Senate Report 110-444 - APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

[Senate Report 110-444]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

Calendar No. 895
110th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 110-444

======================================================================

APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

_______

August 1, 2008.--Ordered to be printed

_______

Mr. Baucus, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany S.J. Res. 41]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint
resolution (S.J. Res. 41) approving the renewal of import
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do
pass.

CONTENTS

Page
I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee.........................2
A. Report of the Committee on Finance.................... 2
B. Background............................................ 2
1. The Government of Burma........................... 2
2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003..... 2
3. Expedited Procedures for Renewing the Import
Restrictions Contained in the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003............................ 3
4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 41........... 4
5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the
Trade Sanctions Against Burma.................... 4
6. Additional International Sanctions Against Burma.. 9
II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution.........................10
III.Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters......11

IV. Changes in Existing Law..........................................12

I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Report of the Committee on Finance

B. Background

1. The Government of Burma

Burma is governed by the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), which is a military junta that took power in
September 1988. Since taking power, the junta has violently
suppressed pro-democracy movements. International human rights
organizations and the U.S. Department of State have reported a
pattern of SPDC policies that include the suppression of
political and civil liberties, jailing of political prisoners,
widespread physical abuses, forced relocation of civilians,
conscription of civilians--including children--into military
services, and conscription of thousands of civilians for work
on economic projects.
In recent years, the SPDC has continued to suppress
political opponents. On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of
several hundred people assaulted the opposition National League
for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her
supporters near Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city. The
attackers were members of the United Solidarity Development
Association (USDA), a mass organization affiliated with the
SDPC. Some NLD supporters were killed, and other NLD leaders
were taken into custody. Arrests and disappearances of
political activists continue. The military regime continues to
be hostile to all forms of political opposition. In May 2008,
the Burmese Government extended the house arrest of Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi for another year.
Burma's human rights conditions further deteriorated in
2007 and 2008. In September 2007, the Burmese Government
forcibly restrained Buddhist monks who were demonstrating
against poor economic conditions in Burma. In May 2008, Cyclone
Nargis struck Burma, and left thousands of Burmese people dead,
injured, or homeless. After the cyclone, the government refused
to allow the speedy entry of international humanitarian aid.

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

On June 4, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
2003 (the Act) was introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) in
response to the May 30 attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. A
revised version of the legislation was introduced in the Senate
(S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215, passed
the Senate with an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a recorded
vote of 97-1. In the House, H.R. 2330 passed with an amendment
on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote of 418-2, 1 Present. The
Senate then passed the House-passed version of H.R. 2330
without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a recorded vote of 94-1.
The legislation was presented to the President on July 22,
2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28, 2003
(Pub. L. 108-61).
The Act bans the importation of any article that is a
product of Burma. This ban affects mainly imports of Burmese
textiles and garments. The Act allows the President to lift
these import restrictions if he certifies to Congress that (1)
the SPDC has made substantial progress to end human rights
violations, including rapes, and no longer systematically
violates workers' rights, including forced and child labor, and
conscription of child-soldiers; (2) the SPDC has made
substantial progress toward implementing a democratic
government, including by releasing political prisoners,
allowing freedom of speech, press, association, and religion,
and reached agreement with the NLD for a civilian government
chosen through democratic elections; and (3) Burma has not been
designated as a country that has failed to abide by its
obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and
take other effective counternarcotics measures. Under the Act,
the import ban must be renewed on a yearly basis. In addition
to the import ban, the Act freezes Burmese assets in the United
States and requires the United States to oppose aid to Burma by
international financial institutions.
As originally enacted, section 9(a)(1) of the Act limited
the imposition of import restrictions to a maximum of 3 years.
In 2006, a joint resolution was introduced to permit the
renewal of import restrictions for a maximum of 6 years;
specifically, H.J. Res. 86 was introduced in the House on May
19, 2006, and S.J. Res. 38 was introduced in the Senate on May
26, 2006. The House passed H.J. Res. 86 on July 11, 2006, by
voice vote. H.J. Res. 86 was placed on the Senate calendar on
July 26, 2006, and passed without amendment by voice vote. The
President signed the joint resolution on August 1, 2006 (Pub.
L. 109-251).
Pursuant to section 9(b) of the Act, the import ban will
expire after 1 year unless a new joint resolution (renewal
resolution) approving a 1-year renewal of the import ban is
enacted into law prior to the anniversary of the date of
enactment of the Act. The current import ban, which expired on
July 28, 2008, was signed into law by the President on August
1, 2007 (H.J. Res. 44; Pub. L. 110-52).
S.J. Res. 41 renews the import ban for another year, in
accordance with the Act. A similar resolution (H.J. Res. 93),
which included budgetary offsets, was passed by the House on
July 23, 2008, by voice vote. H.J. Res. 93 was placed on the
Senate Calendar on July 24, 2008, and passed by Unanimous
Consent. The President signed H.J. Res. 93 on July 29, 2008
(Pub. L. No. 110-287), thus extending the import ban until July
28, 2009.

