at the problem of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan has taken some recent very welcome steps to address this problem. It has arrested and

rendered to the U.S. and other countries a number of persons wanted for terrorist crimes. It has announced that it is taking a close look at foreigners living in Pakistan to ensure that they are there for lawful and peaceful purposes.

Such steps are particularly welcome, because both Pakistani and U.S. interests have been targeted in Pakistan. Some terrorists and their supporters certainly continue to live in and move through Pakistan. This includes the HUM, which is designated as an FTO. We will continue to urge Pakistan to take action against such groups and to take all steps necessary to see that it does not become a safe haven or safe transit point for terrorists. We will do this in the same spirit of cooperation and pragmatism that has characterized our relations with Pakistan for many years. I hope we can take as an example one area where our common interests are clear, that of our counter-narcotics effort. Over 20 years, we have developed a good working relationship with the counter-narcotics agencies and have made together, steady progress against poppy cultivation and the heroin trade. Opium production in Pakistan has been reduced almost to zero--a goal we hope Pakistan will achieve in the next year. We would like to replicate this success in the area of counter-terrorism with Pakistan.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman let me once again thank you for this opportunity to come before your Committee to address this important subject. I would be happy to respond to your questions.

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ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
AND
MICHAEL SHEEHAN, COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATOR
ON THE
1999 ANNUAL "PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM" REPORT

Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good morning. Today we are releasing the State Department's Annual Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism. The story it tells this year is largely heartening, one of terrorists caught, plots thwarted and lives saved, which means that worldwide casualties fell sharply; and the number of Americans killed, while still entirely unacceptable, was the lowest in seven years.

The overall number of terrorist incidents did rise by more than 40 percent, reversing what had been a welcome trend. But this reflected many non-lethal attacks conducted in response to the capture by Turkish authorities of PKK terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan. That marked a major victory in the fight against terrorism, and it meant that even this one statistical step backward signified a larger stride forward.

But the picture for 1999 easily could have been composed of more shadow than light. Imagine if suspected Algerian terrorist Ahmed Ressam had managed to carry out a bombing when he sought to enter the United States in December from Canada. Or if the al-Qaida terrorist network had acted on its plans to attack Americans during millennium celebrations in Jordan.

And that's why we can not relax our global full court press against terror, and it's why I have made this a top personal priority as Secretary of State, and why we will continue to work with other countries that want to make progress – not by pointing fingers, but by linking arms.

This year's report also reflects changes in the nature of our common foe. We are seeing a shift from well-organized local groups supported by state sponsors to more far-flung and loosely structured webs of terror. We're detecting a shift from state funding to private sponsorship in criminal enterprises, such as blackmail and trafficking in drugs, guns and even human beings. And we're seeing an eastward shift in the terrorism center of gravity from the Middle East to South Asia, particularly Afghanistan.

The Washington Times

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AFGHANISTAN

Seat of terrorism shifts to South Asia

★ TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2000

By Ben Barber
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The State Department says the home base of world terrorism has shifted from the Middle East to South Asia, where Afghanistan serves as the primary safe haven for terrorists and Pakistan has supported violence in Kashmir.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said that U.S. counter-terrorist activities had thwarted many attacks, and that as a result, U.S. terrorism deaths fell to only five in 1999.

She warned that a proposed \$2 billion congressional cut in the administration's foreign affairs budget request would undermine anti-terrorism efforts.

"We are seeing an eastward shift in terrorism's center of gravity, from the Middle East to South Asia, particularly Afghanistan," Mrs. Albright told reporters yesterday.

In the annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report released yesterday, the State Department said the same seven nations that have been listed since 1993 were again named "state sponsors of terrorism": Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.

However, the report noted a shift in the way terrorism works: Aside from moving east to Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is breaking down into small networks of transnational groups not directly sponsored by states and now fueled by religion and ideology rather than politics.

Pakistan, a staunchly pro-American ally during the Cold War, was not placed on the list of state sponsors. Such a move would have cut off all U.S. aid and required the United States to block World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans to the nearly bankrupt country.

"The United States has repeatedly asked Islamabad to end support to elements that conduct terrorist training in Afghanistan, to

interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons, and to block financial and logistic support to camps in Afghanistan," the report said.

"In addition, the United States has urged Islamabad to close certain madrassas or 'religious' schools, that actually serve as conduits for terrorism" and to end "official support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism such as the Harakat ul-Mujahideen.

Pakistan reacted swiftly to the accusations of terrorism, blaming India for "state terrorism" in Kashmir.

"Pakistan is irrevocably opposed to terrorism in all its forms," said a government spokesman yesterday.

A spokesman for Dawa-wal-Irshad, whose militant wing, Lashkar-e-Taiba is the largest fighting in Indian-controlled Kashmir, said Washington had no right to condemn organizations waging "jihad," or holy war against India.

The State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, said yesterday that militants are considered terrorists and not "freedom fighters" if they target noncombatants or soldiers in their barracks.

Pakistan's military government headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and previous Pakistani governments, have cooperated with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts by extraditing important suspects such as World Trade Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Ahmed Yousef in 1995.

Pakistan also sent U.S. citizen Khalil Deek to Jordan several months ago to stand trial for a plot by suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden to attack Americans.


Such cooperation mitigates U.S. anger at Pakistan for allowing groups listed in the report as terrorists to operate openly and to receive official praise for fighting to oust India from its portion of the divided Kashmir.

Afghanistan, which shelters bin Laden and hosts training camps for Islamic fighters from several countries, was not listed as a state sponsor because the United States does not recognize the Afghan Taliban government, which has relations with only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Mrs. Albright said although "the number of terrorist incidents did rise by more than 40 percent," in 1999, only five Americans died — three in Colombia and two in Rwanda — the lowest toll in seven years, because of "terrorists caught, plots thwarted."

SPONSORS OF TERROR

The State Department reported new concerns about state terrorism in South Asia yesterday but did not change its list of sponsors of terrorism.



The Washington Times