3. Expedited procedures for renewing the import restrictions contained
in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

Section 9(c)(2)(B) of the Act applies the expedited
procedures set forth in section 152 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (b), (c), (d), (e),
and (f)), to Committee and floor consideration of a joint
resolution to renew the import ban for another year.
Pursuant to those procedures, a renewal resolution
introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee.
The Committee has 30 days to consider and report the
resolution, not counting any day excluded under section 154(b)
of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 154(b) excludes Saturdays and
Sundays when either House is not in session, any day during
which either House is adjourned for more than 3 days, and any
day while Congress is adjourned sine die. If the Committee does
not report the resolution within that period, it is in order
for any Member favoring the resolution to move to discharge the
Committee from further consideration of the resolution. A
renewal resolution is not amendable.
In this case, S.J. Res. 41 was introduced in the Senate,
and the Committee reported the Senate measure, before receipt
of H.J. Res. 93 from the House. Thus, upon receipt of the
House-passed measure the House resolution was placed on the
Senate calendar, and the Committee continued to report the
Senate measure. After the Committee reported the Senate
measure, the vote on passage in the Senate was on the House-
passed measure.

4. Committee consideration of S.J. Res. 41

The Committee considered S.J. Res. 41 in open executive
session on July 23, 2008. The Committee voted unanimously, and
without amendment, to favorably report S.J. Res. 41.
With a quorum present, the Committee approved S.J. Res. 41
by unanimous voice vote.
The Chairman reported the resolution to the Senate on July
23, 2008.

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions
Against Burma

On May 28, 2008, the U.S. Department of State submitted to
Congress a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma,
as required by section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003. At the request of the Chairman, that
report was made a part of the record of the Committee's
consideration of S.J. Res. 41. The State Department report is
reprinted below:

U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, May 23, 2008.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The enclosed report reviews measures to
promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the
effectiveness of the trade provisions in the Burmese Freedom
and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) to improve conditions
in Burma and advance U.S. policy objectives. This report also
discusses the importance of maintaining the import ban
contained in the Act.
We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not
hesitate to contact us if we may be of further assistance in
this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosures:
As stated.

Report on U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Burma May 2007-April 2008

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In view of the impending expiration of the import ban
contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,
P.L. 108-61 (the BFDA), as amended, this report reviews
bilateral and multilateral measures to promote human rights and
democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the Act's
trade provisions relative to the improvement of conditions in
Burma and the furtherance of U.S. policy objectives.
During this reporting period the United States
significantly tightened financial sanctions targeting the
leaders and supporters of the Burmese regime. U.S. economic
sanctions have increased pressure on the Burmese junta and its
supporters, as restrictions on their ability to access the U.S.
financial system have made it more difficult for them to do
business in U.S. dollars. The European Union, Australia, and
Canada also expanded targeted sanctions on the Burmese regime
as well. Despite these measures, expanding trade with countries
in the region and growing income from the exploration and
exploitation of Burma's natural gas reserves provided the
regime the economic means to maintain its grip on power and to
continue to impose its self-styled ``roadmap to democracy,'' a
process designed to lend a veneer of democratic legitimacy to
the perpetuation of authoritarian military rule. In light of
the regime's crackdown on peaceful protestors in August and
September 2007, and its continued imposition of its
illegitimate constitutional process on the Burmese people, the
State Department supports a renewal resolution to maintain the
import ban.
At the end of this reporting period, Tropical Cyclone
Nargis struck Burma. Following this natural disaster, the
Treasury Department issued a general license authorizing the
exportation or reexportation of financial services to Burma in
support of not-for-profit humanitarian or religious activities.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

During the reporting period, the United States intensified
its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Burma
through diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in
Southeast Asia and beyond, by supporting U.N. Security Council
action on Burma, by tightening targeted sanctions on the
Burmese leadership and its supporters, and through support to
the Burmese democracy movement. Following the Burmese regime's
crackdown on peaceful protestors in August and September 2007,
the United States used the increased attention on Burma to push
for international pressure on the Burmese regime to begin a
dialogue with representatives of democratic and ethnic minority
groups on a transition to democracy. Senior U.S. officials
encouraged their counterparts in the EU, China, India, Japan,
South Korea, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the U.N. Security Council, to press the
regime to take concrete and credible actions toward the
democratic transition it claims to want. The U.S. Embassy in
Rangoon remained in regular contact with representatives of
civil society, pro-democracy activists, and ethnic minority
groups, as well as urging Burmese officials at every
opportunity to begin an inclusive political dialogue, release
political prisoners, and respect human rights. The State
Department regularly issued statements highlighting the
regime's human rights abuses and calling for a genuine
dialogue.
The United States worked closely with like-minded members
of the U.N. Security Council to address the threats posed to
regional security by the situation in Burma. On October 11,
2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential
Statement that expressed support for the Secretary General's
``good offices'' mission, deplored the regime's use of violence
against peaceful demonstrators, and highlighted the importance
of the release of political prisoners and the creation of a
dialogue among all relevant parties. The Security Council
received regular briefings from U.N. Special Advisor on Burma,
Ibrahim Gambari.
On September 25, 2007, President Bush announced that the
United States would tighten U.S. sanctions against Burma, and
the Treasury Department subsequently imposed financial
sanctions on 14 regime leaders. On October 18, 2007, President
Bush signed Executive Order 13448 authorizing targeted
sanctions on, amongothers, the financial and material
supporters of the regime, and the Treasury Department blocked the
property and interests in property of senior regime leaders. To date,
the United States has sanctioned 25 senior regime officials, as well as
five financial supporters of the regime and 27 of their companies;
several other individuals, including spouses and dependent children of
regime officials and individuals involved in the financial networks of
regime supporters, have also been sanctioned. On April 30, 2008,
President Bush signed a new Executive Order blocking property and
interests in property of three Burmese entities and authorizing
additional designations of, among others, persons determined to be
owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, the Government of Burma
or an official or officials of the Government of Burma.
The Treasury Department recently issued a general license
authorizing the exportation or reexportation of financial
services to Burma in support of not-for-profit humanitarian or
religious activities in Burma by any organization or
individual, for a period of 120 days, with the exceptions of
the Government of Burma and persons blocked under the Burma
sanctions program. In addition, Treasury issued a second
general license authorizing unlimited noncommercial, personal
remittances to family and friends in Burma. These licenses
allow transfers to be made utilizing the services of blocked
financial institutions in Burma, provided the transfers are
made through third-country banks and that debits or credits are
not made to any blocked account on the books of a U.S.
financial institution.
Many in the international community joined the United
States in condemning the regime's crackdown. On September 27,
2007, Singapore, as Chair of ASEAN issued a statement on behalf
of ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressing their ``revulsion'' at
the Burmese generals' use of violence against the Burmese
people. EU Foreign Ministers joined Secretary Rice in issuing a
joint statement condemning the crackdown and calling for a
transition to democracy. In October 2007, EU Foreign Ministers
announced additional restrictions on certain trade and
investment in Burma. The same month Australia announced that it
would freeze the assets and block any transactions associated
with key regime leaders. In December 2007, Canada announced
broad economic sanctions against Burma, including a freeze of
the assets of designated individuals, a ban on the exportation
and importation of goods to and from Burma, a ban on new
investment, and a ban on the export of financial services. EU
Foreign Ministers renewed EU sanctions on Burma on April 29 and
indicated their readiness to introduce further restrictive
measures in light of developments in Burma.
The U.N. continued its efforts to promote human rights and
national reconciliation in Burma. Despite Special Advisor
Gambari's visits to Burma in September and November 2007, and
March 2008, the regime failed to respond to his requests to
release political prisoners and begin a genuine dialogue. U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Paulo Sergio Pinheiro
visited Burma in November 2007 and subsequently issued a report
that was highly critical of both the regime's crackdown and its
self-styled ``roadmap to democracy.'' On March 28, 2008, the
U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning Burma
for ``systematic violations'' of human rights. It also extended
the mandate for the Special Rapporteur on Burma, appointing
Tomas Ojea Quintana of Argentina to replace Pinheiro after his
term had ended.

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SITUATION IN BURMA

U.S. economic sanctions have increased pressure on the
Burmese junta and its supporters, as restrictions on their
ability to access the U.S. financial system have made it more
difficult for them to do business in U.S. dollars. Influential
businessmen in Rangoon with connections to the regime
increasingly have complained to the regime and to others about
the effects that financial sanctions have had on their business
operations and personal lives. For example, after the issuance
of E.O. 13448, Air Bagan, an airline owned by regime supporter
Tay Za, suspended flights to Singapore when certain financial
institutions decided to terminate their business relationships
with a company so closely affiliated with the regime. The
Treasury Department blocked 86 transactions involving Burmese
entities totaling approximately $1.8 million between April 2007
and April 2008. Over the same period, the Treasury Department
issued 152 licenses. The regime has also announced its
intention to authorize the use of Singaporean and Chinese
currencies for transactions requiring foreign currency,
apparently due to difficulties in making such transactions in
U.S. dollars. Increased political and economicpressure after
the crackdown notwithstanding, the Burmese regime has given no
indication that it is open 10 meaningful democratization.
Despite the tightening of sanctions, growing trade with
countries in the region and increased income from the
exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits
provided the regime the economic means to maintain a firm grip
on power. Burma's oil and natural gas revenues doubled in 2006-
07 from just over $1 billion the previous year to over $2
billion, due primarily to rising global prices rather than any
increase in output. According to Burma's Ministry of Commerce,
its total trade reached $8.7 billion in 2007, with exports of
$5.9 billion and imports of $2.7 billion, a record high since
the regime took power. In addition to natural gas and oil,
Burma's major exports included agricultural products, timber,
and minerals. Thailand was Burma's leading trade partner ($3
billion in total bilateral trade), followed by Singapore ($1.66
billion), China ($1 billion), and India ($744 million).
Its increased income notwithstanding, the regime's
corruption and economic mismanagement have resulted in a
decreasing quality of life for the average Burmese citizen.
Official spending on health and education equals only 1.4
percent of GDP. Burma has the fourth highest infant mortality
in the world. Malaria, a leading cause of morbidity and
mortality in Burma, results four times the deaths in Burma than
in any other country in the region. Forty percent of Burma's
population is believed to be infected with tuberculosis. Due to
poor public health administration, drug resistance to malaria
and tuberculosis treatments is on the rise in Burma. As a
result of continued military offensives against civilians in
ethnic minority areas, particularly in eastern Burma, it is
estimated there were at least 500,000 internally displaced
persons in Burma at the end of 2007.
Respect for human rights in Burma deteriorated sharply
during this reporting period. The regime acknowledged that 15
persons died during its crackdown on peaceful protestors in
August and September 2007. While U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro estimated that the
regime killed at least 30 persons. Some human rights groups
estimated that the actual death toll was much higher. During
and after the crackdown, the regime detained more than 3,000
persons suspected of participating in the demonstrations and
many were held indefinitely and without charges. At the end of
April 2008, over 1,800 political prisoners remained in custody.
In addition to deaths and arbitrary detentions, many Burmese
monks were beaten, and several monasteries were raided,
ransacked, and closed in retribution for their monks'
involvement in the September protest marches. Harassment and
violent attacks on civic activists continued throughout the
reporting period, as did arbitrary detention, prosecution, and
punishment of persons for engaging in legitimate political
activities.
The Burmese regime continued to impose its self-styled
``roadmap to democracy,'' despite its lack of popular support,
by announcing on February 9 a referendum on its draft
constitution. The draft constitution was written in secret by a
hand-picked committee that excluded input from democratic
groups and ignored ethnic minority recommendations. The
Referendum Law, like other junta decrees, criminalized
criticism of the constitution and referendum, making it
punishable by up to three years in prison. The National League
for Democracy and other democratic organizations have denounced
the regime's draft constitution, which is designed to
perpetuate authoritarian military rule, and the unfair manner
in which the referendum is being conducted.

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON BROADER U.S. INTERESTS

Intensified sanctions targeting regime leaders and their
supporters send a clear signal to the regime and to the Burmese
people that the United States supports a transition to
democracy. The vast majority of individuals in the Burmese
democracy movement support U.S. sanctions. However, some
academics and exiled Burmese have questioned whether U.S.
sanctions have any chance of success without the participation
of Burma's major trading partners, including China, India,
ASEAN members, and other countries in the region.
The trade-related and financial sanctions implemented
pursuant to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and
Executive Orders 13310 and 13448 have had a limited impact on
U.S. relations with other nations. Although some foreign
businesses and their representative embassies complained about
the impact ofsanctions, most acknowledge that they are not
investing due to the difficult operating environment and overall poor
economic climate created by the regime.

CONCLUSION

Despite the increased international criticism of the
Burmese regime's repression following the crackdown of August
and September 2007, the generals ruling Burma continue to
ignore the desire of the Burmese people for democracy and
respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the Administration's
support for Burma's democracy movement remains firm. The United
States continues to work within the U.N. and with other
countries in Southeast Asia and beyond to promote a peaceful
transition to democracy. Economic sanctions remain an important
tool for exerting pressure on the regime to respect the will of
the Burmese people and to cooperate with the international
community's efforts to facilitate a genuine dialogue with
democratic and ethnic minority representatives on a transition
to democracy. In light of the crackdown and the regime's
continued imposition of its illegitimate constitutional process
on the Burmese people, failure to renew the import ban in the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act would send Burma's ruling
generals the wrong message. The State Department supports a
renewal resolution to maintain the import ban.

6. Additional international sanctions against Burma

In recent months, the international community has protested
the SPDC's use of violence to restrain protests by Buddhist
monks, and its slow response to Cyclone Nargis. In May 2008,
the European Union imposed import sanctions against Burmese
gems, timber, and metal, and expanded financial and travel
sanctions on SPDC and other Burmese officials. Also in May
2008, the United Nations called on the Burmese Government to
hold a free and fair constitutional referendum, and to allow
greater humanitarian aid to enter the country. On October 18,
2007, the House introduced a bill to strengthen sanctions
against Burma (H.R. 3890). The Senate passed an amended version
of that bill on December 19, 2007. After resolving differences
with the Senate, the House passed the ``Tom Lantos Block
Burmese JADE (Juntas Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008''
(JADE Act) on July 15, 2008 by voice vote. On July 22, 2008,
the Senate passed the JADE Act by Unanimous Consent. The
President signed the JADE Act on July 29, 2008 (Pub. L. No.
110-286). The JADE Act expands import sanctions on Burma, and
imposes additional financial and visa sanctions on members of
the SPDC or USDA, and their immediate family members.

II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

S.J. Res. 41--A joint resolution approving the renewal of import
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
of 2003

Summary: S.J. Res. 41 would renew for one year the ban on
all imports from Burma. The ban was originally enacted as the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-61)
and was set to expire on July 28, 2004. The ban has
subsequently been renewed four times, most recently in Public
Law 110-52, through its current expiration date of July 28,
2008. The original legislation limited renewals of the ban to a
total of three years. The third renewal resolution increased
that limit to six years, thereby allowing three additional one-
year bans.
CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports from
Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in
2008 and by about $2 million in 2009, with no effect
thereafter. CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 41 would not
affect federal spending.
Under S.J. Res. 41, the President could lift the import
restrictions if the State Peace and Development Council, the
military regime of Burma, has made substantial and measurable
progress to end violations of human rights, implemented a
democratic government, and met its obligations under
international counter-narcotics agreements. The President also
would have the authority to terminate the restrictions upon the
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or
waive them in the national interest.
By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 41
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot estimate the cost of
those mandates because information on the value of lost profits
to importers resulting from the ban is not available. Thus, CBO
cannot determine whether the aggregate direct cost of the
mandates would exceed the annual threshold for private-sector
mandates established by UMRA ($136 million in 2008, adjusted
annually for inflation). CBO has also determined that S.J. Res.
41 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S.J. Res. 41 is shown in the following
table.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues.............................................. * -2 0 0 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* = Loss of less than $500,000.

Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 41, the President would
have the authority to lift or waive the ban imposed by the
resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the President
would not exercise this authority before the termination of the
one-year ban.
Based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission
on recent U.S. imports from Burma and CBO's most recent
forecast of total U.S. imports, CBO estimates that enacting
S.J. Res. 41 would reduce federal revenues by less than
$500,000 in 2008 and by about $2 million in 2009, net of income
and payroll tax offsets.
In years just before the import ban first went into effect,
over half of all U.S. imports from Burma were knitted or
crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The remaining imports
included apparel items not knitted or crocheted, certain types
of fish and crustaceans, goods made of wood, certain precious
and semiprecious stones and metals, and woven fabrics and
tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 percent of duties
collected on these imports came from knitted and crocheted
articles. CBO assumes that most of the banned imports would be
replaced with imports from other countries.
The President could remove the ban on imports upon the
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if
he were to determine and notify the Congress that to do so is
in the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S.
companies would be allowed to resume importation of goods
produced, manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. If such
an action were taken during the 2008-2009 period, the impact on
federal revenues would be reduced accordingly.
Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments:
CBO has determined that S.J. Res. 41 contains no
intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose
no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimated impact on the private sector: By renewing the ban
on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 41 would impose private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA. CBO cannot estimate the
cost of those mandates because information on the value of lost
profits to importers resulting from the ban is not available.
Thus, CBO cannot determine whether the aggregate direct cost of
the mandates would exceed the annual threshold for private-
sector mandates established by UMRA ($136 million in 2008,
adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimate prepared by: Federal revenues: Zachary Epstein.
Impact on state, local, and tribal governments: Neil Hood.
Impact on the private sector: Dang Du and MarDestinee C. Perez.
Estimate approved by: G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant
Director for Tax Analysis.

III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states
that the resolution will not significantly regulate any
individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy
of individuals, and will result in no significant additional
paperwork.
The following information is provided in accordance with
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
(Pub. L. No. 104-04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions
of S.J. Res. 41 as approved by the Committee on July 23, 2008.
In accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. No. 104-04, the
Committee has determined that the bill contains no
intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not
affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules
of the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law
made by S.J. Res. 41, as ordered reported.